FIRST

REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY,

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE

CARNATIC,

AND OF

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THOSE PARTS.

Printed in the Year M.DCC.LXXXI.

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POSSESSIONS IN THOSE PARTS

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH

AND OF

CANADA

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE

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COMMITTEE OF SECRECY.

LONDON

KEBOCK

1781

FIRST REPORT

FROM THE COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, &c.

The Committee of Secrecy, appointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the War that now ſubſiſts in the Carnatic, and of the preſent Condition of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts, and to report the ſame to the Houſe, with their Obſervations thereupon, having, ſince the Day of their Appointment, employed themſelves with the utmoſt Diligence in peruſing the Records of the Eaſt India Company, and ſeveral other Papers which they had ordered to be laid before them, and in examining ſuch Witneſſes as were likely to afford them Information, and to throw Light on the ſeveral Objects of their Enquiry; they will now report to the Houſe the Reſult of their Proceedings in the following Manner:

THEY will firſt give the Houſe an Account of the Irruption of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic; of the military Tranſactions that happened in Conſequence thereof; and of the Meaſures that were taken by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and by Sir Edward Hughes, Commander of His Majeſty's Ships in thoſe Seas, upon their receiving Information of Hyder Ally's Irruption; and of the Defeat of the Troops under the Command of Colonels Fletcher and Baillie.

And as it impoſſible fully to judge of the Conduct of the Company's Servants, as far as it may be ſuppoſed to have had any Influence on theſe Tranſactions, without being firſt informed of the Intelligence they received of Hyder Ally's Intentions to invade the Carnatic, Your Committee will, in the next Place, ſtate to the Houſe the Intelligence which the Company's Servants appear to have received of the hoſtile Intentions of that Prince, and of his Preparations to make War on the Britiſh Poſſeſſions; and your Committee will then proceed to report the Conduct of the Company's Servants, as far as it appears to have had any Influence on theſe Tranſactions, or to have been the Cauſe of the Misfortunes that have lately happened, under the following Heads:

MILITARY,
POLITICAL,
REVENUE.

Although Your Committee are not as yet prepared to give full Information to the Houſe upon all theſe different Branches of Enquiry, they have thought fit not to let the

Seſſion come to a Concluſion without bringing down a Report of what they have already prepared.

And Your Committee find, as well by the Diſpatches received by the Court of Directors from their Servants in India, as by Letters received by the Lords of the Admiralty, by His Majeſty's Principal Secretaries of State, and by the Secretary at War, from His Majeſty's Officers in thoſe Parts, That the various Reports which had for ſome Time prevailed of the hoſtile Movements and Preparations made by Hyder Ally Khan, for the declared Purpoſe of invading the Carnatic, were verified by certain Intelligence, received at Fort St. George on and after the 23d of July 1780, that Part of his Cavalry had actually entered the Province in different Places, and that One Body, after deſtroying the Village of Conjeveram, had penetrated quite acroſs the Peninſula as far as Porto Novo (a Sea Port a little to the Southward of Cuddalore) and had plundered it, and that Hyder himſelf ſoon followed with his whole Army through the Paſs of Changama.

See Letter from Select Committee of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, 15 October 1780.

It appears that the Alarm was now poured in from all Sides, and almoſt every Frontier of the Carnatic was at once attacked or threatened by the Enemy's Horſe; nor were the Northern Circars without reaſonable Apprehenſions of being over-run by detached Parties of them.

Select Committee, July 24, 25, 26.

And your Committee find, That theſe Accounts were generally accompanied by Repreſentations from the different Garriſons, of the Danger to which they were expoſed, of falling a Sacrifice to the Invader, unleſs they had a material and ſpeedy Supply of Men and Stores.

And it appears, That Hyder's Power was repreſented as the more formidable, not only from the Number of his own Troops, which, by Reports, amounted to near One hundred thouſand Men, but from his being joined by a conſiderable Body of Europeans under Monſieur Lally, with whom he was ſaid to confer on all Occaſions, and by whom he was ſtimulated to ſuch determined Enmity againſt the Engliſh, as to give up his firſt Intention of writing to the Governor of Madras.—And it appears, that News being alſo then ſaid to be brought from Mauritius, of the French Superiority of Force and Succeſs in Europe, and of their Intention of ſending to the Coaſt a conſiderable Reinforcement of Troops, and Supply of military Stores, Hyder was ſaid to have expreſſed his Pleaſure at theſe Tidings, and to have repeated his Determination "to "ruin the Carnatic, and to chaſtiſe the Engliſh. He had tried them already, and "knew them well; they had no Conduct; and even now, although he had aſſembled "ſo great a Force to enter into their Country, they had not manifeſted the leaſt Glimmering of Ability, and therefore now was the Time to go againſt them."

It was ſaid, he had given particular Orders that no Attack ſhould be made on the Tanjore Country; but his Deſign was either to ſurprize Madras, with the Situation of which he was well acquainted, or to aſſault Arcot, or to go firſt to Pondicherry, and after fortifying it, to proceed to the Siege of the Capital of the Carnatic—That he had received Letters from Poonah, which encouraged him to invade the Carnatic, and aſſured him, that the Peſhwa would on his Part alſo proſecute the War after the Rains ſhould be over.

And Your Committee find, That Mr. Whitehill was now Preſident and Governor of Fort St. George, and that Mr. Smith, Mr. Johnſon, and Sir Hector Munro, compoſed the Select Committee; which being aſſembled on the 24th of July, and the following Days, in Conſultation, on the Intelligence lately brought to them, reſolved, "That, as "beyond all Doubt, Hyder had actually committed Hoſtilities againſt the Carnatic, "the moſt expeditious Means ſhould be taken for aſſembling an Army in the Field, "and for this Purpoſe the following Troops were, by the Commander in Chief, recommended to be immediately ordered to hold themſelves in readineſs to march at "a Moment's Warning," His Majeſty's 73d Regiment at Poonamakee, 1ſt Battalion, One Regiment at Vellore—the Troops cantoned at Pondicherry, conſiſting of One Battalion of Europeans, and 4 Battalions of Sepoys—15th Battalion of Sepoys at Trichinopoly—21ſt D° of D° at Madras—Grenadiers of the European Battalion at D°—The Artillery at the Mount—At the ſame Time abſent Officers were directed to join their Corps, Draft and Carriage Bullocks were ordered to be got in Readineſs, and all neceſſary Stores to be prepared:

Letters were wrote to Bengal, to Bombay, to Tellicherry, to the Nabob of Arcot, to the Raja of Tanjore, to Sir Edward Hughes, and to the Officers Commandants on different Stations.

It appears that the Select Committee, in their Diſpatch, dated 26th July, to Bengal, after reminding the Governor General and Council of having in their laſt Letter informed them of Hyder's Approach to the Frontiers, now give an Account of his being actually in the Carnatic with a large Army; and that great Numbers of the Inhabitants were fled from their Habitations, and that thereby an entire Stop would be put to the Tillage of the Ground —That in theſe Circumſtances they muſt hope for a ſpeedy Supply of Money from them, or their Reſources would be found inadequate to the Exigency ;—that if they could be aſſured of Means to ſupport the Expence, and knew the preſent Situation of the Government of Bengal, in Regard to the Marattas, they would direct an Attack on Hyder's Poſſeſſions on the Malabar Coaſt, by Aſſiſtance ſent to the Detachment they had at Tellicherry, and by the Co-operation which they ſhould hope for of the Squadron of His Majeſty's Ships. In Concluſion, they earneſtly enforced the Neceſſity of all the Preſidencies uniting to puniſh Hyder.

It appears in their Letter to Bombay, dated 28th July, the Select Committee give a ſimilar Account of Hyder's Invaſion, (the probable Cauſes of which they think it were ſuperfluous now to ſtate) and declare themſelves capable of acting only on the Defenſive: They expreſs a Hope that Bombay might be in a Situation to diſtreſs Hyder by attacking his Poſſeſſions on their Coaſt, or at leaſt that they would do ſo when the Maratta War ſhould be at an End: They ſuggeſt it to them to uſe Endeavours for ſtirring up the Nairs againſt Hyder, which they ſuppoſe might be eaſily accompliſhed.

It appears that they addreſs themſelves, on the 28th July, in like Manner to the Chief and Council of Tellicherry, recommending to them to be on their Guard againſt Hyder's Partizans in thoſe Parts; but hoping at the ſame Time that they may be eaſily able to draw off the Nairs to act offenſively againſt him.

It appears to Your Committee, That the Nabob had been the firſt to give Intelligence of the Irruption of Hyder's Horſe, and of the Ravages which they had committed; he had very ſtrongly expreſſed his Alarms for the Safety of his Country, and had himſelf been a Solicitor to the Preſidency for the Protection of his Territories.—And it appears that the Letter of the Governor to him, dated the 26th of July, contained not only an Application for his Aſſiſtance in Money and other Supplies, but alſo an Anſwer to Parts of his Letters. The Governor obſerves, "That Hyder's Motions for ſome Days had "unveiled the Deſign he ſeems to have entertained for ſome Time paſt againſt the Carnatic; that whilſt there was any Probability of his Intentions being fruſtrated or directed "to another Object, he, the Governor, choſe not to put the Company or the Nabob to "the Expence of great Military Preparations, becauſe he was very certain after the Exertions they had lately made againſt the French, that ſuch Expence could not be provided "for, without neglecting other Objects of great Importance; but that now, when Hoſtilities were actually commenced on the Part of Hyder, it became expedient at all Events "to attend to the Safety of the Country; and he hoped that the Nabob would exert himſelf for that Purpoſe, and inform him what Money he could furniſh, and endeavour to "collect as great a Supply as poſſible of Bullocks, Proviſions, and other Neceſſaries."

Country Correſpondence, N° 59, N° 60, N° 61; 23 and 25 July.

N° 62, Country Corr.

It appears to have been ſuggeſted, That the Country of Tanjore was not over-run or plundered by thoſe who were ſpreading Devaſtation all around it; and of this Circumſtance the Governor made Uſe in his Letter to the Raja, dated the 29th of July, to enforce his Application for Aſſiſtance, particularly for a Supply of Grain, and an ample Contribution of Money, to expedite the Military Operations, and to ſhew his Zeal in a Cauſe in which the Welfare of his own Government, as well as that of the Company, and of the Nabob, were ſo much intereſted.

N° 65, Country Corr.

It appears that the Letter dated the 28th of July, to Sir Edward Hughes, contained a Requeſt that he would ſend the Sartine Frigate to Pondicherry, to convey thither Artillery, Officers, and Men, and ſome Laſcars, with Tents and Baggage, and ſome Field Pieces, and to aſſiſt in bringing off ſome French Officers, Cannon, and Military Stores, which Colonel Braithwaite, the Commander of the Troops ſtationed there, would wiſh to put on Board.—And it appears that Sir Edward Hughes very readily complied with this Requeſt, and informed the Board by Letter of 30th July, that as he apprehended the French would attempt to land a Body of Troops from Mauritius on the Coaſt, he ſhould proceed with the Squadron to a Station off Najore and Negapatam, that he might be in the way of intercepting them.

It appears to Your Committee, That Orders were ſent to Colonel Braithwaite, on the 24th and 27th of July, that, after he ſhould have embarked on board the Sartine, and ſuch other Veſſels as he could procure, all the Gunpowder, Cannon, and Stores, remaining in Pondicherry, he ſhould march to Wandewaſh with the Troops under his Command,

Command, provided he had reaſon to believe there would be no Danger of his meeting a Force much ſuperior to his own; but if he apprehended any Danger of that Sort, he was to march directly to Madras, by the moſt ſecure Route he could take.

And it appears that Colonel Nixon, commanding at Trichinopoly, was ordered, by Letter of 26th July, to detach immediately Captain Davis's Battalion and Two Field Pieces, to join Colonel Braithwaite at Pondicherry.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel Baillie, who commanded at this Time a ſtrong Detachment of Troops in the Guntoor Circar, was ordered, by Letters the 25th and 29th of July, to direct an Attack, as he might find Opportunity, on Cuddapah, or ſome other of Hyder's Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts, with a View "of diſtreſſing the Enemy as much as "poſſible, conſiſtently with the neceſſary Protection of the Company's Territories;— "and that, if for the Purpoſe of reducing the Fort of Sedhout, he ſhould want heavy "Cannon, he was inſtructed to wait till it could be ſent to him from Madras—that he "ſhould detach Aſſiſtance to Lieutenant Douglas, for the Defence of the Guntoor, "if neceſſary or expedient, and ſhould ſend Captain Smith's Battalion to Madras, if he "could ſpare it."

And Your Committee find, That Lord Macleod, who commanded His Majeſty's 73d Regiment, was ſummoned to the Board on the 26th of July; and having, on his Attendance there, promiſed to exert himſelf to the utmoſt for the Service to which he was appointed, received Orders the next Day to march from Poonſmalie to Eyecollam, near Conjeveram, as ſoon as he ſhould be joined by the Detachment from the Garriſon, and the Artillery from the Mount; for which Purpoſe, Orders had been made out on the 26th to Colonel James, who commanded there.

And Your Committee find, That all theſe Reſolutions of the Board were not unanimous.

It appears, That Two Members of the Select Committee adviſed, in their Minutes of the 26th of July, that Sir Edward Hughes ſhould be deſired to ſail to Pondicherry, with the whole Squadron, for the Removal of the Troops by Sea, "if Colonel "Braithwaite ſhould think it would be attended with the ſmalleſt Riſk to march ſo "important a Detachment by Land."

And Your Committee find, That theſe Gentlemen, on the 29th and 30th of July, proteſted in very ſtrong Terms againſt the Orders ſent to Colonel Baillie; ſtating, "That the Cuddepah Country was on the other Side of the Paſſes, far diſtant from "Innaconda, and that if he ſhould proceed thither with his Detachment, it would be no "eaſy Matter to recall him, ſhould his Services be required in the Carnatic; that he "ought to be directed to come with all Expedition to join the Army, by which it "might be made ſufficient, in all Probability, to drive Hyder out of the Province, or at "leaſt to prevent his taking Poſſeſſion of any of the ſtrong Forts. And that it would "not be poſſible to oppoſe him, if the Troops remained in diſperſed Bodies, and ſcat-"tered in diſtant Garriſons."

29th, Select Conſultation. And Your Committee find, That the Preſident and General perſiſted in recommending the Orders to be ſent as before reſolved on, alledging as Reaſons, "That Colo-"nel Baillie might not only diſtreſs the Enemy in that Quarter, but oblige Hyder to "withdraw Part of his Force from the Carnatic, and becauſe it was doubtful if Provi-"ſions could be immediately procured for a greater Number than were now under "marching Orders."

Select Conſ. 30th July. It appears, That Meſſieurs Smith and Johnſon would not admit the Idea of their being unable to procure Proviſions for Colonel Baillie's Detachment; and declared, that they held the Majority of the Committee reſponſible for the Conſequences of their Reſolution on this Head.

And it appears to Your Committee, That the Colonel having, by Letter dated the 27th of July, tranſmitted an Account of the Difficulties he was under to ſubſiſt his Troops, on Account of Hyder's Horſe to the Southward, and the Fullneſs of the Kiſtna to the Northward, and mentioned alſo his Apprehenſions of not being able much longer to detain the Bullocks neceſſary for a March (without which he could not move) the Select Committee altered their firſt Inſtructions, and iſſued a new Order on 31ſt of July, for him to march towards the Preſidency "if he ſhould be "unable to ſubſiſt his Detachment in the Enemy's Country, or from any other "Quarter."

And

And Your Committee find, That Meſſieurs Smith and Johnſon, on the 29th of July, moved, that Sir Hector Munro ſhould himſelf take the Command of the Forces in the Field; and that the Governor, on the 30th July, entered his Minute of Diſſent to the Motion, "thinking it highly expedient to have the Continuance of the Gene-"ral's Advice, to enable the Committee to form their Plans of Operations."—And it appears, that the General at the ſame Time declared, "That whenever the Army "ſhould be aſſembled, and the Committee be enabled to judge more clearly of Hyder's "Intention, he would take the Command: In the mean Time, he thought he could "render more Service by ſtaying at Madras, and that excluſive of this Conſideration, "his Health was very indifferent;" it was therefore reſolved, "That Lord Macleod "ſhould be deſired to take the Command, and that Inſtructions ſhould accordingly be "prepared for him."

And it appears, That the Commander in Chief then recommended, that the Troops which were to take the Field from thence and from Vellore, ſhould aſſemble at Eyacollam, near Conjeveram; and that it was reſolved accordingly by the Select Committee.

But it appears, That a Letter received from his Lordſhip on the Firſt of Auguſt by the Select Committee, occaſioned a Change in this Meaſure.—He therein offers his Sentiments on the Plan of Operations, and particularly for the Junction of the ſeveral Corps of which the Army was to be compoſed.—He obſerves, "that the Rendezvous now intended, might have been the propereſt before the Invaſion, but the March of thoſe Detachments by the Routes propoſed, would, at this critical Juncture, render them liable to be attacked ſeparately, and either the Object of their Junction rendered abortive, or ſome Part of the Army receive ſuch a Check, as, in his Opinion, it would be imprudent to riſk in the firſt Outſet of the War. And, deeming the Corps aſſembled at Poonamakee to be the Baſis of the Strength of the Carnatic, he thinks it ought not to move from the Neighbourhood of the Magazines and Stores, till joined by all the Troops which could be drawn together, and enabled to march in ſufficient Force to act effectually in the Field againſt the humerous Cavalry of the Enemy.

He would not venture to ſuggeſt the Manner of aſſembling theſe Corps, but would recommend thoſe Routes for their March, which a Knowledge of the Country would point out as leaſt expoſed to be harraſſed by the Enemy; and that the Junction ſhould be formed near the Preſidency.—He declares his Opinion, that Colonel Baillie's Detachment ſhould be ordered to march to the Carnatic, without Delay, upon the Principle, that all the Force of the Country ſhould in ſuch a Criſis as the preſent, be collected in the Center of it.—He wiſhes alſo to be joined by all the Cavalry which could be procured; and concludes with declaring, that "he cannot adopt a "Reſponſibility in the Execution of Plans which do not coincide with his own Judg-"ment." It appears, That Sir Hector Munro, in conſequence of this Letter, delivered in a Minute on the 1ſt of Auguſt; in which he declared, "that the De-"fence of Madras and the Jaghire, not being the great Object of his Plan, but as "he alſo wiſhed to prevent Hyder, if poſſible, from getting Poſſeſſion of the prin-"cipal Forts, he could not approve of Lord Macleod's Reaſoning; that he ſtill "thought the Troops ſhould be aſſembled near the propoſed Scene of Action, and "could not himſelf ſee the Difficulties of bringing the Force together; that if the "Committee ſhould do him the Honour to deſire him to effect a Junction, he "thinks he might venture to promiſe them to perform it, and eſpecially as Hyder "with his Infantry was yet at Caliſpauk, near his own Territories; and while he "remained there, his Cavalry could not prevent the Junction of their Troops."

And Your Committee find, That the Preſident hereupon moved, that Sir Hector Munro be deſired to take the Command of the Army aſſembled in the Field; which was reſolved on; and Lord Macleod was directed to proceed next Day from Poonamalee (if the Stores, &c. ſhould all arrive that Night) towards Eyecollam, and that the General would join him on his March, in a Day or two. Select Conſ. 1 Auguſt.

And Your Committee find, That the Inſtructions propoſed to be given to the General (by which the Plan of Operations were left to his Diſcretion) contained a Deſire, that "if the Diſpoſitions made by the Enemy at any Time enabled him to "leave the Command for a few Days, he would on ſuch Occaſion return to Madras, "that the Committee might have the Benefit of his Advice for future Opera-"tions."

1st August 1780. And it appears, That Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon diſſented to this Part of the Inſtructions, which authorized the General to leave the Army at Pleaſure; and they declared their Concurrence of Opinion with Lord Macleod, on the proper Mode and Place for effecting a Junction of the Troops; and expreſſed much Alarm at the Idea of a diſtant Rendezvous of the Army, becauſe of the Weakneſs and Wealth of the Black Town, for the ſpecial Defence of which they wiſhed to have Two Battalions of Sepoys raiſed, which the Town had promiſed to pay; they recapitulated many Points on which the Preſident and Sir Hector Munro had differed with them; and they aſſerted, that every material Opinion of theirs had, however, been neceſſarily adopted by the Majority in the Orders requiſite for Colonel Baillie.

1st August 1780. And it appears, That the Select Committee now on further Conſideration, reſolved to direct Colonel Baillie to march towards the Preſidency at all Events, and to take ſuch Route as might poſſibly give him an Opportunity of cutting off ſome of the Enemy's Convoys.

And it appears to Your Committee, That new Inſtructions were now ſent to Colonel Braithwaite (who had, by Letter received the 31ſt of July, repreſented his Force to be ſo reſpectable as, in his Opinion, not to fear the Impediment of any Enemy they were likely to meet with) that he ſhould march to Chingleput inſtead of Wandewaſh, and from thence join the Army at Eyecollam.

The European Battalion from Vellore was ordered on the 31ſt July not to advance to join the Army at the Place of general Rendezvous, if any ſtrong Party of the Enemy was known to be in the Way; but it was in ſuch Caſe to be detained at Vellore, till Meaſures could be taken to facilitate a Junction.

Country Corr. N° 63, 64, 66. Country Corr. N° 68, 69. 1 Auguſt. N° 74, Country Corr.

And Your Committee find, That the Enemy was in the mean Time making an almoſt uninterrupted Progreſs in ravaging the Country, and plundering and burning the Villages, and taking ſeveral Forts on the Frontiers: Accounts of Alarm were conſequently very frequent, and the Nabob ſent daily Intelligence of the diſtreſſed State of his Dominions, and of the few Troops there were to defend ſome of the principal Garriſon Towns, expreſſing particularly his Fears for his Capital, which he knew would be ſoon attacked, and which muſt quickly fall, if it was not ſtrengthened with additional Troops and Fortifications. He repreſented the fatal Conſequences of its Loſs, as he had lodged great Magazines of all Kinds of Stores in it, and in the principal Forts of Vellore, Gingee, Wandewaſh, and Trichinopoly, and hoped that Meaſures would be taken to preſerve them; that his Diſtreſſes alſo were great for want of Money, and that he could borrow none to pay his Cavalry, which could not take the Field for want of their Arrears.

Country Corr. N° 67. Country Corr. N° 72, 1 Auguſt. N° 75, Country Corr.

And Your Committee find, That the Raja of Tanjore had early declared himſelf diſpoſed to aſſiſt, as far as he ſhould have the Power, in repelling the common Enemy; but, that having no Troops of his own, he muſt depend on the Company for the Protection of his Country, which had as yet indeed eſcaped the Ravages of Hyder's Horſe, becauſe the Rivers were impaſſable, but that as ſoon as the Waters ſhould fall, he muſt expect their Incurſions: — He complained particularly in his Letter of the 7th of Auguſt, that the Nabob had, while in Poſſeſſion of his Country, ſo oppreſſed the People and deſolated the Lands, that he was now himſelf ſo far from having Money to ſend to the Aſſiſtance of the Company, that he could not fulfil his Engagement for the Depoſit, and had with Difficulty paid his Subſidy of Four Lacks; — that he had great Satisfaction in knowing that the Company were clear Gainers of Two Lacks annually in Time of Peace, as the whole Expences of the Troops ſtationed for the Defence of his Country, amounted only to Two Lacks; — that he would however exert himſelf to procure Grain for the Preſidency, and had taken off all Duties on Exportation, as the Preſidency had informed him they had done on Importation, for the Encouragement of the Country People to carry down their Grain to the Veſſels, which he deſired might be ſent for it.

Raja's repreſentation

N° 67, received 30th July.

And Your Committee find, That the Raja, in a Letter dated 27th of July, and Major Maclellan (who commanded the Company's Troops at Tanjore) in a Letter dated the 26th, repreſented the Neceſſity of Repairs to the Fortifications, and of Reinforcements to the Troops for Defence of the Country, and of Artillery Men to work the Guns in the Fort, there being none at preſent there but a few Invalids.

Your Committee, in forming the Recital hitherto given, have been under the Neceſſity of examining a Variety of Letters, and other Documents, which they did not think it incumbent upon them to ſtate to the Houſe more minutely than they have done; but thoſe which appeared moſt material are collected together, and, for the Information of the Houſe, ſubjoined in the Appendix N° 1. from the Peruſal of which a more minute

Appendix, N° 1.

Knowledge

Knowledge can be acquired of the Particulars of Alarm and Inability to reſiſt the Enemy, as expreſſed in Letters from various Forts or Stations in the Carnatic, and in the Circars. From ſuch an Examination it will likewiſe appear, that ſcarce any Place from one End of the Coaſt to the other was without Alarm, and very few acknowledged to be in a ſufficient Condition of Defence. And Your Committee deſire in this Place to obſerve, that the Vouchers of the Narrative of the Report ſubſequent to this Reference, will be found in the Appendix N° 2. and ſo on in the Courſe of the Report.

But it appears to your Committee, That the Irruption of the Enemy did not appear formidable only to the Nabob, and to thoſe moſt immediately expoſed to attack; and that Complaints of the Neglect of Preparations, and of the deficient Means for Reſiſtance, were not expreſſed from thoſe Quarters only.

Your Committee find, That one of the Members of Council, Mr. Sadlier, delivered in a Minute on the 29th July, relative to the preſent State of Affairs; in which he declares, That they had been long approaching to that unhappy State at which they were now arrived; and that private Miſmanagement, and not public Calamity, had brought them to the Brink of Deſtruction; that Hyder Ally had long treated them with Neglect and Inſult; that he had for ſome Months paſt been aſſembling a large Army on the Frontiers, while his Vakeel was allowed to remain at Madraſs, to give him daily Intelligence of the Effect his Motions had upon this Government, which remained inactive, and had neither Reſolution to queſtion him about the Cauſe of his Intentions, or to provide againſt the Danger—That they had ſuffered their Troops to remain ſcattered in different Parts of the Country, without Stores or Guns; their Garriſons were not put in a State of Defence; no Pains were taken to repleniſh an empty Treaſury, and that their Want of Exertion now was equal to their Neglect of timely Precaution.

That Hyder, now in the Heart of the Carnatic with ſo great a Force, might cut off their ſmall Detachments before they could form a Junction; that the principal Garriſons, neglected and wanting all Neceſſaries, would eaſily fall.—A Number of ſmall Forts, Wandewaſh, Carangolly, Arneé, were left defenceleſs, or garriſoned by a few Companies of Nabob's Sepoys, who had not been paid for 18 Months, and might be glad to change their Maſter;—that Arcot, and all the Stores hoarded there, perhaps had fallen;—Vellore could not ſpare a Man from its own Defence to ſtrengthen it—The Three Battalions of Pondicherry, without Guns, might be eaſily cut off by a Part of Hyder's Army—In ſhort, that the whole Country, from the Coleroon in the Southward to the Country of Nellore to the Northward, excepting Trichinopoly, Vellore, and perhaps Amboor, might be in Hyder's Poſſeſſion in a Month, and even thoſe Garriſons would then be ſtarved into Capitulation; that by the Means of Porto Novo he had gained a Communication with the Iſlands.

That, "Till Conjeveram was plundered, the News of which arrived on the 23d, not one of thoſe who aſſumed to themſelves the entire Management of the Company's Affairs, would believe that there either was an Enemy in the Country, or that it was likely to be invaded;" yet, in Eight Days the Country was over-run—That moreover the Capital itſelf was in Danger, and no effectual Means had been yet taken for its Safety.

That the Treaſury was empty—The Nabob had declared he had no Money; the Rajah of Tanjore had made the ſame Declaration—The Maſulipatam Diſtricts were ſo far from being able to furniſh Supplies, that the Arrears of Tribute now amounted to 17 Lacks of Pagodas—That Sitteram Rauſe, the moſt wealthy Zemindar under the Company, had not paid his Kiſts, and inſtead of being preſſed to pay them, a Remiſſion of Tribute had been voted to him. Ball Kiſtna was in Arrear, nor was it believed that he would ever be induced to make good his Engagements.

That the Nabob's Revenue had been diminiſhing annually, though his Expences had not been adequate to his Revenue;—the other Revenues of the Preſidency had been alſo diminiſhing, their Specie had been tranſported to China and to Europe at the Rate of 10 and 15 Lacks annually;—that he ſtill however thought there remained Reſources, if there was Exertion to draw them forth.—He then ſtates the Confuſion which followed the News of the Irruption, and the Danger in which the Black Town had been, of being pillaged, and that to which the Nabob and his Treaſures were expoſed, while no immediate Steps, proper for aſſembling the Army, were taken—Colonel Braithwaite's Corps ought to have been brought by Sea; Colonel Baillie ſhould have been ordered to march to the Preſidency; the Commander in Chief ſhould immediately have been at the Head of the Army on its firſt forming.

Nabob's revenue diminiſhes

10 & 15 Lacks to China.

He then reprobates the Diſorder ſuffered to prevail in the Black Town and the Fort;

—dreads the Conſequence of ſuffering the Army ſtill to remain in ſeparate Bodies, each thereby eaſily to be cut off;—inveighs againſt the Idea of forming it in a Country already plundered by the Enemy.—And laſtly, after recapitulating his Obſervations, he concludes with an Advice, that the Nabob and his Effects ſhould be received into the Fort, and his Cavalry ſhould be paid, that they might be brought to act as ſoon as poſſible.

It appears, that Mr. Johnſon, remarking a Paſſage in the Minute of Mr. Sadlier, where he ſays, "That till Conjeveram was plundered, the News of which arrived on "the 23d, not one of thoſe who aſſumed to themſelves the entire Management of the "Company's Affairs, would believe that there either was an Enemy in the Country, or "that it was likely to be invaded;" deſired to remind the Committee, that he had delivered in a Minute on the 19th of June, and Mr. Smith the 19th of July, wherein they had given their Sentiments on the approaching Danger.

Conſ. Auguſt 1ſt. And Your Committee find, That the Preſident and the General did not delay an Anſwer to Mr. Sadlier's Obſervations; which they term "illiberal Reflections on the Conduct and Meaſures of Government;" and the Whole "an inflammatory Declamation," which they attribute to his Grief at not being of the Committee, or to a Panic with which he had been ſtricken, or to the Extravagance of a warm Imagination.

They inſiſt, that the real Situation of Affairs was happily not ſo alarming as Mr. Sadlier had repreſented it to be; and that it was particularly wrong in any Member of Adminiſtration, to picture the Exertions made on a ſudden Incurſion of an Enemy, as Proofs of the Country being ruined: "that if, as Mr. Sadlier aſſerted, the Committee were in-"attentive to the Steps which Hyder had for ſome Time paſt been taking with reſpect to "the Carnatic, they moſt unqueſtionably would feel themſelves worthy of the moſt "ſevere Diſpleaſure of their Employers. But if Mr. Sadlier had been in a Situation to "have known what the Committee had done, he would have known that they have "been by no Means inattentive;—that they had repreſented, both to the Company "and to Bengal, the Extent of Hyder's Views, and had circumſtantially informed the "latter of every Step he had taken, previous to his Attack upon the Carnatic."—That the Committee, who were alone the proper Judges, did not think it expedient, in the then Situation of Affairs, either to demand a categorical Anſwer from him, or to ſend away his Vakeel. That Hyder, from the Moment their Troops marched againſt Mahé, threatened in return an Invaſion of the Carnatic; that his Inclination was little to be doubted, but the Seaſon of the Year was allowed to paſs away when he could moſt effectually have injured the Nabob; the Grain was got in, the Monſoon approaching, which would neceſſarily retard every Operation in the Field. "Under thoſe Circumſtances, therefore, and under the Certainty that his main Army and Artillery had not yet got through the Gauts, and that he himſelf, ſo far from being in the Heart of the Carnatic, was ſtill in the Neighbourhood of the Paſſes: Under all theſe Circumſtances, the Committee deemed themſelves vigilant in the Truſt repoſed in them, when they reſolved to aſſemble an Army as ſpeedily as poſſible, when they took Meaſures for obtaining the Co-operation of the Preſidency of Bengal, when they got the Nabob to collect additional Proviſions in his different Garriſons; and in ſhort, when in the laſt Reſort, they came to the Determination of exerting every Sinew towards the Puniſhment of a wanton, unprovoked Infringement of the Peace of 1769."

They then accuſed Mr. Sadlier of ſowing Diſaffection, by threatening not to confine his Sentiments to the Board at which he ſits, but to communicate them to the Community at large, that they may know their Danger.

They defend the Plan and Place recommended by the Commander in Chief, for aſſembling the different Detachments to compoſe the Army, as the Nabob had aſſerted, that a ſufficient Quantity of Proviſions could not be collected for the Troops nearer than Wandewaſh; and that the centrical Situation of that Place would be found convenient for receiving Supply, and for giving Protection to the Company's and his own Poſſeſſions; that however the Event would ſhew, whether they or Mr. Sadlier was right. They expreſs particular Reſentment at Mr. Sadlier, for having preſumed to ſay, that the "Committee acted by an uſurped Authority;" they conſider this as an Attempt at the Subverſion of a Power, fixed by the moſt explicit Orders of the Company, and an unpardonable Tranſgreſſion: That therefore, "as the Commands of the Com-"pany were clear and deciſive with reſpect to the Line which in caſe of Neceſſity the "Preſident and Council, as well as the Committee, were authoriſed to take, and as that "Neceſſity now exiſted in its moſt alarming Form, the Preſident moves, and the Ge-"neral ſeconds, That Mr. Sadlier be ſuſpended, &c."

It appears that this Motion was carried; but that Mr. Johnſon and Mr. Smith ſtrongly expreſſed their Diſſent; and that the former deſired to make a public Avowal of the ſame Sentiments which were contained in the Minute of Mr. Sadlier. Conſ. Auguſt 1, 1780.

And Your Committee find, That they afterwards, on the 8th of September, entered their Minutes; in which they declare, That the Repreſentation made by Mr. Sadlier agreed in many Particulars with their own Sentiments; that they had before ſo expreſſed them, and had Reaſon to complain of the Inattention of the Committee to them; that they had, particularly on the 19th of June and 19th of July, deſired that Preparations for War might be made without Delay, on receiving various Informations of Hyder Ally's hoſtile Intentions.

They proteſt againſt the Violence of the Meaſure of the Suſpenſion, and fear that the Terror of that Example was calculated to over-awe the Members of Adminiſtration from a free Declaration of their Sentiments; they proteſt againſt it as unjuſt, becauſe no ſpecific Charge was brought, nor was Mr. Sadlier heard in his Defence; and as irregular, becauſe contrary to the Sixth Paragraph of the Company's Letter, dated the 10th of April 1778, which veſts the Power of Suſpenſion in the Committee; and that the Preſident and General had before expreſsly declared it to be entirely in them (the Committee.)—They intimate a Suſpicion, that private Reſentment againſt Mr. Sadlier, more than public Utility, might have cauſed the Severity exerciſed againſt him.

That Mr. Sadlier's Ideas of the Danger of the Nabob was not without Foundation: The Attack made by a Party of Horſe, which had penetrated as far as Triplicane, the Place of his Reſidence, without meeting with any Reſiſtance, had evinced the Propriety of Mr. Sadlier's Reflections.—They conclude with obſerving, that Mr. Sadlier was ſuſpended for a Minute containing Advice, which was afterwards, in ſeveral Inſtances, obliged to be followed.

And it appears, That Mr. Sadlier afterwards, in Two Letters dated 13th September and 9th October, appealed to the Select Committee, and preſſed them to reſcind the Reſolution which they had made for his Suſpenſion; and that he alſo addreſſed a Letter on the 16th of October, to the Preſident and Council, on the ſame Subject. See Part of Letter from Madras to Court of Directors, 13 Sept. and 9 Oct. 1780.

And it further appears, That in a Letter dated 16th November 1780, to the Preſident and Select Committee, he complains of the Inattention ſhewn to his Petitions, and particularly to his Letters to the Governor General and Council, and to the Court of Directors; which, he obſerves, had remained before the Board from the 17th until the 26th of October, and that "then, and not till then, he had received a Letter from Sir Hector Munro;" which Your Committee find to contain a Challenge from Sir Hector to Mr. Sadlier, "for what he had ſaid maliciouſly and falſly of him in his "Letters."

Your Committee have thought proper to put theſe Papers, together with Mr. Sadlier's Anſwer to Sir Hector Munro, into the Appendix, and to ſubmit the whole to the Obſervation of the Houſe. Appendix, N° 2.

And your Committee find, That by a Reſolution of the Select Committee, on the 2d of Auguſt 1780, a Plan was then formed for a Secret Expedition, with a View of intercepting the Convoys of Proviſions or Stores which might be coming through the Paſſes for the Uſe of Hyder's Army; and that Captain Coſby was appointed to command a ſtrong Detachment, drawn for that Purpoſe from the Troops ſtationed at Trichinopoly and at Tanjore, to be joined by Two Regiments of the Nabob's Cavalry, if they ſhould arrive in Time from the Tinevilly Country; and it appears that they joined him at Trichinopoly on the 27th of Auguſt.

But Your Committee find, That this Deſign, the only offenſive one undertaken at this Time, was not attended with Succeſs; that many Circumſtances occaſioned great Delay in the Outſet; that good Intelligence could not afterwards be procured by Captain Coſby; but that on the contrary, continual Information was ſent to Hyder of all his Motions, by the Inhabitants of the Country, whom he had contrived to attach to his Intereſts—That the Ways were ſo much infeſted with Parties of the Enemy's Horſe, and Captain Coſby found himſelf ſo continually betrayed by the Killedars, and other Servants of the Nabob, eſpecially on an Enterprize he attempted for retaking Chittaput, that he at laſt, after various and fatiguing Marches, was obliged to relinquiſh all other Purſuits, than that of ſeeking to join the Army; in which alſo, for want of Information, he was diſappointed, until he accidentally met with it on its Retreat at Chingleput, on the 12th of September. Select Conſ. September 9th.

Vid. Journal of S. H. Munro.

Appendix, N° 3.

And

Select Conſ. 2d and 3d Auguſt, &c.

And your Committee find, that after the Irruption of Hyder into the Carnatic, various Orders were ſent by the Select Board, to different Parts of that Province and the Northern Circars, to ſtrengthen the ſeveral Poſts, and to ſend Aſſiſtance mutually from one Place to another, as it might be neceſſary and poſſible.

Select Conſ. 7 Auguſt.

And it appears, by a Letter from Chingleput, dated 5th of Auguſt 1780, that Lieutenant Mackay, the Commandant, obſerving that no Steps had been taken to ſecure the Grain of the different Villages from being carried away or burnt, and that the Nabob's Managers would do nothing of themſelves, propoſed, for the Good of the Service, to ſend out for as much as he could get, to prevent it from falling into the Hands of the Enemy.—And it appears that the Select Committee, in their Anſwer of the 8th Auguſt, expreſſed their Approbation of his Conduct, and directed him to ſecure as much Grain, and collect as great a Number of Cattle, as he could.

Select Conſ. Auguſt 2.

And it appears, That Advance of Pay was agreed to be made to Three Regiments of the Nabob's Cavalry, and that they were ordered into immediate Service.

And Your Committee find, That on the 3d of Auguſt, Advice was ſent from the Select Committee to Maſulipatam, Vizagapatam, and Ganjam, of Hyder's Invaſion; and that Inſtructions were given to them to be on their Guard, and to draw their Troops together as much as poſſible, that they might be able to act in a Body, in Caſe of Attack; which was, however, not much to be apprehended. And it appears, that particular Application was then made to the Chief and Council of Maſulipatam, that they would remit as much Money as they could collect, it being greatly wanted to anſwer the Expences of the War.

See Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon's Minute.

And Your Committee find, That an Attack made by Hyder's Horſe on 10th Auguſt, upon Triplicane and the Gardens about St. Thomas's Mount, occaſioned a Motion to be made in the Committee on the 11th, That Redoubts ſhould be thrown up around Choulty Plain, for the Purpoſe of keeping off the Enemy's Horſe, and preventing a ſudden Incurſion upon the Black Town. But it appears, that General Munro diſapproving of this Meaſure, as expenſive, laborious, and inadequate, recommended it rather to embody a Militia of Horſe and Foot, and to compleat Two Battalions of Sepoys, for the ſpecial Purpoſe of that Defence: And when it was afterwards, on 16th Auguſt, repreſented, that many of the Inhabitants of the Black Town deſerted the Place from Apprehenſion of Danger, the Preſident aſſured the Committee on the 17th, That a Number of Guns had been mounted on the Wall; that the Ditch was in ſome Parts cleared and the Works were going on; that about 600 Sepoys, who had been enliſted, were perfecting themſelves in their Diſcipline; and that nothing had been omitted for the Defence of the Place, and the Safety of the Inhabitants.

See Minute of Smith and Johnſon.

Select Conſ. 16 Auguſt.

* Sic Orig.

Select Conſ. 8 Auguſt, 584.

Appendix, N° 4.

And Your Committee find, That a Letter of Thanks was addreſſed to Sir Edward Hughes, by the Select Committee, on * 6 Auguſt, for the Services which it appears he had rendered to Colonel Braithwaite by Means of the Squadron; and they at the ſame Time requeſted him to prolong his Cruize to the Southward as much as poſſible, in order to prevent any Diſembarkation of the French Troops on the Coaſt.

Select Conſ. 8, 9, 12, 13, 17 Auguſt.

Select Conſ. 16 Auguſt.

Letter dated 10 Auguſt.

And Your Committee find, That daily Tidings were ſent to the Preſidency, of the Progreſs which Hyder was making in Devaſtation and Conqueſt; and it appears, that Fear, as well as good Information, ſuggeſted various Accounts of his Deſigns; and it was from ſome of his Movements conceived, that after taking Trinomalee, Pollour, Chittaput, and other Places, he deſigned an Attempt upon Gingee, where the Nabob's Killedar would not at firſt allow the European Officer, who arrived there on the 8th of Auguſt with a Reinforcement, to take any Steps for the Defence of the Place, as he had received no Orders for that Purpoſe from his Maſter.

Vide Appendix, N° 5.

It was, however, ſoon made manifeſt, that Arcot was Hyder's firſt great Object; and it appears that he ſat down before it on the 21ſt of Auguſt, it having previouſly received a Reinforcement to its Garriſon from Vellore on the 8th.

And Your Committee obſerve, That it had been reſolved, that General Munro ſhould take the Field, at the Head of the Army to be aſſembled near Conjeveram, and that Orders had been accordingly ſent to the Officers commanding ſeveral Detachments, to repair thither, in order to unite their Corps.

But it appears, That the General informed the Select Committee on the 14th Auguſt, That this Plan was prevented from being put in Execution, by the Want of Bullocks to carry ſufficient Proviſion for the Troops; and that the Reaſon aſſigned at the Durbar

for that Deficiency was, that the Country People had driven them to the Pollams, for Fear of the Enemy's Horſe; and he therefore adviſed, that the Rendezvous ſhould be now made at the Mount, where the Troops ſhould remain till Eight Days Proviſion could be collected and Bullocks to carry it, when they ſhould immediately proceed on their March.—And it appears that this was agreed to by the Committee; and a Letter was ſent the ſame Day to the Nabob, to repreſent theſe Difficulties to him, to requeſt the Exertions of his Interference, that a ſufficient Number of Bullocks might be procured, and Proviſions of Grain and Cattle furniſhed, and that he would ſend a Perſon of Conſequence to accompany the Army, in order to ſecure a conſtant and regular Supply.

Country Corr. N° 76, 14 Auguſt. N° 80, 23 Auguſt.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob in his Anſwer of the 29th Auguſt, reminded the Committee of the Stores of all Kinds which he had laid up in ſeveral of his Forts; and, entreating them to order the Army to march immediately for the Relief of Arcot, aſſured them, that the Troops would be there plentifully ſupplied with every Neceſſary.—And it appears, That in conſequence of the new Reſolution, to rendezvous the Army at the Mount, Orders were ſent to Conjeveram, that in caſe the European Detachment from Vellore ſhould have already reached that Place, it ſhould immediately leave it, and march to the Mount.—It appears, however, that a Letter was wrote on the ſame Day to Colonel Lang at Vellore, inſtructing him, that, as he had ſent ſo large a Detachment to Arcot, he ſhould keep the European Battalion at Vellore till further Orders.

N° 82, Country Corr.

Select Conſ. 14 Auguſt.

And it appears, That Colonel Lang had wrote on the 12th to the Select Committee, to acquaint them, that he had not ſent theſe Troops to Conjeveram, and hoped they would approve of his detaining them, as he ſhould otherwiſe have had not above Two hundred Sepoys for the Defence of that Fort; and that moreover a ſtrong Body of the Enemy's Horſe was encamped in the Way, ſo that it would have been dangerous to attempt the March.

Select Conſ. 17 Auguſt.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel Braithwaite had reached Chingleput on the 18th Auguſt with his Corps, when he received Inſtructions to join the reſt of the Army at the Mount.—It appears, That he had tranſmitted Accounts on the 10th, to the Preſidency, of his having evacuated Pondicherry; and that he had previouſly ſent off all the French Officers capable of Service, and had taken an Atteſtation of Fidelity from other French Gentlemen who were to be left there.

Select Conſ. 19 Auguſt. Select Conſ. 20 Auguſt.

It appears, That Colonel Braithwaite had paſſed through Carangolly on the 12th of Auguſt, and obſerved, with great Concern, the defenceleſs State in which a Place of that Importance was left, garriſoned only by Twenty Nabob's Sepoys, under an Havildar, who objected to receive Ammunition from him without Orders from his Maſter; and having compleated his whole March without ſeeing an Enemy, when there was ſo favourable an Opportunity of attacking him to Advantage, he was led to conſider this Circumſtance as a ſtrong Proof, that Hyder was not to be ſeriouſly apprehended; "and "that if at all faced and puſhed, he would retire out of the Carnatic as faſt as he came "into it."

And Your Committee find, by Letters dated the 20th, 21ſt, and 22d Auguſt, from Chingleput, That Proviſions were extremely ſcarce there, and that Colonel Braithwaite found himſelf in the moſt preſſing Neceſſity for a Supply; which Situation was rendered the more diſtreſſing, becauſe the Nabob's Renters would not aſſiſt him, and indeed had received no Orders to do it.

Select Conſ. 21 Auguſt, &c.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel Baillie, by Letters dated the 5th, 10th, 13th, and 16th Auguſt, and 1ſt September, informed the Select Committee, That in Obedience to their laſt Inſtructions, which had been ſent to him; he was on his March towards Conjeveram—That he had met with many Impediments from the Rivers he was obliged to paſs, but profeſſed his Eagerneſs to bring up his Corps to the Place of Junction as ſoon as poſſible.

Vide Appendix, N° 6.

And Your Committee find, That the General, now about to quit the Committee for the Camps, delivered in a Minute on 21ſt Auguſt, before his Departure; in which he declared the Neceſſity he found himſelf under, of deſiring that Mr. Davidſon might be appointed an acting Member of the Select Committee in his Abſence, in order that "his Reputation as an Officer, and as a Man, might have a fair Chance given to "them whenever any Reſponſibility ſhould fall to his Share, for that he had little Ex-"pectation of having any of his Plans adopted, or a fair Conſtruction put upon his "Actions by Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, who were determined to oppoſe every Mea-"ſure originating from, or approved of by, the Preſident and him: That, therefore,

" being reſolved not to be anſwerable for the Actions of others, which might affect him " in Points as an Officer, and in hopes of carrying the Plan approved by the Preſident " and him into Execution, without Diſpute or Diſſenſion to retard it, he moved ac- " cordingly, That Mr. Davidſon ſhould be appointed of the Select Committee."

Select Conſ. 21 Auguſt. And it appears, That the Preſident ſeconded the Motion upon the ſame Grounds; and added, " That though no Man had a greater Repugnance to acting contrary to the " Commands of his Superiors than he had, yet he thought there was, in the Reaſons " aſſigned by the General, an Expediency for a temporary Infringement of the Com- " pany's Orders," and therefore he further recommended, " That Mr. Davidſon ſhould " be ſworn in before Sir Hector Munro's Departure;" and at the ſame Time he deſired " to thank the General for the liberal and conſtitutional Support he had given him ſince " he had been Preſident."

And it appears, That Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon immediately diſſented; inſiſting, that ſuch Appointment was expreſsly contrary to the Orders contained in the Letter from the Court of Directors, of the 10th April 1778. And it appears, that they afterwards, on the 3d of September, delivered in a Minute on this Subject; and alſo, that on the 6th of that Month, they deſired to refer the Matter to the Deciſion of the Governor General and Council; but that Propoſal appears to have been rejected.

And Your Committee find, That Mr. Davidſon was, by the Preſident's Caſting Vote, appointed and ſworn in on the 21ſt of Auguſt.

And Your Committee find, That on the 22d Auguſt the Preſident propoſed certain Inſtructions for the General when he ſhould take the Field; and that on the 24th, Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon recommended others which they had prepared, and which, with ſome Exception, were agreed to by the Committee; and from them it appears, that no particular Plan was enjoined him, becauſe of the Confidence repoſed in his military Skill and Experience; which he was deſired to exert to the utmoſt on the preſent Occaſion, and to attack the Enemy on the firſt favourable Opportunity.

Vide Appendix, N° 7.

18th Auguſt. And Your Committee find, That a ſecond Letter had been written to Bengal, giving an Account of Hyder's Progreſs, and attributing the Delay of bringing an Army into the Field to oppoſe him, to the diſtant Stations in which the Troops were divided when he made his Irruption into the Province, and alſo to the want of Money; in which Article they ſolicited an ample and immediate Aſſiſtance.

2 Auguſt. And Your Committee find, That it had been propoſed, that the Select Committee ſhould take into Conſideration a Letter from thence, of 12th June, relative to the Guntoor Circar and the Suſpenſion of Mr. Holland; who having been ſent from Fort St. George to be Reſident at Hyderabad, had incurred the Diſpleaſure of the Governor and Council, and they had ſuſpended him from the Company's Service; of all which, however, a more ample Account will be given in another Report; and it is therefore judged ſufficient in this Place, to obſerve, that the Preſidency of Bengal had thereupon appointed him to be their Reſident at the Nyſam's Court, with particular Inſtructions to ſatisfy that Prince on account of the Guntoor Circar, and to promiſe a Relinquiſhment of the Grant of it from Bazalet Jung. It was propoſed, on the 2d and 7th Auguſt, by Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, that the Select Committee ſhould take off the Suſpenſion from Mr. Holland, and, in Obedience to the Requiſition made by the Governor General and Council, withdraw the Troops from the Guntoor, and reſtore it to Bazalet Jung.

Select Conſ. 7 Auguſt 1780. And Your Committee find, That this Motion was oppoſed on the 7th, by the Preſident and the General; and that the latter expreſſed an Apprehenſion, that the Court of Directors might not approve ſuch a Meaſure; and that it was therefore neceſſary to acquaint the Governor General and Council, that as they had given their Sanction to the Means of acquiring the Circar, they muſt be anſwerable for the Conſequences if they ſhould now inſiſt upon its being given up.

The Letter, however, for this Purpoſe, having been long delayed, it appears that Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon moved on 22d Auguſt, that the Circar in queſtion ſhould be given up, as it was highly neceſſary at this Juncture to ſecure the Alliance of the Soubah, without Delay.

22d Auguſt 1780. And Your Committee find, That it was hereupon reſolved to acquaint the Governor General and Council, that the Preſidency of Fort St. George was willing, notwithſtanding many Objections, to make the Sacrifice on account of the preſent Poſture of Affairs; but that the Circar having been let at Rent to the Nabob, it was neceſſary to

prevail

prevail upon him to give up his Leaſe, and that they promiſed to make Application to him for his Conſent.

And it appears, That a Letter was accordingly wrote him on the 2d of September, to deſire his Concurrence in that Meaſure.

N° 84, Country Corr.

And it further appears, That the Letter to the Governor General and Council, drawn up in Conſequence of the Reſolution recited above, is alſo dated the 2d September; and that it was laid before the Select Committee on the 6th, when Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon expreſſed their Diſapprobation of it, as inconſiſtent with the Sentiments which they had already expreſſed on the Subject of it.

Select Conſ. September 6.

But Your Committee find, That the Nabob, in a Letter dated the 17th Auguſt, and laid before the Board the 7th September, informed the Governor of the Danger in which that Diſtrict was of falling into Hyder's Hands, as there were no Troops nor Fortifications in Condition to oppoſe his numerous Cavalry; and as moreover the Zemindars were diſaffected to the Company, and had ſent Vakeels to him.

N° 85.

See alſo Letters from Lt. Douglas.

Select Conſ. September 6.

And Your Committee find, by Letters from Viſagipatam, 5th Auguſt, That a new Alarm had been ſpread through the other Circars alſo, by a very large Body of Horſe, which appeared, and encamped, in the Country of Cuttack, adjoining on the North to the Cicacole Circar, and that theſe Troops were commanded by a Son of the Raja of Berar, but ſuppoſed to be under the Controul, and in the Pay, of the Court of Poonah, and conſequently inimical to the Company.

And it appears, That the Dread of their Deſigns was ſo much the more reaſonable, as the Accounts of the weak State of the Circars left little Hope of ſucceſsful Reſiſtance againſt any conſiderable Attack.

Select Conſ. 5 September Letter from Ganjam, 21 Auguſt.

And Your Committee find, That the Apprehenſions of the Preſidency was at the ſame Time awakened for another Part of their Poſſeſſions in a different Quarter; for News reached the Select Committee, on the 21ſt Auguſt, that the Sardar of Calicut had led a conſiderable Body of Hyder's Forces to join the Nairs; and that having together driven the Company's Troops out of the Iſland of Durampatnam, they threatened Tellicherry, and the reſt of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions on that Part of the Malabar Coaſt.

Letter from Anjengo.

And Your Committee find, That Hyder's Horſe and Sepoys had alſo appeared about Madura; and that in the Tinevelly Country the Polygars required Aſſurances of being encouraged and protected by the Company and the Nabob, before they would be induced to draw any Force together to reſiſt the Invaders. And the Commandant at Palamcotta ſuggeſted, that it would be expedient for him to be empowered to pledge the Faith of the Company to them, as they were a formidable Body, could they be depended upon; and he pointed out the Neceſſity of his having all the Troops put under his Orders, becauſe the Nabob's Manager had intended to appoint the Brother of One of Hyder's Havildars to be Commander of the Nabob's Polygars and Troops.

See Letters from Captain Edington, dated Palamcotta, Auguſt 17 and 25, on Conſultation 6 Sept.

Letter from Madura, dated 2 Sept. received 8th.

And Your Committee find, That Sir Edward Hughes, in a Letter dated the 28th of Auguſt 1780, informed the Preſident and Select Committee, that from the Intelligence he had lately received, he thought there could be no Doubt that the French would ſoon receive a Reinforcement of Ships and Troops at the Mauritius, and that they meant to act offenſively againſt ſome of the Company's Settlements in that Country, either jointly with ſome of the Country Powers, or ſeparately by themſelves.

Select Conſ. 2d Sept. 1780.

Extract of Letter from Vellore, dated 25 Auguſt.

Select Conſ. 1 Sept. 1780.

Select Conſ. Sept. 6.

Letter from Trichinopoly.

Received 8 Sept. no Date.

N° 87, Country Corr.

And Your Committee find, That theſe Diſtreſſes, brought from without, were heightened by the inteſtine Miſchief of a mutinous Spirit in the Nabob's Sepoys, even within the important Fortreſs of Vellour, and by the general Complaint of their Want of Pay, and the conſequent Danger of their Deſertion.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob alſo, at this Criſis, ſent his Anſwer to the Governor's Letter of the 26th of July; and in it drew a melancholy Picture of his Situation, from his Poverty and the Deſolation of his Country; the Firſt he attributed to his being ſtripped of the Tanjore Country, which had obliged him to contract a great Debt, and to borrow of Individuals; the other he declared to be only the Confirmation of his Apprehenſions, which he had expreſſed often, both to the preſent and late Governor; and earneſtly entreated them to be prepared againſt the certain Intentions of Hoſtility, which Hyder had long manifeſted. He rejoiced, however, in knowing that now at leaſt an Army was in the Field, to ſtop the Progreſs of, and to puniſh the unprovoked Invader of his Dominions. He hoped, that in Compaſſion for his Diſtreſſes, and out of Conſideration

for the oldeſt and moſt faithful of the Company's Allies in Hindoſtan, his Friends would raiſe the Money neceſſary for the Expences of War, which he, on the Return of Peace, would refund.

Vide Appendix, N° 8.

And your Committee find, That ſuch was the Situation of Affairs when Letters from Sir Hector Munro of the 5th and 9th of September, informed the Select Committee, that Hyder had raiſed the Siege of Arcot, and was encamped within Two Miles of him near Conjeveram. He added, that he meant to attack Hyder as ſoon as he could join Colonel Baillie, who had at laſt been able, on the 3d of September, to croſs the Rivers, which had ſo long obſtructed his Progreſs; but that to effect a Junction, he muſt detach a ſtrong Body of the Troops to ſtrengthen the Colonel on his March, while he himſelf ſhould remain where he was, to watch the Enemy and guard his Proviſions, the Want of which he foreſaw would ſoon end the Campaign. He complained of the Nabob for not ſending a proper Perſon with the Army, to ſecure a conſtant Supply; and he wiſhed alſo to have a Reinforcement of 200 Europeans from Madraſs, as there was now no Danger of an Attack on that Place.

Select Conſ. Sept. 11.

And your Committee find, by a Letter from the Commandant of Chingleput, dated the 11th September, and by another from Sir Hector Munro, dated 12th September, That the News of the Defeat of Colonel Baillie, and of the General's falling back to Chingleput, and of his intended Retreat to the Mount, or by the Way of Sadras, as he might find it expedient from the Motions of the Enemy, or with a View to be ſupplied with Proviſions, followed very ſoon.

Select Conſ. 12 and 13 Sept.

Your Committee judge it proper, in this Place, to direct the Attention of the Houſe to the Accounts given of theſe unfortunate Events, by thoſe who were moſt competent to relate them, and to offer their Sentiments upon them; and they therefore here inſert at large, the Journal of the Proceedings of the Army from the 25th of Auguſt to the 15th September, delivered in by the General to the Select Committee on the 21ſt September.

Extract of a Letter from General Sir Hector Munro to the Select Committee, dated 21ſt September 1780.

After having, with the greateſt Difficulty, got as much Rice as would ſerve the Troops for Eight Days, I was obliged to order the Sepoys to carry Four Days Rice each; and with the utmoſt Difficulty got Bullocks ſufficient to carry the Remainder. Hyder Ally having beſieged Arcot, and the Relief of that Place being conſidered of the greateſt Conſequence, as the Nabob's Capital, and a Place in which there was a great Quantity of Military Stores, as well as Proviſions, I was willing to move, as quick as poſſible, towards Conjeveram, imagining that an Army advancing towards Arcot might be the Means of raiſing the Siege; which, in Fact, happened. Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, with a large Detachment from the Northward, was advanced ſo far, that I had concerted Meaſures ſo that he would arrive at Conjeveram the Day after we got there.

The 25th of Auguſt I went to St. Thomas's Mount, where the Army was encamped. Captain Campbell's Regiment belonging to his Highneſs the Nabob, was with the Troops, but refuſed ſerving any longer, unleſs they received all their Arrears of Pay; which the Ameer, who was there in Perſon, not conſenting to, their Arms and Horſes were taken from them; about 56 of them, including 17 Black Officers, offered to ſerve, and Lieutenant James Campbell took the Command of them; Lieutenant Young with 33 European Troopers diſmounted, got ſome of the worſt Horſes to mount them. Theſe were all the Cavalry I had; the diſmounted Troopers of Captain Campbell's Regiment were marched Priſoners to Madraſs, and I have been informed, that the Ameer enliſted them all into his own Body Guard the next Morning.

The 26th Auguſt the Army, conſiſting of His Majeſty's 73d Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 1ſt Regiment, the Grenadier Company of the 2d Battalion 2d Regiment, with 5 Battalions of Sepoys, and a Company of Markſmen, the Two Troops of Cavalry, with a large Train of Artillery, amounting in all to 5209 Men, including Officers, (as the Corps were not compleat) marched from the Mount to Podepire, 11 Miles—27th to Tripamadore, 8 Miles—28th to Mootaimaicks Choultry, 8 Miles—29th to Camp near Conjeveram, 11 ½ Miles.

During theſe Four Days nothing very particular happened; the Enemy's Horſe followed us in great Numbers, and wounded and took a few Men. The Night we were at Tripamadore the Weather changed, and rained moſt violently; this Sort of Weather

continued till our Arrival at Conjeveram, by which the Roads became very bad, and the Country was all under Water. I was now obliged to deliver to the Troops the Four Days Rice that I had brought with me. The Nabob had ſent a Perſon from the Durbar, who I underſtood was to attend and aſſiſt me till I met with Niſiph Cawn at Arcot; I ſent for him, and told him he muſt immediately get Proviſions for the Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment, that I expected the next Day; and I alſo deſired he would uſe his utmoſt Endeavours to get Intelligence of the Enemy's Motions. His Anſwer was, that he was ordered by the Nabob to attend me, but had no Power given him to procure me either Proviſions or Intelligence. I had now no Hopes of Proviſions but from the Paddy that might be found in and about Conjeveram, which I ordered the Cutwall to collect, and gave him Guards of Sepoys to aſſiſt him in bringing it to the Pagoda.

30th. The Army remained on the ſame Ground, expecting Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment, which was to have joined this Day.—The Rains ſtill continued with great Violence.

31ſt. We were this Day informed by Two Deſerters, that Hyder had left Arcot, and was croſſing all his Army over the Parlar, and marching towards us. His Cavalry were in large Bodies all round us. The Rains ſtill continued both Night and Day. I received Accounts from Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, that his Detachment was ſtopped about Five Miles North of Trepaſſore, by a ſmall River, that was ſo deep that he could not paſs it.

Having Information that Hyder had got Poſſeſſion of a Mud Fort at Muſſalpauk, about Six Miles in our Front on the Left, where he had ſome Horſe and Infantry, and ſome Rocket Bays near it, a Detachment of Two Battalions of Sepoys, the Company of Markſmen, and a Grenadier Company, with Scaling Ladders, marched at Seven this Evening to ſurprize them, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Harper; but the Man who undertook to ſhew the Road, miſſed his Way in the Night, and after marching all Night, the Detachment returned in the Morning, without having effected any Thing.

Sept. 1ſt. The Ground was ſo covered with Water, that I was obliged to change my Camp nearer to Conjeveram.

2d and 3d. We remained on the ſame Ground, but the Rains ſtill continued moſt violently. This Day I received a Note from Captain Prendargaſt, that Hyder quitted his Ground before Arcot on the 29th Auguſt.—The Enemy were encamped at Ball Chitty's Choultry, about Five Miles in our Front.—I was obliged to give Paddy to the Battalion, to beat it out into Rice themſelves, as the Quantity beat out by the Followers of the Army, was not ſufficient for more than One Day's Conſumption for all the Troops.

Sept. 4th. This Evening it rained extremely hard.—Lieutenant Croker, with the 17th Battalion, marched and attacked an advanced Poſt of the Enemy in a Tope in our Front; he returned to Camp in the Morning, having killed ſeveral of the Enemy, and brought back Two Horſes.

5th. The Troops remained in the ſame Encampment. I received a Note from Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, informing me that he had croſſed the River the 3d.—The Rains ſtill continued very violent.

6th. The Enemy moved their Camp this Day to the North Eaſt.—We ſtruck our Tents, and marched to a high Ground, about Two Miles on the Road to Trepaſſore, where we encamped.—The Enemy's Camp was about Two Miles to our Left.—They had ſent forward a very large Detachment, which attacked Lieutenant Colonel Baillie at Peerambaucum, who repulſed them.—It rained moſt violently this Day.

7th and 8th. I received a Note from Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, informing me, that on a Review after the Action with Hyder's Detachment, he found it was not in his Power to join me, but hoped to ſee me at Peerambaucum.—I found myſelf now in a very critical Situation.—The only Hopes of Proviſions were from the Paddy I had collected in the Pagoda.—The Enemy was encamped within Two Miles of me.—Had I marched with my whole Force, he moſt certainly would have poſſeſſed himſelf of my Ground, and of Conjeveram, and thereby cut me off of all my Proviſions.—In this Caſe we muſt have been ſtarved; I therefore, with the Concurrence of the principal Officers of the Army with me, reſolved to ſend a ſtrong Detachment to Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, who was ſtill at Peerambaucum, 14 Miles from me, on the Trepaſſore

Road, and to remain with the reſt of the Troops to watch the Enemy's Motions.—At Nine o'Clock at Night, Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher marched with the Grenadier and Light Infantry Companies of the 73d Regiment, Two Companies of European Grenadiers, One Company of Sepoy Marſkmen, and Ten Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers. It was my Intention that this Detachment ſhould have taken with them Four Six Pounders; but Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher obſerved, that he ſhould be better able to croſs the Country without Artillery.—The Men left their Knapſacks, and I ſent with them Two Days Rice, Ammunition on Nine Camels, and Biſcuit and Arrack in Pots, on Coolies Heads.—I flattered myſelf ſo ſtrong a Detachment, when joined to Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Corps, would enable him to join me; and I deſired Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher to tell him to begin his March in the Evening of the 9th of September, and march all Night towards me; but if any Thing happened that he thought might impede his March, I then deſired he would move with the Detachment to Irapadamour, which was 20 Miles in my Rear, and inform me of it.

Sept. 9th. Our Army and the Enemy remained on the ſame Ground. This Evening the Tents were ſtruck, and we lay on our Arms all Night. About Twelve o'Clock we heard ſome Cannon and Muſquetry, which ſoon ceaſed, and every Thing remained quiet.

Sept. 10th. A little before Day-light, we heard a very heavy Firing of Cannon and Muſquetry, at a Diſtance. The Company's Army, I underſtood, had moved: I alſo, at Day-light, marched by my Right, on towards where we heard the Firing. When we had marched about Four Miles, I ordered Three Guns to be fired, as Signs of our Approach; and obſerving the Smoke of the Guns to be to our Left, we moved in a direct Line towards them. After marching about a Mile and Half more, I repeated the Signals, but had no Return. We ſaw a great Smoke, and of a ſudden all the Firing ceaſed. We continued our March to the Right, towards the Trepaſſore Road again, expecting to meet Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, not doubting but that he had repulſed the Enemy. After marching about Two Miles, we met One of our own Sepoys, wounded, who told us, that Colonel Baillie had been attacked, and entirely defeated. Though I could not depend on this Information, yet not meeting the Detachment, and the Firing having totally ceaſed, gave me too much Reaſon to ſuſpect ſome Diſaſter. The Security of the Army determined me, therefore, to return to Conjeveram, where we arrived about Six in the Evening. Several other wounded Sepoys came in this Night, who confirmed the Defeat of the Detachment. The Reports of the Sepoys differed ſo much as to Particulars, that no Credit could be given them; in One Circumſtance only they ſeemed all to agree, which was, that either Two or Three Tumbrils blew up, and that then the Horſe broke in upon the Detachment. This is all the Information I got of this moſt unhappy Diſaſter.

I found there was barely One Day's Rice for the Troops; and I conſidered, that if I remained at Conjeveram, I ſhould be ſurrounded with all Hyder's Cavalry, ſo that I ſhould be every Day more diſtreſſed for Paddy and Sheep, and the Horſes and Bullocks muſt have ſtarved; nor had I any Hopes of Relief. I reſolved therefore to fall back to Chingleput, where I hoped to find Proviſions; I ordered all the Baggage out of the Pagoda, which was not in a State of Defence, and threw the heavy Guns and Stores, that could not be moved, into the great Tank.

Sept. 11th. At Three in the Morning, we left Conjeveram; we marched all Day. Our Flanks and Rear were continually harraſſed with not leſs than 6000 of the Enemy's Horſe, who wounded ſeveral Men, and cut off ſeveral Carts of Baggage. A deep Nulla near Skeveram retarded our March much; and the Followers of the Army, with the Baggage, preſſed ſo cloſe on the Line in this narrow Paſs, that many of the Coolies threw down their Loads, and left them on the Ground. We arrived at Eleven at Night at a River, within a Mile and a Half of Chingleput, ſo deep, that the Rear of our Army did not paſs it till Nine o'Clock next Morning.

Sept. 12th. I was much diſappointed on being informed, by Lieutenant Mackay, who commands at Chingleput, that I could not get any Proviſions for the Troops, and that the Nabob's Hamildars had all run away from the Country. After every Endeavour, we could only get Paddy ſufficient for One Day's Rice, and ſome Sheep for the Europeans. Colonel Coſby joined us here, with his Detachment from the Southward, conſiſting of Ten Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers, Three Battalion Companies of Sepoys, Two Regiments of his Highneſs the Nabob's Cavalry, with Six of his Light Infantry Companies, and Two Three-Pounders. Had we had Proviſions, I could have remained at Chingleput with this Reinforcement, till I had heard from Madras; but Neceſſity obliged us to make another forced March to St. Thomas's Mount.

Sept. 13th.

Sept. 13th. We left all our Sick and ſome of the Baggage at Chingleput, and began our March at Six in the Evening, and arrived at the Mount on the 14th, about Two o'Clock in the Afternoon: the Troops were quartered in the Barracks and Houſes; and the 15th the Army marched to Marmelon, where they are now encamped.

I have now, Gentlemen, in plain Terms, informed you of every Particular relative to the Army, that I can recollect worthy your Obſervation; and give me Leave to aſſure you, that in the ſhort Time we have been from Madras, I have had more Difficulties to encounter than ever I experienced ſince I have been a Soldier. I imagine it will appear, that the unexpected as well as uncommon Quantity of Rain, that fell from the 26th of Auguſt to the 6th September, has been the Cauſe of our Misfortune, by ſwelling a ſmall River ſo as to prevent Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment from paſſing, from the 27th of Auguſt to the 3d of September; and what ſtill adds to the Diſtreſs, I underſtand it is a River that has ſcarce ever been known to be impaſſable for any Length of Time. Had Lieutenant Colonel Baillie joined us the 29th of Auguſt at Conjeveram (which nothing but the Rains could prevent) I ſhould have had it in my Power to have attacked Hyder's Camp at Ball Chitty, before his whole Force had been collected. His Situation favoured the Attempt, being encamped in a Wood, which would have given our Infantry the Advantage over his numerous Cavalry; I ſhould alſo have had Proviſions ſufficient to have ſerved the Army to Arcot, where we expected an ample Supply; but the Neceſſity I was under of remaining at Conjeveram, deprived me of theſe Advantages. The Quantity of Paddy I had collected in the Pagoda was our only Support, and had I quitted Conjeveram, the Enemy would immediately have occupied it, and we muſt have ſtarved. In the unfortunate Affair of the 10th, as I am certain Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, his Officers, and the whole Detachment, would exert themſelves to the utmoſt, I am of Opinion that the blowing up of the Tumbrils was the Ruin of the Detachment, the Number of Lives that muſt have been loſt by the Exploſion, the Confuſion it muſt have created in the Ranks, and the Want of Ammunition, might have been the Cauſe of the Defeat of a much larger Body, and I fear it was at this Moment of their Diſtreſs that Hyder's Multitude of Cavalry fell on them. The Want of Intelligence was a Circumſtance in which I was much diſtreſſed: I found myſelf in a Country ravaged with Fire and Sword, and ſo ſurrounded with Horſe, that Hircarras could with Difficulty go out or return to Camp without being wounded by them. The Inhabitants moſtly fled, and the few that remained, ſeemed more in the Intereſt of the Enemy than of their proper Maſter. It was to Captain Pringle, who is Captain of the Guides, that I was obliged in this Particular, whoſe unwearied Diligence provided me all the Intelligence I did receive.

Great as the Misfortune is in the Loſs of ſo large a Detachment, I hope we have ſtill Reſources to bring a ſtrong Army to the Field; but in particular give me Leave to fix your Attention to Cavalry: The Oppreſſion of the Artillery and Infantry for want of Horſe is too great; the Numbers of Detachments obliged to be ſent out for Proviſions harraſſes the Troops ſeverely; whereas, a certain Number of regular Cavalry would cover your Troops on all Marches, provide Eſcorts for Convoys, keep your Camp quiet by Patroles, and give Relief to the Artillery and Infantry, ſo as to enable them to act with full Force when actual Services require their Exertion.—I beg this Letter may make a Number in the firſt Packet to Europe.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

Your Committee think it proper to refer the Houſe to the Appendix N° 9, for other Letters relative to theſe Events; and they have there put a Letter from the Select Committee to the Court of Directors, dated the 15th October 1780, and together with it, the Correſpondence between the General and the Governor in Letters which appear to have not been laid before the Board; and alſo the General's Correſpondence with Colonels Coſby and Baillie, and the Inſtructions which he gave to them and to Colonel Fletcher.

There will alſo be found annexed, a Return of the Detachment under Colonel Baillie, a Return of the Troops at the Mount on the 26th Auguſt, and of the Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, iſſued from 26th Auguſt to 15th September, and a State of the Troops which now, ſince the Retreat from Conjeveram, were encamped on the Madras Side of the Marmelon River; to which is added, the Minute of the General reſpecting Colonel Baillie's Loſs, and ſome official Letters to the Secretary at War, and Encloſures, which he tranſmitted to Europe.

See alſo Appendix, N° 2.
Mr. Sadlier's Letter to Bengal.

And

And Your Committee have alſo here ſubjoined to thoſe Papers which were produced or ſent by Sir Hector Munro, a Letter from Lord Macleod to the Secretary at War, and ſome Letters from Sir Edward Hughes, and alſo from other Officers who have given any Accounts of theſe Events.

And as it appears, That the firſt Step taken by the Select Committee after receiving Information of this Misfortune, was to tranſmit an Account of it to Bengal, Your Committee have thought proper to place alſo in this Number of the Appendix, the Conſultations of that Select Board, on 13th September, and the Reſolutions formed in conſequence of them, and their Letter of the 14th to the Governor General and Council thereupon, that the Houſe may have before them in One View, all the Circumſtances leading to and immediately conſequential upon the Defeat, which Your Committee have been able to collect.

Letter to Governor General, &c. 14 Sept. 1780.

It appears, That to the Neceſſity of Aſſiſtance in Money, for which this Preſidency had before, as has been ſeen, applied to that of Bengal, was now ſuperadded an urgent Demand for a Reinforcement of Troops; which, they ſay, the bare Recital of their Loſs would make evident, "eſpecially as it had been with the utmoſt Difficulty "that they could before draught a ſufficient Number of Troops from their Garriſons "to meet the Enemy in the Field."

Vide Appendix, N° 9.

And Your Committee find, That this was enforced by a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes of the ſame Date; who, after repreſenting the imminent Danger of the Preſidency of Madras, entreats the Governor General and Council to lay aſide all Plans againſt the Marattas, and unite in oppoſing Hyder and the French, who were certainly acting in concert.

And Your Committee find by the General Letter from Fort Saint George to the Court of Directors, dated 15th October, that immediately upon the Irruption of Hyder Ally in July, Advertiſements had been iſſued for receiving Loans upon Company's Bonds; and that the Supply raiſed by this Means proving very inadequate, and having no other immediate Reſource, they obſerve, that they had been obliged, in this Exigency, to act contrary to Orders, and to draw Bills on them to an Amount exceeding £. 200,000.

N° 91, Country Corr.

Sel. Conſ. 22 Sept. Minute of Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob was required by Letter of 19 September, to return an exact and poſitive Anſwer to ſome Queſtions put to him in regard to the Contributions which might be depended on from him; and an Aſſignment of Territory was inſiſted upon, for all Money which had been or ſhould be advanced for the Payment of his Troops.

N° 100, Country Corr.

And Your Committee find, That the Anſwer of the Nabob to the Governor, dated the 1ſt October, contained an Account of his great Diſtreſs, and of his Inability to aſſiſt, as he could wiſh, in furniſhing Supplies;—that he had often given Warning of the Enemy's Intentions to invade the Carnatic, and was not then called upon to provide thoſe Neceſſaries, which he had declared it would be very difficult to procure when the Enemy ſhould have entered his Country—That now, when they had been Two Months in the Carnatic, he received a Letter from the Governor, requeſting a Supply of Bullocks, Sheep, and Rice; that, however, he would endeavour to procure them all, in as great Number and Quantity as he could;—and that he would exert himſelf to compleat Four Regiments of Cavalry, which ſhould be put under the Directions of the Commander in Chief during the War—That he would conſent to make Aſſignments of Territory, for the Sums which ſhould be advanced by the Company to pay his Troops.

20th October, N° 113. 25 October, N° 117.

It appears, That on the 6th of October, Two Members of the Select Committee complained, That an Alteration had been made in this Letter ſince they had ſeen it on the 2d.—Your Committee have not diſcovered what this Alteration was; but it appears, That the Nabob, in ſeveral ſubſequent Letters, repeated his Conſent to appropriate the Revenues of Tinnevelle, Ramnaut, Shevagunga, and Trichinopoly, for Money advanced to pay the Arrears due to his Troops, and for their future Payment; and that on the 30th of October, it was reſolved by the Select Committee, to diſcharge thoſe Arrears, and to regulate the Aſſignments in the Manner then propoſed by the Preſident.

Minute Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, 13 Sept. Vide App. N° 9.

And Your Committee find, That the Select Board now judged it to be a neceſſary Meaſure to ſtrengthen the Fort of Tanjore; and it was propoſed to ſend a Detachment of Troops, who ſhould not be Tanjoreans, to reinforce the Garriſon. And Colonel Braithwaite,

Braithwaite, who had on the 15th September been appointed to the Command of that Place, ſuggeſted an Advice on the 23d of the ſame Month, That a Body of Horſe ſhould be raiſed in that Country, where there formerly was ſome good Cavalry, which, having been ſince neglected, had deſerted to Hyder.

And Your Committee find, That Letters were afterwards wrote to the Raja, to deſire his Aſſiſtance for that Purpoſe, and to put his Sebendy Corps under the Direction of the Commandant at Tanjore; and alſo to requeſt from him a conſtant Supply of Proviſions, aſſuring him at the ſame Time of Protection: And it appears, that the Raja returned a very favourable Anſwer to theſe Applications. N° 107, 11th October. N° 116, 24 October. N° 118, 13 October. Appendix, N° 10.

It appears, That the giving up the Guntoor Circar, which had been ſo long delayed, was now reſolved upon; and that the Select Committee, on the 14th September, wrote to Lieutenant Douglas, who commanded in that Diſtrict; encloſing an Order from the Nabob to his Managers, to withdraw from all farther Concern in that Country. Lieutenant Douglas was alſo directed to write to Bazalet Jung's Agent; and inform him of this Intention, that he might take Charge of the Circar till he ſhould receive Inſtructions from his Maſter about it. The Company's Sepoys were to be collected together from different Parts of the Diſtrict, and to march immediately to Ongole, and to proceed from thence with all poſſible Expedition to the Preſidency.

Your Committee have thought proper to put into the Appendix, N° 11, a Letter from the Governor to Bazalet Jung on this Subject, which appears to have been wrote on the 23d September, in conſequence of a Motion made in the Select Committee by Mr. Johnſon; and in the ſame Appendix will be found a Letter from the Nabob on the ſame Subject, dated 16th September; wherein alſo he deſired to be authorized to negotiate a Treaty with the Nyſam. Country Corr. N° 92. Country Corr. N° 90.

And it appears, That the Select Committee came to a Reſolution on the 23d Sept^r. that the Governor ſhould write a Letter to that Prince, acquainting him with their having ordered the Guntoor Circar to be reſtored. This Letter appears to have been ſent on the 25th, and ſtates, That as his Highneſs had induced the Preſidency of Bengal to interfere for attaining that Object, and they lament the long Diſappointment they had found, to their Hopes of being able to pay him their Arrears of the Peſcuſh due for the other Circars; but deſire him to believe their Aſſurances, that they will neglect no Opportunity for the future of making good the Balances; and they conclude with expreſſing a confident Hope, "that his Highneſs would act according to the Treaties ſubſiſting between him and the Company, and endeavour to the utmoſt of his Power to "check the Deſigns of their Enemies."

And Your Committee find, That it was reſolved, on the 13th September, by the Select Committee, to withdraw the greateſt Part of the Troops from the other Circars, and to leave Garriſons only in Ganjam, Mazulipatam, and Vizagapatam, the Works of which were ordered to be ſtrengthened as much as poſſible; and that Inſtructions were ſent to that Effect, on the 14th and 16th September, to the Chiefs and Council of thoſe Places; and at the ſame Time they were directed to pack up their Treaſure, and put it on Board the Nymph Sloop of War, which Sir Edward Hughes had agreed to diſpatch with the Packet to Bengal, and permitted it to touch at thoſe Places on her Return.

And Your Committee find, That Lieutenant Douglas, in Obedience to his Inſtructions, delivered up the Guntoor to Bazalet Jung's Manager; but was obliged to inform the Select Committee, by Letter dated the 24th September, that the Sepoys would deſert, if ordered to march to the Southward. And it appears that he was thereupon directed by Letter of 4th October, to leave them at Ongole; and that the Four Companies of the 7th Carnatic Battalion ſhould be ſent from thence to the Preſidency, according to his Advice in a Letter dated the 1ſt October. Letter dated 21 Sept. Select Conſ. 27 Sept. Select Conſ. 30 Sept. Letter to Capt. Edwards

And Your Committee find, That a Difficulty of a ſimilar Nature, in another Circar, was not ſo happily concluded; for upon an Attempt to embark the Sepoys for the Preſidency at Mazulipatam and Viſagapatam, they mutinied; and though at the firſt of theſe Places Order was reſtored by the Addreſs of General Stewart, at the other they proceeded to Acts of the moſt extreme Outrage, killed ſome of their Officers, "and a compleat "Plunder of the Place enſued, whereby the Property of every Individual, as well as that "of the Company, had ſuffered effectually."—It appeared that the Mutineers then went off, accompanied by Five Companies of the Firſt Circar Battalion, which happened to be in Garriſon there; and that there were great Apprehenſions that the Sepoys in the Cicacole Circar would follow their Example; and alſo, that the Zemindars would avail themſelves of that Opportunity to throw off their Allegiance; that Sittaram Rauze was Select Conſ. October 9. Letter from Maſulipatam, 2 Oct. Select Conſ. October 13. Letters from Viſagapatam, 4 and 5 October.

not yet arrived at Viſagapatam, and that he kept away in a Manner that had the Appearance of premeditated Delay; that on all theſe Accounts there was much Anxiety about the Fate of that Settlement.

Select Conſ. Oct. 18.

Select Conſ. 30 Oct. Appendix, N° 11.

And it appears by further Accounts, that Viziram Rauze, the Brother of Sittaram Rauze, had wrote Letters to the Zemindars to aſſiſt in ſuppreſſing the Mutiny; but Your Committee find, by a Letter dated the 10th October, that the Inſurgents had laid down their Arms and Part of their Plunder, and had diſperſed.

Select Conſ. 14 Sept. 1780.

15 Sept.

Select Conſ. 23 Sept.

And Your Committee find, That Sir Hector Munro, who had aſked and obtained Leave to come to the Preſidency after he had encamped the Remains of his Army on the Banks of the Marmelon, having again reſumed his Seat in the Committee, propoſed and recommended there, on the 22d September, a Mode, by which he hoped that the late Misfortunes would be repaired, and the Army ſtrengthened as ſoon as poſſible, ſo as to enable them to oppoſe the Enemy. After explaining his Plan for the ſtrengthening the principal Garriſons; for raiſing Sepoy Recruits to compleat their Battalions; for encreaſing their monthly Pay to engage them in the Service, and perhaps alſo to tempt them to quit that of the Enemy; in ſhort, for the general Regulation and Diſtribution of the Forces, he urged the Neceſſity of putting theſe Meaſures into immediate Execution; and then concludes in theſe Words: "It is in Peace we ſhould prepare for War. After the Siege of Pondicherry, I had the Honour of addreſſing the "Select Committee by Letter, wherein I ſtated the Defects in their Garriſons and "Stores, and pointed out the Neceſſity of putting them in ſuch a State as to be ready "on any Emergency; and I frequently recommended that the Troops ſhould always be "ready for the Field. I am ſorry to ſay that any Obſervations of mine had not the "Effect I could have wiſhed. I ſhall ſay no more on what is paſt; it is our Buſineſs "now to uſe every Endeavour for the public Good. We ſhould have One Voice, and "One Hand, and if the ruling Power is ſteady and determined in its Reſolutions, the "executive Part muſt and will be properly attended to; nor can you make yourſelves "more formidable to your Enemy, than by Unanimity in your Council."

Appendix, N° 12.

Sept. 1780.

Select Conſ. October 12.

And Your Committee find, That frequent Conſiderations being now had of deviſing the moſt proper and effectual Means for Security and Reſiſtance againſt the ſucceſsful Enemy, ſeveral Propoſitions were laid before the Select Committee, and ſeveral Reſolutions taken upon them; the moſt material of which will be found in an Appendix, N° 13. And as the heavy Loſs ſuſtained by the Defeat of Colonel Baillie, made it moſt immediately obvious that the firſt neceſſary Expedient was to endeavour to recruit the ſhattered Battalions, Orders appear to have been diſpatched by the Select Board to different Stations for that Purpoſe; but as almoſt every Diſtrict was now over-run by the Enemy's Troops, and Communication thereby with the Country greatly cut off, the Means of gaining Recruits were of courſe much ſtreightened; it was found neceſſary to apply to the Nabob for Leave to draft his Sibbendy Corps, and alſo to order that recruiting Money ſhould be increaſed to One Pagoda. And as Intimations were made to the Select Board, that the Europeans in Hyder's Service were diſpoſed to deſert from it, they appear to have commiſſioned their Officers to hold out ſuch Encouragement as might be likely to induce thoſe Men to enter into the Company's Regiments. The Chief Engineer gave in a Plan of Meaſures neceſſary to be adopted for the Defence of the Black Town and Fort; and it was particularly reſolved, on 25th September, to lay up Six Months Store of every Kind of Proviſion within the Fort, as ſoon as poſſible; and the Preſident was deſired to take the neceſſary Steps accordingly. The Commander of the Artillery propoſed, by Letter of 24th September, an Augmentation of that Corps, which was agreed to be referred to the Court of Directors; Ammunition and Stores were ordered to thoſe Places which were found to want them; and Arcot was reinforced by Fifty Europeans from Vellore, ſo that the Garriſon conſiſted, on the 26th September, of about 150 Europeans, beſides Two Companies of Sepoys commanded by the Company's Officers, and about 7000 armed People; but the Nabob, ſtill anxious for the Fate of his Capital, of which Hyder had reſumed the Siege, continually ſolicited freſh Succours, which could not be given to it.

Letter to Trichinopoly, 15 Sept.
to Ongole, 16 Sept. &c.

Select Conſ. October 6.
Letter from Ongole.
Select Conſ. 19 October.
Select Conſ. October 12.
Minute of Sir H. Munro.
Letter from Vellore, 5 Oct.
Select Conſ. Oct. 10th.
Letter to C. Lang.
Select Conſ. 19 Sept.
Select Conſ. 28 Sept.
28 October, Palamcotty, Trichinopoly, &c.
Select Conſ. 23 and 25th Sept.
N° 95, 97, 99, 103, 108. 25th Sept. 27 Sept. 1 Oct. 6 D°, 12 D°.

Appendix, N° 13.

It appears indeed to Your Committee, That much Apprehenſion was at this Time conceived for the Situation of Madras itſelf, from the incomplete State of the Fortifications, the Weakneſs of the Garriſon, and the Want of Proviſions: And Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, in their Minute of the 11th October, made theſe, as well as the probable Deſigns of the French from the Iſlands, the Grounds of their Deſire, that Sir Edward Hughes ſhould be requeſted not to quit that Coaſt, but to bring his Fleet into the Road, as ſoon as he could with Safety.

But it appears to Your Committee, That the Admiral attended the Select Committee on

on the 12th October; and after ſtating many urgent Reaſons, which made it incumbent upon him to proceed to Bombay, obſerved moreover, That he did not think it probable that the French Attack would be directed firſt to the Coromandel Coaſt; and that at all Events, they were not to be expected during the enſuing Monſoon, immediately after which, he ſhould hope himſelf to return.

And it appears, That the Committee then came to a Reſolution, not to make any further Requeſt to Sir Edward, to alter his Determination of proceeding to Bombay.

And it appears, That the Committee took the Opportunity of ſending a Packet by him to that Preſidency; in which they gave a Relation of the Defeat of their Troops under Colonel Baillie, and remarked, with Regret, the Inconvenience they ſuffered from the Abſence of thoſe Troops which they had detached to Bombay, to their Aſſiſtance, and that they wiſhed to have them returned to their Coaſt by the firſt Opportunity. 13 October. Appendix, N° 14.

It appears, That the Select Committee having received Advices from Tellicherry, that it was cloſely beſieged by the Nairs, aſſiſted with the Force of Hyder Ally, wrote to the Chief and Council, and to the Commandant of that Place, inſtructing them, that as they conceived it not poſſible, without powerful Support, to keep Poſſeſſion of it for any Length of Time, and as the Situation of Affairs rendered it neceſſary that the Troops ſhould return to the Preſidency, with all poſſible Expedition, they ſhould abandon the Settlement, and that Sir Edward Hughes would aſſiſt in bringing off the Troops, Stores, and Effects, and would tranſport them to Anjengo. Dated 13th Oct.

And it appears to Your Committee, That a Letter was written on the ſame Day, to Sir Edward Hughes, in which the Committee requeſted him to execute that Service. Appendix, N° 15.

And Your Committee find, That at this Time a General Letter having been made up, and diſpatched by the Nymph Sloop of War, Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, delivered in a Minute, October 19th, expreſſive of their Diſapprobation of the Contents, as being a partial and unfair Account of the Tranſactions and Events which it was meant to communicate to the Court of Directors; and they point out ſeveral Circumſtances, which were omitted or miſrepreſented—they obſerved, "That they might re- "late what had happened in the moſt favourable Manner their Records would allow, "but on no Account to deviate from them; remarking, that by them, and not by partial "Repreſentations, their Conduct would be judged; and that they therefore totally diſap- "proved of every Part of the Letter, which could not be corroborated by the Minutes "of the Committee." 15 October.

It appears, That another joint Minute had been delivered in by the ſame Gentlemen, on the 14th Inſtant, which they thought neceſſary, to make the Record of their Sentiments on the Mode in which Buſineſs was conducted in the Committee, that it might be ſeen how far any Reſponſibility could be required of them in particular, who formed a Part of the Government, that they would therefore point out the ruling Influence which that Inſtitution had thrown into the Hands of the Governor, and conſequently, how much he was reſponſible for all Meaſures that came before it.

They particularly remark his Power of preſenting or ſuppreſſing all official Information, and obſerve, "That they had Reaſon to think the late Preſident expected before "his Departure, that the Company's Poſſeſſions on the Coaſt would be invaded by "Hyder;—that they likewiſe had Reaſon to think that he knew Magazines were col- "lecting on the Frontiers of the Carnatic, at Bengalore, &c. and that they had been "informed that Mr. Grey wrote ſeveral Letters to him on that Subject (although only "One appeared on Record;) but this Information was never communicated to the "Committee."

They then refer to ſeveral of their Minutes, which contained Intelligence of Hyder's Deſigns, and of their Advice to prepare to oppoſe him; and aſſert their Opinion, that if thoſe Meaſures had been attended to, it was probable that the Enemy would not have invaded the Carnatic, or that at all Events the Army would have been in Readineſs to have met him on his firſt Appearance.—They condemn, in expreſs Terms, many Steps taken by the Majority of the Committee ſince his Irruption; and ſtate the Conduct which they had themſelves purſued—"They think it neceſſary, in Concluſion, to deſire "that the Court of Directors, and the Committee, would refer to the Report of the "late Preſident, relative to Hyder's Diſpoſition and Intentions, as entered in the Mi- "nutes of the Committee on 23d October 1779, and to the Committee's unanimous "Opinion thereupon; and to Mr. Smith's Minute 10th November, and to the Com- "mittee's Opinion in conſequence thereof." Appendix, N° 16. in which Your Committee Appendix, No. 16.

mittee have alſo put a Letter from the Nabob to the Court of Directors, dated 17th October, 1780.

Such were the Steps which appear to have been taken at Fort St. George, in conſequence of the Diſaſter, which had ſo weakened their Power and Reſources, as to occaſion a voluntary Dereliction of ſome of their Poſſeſſions, in order to be better enabled to preſerve the reſt.

Your Committee will now take a View of the Proceedings at Bengal, on their receiving Information of the Irruption of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic, and of the heavy Loſs which had happened afterwards to Part of the Madras Army.

It appears, by the Conſultations of that Preſidency of the 4th September, That though a Motion was made to ſend a Sum of Money to Madras, adequate to the Emergency of the Occaſion, provided they ſhould not be able to furniſh themſelves by the Method they were purſuing, of raiſing Money upon the Company's Bonds; yet, on farther Reflection, it was agreed to wait till more particular Accounts of the Neceſſity ſhould be received, and a "further Information had of the State of that Preſidency with re-
"lation to its Diſpoſition for repelling the actual or pretended Invaſion, whichever it
"might prove, and the other diſtinct Services to which they might propoſe to apply
"the Sums afforded them; and eſpecially as Two Modes of Remittance were already
"provided, which, though not ample, would prove a ſufficient Relief to their imme-
"diate Wants."

Conſultations, 22, 25, 26, 27 Sept.

The Accounts which followed ſoon after of the Defeat of Colonel Baillie, and of the alarming Diſtreſs in which the Britiſh Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel were involved, by the ſucceſsful Progreſs of Hyder Ally, occaſioned Meaſures of more immediate Relief to be propoſed and adopted: It was reſolved to ſend a Supply of 15 Lacks of Rupees, to tranſport to Madras immediately a conſiderable Reinforcement of European Troops, and that ſeveral Battalions of Sepoys ſhould follow them at a proper Seaſon, and in the Manner which ſhould then be found moſt adviſeable; for the Seaſon was now too far advanced to prepare Veſſels to carry ſo large a Body of Men, provided, which could hardly be hoped, that the Sepoys would ſubmit to an Embarkation, and get the better of their Repugnance to a Paſſage by Sea.—The Roads by Land lay through a marſhy Country, and were yet impaſſable, and there were yet alſo to be removed the Doubts of the Deſign with which the Berar Anny was ſtationed in the very Line of the Route which they muſt take.—Sir Eyre Coote was deſired, and he agreed, to proceed himſelf immediately to the Coaſt, and take the Command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment. And it was urged, that, "Though the Danger impending
"on the Company's Intereſts in the Carnatic might be eaſily repelled, even with the
"Force which it already poſſeſſed for its Defence, yet, that no Reliance could be placed
"upon it, unleſs it ſhould be properly applied and conducted;—that it did not appear
"to have been properly applied, nor could be expected to be properly conducted,
"unleſs Sir Eyre Coote would at this Criſis ſtand forth, and vindicate, in his own Per-
"ſon, the Rights and Honour of the Britiſh Arms."

Doubts alſo being then ſuggeſted, of the Propriety of truſting ſo large a Sum as 15 Lacks of Rupees to the Management of the Gentlemen of Madras, from an Apprehenſion that they would "not only miſapply but waſte it;" a Reſolution was taken, that the Treaſure ſhould be conſigned to Sir Eyre Coote, and appropriated excluſively to anſwer Military Charges; "but that he ſhould be authorized to advance any Part of it
"on the Requiſition of the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort St. George, ſhould
"he agree in the Expediency of doing ſo."

Theſe Particulars were communicated to the Madras Board, in a Letter from the Governor General and Council of 2d October; wherein, after expreſſing a moſt ſenſible Concern at the fatal Check which the Company's Arms had received, they declare, "that they purpoſely forbear at preſent from making any Obſervations on that Event,
"or on the Steps, which if taken would, in their Opinion, have prevented it." They inform them alſo of having ſent ſome Salt Proviſions in caſe of a Siege, and of the Means taken to provide them with Grain; of their having reſolved to offer Terms of Peace to the Marattas, and of having written to Sir Edward Hughes, requeſting him to direct, if poſſible, the Operations of His Majeſty's Squadron, againſt the Poſſeſſions and Ships of Hyder, on the Coaſt of Malabar.

In their Letter to Sir Edward Hughes, which was alſo of the ſame Date with that to Madras, they particularly remark to him, that they had reſolved on a Peace with the Marattas; "that it had been long their Wiſh to ſee an early Iſſue to their Differences,

" and were happy to obſerve, that this Wiſh ſeemed to accord with the Sentiments " ſtrongly conveyed to them in his Letter of the 14th ult."

To theſe Reſolutions the Governor General and Council added another, which they came to on the 10th October, of ſuſpending Mr. Whitehill from his Office of Preſident and Governor of Fort St. George, for ſeveral Cauſes aſſigned in their Secret Conſultations of that Date.—They tranſmitted Accounts of all theſe Proceedings to the Court of Directors, in Letters of the 13th and 17th October; in the latter of which they refer to a Letter they wrote to Fort St. George on the 20th of January 1778, reſpecting the Diſpoſition of the Troops on that Eſtabliſhment; and declare it to be their Opinion, that, had that Diſpoſition been attended to, or the Advice contained in that Letter followed, the Calamity which their Forces lately ſuffered, and which was owing to a Diviſion of the Troops at a Moment of Emergency, would not have happened. Appendix, N° 17.

It appears to Your Committee, That Sir Eyre Coote arrived at Madras on the 5th November, and that he took his Seat as Second in Council on the 7th; when the General Letter from the Bengal Preſidency, containing their Order and Reaſons for the Suſpenſion of Mr. Whitehill, was read; and alſo a Minute of Mr. Whitehill's, in which he diſclaims and proteſts againſt the Authority of the Supreme Council to deprive him of his Office of Preſident and Governor of Fort St. George, and holds every Member of Adminiſtration who ſhould ſubmit to it on the preſent Occaſion, to be anſwerable to the East India Company for the Subverſion of the Government, and to him, for any Loſs he may ſuſtain in his Perſon or Liberty.

And it appears in the Conſultations of the 8th November, that Mr. Whitehill was held to be ſuſpended by a Majority of the Council; and that Mr. Smith, as next to the Chair, ſucceeded to the Government.

And Your Committee find, That the Preſident and Select Committee, informed the Court of Directors, by Letter dated 29th November, of the Aſſiſtance which Sir Eyre Coote had brought to their Preſidency in Money and Troops, and that a large Reinforcement of Sepoys was expected to march from Bengal to join their Troops, as ſoon as the Weather would permit; but its Arrival at Madras could not be looked for earlier than March; even on a Suppoſition that the Detachment ſhould not be oppoſed on its march, either by the Troops of Moodajee Booſla, the Raja of Berar, or by thoſe of the Nyſam, which it was impoſſible to ſay it might not, although neither of thoſe Powers had yet broke with the Company.

It appears to Your Committee alſo by this Diſpatch, That the Pettah of Arcot, having been carried by Aſſault on the 31ſt October, after a Siege of 6 Weeks, the Fort ſurrendered to Hyder Ally, by Capitulation, on the 3d of November; and that this Loſs was conſidered to be of great Importance, as there were lodged in it a very large Quantity of Stores of all Kinds, and as it was extenſive enough to afford Protection and Accommodation for the whole Army of the Enemy.

It appears alſo, That Hyder's Cavalry having over-run and laid Waſte the whole Country, the chief Supply of Proviſions, and Draught and Carriage Bullocks, for the Britiſh Army, was thus cut off. No Money could be obtained from the Nabob, or from the Raja of Tanjore. The Revenues of the Nabob, indeed, had ſuffered much from the Incurſion of the Enemy, and the Deſolation of his Territories; but the Raja of Tanjore had not yet had a Grain of his Country touched. And, " thus," ſay they, " from " our paſt Diſappointments and preſent Proſpects, we can place but little Dependance " on any other Reſource than that of Bengal for carrying on the War; and as to the " Expences of the Civil Department, we have very ſlender Hope of procuring ſufficient " to anſwer them from any Quarter."

And Your Committee find, That Sir Eyre Coote, in Letters to the Court of Directors, to One of His Majeſty's Principal Secretaries of State, and to the Secretary at War, exhibits a very ſtriking and melancholy Picture of the Situation of Affairs on his Arrival at Madras; where he found their preſent State to be indeed more diſtreſſed and ſunk than he even could have had any Idea of, and the Proſpect of Alteration appeared hardly leſs diſcouraging. He profeſſes to avoid a minute Diſquiſition of the Perſons or Cauſes to which theſe Misfortunes might be attributed; " but he ſhould hope that both " would be brought forward to public View; and that the Nation might thereby have " an Opportunity of redreſſing itſelf of thoſe who had wantonly injured its Honour and " Intereſts." He obſerves, that, regardleſs of the Jealouſy which muſt have been expected in every Native Power, from our having driven out our only European Competitor from that Quarter of the World, the Government of Madras had contrived, by

an inexcuſable Effort of bad Policy, to ſtimulate that Jealouſy into avowed Reſentment—that this was ſtrongly inſtanced by their Conduct in regard to Hyder, who, incenſed at their Refuſal to aſſiſt him againſt the Marattas, as by Treaty they were virtually bound to do, had ſince received other Provocations from them to ruſh into open Hoſtillity; and though well-informed and aware of his Intentions againſt the Carnatic, they had choſen not only themſelves to diſcredit them, but to diſſuade the Belief of others; they had made no Oppoſition to his Entry into the Province, nor taken the ſmalleſt Precautions for their own Security—that moreover, this Inactivity had ſtill continued; and what ought to have been their firſt Care, lay as much neglected as if no Enemy had been near. That the Troops were diſpirited, the Sepoys deſerting, the Country deſolated, the Inhabitants treacherous, all Communications were cut off, their Proviſions were conſumed, and their Reſources exhauſted. The Nabob, ſo far from being able to give Aſſiſtance in this Exigency, had neither Men, Money, or Influence, and looked up to the Company for the Support of his Intereſts and Credit—that Arcot had fallen into Hyder's Hands; an Event which, whilſt it gave him almoſt every Thing he would wiſh, produced Effects the moſt embarraſſing to the Company's Affairs, and to the Conduct of the War on their Part; that other Forts and Garriſons had ſurrendered without Reſiſtance, and their Commanders were thereby to be ſuſpected of Treachery; but that ſo ſhameful had been the Neglect of every Neceſſary for their Defence, that they were furniſhed with an Excuſe for ſo readily giving them up—even the neceſſary Arrangements for the Security of Fort St. George, the very Foundation of our Exiſtence on that Coaſt, had not been made; no Pains had been taken to repair the ſhattered Condition of the very ſmall Army that remained for their Defence; the Field Artillery requiſite for a Campaign, was ſo far from being in Readineſs, that the Carriages were then making up; that it was true, how ſurpriſing ſoever, that Pondicherry was, when evacuated, left not only not in a Condition uſeleſs to the French, in caſe of their landing on that Coaſt, but open and convenient for their Reception—nothing but the Fortifications deſtroyed, the French Inhabitants left in ample Poſſeſſion of their Houſes; and in conſequence they had riſen in Arms, robbed the Reſident, and raiſed Two or Three Battalions of Sepoys, which they called Hyder's, but which were evidently French. Large Quantities of Proviſions were laying up at Carongolly, in the Neighbourhood of Pondicherry, which being on the Sea-Coaſt, could be intended only for the French on their Arrival. To ſuch Diſadvantages, ariſing from theſe Misfortunes, and this Miſconduct on their Part, was to be added, the Increaſe of Superiority to the Enemy, by his good Policy, as well as the Strength and Succeſs of his Arms; for, that Hyder had taken every Meaſure which could occur to the moſt experienced General to diſtreſs us, and to render himſelf formidable; and "that his Conduct in his civil Capacity had been ſup-"ported by a Degree of political Addreſs, unequalled by any Power that had yet ap-"peared in Hindoſtan."

That the Smallneſs of the Britiſh Force, and of their Reſources, compared to thoſe of Hyder, augmented the Difficulties of future Conteſt with him—That his Army, on the moſt moderate Computation, "amounted to not leſs than 70,000 Infantry (common "Report makes them 100,000) of which there are 20,000 in regular Battalions, 400 "Europeans under the Command of a Mr. Lally, 100 Pieces of Cannon of different "Calibres, which are worked by Europeans, in Number 300, and Black Artillery diſci-"plined by us, and formerly in the Service of the Nabob Mahomed Ally, and at the "Siege of Arcot were ſo well ſerved, as repeatedly to have diſmounted our Guns upon "the Batteries; his Approaches, on that Occaſion, were as well carried on as if con-"ducted by the moſt ſkilful Engineers. He has got 30,000 Cavalry, of which 2000 "are Abiſſynean Horſe, which conſtantly attend his Perſon; 10,000 Carnatic Horſe, "well trained, Half of which, we are well informed, are compoſed of thoſe Regiments "which were diſbanded from and deſerted the Service of the Nabob within theſe laſt "Four Years, and which were all diſciplined by Engliſh Officers; the reſt of his Ca-"valry are the common Horſe of the Country, under different Chiefs."—That to ſecure a Supply of Proviſions for ſo numerous an Army, he had, beſides other Reſources, 30,000 Bullocks, which were conſtantly employed in that Service.

Sir Eyre Coote then ſtates the Force under his own immediate Command; which, not exceeding 7,000 Men in all, of whom only 1,700 were Europeans, was totally unequal to the Undertaking of an Attack upon Hyder, in his ſtrong Poſts; but that he was taking every Step, and making every neceſſary Arrangement, as well for encouraging the Sepoys, repairing the ſhattered Condition of the Army, and for the Security of our remaining Poſſeſſions, as for facilitating his Operations againſt the Enemy; and had written to the Preſidency of Bombay, to Sir Edward Hughes, and to General Goddard, to unite in diſtreſſing Hyder's Poſſeſſions on the Malabar Coaſt, and to be particularly aſſiduous in promoting Peace with the Marattas.

It appears alſo, That in theſe Diſpatches Sir Eyre Coote encloſes Two Tranſlates of Treaties, which, as he was informed, had been really entered into; the one between the French and Hyder, and the other between that Prince and the Marattas; and they will be found in the Appendix, N° 18. Appendix, N° 18.

Your Committee having thus completed the Narrative of all Tranſactions ſubſequent to the Irruption of Hyder, including the Accounts brought by the laſt Diſpatches, it appears to them to be now properly the next Step of their Enquiry, to learn what Symptoms of Diſcontent, or what Indications of Enmity, were diſcovered in Hyder Ally, at any Time before his Irruption into the Carnatic, in order that the Houſe may be enabled to judge of the Degree of Warning which the Company's Servants received of his hoſtile Intentions.

And Your Committee having found it ſuggeſted in ſeveral of the late Diſpatches, wherein any Remarks on the Cauſes of the preſent Invaſion are made, that he had conſtantly manifeſted a Spirit of Reſentment againſt the Engliſh, ſince the Time when the Preſidency of Fort St. George refuſed to ſend Aſſiſtance of Troops to co-operate with him againſt the Marattas, which he demanded in virtue of the Treaty concluded 3d April 1769, between the Preſidency and him:

Your Committee were led to examine that Treaty; a Copy of which, with the Obſervations annexed, will be found in the Appendix, N° 19; and they deſire to direct the Attention of the Houſe to the Second Article of it, wherein it is ſtipulated, "That in "caſe either of the contracting Parties ſhall be attacked, they ſhall, from their reſpec- "tive Countries, mutually aſſiſt each other to drive the Enemy out."

Your Committee will not here make any political Remarks upon this, or any other Article of the Treaty in queſtion, as ſuch will be more properly introduced in a future Part of theſe Reports; they mean at preſent to confine themſelves to the Fact of Hyder's demanding Aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of Fort St. George, and of any Tokens of Diſpleaſure or Reſentment, in conſequence of their Delay, or Refuſal, to gratify him.

And it appears to Your Committee, That on the 29th of May following the Concluſion of this Treaty, Hyder wrote to the Governor of Madras, and after propoſing to unite Jenagee Bonaſila with them in a new Treaty, which ſhould be made for that Purpoſe, he ſignified his Deſign of recovering ſome Places which had been for Two Years in the Hands of Maudhoroow, and deſired, "that (conſiſtent with the Friendſhip and "Regard ſubſiſting between them, and the good Appearance thereof in the Eyes of the "World) he would ſend to his Aſſiſtance, for Form Sake, an Officer with a Battalion "of Sepoys." N° 210.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor, in his Anſwer dated 16th June, excuſed himſelf from ſending the Troops for the Purpoſe required, as ſuch a Step would amount to a Declaration of War againſt the Marratas, for which the Company had no juſt Ground; and he therefore hoped, that Hyder would decline aſking of it.—He at the ſame Time repreſented to him, that it would be improper for him to conclude any Treaty, without conſulting the other Preſidencies. 1769. N° 216.

And Your Committee find, by a Minute of the Preſident's of the 24th July, That he ſuppoſed it to be the Intention of Hyder to draw the Preſidency into a War with the Marattas. And a Letter from Hyder to his Vakeel, of the 1ſt of July, makes it appear that he had requeſted the Battalion of Sepoys from the Preſidency, thereby to make a Trial of their Intentions, whether they would aſſiſt him with their Troops according to Agreement, in caſe the Marattas began a War. 1769. Mil. Conſ. Fort St. George. N° 239. Appendix, N° 19.

And Your Committee find, by a Letter from Hyder to the Governor of Fort St. George, dated 7th March 1770 (N° 84.) that the Marattas had entered his Territories, and had taken ſeveral Forts—And he again deſires Aſſiſtance in theſe Words: "In "Conſideration of the Union between us, the Army and Artillery, which are with me, "are your own; notwithſtanding, out of Regard to the firm Agreement mentioned in "the Treaty between us, if the Company be but pleaſed to ſend but a ſmall Force to "join and act in Concert with me to ſave the good Appearance, and to be talked of "by the People, it will be very proper."

And Your Committee find, by a Letter dated 21ſt March, from Meſſrs. Church and Sibbald to the Preſident and Council, who were then in Hyder's Camp, that he had deſired them to inform the Governor and Council, that as there was a ſtrict Friendſhip between them, which he ſhould, on his Part, punctually maintain, he expected 1770. Mil. Conſ. Fort St. George 30 Apr.

pected to be assisted with a Body of Troops, &c. and that he was even willing to engage to give the Company Three Lacks of Rupees, through the Hopes of their Assistance.—And these Gentlemen remark, that they much feared his former Coolness would return again, if they did not comply.

Mil. Conf. 12 March 1770. Mil. Conf. 30 Apr. 1770, &c. Mil. Conf. 29 Oct. 1770. Country Corr. N° 11, Jan. 1771. Conf. 14 Jan. Appendix, N° 20.

And Your Committee find, That the Madras Board continually evaded Compliance with these Demands, under various Pretences, and particularly on the Ground of expecting the Commissioners, who had been then appointed to come into India with a general superintending Power.—The Maxim of Delay appears to Your Committee to have been resolved on by the Presidency of Fort St. George; and that the Instructions from Home confirmed them in adhering to those Resolutions, though the Marattas in the mean Time gained great Advantages over Hyder, and he became proportionably more earnest in his Representations of the Necessity which impelled him to require the Aid stipulated by the Treaty.

And Your Committee find, by the Select Consultation of the 29th of November 1771, wherein the President states the Situation of the Marattas and Hyder Ally, that the former seemed determined to destroy Hyder, and annex his Dominions to their present Possessions; and that as he was unable to oppose them in the Field, he could have nothing to depend upon, but the Provisions laid up in his principal Forts, which must of course be greatly exhausted.—And on the same Consultation will be found the Difficulties started by the President, in regard to the Conduct which the Presidency should hold between the contending Parties, and particularly from their not having received positive Instructions from the Court of Directors. It appears, however, that they at last determined not to make any Declaration in favour of either Side. Appendix, N° 21.

Country Corr. N°16. And Your Committee find, That on the 23d of January 1772, it was resolved by the Governor and Council, to inform Hyder Ally, in Answer to a Letter from him, setting forth the Advantages of joining him against the Marattas, that the Orders received from the Company prevented their sending their Troops out of the Carnatic to the Assistance of any one.

N° 130. Appendix, N° 22. And Your Committee find, by a Letter from Hyder Ally to the Governor of Fort St. George, dated the 9th of July 1772, that he had concluded a Peace with the Marattas, of which he advised them, in Conformity to the Friendship subsisting between them.

13 Dec. 1771. N° 180. Select Conf. 12 June 1771. Mil. 22 Apr. 1771. Appendix, N° 23. And Your Committee find, by several Records, some of which will be found in the Appendix, N° 23. that the Nabob, Mahomed Ally, frequently pressed the Governor and Council to enter into Alliance with the Marattas against Hyder Ally; and it appears, that His Majesty's Ministers Plenipotentiaries in those Parts, openly concurred in recommending Negociations for that Purpose; but Your Committee do not find, that in effect the Government of Fort St. George did conclude any such Engagements with them.

And Your Committee find, by a Letter from the Governor and Council of Madras, the 8th of December 1774, to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, that Hyder had taken the Opportunity, while the Attention of the Marattas had been engaged by their Distractions at Home, to recover the whole of the Countries which they had within a few Years past wrested from him. And that it was evident, that by Means of the French he was plentifully supplied with military Stores; and that Adventurers of that Nation were allowed, if not encouraged, to enter into his Service.

Appendix, N° 24. And it appears also by the same Letter, That a Correspondence had for some Time been carried on between the Nabob and Hyder Ally; but, "that from the Jealousies "which they entertained of each other, there appeared little Probability of an hearty "Union ever taking Place between them."

Mil. Conf. 23 Jan. 1775. Appendix, N° 25. And Your Committee find, That frequent Accounts were received of Hyder's Attention to the Augmentation and Discipline of his Troops; and that for some Years the Uncertainty of his Designs caused much Consultation, and that Suspicions were at sundry Times, during the Years 1775, 1776, and 1777, entertained of his hostile Intentions against the Company and the Carnatic, particularly by the Nabob, who also expressed his Apprehensions of the Consequences of an Alliance between the French and Hyder, in case of a War with the former Power.

But it appears to Your Committee, That the Ideas which the Madras Presidency entertained of their State of Connection with Hyder, or Apprehensions from his increasing Power, will be best explained by a Reference to their Letters, descriptive of the Posture of Affairs with respect to the Country Powers.—And it appears by a Minute in the Military

Military Conſultations, on the Poſture of Affairs with regard to the Country Powers, 21ſt April 1777, That Hyder, then engaged in War with the Marattas, was expected to apply to the French for Aſſiſtance; that he had received Military Stores by the Way of Mahé, and it was ſuppoſed that the People embarked on Board the Man of War that carried thoſe Stores, were intended for his Service: The Minute concludes thus: "Should, however, the Deſigns of Hyder prove unſucceſsful againſt the Marattas, it is "not improbable to ſuppoſe the French would deem it a favourable Opportunity to afford "him the Aſſiſtance which we have Reaſon to believe they have long premeditated "againſt the Carnatic." Appendix, N° 26.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor General and Council, in their Letter of the 17 September 1777, to the Madras Council, deſire to receive a Return of the actual State of the Troops under that Preſidency, and an Account of the Views and Connections of the different Country Potentates, their Strength and Reſources, together with their Opinion of ſuch Alliance as they would recommend to be formed in caſe of Emergency. Mil. Conſ. 27 Oct.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, returned an Anſwer on the 16th of January 1778, and ſent the Return required; and took Occaſion to obſerve how much they depended on the Nabob for Money to pay their Troops, and how neceſſary it would be to have always in the Treaſury a ſufficient Fund to anſwer the Exigencies of War; but, that under the preſent Syſtem they might be unable, were the Carnatic, or the Poſſeſſions of the Company, ſuddenly invaded, to put their Troops in the Field, ſo as to employ them to any good Purpoſe. With reſpect to the Views and Connections of the different Powers, they obſerve, that the Marattas and Hyder Ally were engaged in War, and that on account of the late inteſtine Diviſions of the former, Hyder appeared now in a Condition to reſiſt them, with ſome Proſpect of Succeſs. They ſtate the reſpective Force of theſe Opponents, and particularly the great Power and Revenues of Hyder; and they obſerve, that he kept up a conſtant Correſpondence with Monſieur Bellecombe, at Pondicherry, who endeavoured all in his Power to engage him in the Intereſt of the French. They give it as their Opinion, that Hyder Ally might be made an uſeful Ally to the Company, but that they were afraid the Nabob would never be brought to act cordially in ſuch an Alliance, as he had long entertained a rooted Enmity towards Hyder, and had, on ſeveral Occaſions, manifeſted it in Oppoſition to his own Intereſts. Appendix, N° 27.

And Your Committee find, That a few Days after the Madras Board ſent the Account laſt related, the Preſident received a Letter, dated 5th January 1778, from Hyder, containing an Account of a great Victory obtained by him over the Marattas, who had penetrated into the Balaghaut, with an Army of 50,000 Men; and that he gives this Account of his Succeſs to the Governor, from his Conſideration of their Alliance and Friendſhip.

And your Committee find, That on the 13 February 1778, Sir Thomas Rumbold, who arrived at Madras on the 8th, ſends an Anſwer of Congratulation, and at the ſame Time informs Hyder of his having ſucceeded to the Charge of Governor and Preſident of Fort St. George; to which Hyder replied 24th March, and after ſome Expreſſions of Civility obſerves, that for a Length of Time the Company and he had been allied by Ties of Friendſhip, and that he entertained no Doubt of the new Governor's confirming and ſtrengthening them. N° 25. N° 67. Appendix, N° 28.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor reported to the Council held on the 4th July 1778, an Account of a Converſation which he had had with Hyder's Vakeel, on the Subject of ſome Overtures for an Alliance, which he was authorized by his Maſter to propoſe; the principal Articles of which were, that Hyder would aſſiſt in placing Ragonaut Row in the Peſhwaſhip; that he ſhould be ſupplied by the Madras Government with Military Stores, Artillery, and Fire-Arms, and with a Body of Troops, which he would pay for, either in Specie or by Grant of Lands: And that a General Declaration was at the ſame Time made by his Vakeel, that his Wiſhes ever had been to cultivate a Friendſhip with the Engliſh; that he had been deterred by Cauſes which it was not neceſſary for him to point out, but that he was now ready to negotiate and to conclude a Treaty of Alliance and Friendſhip. Fort St. George, Mil. Conſ.

It appears, That the Governor then pointed out the Advantages of an Alliance with Hyder, whoſe Vakeel had hinted at the Diſappointments which his Maſter had hitherto met with, to his Deſire of cultivating that Friendſhip, and he (the Governor) attributed to that Backwardneſs on the Part of the Engliſh, that Hyder had been impelled to ſhew more Attention to the French, than he otherwiſe would have done; and remarking upon

upon the Danger of his cementing a closer Alliance with them, observed, "That it "would be a Circumstance of fatal Tendency, and almost the only Event which would "endanger the Carnatic, and the Safety of the British Possessions on the Coast."

On these Accounts he advised the Measure of entering into a Negotiation with Hyder, and to propose a Meeting for that Purpose with him, as the most eligible Method of settling the Treaty.

To these Suggestions the Board gave entire Assent, and at the same Time agreed to acquaint the Supreme Council of their Proceedings.

July 8, 1778. N° 95. N° 141. Your Committee find, That in consequence of the Resolutions of the Board, Letters were written to Hyder, and a Meeting proposed, with a View of more easily accomplishing an Agreement upon proper Terms; and that Hyder in his Answer, dated 31 July, received 16th August, informed the Governor, that "in Truth, a sincere "Friendship had subsisted from the Beginning between the Company and him," and that he wishes to continue it; that he should consider of the Proposals mentioned by his Vakeel; but observed, that the great Distance between them would prevent a Meeting at present, which he should hope hereafter to effect; and promised to write, when the March of his Army was fixed, upon the Subject of a Person of Consequence being sent to his Durbar.

Appendix, N° 29.

Mil. Cons. 16 July 1778. It appears to Your Committee, That in the mean Time, Letters dated 25th June 1778, had been received from Bengal, which communicated Accounts transmitted from Bombay, of Hyder's friendly Intercourse with the French; and that the Presidency of Bombay proposed sending a Resident to his Durbar to endeavour to counteract their Schemes; on which the Governor General and Council observed, that they should make no Objection, if the Nabob Mahomed Ally, who had a personal Animosity against Hyder, should consent to it.

It appears also, That the Madras Council informed that of Bengal, by Letter of 19th July, of the Circumstances relative to the proposed Alliance with Hyder, and expressed their Opinion of the Importance of securing his Friendship, as they were on the Eve of a War with France, but at the same Time doubted of Success in completing a desirable Treaty, as the former Government had formerly resisted his Importunities to form Engagements of mutual Assistance when he wanted Support, which he, on our Refusal, had applied for and gained from other foreign Powers; and therefore nothing but a Regard to his Interests, which point out the English as the most useful Allies to him, could induce him to enter into new Engagements with them; and on account of the Situation between them and Hyder, with respect to the Carnatic and the Company's Possessions on that Coast, they wish to send a Resident to his Durbar from their Presidency, rather than that one should be sent from that of Bombay; and add, that they are persuaded it would be more agreeable to the Nabob.

Your Committee find, That in another Letter, dated 2d August 1778, to the Supreme Council, they remark, that it would not be possible to conclude Engagements with Hyder on any other Terms than mutual Assistance; and that the Treaty of 1769 appeared to them fully to express the Condition on which his Friendship was now to be secured; "and that if that Treaty had not been evaded by the former "Government, they did not believe that Hyder would desire any new Engagements "at this Time, &c."

Select Cons. 19 Sept. 1778. And Your Committee find, That the Supreme Council assured the Presidency of Madras, by Letter 14th August 1778, that they fully approved of the Proposals for forming a new Alliance with Hyder; but observed, that they must require a total Alteration with respect to the immediate Objects of that Alliance, as in Reality, Ragonaut Row was not the End, but only made the Means of accomplishing their Designs in the West of India; and they therefore desired, that the First Article might remain to be finally adjusted by the Communications which should be received from Mr. Elliot in regard to the Conditions he might have concluded with Moodagee Boonsla.

Appendix, N° 30.

And Your Committee observe, That Accounts having been received at Madras about this Time, of our Rupture with France, an Expedition was undertaken, and succeeded, for the Reduction of Pondicherry; and Letters dated 30th October 1778, containing Information of that Success were sent to the Nysam and to Hyder, and the latter was desired to acquaint the Governor more explicitly with his Sentiments on

N° 166.

their intended Treaty, as the Madras Presidency very much wished to shew (now that they had put an End to the Power of the French in India) their Moderation and Sincerity of Friendship towards those, who had given them Proofs of their good Will, and desire to live in Amity with them.—That particularly in regard to him, they considered an Alliance between him and the Company as for the Interests of both, and therefore the Governor wished to meet him to confer with him on that Subject.

And Your Committee find, That Hyder returned an Answer, dated 29th November 1778, expressive of his Pleasure at the Reduction of Pondicherry, and promised to write on the Subject of an Interview with the Governor when he had finished an Expedition, on which he was then engaged. N° 190.

But it appears, That Accounts were now received which tended to make the Sincerity of this Congratulation doubtful; for Your Committee find, That the Select Committee of Fort Saint George had addressed Enquiries, 4th August, to the Chief and Council of Tellicherry, about the State of Mahé, with a View to set on Foot an Expedition against it; and that Mr. Church, in his Answer of September 2d, informed them, that Mahé was in the Country of the King of Cartinaddy, who with the other Princes of the Neighbourhood, were Tributaries to Hyder, and that there was a prevailing Report of his having directed them to assist the French in case of an Attack upon them by the English: And it appears, that Mr. Church sent further Accounts, 2d December 1778, and at the same Time informed the Board, that 300 of Hyder's Sepoys were in the Garrison at Mahé, and that 150 Europeans had marched from thence to Mangalore on 16th September, to join the Army of Hyder, for whose Service they had arrived from Mauritius in July. Select Cons. 19 Sept. 1778. Select Cons. 17 Dec.

And Your Committee find, That the President recommended on 27th November 1778, several Points for Consideration, relative to their undertaking an Expedition against Mahé: And it appears that these Informations occasioned some Doubts in the Select Committee which met afterwards upon this Subject, whether they should venture upon this Enterprize at a Distance from the Carnatic, as they might expect Opposition in their March, from Hyder's Dependants acting under his Orders; and they were led the more to apprehend it, being assured by Letters from Bombay, dated 12th December, that Hyder was said to have allowed the French to hoist his Colours in the Place, should it be attacked by the English.

But it appears to Your Committee, That after many Consultations, at some of which Sir Eyre Coote assisted, they became determined in their Opinions, that the Advantages much exceeded the Risk, and Delay was likely to be destructive of Success, and they therefore resolved, on 7th December, to direct the Attempt to be made immediately; and Sir Hector Munro was desired to prepare an Arrangement of the Troops necessary, and settle the List of Stores; and that they should not wait for an Answer from Hyder to a Letter, which it was resolved that the Governor shall write to inform him of the Design. Select Cons. 27 Nov. 30 D° 4 Dec. 7 Dec. 10 Dec. } 1778. 29 Dec.

And Your Committee find, That soon after these Resolutions were made, the Necessity of cultivating a good Understanding with Hyder, whom the Governor observed not to be pleased with the Capture of Pondicherry, became a Subject of Consideration in the Select Committee 11th January 1779; and that it was agreed to send a Resident to his Durbar to negotiate a Treaty with him, or in the View that at all Events his real Disposition and Designs might be known, and Precautions taken on their Part accordingly. 4 Jan. 1779. Select Cons. 14 Jan.

And Your Committee find, That a Letter was wrote to him on 16th January, in which he is requested to admit a Resident at his Durbar, and in the Conclusion of it is informed of the intended Expedition against Mahé. N° 10.

And Your Committee find, That a Letter of Instructions was given to Colonel Braithwaite on 18th January; wherein it was observed, that from the passive Conduct of Hyder Ally during the Operations against Pondicherry, the Board were inclined to think he had no serious Intentions of assisting the French, especially now that they were at the last Stake, and that therefore, on every Ground, it was warrantable to conclude that he would not break with the English; and that as to secret Support on this Occasion by Means of his Tributaries, Colonel Braithwaite would be strong enough to encounter that; but at the same Time, he was to be cautious not to risk a Defeat, if he had reason to believe that Hyder should declare openly in their Favour, and assist them with a very superior Force. Appendix, N° 31.

It appears to Your Committee, That this Step became the more necessary, as the Nabob now communicated Intelligence of the Progress of Hyder's Arms towards the Kistna; N° 17, 29th Jan. 1779.

Kiſtna; and that there was great Reaſon to believe, that after reducing the Cuddepah and Kannoul Countries, againſt which he was now about to march, and which, unleſs protected by Troops from the Preſidency or from him, muſt certainly be ſubdued, he intended to proceed to an Attack upon Nellore and the Carnatic; and that he was determined ſo to do, if the Engliſh made any Attempt upon Mahé, and that he had detached a large Body of Horſe to the Frontiers for that Purpoſe. It appears that this laſt Information was communicated by the Nabob's Governor of Arcot, who at the ſame Time repreſented the bad State of the Fortifications at that Place.

N° 18, 30 Jan.

And your Committee find, That the Nabob tranſmitted alſo Intelligence 4th February 1779, which he had received from Hyderabad, that the Bombay Army had been ſurrounded and made Priſoners by the Marattas, which ſeemed to give great Satisfaction to the Nyſam. And it appears, that a Conſultation was held hereupon; and that the Preſident took Occaſion to repreſent the State of the Treaſury, and the Difficulties which they ſhould have to ſupport an Army adequate to the Services for which it might be required; that Methods muſt be deviſed, and the Supreme Council be conſulted on that Head, for ſecuring the regular Payment of the Tanjore Subſidy, and of the Nabob's Peſcuſh, which would enable them to make great Efforts;—that they had a ſtanding Army of Twenty-ſeven thouſand Men; and that beſides the Charges neceſſary for their Support, they were burthened with the Expences attending Repairs of Fortifications, "which muſt not on any Account be neglected," and with other chargeable Articles.

4th Feb. 1779.

That theſe, among many other Conſiderations, induced him to doubt, whether the Expedition againſt Mahé, the Troops being now far advanced on their Route, and the Fleet probably arrived at Anjengo, ſhould be proſecuted. On the one Hand it was neceſſary to reflect on the Danger of a Diviſion of the Forces; Hyder indeed was to be regarded as the Enemy of the Marattas, and not likely to rejoice in their Succeſs, as his own had ariſen from their Quarrels among themſelves; that he would alſo have to dread the Nyſam, who was a faſt Friend to the Peſhwa; that thoſe Three Powers were never likely to unite in Alliance, and therefore the Engliſh might hope to be preferred by Hyder, as he could have no Expectations of Support, from the humbled Power of the French, and in Caſe of an Union with him, Mahé would fall of courſe at any Time.—On the other Hand, they had Expectation of being ſoon reinforced by Lord Macleod's Regiment, and that to recede from the Expedition now that it was ſo far advanced, would have the Appearance of Apprehenſion, from the late bad Succeſs at Bombay; that it was alſo to be remembered, that the French had the Iſlands of Mauritius and Bourbon, from which they might ſend freſh Forces to this Country, and if Mahé was not now reduced, Tellicherry would be in Danger of being captured.

And Your Committee find, That Sir Eyre Coote then gave his Opinion, that the Troops ſhould not be recalled, but that they ſhould remain at Anjengo, till better Information could be had of what the French were meditating, or a Knowledge of Hyder's real Intentions might allow a Deciſion with Safety.

4th Feb.

Your Committee find however, That it was reſolved to proſecute the Expedition, and to inform the Supreme Council of every Circumſtance which had occaſioned and determined their Conſultations.

And it appears to your Committee, That a Letter was accordingly wrote to Bengal, on the 7th February 1779, in which it was alſo ſpecified, that it would admit of no Doubt that Hyder Ally at preſent bore no favourable Inclination to the Engliſh; that he was very ſtrongly in the Intereſt of the French, and that probably the Succeſs of the Britiſh Arms alone, in reducing Pondicherry, had determined him to preſerve a Neutrality.

Appendix, N° 32.

Your Committee find however, That this Determination of Hyder was reported to be ſoon altered; and that on receiving Accounts of the Deſign againſt Mahé, he formed an immediate Plan to go againſt the Carnatic, and wrote to his Vakeel at Poonah, to ſettle a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Miniſters; that frequent Letters, containing ſuch and ſimilar Intelligence, particularly of great Bodies of Hyder's Horſe being collected on the Borders of the Carnatic, were now brought from the Nabob, and frequent Conſultations held thereupon; the general Reſult of which was, that it would be neceſſary to make Preparations for Defence.

11 }
16 } Feb. 1779.
18 }
N° 25, 23, 29.

And your Committee obſerve, That on the 18th February Mr. Smith, One of the Members of the Select Committee, delivered in a Minute; in which he gives his Reaſons for thinking, That as at all Times Hyder Ally ought to have been conſidered as the natural

tural Ally of the Engliſh in thoſe Parts; ſo this was a Period in which his Friendſhip ſhould be particularly cultivated, and that they ſhould aſſure him, in unequivocal Terms, of their ſincere Deſire to perfect a good Underſtanding with him.—He adviſes at the ſame Time, that, "to facilitate the Negociation, and ſhew Hyder we are determined to "act with Vigour, and to ſupport the Meaſure we have taken, a ſtrong Detachment "ſhould be aſſembled at Vellore, under the Command of an active and experienced "Officer, and encamped without the Walls, where it would occaſion little additional "Expence, except the Bullocks for the Guns, which ſhould be procured and kept in "Readineſs, as it would be very difficult to collect them at a ſhort Warning."

It appears, That the Nabob alſo recommended the Plan of drawing the Force of the Carnatic together, and forming Encampments in One or Two Places; for that when the Alarm of the Enemy's Horſe ſhould ſpread through the Country, it would be difficult to get Train Bullocks, Coolies, and other Neceſſaries: And he declared, that he had no Treaſures, nor Bodies of Horſe, by which he could hope to make an effectual Reſiſtance againſt the Invaſion of his Territories, with which the Vakeel of Hyder had, in the Name of his Maſter, explicitly threatened him. 18 Feb. 1779.

Your Committee find, That a Declaration, 22d February, was alſo formally made by Hyder's Vakeel to the Governor, "That he conſidered Mahé as a Settlement dependent "upon his Country, and that his Intentions were, in caſe of any Attack upon it, to "oppoſe it immediately, or by detaching a Body of Troops into the Carnatic."

It appears, That the Preſident, when he had reported this Meſſage to the Committee, deſired them to conſider, whether, on this Intelligence ſo received, of a threatened Invaſion, it might not make it prudent to ſend Directions to Colonel Braithwaite, not to embark from Anjengo till further Orders, unleſs he ſhould have received ſuch Advices from Tellicherry, as might remove every Idea of Hyder Ally's Deſigns of ſupporting the French at Mahé: And the Committee agreeing in Opinion with the Preſident on the Propriety of that Meaſure, a Letter to that Purpoſe appears to have been wrote and diſpatched the 22d February. 22 Feb. 1779.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor further obſerved, that Hyder meant to oppoſe the Expedition againſt Mahé, and to give Trouble in the Carnatic; and, "though he would not believe ſuch to be his Intentions till he had more convincing "Proofs than any already received; yet to reſt the Event on his Judgment, and neglect "to take every Precaution to guard againſt ſo ſerious and alarming a Circumſtance, "would merit the higheſt Cenſure."

And your Committee find, upon the Select Conſultations of 25th February 1779, a Letter from Major Maclellan at Tanjore; by which the Board was acquainted, that the Report of Hyder's having thrown Men into Mahé was without Foundation;—that the general Opinion on the Malabar Coaſt was, that he was dead.—The Major alſo ſtated what the Force conſiſted of, which was ſaid to be in Garriſon there.

And it appears to your Committee, That a Letter was, in conſequence of this Intelligence, diſpatched on that Day to Colonel Braithwaite, informing him, "That though "from repeated Intelligence of Hyder's Deſigns, the Committee had been induced to "ſend him the Orders of 22d Inſtant; yet, from other Circumſtances which had ſince "been communicated, and particularly from the Forwardneſs to which the Expedition "was advanced, they were now inclined vigorouſly to proceed in the Execution of it;" and then referring him to his firſt Inſtructions, they repeated the Neceſſity of Diſpatch, that they might again have the Benefit of his Forces for the Defence of the Carnatic.

It appears, That on this Day alſo a Letter, which had been agreed upon in the Committee on 22d, at the Motion of the Governor, was ſent by him to the Nabob; in which he acknowledges the Intelligence communicated by him, as a Warning to be prepared againſt Hyder's Deſigns; and aſſures him, that all Precautions ſhould be taken: He obſerves at the ſame Time, that he was ſorry to hear of his Highneſs's Inability to contribute towards forwarding the Preparations; that it would be to reflect ſeverely on his Government, and to judge him incapable of the Foreſight which prompts every wiſe Prince to be on his Guard againſt the worſt that can happen, if he ſhould really ſuppoſe him without Reſources; that the Company never were better able to protect him againſt all his Enemies, provided that he would furniſh the Aſſiſtance which ought to be expected from the Carnatic; that he muſt therefore take the Liberty of reminding his Highneſs of Arrears due from him, and of the Neceſſity he now found himſelf under, to call upon him for them; that indeed it was not poſſible to account for his Deficiency

of Money, as his Creditors, new and old, had received nothing from him; his Troops were all in Arrear, the Country had been long in Peace, and this Season particularly fruitful; that they must request Accounts of the Provisions and Stores which his Highness had laid up in his Garrisons; and that he would see his Troops regularly paid and well appointed, least on an Invasion, Hyder might be able to draw the Whole or the greatest Part of them to his Standard.

1779. And Your Committee find, That the Board acquainted the Supreme Council, the 25th February, of these Transactions; and observed, That they could not say how far they might be able to avert Hyder's threatened Invasion—that it was an alarming Circumstance, from their total Inability to prevent the Ravages of Horse; and that their Resources for War would be instantly cut off by their Incursions;—that in the present Situation of the Presidency, they must endeavour, if possible, to avoid a Quarrel with Hyder; and they trusted, that by a proper Firmness with regard to the Expedition to Mahé, they would not hasten it in any Degree; that they had therefore determined not to relinquish it on the mere Threats of Hyder, though they had cautioned Colonel Braithwaite to be upon his Guard against a Defeat.—They observe, that Hyder's Conduct called so strongly for Resentment, that if they could entertain a reasonable Hope of Support from the Carnatic, or of Funds sufficient to carry on an active War, they should certainly recommend the necessary Preparations for it; but that they were not in Condition with respect to Revenue, even to oppose any powerful Attempt either of the French or Hyder; that they would however exert themselves, trusting that the Difficulty of their Situation would plead their Excuse for any Failures that might happen.

Appendix, N° 33.

1779. N° 36. It appears, That on the 28th February, a long Letter, dated 23d, was received by the Governor from the Nabob; wherein he states many Proofs he had given of Hyder's Enmity to them, and of Attachment to the French; and that in having advised former Governors to make War upon Hyder, and an Alliance with the Marattas, he had consulted only the Good of his Country, and of the Company; he suggests a Rule of Conduct for the Government in the present Circumstances, and advises, that if they would endeavour (which he hopes to be their Desire) to divert Hyder from his intended Attack on the Carnatic, they should use Arguments of Persuasion, and offer to desist from their Attempt on Mahé; but if they resolved to quarrel with him, they should fortify themselves by Alliances against him, and turn their first Attention to the Marattas, whose Friendship it might not be yet too late to secure; and although his Advice on that Subject had not been taken before, he wished now to be employed in attempting to bring about a Negociation with them.—He expresses great Apprehension lest Hyder should seize upon the Cuddepah Country, which, he says, is an Appendage of the Carnatic, and that the Loss of it would be the Loss of all Communication with the Northward, in the same Manner as it was already cut off to the Westward; and that the whole Carnatic would be thereby blockaded.

N° 40. And Your Committee find a Letter from the Nabob, dated 1st March 1779, in which he observes, that as he had been desired by the Governor to write to the Poonah Ministry, in order to open a Negociation for a Treaty between the Presidency and the Peshwa, he inclosed Letters which he had prepared accordingly for his Approbation: And it appears, that the Governor, on the 21st of May following, wrote to the Nabob, N° 78. acknowledging the Receipt of this and several other Letters from him; wherein he had given Intelligence of Hyder's hostile Designs against the Carnatic, and recommended Alliances with the Soubah and the Marattas, for the Purpose of reducing him: And it appears, That the Governor in this Answer informed the Nabob, that as Hyder had retired from the Cuddepah Country, and was marching towards Sevingapatam, the threatened Danger of Invasion was at present over, without having Recourse to the Alliances proposed; but that as Hyder's late Proceedings might lead to a War with him, it became necessary to know what Resources they should have for carrying it on; and that no Doubt his Highness, from the earnest Manner in which he had pressed an Union in a general Attack upon Hyder, even before he had invaded them, had well considered the vast Sums which it would require to execute such a Plan, and would inform the Governor what Provisions he had made, and what extraordinary Supplies could be depended on from him.

Your Committee will here remark to the House, That they have found many Letters from the Nabob, containing Papers of Intelligence relative to the continual Augmentation of Hyder's Forces, and his Threats of employing them against the Possessions of the English and the Carnatic, because of the Attack on Mahé. But your Committee conceive, that there could be no Evidence more strong, to persuade the Presidency of Madras, of what Hyder's Disposition and Intentions were, than his own Letters on that

Subject, and any Acts of Hoſtility which he appears to have begun or incited againſt them; and therefore Your Committee think it proper chiefly to make Uſe of theſe Teſtimonies for the Information of the Houſe on this Head; and they point out a Letter from Hyder to the Governor, dated 17th February, in which he ſays, "I ſee what you write concerning the French Factory of Mahé: In my Country there are Factories belonging to the Engliſh, Dutch, Portugueſe, Danes, and French, and beſides, there are many Merchants there who are conſidered as my Subjects; if any one entertains Deſigns againſt thoſe Factories, I will, without Doubt, take the beſt and moſt conſiderable Methods to give them Aſſiſtance." N° 42. 1779.

And Your Committee find, That another Letter was received from Hyder, 7th April 1779, in which he complains of Violences committed on his People at the Frontiers, by Killedars of the Carnatic; that he had before complained of them in vain; but "that out of Friendſhip for the King of England, and the Gentlemen of the Coun-"cil, he had as yet taken no Step to retaliate the Injury." N° 59.

He again repeats what he had before wrote about the Expedition againſt Mahé, and of the Aſſiſtance which he ſhould give to thoſe whom he conſidered as his Subjects; and adds, "that the Governor and the Gentlemen of the Council were acquainted with "this, and at any Rate would act as they ſhould think proper."

It appears that an Anſwer was returned to this Letter by the Governor, dated 19th April; in which he expreſſes his Surprize on peruſing Hyder's Letters, and on hearing the Meſſage delivered by his Vakeel, "that he would oppoſe any Attempt made upon "Mahé to the utmoſt of his Power;"—that he did ſuppoſe, if Hyder thought it neceſſary to interfere in our Quarrel with the French, that he would take Part with the Engliſh, not againſt them;—that he had never heard of any Irregularity committed in Hyder's Country by the Nabob's People, but that they ſhould have been puniſhed, had he been made acquainted with their Offence. N° 62.

He declares, that it had been the conſtant Aim of his Government to promote a good Underſtanding with Hyder, from a full Conviction that it was for the mutual Intereſt of the Company and his Circar, that the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between them ſhould be perpetual; but that if he (Hyder) perſevered in the Conduct which he had obſerved of late, it did not appear how it could be much longer maintained; that the Company and their Allies were ſufficiently powerful to avenge every Kind of Injury that might be offered to them; that they would not be the Aggreſſors in any Quarrel; but once provoked into Hoſtilities, they would not fail to exert all their Strength to puniſh the Offender.

That there was Reaſon to complain of Hyder's Conduct in reducing Morarowrow, who had been included in the Treaty of 1769 as a Friend of the Carnatic; and Reaſon alſo to complain of his Proceedings againſt Cuddepah and Kannoul.

That it was reported he had ſome Deſigns againſt Bazalet Jung, which made it neceſſary that he ſhould be informed of Engagements of Friendſhip entered into between the Company and Bazalet, and of their having promiſed to aſſiſt him in the Defence of his Country; and that it was therefore hoped he would lay aſide any Intentions he had formed againſt him. Appendix, N° 34.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel Braithwaite ſucceeded without Difficulty in his Enterprize againſt Mahé, which ſurrendered on the 19th March, a Day or two after his Arrival before it; that he informed the Board at the ſame Time of his Intention to ſend back Part of the Troops, which he hoped would reach the Preſidency in Three Weeks, and that he found it neceſſary to detain the reſt of the Detachment "becauſe of "the Reports of Hyder's Troops coming."

And Your Committee deſire to refer the Houſe to the Appendix, N° 35, where are ſubjoined ſuch Letters from and to Colonel Braithwaite, relative to his Proceedings at Mahé, and on that Part of the Malabar Coaſt, as appear to contain any Information, by which the Deſigns of Hyder might be diſcovered.

And your Committee will here only obſerve, That they find by theſe Letters, that the Colonel ſoon diſcovered the Nairs and Petty Princes of the Neighbourhood to be diſaffected to Hyder, which induced him to propoſe an Advice to the Preſidency, that ſhould it be their Plan to make any Attack upon that Prince, they ſhould direct it particularly to thoſe Quarters where he was moſt vulnerable; and he thought, that even if the Corps he commanded might be allowed to remain in thoſe Parts, it would be a great

Check

Check upon Hyder's Projects; that he believed his Expreſſions of Anger on account of the Expedition againſt Mahé, aroſe from his Fear that the Engliſh would protect his revolting Dependants, and likewiſe becauſe he uſed to receive his Supplies of Ammunition and Military Stores through that Port. The French however, he ſaid, greatly complained of him; and Monſieur Picot, the late Commandant, aſſured the Colonel that he had promiſed to ſend 34,000 Troops to Mahé, of whom 8,000 were to have been Horſe, to ſcour the Country.

22 April 1779. Your Committee find, however, That the Colonel was directed by the Government of Madras not to interfere in any Diſputes between Hyder and the Nairs, or any of the Country Powers, whom he had repreſented as earneſt to acknowledge their Submiſſion to the Company, and united in a Deſign to revolt againſt their own Prince.

Select Conſ. 22 Apr. 1779. It appears indeed, that the Diſpoſition of theſe People had ſhewn itſelf by Marks of open Rebellion; and that Hyder's Governor of Calicut was in great Apprehenſions for that Place, which was beſieged by them, and that the Company's Reſident had been ordered to quit it at a very ſhort Notice.

And Your Committee find, That large Bodies of Hyder's Troops came down at laſt and relieved it, and fixed themſelves alſo in Redoubts all round Mahé, and diſtreſſed it much, for Want of Proviſions, which they would not ſuffer to be carried in, though they proceeded to no other Act of direct Hoſtility, but talked with much Anger in their Camp of the Aſſiſtance given to the Revolters from Tellicherry. The Nairs themſelves, finding they were not to expect Support from Colonel Braithwaite, ſoon ſubmitted to Hyder, and began to infeſt, and to ſkirmiſh with, the Engliſh Troops.

Select Conſ. 14 June.

18 October. And Your Committee find, That Colonel Braithwaite having received Orders to ſend his Detachment to Surat, where it was to join General Goddard, he evacuated Mahé on the 29th November, after the Stores were ſhipped and the Fort blown up; and that Hyder's Sardar of Calicut immediately took Poſſeſſion of the Ruins, and lodged ſome Troops with Twelve Guns on the Mount:—That the Colonel on his Arrival at Tellicherry, found it inveſted by the Nairs; and having obſerved that every Act of Hyder's Tributaries and Managers ſhewed them to be open Inſtigators of this Attack, he wrote to the Preſidency, that he had thought it prudent to reland the Troops, and to remain there for the Protection of the Place; complaining greatly at the ſame Time of the Gentlemen of the Council, who, as he had been well informed, had done many Things to irritate Hyder's Government without providing in any Shape for their own Defence. And it appears that his Conduct was approved of by the Madras Board, who inſtructed him, however, to detach the European Corps to join General Goddard, while he ſhould remain himſelf with the Sepoys, till he ſhould think the Danger removed; and they deſired, that if any juſt Cauſe of Offence had been given either to the Nairs or to Hyder, it ſhould be inſtantly removed, "for that it was highly neceſſary in their preſent Situation "to avoid all Occaſions of adding to their Enemies."

Letter from him, dated 9 Dec.

30 Dec. 1779.

Appendix, N° 35.

And Your Committee will now deſire to direct the Attention of the Houſe to another Source, from which Intelligence ſeems to have been drawn of Hyder's Diſpoſitions and Deſigns againſt the Company and their Poſſeſſions in India.

It appears, That the Select Committee of Fort St. George, in a Letter of 23d April 1779, informed the Supreme Council, that they had received Intelligence of Hyder's having completed a Conqueſt of the Cuddepah Country, and that he was proceeding to make an Attack upon the Territories of Bazalet Jung, whoſe Vakeel had expreſſed, in his Maſter's Name the ſtrongeſt Apprehenſion of that Event; that he had alſo written threatening Letters to the Zemindars of Veneatagerry and Calaſtry, who are Tributaries to the Nabob; that in conſequence of their Negotiations with Bazalet Jung, they had reſolved to ſend, for the Protection of his Country, Three Battalions of Sepoys, One Company of Artillery, and Six Field Pieces; and they remarked, "that Hyder's Pro-"ceedings in that Quarter had added greatly to his Power, and given a much more eaſy "Acceſs to the Carnatic than he had before; that they were of Opinion, that immediate "Meaſures ſhould be taken to compel him to retreat back within his former Limits, "or if neceſſary, to reduce him totally; for there was every Reaſon to conclude, from "the Language he held, and from the Nature of his Proceedings, that he would very "ſhortly draw into Hoſtilities, in which Caſe it would be highly expedient that they "ſhould prepare to act defenſively."

And Your Committee think it incumbent on them, in this Place, to lay before the Houſe ſuch Papers as will briefly inform them of the Nature and Purpoſe of thoſe Negotiations, which the Preſidency of Fort St. George appear to have entered into with

Bazalet

Bazalet Jung; but Your Committee do not mean at preſent to make any Remarks on the political Propriety or Expediency of them.

And Your Committee find, That on the 10th July 1778 the Preſident having obſerved to the Council, that great Inconvenience aroſe from the Opening, which the French had of introducing Troops and Military Stores to that Part of the Coaſt by Means of the Port of Mootapillee, in the Guntoor Circar, to which the Company had a reverſionary Right; and having obſerved alſo, that the French already there had much Influence with Bazalet Jung, (who, it appears, was in Poſſeſſion of that Circar under Grant for Life, from his Brother Nyſam ul Dowlah, Subah of the Decan, and under Articles not to diſpoſe of it without his Brother's Conſent) propoſed to take Meaſures for getting that Port at leaſt immediately into their Hands; and having recalled to the Remembrance of the Council, that a former ineffectual Application had been made to the Nyſam, he now adviſed that they ſhould addreſs themſelves directly to Bazalet, and inform the Nyſam, by Letter, of the Motives for their doing ſo.

But it appears to Your Committee, That in the Month of November following the Preſident informed the Select Committee, that Bazalet's Vakeel had ſignified to him, his Maſter's ſtrong Deſire of obtaining Marks of the Company's Favour, which he was willing to purchaſe, by giving to them the Guntoor Circar at Rent on certain Terms; which the Governor then laid before them, and at the ſame Time he preſented other Articles, which he thought himſelf ſhould be made eſſential to any Agreement; the chief Effect of which was, that the Company ſhould keep a Body of Troops, to be paid out of the Revenues of the Circar, for the ſole Purpoſe of defending Bazalet Jung's Dominions, and not to be employed out of them; and that he (Bazalet Jung) ſhould conſent to diſcharge and diſarm the French then in his Service.—It appears, that the Committee approved of the amended Articles, and directed them to be communicated to the Vakeel, and by him to his Maſter; it appears that a Treaty was concluded on theſe Terms with ſome trifling Alterations, and that the French under the Command of Monſieur Lally were diſmiſſed, and were afterwards taken into the Service of the Nyſam. 9 Nov. 1778.

And Your Committee find, That on 22d April 1779, an Application was made by Bazalet Jung, for the ſtipulated Support of Troops on Account of a threatened Invaſion of his Country by Hyder Ally; and that there was a Detachment ſent accordingly to Mootapillee from Madras, under the Command of Colonel Harper, who was inſtructed, that it was to be employed in the Defence and Protection of Bazalet's Jung's Territories, and for the Support of his Government; and that he was to march by the ſhorteſt and moſt expeditious Route to Adone or Rachour, as Bazalet might appoint.

And Your Committee find, by ſeveral Letters from Colonel Harper, That he marched from Mootapillee to Innaconda; and that intending to purſue his Route towards Adone, through the Cuddepah Country, which had been lately conquered by Hyder Ally, he gave Notice to Hyder's Zemindars on entering it; but that he found the Paſſes defended by a Barrier, and a large Body of Men belonging to Hyder, who oppoſed his March, and obliged him to fall back to Innaconda on the 14th Auguſt 1779.

And Your Committee find, That a Letter was thereupon written, 26th Auguſt 1779, to Hyder, by the Governor of Madras; in which he complained of the Oppoſition made to the Paſſage of the Troops through a Part of the Diſtrict of the Cuddepah Country; and obſerved, that it was the invariable Practice of all Powers, who lived in a State of Friendſhip and Peace, to let their Troops paſs and repaſs through their Territories; and that he was willing to perſuade himſelf, that Hyder's Managers acted on this Occaſion without their Maſter's Knowledge or Authority.

But it appears to your Committee, That the Nabob, on the 24th Auguſt, communicated to the Governor a Letter which he had received from Bazalet Jung, wherein was One incloſed from Hyder Ally to Ifeecher Chawn, his Vakeel at Bazalet Jung's Durbar. Hyder, in this Letter, expreſſed himſelf in Terms of great Diſpleaſure, that the Guntoor ſhould be given up to the Engliſh; who, he ſaid, ought not to be allowed a Footing in that Part of the Country, and wiſhed that his Killedars might be permitted to rent it, and that then Nobody would dare to attack that Circar. He concludes his Letter in the following Words: "It is not in my Power to conſent to his Excellency's giving up the "Guntoor Circar to my old and bitter Enemies, for it joins to my Country. If the "Engliſh are put in Poſſeſſion, his Excellency and I cannot agree. You, Sir, will ex-"plain all this in a proper Manner to his Excellency, and get his Leave to come to me "in order to ſettle this Affair. N° 117.

" What are the Engliſh, whoſe Name gives ſo much Alarm to the People of this " Country? How did I encounter them when I was at War with them? How often " were they not defeated by my victorious Troops? This is well known to every Body. " Why ſhould they be ſo much afraid, that their Protection ſhould be ſolicited?

" If his Excellency and I are joined, we ſhall ſtand in Fear of no one."

And it appears that Bazalet diſcovered great Apprehenſions on account of this Letter, and great Impatience to have Colonel Harper and his Detachment with him.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel Harper received a Reinforcement of Troops from Madras, but that he was long prevented from renewing his March from Innaconda by the Want of Proviſions and Money; and that he was urged to proceed as quickly as poſſible, both by Bazalet Jung and by the Madras Council, who, being diſpleaſed with
27 Oct. 1779. this Delay, had, upon his Offer to reſign the Command, appointed Colonel Baillie to
11 Nov. ſucceed to it. But it appears that Colonel Harper having at laſt ſet out on his March,
13 Nov. 1779. he was ſtopt by Orders from Bazalet Jung; who cauſed him to be informed, that Hyder Ally had threatened to deſtroy his Country, himſelf, and Family, if he did not ſpeedily diſcontinue all Correſpondence with the Engliſh; and that the Nyſam, his Brother, had wrote to Hyder, and deſired that they might jointly prevent the Engliſh from entering his Territories; that Hyder had ſent ſome Troops, and taken Poſſeſſion of all the open Country, and confined him in his Capital; and that the Nyſam, appriſed of Bazalet Jung's Situation, had wrote to him, that if he would renounce all Concerns with the Engliſh, and regain Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, he would reſtore him to thoſe Countries which Hyder had ſeized on; and that if the Engliſh did not immediately comply, and march out of the Country, that he (the Nyſam) would beſtow the ſaid Circar upon Hyder, and that they would jointly extirpate the Engliſh from the whole Carnatic; and that, in ſuch Circumſtances, he (Bazalet) had been obliged to ſubmit.

And it appears, That Bazalet Jung complained, that he had given Tunkars in the Guntoor Circar for the Payment of thoſe Troops, which he ſtill retained; but on producing the Tunkars to Lieutenant Douglas, who commanded for the Company in the Guntoor, he would not permit any Collection to be made; which gave great Uneaſineſs to him, as his Troops would not march againſt the Enemy without receiving their Pay.

It appears to Your Committee, That the Governor had wrote to Bazalet Jung on the 11th November, to aſſure him, that the Troops ſhould march as ſoon as poſſible to his Relief, and to acquaint him, that the Guntoor was put under the Management of the Nabob, who had been requeſted to give Orders that the Balances ſhould be accounted for to him in the moſt expeditious Manner poſſible.

And Your Committee find, That the Select Committee having taken theſe Accounts into Conſideration, reſolved, 20th November, to order the Detachment to return to Innaconda, and to inform Bazalet Jung of their Concern for the Neceſſity he found himſelf under, of concluding Terms with the Nyſam, as the Troops were actually on their March to ſupport him. But that, notwithſtanding theſe Circumſtances, they conſidered the Treaty between the Company and him to be ſtill in force; and that he might command the Aſſiſtance of their Troops at any future Time that he ſhould require it; and that the Revenues of the Guntoor Circar ſhould be faithfully applied to maintain a Force for that Purpoſe, agreeably to the Treaty.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob, on the 5th of December, tranſmitted to the Governor a Letter from Bazalet Jung; wherein Bazalet repreſented the Neceſſity he was under of requiring the Reſtoration of the Guntoor Circar, for fear of the Reſentment of the Nyſam and Hyder Ally.

But it appears to your Committee, That Inſtructions were agreed upon by the Select Committee, and ſent to Colonel Baillie, 30th December 1779; " That it would be ne- " ceſſary for him to be upon his Guard, in caſe of any Attempts being made againſt the " Guntoor Circar—That he ſhould only protect their preſent Poſſeſſions, and not act " offenſively againſt any Power without poſitive Orders; but that he was impowered, " in caſe of any Movement towards the Guntoor Circar, either from the Nyſam or " Hyder Ally, to call for the Sepoys under Lieutenant Douglas, and for as many " Sepoys as could be ſpared from the Mazulipatam Diſtrict."

And Your Committee find, That a Letter, dated 31ſt December, was wrote by the Governor to Bazalet Jung, expreſſive of Concern at his Misfortunes, and the accidental Cauſes of them, by the Delay of the March from Innaconda; and reminding him, that

Application had been frequently made in vain to the Nyſám, for giving up the Guntoor Circar to the Company; that at laſt they had got Poſſeſſion of it by his (Bazalet Jung's) voluntary Offer, and that therefore every Thing had been properly concluded; that the Troops had been delayed at his Deſire, that they ſhould remain on the Borders of the Guntoor, or ſhould go into Quarters, if he had no further Uſe for them. Appendix, N° 36.

Your Committee having thus laid before the Houſe, very briefly, ſome ſtrong Tokens of Hyder's Diſcontent, and Purpoſe of Reſentment, which ſeem to have diſcovered themſelves immediately from the Two Cauſes of the Expedition to Mahé, and the Affair of the Guntoor Circar, they will proceed to examine, and produce for the Information of the Houſe, ſuch Meaſures as appear to have been taken to gain a more certain Account of his Diſpoſitions and Deſigns.

And Your Committee find, That on the 23d October, the Preſident informed the Select Board, that he had purſued a Method which he had thought it incumbent upon him to conceal, even from their Knowledge, in the View of ſounding the real Intentions of Hyder; whoſe Letters and Meſſages, ſince they had undertaken the Expedition againſt Mahé, and formed an Alliance with Bazalet Jung, had been couched in Terms ſo hoſtile and unfriendly, that he could hardly believe they were genuine Productions of Hyder. He ſuſpected the Informations of the Nabob, from his well known Enmity to Hyder, and he doubted whether the Vakeel might not have been tempted to pervert, or exceed, the Intentions of his Maſter, eſpecially as there appeared no Reaſon why he ſhould quarrel with the Preſidency, and bring on a War ſo contrary to his true Intereſts. He had therefore thought it expedient to ſend a Perſon privately to Hyder, with a Letter from himſelf, deſiring an explicit Declaration; and that the Anſwer he had received, gave him too much Reaſon to apprehend that Hyder's Intentions were really hoſtile, both againſt the Company and the Carnatic; and it became neceſſary for the Committee to guard, as much as poſſible, againſt the Conſequences.

It appears that in his firſt Letter, Hyder refers to another for a full Anſwer to that of the Preſident; and obſerves further, that Mr. Swartz would acquaint him with ſeveral Matters he had charged him with.

Your Committee muſt here remark, That they have not diſcovered any Entry of further Information from Mr. Swartz relative to the ſeveral Matters he was charged with.

It appears that the Preſident's Letter was dated 11th June 1779, and that it contained an Account of the Motive which induced him to ſend Mr. Swartz, as he feared that deſigning People might have been at Pains to diſturb the Friendſhip which both had at Heart from taking Place; and he therefore acquainted him, that, if he was deſirous to enter into the Bonds of Friendſhip with the Company, he might put an entire Reliance on the Perſon who was ſent, and who would communicate every Particular to him—that nothing would tend more to the Cement of their Friendſhip, than an Interview, in which he might aſſure Hyder perſonally of the Sincerity of his Intentions, and uſe the moſt proper Expedients to render their Friendſhip laſting.

It appears that Hyder in his Anſwer, begins with a Remark, "That before, when a "Friendſhip, confirmed by a ſolid Treaty, ſubſiſted between the Company and him, he "imagined that it would increaſe daily, and not have been broke through; which he "conſidered it to be by the Expedition to Mahé, and the ſending Troops to Bazalet "Jung, and that he conceived there was a Determination to break with him at all "Events.

"That out of Conſideration for the Friendſhip of the King of England and the "Company, whom he had conſidered as One, but now thought otherwiſe, he had not "yet taken Revenge."—His Concluſion is in theſe Words: "It is no Matter!—But "if you, henceforth forgetting all Treaties and Engagements of the Company, ſtill are "intent on breaking with me, what Advantage can attend writing to you? You are ac-"quainted with every Thing; it is right to act in all Things with Prudence and Fore-"ſight."

It appears that the Committee, on hearing theſe Letters read, agreed in Opinion concerning the Deſigns of Hyder, and reſolved immediately to acquaint the Governor General and Council of their Sentiments; and to write to General Goddard, hoping that a Knowledge of their Situation might induce him to make Peace with the Marattas.

It appears that a Letter, dated 30th October 1779, to that Purpoſe, was immediately

diſpatched to General Goddard, informing him alſo of the Force at Mahé, which was ordered to obey his Requiſition to join him—and that no greater Succour could at preſent be ſpared from their own Eſtabliſhment.

It appears alſo, that a Letter was diſpatched on the ſame Day, 30th October, to Bengal, wherein your Committee find the following Obſervations ſucceeding an Account of Hyder's Preparations, and of a probable Rupture with him:—"A War with Hyder, "let the Event be ever ſo ſucceſsful on our Part, would diſtreſs the Carnatic beyond "Meaſure, and prove a moſt expenſive Burthen on the Company; we ſincerely hope, "therefore, that General Goddard may conclude a Treaty with the Marattas, and "thereby free the Company from the Neceſſity of engaging with the Two moſt power- "ful States of India at the ſame Time; which will probably be the Caſe if he fails in his "Negociation: Should we be at Peace with the Marattas, Hyder will be afraid to diſ- "turb us, for, excluſive of our Strength, which he could then have no Hope of reſiſt- "ing, the determined Enmity which the Marattas bear him would induce him rather "to court our Friendſhip than to provoke us into Hoſtilities; and this is preciſely the "State wherein only we can expect to preſerve that Tranquillity in the Carnatic, which "is ſo neceſſary to the Affairs of the Company at all Times, but eſpecially at this
Appendix, N° 37. "Juncture."

And your Committee find that Mr. Smith, at the Select Committee of 11th November 1779, delivered in a Minute on the general Situation of Affairs, ariſing from the Probability of an approaching Rupture with Hyder, whom he conſidered as by far the moſt powerful and dangerous of any of the Country Princes, and repreſented in a ſtrong Light, all his Advantages of Power, Riches, and Ability; and foreſaw that the reducing him muſt be attempted ſooner or later. He thought a War could not be avoided, becauſe Hyder had manifeſted his Intentions to provoke it, and that it being therefore neceſſary to conſider a Plan for their future Conduct, he ventured to ſuggeſt the Neceſſity of laying their Account that an Army ſhould be in the Field in January, and every Hour employed in making neceſſary Preparations; he would adviſe the Committee to ſtrengthen the Detachment under Colonel Harper, that it might be able to ſtop Hyder's Progreſs in thoſe Parts, and recommended the collecting a ſtrong Body of Troops immediately to be cantoned at Conjeveram or Vellore.

It appears that the Committee were of Opinion, that they had taken the only Step in their Power, by writing to the Supreme Council, and collecting their Troops together as much as poſſible; and that their future Conduct muſt depend upon what the Gentlemen of Bengal might determine—that they can purſue no active Meaſures whatever, being entirely without the Reſources neceſſary for putting a conſiderable Body of Men into the Field.

Your Committee think it proper to obſerve in this Place, That it appears, by a Letter from Sir Eyre Coote, dated 2d April 1779, from Bengal to the Select Committee of Fort St. George, that he had ſtated to the Governor General and Council the Neceſſity there was of ſending them a Supply in ſome Degree adequate to the great Expence they were at, and the Difficulties they would certainly be reduced to for want of a Treaſury, ſhould Hyder put his Threats in Execution by entering the Carnatic; and that
Appendix, N° 38. the Governor General and Council had agreed to ſend them Fifteen Lacks of Rupees.

And Your Committee find, That in conſequence of Accounts from General Goddard and from Bombay, that Hoſtilities were likely to take Place with the Marattas, the Select Committee of Fort St. George addreſs another Letter, November 10th, to Bengal, repeating their Expectation of an Attack from Hyder, whoſe great Preparations they continually hear of, and whoſe Force at preſent is ſaid to conſiſt of 30,000 Sepoys and 20,000 Horſe; and that ſhould he enter the Carnatic, it would be out of their Power to prevent the Ravages of his Horſe, which would greatly injure their Revenues—That they wiſh to know in Time what Aſſiſtance they may depend upon, in order to take Meaſures accordingly—They propoſe, as the beſt Plan in caſe of being compelled to act againſt Hyder, to carry the War into his Country, by ſending a conſiderable Force to Mangalore by Sea, from which they might very eaſily march to Seringapatam, and be more readily ſupplied with Proviſions, while engaged in beſieging it, than they could while defending the Capital of the Carnatic—They obſerve, that the Detachment ſent to protect Bazalet Jung, and that ordered to join General Goddard, made no inconſiderable Part of their Troops; and that their remaining Force, except by the King's Regiment expected from Europe, would be by no Means adequate to the various Services required from them, and they therefore ſtill hoped to hear of Accommodation with the Marattas, as they could not ſuppoſe the deſigned Propoſals which they had ſeen, would be finally rejected by the Poonah Miniſtry, unleſs ſome new Requiſitions were added to them.

It appears, however, to Your Committee, That the Nabob communicated at this Time to the Governor, Intelligence of a Treaty between Hyder and the Marattas, and acceded to by the Nyſam, for uniting their Forces, and commencing a general Attack upon the Company's Poſſeſſions. 25 Nov. 1779. N° 158.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor, in his Anſwer to the Nabob, aſſures him, that in the Firſt Place ſuch an Alliance is highly improbable, and could hardly be effected, but that at any Event he hopes, with the Support which his Highneſs is capable of affording, that the Company would be able to protect him againſt all the Powers of Hindoſtan. N° 161. 2d Dec.

But it appears to Your Committee, That freſh Accounts arrived from Poonah, which gave Force to the Rumours before communicated by the Nabob; and many Particulars were now related of the Terms on which Hyder had made Peace with the Marattas, and of the Plan for carrying on War againſt the Engliſh in every Part of India; and Your Committee find, That the Preſident paid Attention to it in his Minute of 30th December, wherein he conſiders Means to ſecure the Neutrality of the Soubah. And it appears, that the Select Committee incloſed this Intelligence in a Letter to Bengal, dated 31ſt December, in which they thus expreſſed themſelves, "It is beyond Doubt, that a Treaty "of Peace and Alliance has taken Place between Hyder and the Marattas." N° 168. 14 Dec.

And Your Committee find, That on Accounts brought from Tellicherry, dated 9th December, that the Troops had not been able to proceed from thence to join General Goddard, the Preſident propoſed to ſend a Reinforcement to him from the Preſidency, notwithſtanding the critical Situation of their own Affairs, becauſe he thought it neceſſary for the Purpoſe of obtaining Peace with the Marattas, that the Company's Force there ſhould be made as reſpectable as poſſible; and as they themſelves daily expected Lord Macleod's Regiment at Madras, "they would be enabled to form a ſufficient "Army to cover the principal Garriſons in the Carnatic; and that as to the open "Country, they could not pretend with Infantry only, to protect it againſt the numerous "Horſe of Hyder Ally, ſhould he make an Irruption into it."—The Preſident's Propoſal was approved of; and Captain Panton, of the Sea Horſe, was deſired to convey the Troops by Sea to Surat. Appendix, N° 39.

And Your Committee find ſuch to have been the Situation of Affairs under the Preſidency of Fort St. George, at the End of the Year 1779, in reſpect to their Expectations of Hoſtilities with Hyder Ally.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor ſent a Letter on the 21ſt January 1780, to the Court of Directors, in which he obſerves, that every thing was quiet in the Carnatic; that nothing material had happened ſince the laſt Diſpatch, though they had been kept in continual Alarm, from various Reports of the hoſtile Intentions of Hyder and the Nyſam; the former, in conſequence of a Treaty which it was confidently affirmed (and ſcarcely admitted of a Doubt) he had entered into with the Maratta State, and the latter from the Friendſhip which had long ſubſiſted between him and the Infant Peſhwa, and Miniſters at Poonah—That Hyder had hitherto contented himſelf with extending his Conqueſts to the Northward, and had not yet invaded any Part of the Nabob's Poſſeſſions; and that every Thing had been done, on the Part of their Government, to keep him quiet at ſo critical a Juncture; and that, from the Advance of the Seaſon, without any Movement having been made by him towards the Carnatic, he was inclined to think they ſhould remain in Peace, eſpecially as the very ſeaſonable Arrival of the Fleet with the Troops, would have a powerful Effect in preventing any Deſign of an Invaſion, if ſuch had been ſeriouſly intended.

The Governor alſo mentions the Reinforcement which they had ſent to join General Goddard, notwithſtanding their Apprehenſions of the Nyſam and Hyder; and that it had left the Coaſt on the 11th Inſtant—that the Troops from Mahé had alſo Orders to join him; and that the 8th Battalion of Sepoys would embark from Pondicherry in a few Days for the ſame Purpoſe.

He obſerves alſo, That he had ſent his Conſiderations upon the preſent political State of the Company in India, of which Your Committee do not think it proper in this Place to take any further Notice than by inſerting the introductory Page, which is as follows:

"The Meaſures lately purſued at Bengal and Bombay, in Support of Ragonaut "Row, having drawn on the Company the Reſentment of the Maratta State, given "Offence to Nizam Ally Cawn, who is in Friendſhip with that State, and a declared "Enemy

"Enemy to Ragonaut Row, and opened the Way to a Rupture with Hyder Ally, "by promoting Peace between him and the Marattas, and leaving him at Liberty to "execute the Threats which he has denounced againſt the Carnatic, it is become a "Matter of ſerious Importance with the Company, to conſider how they may beſt "avert the Evils that ſurround them, and what Line of Conduct it may be proper "to adopt for eſtabliſhing their Affairs in future upon a ſolid and permanent "Footing."

And Your Committee find, by another Letter from Sir Thomas Rumbold, dated 7th February 1780, that "he could ſpeak with Confidence, that there was no Likeli-"hood, at that Time, of any Troubles on that Side of India; as Hyder Ally had "lately releaſed ſome Gentlemen who had been detained by his Officer on the Mala-"bar Coaſt; and as he had remained till that Time at Seragapatnam, and withdrawn "ſome Troops he had to the Northward."

And Your Committee find in a Select Letter from Fort Saint George, dated 3d April 1780, ſeveral Obſervations on the Growth of Power and Importance of Hyder Ally, and of his Conteſts with the Marattas, who "ſeeing no Proſpect of Re-"lief from their Wars with the Engliſh, were forced to conclude a Treaty with "Hyder, which they made offenſive, that they might have the Benefit of his As-"ſiſtance againſt them."

And Your Committee alſo find in this Letter, an Account of the Tranſactions relative to the Guntoor Circar, and of the Neceſſity which Bazalet Jung had repreſented himſelf to be under, of requiring the March of the Troops to be ſtopped, and that the Circar ſhould be delivered back to him by Orders from the Preſidency of Fort Saint George—that they had complied with the Firſt Requeſt; but that as they had done every Thing in their Power to fulfil the Agreement, they deemed it by no Means incumbent on them to deliver up the Circar, and more eſpecially, as they had ſo much Reaſon to believe that Diſtrict would, in that Caſe, have been given to Hyder—that they had therefore promiſed to account for the Rent, and after deducting the Expences for their Troops employed in his Service, to remit the Surplus, and had given him Aſſurance, that he might call for that Body of Troops whenever the Situation of his Affairs ſhould require it.

They obſerve, That they indeed conſidered it as a fortunate Circumſtance for the Company, that their Troops were not required to proceed to Adoni, as, from the Part taken by Hyder Ally, there was Reaſon to fear they might have embroiled themſelves with him; and that indeed, having been aware of that at the Time of the Firſt Propoſals for a Treaty with Bazalet, they ſhould not have agreed to them but from the Expediency of procuring the Diſmiſſion of the French Troops—and that they ſhould now wiſh to take any Opportunity of annulling the defenſive Articles in the Treaty (continuing ſtill to hold the Circar at Rent) and thereby of freeing themſelves from the only Embarraſſment which could attend that Connection.

They mention the Appointment of Mr. G—— Gray to go to Hyder Ally, to ſollicit the Releaſe of ſome Engliſh Gentlemen, and that he had ſet out on the 14th of January, but before he reached Syringapatam, Hyder had releaſed them—that Mr. Gray however, proceeded, and delivered this Letter to Hyder, and at the ſame Time aſſured him of their Diſpoſition to cultivate Friendſhip and good Underſtanding with him—that Hyder made but an indifferent Return to theſe Overtures, ſeemed neither deſirous of their Friendſhip, nor did he treat Mr. Gray with Civility—that Mr. Gray returned with a Letter from Hyder, which would be found in the Country Correſpondence of that Year.

They conclude this Subject with obſerving, that from that Letter, and from one from Mr. Gray, the Court would be able to judge clearly of Hyder's real Diſpoſition towards them; and they remark, that his inſolent Conduct could only be encouraged by their preſent Troubles with the Marattas.

Appendix, N° 40.

Your Committee muſt here remark to the Houſe, That the Books of Conſultations, and of the Country Correſpondence of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, from 31ſt December 1779 to the 2d April 1780, were loſt on Board the General Barker, which was caſt away on the Coaſt of Holland, and that no Duplicates had been brought in the other Ships which ſailed from Madras at the ſame Time, ſo that Your Committee have not been able to gain any further Account than they have already given of the Tranſactions relative to Hyder Ally during that Period.

But Your Committee find that Sir Edward Hughes, in a Letter dated Madras Road 5th April 1780, to Lord Viſcount Weymouth, obſerves, "that if any Judgment can "be formed of Hyder Ally's Intentions from the Language he holds, they muſt be "extremely hoſtile to the Britiſh Intereſts;"—and in Support of his Obſervation, he encloſes a Copy of the Letter mentioned above from Hyder Ally to Governor Rumbold; and by this Means Your Committee have an Opportunity of laying it before the Houſe, which we think it proper to do at Length, becauſe it contains his explicit Complaints againſt the Company's Servants on ſeveral Grounds, and as far back as the Treaty of 1769.

Copy of a Letter from Hyder Ally to Governor Rumbold, dated 12th Rubby at Amel, 1194 Heg. or 19th March 1780.

"I had the Pleaſure of receiving your Letter by Means of Mr. George Grey, and I underſtand the Contents thereof, as alſo the Repreſentations of the above Gentleman.

"When Chunda Cawn and the French formerly inveſted the Fort of Trichonopoly, the Promiſes and Engagements you then made have not been performed on your Part; afterwards the Governor and Council concluded a Treaty of Friendſhip between me and the Company; the Subſtance of which was as follows: They would conſider thoſe who are my Friends or Enemies, to be Friends or Enemies to them, and that we ſhould mutually aſſiſt each other when Circumſtances required. I aſſured myſelf that the Company would not ſwerve from their Engagements. The Treaty above alluded to, you will have in your Poſſeſſion, and which you'll pleaſe to peruſe. At the Time of the War between me and the Marattas, although I did not ſtand in Need of your Aſſiſtance, yet, in order to know whether you regarded your Engagements, I repeatedly requeſted you to ſend me a ſmall Body of Troops purſuant to your Promiſes; but you then omitted to ſend them. Some Time ago you wrote me you would aſſiſt Bazalet Jung with Troops, and you did ſo accordingly, and a Skirmiſh happened between my Troops and thoſe of yours; beſides this, yours and my Boundaries bordering on one another from Dingadet to Cuddapah, frequent Diſturbances ariſe from the People on your Side. The Commandant of Tillicherry in particular has afforded Protection to the Nairs belonging to my Country, and has given Refuge to their Families within his Bounds, has ſupplied them with Arms and Ammunition, and incited them to raiſe Diſturbances in my Territories, and they have plundered a Country worth 20 Lacks of Rupees, and are ſtill continuing to ravage it.

"When ſuch improper Conduct is purſued, what Engagements will remain inviolate? I leave it to the Judgment of you and your Council to determine, on whoſe Part the Engagements and Promiſes have been infringed."

"Edward Hughes."

And Your Committee find upon the Select Conſultations of Fort St. George, of the 24th April 1780, a Letter from Bombay; wherein was encloſed One from Hyder Ally to the Governor of that Preſidency, received by him February the 1ſt 1780; in which Hyder acknowledged the Receipt of a Letter from the Governor, and acquaints him, that, agreeable to his Requeſt, he had releaſed the Engliſh Gentlemen and their Families, but that he had many Cauſes of Quarrel (which he enumerates) with the Governor of Madras; and that he had given Orders to his Officers to take Care of themſelves, and to fight with the Engliſh People upon their entering his Country; that no Diſpute had come between the Governor of Bombay and him; but that "upon the People who oc-"caſioned unjuſt Quarrels, he reſented them."

A Letter of the 9th May, from Major Cotgrave (who ſucceeded Colonel Braithwaite in the Command at Tellicherry) informed the Select Committee, That the Nairs continued to inveſt that Place, and that he was convinced they were not only encouraged, but aſſiſted by Hyder. Appendix, N° 41.

And Your Committee find, That Lord Macleod, in ſeveral Letters, and particularly in one of 1ſt June, made Complaint to the Select Committee, of want of Proviſions for his Troops; of ill Treatment from the Nabob's Sepoys; and chiefly of the Quarters, in which his Men were ſo much crowded, that great Danger to their Lives was to be apprehended from it; and it appears, that Major Maule was hereupon ordered to give an Account to the Select Committee, why he had not begun the Barracks.

And

And Your Committee find, That on 12th June 1780, the Select Committee reſolved to order the Detachment under Colonel Baillie to remove into the Guntoor Circar, "becauſe, there being various Reports of Hyder Ally's Movements and Deſigns, "it would be proper to have thoſe Troops on this Side the Kiſtna, in caſe of any "Diſturbance in the Carnatic."

And that, on the 19th June, a Letter from Colonel Lang, dated at Vellore 11th June, was read by the Select Committee; in which he gave Intelligence of Hyder Ally's March from Syringapatam, and of the great Force he had collected at Bengalore, and at the ſame Time were read other Letters, containing the like Information.

19 June 1780. And Your Committee find, That on this Occaſion Mr. Johnſon delivered in a Minute, to which Mr. Smith ſubſcribed; in which they ſuggeſt the great Expediency of making Preparations to reſiſt the hoſtile Deſign of Hyder Ally, and of deliberating on Meaſures for reinforcing the Garriſons, and for keeping up a Force at leaſt ſufficient to guard the Company's and the Nabob's Poſſeſſions, if they ſhould not be able to maintain an Army in the Field.

They adviſed, that an exact Return of Stores and Proviſions ſhould be ordered; and then obſerved, "That the General was the beſt Judge of the preſent Diſpoſition "of the Army, and how far it might be expedient to have the Europeans di-"vided."

And Your Committee find, That the Select Committee of Fort St. George, in a Letter, dated 28th June 1780, to the Governor General and Council, inform them, that Hyder Ally had conſtantly kept up an Intercourſe with the French Governor at the Iſlands; that he had received great Quantity of Military Stores from thence; that his Forces (which he had been encreaſing for Two Years paſt) were now equipped for immediate Service; that Part of them were actually advanced to the Frontiers of the Carnatic, and Intelligence was received, that he was employing People to clear the Road leading to One of the principal Paſſes; that in caſe of an Invaſion, they would act in the beſt Manner they could; but much feared their Difficulties would be great for Want of Money.

And Your Committee find, That the Commandant at Tiagar repreſented, in a Letter of 2d July, to the General, the defenceleſs State of that Place, which, being in the Affinity to the Paſſes, was liable to an early Attack in caſe of an Irruption of the Enemy.

And it appears, That Mr. Smith delivered in a Minute, on 17th July, to the Select Committee; wherein he very ſtrongly urged the Neceſſity of ſhaking off that Supineneſs and Inactivity in which they had hitherto remained, and of preparing themſelves to meet the Attack of Hyder, which now ſeemed unavoidable; and he ſuggeſts a Plan for immediate Defence, till a larger Army could, if neceſſary, be aſſembled.

And Your Committee find, That Information was brought from the Commander at Amboor, on the 21ſt July, that Hyder, his Two Sons, and the beſt Part of his Army, were come through the Paſs, and that his Artillery was drawn up in the Road to Changama; and that all the People of the Valley were fled.

And by a Letter, dated 13th October, from Lord Macleod to the Secretary at War, it appears, That about the 20th July, Advices arrived at Fort St. George from different Quarters, that Hyder Ally had invaded the Carnatic with a powerful Army; but that no Attention was paid by the People in Power to that Intelligence, which they treated with Contempt—That the Evening of the 23d, however, put the Invaſion beyond a Doubt, even with the Government; for certain Intelligence was then received, that Porto Novo on the Sea Coaſt, and Conjeveram, not Fifty Miles
Appendix, N° 42. from the Capital, had been plundered by the Enemy.

Your Committee having thus ſtated the Intelligence received by the Preſidency of Madras, of Hyder Ally's Intention to invade the Carnatic; his Manner of invading it, and the various Events that happened, and Meaſures that were taken in conſequence of that Invaſion; they will now proceed to report to the Houſe, the Reſult of their Inquiries on ſeveral other Points, which are neceſſary, in their Opinion, for the Information of the Houſe, that they may be the better able to judge of the Cauſes of thoſe Misfortunes to which the Britiſh Poſſeſſions on the Coaſt of Coromandel have of late been expoſed.

In the former Part of this Report, the Committee have given ſome Account of the great Force with which Hyder Ally had invaded the Carnatic, according to the Intelligence at that Time received, and of the Conduct by which he endeavoured to ſecure the Conqueſts he had made; but as this Intelligence appears to have been received in a Moment of general Alarm, Your Committee think it proper to ſtate to the Houſe, the Opinions which the Preſidency of Madras entertained of the Character of this Prince, of his Reſources, and of the Troops he appears to have employed, at Two former Periods, when the Company was not at War with him:

About the latter End of the Year 1774, the Governor General and Council of Bengal deſired the Preſidents and Councils of the other Settlements, to tranſmit to them the beſt Information they were able to procure of the ſeveral Princes in their Neighbourhood.—In anſwer to this Requiſition, the Preſident and Council of Madras, in a Letter dated the 9th of December 1774, write as follows: "Hyder Ally "Cawn poſſeſſes a valuable, extenſive, and well-regulated Government—They cannot "give an accurate Computation of his Revenue or Forces, but all Accounts agree, "that he can bring into the Field a very numerous and well-diſciplined Army; that "he is no leſs exact in the Payment of his Forces, than attentive to their Diſcipline; "and that his Revenues are ſaid to amount to Three Crores of Rupees—that he has "taken the Opportunity, while the Attention of the Marattas has been engaged by "their Diſtractions at Home, to recover the whole of the Countries which they had, "within theſe few Years, wreſted from him—that as they cannot ſpeak with Certainty "of the Reports which prevail of his Connection with the French, it is almoſt im"proper for them to touch upon them; but thus much is evident, that, by their Means "he is plentifully ſupplied with military Stores; and that Adventurers of their Nation "are allowed, if not encouraged, to enter into his Service."

In Anſwer to a ſimilar Requiſition, made by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, in the latter End of the Year 1777, the Preſident and Council of Madras, in a Letter dated the 16th of January 1778, informed them, "that Hyder Ally had at that "Time in the Field, a Force, conſiſting, as they were informed, of about 30,000 Sepoys "with ſmall Arms, 50,000 Matchlock Men, 28,000 Horſe, and 37 Guns;" and they afterwards add, "that the Revenues ariſing from his different Poſſeſſions are immenſe, "amounting, as they believe, to Three Crores of Rupees; that his whole Attention ſeemed "to be engaged by the Marattas, and his Views confined to the Preſervation of his own "Dominions; that he had a Vakeel at Pondicherry with Monſieur Bellecombe, from whom "he received every Aſſiſtance the French could then afford him; that Monſieur Bellecombe kept up a conſtant Correſpondence with him, and endeavoured all in his Power, "to engage him in the Intereſt of the French." And ſpeaking of the great and dangerous Power of the Marattas, they further add, "We think Hyder might on ſuch an "Emergency (a Maratta War) be made an uſeful Ally, as his Troops are more warlike, better diſciplined, and better appointed than thoſe of any other Power: But we "are afraid the Nabob could never be brought to act cordially in ſuch an Alliance, as he "has long entertained a rooted Enmity towards Hyder, and hath on ſeveral Occaſions "manifeſted it, in Oppoſition to his own Intereſt. As to the Soubah, little could be "gained by a cloſer Union with him; and our Opinion, both in reſpect to him and the "Marattas, is, that we ſhould endeavour, in caſe of a War, to prevent their taking "Part againſt us; but that we ſhould prefer Hyder as an Ally, whoſe Aſſiſtance might "be the moſt ſerviceable."

And Colonel Stuart, in his Memorial of the 9th of December 1776, which was preſented to the Preſident and Council of Madras, and which they highly commend, ſpeaks of Hyder Ally as follows: "This Man ſeems to be in the Mouths of almoſt every "Body, as a Bugbear to frighten and alarm; in England it is the ſame, and even the "Stock Jobbers play him off in Change Alley. I have, with the moſt minute Attention, "collected from the Company's Records in England and elſewhere, informed myſelf of "every material Circumſtance, that led to, or occurred in, what is called the Balla Gaut "War, and our Differences with Hyder. I know alſo how that Buſineſs concluded. "I have in my Poſſeſſion a Copy of General Smith's Commentary upon that War, and "have particularly noticed Hyder's Letters, Meſſages, and Converſations in ſeveral "Periods of the War; from all which it appears to me, that on Hyder's Part, it was a "War of Self-defence; and, becauſe I believe Hyder to be a ſenſible Man, and to know "his true Intereſt, I conclude he was ſincere, when he explicitly declared upon all Occaſions, and particularly to Mr. Hornby their Chief at Tellicherry, and by his Meſſage "by Mr. Stracey, whom he ſent for that Purpoſe to Madras, that nothing was further "from his Wiſhes, than a War with the Company, becauſe he knew they would in "the End ruin him, but that in ruining him, he could ſo protract the Time, and

" increaſe their Expence, as even to diſtreſs the Company by their Conqueſt; and what " is very remarkable, he warns Mr. Hornby of what he next Year performed, that he " would force a Peace perſonally, by riſking an Invaſion into the Carnatic. If at that " Time when he was ſucceſsful, he concluded a Peace without any material Advantage or " Addition of Territory, for what Reaſon now, having no Difference with him, does he " want only to make Incurſions to burn and plunder this Country, when he muſt be " ſenſible, that ſuch Conduct would draw upon him, not only the Strength of this Pre- " ſidency, but alſo a regular Syſtem for his Deſtruction, ſupported by the Influence, " Arms, and immenſe Treaſury of Bengal; and his Deſtruction would ſpeedily fol- " low, not by a Balla Gaut Land War, through the Paſſes, and penetrating at an " immenſe Expence, to Seringapatam from hence, but by the Co-operation of Sea " Armaments at Mangalore, and from other Parts on the Malabar Coaſt? I ſhall " never therefore be led to think, that, without any Reaſon, he will bring himſelf " into ſuch Difficulties; but if he does, I hope the Force of the Carnatic alone will " be ſufficient to chaſtiſe him."

Your Committee will conclude the Information they intend to give of Hyder Ally, by the following Account of his preſent Force, tranſmitted by Sir Edward Hughes, in his Letter to the Earl of Hillſborough, dated the 15th Day of October, 1780.

ACCOUNT

ACCOUNT of Hyder Ally's Force now acting in the Centre of the Carnatic, and laying Siege to its capital City, Arcot.

European Cavalry,			
Mounted under M. Pimorin — — —	300		
D° — M. Lally — — —	80		
D° Infantry and Artillery,			
Attached to the Guns of the different Sepoy Battalions —	200		
		580	
Muſtees,			
Under the Command of M. Janon, a Portugueſe —	—	80	
Topaſſes,			
Under the Command of Janon — — —	900		
D° — Mr. Mills — — —	700		
		1,600	
			2,260
Black Cavalry,			
Under Tepoo Saib, properly armed and accoutred, and cloathed in Red — — —	100		
D°, D°, in Green — — —	100		
		200	
Under M. Lanſquenet, diſmounted — —	200		
D° Davis, D° — — — —	200		
		400	
Choſen Horſes, marked with Hyder's own Chop—Half with himſelf, and Half with Tepoo Saib — —	—	20,000	
Irregulars (called Looty Wallens) of which no preciſe Calculation can be formed, ſuppoſed to conſiſt of — —	—	20,000	
			40,600
Sepoys,			
Under Mahomed Ally, cloathed in Red, Three Battalions of 1,000 Men each — — —	—	3,000	
—— Shaik Omar, cloathed in Green, Five Battalions (attached to Lally's Corps) — — —	—	5,000	
—— Shaik Boudan, cloathed in Red, Four Battalions —	—	4,000	
—— Toleram (his own) Sepoys, attached to Mr. Samuel Mill's Topaſſes	—	1,000	
			13,000
D° Irregular — — — —	—	—	8,000
Matchlock and Pikemen — — —	—	—	20,000
Rockets, 500 Camels, each carrying a Rocket Boy and a Matchlock Peon, with 20 ſpare Rockets; alſo a great Number of Bullocks carrying Rockets, and a Man to each, the whole ſuppoſed to conſiſt of — —	—	—	1,000
Laſcars, ſuppoſed to be about — — —	—	—	2,000
			80,860

Ordnance.

Heavy Guns, }	Braſs	20 }	70
Field Pieces, }		50 }	
Howitzers —	—	5	

N. B. A large Detachment employed under Meer Saib, in deſolating the Northern Provinces of the Carnatic, and the Guntoor Circar, not included in the above.

Your Committee will next proceed to lay before the Houſe, a State of the Company's Forces on the Coaſt of Coromandel; ſhewing, what were their Numbers, what their Condition and Diſcipline; and in what Manner they were ſtationed and diſtributed immediately before the Irruption of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic.

The Committee of Secrecy that ſat in the Year 1773, have given an Account of the Military Eſtabliſhments and Military Regulations under the Preſidency of Madras, which ſubſiſted at that Time.

See Letter of the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, 6th Feb. 1777.

Your preſent Committee find, That in the Beginning of the Year 1777, in conſequence of the Tanjore Country falling under the Military Protection of the Company, the Preſident and Council of Madras augmented and new-modelled their Army, upon a Plan firſt ſuggeſted, in Part by Sir Robert Fletcher, but afterwards much improved by Colonel Stuart, augmenting the Number of Sepoy Battalions, viz. the Carnatic Battalions from 12 to 16, and the Circar Battalions from Six to Eight, diminiſhing at the ſame Time the Privates in each Company from 86 to 65, which, together with the Native Non-commiſſioned Officers, brought the Strength of each Battalion to 750 Men; this, however, is excluſive of European Commiſſion and Non-commiſſioned Officers, in Number 19, Native Commiſſioned Officers in Number 20, Drummers 12 and Puckallys 10. For the Information of the Houſe, the Committee have inſerted the Eſtabliſhment of One of theſe Sepoy Battalions in the Appendix. They at the ſame Time raiſed Five new Battalions, of the ſame Eſtabliſhment and Numbers, ſo that the Force of the Preſidency, according to the Eſtabliſhments of that Time, conſiſted of 29 Sepoy Battalions, amounting to 23,519 Officers and Men; to theſe are to be added a Troop of Cavalry, conſiſting of 48 Officers and Men, and Two Regiments of European Infantry of Two Battalions each, which, according to their Eſtabliſhments, ſhould amount to 576 Men in each Battalion, Non-commiſſioned Officers included, or 2,304 Men in the whole, beſides Non-commiſſioned Officers and Staff, and Six Companies of Artillery, amounting to about 600, Commiſſioned and Non-commiſſioned Officers included, beſides European Invalids and Penſioners, amounting to about 900.

Appendix, N° 43.

See Military Regulations, Pages 47, 57, and 58.

On the 29th of June, 1778, upon receiving Information of the War with France, the Preſident and Council ordered that 20 Men be added to each of the Battalion Companies of 13 Carnatic and Eight Circar Battalions, making an Augmentation of 3,360 Men; — but on the 5th of November of the ſame Year, the Select Committee ordered, That the Sepoy Battalions, to which this Augmentation had been made, ſhould be reduced to their former Eſtabliſhment, and that the Overplus Sepoys which had been raiſed, do fill up the Vacancies in the other Battalions.

On the 16th of July, in the ſame Year, they ordered their Corps of Artillery to be new modelled, making it conſiſt of Eight Companies inſtead of Six, each Company having One Captain, Two Lieutenants, Two Lieutenant Fire Workers, Five Serjeants, Six Corporals, 10 Gunners, 54 Matroſſes, One Drummer, and Two Fifers, making 83; and the Eight Companies, amounting in the Whole to 664, beſides the Staff, conſiſting of One Lieutenant Colonel, One Major, One Adjutant, One Quarter Maſter, One Serjeant Major, One Quarter Maſter Serjeant, One Drill Serjeant, One Drill Corporal, One Drum Major, and One Fife Major, in all Ten, which in the whole makes the Corps to conſiſt of 674.

And on the 26th of the ſame Month, they gave Orders for raiſing Two more Battalions of Sepoys for the Defence of the Circars.

Your Committee do not find that any further Augmentations were made to theſe Troops, till the 31ſt of July 1780, when, in Conſideration of the Army's taking the Field, and the Garriſons in the Carnatic being weakened thereby, it was reſolved, That ſuch of the Battalions of Sepoys as remain in Garriſon, be ordered to augment their Companies 20 Men each. It appears by the Select Conſultations, 23d September 1780, that Sir Hector Munro then recommended augmenting the Sepoy Battalions to 100 Sepoys each Company; but Your Committee do not find that any Orders were iſſued in Conſequence of this Recommendation, the General's Minute being ordered to lie for Conſideration.

Your Committee find, That the Preſidency and Council of Madras frequently repreſented, that the European Regiments were incomplete for want of a ſufficient Number of Recruits from Europe; but the Sepoy Battalions were in general compleat.—And on the 22d of December 1778, ſoon after the Surrender of Pondicherry, General Munro reported to the Select Committee, that the Sepoy Corps appear, by the Returns, to be compleat to the Eſtabliſhment of 750 Men; and that there were about 250 Supernumeraries to be diſpoſed of as the Committee ſhould think proper.

The

The following is an Account of the effective State of the Company's Forces on the Coaſt of Coromandel, in January 1780.

Cavalry	- - - - - - - - - -	48	
Artillery	- - - - - - - - - -	562	Non commiſſioned Officers included.
Infantry, 2 Reg^{ts}.	- - - - - - - -	2,028	Rank and File, including Non-commiſſioned Officers.
European Invalids and Penſioners,	-	853	
Sepoys. Carnatic, 21 Batt^{s}.	- - -	16,279	Native Officers included.
Sepoys. Circars, 8 Batt^{s}.	- - -	6,295	
Total Native Troops, Officers included,	-	22,574	as alſo a Corps of Sepoy Independants, amounting to 763, Native Officers included, and 722 Sepoy Invalids and Penſioners.

In this Account, no Notice is taken of the 2 Battalions ordered to be raiſed for the Defence of the Circars, on the 26th of July 1778.

It appears to Your Committee, That of the above Troops, the Nabob has long been engaged to pay 10 complete Battalions of Sepoys; the Charge of which, together with the Expence of the Garriſons, which he has alſo engaged to defray, amount annually to about 4 Lacks of Pagodas, as ſtated in the Letter of the Preſident and Council of Madras to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, dated the 7th of December 1774.

Letter of the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George in their Military Department, 29 October 1773.

And it further appears to Your Committee, That the Rajah of Tanjore is under an Engagement to pay annually to the Company 4 Lacks of Pagodas for the military Defence of his Country.

Letter from Fort Saint George, 14 May 1776.

Your Committee find, by a Letter from Governor Rumbold to the Court of Directors, dated the 15th of March 1778, That the Troops of the Company on the Coaſt of Coromandel, were in excellent Order. The Governor declares, that a Spirit of Diſcipline ſeemed to run through the Whole, and that he had ſeldom ſeen a more orderly Body of Men. And Governor Rumbold, in a Letter to the Chairman of the Eaſt India Company, dated the 31ſt October of the ſame Year, expreſſes himſelf as follows: "I think "it neceſſary to mention to you, in Juſtice to Brigadier General Stuart, that one great "Advantage on our Part, and which enabled us to carry the Orders of the Court of "Directors for attacking Pondicherry into immediate Execution, was the State in "which we found the Army upon this Eſtabliſhment, at the Time of receiving thoſe "Orders, owing to the very ſeaſonable Augmentation that had been made, and the proper military Regulations and Diſcipline which had taken Place, during the Time he "commanded the Troops."

And Sir Eyre Coote, in a Letter to the Committee of Correſpondence, dated the 18th January 1779, bears Teſtimony to the Diſcipline and good Order of theſe Troops in the following Words: "I have reviewed ſeveral of your Corps ſince my Arrival here, "and can aſſure you with much Pleaſure, that they are brought to a Perfection I could "hardly have an Idea of in this Country. Your Artillery is equal to any Thing in "Europe; and nothing is left us to wiſh, but an Addition of Numbers to both. The "Officers merit every Thing that can be ſaid in their Praiſe, for the unwearied Pains "they have taken to bring the Troops to the State they are in at preſent."

To the Forces above ſtated, is to be added the firſt Battalion of His Majeſty's 73d Regiment, amounting, according to the Eſtabliſhment, to 1082 Men, Non-commiſſioned Officers included; and it appears by the laſt Return, previous to Hyder Ally's Invaſion, that the effective Strength of this Battalion was, at that Time, Non-commiſſioned Officers 72, Rank and File 846, Total 918. And it appears to Your Committee, that 245 Recruits for this Battalion were ſent out in the Ships of laſt Year, but were taken on their Paſſage.

And Your Committee find, by a Return, dated Camp at Marmalon, 1ſt November 1780, That the Strength of this Battalion, after the Defeat of Colonel Baillie, conſiſted of Non-commiſſioned Officers 55, Rank and File 568; beſides miſſing, Non-commiſſioned

Officers 11, Rank and File 117, being Part of the Two Flank Companies of the Battalion that were ſent with Colonel Fletcher to join Colonel Baillie, and are ſuppoſed to be now either killed, wounded, or Priſoners; and beſides a Detachment ſent to Bengal, conſiſting of, Non-commiſſioned Officers 4, Rank and File 50, 48 of which appear, by Sir Eyre Coote's Return, to have arrived with him ſince at Madras.

Your Committee alſo find, by the Return of the 30th of November 1780, That there is in the Garriſon of Fort St. George 100 European Militia, and in the Black Town 100 European and 1500 Sepoy Militia, formed into Two Battalions; beſides 100 Native Portugueſe, and 100 Black Artillery, in the Black Town.

With reſpect to the Diſtribution of theſe Forces, Your Committee find, That it has ever been the uniform Opinion of both Civil and Military Perſons, that for the Defence of the Carnatic, as great a Force as could be ſpared from the different Garriſons ſhould be collected in ſome central Spot.

Proceedings of the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, in their Military Department, dated 18 Nov. 1776.

It appears to Your Committee, by the Proceedings referred to in the Margin, That this Plan had been earneſtly recommended by Generals Coote, Smith, and Fletcher.

The Governor General and Council of Bengal, in their Letter of the 26th of January 1778, after obſerving upon the diſperſed State of the Troops appointed for the Defence of the Carnatic, and particularly of the Europeans and Artillery, proceed to ſay, "Thoſe, "who, when united, will form a moſt reſpectable Corps, loſe almoſt their whole appa- "rent Conſequence, and much of their real Subſtance, by ſuch a Diviſion and Diſſipa- "tion of them; we believe, that the Want of Accommodation for the Whole of your "European Eſtabliſhment, may have rendered it, in ſome Degree, an Act of Neceſſity; "and we have no Doubt but it has been occaſioned by ſome powerful Cauſe; but what- "ever it may have been, we cannot help recommending as an Object moſt worthy of "your Attention, to deviſe the Means by which your European Forces may be collected, "and kept entire at your Preſidency, or within its Reach, for in that Light we regard "the Quarters of Poonomalle and the Mount; that all the other Forts and Paſſes be "garriſoned by Native Troops; and that not a Man of the ſeveral Ranks of European "Soldiers and Artillery, be detached from their proper Corps. You will agree with us "in Opinion, that it is on the European Forces which the Company maintain in India, "that the preſent Exiſtence of their Power, the future Safety and Duration of their Set- "tlements, eſſentially depend, and that theſe muſt loſe both their Diſcipline and Strength, "by being divided."

And in their Letter of the 17th October laſt, they ſay, "Had the Diſpoſition been "attended to, or the Advice contained in that Letter followed, the Calamity which their "Forces lately ſuffered, and which was owing to a Diviſion of the Troops at a Moment "of Emergency, would not have happened."—And Colonel Stuart, in his Memorial before mentioned, of the 9th December 1776, propoſes the following Plan for ſtationing the Troops, as beſt calculated, in his Opinion, for the Defence of the Carnatic: In Time of Peace, to have Two Cantonments, one near Conjeveram, the other near Tiagar, Volconda, or Trinamalle; Six Battalions of Sepoys, and the Grenadier Companies of ſome others, Two Regiments of Horſe, Two Companies of European Grenadiers, and Two Companies of Artillery, to form the firſt Cantonment; and Three Battalions, and ſome Sepoy Grenadiers, and a Company of Artillery, to form the other Cantonment; with a Detachment from the European Companies, to work the Guns of the Sepoys at each Cantonment.

In Time of War, when the Army muſt be increaſed, the Number at each Cantonment to be double, or more if thought neceſſary.

Sir Hector Munro, in a Letter to the Governor and Council of the 8th of November 1778, in treating of the Diſpoſition of the Troops, ſoon after the Surrender of Pondicherry, ſays, "It appeared to me alſo neceſſary, that they ſhould be ſo diſpoſed, that a "conſiderable Body might be formed, if neceſſary."

And Governor Rumbold, in his Letter to the Court of Directors of the 15th of March 1778, writes, "It is my Intention, with the Advice of General Munro, to fix upon ſome "convenient Spot, within a Day and Half's March of Pondicherry, ſuch as between "Wandewaſh and Gingee, or more immediately within the Jaghire, and there embody "as great a Part of your Army as can be ſpared from the Defence of the ſtraggling "Garriſons in the Carnatic; for if an Enemy were to land To-morrow, they might get "a Footing before we could collect together Part of your Troops: I therefore judge "it highly neceſſary to have an Army in Readineſs to attack Pondicherry;—at any Rate, "a Body of Troops ought always to be in Readineſs in the Carnatic."

The following Diſtribution of the Troops on the Coaſt of Coromandel, in January 1780, which has been laid before Your Committee, will ſhew how far any of theſe Plans had at that Time been complied with.

	Europeans.				European Invalids.	
	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Sepoys.	Artillery.	Infantry.
Cuddalore	—	4	1	446	1	28
Chingleput — —	—	—	1	63	4	275
Carrangooley — —	—	—	—	658	—	—
Conjeveram — —	—	—	—	—	—	—
Fort St. George — —	—	22	477	1,991	35	238
Mount — —	—	313	—	—	1	—
Madura — —	—	—	4	632	2	1
Madranticum — —	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ongole — —	—	2	2	158	2	—
Pondicherry — —	48	1	416	1,756	9	—
Permacoil — —	—	—	2	68	1	—
Palamcotah — —	—	—	7	789	3	—
Poonamalee — —	—	—	1	79	1	—
Surat — —	—	120	581	1,048	—	—
Trichinopoly — —	—	1	7	789	12	22
Tanjore and Diſtrict —	—	—	36	3,954	19	—
Tiagar — —	—	—	—	—	4	—
Wandewaſh — —	—	—	—	—		
Trippaſore — —	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vellore and Amboor —	—	3	453	1,579	16	12
Vellum — —	—	—	—	—	4	—
Karrical and Nagore —	—	—	5	399	—	—
Circars.						
Chicacole — —	—	—	12	1,187	—	—
Condapilla — —	—	—	4	316	1	—
Coringa — —	—	—	—	38	—	—
Ellore — — —	—	—	10	1,187	2	—
Ganjam and Itchapore —	—	—	15	967	3	—
Guntoor Circar — —	—	95	144	3,524	3	—
Mazulipatam — —	—	1	29	1,153	8	121
Rajahmundry — —	—	—	1	—	—	1
Samul Cottah — —	—	—	4	281	—	—
Vantapollam — —	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vizagapatam and Diſtrict	—	—	7	578	10	18

Your Committee do not find, that in conſequence of the Intelligence received, ſubſequent to January 1780, of Hyder Ally's hoſtile Intentions, any Orders were given for bringing together any conſiderable Body of Troops, and forming them into an Army for the Defence of the Carnatic, previous to the 24th Day of July in the ſame Year.

In Addition to the Obſervation made by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, in their Letter of the 17th October before-mentioned, on the diſperſed State of the Troops, Sir Eyre Coote, in his Letter to the Committee of Correſpondence of the Eaſt India Company, of 30th November 1780, expreſsly ſays, "That "the Army was left in the ſame divided State as in Time of the moſt perfect Peace "and Tranquillity; and the Places of Strength, which whilſt we maintained, he (Hyder "Ally) could never become Maſter of the Carnatic, were entirely neglected."

It appears by Lord Macleod's Letter to the Secretary at War, of the 13th of October 1780, That even on the 20th of July no Attention was paid by the Government of Madras, to the Intelligence then received of Hyder's Intentions: And on the 23d of that Month, when his Lordſhip told the Governor, "that perhaps the Re-"port of Hyder's Invaſion might be true, and that he thought, at all Events, they

"ought

" ought to take ſome Meaſures to oppoſe him," the Governor anſwered, " What can " we do? we have no Money!" But added, " We mean however to aſſemble an " Army, and you are to command it."—And Lord Macleod's Letter to the Governor and Select Committee, of the 31ſt of that Month, points out the Difficulties and Dangers to which the Troops, in forming a Junction, would then be expoſed: And Mr. Sadlier's Minute of the 29th of the ſame Month, confirms the Fact, " That no " Care had then been taken to aſſemble an Army."

And Your Committee think it right here to refer to a former Part of this Report, wherein it is ſtated, That the Preſident and Select Committee, in their Letter to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, of the 18th Day of Auguſt 1780, attributed the Delay of bringing an Army into the Field to oppoſe Hyder Ally, to the diſtant Stations in which the Troops were ſcattered when he made his Irruption into the Province.

The Motions of the Troops, and the Endeavours uſed to form an Army, in order to attack Hyder Ally, and to relieve Arcot, and the unhappy Diſaſters that enſued, from the ſaid 24th Day of July until the Arrival of Sir Eyre Coote; and the Condition in which he found the Settlement, the Garriſons, and the remaining Troops, are already ſtated in the former Part of this Report.

Your Committee will now inſert a Return of the Troops, and their Diſpoſition, as tranſmitted by that General.—The Return is as follows:

Stations and Dates of Returns.	Nations.	CORPS, &c.	European. Commissioned Officers.	European. Serjeants, and other Non-commissioned.	European. Volunteers and Cadets.	European. Rank and File.	Native. Staff.	Native. Officers, Non-commissioned, and Private.	Labourers to assist in working the Guns, &c.	Smiths, Carpenters, Armourers, &c. &c.	Servants, Balmen, Water Carriers, &c. &c.	Total, Officers, &c. included.	Wanting.	Horses. Effective.	Horses. Wanting.
Madras, September 1780.	Europeans.	Cavalry, One Troop; Engineers, Artillery, 1 Battalion and 8 Companies; 1st Battalion 73d Regiment; 2 Regiments, each 2 Battalions; Invalids, Pensioners, and Militia —	253	581	81	3,942	—	—	—	—	—	4,857	517	32	—
	Sepoys.	Twenty-nine Battalions; Artillery, Sibindy, and Militia; Invalids, and Portuguese Militia — — —	335	138	—	—	269	28,628	—	—	—	29,370	64	—	—
	Lascars.	Attached to Artillery and other Corps, and at Bombay —	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,489	—	—	2,489	—	—	—
		Artificers with Artillery, &c. — — — —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	462	—	462	—	—	—
		Bheasties, Bildahs, Leoapacks, and Coolies — —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,500	1,500	—	—	—
		Total — —	588	719	81	3,942	269	28,628	2,489	462	1,500	38,778	581	32	—

The Diſpoſition of theſe Troops is as follows:

MADRAS TROOPS, 30th November 1780.

Artillery, 8 Comp^{a}	European Cavalry, 1 Troop	—	—	with the Army.
	1 ½ Company	—	—	miſſing.
	1 D^{o}	—	—	Fort St. George.
	2 D^{o}	—	—	Malabar Coaſt.
	3 ½ D^{o}	—	—	with the Army.
European Infantry, 2 Regiments, 4 Battalions.	1ſt Battalion, 1ſt Regiment.	1 Company	—	Malabar Coaſt.
		5 D^{o}	—	Vellore.
		3 D^{o} were at Arcot; are returned to Madras Priſoners by Capitulation, not to ſerve againſt Hyder Ally during the War.		
	2d Battalion, 1ſt Regiment.	1 Company of Grenadiers	—	miſſing.
		1 D^{o}	—	Malabar Coaſt.
		7 D^{o}	—	with the Army.
	1ſt Battalion, 2d Regiment.	7 Companies, including Grenadiers	—	Malabar Coaſt.
		2 D^{o}	—	miſſing.
	2d Battalion, 2d Regiment.	1 Company of Grenadiers	—	miſſing.
		2 D^{o}	—	with the Army.
		6 D^{o}	—	Fort St. George.
Carnatic Sepoys, 21 Battalions.	1ſt Battalion	—	—	miſſing.
	2d D^{o}	—	—	with the Army.
	3d D^{o}	2 Companies Grenadiers	—	Malabar Coaſt.
		8 D^{o}, D^{o}	—	Madras.
	4th D^{o}	2 Companies Grenadiers	—	Malabar Coaſt.
		8 D^{o}	—	Fort St. George.
	5th D^{o}	2 Companies	—	Vellore.
		2 D^{o} were at Arcot; are returned to Madras in Number 44; the reſt miſſing.		
	6th D^{o}	2 Companies Grenadiers	—	with the Army.
		8 D^{o}	—	Trichinopoly.
	7th D^{o}	6 Companies	—	miſſing.
		4 D^{o}	—	Fort St. George.
	8th D^{o}	—	—	Malabar Coaſt.
	9th D^{o}	2 Companies Grenadiers	—	with the Army.
		8 D^{o}	—	Tanjore.
	10th D^{o}	—	—	Pallamcottah.
	11th D^{o}	—	—	miſſing.
	12th D^{o}	4 Companies	—	Kirrical & Nagore
		6 D^{o}	—	Cudalore.
	13th D^{o}	2 Companies Grenadiers	—	with the Army.
		8 D^{o}	—	Tanjore.
	14th D^{o}	2 Companies Grenadiers	—	miſſing.
		1 D^{o}	—	Wandewaſh.
		7 D^{o}	—	Poonamalee.
	15th D^{o}	2 Companies Grenadiers	—	miſſing.
		1 D^{o}	—	Wandewaſh.
		7 D^{o}	—	with the Army.

Carnatic Sepoys, 21 Battalions.	16th D°	2	Companies Grenadiers	—	—	—	missing.
		5½	D°	—	—	—	with the Army.
		1	D°	—	—	—	Permacoil.
		½	D°	—	—	—	Chingleput.
	17th D°	2	Companies Grenadiers	—	—	—	missing.
		8	D°	—	—	—	with the Army.
	18th D°	2	Companies Grenadiers	—	—	—	with the Army.
		8	D°	—	—	—	Tanjore.
	19th D°	5	Companies, Grenadiers included	—	—	—	with the Army.
		1	D°	—	—	—	Tiagur.
		1	D°	—	—	—	Gingee.
		3	D°	—	—	—	Trichinopoly.
	20th D°			—	—	—	Malabar Coaſt.
	21ſt D°	2	Companies Grenadiers	—	—	—	missing.
		8	D°	—	—	—	with the Army.
Circar Sepoys, 8 Battalions, and 5 Independant Companies.	1ſt Battalion	6	Companies	—	—	—	Chicacole.
		4	D°	—	—	—	Vizagapatam.
	2d D°			—	—	—	missing.
	3d D°	2	Companies Grenadiers	—	—	—	with the Army.
		2	D°	—	—	—	Mazulipatam.
		6	D°	—	—	—	Condapillie.
	4th D°	2	Companies Grenadiers	—	—	—	with the Army.
		8	D°	—	—	—	Mazulipatam.
	5th D°			—	—	—	Chicacole.
	6th D°			—	—	—	Ganjam & Diſtrict
	7th D°	5½	Companies, Grenadiers included	—	—	—	Samulcottah.
		2	D°	—	—	—	Fort St. George.
		2	D°	—	—	—	Mazulipatam.
		½	D°	—	—	—	Coringa.
	8th D°	2	Companies Grenadiers	—	—	—	with the Army.
		1	D°	—	—	—	Mazulipatam.
		7	D°	—	—	—	Ellore.
	Independents, 5 Companies			—	—	—	Ongole.
Sibendy Sepoys, 2,727.	Tanjore 3 Battalions, conſiſting of			—	—	—	1,749
	Mazulipatam			—	—	—	495
	Vizagapatam			—	—	—	300
	Ganjam			—	—	—	183
European Militia, 200.	In the Garriſon of Fort St. George			—	—	—	100
	In the Black Town			—	—	—	100
Native Portugueze.	In the Black Town			—	—	—	100
Militia Sepoys.	In the Black Town, 2 Battalions			—	—	—	1,500
Black Artillery.	In the Black Town			—	—	—	100
Invalids.	Europeans 828 / Sepoys - 850		in the Garriſons of	—	—	—	Fort St. George, Chingleput, Cuddalore, Trichinopoly, Mazulipatam, Vizagapatam.

N. B. The Troops under the Head, "with the Army," are cantoned in the Environs of Madras; and thoſe mentioned "miſſing," are thoſe that were in the Actions againſt Hyder Ally, under the Command of Lt Colonel Baillie.

As

As Two Detachments appear to have been ſent from the Army, under the Preſidency of Madras, and to have thereby diminiſhed the Force appointed for the Defence of that Preſidency, Your Committee think it right, before they conclude this Head of Enquiry, to ſtate the Numbers which compoſed theſe Detachments, and by whoſe Advice they were ſent.

Select Conſ. 7th Dec. 1778, fol. 724. Your Committee have already obſerved, That on the 7th of December 1778, the Select Committee at Fort St. George reſolved to make Preparations for the Expedition againſt Mahé, and requeſted General Munro to prepare a Liſt of warlike Stores, and an Arrangement of Troops, neceſſary for the Expedition.

Dº, 10th Dº, fol. 761—762. The 10th of December General Munro recommended, that the following Troops be ordered on the Expedition to Mahé, viz.

Europeans, 1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment; Sepoys, 4th and 20th Battalions.
Artillery, Three Companies.
Laſcars, 200.

Dº, 22d Dec. 1778, fol. 862. The 22d of December, in conſequence of Advice being received from Tellichery of the State of the French at Mahé, and of the Country Powers around them, the Committee agreed to add another Battalion to the Force intended to be ſent to Mahé, which then ſtood as follows, viz.

1 Battalion of Europeans
3 Companies of Artillery,
3 Battalions of Sepoys, and
200 Laſcars.

Dº, 19 Jan. 1779, fol. 137. And in a Letter from the Select Committee of Fort St. George, to the Select Committee of Bombay, the Force ordered on the Expedition againſt Mahé is ſtated as follows; viz.

1 Battalion of Europeans — —	439		
3 Companies of Artillery — —	150	Europeans.	
	589		
3 Battalions of Sepoys, each — —	750	Sepoys.	
	2,250		

Select Conſ. p. 100. 22d April. Letter dated 23d March 1779. Your Committee find, That this Force went to attack Mahé, and that after the Surrender of that Fort, which happened on the 19th Day of March 1779, a Part of the ſaid Detachment, viz. Two Companies of Artillery, the Battalion of Europeans, except One Company, and Two Battalions of Sepoys, excluſive of Grenadiers, returned into the Neighbourhood of the Preſidency.

Select Conſ. 30th Auguſt 1779. And Your Committee find, That in conſequence of a Requiſition made by the Governor General and Council of Bengal to the Preſidency of Madras, that they would give Directions to the Officer commanding at Mahé, to join General Goddard with his Detachment as ſoon as the Fortifications of that Place were deſtroyed, the ſaid Preſidency gave Orders, on the 18th Day of October 1779, to Colonel Braithwaite, commanding their Troops at Mahé, to join General Goddard with his Detachment, conſiſting at that Time of One European Company of Infantry, One Company of Artillery, Six Grenadier Companies, and Eight Battalion Companies of Sepoys, which was all the Force they thought themſelves warranted to ſpare in the Situation of their Affairs at that Time.

Letter from the Select Committee of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, dated 3d Apr. 1780, and Col. Braithwaite's Letter referred to therein. On the 30th of December 1779, they received Letters from Colonel Braithwaite, acquainting them, that having entirely raſed the Fortifications, and removed the Stores from Mahé, he was preparing to carry into Execution their Orders for reinforcing General Goddard with his Detachment, when a Requiſition was made to him by the Chief and Factory at Tellicherry, for the whole Detachment to act in Defence of that Settlement, which was cloſely preſſed by a powerful Attack from the Nairs, ſupported, though not openly, by Hyder Ally, to whom the Gentlemen at Tellicherry had given Offence, by protecting a Chief of the Nairs, who was obnoxious to him.

Under theſe Circumſtances, Colonel Braithwaite thought proper to remove with his Detachment for the Defence of Tellicherry; which was fully accompliſhed by the Addition of this Force, though the Nairs continued aſſembled in numerous Bodies at a ſmall Diſtance, making irregular Attacks on the Company's Troops, and threatening to take

any Advantage that might offer, by the Reduction of their Strength, to deſtroy that Settlement.

And Your Committee find, That as ſoon as the Government at Madras received Advice of the Detention of the Troops at Tellicherry, in Manner before mentioned, they determined, upon a Motion made by the Preſident, to ſend, at all Events, immediately from thence, a reſpectable Reinforcement to join General Goddard's Army at Surat; and accordingly ordered a compleat Battalion of Europeans, One Company of Artillery, and a Battalion of Sepoys, to hold themſelves in Readineſs to proceed. His Majeſty's Ship Seahorſe being then in their Road, with a large Country Ship called the Horſendon, the Battalion of Europeans and Company of Artillery were, in a few Days, embarked on theſe Veſſels, and ſailed for Surat the 8th of January. The Battalion of Sepoys, for want of Tranſports, could not proceed at the ſame Time, but embarked from Pondicherry the 11th February, on the Ships Beſborough, Duke of Grafton, and Atlas.

And it appears to Your Committee, by the Return dated the 30th November 1780, That the whole Force belonging to the Preſidency of Madras, which was then ſerving on the Malabar Coaſt, conſiſted of Two Companies of Artillery, Nine Companies of Europeans, and Twenty-four Companies of Sepoys. Theſe Numbers appear exactly to comprehend the before-mentioned Troops at Tellicherry, and the Detachment ſent to Surat. And it does not appear to your Committee, That the Force of the Carnatic had been weakened by any other Detachment when Hyder Ally invaded it.

It is proper, however, that Your Committee ſhould here obſerve, That the Preſident and Council of Madras appear to have been always averſe to making any Detachment to the Malabar Coaſt, for the Purpoſe of carrying on the War againſt the Marattas; and when the Preſidency of Bombay firſt applied to them for Aſſiſtance, in the Beginning of the Year 1778, they abſolutely refuſed to grant it; and in a Letter to the Court of Directors, dated the 5th February 1778, which will be found in the Appendix, they ſtate their Objections to this Meaſure, declaring, that they ſhould be unjuſtifiable if they were to detach any Part of their Troops upon ſo diſtant a Service, from whence it would be impoſſible to recall them, however preſſing the Occaſion, in leſs Time than Five or Six Months; and they add, that as far as they can judge from the preſent Situation of Affairs, it would not be prudent in them to detach any Part of their Force on this Service, though it ſhould meet with the Sanction and Approbation of the Supreme Council of Bengal: And when they were afterwards informed by a Letter from the ſaid Supreme Council, that they had reſolved to ſupport the Views of the Gentlemen at Bombay, under certain Limitations, and deſiring them, in caſe they ſhould renew their Application for Troops, to comply with it; the Preſidency of Madras ſtill continued of the Opinion before expreſſed; nevertheleſs, they thought it proper, in conſequence of the Letter received from Bengal, to deſire General Munro to inform them how the Detachment required for Bombay might be moſt conveniently formed, that no Time might be loſt, ſhould it be hereafter determined to ſend it.

See Letter from the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, dated the 14th Mar. 1778.

And Your Committee find, That when on the 30th Auguſt 1779, they received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 2d of that Month, requeſting, that One Battalion of Europeans, Three Battalions of Sepoys, and Fifty Artillery Men, together with the Detachment ſerving at Mahé, might be ſent to join General Goddard, they delayed taking this Buſineſs under Conſideration till the 18th October, and then ordered only the Detachment at Mahé to join General Goddard (which was detained at Tellicherry in Manner before ſtated; and when they afterwards ſent to Surat a further Reinforcement to join General Goddard, as is already mentioned, they made it leſs, by Two Battalions of Sepoys, than that which the Governor General and Council had required of them; and they complain in ſtrong Terms (as will be ſeen in their Letter of 3d April 1780, which will be found in the Appendix) that the true Object of this Reinforcement was concealed from them by the Governor and Supreme Council.

It is proper that Your Committee ſhould further obſerve, That the Governor General and Council of Bengal, in requeſting that theſe Detachments ſhould be ſent from the Madras Preſidency to join General Goddard, acted upon the Advice of the Commander in Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, who gave it as his Opinion, that from the laſt Returns the Requeſt might with Propriety be complied with; and in the Letter written by the Governor General and Council of Bengal to the Preſidency of Madras, on this Occaſion, it is expreſsly ſaid, that the Commander in Chief had informed them, that One Battalion of Europeans, Three Battalions of Sepoys, and Fifty Artillery, might be ſpared from that Eſtabliſhment, now the Works of Pondicherry are demoliſhed, without any Riſk or Inconvenience to the Service; and that the Reſidue of the Forces under that Preſi-

dency would be ſufficient for the Protection of their Poſſeſſions. As Your Committee find, however, that the Expediency of ſending theſe Detachments to join General Goddard was largely diſcuſſed by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, in their ſecret Department; they have thought fit to inſert at Length in their Appendix, for the Information of the Houſe, their Proceedings on this Occaſion.

Appendix, N° 44.

Beſides the Troops belonging to the Company, which we have already ſtated, there are alſo other Forces which ought to contribute to the Security of the Carnatic; we mean the Troops of Mahomed Ally, the Nabob of Arcot: Your Committee called therefore for the laſt Return of theſe Troops; and were informed by the Servants of the Company, that they were not poſſeſſed of any Return of the Nabob's Troops. Your Committee find, That the Governor General and Council of Bengal, in their Letter to the Preſidency of Madras, of the 26th Day of January 1778, deſire to be furniſhed with a Return of the Nabob's Troops. And Governor Rumbold, in his Letter to the Nabob of the 3d of April, earneſtly requeſted to receive from his Highneſs an exact Account of the Sepoys and Cavalry immediately paid and maintained by him. And in another Letter of the 26th of May following, the Governor again urges the Nabob to communicate to him ſoon the Particulars he had requeſted; the Nabob returned an Anſwer on the 1ſt of June, and all the Account he gives therein of the Troops in his Pay, is as follows: "I have reduced my Sepoys to a Number juſt ſufficient for keeping up the "Collections of my Country and defending the Forts in it.

"During the War with Hyder Ally, I had often heard that our bad Succeſs pro-
"ceeded from our not having Horſe; and I entertained a few under the Command of
"Morare Row and Fazel Beg; but the Enemy's were much better, and greatly ſu-
"perior in Number, ſo that although the Charge of maintaining them was great, they
"were of little or no Uſe.

"Before the firſt Tanjore Expedition, I raiſed Two Regiments of Horſe, and the
"Service they were of at both Sieges of that Place, is well known to the whole
"Army. After Tanjore was taken, Mr. Wynch and Mr. Stone often urged and
"preſſed me to raiſe a Body of Horſe: Since the Increaſe of my Revenue could admit
"of the additional Charge; and as I have nothing more at Heart than to ſatisfy and
"pleaſe my beſt Friends, the Company, I raiſed Five Regiments more, which, in ad-
"dition to the former Two, now made my Eſtabliſhment conſiſt of Seven Regiments.
"I here acquaint you with theſe Particulars, that you may have an Idea of the Sum
"which I was obliged to lay out in buying Horſes and Accoutrements, and raiſing
"Men for them. At this Time, when I was obliged to borrow large Sums of Money
"for the above Purpoſe, I received no Revenue from the Tanjore Country; and in
"my preſent Situation, I find it impoſſible to be at ſuch a Charge; from Experience, I
"am convinced of the Difficulties of keeping up more than what can be regularly paid;
"this has made me reduce my Horſe to Four Regiments, which are commanded by
"European Officers, and the Men cloathed in the European Manner; when I want
"Arms and Broad Cloth for their Uſe, I ſhall apply to you, that I may be ſupplied
"with them out of the Company's Stores. Theſe Regiments have been put by me under
"the Command of my beloved Son, Ameer ul Omrah Behauder, who will take par-
"ticular Care in regulating and diſciplining them. A Part of the Country has alſo
"been aſſigned towards paying off their Arrears and preſent Pay, that they may un-
"dergo no Difficulty in future. I have ſpent the beſt Part of my Life in maintaining
"my Friendſhip for the Engliſh Nation, and fighting againſt their Enemies, and I
"have educated my Children in the ſame Principles of Friendſhip for the Engliſh. As
"I conſider my above mentioned Son as my ſecond Self, and my Blood runs in his
"Veins, he will find the higheſt Satisfaction in devoting it, with that of the Troops, in
"the Service of the Engliſh, whenever it is required, in the ſame Manner as I have done,
"and be ever ready, in Conjunction with the Company's Troops, either in Defence of
"the Country, or in fighting againſt the Enemies of my Friends, to ſurpaſs even the
"Valour of European Troops.

"I have given you the above circumſtantial Account for your Information. The
"public Accounts of the troubleſome State of Affairs in Europe, have in ſome Degree
"helped to encreaſe my Vigilance and Anxiety to have theſe Things properly ſettled;
"but not only at this Time, but at all Times, I am and ſhall ever be ready to mani-
"feſt my hearty Friendſhip for the Engliſh Nation.

"As my Troops are now upon a good Footing, and their Affairs ſettled, I ſhall ſoon
"diſcharge the Balance of my Debt to the Company."

unsatisfactory return.

To this unſatisfactory Account of the Troops of the Nabob, given by himſelf, Your Committee could add other Information, which they find in the Records of the Company, concerning the Numbers of theſe Troops at different Periods; but as it makes the Numbers different in each Period, and relates to Times antecedent to the Letter of the Nabob juſt ſtated, they do not think it neceſſary to inſert it in the Body of their Report, but have added it to their Appendix: They will inſert here, however, an Account of the Nabob's Force, as it ſtood in the Year 1776, which was preſented to them by Colonel Matthews, whom Your Committee thought fit to examine, as it is the fulleſt and moſt compleat they have ſeen.

Appendix, N° 45.

Nabob Mahomed Ally Khan, his Force in the Carnatic.

		Number.
Regulars.	Cavalry. 7 Regiments, of 5 Troops of 100 Men each, to which are attached 2 Companies of Light-armed Infantry, and Two Field Pieces drawn by Horſes; to the Firſt and Second Regiments are 4 Companies attached; to each Troop and Company are European Officers — — — —	5,500
	Topaſſes. A Battalion of 10 Companies of 75 Men each—an European Captain, and Two Subalterns to each Company — — — —	750
	Artillery. Regimented 6 Companies of 100 Men each, chiefly Mahomedans and Rajputes—to each Company is an European Captain and 2 Subalterns — — This Corps was to be encreaſed to 1,000.	600
	Battalions of Sepoys 16, with European Officers, 10 Companies to a Battalion, and each Company conſiſts of 100 Men; theſe Men are in general much better than any in the Company's Carnatic Battalions —	16,000
	Irregular Cavalry — — — —	3,000
	Bom Rajah, Venkatty Gurry Rajah, and Kallaſtry, have at the Nabob's Command, Horſe and Infantry, at leaſt —	10,000
		35,850

In every Fort are Sebendy Sepoys or Peons, and the ſame Kind of armed Men are employed under the different Phouſdars and Amuldars; alſo in every Fort are Gunners, either Topaſſes or Mahomedans.

The Number of European Officers in the Nabob's Service, nearly 200, of all Nations.

The Artillery Men who manage the Guns that are attached to the Cavalry, are not included in the regimented Artillery, and may be reckoned at leaſt 300.

his Troops bad in gen.

Sepoys in good order
Cavalry
want of pay

artillery better.

It would be endleſs if Your Committee were to report all they find on the Records of the Company concerning the Condition of the Nabob's Troops, which in general are repreſented as bad. Colonel Matthews informed Your Committee, that in the Year 1766 the 16 Battalions of Sepoys which the Nabob then had, were in good Order, though not ſo well diſciplined as thoſe of the Company: His Cavalry were in very bad Order, exceedingly ill appointed, owing to his Want of paying them; and that whole Regiments frequently mutinied and confined their Officers, and deſerted by 50 at a Time to Hyder Ally. The Artillery was in general compoſed of Mahomedans: That he cannot ſay any Thing of the Condition of their Artillery at that Time, as it was in the Southern Part of the Carnatic, but that Detachments of them have behaved exceedingly well at the Sieges of Tanjore and Pondicherry.

He

He further informed your Committee, That moſt of the good Recruits were enticed and enliſted into the Nabob's Service, which was the Reaſon that the Company's Troops are, in one Reſpect, worſe than they formerly were, conſiſting of Men of the lower Caſts, inſtead of being of the higher Caſts, or Moors, of which they uſed to be compoſed.

Colonel Stuart, in his Memorial preſented to the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George the 16th December 1776, obſerves, That the Nabob's Troops, from being irregularly paid, and therefore not kept in conſtant Diſcipline and Exerciſe, cannot, as he thinks, be much depended on in their preſent State.

The Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, in their Letter of the 2d July 1777, ſay, That the Nabob's Troops, from the large Arrears continually owing to them, were not only become uſeleſs, but really dangerous to himſelf and to his Country; and they afterwards add, that they had Reaſon to apprehend, from the Conduct of ſome of his Cavalry, which had actually mutinied and confined their Officers, that there would ſhortly have been a general Revolt of the whole Army belonging to the Nabob. And Governor Rumbold, in Two Letters to the Nabob, dated the 7th Auguſt and 1ſt December 1778 (which your Committee have put in the Appendix) repreſents a Mutiny of the Nabob's Cavalry, particularly of Two Regiments, in the moſt alarming Light.— He ſays, in his firſt Letter, that there is an abſolute Neceſſity for diſcharging the 3d Regiment, that had mutinied, without Loſs of Time, and that the reſt of his Troops ſhould either be paid regularly, or totally diſbanded, otherwiſe the Carnatic will be in more Danger from them, than all his Enemies together. And he concludes his Letter in theſe Words: "That if ſome Means be not immediately taken to eſtabliſh them (the "Nabob's Troops) on a better Footing, I ſhall earneſtly recommend to you to diſ-"band the Whole, and truſt entirely to the Company for the Protection of your Coun-"try, which will be much ſafer, and leſs expenſive to you, than the preſent Mode."— And in his Second Letter, in which he gives an Account of the Revolt of the 2d Regiment of Cavalry, he ſays, "That this Mutiny, in all its Circumſtances, is like to what "has already happened in various Parts of the Carnatic." And, he afterwards adds, "That the Danger is now become ſo alarming to the Peace of the Country, and "threatens ſuch violent Conſequences to the Lives of many innocent Men, that if ſome "Remedy be not inſtantly applied by your Highneſs, the Company will be obliged to "interfere ſome way or other, to prevent the Danger from approaching too near their "own Door."

Appendix, N° 46.

Mr. Sadlier, in his Minute of 29th July 1780, ſays, "With regard to the Nabob's "Troops, they are all many Months in Arrears; his Infantry, through Want of Pay "and Want of Diſcipline, could add no Strength to our Army; Part of Six Regi-"ments of Cavalry, formed by him a few Years ago, have deſerted to Hyder, becauſe "they were not paid; and the Three Regiments now remaining, which includes all the "Cavalry in the Carnatic, from the ſame Cauſe, are ready to follow the ſame "Courſe."

Sir Eyre Coote, in his Letter to the Secretary at War, dated 1ſt December 1780, writes as follows:

"Obſerving the enfeebled State of our Army here, and the abſolute Impoſſibility of "reinforcing it from any of the Detachments ſtationed either to the Northward or the "Southward, of which the Fate of that under the Command of Colonel Baillie fur-"niſhes us a melancholy Proof, I naturally turned my Eyes towards the Nabob Mahomed "Ally; but, figure my Diſappointment, when, inſtead of finding him in a Condition to "aſſiſt our Exigencies, I learned from his own Mouth, that he had neither Men, Mo-"ney, or Influence, and that he looked to the Company for the Support of both his "Intereſts and Credit."

In what Manner the Troops of the Nabob behaved in the Moment of Trial, when Hyder Ally invaded the Carnatic, and how far they contributed to the Defence of his Poſſeſſions, is fully ſtated in the former Part of this Report; it may be proper, however, to add, that Colonel Matthews, who has been at Arcot ſeveral Times, being examined concerning the Defence of that Place, which was garriſoned by the Nabob's Troops, and about 150 Europeans, informed Your Committee, that from his Knowledge of the Fortifications of Arcot, he thought it might have held out a conſiderable Time, even with the Troops that were in it when it was taken; that they defended the Petta, flanked with round Towers, with a very narrow Rampart, where Cannon could hardly be drawn, for a conſiderable Time; and he ſhould have thought the ſame Number of Men might have defended the Fort of Arcot, which is in all Reſpects infinitely ſtronger, a conſiderable Time longer than they did; though "he underſtands Hyder Ally's Troops are much "improved in the Art of attacking Places from what they were formerly." And being

further

further aſked, Whether the Nabob could in any Reſpect defend his Country, if it was not for the Force of the Company? he anſwered, It would be impoſſible. And being further aſked, Whether it would not have been more for the Intereſt of the Company, that the Nabob ſhould have had no Troops at all, and that the whole Military Force neceſſary for the Defence of the Carnatic ſhould belong to the Company? he anſwered, That he was clearly of that Opinion; and that if it had been ſo, he thought Hyder would never have invaded the Carnatic; and if he had, he would not have taken a ſingle Fort.

Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort St. George, on the 30 Oct. 1780.

And Your Committee find, That as late as the 30th of October 1780, the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort St. George thought it neceſſary, in order to obtain the Aſſiſtance of the Nabob's Cavalry, to advance the Balance of Arrears of Pay due to them for the Uſe of the Private Troopers, who are there ſaid to be in want of it, and will not ſerve unleſs their Arrears are diſcharged; and at the ſame Time to direct, that the ſaid Cavalry be paid for the Month of October, according to a Return of its preſent State, to be ſent to the Paymaſter at Camp, allowing the Commanding Officers for feeding the Horſes, at the Rate of Six Pagodas each per Month, and to continue the ſame in future.

See 9th Report of the Committee of Secrecy, on the State of the E. India Company that ſat in 1773, p. 607, and following.

Sel. Conſ. Fort St. Geo. 29 June 1778.

Gov. Rumbold's Letters before mentioned, 7 Aug. and 1 Dec. 1778.

See Letter from Preſident and Council of Madras to the Gov. Gen. and Council of Bengal, p. 133.

It is proper that Your Committee ſhould here obſerve, That it appears to them by the Records of the Company, that the Preſidency of Madras have not been wanting, at different Times, ſtrongly to recommend to the Nabob, to be more regular in the Pay of his Troops, and more attentive to their Diſcipline; and that, from the Conſideration of many of the Circumſtances before ſtated, it has been their conſtant Wiſh to induce the Nabob either to diſband a conſiderable Part of his Forces, or to reduce the Whole, and to truſt for the Defence of his Poſſeſſions to the Troops of the Company; but that the Nabob has hitherto refuſed to adopt this Meaſure.

It is proper that Your Committee ſhould alſo obſerve, That as the Pay of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt of Coromandel, depends in Part on the Sum ſtipulated to be paid by the ſaid Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore, the Preſidency complain, that theſe Sums are often very much in Arrear, and that they had great Difficulty in obtaining Payment of them, ſo that they are frequently in great Diſtreſs on that Account; and as the Sums are calculated principally for the Pay of the Troops in Time of Peace, they are in great Want whenever Hoſtilities commence, for Reſources to defray the Extraordinaries of War. But as this Subject will be treated more at large by Your Committee, when they report on the Revenues of Madras, they will enter no further into it at preſent.

Having thus ſtated the Numbers and Condition of the Troops belonging either to the Company, or the Nabob, employed in the Defence of the Carnatic, and of the Company's Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts, Your Committee directed their Attention, in the next Place, to the Military Preparations that were made by the Government of Madras, for putting the Fortreſſes in a proper State of Defence, by collecting Proviſions, iſſuing Stores, and by providing Draft Bullocks, and every Thing elſe that muſt neceſſarily attend an Army on Service.

Your Committee find, That Sir Eyre Coote, in his Letter to the Secretary at War, of the 1ſt of December 1780, ſays, "That the Government of Madras had avoided taking "any Steps towards oppoſing Hyder Ally's Entry into the Carnatic, and made not the "ſmalleſt Preparations for their own Security.

He adds, "It is hardly credible, but no leſs true, that even after Hyder Ally's In- "vaſion, the ſame Inactivity prevailed in this Government; and what ought to have been "their firſt Care, lay as much neglected as if no Enemy had been near. Even the ne- "ceſſary Arrangements for the Security of Fort St. George, the very Foundation of our "Exiſtence on this Coaſt, had not been made."

And he further ſays, "That the Field Artillery requiſite for a Campaign, are ſo far "from being in Readineſs, that the Carriages are only now making up."

And giving an Account of the Surrender of many of the Nabob's Garriſons, without offering the ſmalleſt Reſiſtance, upon Appearance of Hyder's Horſe before them, he obſerves, "That ſuch ready and unconditional Submiſſion to the Enemy, muſt ariſe, "either from Treachery, or a Diſaffection of the Nabob's Government; but for which, "the unpardonable Neglect of every Thing neceſſary to the Defence of the Forts, has "furniſhed thoſe who were ſtationed in them, with an eaſy Excuſe for having ſo tamely "given them up."

And in repreſenting the Difficulty of ſending Supplies of Stores and Proviſions to the remaining Garriſons, he adds, "In both of which they have been kept ſcandalouſly "deficient."

In his Letter to the Court of Directors of the 30th of November 1780, he ſays, "That the Draught Bullocks are deficient in Numbers, and of what there are, many are "ſo weak as to be inadequate to the Service required of them—That Proviſions of "every Kind were ſo ſcarce, that the Troops in Camp could only procure a ſcanty "Supply for One Day's Expence. The whole Country around within Five Miles of "Madras, was entirely plundered and laid waſte by Hyder's Cavalry; that large Bo-"dies ſtill continue to infeſt it, of courſe no Proviſions are to be procured beyond "that Circle; that both the Army and Inhabitants were maintained chiefly by Supplies "from Bengal, and upon which, he was ſorry to obſerve, they muſt principally depend "for their future Support."

And Mr. Sadlier, in his Minute of the 29th of July 1780, a few Days after certain Accounts arrived of Hyder Ally's Irruption, ſays, "Inſtead of aſſembling ſuch Part of "our Army as was capable of making ſome Head againſt his (Hyder Ally's Force) and "putting our Garriſons in a State of Defence, and providing the Means by which an "Army might be ſupported, our unhappy Inactivity prevailed over every Duty which "we owed to our own Characters, to our Employers, or to the miſerable Inhabitants "of a Country, now ſuffering from Fire and Sword, which depend upon us for Pro-"tection."

He further adds, "That our Troops were ſcattered in ſmall Detachments, without "Stores or Guns; that our principal Garriſons were without Ammunition, Stores, or "Proviſions, to enable them to bear a Siege; that a Number of ſmall Forts in the "Carnatic, ſuch as Wandewaſh, Carangooly, Arnee, and many others, the Poſſeſſion of "which have coſt us ſo much Blood and Treaſure, are either left defenceleſs, or garri-"ſoned by a few Companies of the Nabob's Sepoys, who have not been paid for 18 "Months."

And for further Information on this Head, Your Committee think proper to refer to a former Part of this Report, where it is ſtated, "That the Nabob complained of the "few Troops he had to defend the Garriſon Towns, and that many of them required "Stores and Repairs to the Fortifications; and that his Capital would ſoon be attacked, "if it was not ſtrengthened with additional Troops and Fortifications; that he had "lodged great Magazines of all Kinds of Stores in it, and the principal Forts of Vellore, "Gingee, Wandewaſh, and Trichinopoly."

They refer alſo to another Part of this Report, where it is ſtated, "That the Rajah "of Tanjore, and Major Maclellan, who commanded the Company's Troops at Tan-"jore, repreſented the Neceſſity of Reparation to the Fortifications, and of Reinforce-"ments to the Troops for Defence of the Country, and of Artillery Men to work the "Guns in the Forts, there being none at preſent there, but a few Invalids."

They refer alſo to Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon's Minutes of the 18th of October 1780, before ſtated, where it is ſaid, "That the firſt Intelligence they had of Hyder Ally's "Motions, was accompanied by Accounts that his Cavalry had actually burnt Conje-"veram, and finding nothing to oppoſe them, were puſhing on towards Madras; and "that the Majority neglected to take any one Step by which their Safety might be ſe-"cured, until the Enemy's Cavalry had entered into the Heart of the Carnatic, and pe-"netrated to a great Extent, both North and South; and that for ſeveral Days after "the Invaſion, the ſame unhappy Indifference and Inactivity prevailed."

They refer alſo to other Parts of this Report, where it appears, that Sir Hector Munro, with his Army, were in great Want of Proviſions, both while they were at Con-jeveram and in their Retreat from thence, being at the firſt of theſe Places obliged to beat out Paddy (Rice in the Huſks) for the immediate Subſiſtence of his Troops; and unable to march from thence with the Whole of his Force, in order to form a Junction with Colonel Baillie, for Fear of abandoning this, the only Store of Proviſion which he had.

And Your Committee find, That Major George Maule, Chief Engineer at Fort St. George, having, on the 31ſt of July 1780, repreſented to the Select Committee, the Ne-ceſſity of expediting ſome Works to the Fort, which, he ſays, would, before that Time, have been in a compleat State of Defence, had near the Quantity of Materials which he had every Reaſon to expect been ſupplied; and having applied for ſeveral other Things

to be done, which he thought neceſſary for the Defence of the Fort, the Select Committee gave Orders accordingly.

For the further Information of the Houſe on this Subject, Your Committee have inſerted, in the Appendix an Account of Ordnance and Military Stores ſent to Fort St. George from the Year 1775 to 1779, both incluſive; and alſo an Account of Arms, Ordnance, Ammunition, Military Stores, and Proviſions, remaining at Fort St. George in December 1779 and January 1780. Appendix, N°47.

And Your Committee obſerving, That Sir Eyre Coote, in his ſeveral Letters to the Secretary at War and the Court of Directors, complains that Pondicherry, excepting the Fortifications which had been deſtroyed, is in every other reſpect open and convenient for the Reception of the French, in caſe of their landing in that Country; that when it was evacuated by our Troops, on Hyder Ally's Invaſion of the Carnatic, all the French Inhabitants were left in undiſturbed and ample Poſſeſſion of their Houſes, with only a Reſident to tend over them; the Conſequence of which has been, that they have riſen in Arms, have robbed the Reſident, and with fixed Bayonets at his Breaſt, obliged him to ſign a Paper, the Contents of which he knew not, and have raiſed Two or Three Battalions of Sepoys, which they call Hyder's, and which he, no Doubt, pays for, but which bear evident Marks of the Choice of Men being French, as they are chiefly compoſed of thoſe who were formerly in their Service, as ſtated before; and as the Neglect of the Company's Servants in this Reſpect may be imputed as One Cauſe of the preſent State of the Carnatic, Your Committee have thought it right to inquire into the Conduct of the Company's Servants on this Occaſion: And they find, by the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 22d, and 23d Articles of Capitulation for the Surrender of Pondicherry, dated the 17th October 1778 (all which are inſerted in the Appendix) That the Fortifications and public Buildings of Pondicherry were not to be deſtroyed until further Inſtructions were received from Europe—that the Eccleſiaſtic and Religious Orders, as well as the Miſſionaries, were to be ſupported in the full Enjoyment of their Houſes, their Property, and in the Exerciſe of their Religious Functions, as long as they behave with Propriety, and do not endeavour to make Converts of Perſons profeſſing the Proteſtant Religion—that the French Subjects, except Military Officers, were permitted to remain at Pondicherry, without Moleſtation, and to enjoy the ſame Protection as the free Subjects of His Britannic Majeſty, and upon taking the Oaths of Allegiance to His Britannic Majeſty, were allowed to trade under the Protection of the Britiſh Flag, and at all Times to go whither they pleaſe—and that the Sepoys, or other Indians, of whatever Caſt or Religion they be, who had ſerved under the French Flag, ſhould not be troubled or moleſted in their Poſſeſſions, or in their Perſons, on Account of their Services, and of their Attachment towards the French Nation; and that they, as well as all other French European or Indian Subjects, ſhould be protected from the Power of all Indian Princes. Appendix, N°48.

And Your Committee find, That the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort St. George, in their Letter to General Munro, of the 20th October 1778, approved, in general, the Articles of Capitulation, but expreſſed a Wiſh that they had been left more at Liberty with reſpect to the Fortifications of Pondicherry; but General Munro, in his Letter of the 23d of the ſame Month, defended his Conduct in this reſpect, by referring to a Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 15th April 1778, wherein it is ſaid, "In caſe of a ſucceſsful Attack on Pondicherry, it "will be expedient, as War is not yet declared againſt France, that every Thing "ſhould remain in the State it may be in at the Time of the Capture, as far as can be "conſiſtent with the Company's Poſſeſſions."

And Your Committee find, That on the 14th January 1779, the Preſident and Select Committee begun to make Preparations for the demoliſhing the Fortifications of Pondicherry; and having, on the 11th of March following, received further Diſpatches from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 31ſt of Auguſt preceding, by Colonel James Capper, they unanimouſly reſolved, That the Fortifications be demoliſhed without Loſs of Time; and that the Nabob be applied to, to aſſiſt on this Occaſion with as many Labourers from his Country as he can poſſibly ſpare. See Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort St. George, of 11th of March 1779.

On the 31ſt of March, Inſtructions were given to Captain Thomas Giels for this Purpoſe, directing him to confine himſelf to the Demolition of the Fortifications, which muſt be accompliſhed in the moſt effectual and expeditious Manner.

And Your Committee find, That on the 29th of July 1779, the Preſident and Select Committee reſolved, That the only Building within the Town of Pondicherry that ſhould

ſhould be deſtroyed, was the Powder Magazine; and they gave Directions for the Deſtruction of it, as ſoon as the Miners could be ſpared from the Fortifications.

And Your Committee find, That on the 31ſt of October following, Captain Giels reported to the Preſident and Select Committee, that the Fortifications were effectually deſtroyed.

Your Committee think it proper next to obſerve, That it appears by the Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort St George, of the 11th March 1779, that it was Sir Eyre Coote's Opinion, "That the Force of the Company was much too "weak to afford a proper Garriſon for that Place and for Madras; and that it would be "utterly impoſſible to put an Army in the Field without abandoning Pondicherry al-"together, or leaving it in a State ſo inſecure as to render it a ſure Sacrifice to any "Force, however inconſiderable, that might attack it."

With reſpect to the Inſtructions given at the Time that the Troops were ordered to march from Pondicherry, in conſequence of Hyder Ally's Invaſion, for removing from thence the French Officers and Veterans, and ſuch other Perſons as it was improper to leave there, and the Manner in which theſe Inſtructions were executed, Your Committee think proper to refer to Extracts of Two Letters from Colonel Braithwaite, commanding the Troops at that Place, of the 8th and 11th of Auguſt 1780; which are all the Information Your Committee can procure on this Subject, and are as follows:

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort St. George, dated Pondicherry, 8th Auguſt 1780.

"Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

"In conſequence of the Governor's Advice, to ſend from hence the Military French "Officers and Veterans, and ſuch Perſons as I thought improper to remain in Pondi-"cherry at this Juncture, I ſignified, by Letter to Meſſrs. Piveron and Caginive, and "all the Military, that it was your Orders that they muſt prepare to embark in "Twenty-four Hours on Board His Majeſty's Ship Sartine, in order to go to Madras.— "My Reaſons for pitching on Mr. Piveron were, that as Attorney General for the "French King, he might be excited to take a leading Part in any Attempt to re-eſta-"bliſh the French Flag here when I was gone, becauſe there were many Reports con-"cerning him, and becauſe he had long ſince promiſed to repair to Madras, to "withdraw an unjuſt Memorial he had written in to you, and had not been "as good as his Word; and becauſe from his Situation he might have great Influence "over the Minds of the French Inhabitants, and the Natives lately ſubordinate to the "French Government: My Reaſons for pitching on Mr. Caginive were, that he was "reported to be a great Politician, and that his Garden Houſe was every Evening a "Place of general Rendezvous for the French; when their Diſcourſe naturally turned "upon their own Nation, and its preſent Proſpects in India; and I conſidered ſuch "Meetings as likely to animate them imperceptibly to improper Conduct, and becauſe, "by Mr. Guy's Report, he had ſhewn repeated Contempt of your Authority, by refuſ-"ing to ſhew the Title by which he held his Plantation.—However, upon a long private "Converſation with theſe Gentlemen, in which I gave them a great deal of Advice, "which they promiſed to follow, I told them, that if they would declare in Writing "what they ſo readily declared in Diſcourſe, I would take upon me to diſpenſe with "their being hurried away in this Manner, and that I was ſure you would approve of "my Conduct—they chearfully ſigned the encloſed Declarations, and I have permitted "them to remain; and I believe this Alert on them has produced very good Effects: "I had other Reaſons alſo for permitting them to ſtay, which I ſhall have the Honour "of communicating in my Letter to the Governor.—all the Military who were in any "Situation to render Service, I have ſent, as you will ſee by the encloſed Liſt. They com-"plain much, the Officers, as if they have been ſuſpected of breaking their Paroles: "I aſſure them no ſuch Thing is ſuſpected, but as the Committee is bound to tranſmit "them to Europe, and we may ſuddenly leave this Place, it is neceſſary they ſhould be "at Madras, that the Company may have it in their Power to fulfil their Engage-"ments; and beſides, ſhould we be conſtrained ſuddenly to leave it, and the Enemy "were to come into it, it would be a ſhocking Thing for you to think that brave Gen-"tlemen of Honour might be reduced to ſuffer the moſt inhuman Treatment in conſe-"quence of their perſiſting in their Paroles.

"This Argument ſeems to have Weight with them, not but they want to ſtay; and "ſay, that even was a French Fleet to come, they would never in any reſpect act con-

"trary

" trary to their Paroles; and as to Hyder, he might cut them to Pieces, but that they " never would ſerve him.

" I have ſhipped off all the Guns, among which are Nine of Mr. Amelrick's, for " which I ſhall give him a Receipt on the Honourable Company's Accounts. I am " ſorry to inform you, that upon Captain Nodler's having, as he paſſed through here, " praiſed the Braſs Twelve Pounders very much, I was at great Trouble in fixing " Ammunition, and getting Bullocks for them, as a Brigade for the European Batta- " lion; but as Captain Rigault has poſitively declared them unfit for immediate Service, " I have diſmounted and embarked them, and the European Corps will march without " Guns.

" I have alſo ſhipped off as much Powder and Shot as His Majeſty's Ships can " receive, and have ſent other Stores to the Sartine, till the laſt Boats were ſent back, " the Captain declaring that he could not receive a ſingle Thing more—I am now load- " ing ſome Chilingas with Powder to ſend to Cuddalore—I hope other Conveyances may " arrive, or I ſhall have much to deſtroy.

" I will not, Honourable Sir and Sirs, trouble you with a Detail of the Difficulties " I have had to encounter, they will occur to you; and if in ſome Things I may have " deviated from the regular Mode preſcribed for carrying on Buſineſs, I truſt you will " rather commend than blame me for my Exertions to put the Troops under my Com- " mand in Motion, and of courſe to furniſh them with what was neceſſary; alſo to diſ- " encumber myſelf of Powder and Stores in the ſecureſt Manner; and if it ſhall be found " in the End, that I have done this in as expeditious a Manner as the Circumſtances " would admit, and without violating the Capitulation, by uſing either Force or Me- " naces to any Inhabitant of Pondicherry, or poſſeſſing myſelf of an Atom of their Pro- " perty, or an Hour of their Labour, that has not been paid for, I flatter myſelf that " I ſhall have Merit in your Eyes; that I ſhall be excuſed for having given a Receipt " for Money on the public Account; more particularly when you will ſee that I have " given my own private Security for nearly as much more.

" I have not ſignified to any one in Pondicherry, that I have yet received poſitive " Orders to move, of which I ſhall ſpeak farther in my Letter to the Governor.

" There were ſome Priſoners here under Sentence of a Court Martial, the Proceed- " ings of which go by this Conveyance to the Judge Advocate General: As there were " Six of them tried for Deſertion to Hyder, I thought them very improper Incum- " brances for this Detachment, they are therefore ſent on Board the Sartine—Captain " Sydenham has been written to concerning them, and I have alſo adviſed the General " of this Meaſure with them; I alſo ſend the French Deſerter from Hyder's Army, who " I am convinced is an Impoſter.

" It would be unpardonable in me not to take this earlieſt Opportunity to inform you " of the great Aſſiſtance I have received from Rear Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, and " all the Commanders of His Majeſty's Ships, nay every Individual in the Fleet.— " They have ſhewed that Anxiety for promoting the public Service on this Occaſion, " which is the Admiration of all the Inhabitants of Pondicherry, who have been little " uſed to ſee ſuch Conduct in their Marine, and have done every Thing in ſo polite and " hearty a Manner, that I have not Words to expreſs my Obligations to them. The " Admiral only waits for a Wind, intending to continue his Courſe to the Southward " as ſoon as he can.

" I cannot, Honourable Sir and Sirs, conclude this Letter without recommending " to your humane Conſideration, the Officers and Veterans now ſent to you; many of " them leave very diſtreſſed Families, and will not be able even to ſupport themſelves " at Madras, unleſs allowed free Quarters, and even perhaps ſome Encreaſe of Pay.

" I particularly point out to you, old M. Manceau; his Age and Diſtreſſes would " have induced me to paſs him over, but his long and meritorious Services, as an ex- " perienced and brave Officer, make him too dangerous a Man to be left within the " Reach of Hyder's People, who would force him to be uſeful to him, in ſpite of his " Unwillingneſs to act.

" I beg Leave to call to your Mind, the particular Situation of the Women and Chil- " dren of the Detachment under Colonel Brown, who were left here to receive a " monthly Subſiſtence, which is actually ſtopped from the Soldiers at Surat, and " amounts to about One thouſand Pagodas per Month. I ſhall now refer you to the

" Monthly Returns, and ſhall only add, that there is a fair Proſpect of my moving
" by the Night after To-morrow; and that I ſhall carry with me Fifty Barrels of Pow-
" der, and a great deal of ſpare Muſket Ammunition, ſo as to be able, if it ſhould be
" wanted, to puſh any immediate Supplies into the little Frontier Forts. I have al-
" ready furniſhed Cuddalore with Powder and Stores, and Pamacoil with Fifty Barrels
" of Powder; and I hope to carry to meet the General, a great Number of ſpare Bul-
" locks, both Draught and Carriage: But with reſpect to Proviſions, as all here is the
" private Store of the Inhabitants, I fear I cannot do more than furniſh myſelf for
" my March.

" I have the Honor to be, &c.

" John Braithwaite."

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort St. George, dated Camp on the Red Hills, Auguſt 11th 1780.

" Honourable Sir and Sirs,

" I have to aſſure you, that if you do not very ſoon ſend Protection to Pondicherry,
" the Inhabitants will be gradually armed. I have Reaſon to think the Minor or
" Polygar is a great Raſcal: He never would come to me, or any of your Command-
" ing Officers; and this Afternoon, as ſoon as the laſt Guard of mine was come away,
" he went in great State to Mr. Piveron, and has propoſed to arm a Number of his own
" People, old French Sepoys. He ſhould be ſent for to Madras.

" I have the Honour to be, &c.

" John Braithwaite."

Appendix, N° 49.

Your Committee will conclude with calling the Attention of the Houſe to the late Period of the Seſſion at which they were appointed; and the Hurry, in conſequence thereof, with which they have been obliged to prepare their Report. Owing to this Circumſtance, they have been deprived of ſome parole Evidence, which, they had Reaſon to think, might have afforded Information relative to the Subject of their Enquiry. To the ſame Cauſe it muſt be attributed, if it ſhall appear that their Report is not framed with ſo much Conciſeneſs as it might otherways have been. They flatter themſelves the Narrative, and Obſervations they have ſuggeſted for the Information of the Houſe, will appear to be faithfully and accurately collected from the Materials upon which they are founded; and as to any Defects of a different Nature, they muſt ſubmit themſelves to the Indulgence of the Houſe.

2

APPENDIX

TO THE

FIRST REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY,

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE *CARNATIC, &c.*

1781.

Vol. 1
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX,

N° 1.

Fort Saint George, Monday 24th July 1780.

At a Select Committee;

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

MINUTES of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letter from the Nabob:

N° 59, *Country Correſpondence. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 23d July 1780.—Received D°.*

I herewith ſend for your Information, a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah Burbar, dated Yeſterday. What greater Conviction can we have than this? no Veil remains now to conceal the Enmity of Hyder towards us. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſh from Alha Rajah Burbar Behauder, dated 19th Reſul 1194, in the Evening.

Your Servant herewith tranſmits to your Highneſs a Letter he has received from the Aumildar of Cotiſpauk Yeſterday at Four o'Clock in the Afternoon, giving an Account of the Arrival of 2,000 of the Enemy's Horſe at that Place, who had plundered and laid waſte all the Villages in that Neighbourhood, and that 5,000 Horſe more were aſſembled to the Weſtward. The People who brought this Letter from Coliſpauk, told your Servant, that Hyder's Horſe were ſcattered about the Country near Calniour and Arne, and laying waſte all the Villages; they alſo ſaid, that ſome of Hyder's People had carried away the Family of Mahomed Aſlum Cawn, who were going to Muliabad.

Tranſlation of a Letter from the Aumildar of Coliſpauk, dated 18th Regub, or 21ſt July 1780.

Hyder's Horſe are come through the Paſs, and about 2,000 Horſe were this Day ſeen here at Ten o'Clock in the Morning; the People in the Fort of Caliſpauk fired upon them; the Horſe plundered all

all the Villages around, excepting the Cuſba of Caliſpauk. It is ſaid that 5,000 Horſe are coming this Way, and the grand Army is not far off. The Enemy's Troops croſſed the Paſs before Intelligence could be received of it. I am juſt now in the Fort, where there is little Powder or Shot. You will be pleaſed to ſend us ſome.

N° 60. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 23d July* 1780—*Received Ditto.*

I ſend you with this, Paper of News from Hyder Ally Cawn's Camp, dated the 18th Rejub, or 21ſt July, which is this Inſtant come to my Hands, with the Tranſlation, of Intelligence from Choubatty, ſent by the Tappie Man at at Woollendous Pettah. What ſhall I ſay more?

Paper of News from Hyder Ally's Camp, dated 18th Rejub, or 21 of July 1780.

This Day Hyder Ally Cawn arrived at Covinpatam, where his Son, with the Horſe under his Command, had come Yeſterday. While Hyder was on his March from Hurryduſg, the Intelligencies at Tungricotta complained to him of Tim Naig the Head Peon. Upon this Hyder went himſelf to Tungricotta, and enquired into the Complaint; when it appeared, the Head Peon, Tim Naig, had ſent ſome of his Family to a Marriage at Trichinopoly, and had ſince wrote to them to take Care of themſelves, and return ſoon, for that there would ſhortly be Troubles in that Country. The Peon was accordingly found guilty, and hanged on the Spot.

The Troops from Huſſoor and Banaour have joined Hyder, whoſe whole Army is now at Coverepatam. All the Artillery and Foot are put under the Command of Monſieur Lally. Hyder means to join him in the Attack againſt the Engliſh, and ſend his Son Tippoo, with a large Body of Horſe, to lay waſte the Country. He intended writing to the Governor, but Monſieur Lally has told him, that he will not have a proper Anſwer to his Letter; they are always conſulting together. Mr. Lally was ſent To-day with the Cannon and Artillery, to croſs the Paſs of Changaina. It appears that there are Letters from the Mauritius, which mention, that the French have had the Superiority over the Engliſh in Europe; that 800 Europeans have been ſent from the Mauritius to join Hyder; and that the French King has ſent him ſome Preſents. This Intelligence has given Hyder great Pleaſure. The Sloop who brought it ſailed a few Hours before the French Ships, from Mauritius.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs, Hyder has ſent ſecret Orders to the Troops who were at Singapetta, at the Ghaut of Timerallamutty, to march to Caliſhauk.

Intelligence ſent by the Tappie Man from Ottendour Petta.

The Trichinopoly Tappies have not come in theſe Two Days; Four thouſand of Hyder's Horſe, and Four thouſand Five hundred Foot are arrived at the Village of Yerour, not far from Tiaga, and all the Inhabitants have taken the Alarm and fled to the Woods and Mountains. The Tappy Man is afraid to remain longer at Ottendour Petta, and is removed ſecretly to a Place diſtant one Coſs from it, from whence he has wrote this.

24th July 1780.

The foregoing Letter from the Nabob putting it beyond all Doubt, that Hyder Ally Cawn has actually committed Hoſtilities againſt the Carnatic, the Committee reſolved, that the moſt expeditious Means be taken for aſſembling an Army in the Field; and for this Purpoſe, the following Troops are by the Commander in Chief's Recommendation to be immediately ordered to hold themſelves in Readineſs to march at a Moment's Warning.

His Majeſty's 73d Regiment at Poonamalee.
1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment at Vellore.
The Troops cantoned at Pondicherry, conſiſting of one Battalion of Europeans, and 4 Battalions of Sepoys.
15th Battalion of Sepoys at Trichinipoly.
21ſt D° — D° at Madras.
Grenadiers of the European Battalion at Madras.
The Artillery at the Mount.

Reſolved, That all Officers abſent with Leave, be directed to join their Corps forthwith.

APPENDIX, N° 1.

Ordered, That the Agent for providing Draft and Carriage Bullocks, be directed to get in Readineſs, with all Expedition, a ſufficient Number for the Troops ordered to hold themſelves in Readineſs to march from hence, Poonamalee, and the Mount.

The Commander in Chief deſired to hold a Committee of Stores as ſoon as poſſible, to determine the Field Train, Stores, &c. that will be requiſite for the Army, and to prepare them accordingly.

Reſolved, That a Letter be immediately written to Bengal, adviſing the Governor General and Council there, of the Hoſtilities commenced by Hyder Ally, and requeſting all the Aſſiſtance and Support in their Power, particularly in the Article of Money; and that another Letter be written to the Nabob, requeſting him to give Orders for providing Draught and Carriage Bullocks, Proviſions, and every other Article neceſſary for the Troops when they take the Field, and preſſing him to furniſh us with Money to the utmoſt of his Abilities.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Sam[l] Johnſon.

Agreeably to Reſolutions of laſt Committee, the following Letters were this Day written.

To the Right Honourable Lord M'Leod.

My Lord,

As in the preſent Situation of Affairs it is become expedient to aſſemble an Army in the Field, we requeſt your Lordſhip will favour us with your Preſence at a Committee on Wedneſday Morning, that we may have an Opportunity of conferring with you in reſpect to the Employment of His Majeſty's 73d Regiment on this Occaſion; in the mean Time we requeſt you will iſſue the neceſſary Orders to the Regiment, to hold itſelf in Readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt Warning.

We have the Honour to be,
My Lord;
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient
and humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

To Colonel Roſs Lang, commanding at Vellore.

Sir,

We deſire you will hold the 1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment, in Readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt Notice.

We deſire you will ſend a Return of the Tents that will be wanting for the 1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

To Lieutenant Colonel Eccles Nixon, commanding at Trichinopoly.

Sir,

We deſire you will hold the 15th Battalion of Sepoys in Readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt Notice, with the Two 3 Pounder Field Pieces at Trichinopoly.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 1.

To Colonel John Braithwaite, commanding at Pondicherry.

Sir,

We desire you will hold all the Troops at Pondicherry in Readiness to march at the shortest Notice. All the Military Stores now there (except such as the Troops may want for their March) we would have sent up to Madras by His Majesty's Ship Sartine, which will be ordered to Pondicherry to receive them; likewise the Guns intended for the Nabob, but which he has not yet removed. You will be pleased to send a Return of the Tents that will be wanting for the Troops ordered to be held in Readiness.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

To Colonel Edward James, commanding the Artillery at the Mount.

Sir,

We desire you will hold the Corps of Artillery at the Mount in Readiness to march at the shortest Notice; and send to Madras such Artillery and Stores as do not come within the Description of Field Train.

You will be pleased to send a Return of the Tents that will be wanting for the Corps of Artillery.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

To Mr. William Augustus Dobbin.

Sir,

I am directed by the President, &c. Select Committee, to order you immediately to set about preparing as many Draught and Carriage Bullocks as you can possibly procure.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
Chas Oakley, Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

25th. Received the following Letters.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to write you, in consequence of a Cannonade I heard all Yesterday Forenoon to the Westward of this Place; and on Enquiry, find it was from the Forts of Circherd and Pollacamore, belonging to the Vancataguery Rajah, at some Parties of Hyder's Horse; and last Night about 12 o'Clock, I received certain Intelligence that a Party, consisting of 150, had set fire to Ardinge, one of the first Villages in this Country, and carried off many of the principal Inhabitants Prisoners. This Village is only 10 Cos N. W. of this Place. I must beg Leave to refer you to my Letters of the 8th and 11th of November, wherein I did myself the Honour to represent to you the ruinous State of this Fort, and the Weakness of its Garrison, which appear at present very conspicuous. The Inhabitants, instead of coming under its Walls for Protection, fly from it to the Southward. I cannot help being a little alarmed, when I reflect on the Quantity of Stores, &c. committed to my Charge, in so defenceless a State. The Guns that are mounted on the Works, have not a Carriage that will bear the Shock of twice firing.

I have the Honour to be, with Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Edwd Edmonds,
Captain.

Ongole, 21 July,
1780.
6 o'Clock in the Morning.

To

APPENDIX, N° 1.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I take the Liberty to inform you, that in conſequence of Reports circulated by the Black People, of the Advances of Hyder's Horſe towards Madras, the Inhabitants of Conjeveram, and all the Way from Wandewaſh, to upwards of about Twenty thouſand, are aſſembled near this Fort. Permit me at the ſame Time to acquaint you, that there is not One Day's Proviſion, I mean Rice, Gee, and Curry Stuff, in the Fort.

I am,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and reſpectful Servant,
Geo. Mackay,
Lieut. Comm^t.

Chingleput,
24th July 1780.

Wrote the following Letter to Lieutenant Colonel Baillie.

To Lieut. Colonel Baillie, commanding at Inacunda.

Sir,

As Hyder Ally has openly commenced Hoſtilities againſt the Carnatic, we are deſirous of employing the Troops under your Command to annoy him in his Territories to the Northward. If from the Information you have acquired, of the Situation of the Fort at Cuddapa, you think it can be taken by your Detachment, we would have you uſe your Endeavours for that Purpoſe, with the utmoſt Expedition, and in any Manner you may think likely to anſwer the End. Should you be of Opinion that it cannot be done without heavy Cannon, you muſt wait until ſome can be ſent; and in the mean Time employ the Detachment ſo as to anſwer our Views of diſtreſſing the Enemy as much as poſſible; having an Eye at the ſame Time to the Protection of our own Territories.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
25th July 1780.

Fort Saint George, 26 July 1780.

At a Select Committee;

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of the laſt Committee read, and approved.

The Committee having determined, that Lord Macleod's Regiment ſhall take the Field with the Company's Troops, his Lordſhip was deſired, by Letter, to hold them in Readineſs to march; and the Committee, wiſhing to pay every Attention in their Power, at the ſame Time requeſted he would favour them with his Attendance this Day, that they might explain to him the Service for which the Regiment was required. His Lordſhip being accordingly now introduced, the Preſident informs him of the unprovoked Hoſtilities commenced by Hyder Ally, and the Neceſſity there is for the moſt powerful Exertions to be made in the Defence of the Carnatic. His Lordſhip in Reply obſerves to the Committee, that as he was ſent out with his Regiment for the Service of the Company, ſo he will be happy now, and at all Times, to employ it in ſuch Manner as may be deemed moſt uſeful to their Affairs. He then withdrew.

Reſolved, That a Letter be written to the Admiral, requeſting him to ſpare the Sartine, for the Purpoſe of carrying Camp Equipage, &c. to Pondicherry.

Reſolved,

Reſolved, That a Letter be written to Colonel Braithwaite, Commandant at Pondicherry, acquainting him, that the Sartine will be ſent there, and directing him to embark on her, and ſuch other Veſſels as he can procure, all the Cannon, Stores, Gunpowder, &c. now lying at Pondicherry; deſiring him alſo, as ſoon as this neceſſary Service is effected, to march with the Troops under his Command, to Wandewaſh, provided his Intelligence be ſuch, that he has Reaſon to believe there will be no Danger of his meeting a Force much ſuperior to his own; but if he apprehends any Danger of that Sort, he is in that Caſe to march the Troops directly to Madras, by ſuch Route as he ſhall judge moſt ſecure.

Mr. Smith, and Mr. Johnſon, on this Occaſion, deliver in the following Minutes:

The more I reflect on the Situation of the Troops cantoned at Pondicherry, the more am I perſuaded of the Expedieney of applying to Sir Edward Hughes, for the Squadron to proceed thither; that in caſe Colonel Braithwaite ſhould think it would be attended with the ſmalleſt Riſk to march to Wandewaſh or Madras, the Troops may be embarked for this Place with the utmoſt Expedition: Such fatal Conſequences would enſue, were the Detachment either cut off, or prevented from joining the Troops from hence, that I conceive it highly proper to afford ſome Alternative to Colonel Braithwaite, ſhould he think it dangerous to attempt a Junction by Land.

Charles Smith.

The Safety of the European Battalion and of the 3 Battalions of Sepoys at Pondicherry, is an Object of the utmoſt Importance; and therefore I am of Opinion, Application ought to be made to Sir Edward Hughes, for the Squadron to proceed thither; and that Orders be diſpatched to Colonel Braithwaite, for the Embarkation of the Troops, in caſe he apprehends any Riſk in their March from thence to Wandewaſh or Madras; but if he thinks otherwiſe, that then they be ordered to proceed over Land directly.

I am aware it may be urged, that more Time will be loſt by the Troops coming by Sea, than if they were ordered to march directly from Pondicherry to Wandewaſh or Madras: But I am of Opinion, little Inconvenience can ariſe from the ſailing of the Fleet for Pondicherry; and that it may prove a fortunate Circumſtance to have it ready there for the Reception of the Troops, ſhould Colonel Braithwaite judge it expedient to embark them.

Samuel Johnſon.

Ordered, That a Detachment from the Artillery, with Eight Field Pieces, be embarked on the Sartine for Pondicherry, to reinforce the Troops ordered from thence.

Reſolved, That Orders be diſpatched to Trichinopoly, directing Lieut. Colonel Nixon to ſend the 17th Battalion of Sepoys immediately from thence to join Colonel Braithwaite's Detachment.

Read the following Letter from Cuddalore:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

It is with much Concern that I have to acquaint you that laſt Night Porto Novo was plundered by a large Body of Hyder's Horſe. From every Intelligence I have been able to collect in ſuch a Time of Confuſion as this is, that their Numbers are not leſs than One thouſand, and ſome Accounts add, that they are accompanied by an equal Number of Sepoys; and at One o'Clock this Day they were encamped between Porto Novo and Arriavelly. All the Inhabitants in theſe Bounds have taken Refuge in this Fort, and the whole Country is in a State of the greateſt Confuſion and Alarm. Whether they mean to come here, I have not been able to learn, but I may venture to aſſure your Honour, &c. that no Means will be wanting to protect this Fort, and the Honourable Company's Property therein, as far as the State of our Garriſon and Fortifications will admit; but ſorry am I to ſay we are in a very defenceleſs Situation, in conſequence of which I have been induced to apply to Col. Braithwaite for Aſſiſtance, and take the Liberty of incloſing you a Copy of my Letter to him. To-morrow I hope to be able to ſend you more favourable Accounts, but at preſent all the Inhabitants here are ſo much alarmed, that the Intelligence we can poſſibly get is not entirely to be depended upon.

I remain, with the utmoſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
William Cuming.

Cuddalore
23d of July 1778,
at 9 P. M.

P. S. To add to all, we are very badly provided with Guns and Ammunition.

Read

APPENDIX, N° 1.

Read the following Minutes from the Committee of Stores:

Fort Saint George 24th July 1780.

At a Committee of Stores;

PRESENT,

Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Col. Edward James,
Major George Maule,
Mr. Bryan Scottney.

1st. The Committee, at the Recommendation of the Commander in Chief, direct the Commiſſary of Stores to make out an Indent of Ammunition, calculated for the undermentioned Ordnance, and the following Force, viz.

Braſs Ordnance.

12 Pounder	—	—	4
6 Pounder	—	—	8
3 Pounder	—	—	8
5 ⅓ Inch Howitzers	—	—	4
4 ⅘ Inch Howitzers	—	—	4

His Majeſty's 73d Regiment.
The Battalion of Europeans from Vellore.
Four Companies of European Grenadiers.
Artillery.
Five Battalions of Sepoys.

2d. The Military Storekeeper lays before the Committee, Indents of Stores wanted for the Garriſons of Tanjore and Chingleput.

Agreed, that they be complied with, agreeably to the Commiſſary's Remarks.

3d. The Commiſſary of Stores lays before the Committee, a Liſt of Stores received from the Military Storekeeper in the Month of June, Muſters of which being examined are approved.

Hector Munro,
Edwd James,
Geo. Maule,
B. Scottney.

Read the following Letters.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have nothing to inform you of but which you will have heard from Mr. Cumming, namely, that the Enemy have plundered Porto Novo of every Thing valuable, and ſent their Plunder off on Camels, and the Elephants they took to the Weſtward. Their main Army is ſaid to be advancing between Venkaguery and Coverypatam: The Body near us is ſaid to conſiſt of Three thouſand, and to be commanded by a German of the Name of Emheff; they have Four Field Pieces and Two Cohorns, which move as briſkly as the Cavalry. The Party gone towards Madras is ſaid to be larger. I have offered to receive the 1ſt Regiment (Nabob's) of Cavalry, and to aſſiſt them with Money; but Lieutenant Poney wiſhes to wait a little longer on the Red Hills, in Hopes of Orders.

I have the Honour to be,
with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Pondicherry,
24th July 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esq; President, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the Intelligence I have this Moment received, Tippo Saib, with Four thousand Horse, has entered the Carnatic by Way of Changamah and Calishpawk, and is gone towards Madras. A Village was destroyed last Night by his People near to Arnée.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient,
and devoted Servant,
Ross Lang.

Vellore,
23d July 1780,
8 o'Clock at Night.

To John Whitehill, Esq; President and Governor, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

About an Hour ago I received from Colonel Braithwaite an Answer to a Letter I wrote to him last Night (a Copy of which I enclosed to your Honour, &c.) informing me, that from the present Situation of Affairs, it was not in his Power to supply me with any Reinforcement, should it be necessary.

I remain with the greatest Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient
humble Servant,
Will^m Cuming.

Cuddalore,
24th July 1780,
8 P. M.

Fort Saint George, 26th July 1780, Select Committee.

Wrote the following Letters.

To the Honourable Warren Hastings, Esquire, Governor General, &c. Council of Fort William.

Gentlemen,

Our last Letter (of which we enclose a Duplicate) gave you Information of the Approach of Hyder Ally, with a large Army, towards our Frontiers. We now transmit Two Papers of Intelligence just received from the Nabob; by which you will learn, that he has actually detached Part of his Cavalry into the Carnatic, and is preparing to follow with his whole Army.

We are taking Measures for assembling our Troops in a proper Situation to oppose this Attack, and defend the Country in the best Manner we are able; but the Alarm already occasioned by the Report of an Invasion, and the Ravages, which have been actually committed by Hyder's Horse, have driven the People from their Habitations, and put an intire Stop to the Tillage of the Ground.

Under these Circumstances, it will be impossible for us to draw Resources from the Country in any Degree equal to the Expences which the War must inevitably produce, and if we do not obtain a speedy Supply of Money from you, we see no Probability of our being able to act with Vigour and Effect, proportionate to the Exigency of our Situation.

If we can be assured of sufficient Means to carry on the War, we should propose an immediate and powerful Diversion on the Malabar Coast, where the Possessions of Hyder are more within the Reach of our Force, and might, by the Assistance of the Squadron, become an easy Conquest. The principal Settlement belonging to Hyder on that Coast, is Mangalore, to which we should first point our Attention.

We are sensible, however, that these Operations will depend much upon the State of your Affairs with the Marattas, at least with respect to the Force to be employed against Hyder, for it would be highly imprudent in us to detach any Part of the Troops, now remaining with us, upon such distant Service; and as you have the entire Direction of the Force on the other Side of India, we doubt not you will consider how it may be best applied to the Annoyance of this new Enemy.

We have at Tellicherry a Detachment of Troops, from the Coast, which might be of use, and which, if you think proper, we will direct to co-operate with the other Troops in any Plan you may

adopt. We ſhall only obſerve further upon this Head, that the proper Time for commencing any Operations on the Malabar Coaſt, will be in the Month of September or October, when the Monſoon will admit of the Squadron going round.

As the Company have never, within our Remembrance, experienced ſo wanton and unprovoked an Attack, as that againſt which we are now called upon to defend them, we are confident the ſeveral Preſidencies will unite Heart and Hand to humble and reduce within proper Bounds, the Power which has thus dared to inſult them; and we reſt aſſured, that your Honourable Board will exert itſelf in a particular Manner on the Occaſion, to ſupport the Honour and Intereſt of the Company, and promote the Reputation which their Arms have hitherto acquired in the Wars of Indoſtan.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
26th July 1780.

To Lieutenant Colonel Nixon, commanding at Trichinopoly.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee, to deſire you will order Captain Davis's Battalion, with the Two Field Pieces at Trichinopoly, to march with all Expedition to Pondicherry, and put himſelf under the Orders of Colonel Braithwaite.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Charles Oakeley, Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
26th July 1780.

To Lieutenant Colonel James, commanding the Artillery at the Mount.

Sir,

I am directed to deſire you will have in Readineſs Two Field Pieces, with Ammunition, and a proper Number of Artillery to man them, for a Detachment which will march from Madras to the Mount To-morrow Morning.

I am directed alſo to deſire you will ſend to Madras, to be embarked on his Majeſty's Ship Sartine, a Detachment from the Artillery, with Laſcars ſufficient to man Eight Field Pieces.

After making theſe Detachments from the Artillery, the Preſident and Select Committee deſire you will march with the reſt of the Artillery intended for the Field, and the Remainder of the Field Train, to Poonamalee, ſending what may then remain of the Artillery Men to Madras.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Charles Oakeley, Sec.

Fort Saint George,
26th July 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I ſhall keep a good Look out, and keep every Thing as quiet here as the general Conſternation will permit; and have adviſed the Commanding Officer of his Highneſs the Nabob's Regiment of Cavalry on the Red Hills. I feel a want of Field Pieces and ſome Artillery Men, for the Security of theſe large Limits. I have about Eighty Europeans ſick in the Hoſpital, and a very large Quantity of Powder here, which I have before repreſented.

I have the Honour to be, with great Reſpect,
Your very obedient, and faithful Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Pondicherry,
24th July, Four in the Morning.

To

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esq. President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Some of my Scouts which went to the Southward, accompanied the Plunderers of Porto Novo Two Days, but they could not keep up with them longer; they marched back with Precipitation by the Route they came, to lodge their Plunder with the Army; they burned some Villages, and their Talk was, that as soon as they had lodged their Plunder, they should return, and scour the Country hereabout, and drive off the Cattle towards the Army. They had Accounts that Hyder, with his main Body, Artillery, and Europeans, had come to Coveripatam; and that his Son, who was there before with the advanced Party, had advanced to Trincomalee and Chilleput, where much firing has been heard. They spake of the Party gone towards Madras as 3,000 strong; that there was a Party farther to the Northward, and one to the Southward; but they talked of these with such Exaggeration, that there is no giving any Credit to their Stories. I am pretty well convinced that Hyder has not Six hundred Europeans in his whole Service, effective at least. These People did not speak, as if Hyder himself, with the Cannon, would advance, till the French Fleet arrived; as soon as it should appear on the Coast, he was to come down and meet them there. They said, Tippo Saib had Orders to take such Forts as he could garrison, and put Grain into them. The Number at Porto Novo were about 1,000 Horse, and a few Foot cloathed, which on their Return they mounted on Camels and Elephants above their Loads; both Horse and Foot were well armed, and the former very well mounted. They talked of their Plunder as worth Three Lacks of Pagodas; from one Dutchman 80,000 Dollars in Specie, which they were so anxious to secure, that they marched Thirty Miles a Day. I have Scouts out to the Westward, some of whom will I am sure go to their Army; by them I hope to be informed of their real Strength. I think Hyder will not advance with Infantry and Cannon, unless the French were to arrive, which cannot well be before the Monsoon; if he did, he would not be able to avoid an Action, which I believe he is too cautious to risk. Bon Enfan's Wife is here; she has received a Letter from him, advising her to move every Thing from the Gardens, as Hyder's Horse will be down here very soon. Mr. Piveron Yesterday gave an Entertainment to all the principal French Gentlemen, the first I am told since the Capture: The French in general seem quite easy, not disturbed at the Thought of being left without Troops, and some of the Black Men are carrying their Effects to principal French Houses; but there are some who are very downcast; they think that we know that no French Fleet will arrive; and that they shall suffer in the End for Hyder's present Conduct.

I remain, with the greatest Respect,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant
John Braithwaite.

Pondicherry,
26th July 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 27 July 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Since Yesterday, I learn that Hyder's Horse have retreated from Chitty Rell, towards the Passes through which they entered the Carnatic. Some of their flying Parties are still plundering about in the different Villages, but they are reported as of no great Consequence.

This Fort and Garrison are in very fine Order, and I humbly beg Leave to assure you, that there is nothing to be apprehended in this Quarter, if Hyder's whole Army surrounded it.

I am,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your most respectful and obedient Servant,
George Mackey, Lieu' Col.

Chingleput,
26th July 1780.

Dispatched the following Letters.

To Colonel John Braithwaite, commanding at Pondicherry.

Sir,

The Sartine will sail immediately for Pondicherry, with Six Field Pieces, Ammunition, &c. and a sufficient Detachment from the Artillery to man them; also Tents for a Battalion of Sepoys. We desire you will, on her Arrival, land these Articles, and put on Board the Sartine the Cannon and Stores of all Kinds at Pondicherry, also as much Gunpowder as the Captain may think proper to receive.

receive. The Remainder of the Gunpowder we would have you diſpatch in the beſt and moſt expeditious Manner you can, by Boats, to Madras.

We have ordered the 15th Battalion of Sepoys, with Two Field Pieces, to join you from Trichinopoly, and upon their Arrival you will be pleaſed to march with your whole Force to Wandewaſh; but if from any Intelligence of the Motions of Hyder's Army, you ſhall be of Opinion, that you cannot reach that Place without running too great a Riſk, you will in that Caſe, either move this Way, or take Poſt in ſuch Manner as you ſhall judge moſt conducive to the Security of the Troops, until you can be relieved.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
27 July 1780.

To the Right Honourable Lord Macleod.

My Lord,

We have ordered the Artillery from the Mount, and the Detachment that is to go from the Garriſon, to march as ſoon as poſſible to Poonamalee, to join the 73d Regiment; and on their Arrival there, we requeſt your Lordſhip will move the Whole to a Place called Eyacollan, near Conjeveram, where they will be joined by a Battalion of Europeans from Vallore.

We have the Honour to be
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
27 July 1780.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 28 July 1780.

Received the following Letters.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir,

I have had To-day no Intelligence worth troubling you with, only that the Horſe who made the Attack at Porto Novo are gone to the Weſtward. We are exerting ourſelves to defend this Place in the beſt Manner our *very ſmall Means* will allow. Half of the Battalion doing Duty here, are at Nagore, where, if I am not miſinformed, there is little or no Property of the Honourable Company to defend, and here is a great deal; if the Whole or any Part of the Nagore Sepoys were ordered here, they would be of the greateſt Utility, and if it was poſſible to add a few Artillery Men (of which we have only Two, and them Invalids) it would be of infinite Service. My Duty, I think, obliges me to give you the above Information, ſubmitting it to the Deciſion and Approbation of your Honour, &c. I remain, with the greateſt Reſpect,

Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
William Cumming.

Cuddalore,
26th July 1780.
9 P. M.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 23d at Night, acquainting you that Tippoo Saib has entered the Carnatic, and by the Intelligence that I have received this Day, Hyder Ally is on his March by Singepittan and Changarnah, and go directly to Pondicherry; he has left all his heavy Baggage at Coverypatam. A large Body of Horſe and Poligars, I expect to hear every Moment, have inveſted Amboor and Lacet Gur.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
25th July 1780.

APPENDIX, N° I.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 28 July 1780.

Diſpatched the following Letter.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at Bombay.

Gentlemen,

We are now to adviſe you, that Hyder (whoſe Intentions for ſome Time paſt have appeared hoſtile) has invaded the Carnatic with a conſiderable Force; and his Cavalry have already done great Miſchief by their Ravages.

It were ſuperfluous in this Place to ſtate the probable Cauſes of this Invaſion. The only Thing which now remains for us, is to conſider upon the beſt Method of repelling it, and puniſhing the Author of ſo daring an Inſult: For our Part, we can act here only upon the defenſive. The War muſt be carried into Hyder's Poſſeſſions on the Malabar Coaſt, and we truſt your Situation will enable you to act with Vigour on that Side, at leaſt when the Maratta War is at an End. In the mean Time we would propoſe, that ſome Attempt may be made to ſtir up the Nairs againſt Hyder's Government, which we have always underſtood to be a very practicable Meaſure. In ſhort, there is nothing within the Compaſs of our united Power, that ought to be omitted on an Occaſion which calls ſo loudly upon all the Preſidencies for the moſt ſpirited Exertions.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
28 July 1780.

To Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's Ships in India.

Sir,

As you have been ſo good to ſpare us the Sartine to go to Pondicherry, we requeſt the Favor of you to give Orders to the Captain to receive Two Officers and 71 Artillery Men, and 64 Laſcars, with their Tents and Baggage; alſo at his Return from Pondicherry, to receive ſuch Articles as ſhall be tendered him by Colonel Braithwaite, and ſuch French Officers and others as he ſhall be deſirous of putting on Board.

We have the Honor to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
28th July 1780.

To Colonel John Braithwaite, commanding at Pondicherry.

Sir,

Although in our Letter of the 27th Inſtant, we deſired you to march as ſoon as the 15th Battalion ſhould join you, but as it is doubtful when that Battalion may be with you, and as it is of material Conſequence that a Junction ſhould be effected between your Troops and thoſe detached from hence, we would have you march as ſoon as you are ready, giving Information to Captain Davis, with ſuch Inſtructions as may enable him to join you, or the Army, with as much Safety and Expedition as poſſible.

We would have you ſend the Sick in your Hoſpital to Cuddalore.

The Brigade of Guns for the European Battalion, will be ſent with the reſt of the Artillery from the Mount.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
28th July 1780.

To Mr. Richard Church, Reſident at Tellicherry.

Sir,

We are now to adviſe you, that Hyder Ally has invaded the Carnatic with a large Force, and his Cavalry have already done conſiderable Miſchief. You will, in conſequence of this Intelligence, be on

on your Guard againſt every Attempt that may be made on your Side. We hope your Troubles with the Nairs have ceaſed; and we would recommend to you to try every Means in your Power to ſtir them up againſt Hyder's Government, which we have always underſtood to be a very practicable Meaſure.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
28th July 1780.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon having this Day delivered in the following Minutes, they were ordered to be ſent round for the Peruſal of the Gentlemen of the Committee.

Mr. Johnſon's Minute.

When I conſented, at the Committee on the 26th, that Colonel Baillie ſhould proceed againſt Cuddapa, Matters did not appear to me to be ſo ſerious as they now do. It was then reſolved, that another Committee ſhould be ſummoned on Friday the 28th Inſtant; and had we met, I meant to have propoſed, that Colonel Baillie ſhould be immediately ordered to proceed to the Preſidency with the utmoſt Expedition; and I now beg Leave to offer this as my Opinion.

29th July 1780.

Mr. Smith's Minute. The 29th July 1780, in the Evening.

Before I ſign the Letter to Colonel Baillie, I think it incumbent on me to inform the Committee, that I underſtood the Cuddapa Country was ſituated on the other Side of the Paſſes, far diſtant from Innacunda. This being the Caſe, ſhould Colonel Baillie proceed thither with his Detachment, it will be no eaſy Matter to recall him, ſhould his Services be required in the Carnatic. I therefore offer it as my Opinion, and propoſe, that counter Orders be ſent to Colonel Baillie, directing him to move with his Detachment towards the Preſidency, with all poſſible Expedition. By the Junction of this Detachment we may be enabled to form an Army ſufficient, in all Probability, to drive Hyder Ally out of the Carnatic, or at leaſt to prevent his taking Poſſeſſion of any of the ſtrong Forts, which I otherwiſe very much fear he will do in ſpite of us, as I ſee no Poſſibility of our now collecting together the Troops that are ſcattered in the different Garriſons.

Upon which the Preſident and Sir Hector Munro deliver in the following Minute:

As Colonel Baillie, in our Minds, is much better for the preſent with his Detachment where he is, as he may have it in his Power not only to diſtreſs the Enemy, but thereby oblige Hyder Ally to withdraw ſome Part of his Force from the Carnatic; and as there may be ſome Doubt if Proviſions can be immediately procured for a greater Number than what are now under Marching Orders, it is our Opinion, the Letter to Colonel Baillie ought to go without any Alteration.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 29th July 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I think it neceſſary to acquaint you, that in conſequence of Reports brought hither Yeſterday and To-day, of the plundering of Porto Novo, by a conſiderable Body of Horſe, the Merchants and Inhabitants of this Town have taken the Alarm, and are preparing to retire to Negapatam, whither they are already ſending their Families and Effects. I have in vain endeavoured to convince them of their Safety, by repreſenting to Mahomed Coſſim, and others of the principal Inhabitants, that the Horſe are merely Plunderers, and will not dare to come where they know there are Company's Troops, particularly as they muſt croſs ſeveral Rivers before they can reach Nagore. Theſe Arguments have had but little Effect upon their Fears; and upon the next unfavourable Report, whether true or falſe, they will, I doubt not, deſert the Town.

Though I think it improbable the Enemy may venture this Way, we are going to prepare for their Reception, by placing our Three Guns at the Avenues to the principal Streets, and Captain Hughes intends to take Poſt at the Moſque, which is the Situation for the Protection of the Town; but here I muſt obſerve to your Honour, &c. that Captain Hughes is of Opinion, that if the Enemy were to come hither in any conſiderable Numbers, it would be impoſſible to prevent their plundering and burning many Parts of the Town, becauſe he could not venture to divide his Force, which, ex-

cluſive of the Company at Carical, the Half Company at Kivalore, and the different Guards here, conſiſts of not more than 150 Sepoys fit for Duty. I have had no authentic Intelligence of the Enemy's Numbers, nor of their Intentions: Your Honour, &c. having, I preſume, received Information on theſe Points, from the Chief of Cuddalore, can beſt judge whether or not it be neceſſary to order us a Reinforcement.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
J. Hudleſton.

Nagore,
25 July 1780.

Wrote the following Letter.

To Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, commanding the Troops in Camp to the Northward.

Sir,

In our laſt Letter we ſuggeſted to you the Idea of marching againſt the principal Fort of Cuddapah, and we are in great Hopes you will be able, by active Meaſures, to acquire Poſſeſſion of that whole Diſtrict; but if, from any Intelligence you may have obtained concerning the Strength of the Fort of Sident, you judge it cannot be taken without heavy Cannon, you will inform us, that we may ſupply you from hence; and in that Caſe, we would recommend to you to proceed againſt Comum, or act in any other Manner you may judge moſt eligible for the Diſtreſs of the Enemy.

Should Lieutenant Douglas at any Time be in Want of Aſſiſtance for the Protection of the Guntoor Circar, you will afford him ſuch as you may think expedient, or as you can ſpare from your Force.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
29th July 1780.

P. S. We deſire you will ſend the whole of Captain Smith's Battalion to Madras (relieving the Two Companies at Ongole with Two other Companies from your Detachment) provided you can execute the Service recommended to you without it, as we much want to ſtrengthen the Army going into the Field; but if you cannot poſſibly do without that Battalion, you may keep it with you, as long as it ſhall be abſolutely neceſſary, and then ſend it hither with all Expedition.

30th. This Day came in the following Letters:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since laſt I did myſelf the Honour to write you, the Behaviour of Hyder's Horſe has become every Day more alarming; they have plundered Villages to the Northward of this, as far as Yantipollam; and I have juſt received certain Intelligence, that Yeſterday they plundered and burnt the greateſt Part of the Village of Condacore, a principal Village in the Diſtrict of Vellore; and look where I will towards the Vankatogary Country, I ſee Villages in Flames; and the Inhabitants of this Country, as well as the Vankatajay, are fled to the Hills with what they could ſave.

I am alſo informed, that Meer Saib, Hyder's General, is arrived from Cuddapah to Commum with a ſtrong Party. I have directed ſome of the waſte Places in the Fort Wall to be repaired, which I hope will meet with your Approbation.

I have the Honour to be, with much Reſpect,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Edw^d Edmonds,
Cap^t Comman^t.

Ongole,
25 July 1780.

To

APPENDIX, N° 1.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

For several Days past, Reports have prevailed universally in the Country, that a Body of Hyder's Horse had entered the Carnatic, and had plundered and burned several Villages near Arialore and Warianpollam. This Morning I have received Intelligence, that they have taken Outalore, in which there were a few of the Company's Sepoys, who have escaped.

On hearing these Reports, I went to the Rajah, who very readily, on my representing the Propriety of the Measure, agreed to lay in large Supplies of Provisions; One Lack of Columns of Paddy, with Dall, Ghee, Curry Stuff, &c. in Proportion, is already collected. People are employed to bring in 10,000 Sheep, a Hundred good Draught Oxen for the Service of the Artillery, and ordered to be collected as they may be wanted.

The Rajah declared his Readiness to supply any Thing else in his Power, which might be wanted for the public Service: He at the same Time requested me to represent to your Honour, &c. the defenceless State of his Country, as he could have no Reliance on the Sebendies for any Military Purpose; (indeed I believe there are very few if any of these now on Country Duty, who have ever burned Powder since they have been in the Service) That in a Fortnight hence the Season for putting Seed in the Ground commences; that a very small Body of Horse would frighten the Inhabitants, and drive away the Cattle; this would prevent the sowing of the Seed, consequently there would be no Crop, nor no Means of raising Money for the public Service.

With only Three Battalions here, I should not, if I may be permitted to offer my Opinion, think it adviseable to send any large Detachments to any considerable Distance from the Garrison. At present the Coleroon is so high, that it affords Protection to the Tanjore Country, but it will probably be fordable in Ten or Fifteen Days, when there will be nothing to prevent the Depredations of Cavalry. As there are several Breaches in the Fausse Bray Wall, at which an Enemy might enter without Difficulty, I have taken the Liberty to order the Engineer to put them in such a State of Defence as to secure us against the Effects of any immediate Attack; and I have directed that a Number of Palmyras, which are in Garrison, shall be pointed, so that they may serve for Stockades. As these Works will be attended with very small Expence, and as they appear so necessary for the Safety of the Fort, I hope you will approve of what I have done.

The Tondemans Vaqueel informs me, that his Master has Intelligence of 5,000 Horse having marched towards Madura.

As we have no Artillery Men in Garrison, except a few Invalids, I have ordered the Lascars to be instructed in Long-Gun Practice; and I beg to assure your Honour, &c. that every Thing in my Power shall be done to put the Fort, &c. on as respectable a Footing as possible.

I have the Honour to be, with great Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient and
Most humble Servant,
Alex^r Maclellan.

Tanjore,
26 July 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have collected Seven hundred Bullocks, and a Number of Sheep, and shall continue to collect, as at all Events it secures the Cattle, whether they should all be wanted or not.

I have the Honour to be, with the greatest Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Pondicherry,
23d July 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 1.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I have received certain Intelligence, that the separate Body of Hyder's Army, that was encamped on this Side of Wandewash, are moving towards this District. The Number is computed at Four thousand.

I have loudly to complain of Verasamy, Renter of the Jagheer, and Selembet Pettah, Renter of Chingleput, who are now here: They neither will provide a Grain of Rice for the Provision of this Garrison, nor will they allow me to purchase any from the Country People.

The Paymaster General's Head Conicopola Gopolaya, who is a Man of great Property in this Country, and a very faithful Servant of the Honourable Company, sent me Word, as he understood I had not a Grain of Rice in the Fort, I might send for all he had in his own House at Colattoon, to the Amount of One thousand Three hundred Pagodas worth, and use the Whole for the Use of the Soldiers, and be responsible to him for the Money.

To this I accordingly agreed, and this Day sent my People with Carts and Bullocks for the Grain; but these Renters, upon some Pretence of the Man's owing them Money, will not allow me to fetch the Rice into the Fort, nor will they provide the Garrison themselves with any Thing whatever. I will, Honourable Sir, act for the best, as the Time is critical. Every other Article is in the greatest Order and Readiness.

I am,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your respectful humble Servant,
George Mackay, Lt.

Chingleput,
29th July 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

When I had the Honour last to meet you in Committee, I signified to you my Apprehensions, that the French might attempt to land a Body of Troops from the Mauritius on this Coast; and the Intelligence I have very lately received from England, which I have communicated to you, strengthens my former Apprehensions.

As it is of the greatest Importance to the Safety of the Company's Possessions, and of the Carnatic, to prevent such Landing, and to defeat the Designs of the Enemy, I shall proceed with his Majesty's Squadron under my Command to the Southward, as far as Nagore or Negapatam, where I shall be in a Situation with the Squadron to endeavour to intercept any of the Enemy's Ships coming on this Coast for that or any other hostile Purpose.

If in the Course of this Service I can be of any other Use to the Company's Affairs, it shall be particularly attended to.

I am, with great Respect,
Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Edw^d Hughes.

Superb, in Madras Road,
30th July 1780.

Mr. Smith this Day delivered in the following Minute:

I lament most sincerely, that the Majority of the Committee are determined to persevere in their Resolution of ordering Colonel Baillie's Detachment to proceed into the Cuddapa Country, as I am convinced it will prove a most destructive Measure; and that by not recalling that Detachment, the Carnatic may be exposed to the utmost Hazard and Danger. Cuddapah, and that Country, are of very small Importance to Hyder Ally, and he will retake them at Leisure. As to our not being able to procure Provisions for Colonel Baillie's Detachment, I have no Idea of it. I have now done my Duty, and only desire my Minute of last Night and this Day may be recorded for my Justification hereafter, as I do hereby dissent to the Measure of the Majority, and hold them responsible for all its Consequences.

The 30th July 1780, in the Morning.

APPENDIX, N° 1.

This Morning Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon ſent in to the Preſident the following Minute:

In the preſent critical and dangerous Situation of Affairs, we are of Opinion, the Command of the Forces aſſembling ſhould not be delegated, but that General Sir Hector Munro do take the Field, in whom the Army muſt be ſuppoſed to have the greateſt Confidence, founded on his former Succeſſes.

29th July 1780.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 31ſt July 1780.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Baillie to the Governor:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir,

I beg Leave to repreſent, that without ſome Method is taken beyond *my Powers* of finding this Detachment with Rice, they will be very ſoon much diſtreſſed. The Incurſions of Hyder's Horſe have put a Stop to our Supplies from the Southward, and the Fulneſs of the Kiſtnah bars us to the Northward. In Hopes of particular Directions from the Honourable Committee, I have by fair Promiſes hitherto detained our Draught and Carriage Bullocks; they now grow troubleſome, and without, we ſhall not have the Ability to move. No Madras Tappal Yeſterday or To-day.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt humble and obedient Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Inacunda,
27th July 1780.

Agreed to write to Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, directing him, in caſe he ſhould not be able after the Receipt of our laſt Letter, to ſubſiſt his Detachment in the Enemy's Country, or from any other Quarter, that he do immediately march this Way, taking ſuch Route as may appear moſt eligible to him.

Mr. Johnſon, in conſequence of the above Reſolution, carried by the Preſident and Sir Hector Munro, delivers in the following Minute, to which Mr. Smith alſo ſubſcribes.

As I obſerve it is carried by the Preſident's caſting Vote, that Colonel Baillie ſhall not immediately return to the Preſidency, but that he do proceed againſt ſome Forts in the Cuddapa Country, I deſire, that my Opinion of Yeſterday be recorded, and I now diſſent from the Meaſure, holding the Majority reſponſible to the Company for the Conſequences.

30th July 1780.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute.

The Preſident has the higheſt Confidence in the General's Military Abilities and Experience, and is fully ſatisfied of his Zeal and Readineſs to ſerve the Company in any Manner the Committee may point out; but the Preſident thinks, that in the preſent Situation of Affairs, it is highly expedient to have the Benefit of Sir Hector Munro's Advice, to enable the Committee to form their Plans of Operation; for without this Advantage, he is apprehenſive, they will find themſelves much at a Loſs, particularly as there ſeems to be a Want of that Unanimity in the Committee ſo neceſſary to enſure Succeſs to their Meaſures. For theſe Reaſons, and becauſe the Preſident preſumes that Lord M'Leod, who is intruſted with ſo diſtinguiſhed and honourable a Command in the King's Service, is fully competent to the Charge of the Army, he propoſes, that the General do continue to give his Aſſiſtance in the Committee, and that Lord M'Leod be deſired to take the Command of the Army, and be furniſhed with the neceſſary Inſtructions for his Guidance.

30th July 1780.

General Munro's Minute.

Sir Hector Munro expreſſes the Senſe he entertains of what the Preſident has ſaid concerning him in his Minute; he obſerves alſo, that he ſhall always be ready to ſerve his Employers in any Manner the Committee may think proper, and whenever the Army is aſſembled, and the Committee are enabled to judge more clearly of Hyder's Intentions, he will proceed and take the Command. In the mean Time, he thinks he can render more Service by ſtaying at Madras, and that, excluſive of this Conſideration, his Health is at preſent very indifferent.

Reſolved, That Lord M'Leod be deſired to take upon him the Command of the Troops now aſſembling in the Field, and that Inſtructions be prepared for him, to be laid before the Committee.

The

APPENDIX, N° 1.

The Commander in Chief recommending that the Troops that are to take the Field from hence and from Vellore, be aſſembled at Eyamcollam near Conjeveram, it is reſolved, That a Letter be written to Colonel Lang at Vellour, to ſend the European Battalion to that Place, and that the Troops do march ſo as to join them on their Arrival.

As the ſeveral Garriſons in the Carnatic will be much weakened by the Army's taking the Field, it is reſolved, that ſuch of the Battalions of Sepoys as remain in Garriſon, be ordered to augment their Companies 20 Men each.

Read the following Letter.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Seleƈt Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I this Day received a Letter from Captain Noodler, dated Warrior Pollam, 26th Inſtant. He was on his Way to Anjengo, but ſays, that the Country all around thereabouts is peſtered with the Enemy's Horſe, particularly to the Southward, ſo that he cannot proceed. He deſcribes them as very irregular, ill-mounted Horſe; ſays, that according to the beſt Accounts, there may be 1,500 or 2,000 or thereabouts, but that a Battalion of Sepoys would ſoon clear the Country of them. I have diſpatched a Man to him, to communicate to him your Orders for his joining his Corps. Lieutenant Roberts was here a few Days ago in his Way to Tiagar, and as there was good Reaſon to think the direƈt Road was much infeſted with Cavalry of the Enemy, he went from hence to Cuddalore, hoping to get to Tiagar by the Way of Warrior Pollam; while he was here, I diſpatched one of my Scouts with a Letter from him to the Serjeant who commanded at Tiagar in his Abſence. This Man is returned, and has brought Two Letters for Mr. Roberts, which I have opened: The one is from the Serjeant, of which I have the Honour to encloſe you a Copy; the other is from the Killadar. He mentions the Garriſon to be in a good State as to Proviſions, Ammunition, Stores, &c. which is confirmed by a Return of the Serjeant's. The Killidar wiſhes for a few more Sepoys (they have fit for Duty Eighty) to drive the ſtraggling Parties of Horſe from the Neighbourhood. I find they have 200 ſpare Arms, and I underſtood from Lieutenant Roberts, there would be no Difficulty in raiſing Men. If his Highneſs thought proper to augment the Force in his Frontier Forts, many of the ſtraggling Parties might be cut off, and ſtripped of their Plunder. The Scout I ſent came back the direƈt Road from Tiagar, but ſaw no Horſe; he heard of them, and ſaw ſome Villages burning; in going, he fell in with a Part of thoſe who had been at Porto Novo, returning with their Plunder; they were about 200, and paſſed on within Three Miles of Tiagar. I have been honoured this Day with your Order of the 27th, to which I ſhall pay punƈtual Obedience, and cannot believe that any Thing will occur, to interrupt the March of ſo reſpeƈtable a Force as I ſhall have. Over and above the Number of Battalion of Sepoys you deſcribe, I have his Highneſs's firſt Regiment of Cavalry, which I have put in good Spirits, by the Advance of Four hundred Pagodas to Lieutenant Powney. The European Battalion is grown ſtrong to what it was, no leſs than Fifty-ſix Men have come out of the Hoſpital ſince the Alarm of the Enemy's Approach. I daily ſend out ſmall Parties of Cavalry, and they go farther and farther round, which gives the Country People much Countenance, and has enabled me to get in ſufficient Draught Bullocks for the Field Pieces coming, and the Two Braſs 12 Pounders here, which I am compleating with fixed Ammunition; and I have trained a few Europeans of the Regiment to the Artillery Service, ſo that my Force will be very reſpeƈtable indeed. I have alſo got ſufficient Carriage Bullocks, a good Stock of Sheep, Arrack, Biſcuit, &c. I have ſent to Cuddalore, to deſire they will indent for Military Stores and Ammunition, which I ſhall ſupply them with. I have received thence only Four Marquees, 12 Private, and Two Bell Tents; and I obſerve that your Honours, in your Letter of the 27th, ſpeak of ſending by the Sartine, Tents for One Battalion of Sepoys only.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpeƈt,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Pondicherry,
29th July, 1780.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 1.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 31ſt July 1780.

Diſpatched the following Letters.

To Colonel Roſs Lang, commanding at Vellour.

Sir,

We deſire you, as ſoon after the Receipt of this Letter as poſſible, to direct the European Battalion, with Two Field Pieces, to march from Vellour to Eyamcottam: It lies on the South Side of Paloor River, near Conjeveram, and is the Place on which General Smith encamped the Army in the laſt War with Hyder Ally: We have ſent that Part of the Army which is to go from hence, Poonamalee, and the Mount, to the ſame Place, where it will join the Battalion from Vellour. In the marching of this Battalion you will be guided, with reſpect to the Route and Time of ſetting out, by the Intelligence you may receive, relative to the Movement of Hyder's Force, ſo that the Battalion may proceed in Safety to the Place of Rendezvous; but in caſe you ſhould be of Opinion, that the Battalion cannot march without Danger of being interrupted by a ſuperior Force, you will then write immediately to the Commanding Officer of the Troops at Eyamcottam, and keep the Battalion at Vellour until he ſhall have taken the proper Meaſures to facilitate the Junction: You will ſee the Neceſſity of keeping the Time of marching, and the Route the Troops are to take, as ſecret as poſſible. We deſire you will order all the Draught and Carriage Bullocks you have provided, to be ſent with the Battalion. We ſhall direct 100 European Invalids to march as ſoon as poſſible, from Chingleput to Vellore, where they are to do Duty. We deſire that all the Cadets at Vellore, may accompany the Battalion when it marches.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
31ſt July 1780.

Received the following Letter.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to acquaint your Honour, &c. that I arrived here Yeſterday, after having been obliged to wait much longer for Bullocks and Coolies than I expected, on account of the Diſturbances in the Country. The Villages in my Route from Ongole to this Place, are almoſt entirely deſerted, and ſome of them laid waſte, by the late Incurſion of the Horſe.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
John Pringle.

Innacundah,
27th July 1780.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, dated the 21ſt Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Maſulipatam:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Conſideration of the Stores at this Garriſon having engaged our particular Attention, on the Occaſion of the Reports which have lately prevailed of approaching Troubles in the Country, we eſteem it our Duty to make an immediate Reference to your Honour, &c. in ſome few Points, which may, by an unexpected Turn in Affairs, require your deciſive and ſpeedy Orders. Our Garriſon Stores are exceedingly deficient, for we have only a ſmall Quantity of a very few Articles; the State of our Military Stores has lately been fully repreſented to your Honour, &c. the Monthly Returns will ſufficiently explain what Supplies of that Kind it may be expedient to forward to us: One Circumſtance, however, relative to this Subject, we ſhould do wrong to omit upon ſuch an Occaſion as this; we have ſcarcely an Artillery Man in the Fort, the Number at leaſt does not exceed Four or Five. We have ſubmitted theſe few Circumſtances to your Honour, &c. from an Opinion, it may be neceſſary that ſome Steps ſhould be taken therein, and that we ſhould have been highly culpable, were any Thing to have happened from the want of ſuch an Attention; we ſhall wait your Orders herein. The Board have authorized me to explain the above to your Honour, &c. and I am, for myſelf and them, with great Reſpect,

Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Edward Cotsford.

Maſulipatam,
4th Auguſt, 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 1.

By the Duke of Portland, which is going to Bengal, Stores of every Kind will be ſent to Maſulipatam, agreeable to their laſt Indent; but with reſpect to the Artillery Men, whom they have requeſted might be ſent, it is totally out of our Power to ſpare any at preſent; they muſt therefore be directed to ſupply the Want of them as well as they are able, by teaching Laſcars or Europeans the Gun Exerciſe; and it is agreed to order 12 or 15 of the Coffree Company at Ganjam, who have had ſome Experience in this Exerciſe, to be ſent to Maſulipatam.

Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies, to Mr. Stephens, dated Superb in Madras Road, 30th July 1780.

A Report prevailing here that Hyder Ally is advancing towards the Carnatic with a formidable Army, and ſome Detachments of his Cavalry having already penetrated as far as Porto Novo, a Sea Port Town on this Coaſt, which they have plundered; I have Reaſon, from the Intelligence I have lately received, to apprehend a Junction may be intended between him and the French, with whom he has lately entered into an Alliance, and that it is not improbable they may attempt to land on this Coaſt a Body of Troops from the Mauritius, I ſhall therefore proceed To-morrow with His Majeſty's Squadron under my Command, to a Windward Station off Negapatam, where I ſhall be in a Situation to intercept any of the Enemy's Ships, if they attempt coming on the Coaſt.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 1ſt Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lord Macleod:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. the Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

As you have done me the Honour to appoint me to the Command of the Army you propoſe to ſend into the Field, againſt the moſt formidable Enemy that ever invaded the Carnatic, I muſt now take the Freedom to expreſs to you my Sentiments on ſo important an Occaſion. I have never been preſent at any Deliberation you have had, nor has my Voice been called upon concerning your Plans of Operation, otherwiſe I would have communicated my Opinion to you in Perſon. Shortneſs of Time now only allows me this Mode of informing you of my Ideas on the Plan you direct me to carry into Execution. You propoſe that the 73d Regiment, joined by the Artillery from the Mount, a Company of European Grenadiers, and a Battalion of Sepoys from Madras, ſhall march to Eyamcottam, where they are to be joined by the European Battalion from Vellore, and afterwards by Three Battalions of Sepoys, and a Body of Europeans, under Colonel Braithwaite from Pondicherry, at Wandewaſh. I underſtand that Hyder Ally, the Enemy you have to cope with, has entered the Carnatic in great Force, and that large Detachments of his Cavalry have penetrated as far as Conjeveram, which they have deſtroyed, and alſo Porto Novo on the Sea Coaſt, which they have plundered; that is, they have had, and there is nothing to prevent their ſtill having, Poſſeſſion of that very Range of Country through which the Three Detachments are ſingly to paſs. I muſt take the Liberty to obſerve to you, that the Meaſure of forming a Junction of your Troops from ſuch Diſtances, in the Face of ſo formidable an Enemy, neither whoſe entire Force nor whoſe Poſt you are thoroughly acquainted with, ſeems to me far too dangerous to be hazarded at this Juncture. Hyder is an intelligent Enemy, who has moſt probably concerted his Meaſures from a Knowledge of our Situation; his Motions are rapid, and any Miſtakes on our Side may be of the moſt ſerious Conſequences. The Rendezvous you propoſe might have been the propereſt before the Invaſion, but the March of thoſe Detachments by the Routes propoſed, would at this critical Time render them liable to be attacked ſeparately, and either the Object of this Junction rendered abortive, or ſome Part of your Army receive ſuch a Check, as in my Opinion would be imprudent to riſk in the firſt Outſet of the War.

I deem the Corps aſſembled at Poonamalee as the Baſis of the Strength of the Carnatic, and the Protection of this Settlement. In my Judgment, it ought not to move from the Cover of your Fort, and from the Neighbourhood of your Magazines and Stores, till it is joined by all the Troops you can draw together, and enabled to march in ſufficient Force, to act effectually in the Field againſt ſo numerous a Body of Cavalry as are now ſaid to have entered the Country. I will not take upon me to point out in what Manner the diſtant Corps ſhould be aſſembled; they ſhould be directed to march by Routes which your Knowledge of the Country point out as leaſt expoſed to be harraſſed by the Enemy, and the Junction ſhould be formed near your Preſidency. A conſiderable Part of your Forces, both European and Sepoys, are now in the Northern Circars. It is a Maxim ſupported by the ableſt Maſters in the Art of War, that when the Centre of a State is invaded, and in Danger, the Troops ſhould be called from the Extremities for the Defence of the moſt material Part, if you cannot guard the whole Extent of your Country. It ſurely does not admit of a

Doubt whether a diſtant Province, or the Center of your Poſſeſſions, or the Environs of your Capital, are moſt worthy to be preſerved: Colonel Baillie with his Detachment, I therefore think, ſhould be ordered to march towards the Carnatic without Delay. The Nabob has given the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances that his Three Regiments of Cavalry ſhall be paid their Arrears, and join the Army; after his ſolemn Promiſes I cannot doubt his Intention: But a Body of Cavalry are ſo eſſentially neceſſary on this Occaſion, that I cannot help requeſting that his Intention may be warmly preſſed to loſe no Time in performing his Promiſe. At the ſame Time that I have thought it neceſſary to inform you thus of my Sentiments reſpecting the Junction of the Troops, let me aſſure you that I have no other Motive for doing ſo, than Zeal for the Intereſt of the Company and Honour of the Nation. I do not wiſh to multiply Difficulties, but a proper Regard to my Reputation will not permit me to adopt a Reſponſibility in the Execution of Plans which do not coincide with my own Judgment.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,
Macleod.

Fort St. George,
31ſt July 1710.

Sir Hector Munro, in conſequence of the foregoing Letter, enters the following Minute.

If the Committee have nothing in view, but guarding Madras and the Jaghires, Lord Macleod may be right with reſpect to the Troops being aſſembled at or near the Preſidency; but as it is not only intended to ſecure Madras, but if poſſible, to prevent Hyder Ally from getting Poſſeſſion of the principal Forts in the Carnatic, I, as a Member of the Committee, thought then, and do think now, that the Troops might and ought to be aſſembled rather near the Scene of Action, or where in all Probability the Operations of the Campaign will be carried on, than at or near the Preſidency. What confirms me the more in this is, that from all the Information I have as yet had, there have but Parties of irregular Horſe entered the Carnatic, as by the Two Hircarrahs that came in to me laſt Night, Hyder, with his Infantry and Artillery, is ſtill at Calaſapauth, which is near Part of his own Territories; whilſt he remains in that Poſition, his Cavalry cannot prevent the Junction of the Army; and if the Committee do me the Honour to deſire me to effect the Junction, I think I may venture to promiſe them to perform it: But if owing to various Delays in getting the Bullocks, Stores, &c. &c. ready, ſo as that the Troops might move from their different Cantonments for marching the Troops, and even this can be done, ſhould there be a Neceſſity for it. In regard to Colonel Baillie's Detachment, if no Care is neceſſary to be taken of the Circars, if Colonel Baillie cannot diſtreſs the Enemy, I have no Objections to his being ordered into the Carnatic with his Detachment; but ſhould it be thought that both or either may be of ſome Conſequence, ſhould Hyder's Army be ſo very ſuperior to ours in that Event, when the Troops have aſſembled, they can act upon the defenſive, at the ſame Time prevent Hyder from poſſeſſing himſelf of any of the principal Forts, provided Proviſions are had for the Troops; and in this laſt Event Colonel Baillie may be ordered up to join the Army.

The Preſident propoſes that Sir Hector Munro be now deſired to take upon him the Command of the Army aſſembling in the Field, and that the following Inſtructions be delivered to him.

To Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Honourable Company's Forces on the Coaſt of Coromandel.

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed to take the Command of the Troops aſſembling at Poonamalee, and march with them to Eyamcottam, near Conjeveram, where you will make the neceſſary Diſpoſitions for forming a Junction with the Troops coming from Vellore, Pondicherry, and Tritchinnopoly: To enable you the more effectually to anſwer the Purpoſe, we empower you to iſſue ſuch Orders as you may find expedient, to any Officer commanding Garriſons or Detachments of Troops in the Carnatic. We can find no particular Place of Operations for the Army, until the Deſigns of the Enemy become more apparent; our Views are at preſent to the Protection and Defence of the Carnatic; and the only Inſtructions we ſhall give you, are to act in ſuch a Manner as you may deem moſt conducive to that End. When the Army is aſſembled, if from the Diſpoſitions which may be then made by the Enemy, you think you can leave the Command, we wiſh you to come to the Preſidency, that we may have the Benefit of your Advice for our future Operations; and in that Caſe you will deliver over the Charge of the Army to the next ſenior Officer, giving him every neceſſary Information for his Guidance; we are the more deſirous of your Return, as we muſt in a great Meaſure depend on the Opinion which you may be enabled to give us of the Strength of Hyder's Army, with the Train of Artillery attached to it, and likewiſe of the Probability of our Troops being ſupplied with Proviſions, ſo that we may form a Judgment, whether it be moſt expedient to act upon the offenſive or defenſive during the Campaign. In the ſettling of this Point, as ſeveral

upon

Things will occur, which will be more fully and more properly diſcuſſed at the Board than by Letter, we hope you will have it in your Power to come to Madras, if it be but for a few Days.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
1ſt Auguſt 1780.

Approved by the Preſident and Sir Hector Munro: Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnſon wrote the following Diſſents.

Mr. Smith's Diſſent.

Having attentively peruſed the Letter from Lord Macleod, I muſt expreſs that his Ideas coincide very much with mine, and that I think with his Lordſhip, the Junction of the Troops expected from different Places, ſhould be made nearer to the Preſidency than Conjeveram.

I think with his Lordſhip, that inſtead of the Troops now aſſembled at Poonamalee marching to Eyamcottam, they ſhould take their Station at ſome convenient Spot not far diſtant from Madras, that they may be ſupported in caſe of Emergency, and from whence the General might march as Occaſion ſhould require, to facilitate the Junction of Colonel Braithwaite's Detachment and that expected from Vellore. The former is of the utmoſt Importance in the preſent Situation of Affairs, and every Nerve ſhould be ſtrained to effect it; this once accompliſhed, the Junction of the Detachment from Vellore can be no difficult Matter, as the Whole can then move to enſure its Succeſs. On the other Hand, ſhould the Troops at Poonamalee proceed to Eyamcottam, and Hyder make a rapid March in Force, they might be expoſed to great Hazard and Danger, and the Junction of the other Detachments be rendered more difficult and precarious; and ſhould any Accident happen to any one of theſe Detachments, it might be attended with the moſt ſerious Conſequences. At preſent I confeſs I apprehend little Danger to the Capital, ſo cannot approve of his Lordſhip's Idea of taking Poſt near the Black Town Wall; but until Sepoys are raiſed for the immediate Defence of the Black Town, I muſt candidly own that I think it is at Riſk, from ſo enterpriſing an Enemy as Hyder Ally, and who may, by forced Marches, come upon us before we are prepared to give him a proper Reception: Two Battalions or 2,000 Sepoys once raiſed and eſtabliſhed for the Defence of the Black Town, will put it in a perfect Security, and calm the Minds of the Inhabitants, who at preſent are in conſtant Alarm and Apprehenſion. I truſt therefore, the Committee will iſſue the neceſſary Orders for the moſt ſpeedy and effectual Completion of this very deſirable Object, and that proper Officers be appointed for this Purpoſe. The Preſident mentioned Mr. Sydenham, the Town Major, for this Buſineſs; and to this Officer I am willing to allow every Qualification that can be wiſhed for or deſired in an Officer: But in my Judgment, he muſt be ſomething more than Man, if he is able properly to attend to the various Duties of his Stations, as Fort Major and Aid de Camp to the Governor in ſuch critical and buſy Times as theſe, and beſides find Time to raiſe and form Battalions of Sepoys. There can be no Heſitation as to the Propriety of raiſing theſe Battalions, for the Safety and Protection of the Black Town, as the Inhabitants have voluntarily offered to bear the Expence; and the Riches contained within thoſe Walls are too great to be left neglected and expoſed, when we have ſo fair an Opportunity of effectually ſecuring them.

I think it highly proper that General Sir Hector Munro ſhall take the Field; but I cannot approve of giving him a Latitude for returning to the Preſidency at his own Diſcretion. The Committee muſt be the beſt Judges when they ſtand in need of his Advice, and will deſire his Perſonal Attendance at their Deliberations, when the Subject under Debate cannot be diſcuſſed by Letter; but in all other Caſes I am of Opinion that the moſt proper Station for the Commander in Chief, in theſe Times of Danger, is in the Field.

1ſt Auguſt 1780. Charles Smith.

Mr. Johnſon's Diſſent.

I diſapprove of the Inſtructions propoſed to be given to General Sir H. Munro. If I may judge of the premature Manner in which they were brought into Committee, they muſt have been previouſly agreed on between the Governor and General, on a Suppoſition that no Debate could ariſe on their Propriety: But I am of Opinion, that we ſhould not leave it in the General's Option to remain with the Army, or to return to the Preſidency, as he may think proper. It is evident that from Camp he can give us every neceſſary Information relative to the Diſpoſition of our Army and that of the Enemy, with more Preciſion than if at the Preſidency. I cannot foreſee any Caſe in which his Advice can be of greater Service at the Preſidency than at the Head of his Army: It is from our Camp we muſt expect the moſt material Intelligence; and therefore the General's Reſidence there muſt be of the higheſt Importance. It gives me the deepeſt Concern, that Difference in Opinion ſhould at this critical Juncture be conſtrued into an Oppoſition to the Meaſures of Government; that it tended to retard our Operations againſt Hyder Ally, whoſe rapid Progreſs requires the utmoſt

moſt Vigilance and Diſpatch. I therefore deem it incumbent to recapitulate the moſt material Points in which the Preſident and General have differed from Mr. Smith and myſelf, ſince the 23d ult°, when the firſt Advices were received here, from Hyder having actually invaded the Carnatic.

The Preſident and General inſiſted that more Time would be loſt in embarking the Troops at Pondicherry on Board the Squadron, than by marching them over Land, and that the latter could be effected without endangering the Detachment. Had the Opinion given by Mr. Smith and myſelf been followed at the Time it was offered, theſe Troops would probably ere this have been at the Preſidency, and every Apprehenſion of an Attack on them by the Enemy removed. The Preſident and General were firſt of Opinion, that Colonel Baillie's Detachment ſhould attack Cuddapah in the Enemy's Country, and far beyond the Paſſes; Mr. Smith and myſelf were for its being ordered directly to Madras; but Orders were given to Colonel Baillie, in conſequence of the Reſolution of his Majeſty. When the Preſident and General had made further Reflections on this Subject, they thought it might be better to order Colonel Baillie, that in caſe he judged it hazardous to attack Cuddapah, he ſhould proceed againſt ſome other Place. Mr. Smith and myſelf ſteadily adhered to our former Opinion. Another Letter was written to Colonel Baillie, in conſequence of this Determination; but after ſeveral Days were loſt, the Opinion of Mr. Smith and myſelf was ultimately adopted. A proper Situation for the Army at preſent, has been another Subject of Debate; and I am happy to find my Opinion on this Subject perfectly coincides with that of Lord Macleod, as recited in his Letter to the Committee of the 31ſt ultimo.

The Reaſon aſſigned for the Army proceeding to Wandewaſh, is to form a Junction with Colonel Braithwaite's Detachment from Pondicherry. This, I apprehend, might be attended with the Riſk of an Attack on our Black Town, which the Weakneſs of our Garriſon, and the great Wealth of our Inhabitants, might naturally induce an enterprizing Enemy to attempt; but at any Rate, if they ſhould not ſucceed, they might at leaſt be able to cut off all Communication between this and our Army, or oblige them to retreat from any Objects they may at that Time be engaged in. Had Colonel Braithwaite's Detachment been brought here by the Squadron, both the Hazards I have pointed out, would have been avoided; Colonel Baillie might alſo have been much advanced on his Way thither; and upon his joining our Army, would have, I ſhould hope, been able to force Hyder, beſides providing for the Defence of the Black Town. Diſperſed as the Troops are now, I ſhall tremble for the main Body, when they are at any Diſtance from Madras, until the Junction with Colonel Braithwaite, whoſe Detachment will certainly be in imminent Danger, ſhould Hyder be near him in Force at the Time he begins his March from Pondicherry. I think the Nabob's Reaſons for wiſhing that our Army ſhould be encamped near Wandewaſh, are too obvious to need Recital. It is very natural for him to be alarmed at the Danger there is of loſing his favourite Capital, Arcot. He is deſirous of drawing the Army as near to it as poſſible, in Hopes that the Enemy will be thereby intimidated from attacking it; but ſurely his Partiality for any particular Place ſhould not induce us to make any Diſpoſitions, which are not apparently calculated for our general Security. There are not above 300 European Infantry, and a few Cadets, at Vellore, with about 260 Seapoys; theſe are in fact no more than neceſſary for the Defence of that Fort; but if it be hereafter found neceſſary to draft a Party, or the Whole of the Europeans, to ſtrengthen the Army, I ſhould imagine there ought to be a Battalion of Sepoys left in the Fort.

I hope I have proved, that the Preſident and General have thought proper. ultimately to adopt every material Opinion given by Mr. Smith and myſelf, relative to the Order requiſite for Colonel Baillie. Rather than give up another Point, they have been under the Neceſſity of ordering a Company of Artillery, with Six Field Pieces, to join Colonel Braithwaite before he begins his March. Time will evince, whether they may not alſo find it neceſſary to carry into Execution all we have further recommended; but whatſoever may be the Event, I ſhall be happy if our future Deliberations can produce a Plan of Operations that may ſpeedily terminate a War, which I fear we cannot maintain but under manifeſt Diſadvantages.

1ſt Auguſt 1780.

Agreed to write a Letter to Lord Macleod, to deſire he will proceed to Poonamalee, and if the Troops there are in Readineſs, to march them To-morrow Morning towards the Place of their Deſtination; informing him at the ſame Time, that Sir Hector will join them at their March.

APPENDIX, N° 1.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 1st Auguſt 1780.

Read a Draught of a Letter prepared in conſequence of laſt Committee. After ſome Debate it was agreed, That Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment ſhould be ordered at all Events to march this Way; and the Letter was accordingly altered as follows:

To Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, commanding the Detachment to the Northward.

Sir,

The Preſident has laid before us your Letter of the 27th July; by which we are ſorry to perceive the Diſtreſs you were in for Proviſions. As you had not then received our Letters, acquainting you with the Hoſtilities commenced againſt us by Hyder, we are in Hopes the Orders for your Movement contained in thoſe Letters, will have enabled you to obtain Supplies of Proviſions in the Enemy's Diſtricts. We now deſire you will, with all Expedition, move with the Detachment towards this Place, keeping ſuch a Route as may be moſt likely to furniſh you with Grain; and as we underderſtand that your marching by Bimm, Rous, Polham, and Tripaty, may poſſibly enable you to come up with ſome of Hyder's Convoys with Proviſions for his Army, or, by getting between him and the Paſſes, diſtreſs him much, we would recommend that Route to you, provided you can effect it with Safety, and the Roads admit of your bringing forward your Artillery, &c.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Sam[l] Johnſon.

Diſpatched the following Letters.

To the Right Honourable Lord Macleod.

My Lord,

We requeſt your Lordſhip will proceed to Poonamalee this Evening; and in caſe the Stores, &c. ſhould all arrive at that Place To-night, we would have you begin the March of the Troops early To-morrow Morning towards Eyamcottam; proper Guides will be ſent you To-night. We have appointed Sir Hector Munro to take the Command of the Army, and form the Junction to be made with the Troops from Pondicherry, Vellore, and Trichinopoly; and Sir Hector will join you on the March To-morrow, or the next Day.

We have the Honour to be your Lordſhip's
Moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill,
&c. Select Committee.

To Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Fletcher.

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed with the Troops going into the Field, and on the Junction of the European Battalion from Vellore, you are to take the Command of that Battalion.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
1ſt Auguſt 1780.

To Colonel John Braithwaite, commanding the Troops at Pondicherry.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee, to acquaint you, that from Intelligence received of the Motions of Hyder, they think it neceſſary to deſire, inſtead of marching to Wandewaſh, as before ordered, that you will proceed to Chingleput, and from thence to Eyamcollam, a Place within 3 Miles of Conjeveram, where the General, with the other Troops from hence, will join you. They deſire that you will ſend off an Expreſs to the Officers commanding the Battalion from Trichinopoly, acquainting him with your Route, and preſſing him to march as expeditiouſly as poſſible. You will acknowledge the Receipt of this Letter, which is ſent in Duplicate.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Charles Oakely.

Fort Saint George,
1ſt Auguſt 1780.

Received

APPENDIX, N° 11.

Received the following Letters.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I was favoured with your Orders of the 13th Inſtant; and agreeable to your Inſtructions, I will endeavour, as faſt as poſſible, to complete the Deficiency in the Battalion occaſioned by the Detachment ſerving with the Troops at Tellicherry, excluſive of the Augmentation ordered the 27th of July; and I alſo will put this Fort in the beſt State of Security poſſible. I am obliged to employ ſome of my Sepoys in repairing the Breaches in the Works, and I alſo have got a few extraordinary Artificers to aſſiſt in repairing ſome of the Gun Carriages. If a few truſty old Gunners can be ſpared, they are much wanted here.

I am,
With the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Rob[t] Gibbings.

Madura,
25th Auguſt 1780.

N° 61. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 25th July 1780—Received the 26th Ditto.*

I now ſend you the Copy of a Paper of Intelligence juſt received from Hyder Ally's Camp, dated 19th Rejub, or 22d Inſtant. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence from Hyder Ally's Camp.

This Night at Twelve o'Clock Hyder is at Singarpetta; he has ſent 20,000 Horſe with his Son Tippo, towards Vellore; they have no Baggage with them, and are arrived at Tripatore. Hyder has 6,000 Horſe, with Foot and Artillery, and Monſieur Lally. He intends marching by the Gaut of Changama, and after taking Trenamatic, purpoſes leaving his Baggage, Bazar, &c. at that Place, and to go againſt Arcot with his battering Guns and Horſe and Foot. His other Deſign, is to go firſt againſt Pondicherry, and after leaving a Garriſon there with Monſieur Lally, to ſend for Military Stores, Grain, &c. which he may want, from Coverealbunder by Sea, and to fortify and ſtrengthen Pondicherry; afterwards he means to go to Madras. Monſieur Lally encourages Hyder, by telling him, that he has 800 Europeans with him, with which he will try his Skill againſt the Engliſh; Hyder hopes in the mean Time to receive freſh Troops from Mauritius, and is determined to ruin the Carnatic and chaſtize the Engliſh. He ſays, he has tried them already; that he knows them well, and that they have no Conduct; that even now, although he had aſſembled ſo great a Force to enter into their Country, they had not manifeſted the leaſt Glimmering of Ability; and therefore now was the Time to go againſt them. He has ſhewn great Favour to Govendrow Birky, and given him the Command of 4,000 Horſe, and he alſo conſults with him. To-morrow Morning he leaves this, and marches to the Village Senelpally, at the Entrance of the Gaut; his Ordnance and Artillery go along with him: He ſent for Lookman Caun, Solomon Caun, and other Jemmautdars, who command Parties of Plunderers, and ordered them to march, and raiſe Troubles in the Trichinopolly Country, and then to remain at the Pettah of Aamzueg, but not to go into the Tanjore Country. Three thouſand Horſe are already in the Neighbourhood of Arcot and Madras. When they left this, he ordered them to halt at ſuch Places as were moſt plentiful and beſt. Hyder is well acquainted with the Situation of Madras, and intends to ſend a Force to ſurprize it. Great Care is neceſſary; there is no Occaſion to ſay more; may the Almighty prevent it! A Letter has been received from the Row Pundit Purdhaun, at Poonah, in which he tells Hyder, that his Forces are gone into Winter Quarters, but that the War will go on after the Rains are over; but that ſince the rainy Seaſon was not commenced in the Carnatic, he deſires Hyder to attack the Engliſh there. Orders are gone to the Troops ſtationed at Otoor Anuntgurry, to go into the Country of Velcondah, and lay it waſte.

62. *To the Nabob, dated 26th July 1780.*

I have the Honour to receive your Highneſs's Letter on the Subject of Hyder Ally, whoſe Motions, within theſe few Days, have unveiled the Deſign he ſeems to have entertained for ſome Time paſt againſt the Carnatic.

Whilſt there was any Poſſibility of his Intentions being fruſtrated, or directed to another Object, I choſe not to put the Company, or your Highneſs, to the Expence of great Military Preparations, becauſe I am very ſenſible, after the Exertions we have lately made againſt the French, that ſuch Expence could not be provided for, without much Difficulty, and without neglecting other Objects of great Importance; but now, when Hoſtilities are actually commenced on the Part of Hyder, it becomes

expedient

expedient at all Events to attend to the Safety of the Country; and I truſt your Highneſs will exert yourſelf to the utmoſt on this Occaſion, to promote the Succeſs of our Operations.

As I have given Orders for aſſembling Troops in the Field, I earneſtly entreat your Highneſs to inform me what Supplies of Money you can depend upon furniſhing, and at what Period, that I may take the neceſſary Steps accordingly. I beg your Highneſs will alſo take the moſt effectual Meaſures for collecting Bullocks and Proviſions for the Uſe of the Army. Give me Leave to add, that however deſirous I may be to defend the Company's and your Highneſs's Forts and Poſſeſſions in the Carnatic, it will in a great Meaſure depend upon the ample Supplies of Money your Highneſs can furniſh me with at this critical Juncture: It will likewiſe determine me in what Manner I ſhall write to the Supreme Council of Bengal, and how far I ſhall feel myſelf authorized, with Conſiſtency, to engage them in the preſent Troubles, ſo as not only to co-operate with this Government in what may tend to the Intereſt of the Company, but alſo anſwer your Highneſs's Purpoſes fully with reſpect to chaſtizing Hyder Ally, and for the Protection of the Subjects, and the future Safety of the Carnatic.

Intelligence ſent by the Nabob on the 26th July 1780.

63. *Paper of News from Wandewaſh, dated 20th Rejub, or 23d July 1780.*

On the 18th, at Night, an Alarm was ſpread of the Arrival of Hyder's Horſe; the Inhabitants of all the Country around fled into the Fort; the Villages were ſet on Fire by the Enemy's Horſe. This Place is ſo full of People, that there is not the Space of an Hand Breadth left unoccupied; and People are ſtill coming in. In their Flight, ſeveral have loſt their Effects; ſome have come in wounded, and their Women taken away by them. Dreadful is the Terror which reigns in this Place amongſt all Ranks of People. Guards and Centries have been placed all round the Wall of the Place, and Powder and Shot have been placed near the Guns. Agreeable to your Orders, I applied to the Amuldar Damalippa for Money to pay the Sepoys in the Fort; but he ſays he can give none; that the Inhabitants are all fled, and no Revenue can be collected. Be pleaſed to ſend me your Inſtructions in what Manner I am to ſatisfy the Sepoys in the Garriſon.

Arzee from Azein Uddein, dated Rejub, at Night.

This Day, the 20th Rejub, I have had certain Intelligence that Tippoo has come into the Paſs at Changama, with a large Body of Horſe, plundered the Villages of Caliſpauk, Mudmungul, and Potour, cut and mangled and maſſacred many of the Inhabitants. They afterwards came to Arnee, the Pettah of which was taken, and the Inhabitants put to Death; they went from that to Conjeveram. Some of Tippoo's Horſemen met Captain Hadded, and ſome Troopers belonging to your Highneſs, ſtationed at Poondy, whom they took Priſoners. When Tippoo's Horſe came to Mundimungul, Twelve of your Highneſs's Sepoys ſtationed there, fled into a Pagoda, and fired upon the Horſemen, of whom they killed Two or Three; a Horſe was taken, and brought into Vellour, by one of the Sepoys.

Arzdazht from Rajah Burbur, dated 21ſt Rejub, or 24th July 1780.

I have ſent your Highneſs a Paper of News, tranſmitted me by Gulam Aly, the Naib Killedar of Shugurra. To-day ſome Horſe came within Half a Coſs of the City; the Peons ſtationed there took an Horſeman with his Horſe, and the reſt fled. All the Ryots of the Country around are fled to this Place. Your Highneſs knows how few Men there are to defend the City. You were pleaſed, out of your gracious Favour, to honour this Place with the Name of The Aſylum of the World, and now all the People of this Country have ſeized the Skirts of your Robe for Protection againſt your Enemies. What ſhall I ſay more?

64. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 27 July 1780—Received D°.*

I ſend you a Letter I have received this Moment from Rajah Burbur, informing me of the Ravages committed by Hyder's Horſe in the Carnatic; that the Fort at Changama is taken, as alſo Caliſpauk, by Storm; and that they are now beſieging the Pagoda of Trinomalee, which is fortified in the Manner of a Fort, and the People in it are few. Yeſterday I ſent you the Letter I had received from Rajah Burbur, and one Amer ul Omrah had from the Aumel at Nellour. The Diſtrict

of

of Nellour, Ongolo Guntoor, and Vencatgurry, are over-run with Horſe, and the Villages deſtroyed. There has been a Fight at the Fort of Pubkomour, in the Diſtrict of Vencatgurry, and many killed on both Sides; but Hyder's People fled, and burned all the Villages in their Way. The People in the Fort of Reeinlever, in the Nellour Country, are now defending themſelves. All this Intelligence I now ſend you, as I think it incumbent on me to give you Information of all Tranſactions. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdazht from Mah. Rajah Burbur.

I hear from the Hircarrahs who are come from Hyder's Camp, that he has 40,000 Horſe, 35,000 Foot, and a large Artillery; that he marched from Corripatam the 20th of the Month, with 15,000 Horſe and 15,000 Foot, and 20 Pieces of Cannon, and Monſieur Lally with his Europeans; and that he is arrived at Singarpitta; that upon his Arrival there, he ſent away 5,000 Horſe to the Eaſtward; and his Son Tippoo, with Mahommed Aly, a Commandant, are ordered to march towards Trichinopoly with 10,000 Horſe; Modoo Cawn, with 2,000 Horſe, is ſtationed at Amboor. The Villages about Vellore are burned, and the Country pillaged by the Enemy's Horſe. Your Highneſs is well informed of the Scantineſs of Money and People to defend this Place. May the Almighty grant his divine Aſſiſtance, and proſper your Affairs!

65. *To the Rajah of Tanjore, dated 29th July* 1780.

You have doubtleſs been already informed, by Report, of the ſudden March of Hyder Ally's Troops into the Carnatic. We cannot account for this Invaſion otherwiſe than by ſuppoſing that Hyder has entered into ſome Engagements with the French to diſturb the Peace of the Country. However this may be, the Company and their Allies are called upon to act with the utmoſt Vigour in repelling this Attack. I truſt you will ſhew yourſelf particularly zealous in a Cauſe in which the Welfare of your Government, as well as that of the Company and the Nabob, are ſo much intereſted. A large Supply of Money is abſolutely neceſſary to carry on the military Operations, and to this Object I ſhall be thankful if you will contribute amply and ſoon. The Nabob's Country has already ſuffered conſiderably by the Incurſions of Hyder's Horſe. Your's being as yet uninvaded, I flatter myſelf you will find leſs Difficulty in furniſhing Money to the Company. I requeſt alſo, that you will encourage, as much as poſſible, the Exportation of Grain to Madras; the Duties on that Article are taken off at this Port, a Circumſtance which will, no Doubt, when known to the People of your Country, induce them to ſend large Supplies. May your Happineſs daily increaſe! What can I ſay more?

66. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 29th July* 1780—*Received Ditto.*

You have herewith a Copy of a Paper of Intelligence I have this Day received from Hyder's Camp, dated the 22d of Rejub, or 25 July. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence from Hyder's Camp.

Hyder is at this Time encamped about One Coſs diſtant from Trinomalee; all his Cannon is not yet arrived on this Side of the Paſs, and it will take up Two Days more before they come. It is Hyder's Intention to march to Arcot when all his Cannon arrives, and he thinks he will be in Poſſeſſion of Arcot ſhortly. He intends the Province of Arcot for his eldeſt Son, Tritchinopoly for his Second, and Trinivelly, Madura, &c. for his Third Son. He propoſes marching to Madras, after having taken Poſſeſſion of Arcot; and ſays publicly, that in a few Days the Engliſh ſhall not remain poſſeſſed of a Hand's Breadth of Ground without the Fort of Madras. He imagines there are great Riches in the Black Town, of which he hopes to get Poſſeſſion. He has about Thirty-five Ships at Mungalore, of which he has ordered Fifteen to come round to the Coaſt of Madras, that he may load them with the Riches and Merchandize in Madras.

67. *From the Rajah of Tanjour to the Governor, dated 24th Rejub, or 27th July* 1780—*Received 31ſt Ditto.*

I am told that Hyder Ally entertains hoſtile Intentions to the Company, and has entered the Gaut with an Army, in order to invade the Carnatic; which aſtoniſhes me, for no one in Indoſtan, till this

Day, has been the Enemy of the Engliſh, without ſuffering for it. He is a wicked Invader, and will not ſucceed; for ſince he has taken into his Head what cannot happen, it is a Proof that the Time of his Adverſity has drawn near. I and my Family and Dependants reſt on the Company's Protection, and will partake and ſhare with them all that may happen. The Almighty will proſper the Engliſh, and ſtrengthen their good Fortune: It is my conſtant Prayer that their Enemies may be reduced under their Feet; and God will hear my Prayer. The Protection and Safety of my Country remain with the Company, and they will conſtantly purſue the beſt Meaſures for its Defence; I have no Uneaſineſs on that Account. You will be pleaſed to let me know what Quantity of Grain, &c. you may want, and I will uſe my Endeavours to procure it. Regard me ever as your ſincere Friend.

68. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 1ſt Auguſt* 1780.—*Received 2d Ditto.*

I have undoubted Intelligence that Hyder Ally Cawn is waiting for his heavy Cannon, and as ſoon as it arrives with him, he is determined to lay Siege to Arcot. That City being the Capital of the Carnatic, and an immenſe Quantity of Stores and Ammunition being lodged in the Fort of that Place, I greatly fear that if (God forbid!) any Miſchance ſhould happen to that Country, all the Killedars in the different Forts will be alarmed, and great Part of the Inhabitants will ſubmit to Hyder's Allegiance, which will tend to the great Detriment of my Affairs; I therefore entreat you, Sir, to give immediate Orders to Colonel Lang to ſecure the Defence of Arcot with the Troops under his Command, to the utmoſt of his Ability. What ſhall I ſay more?

69. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 1ſt Auguſt* 1780.—*Received 2d Ditto.*

Your Army having taken the Field in Conſequence of our Enemy Hyder Ally's having entered the Carnatic with an Army of Horſe and Foot, and a Train of Artillery, aſſiſted by the French, you and General Sir Hector Munro have repreſented to me the Neceſſity there is for my Regiment of Cavalry joining the Army. The Difficulties I labour under, owing to the Country of Tanjour being taken from me, are not unknown to you; the Cavalry belonging to me cannot go into the Field without receiving their Pay, and the Collections of Revenue of theſe Countries, ſet apart for this Pay, are now at a Stand by the Depredations of the Enemy: Thoſe with whom I am now treating for the Loan of One Lack of Pagodas, tell me, that if in this Time of Trouble you will aſſiſt me with your Credit, they will let me have the Money; I have therefore to requeſt you will do me the Favour to ſpeak to Mr. John Douglas, and ſatisfy him that when the Country is in Peace, I will without Fail repay the Money borrowed of him. When the Regiments are paid, they ſhall be put under the Orders of Sir Hector Munro, or any other Officer who commands the Army, until the Troubles are over. What ſhall I ſay more?

72. *From the Rajah of Tanjour to the Governor, dated 29 Rejub, or 1ſt Auguſt* 1780.—*Received 6 Ditto.*

It has given me great Concern to find that Hyder's Horſe have plundered Porto Novo and Conjeveram, and laid waſte the Carnatic. As I am a Dependant on the Company, he will no Doubt order his Horſe to commit Ravages in my Country when the Fall of the Waters will permit; it is therefore neceſſary that the Defence of the Country be provided for in Time. As the Company ſupport me, it is left with you to protect my Country and Fort, and take Meaſures for my Welfare and that of my People; the whole Expences of the Troops ſtationed for the Defence of this Country amount to about Two Lacks annually, ſo that in Time of Peace the Remainder of the Four Lacks of Subſidy is a clear Gain to the Company, which gives me great Satisfaction; there are only Three Battalions of Sepoys here, which will not be ſufficient to defend the Fort and Country of Tanjour in the preſent Troubles, and the Sibendy are not for to encounter an Enemy; it will therefore be neceſſary that the Governor and Council do ſend more Troops for the Defence of the Fort and Country of Tanjour; this was what was firſt agreed to. Formerly I had in my Service 4,000 Horſe and 20,000 Foot of various Denominations, and in Times of Trouble defended my own Country; but now I have no Troops, and regard thoſe of the Company as my own, which ſets me at eaſe. The Lands throughout my Country are now preparing to be ſown, and if any Trouble ſhould happen (which God forbid) at this Time, I ſhall be a conſiderable Sufferer; it will therefore be neceſſary to provide for the Defence of the Country, that it may be properly cultivated, and yield a plentiful Harveſt, which will enable me to collect the Revenues as uſual; but if the Country is over-run with the Enemy's Horſe, and laid waſte, all the Ryots will fly for Safety, and no Revenue can be collected; if the Country is not defended, it will not be in my Power to keep my Agreement; you will be kind enough therefore to regard my Loſs as that of the Company, and ſend ſome more

Troops to be ſtationed in different Parts of the Country. Since Hyder Naig has commenced Hoſtilities againſt the Company, I have no Doubt but Ruin will attend him, and the Conſequences be fatal to him. I live under the Company's Protection, and therefore offer conſtant Prayers to the Almighty for their Succeſs, and the Overthrow of their Enemies. The Commanding Officer has taken Meaſures for the Defence of the Fort; you will be pleaſed to give him further Orders to exert himſelf. I hope you will ſend more Troops for the Defence of my Country againſt the Enemy; I ſhall not fail to give every Aſſiſtance as far as lays in my Power. Reſt aſſured, that I conſider myſelf under the Company's Protection, and will not be wanting in their Service. I have taken the Liberty of repreſenting the Neceſſity of defending this Country properly againſt the Enemy; be pleaſed to conſider ſeriouſly of it, and extend your Favour to my Government.

74. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 9th Auguſt* 1780.—*Received Ditto.*

I herewith ſend you a Letter I have received from Rajah Burbur, dated 6th Shaban (8th Auguſt) in which he informs me, the Enemy is beſieging Chittaput, which is ſtill holding out againſt him. Although there is no great Reaſon to imagine that our Affairs will ſuffer any Thing conſiderably by his taking Poſſeſſion of that Place, yet I learn from Rajah Burbur's Letter, that it is the Enemy's Intention to go againſt Arcot and Gingee, after he has taken Chittaput, which is no more than Six Coſs diſtant from Gingee. There are great Quantities of Grain and Stores of various Kinds in the Forts of Arcot, Vellour, Gingee, Wandewaſh, and Trichinopoly; and I have, beſides what may be wanted for their Garriſons, laid in ſtore in theſe Places, large Quantities of Grain for the Troops in the Field: If (God forbid!) any one of thoſe Places ſhould fall into the Enemy's Hands, the Company's Affairs muſt ſuffer greatly. The Fort of Gingee, although ſtrong is very large, and the People in it are too few to defend it properly; if the Enemy ſhould get it into his Poſſeſſion, the Conſequences will be fatal; I therefore make no Doubt that you will as ſoon as poſſible provide for the Defence of the Forts above mentioned. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdazht from Mah. Rajah Burbur, dated 6 Shaban (8th of Auguſt) at 1½ *Pahr of the Night, or* 10½ *Pellr.*

Your Servant ſent lately to Hyder's Camp Two Sepoys, in the Dreſs of Faquiers, in order to bring me Intelligence from thence; they remained there Three Days, and returned here this Day; they ſay that the Enemy has taken Trinomalee, and is now beſieging Chittaput, which was ſtill holding out againſt him on Sunday Evening laſt. It is ſaid in his Camp, that after he has taken Chittaput, he means to march againſt Gingee and Arcot. God Almighty only knows what his Intentions are next!

75. *From the Rajah of Tanjour to the Governor, dated 5th Shaban or 7th Auguſt* 1780—*Received* 14*th Ditto.*

I have been favoured with your Letters, dated 18th and 29th July, which have given me great Pleaſure. In the Firſt of theſe you tell me to pay to Mr. Baine, the Paymaſter, whatever Sums of Money "he may want for paying the Troops with me;" and you deſire me to remember, "that only One Lack of Pagodas has been paid out of the Four I had agreed to give as a Depoſit, and that Three Lacks were ſtill due on that Account."

Sir, the Affair of the Depoſit is freſh in my Memory, but it is not in my Power to pay the Money; it is even difficult for me to diſcharge what juſt Engagements I have made. You are well acquainted with theſe Circumſtances, which I have often repreſented to you. In my preſent Situation, how am I to find Money to diſcharge this Depoſit Money? In the other Letter you ſay, "I may have heard that Hyder's Horſe have invaded the Carnatic, to which he has been inſtigated by the French; that it is therefore incumbent on the Friends and Allies of the Company to exert themſelves, in order to chaſtiſe Hyder; and as my Government depends upon the Company and the Nabob, you make no Doubt I will give every Aſſiſtance in my Power to the Company, in furniſhing Money, which will be much wanted for the Troops employed in the Field." I am convinced of this: It is not neceſſary at this Time, to mention the good Treatment and Service the Nabob has done me; ſuffice it to ſay, that I am indebted to the Company alone for what I have. Since Hyder has attacked the Company, he will inevitably meet with Ruin; after defeating the French, it will be no great Wonder if the Engliſh ſhould overcome him. It is incumbent in all the Friends and Allies of the Company, to aſſiſt them in Proportion to their Reſources; I on my Part ſhall not be wanting in any Thing which lays in my Power; I wiſh for nothing more: But I have no Money, and am without Remedy. If I had Reſources, there would be no Occaſion for your writing upon the Subject; I would

mortgage

mortgage or ſell my Jewels and Effects if I had any, in order to furniſh Money to the Company. It is to the Nabob's Favour I am indebted for this Situation. I have nothing but Stone Fort, and the Produce of the Country left me. If I am told I may borrow Money from the Soucars, there are none who will lend me any; they all excuſe themſelves on account of the Troubles: This is not the Seaſon for collecting the Revenue; on the contrary, Money muſt be advanced to the Ryots, for the Purpoſe of Cultivation. The Cheapneſs of Grain has occaſioned a Fall of Revenue, out of which I am under Engagements to pay the Company Four Lacks annually as Subſidy Money; and this I have faithfully performed till this Time, though with great Difficulty: I have not yet repaid thoſe who lent me Money to enable me to pay the Company; there is nothing due from me at this Time; and if I remit any in Advance, the Company I am ſure will give me Credit in the Subſidy Account. I have with great Difficulty been able to raiſe Thirty thouſand Pagodas, which I have at Two different Times paid to Mr. Baine, the Paymaſter, for which I ſend you his Receipts. I have exerted my utmoſt Abilities to get this Money for the Troops here, but it is beyond my Power to furniſh any Money at Madras. Mr. Lewin, through Mr. Swartz, has delivered me a Meſſage from you, to which I have given an Anſwer; Mr. Lewin has probably informed you of it: I told him that I had paid in Part of One Lack of Pagodas, Thirty thouſand to Mr. Baine the Paymaſter; and if you could get any one to lend me Seventy thouſand Pagodas, I was ready to give my Bond to any ſuch Perſon, payable at the Seaſon of collecting the Revenue: When this is paid to the Company, they will be pleaſed to credit me for the Amount. You ſay in your Letter, that the Nabob's Country has been revaged and laid waſte by the Enemy's Horſe, but that mine has not yet ſuffered by them. As the Rivers have riſen, it is not in the Power of any Horſe to come into my Country at this Seaſon, no more than in the Trichinopoly Country, which they have not yet entered; but when they do, they certainly will come into my Country alſo. You will be pleaſed to take Meaſures to defend it againſt their Incurſions; the Company's Enemies are mine, and I truſt you will not liſten to the malicious Inſinuations of thoſe who are intereſted againſt me. The Nabob has already plundered this Country of all its Riches, and left me without any Thing: Now that I have only the bare Produce of the Country, if the Enemy were to commit any Depredations in it for a ſingle Day, I ſhould be bereft of all Reſources whatever. You will therefore, I hope, take Meaſures for preventing any Incurſions of the Enemy. You acquaint me, that the Governor and Council have taken off the Duties upon Grain imported at Madras, and deſire I will give Orders to encourage the ſending of Grain from this Country to Madras. I have in purſuance of your Orders, ſent for the Merchants and People here, and recommended to them to ſend Grain to Madras; I have alſo taken off all Duties upon Grain exported from hence. Laſt Year I mortgaged a great Quantity of Grain to Soucars, in order to pay Money to the Company; and this Grain I have deſired to be now ſent to Madras, and I will pay them out of the Produce it will fetch. If you will be kind enough to ſpeak to the Merchants and trading People at Madras, to ſend for Grain from this Country, I will give Orders to all the Ryots and People throughout the Country to diſpoſe of what they have to them. The People here are not uſed to export Grain by Sea, and it will be much better done by Madras People; however, I ſhall not be wanting in my Endeavours to encourage it as much as poſſible. You may be aſſured, that I ſhall give every Aſſiſtance I can to the Company, whom I look upon as my Protectors. May the Almighty ever make them victorious and triumphant over their Enemies, and ſucceſsful in all their Undertakings!

77. *From the Rajah of Tanjore to the Governor, 14th Auguſt—Received 20th.*

I have already repreſented to you the Neceſſity of defending this Fort and Country during the preſent Troubles; the Fortifications here are much in want of Repair: You will be pleaſed to give Orders to the Engineer to repair them as ſoon as poſſible. Mr. Lewin left this on the 11th Auguſt, and went to Negapatam, from whence he will proceed by Sea to Madras; he will acquaint you with ſome Particulars which I requeſt you will attend to.

APPENDIX, N° 2.

Fort Saint George. Extract of the Minutes of Conſultation, the 29th July 1780.

MR. Sadlier delivers in the following Minute, relative to the preſent State of Affairs.

Our Affairs have long been approaching to that unhappy State at which they are now arrived. Private Miſmanagement, and not public Calamity, has brought us to the Brink of Deſtruction. We are now in Danger of loſing all our Poſſeſſions which have been conquered by the Company at ſuch an Expence of Blood and Treaſure: But this is no Time for Retroſpection; it is our Duty now to take a View of the impending Danger, and the Reſources which are ſtill left us, and to make the moſt of the Means in our Hands to avert our Ruin, before the Opportunity is loſt, and even Exertion becomes fruitleſs.

Hyder Ally has long treated our Government with Neglect and Inſult; and a Government which bears Inſult unavenged, will naturally be ſuppoſed to bear Injuſtice without Reſiſtance; and Hyder is too good a Politician not to draw this Concluſion, and avail himſelf of our Weakneſs.

For ſome Months paſt, he has been aſſembling a large Army upon our Frontiers, while his Vakeel was allowed to remain at Madras, to give him daily Intelligence of the Effect his Motions had upon our Government. Still we remained inactive; we neither had Reſolution to queſtion him about the Cauſe of his Intentions, or to provide againſt the Danger.

Inſtead of demanding a categorical Anſwer from Hyder, which would have determined the Line of our Conduct; inſtead of aſſembling ſuch Part of our Army as was capable of making ſome Head againſt his Force, and putting our Garriſons in a State of Defence, and providing the Means by which an Army might be ſupported; our unhappy Inactivity prevailed over every Duty which we owed to our own Characters, to our Employers, or to the miſerable Inhabitants of a Country now ſuffering from Fire and Sword, which depend upon usfor Protection. We allowed the Enemy quietly to aſſemble their Troops upon our Frontiers; we allowed our own Troops to remain ſcattered in different Parts of the Country, without Stores or Guns, by the Aſſiſtance of which they might either defend themſelves or act offenſively; we took no Pains to repleniſh an empty Treaſury with Money, which is the Sinews of War. Deſtitute of Means, but more ſo of the Abilities to exert them, we ſtood the ſtupid Spectators of our own Ruin; we would hardly believe it when it was come; and now our Inactivity and Want of Exertion is equal to our Temerity, our Blindneſs, and want of timely Precaution.

Hyder Ally has poured in his Cavalry, and has alarmed the whole Country; he himſelf has followed with his choice Troops, and is now in Force in the Body of the Carnatic; our Troops ſcattered in ſmall Detachments without Guns or Stores, may be unable to form a Junction, and poſſibly may be cut off one after another without the leaſt Reſiſtance; our principal Garriſons neglected, without Ammunition, Stores, or Proviſions, to enable them to bear a Siege, may become an eaſy Sacrifice; a Number of ſmall Forts in the Carnatic, ſuch as Wandewaſh, Carangooly, Arnee, and many others, the Poſſeſſion of which has coſt us ſo much Blood and Treaſure, and either left defenceleſs, or are garriſoned by a few Companies of Nabob's Sepoys, who have not been paid for 18 Months, and who ſtarving, may, through Hunger or Revenge, be glad to change their Maſter. The Fort of Arcot, the Capital of the Province, is perhaps before this Time in the Poſſeſſion of Hyder Ally, and all the Stores and Arms which have been hoarded there, will fall a Sacrifice to our Enemies, and ſtrengthen their Hands againſt us. The Fort of Veliore, ſo far from being able to ſend any Relief to Arcot, cannot ſpare a Man from its own Defence, while the Villages are burning around it. The laſt Intelligence of Hyder, informs us, he was upon the Plains between Arcot and Pondicherry; the Defences of this latter Place being deſtroyed, it is now as open as a Fiſhing Town, with Three Battalions of Sepoys in it, who have but Two Guns to defend them, and but a few invalid Artillery Men to work theſe Guns, though they may have Occaſion not only to combat with Hyder's Troops without, but from the diſaffected French, our natural Enemies, within the Place, who have been fed at our Expence, when we hardly had Money enough for our own Occaſions: Theſe Three Battalions are now in the moſt imminent Danger, and may be cut off by a Part of Hyder's Army, while the reſt of it, without Oppoſition, may poſſeſs itſelf of Arcot; the whole of the Country extending from the River Coleroon to the South, to the Country of Nellore to the Northward, excepting the Garriſons of Trichinopoly, Vellore, and perhaps Amboor, may be in the Poſſeſſion of Hyder in a Month, and theſe Garriſons being cut off from

Proviſions, and a Communication with the Preſidency, with the Country in Hyder's Hands, may be ſtarved into a Capitulation.

The Enemy here even got Poſſeſſion of Porto Novo, a Sea Port which opens to them a Communication to the Iſlands; they have plundered Conjeveram, a Place within Fifty Miles of the Preſidency. The News of this laſt Event arrived, on the 23d, and till it arrived, not one of thoſe who aſſume to themſelves the entire Management of the Company's Affairs, would believe that there either was an Enemy in the Country, or that it was likely to be invaded. This is only the 28th, and within the ſhort Space of Eight Days we ſee the Country over-run, and left, it would ſeem, a devoted Sacrifice to a powerful and barbarous Enemy.

But deplorable as this Proſpect may appear, the worſt is yet to come; the Capital is in Danger, and no effectual Means have yet been taken to provide for its Safety, or for the Safety of Thouſands who have fled to it for Protection.

Let us take a View of Things as they ſtood at the Moment this Alarm was given at Conjeveram, and the Meaſures which have ſince been purſued.

We had at Madras a Regiment of Europeans, and Two Battalions of Sepoys; the King's Regiment was at Poonamalee, and the Artillery at the Mount; Three Battalions of Sepoys were ſtationed at Pondicherry, and the Battalions under the Command of Colonel Baillie to the Northward; the reſt of the Troops were diſpoſed in the different Garriſons. *With regard to the Nabob's Troops, they are all many Months in Arrears; his Infantry, through Want of Pay and Want of Diſcipline, could add no Strength to our Army. Part of Six Regiments of Cavalry, formed by him a few Years ago, have deſerted to Hyder becauſe they were not paid; and the Three Regiments now remaining, which includes all the Cavalry in the Carnatic, from the ſame Cauſe are ready to follow the ſame Courſe.*

Our Treaſury was empty; the Nabob declared he had no Money; the Rajah of Tanjore made the ſame Declaration; the Maſulipatam Diſtricts of the Northern Circars are ſo far from being able to furniſh Supplies, that the Arrears of Tribute now amounts to Seventeen Lacks of Pagodas; Sitteram Rauze, the moſt wealthy Zemindar under the Company, had not paid his Kiſts, and, inſtead of his being preſſed to pay them, a Remiſſion of Tribute was voted to him; Ball Kiſtna is in Arrears, nor is it believed that he will ever be induced to make good his Engagements.

Notwithſtanding this bad State of our Revenue, Money might be raiſed, and enough of it too, had Government acted with Spirit and Reſolution; but I am ſorry to ſay, that both were wanting when both were moſt required. The Nabob's Territories have remained in Peace ever ſince the Year 1769; conſiderable Additions have been made to them ſince that Time. The Nabob's Expences were no ways adequate to his Revenue; What then is become of the Overplus? I know that his Revenue has been diminiſhing annually; I know that the Revenues of the other Countries ſubject to our Government, has been diminiſhing in the ſame Proportion; and that our Specie has been tranſported to China and to Europe, at the Rate of Ten and Fifteen Lacks of Pagodas annually; but though much has been carried away, enough ſtill remained; and I inſiſt upon it, that the Means are ſtill within our Reach, if we will but exert ourſelves with Activity and Spirit.

It was our Duty to have been in the Field on the Firſt Alarm, and to have been ready to attack, inſtead of waiting to be attacked; but inſtead of that, when the Danger approached within 50 Miles of us, we were loſt in Confuſion, and found ourſelves without Reſource. The Horſe that plundered Conjeveram might, under an active and vigilant Officer, have penetrated into the Black Town of Madras, and ſet it on Fire about our Ears. Every one ſaw how much their Lives and Property were in Danger; ſuch as had Habitations in the Fort crowded into it for Safety; ſuch as could not come into the Fort, crowded into the Black Town. The wealthy Armenians, and others, not thinking themſeves in Safety within the Black Town Wall, have lodged their Women and Effects in the Fort Godowns. The Streets of the Black Town are filled with People who cannot get a Lodging; and many Hundreds muſt ſoon meet that Death they fly from, by the Increaſe of Dirt, and the Famine which their Numbers muſt occaſion.

The Nabob's Property, his Money and Jewels, and almoſt all other Property, in which we can depend for our own Defences, is lodged within the Walls of the Black Town, inſtead of being carried into a State of greater Safety in the Fort; the Nabob's own Perſon is left in Danger, he is almoſt deſerted by thoſe who ought to protect him; and I am told he is ſunk in a State of Deſpondency, without Hope, and may conſider himſelf a Victim devoted to Deſtruction.

Inſtead of taking the moſt vigorous Means to avert the Calamity already at our Doors, to remove the Fears of the People, to inſpire Confidence in our Government, and to defend our Lives, our Property, and our Honour, every Act tends to encreaſe the general Idea of our Weakneſs.

APPENDIX, N° 2.

It would have been proper to have recalled the Regiment from Poonamalee, the Artillery from the Mount, to have reinforced them with Two Battalions of Sepoys from the Fort, and to have encamped them on Egmore Plain, for the Security of the Black Town. The Squadron now lying idle in Madras Roads, ſhould have been required for tranſporting the Three Battalions under the Command of Colonel Braithwaite, and Pondicherry ſhould have been evacuated; and there being no Enemy in force Northward, Colonel Baillie ſhould have been ordered to proceed with his Diviſion of the Army towards Madras, with all poſſible Expedition; and thus an Army ſhould have been formed, which by Degrees would have become formidable, and would be able not only to defend the Preſidency, but to march to the Relief of any Place which was beſieged. The Commander in Chief ſhould put himſelf at the Head of this Army on its firſt forming.

Inſtead of this Mode of Conduct, what has been done during theſe Eight Days that the Alarm is ſpread? Why nothing that is not expreſſive of the utmoſt Weakneſs and Diſtraction. Inſtead of forming a Camp, from which Detachments might be ſent, the Two Battalions here are harraſſed to Death, and ſent out upon ſmall Detachments, which can make little or no Reſiſtance. The Artillery has hitherto been allowed to remain at the Mount, and may be cut off at their Guns, for Want of Infantry to ſupport them. The King's Regiment is left at Poonamalee, a Place at the Diſtance of 15 Miles, where it may be cut off from the Poſſibility of protecting the Black Town, or joining the Artillery. A Body of Hyder's Horſe may come to the Black Town by any Route they think fit; they will find nothing but theſe Battalions of Sepoys, in weak and ſcattered Bodies, ready to oppoſe their Progreſs; they may ſet the Black Town in Flames, and not only prevent us from being able to form an Army, but take away every Reſource which we have got for maintaining one.

Inſtead of putting this Garriſon in a State of Defence, inſtead of aſſembling a Militia for its Protection, and inſtead of preventing any Thing from being admitted which is not valuable, the Fort Gates are open until the uſual Hours, every thing is admitted, the Fort is become a Thoroughfare for Thouſands of Stragglers; the Gates are even opened in the Middle of the Night, when an Alarm makes it convenient for a Family to leave their Garden; and in caſe of any real Alarm, the Concourſe of People at the Gates might be ſo great, that it would be impoſſible to ſhut them; and the Enemy might Pell Mell follow our own People in.

Such Weakneſs has already been diſcovered, that nothing is impoſſible; and the Idea of this Weakneſs will ſpread to the Officers and the Troops, and ſtrike a general Panic, which will haſten our Ruin.

Inſtead of forming an Army near the Preſidency, I am told that the mad Idea is entertained, of aſſembling it by ſmall Detachments, from Trichinopoly, &c. upon the Plains of Arnie and Wandewaſh, in the Midſt of a Country now in the Poſſeſſion of an Enemy, who has an Army equal at leaſt to our whole Force when aſſembled; and that inſtead of defending the Black Town, which has not yet been plundered, a Detachment of Sepoys is ordered away to Conjeveram, which has already been plundered, and conſequently cannot ſuſtain any further Damage.

In ſhort, were the Meaſures taken intended for our Deſtruction, and not for our Defence, they could not be more effectual. My Duty to myſelf and to the Company, my Love for the Community, and my Station, all impel and give me a Right to ſpeak in a Language my Feeling and my Honour dictate to me; and I hope at leaſt, if my Sentiments are not adopted, that my Character will be exempted from the Shame and Diſgrace to which our Conduct has already, and will hereafter expoſe us to, in the Eyes of the World.

Although my Sentiments might be collected with ſufficient Preciſion from the foregoing Opinion, yet I will here ſtate them again, that nothing may be left in Doubt or Uncertainty.

The King's Regiment from Poonamalee and the Artillery from the Mount, ſhould immediately be made to encamp in a Situation near the Black Town Wall, the moſt proper for defending it in caſe of an Attack; this Body ſhould be reinforced by the Two Battalions of Sepoys here; the General ſhould place himſelf at the Head of this little Army, and the moſt vigorous Exertions ſhould be made to ſupply it with Guns, Stores, Bullocks, Laſcars, and every Thing neceſſary.

The Militia ſhould be aſſembled for the Defence of the Fort, together with a Regiment of Europeans, and the neceſſary Number of Sepoys; the Governor ſhould put himſelf at the Head of the Militia, and iſſue his Orders from thence; the Gates ought to be ſhut, that nothing might be admitted but valuable Effects; and to prevent the Fort from remaining a Thoroughfare, the Garriſon ſhould likewiſe be reduced to the ſtricteſt Military Order.

The Squadron now in the Road ſhould proceed to Pondicherry with all poſſible Expedition, and bring up the Three Battalions which are now there, under the Command of Colonel Braithwaite; theſe Three Battalions to join the main Body under the General's Command. Until a Squadron can arrive,

arrive, Braithwaite ſhould have a diſcretionary Power to retreat to Cuddalore, if neceſſary; and Colonel Baillie be immediately ordered to proceed by the neareſt Route.

The Army would then conſiſt of a ſtrong Body of Europeans, and Eight Battalions of Sepoys, and might advance as Occaſion required.

While this Army was aſſembling, no Pains ſhould be ſpared in procuring the neceſſary Number of Stores, &c. &c. to enable it to march or act as Occaſion might require.

A proper Place ſhould be aſſigned for the Security of the Nabob within the Fort. His Effects, and that belonging to his Family, ſhould be admitted likewiſe; and ſhould have a Place of Security aſſigned to them during the preſent Troubles.

Money ſhould be immediately ſent for paying off the Nabob's Cavalry, that they may be brought to act as ſoon as poſſible.

If theſe Meaſures were taken as a Ground-work for our Operations, the neceſſary Orders for the further Defence of our Territories could be given as Occaſion required. Our firſt Idea muſt be to inſpire Confidence at Home, and that Confidence will extend in Proportion to our Succeſs.

(Signed)

29th July 1780. Anthony Sadlier.

Mr. Johnſon, upon reading of that Part of Mr. Sadlier's Minute of this Day, wherein he obſerves, "that the News of this laſt Event arrived on the 23d; and till it arrived, not one of thoſe who aſſumed "to themſelves the intire Management of the Company's Affairs, would believe that there either "was an Enemy in the Country, or that it was likely to be invaded;" thinks it neceſſary to remark, that he delivered a Minute, dated 19th June, at a Select Committee held the wherein he has given his Sentiments upon the approaching Danger; and that Mr. Smith followed his Example ſome Time after, in a Minute delivered in the 19th July.

A true Extract.

Cha^{s} Freeman,
Sub-Secretary.

Extracts of the Minutes of Conſultation, dated Auguſt the 1ſt 1780.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute, in reply to the Minute of Mr. Sadlier on the preſent State of Affairs, entered in Conſultation of the 29th ultimo.

Mr. Sadlier, at the laſt Conſultation, having aſſumed to himſelf a cenſorial Authority over the Proceedings of the Committee of which he is not a Member; and having, without the neceſſary Information, not only conveyed the moſt pointed Cenſure, but likewiſe the moſt illiberal Reflections on the Conduct and Meaſures of Government; the Preſident and Commander in Chief deem it a Duty incumbent on them, to reply to ſuch Parts of that inflammatory Declamation as are in the leaſt worthy of their Regard; and ſummarily to draw into one Point of View, a State of the real Situation of Affairs; happily not ſo diſtorted as that produced by Mr. Sadlier. It would be an endleſs, and indeed an unprofitable Labour, to attend this Gentleman through a Labyrinth of diſjointed Argument and angry Invective; his Talent at Diſſenſion is glaringly apparent in almoſt every Inſtance ſince he has been a Member of Adminiſtration; he ſeems grieved at not being of the Committee, and therefore he could wiſh to clog the Wheels of Government entruſted to the Management of others. To ſay nothing of the Strictures, diffuſed with ſuch a laviſh Hand throughout the Minute of Mr. Sadlier, it cannot but be a Matter of Admiration, to obſerve the Panic with which that Gentleman appears to have been ſtricken; every Line breathes Fire, Ruin, and Deſolation! Unhappily, a warm Imagination has carried him beyond the Limits of either Prudence or Diſcretion; he has aſſerted for Fact, that which never did exiſt; he has drawn Concluſions from Premiſes arbitrarily eſtabliſhed, without the Appearance or Probability of Reaſon.

When a Country, from a ſudden Incurſion of an Enemy, or from any other Accident, is brought to the Neceſſity of acting with Firmneſs and Vigour, it ill becomes one of the Members of the Adminiſtration of that Country, to give Way to Apprehenſion, and to ſuppoſe, becauſe Exertions muſt be made, that that Country is ruined! The Hour of Danger is the Hour of Reſolution; political Timidity then becomes the greateſt Bane that can befal a Government, and conſequently a People over whom that Government preſides. If, as Mr. Sadlier aſſerts, the Committee were inattentive to the Steps which Hyder has for ſome Time paſt been taking, with reſpect to the Carnatic,

tic, they moſt unqueſtionably would feel themſelves worthy of the ſevereſt Diſpleaſure of their Employers; but if Mr. Sadlier had been in a Situation to have known what the Committee had done, he would have known, that they have been by no Means inattentive to Hyder's Motions. That they had repreſented both to the Company and to the Gentlemen at Bengal, the Extent of his Views; and had moſt circumſtantially informed the latter of every Step he had taken, previous to his Attack upon the Carnatic. As to the categorical Demands which Mr. Sadlier ſeems to think we ſhould have made to Hyder; as to the Diſmiſſion of his Vakeel, when the Rumour of his Intentions firſt ſpread Abroad; thoſe are Points which the Committee, who are alone the Judges, neither thought it expedient nor adviſeable in the then Situation of Affairs to carry into Execution. Hyder, from the Moment we marched againſt Mahé, threatened in Return an Invaſion of the Carnatic: His Inclination was little to be doubted; but the Seaſon of the Year was allowed to paſs away, when he could moſt effectually have injured the Nabob; his uſual Judgment ſeems to have failed him in this Reſpect; he deferred the Movement of his Troops until the Grounds lay uncultivated; the Grain was collected in, and the Monſoon was approaching, which would neceſſarily retard every Operation in the Field: Under thoſe Circumſtances therefore, and under the Certainty that his main Army and his Artillery had not yet got through the Gauts, and that he himſelf, ſo far from being in the Heart of the Carnatic, was ſtill in the Neighbourhood of the Paſſes; under all theſe Circumſtances, the Committee deemed themſelves vigilant in the Truſt repoſed in them, when they reſolved to aſſemble an Army as ſpeedily as poſſible; when they took Meaſures for the Co-operation of the Preſidency of Bengal; when they got the Nabob to collect additional Proviſions in his different Garriſons; and in ſhort, when in the laſt Reſort, they came to the Determination of exerting every Sinew towards the Puniſhment of a wanton, unprovoked Infringement of the Peace of 1769.

The Alarm occaſioned by the Entrance of Hyder into the Carnatic, was certainly very great; but who, in the leaſt acquainted with the fearful Diſpoſitions of the Natives, can wonder at their Conſternation, and the more eſpecially, when that Conſternation ſeems to have been cheriſhed and fomented by thoſe, whoſe Province it was to have quelled it as ſoon as it appeared? Are we to ſuppoſe that Individuals without Doors are to remain in the Belief of Safety, when a Member of the Government itſelf declares, "The Carnatic is loſt, and we are a loſt Colony; that his Sentiments "ſhall not be confined to the Board at which he ſits, but that they ſhall be communicated to the "Community at large, that they may know their Danger?"

Fear in a deliberative, as well as in an executive Officer of a State, is an unhappy Depreſſion of that Spirit, which is peculiarly wanting in every Act of Moment; but when that Fear, burſting through every Reſtraint, and arrogating to itſelf the Credit of a conſtitutional Oppoſition, not only ſtrives to enfeeble the Councils by which that State is governed, but likewiſe endeavours to counteract its Meaſures, by ſowing Diſaffection among the People, the Evil becomes of Magnitude, and the Welfare of the whole points it out as neceſſary to be cruſhed.

The extenſive Knowledge of Mr. Sadlier does not confine itſelf to the Condemnation of all the Meaſures of the Committee, the Springs of which he is evidently unacquainted with; he even ventures to arraign the Conduct of Sir Edward Hughes, His Majeſty's Naval Commander in Chief in India; and, a little incautiouſly, calls the Plan recommended by the Commander in Chief of the Army, a *mad one*; although it was founded on the cooleſt Deliberation, and although the Nabob poſitively aſſerts, that neither at the Mount, nor at any Place nearer than Wandewaſh, can a ſufficient Quantity of Proviſions be collected for the Troops. Leſt however, the Sentiments of the Nabob ſhould be ſuppoſed oppoſite, it will not be improper here to recite his own Words, freely given in the Preſence of the Preſident, the General, Sir Hector Munro, Lord Macleod, Ummeer Ul Umrah, and Aſſaram Cawn the Dewan. "It would be impoſſible for me," ſaid the Nabob, "to ſupply the "Troops at the Mount, or at any Place ſo near to Madras; at Arcot, Wandewaſh, Gingee, Tiagar, "and Trichinopoly, I have already collected Stores, Proviſions, Bullocks, &c. Hyder being on "that Side of the Carnatic, and Wandewaſh being the moſt centrical Place for aſſembling an Army, "there I would wiſh it to join, as from the Parts adjacent I can furniſh it with whatſoever ſhall be "wanting; and at the ſame Time both my Country, and the Poſſeſſions of the Company will be "protected." Whether the Select Committee, proceeding on their own Knowledge, and on the Judgment of the Commander in Chief of the Army, and ſupported therein by the Sentiments of the Nabob, are wrong, or whether Mr. Sadlier is right, the Iſſue of the Matter will finally determine.

The laſt Reſource of intemperate Minds, is in bold and general Scurrility; fatally indeed the Rancour recoils upon themſelves, and inſtead of injuring thoſe they would wiſh to viliſy, the Opprobrium falls upon their own Heads, and leaves a Stigma which is not eaſily eradicated. Thus Mr. Sadlier, when he ſays, "We have ſtood the ſtupid Spectators of our own Ruin," eſtabliſhes for a Fact what is merely the Offſpring of his own Apprehenſion. Ruin has not fallen upon the Carnatic, nor ſhall Ruin approach it, ſhould Hands and Hearts, zealous in the general Welfare, be able to prevent it. To deſcend ſo far as to anſwer that Part of the Minute which ſays, "the Nabob's Perſon is in Danger, he is almoſt deſerted by thoſe who ought to protect him, and that he is ſunk in a State of Deſpondency without Hope, and may conſider himſelf as a Victim devoted to Deſtruction," would be injurious to his Highneſs; who is ſenſible of the anxious Regard of this Government to his Intereſt

and Honour, and highly unworthy of our own Characters. The Nabob feels ſo totally the Reverſe of all this, that he is warm and ſanguine that Hyder will eventually repent his having diſturbed the Quiet of the Carnatic. But Mr. Sadlier goes a Step farther; we have already remarked his Declaration at the Board, "that he would communicate his Sentiments to the Community at large, that they might know their Danger;" a Declaration fraught with Conſequences of the moſt evil Tendency. But, not confining himſelf to this, he even proceeds to ſay, "the Committee have acted under the Sanction of an uſurped Authority." If in their Wiſdom the Company have thought fit to eſtabliſh a Select Committee for the better Management of their Affairs; if in their Diſcretion they have thought proper to limit the Number of its Members; the daring Inſult in ſuch Language ſhewn to their Authority, and that too by a Member of Adminiſtration, is worthy of the ſevereſt Cenſure that can be paſſed. To encourage a Spirit of Diſaffection, is highly unbecoming in any Man veſted with a Share of the Government of a Country; but to aim at the Subverſion of a Power fixed and eſtabliſhed in all its Points by the moſt explicit Orders, is a Tranſgreſſion of that unpardonable Nature, that Government would be treacherous to their Conſtituents, and negligent of the public Safety, were they to allow it to paſs with Indifference or Impunity: Wherefore, as the Commands of the Company are clear and deciſive with reſpect to the Line which in caſe of Neceſſity the Preſident and Council, as well as the Committee are authorized to take, and as that Neceſſity now exiſts in its moſt alarming Form, the Preſident moves, and the General ſeconds the Motion, That Mr. Sadlier be ſuſpended from the Service of the Company, until the Pleaſure of the Court of Directors ſhall be known.

1ſt Auguſt 1780. Signed, John Whitehill,
Hector Munro.

The Preſident then puts the following Motion to the Board, That Mr. Sadlier be ſuſpended from the Company's Service, till the Pleaſure of the Court of Directors be known: Whereupon the Opinions of the ſeveral Members of Council are taken, and are as follows:

Mr. Davidſon is of Opinion, That the Minute of Mr. Sadlier is wanting in that Deference, Reſpect, and Decency which are due to Government; and the Tendency of his Conduct has been ſuch, that he approves of the Preſident's Motion.

Mr. Johnſon diſſents in the ſtrongeſt Manner to the Preſident's Motion, and will proteſt againſt the Meaſure as ſoon as he can recover from the Aſtoniſhment he is in at ſuch a Proceeding, and can collect his Reaſons with ſufficient Accuracy and Preciſion; in the mean Time, makes this public Avowal of the ſame Sentiments as are contained in the Minute of Mr. Sadlier.

Sir Hector Munro ſubſcribes to the Preſident's Motion.

Mr. Smith is totally againſt the Preſident's Motion; thinks it a very ſevere and very unmerited one, and will enter his Proteſt on the Occaſion.

The Preſident is of Opinion, That Mr. Sadlier be ſuſpended the Company's Service, till the Pleaſure of the Court of Directors be known.

Reſolved, in conſequence, That Mr. Sadlier be ſuſpended the Company's Service till the Pleaſure of the Court of Directors be known.

A true Extract,
Cha, Freeman,
Secretary.

Extracts from the Minutes of Conſultation, dated the 8th September 1780.

Read, and ordered to be entered, the following Minute of Mr. Smith.

I conſider the Suſpenſion of Mr. Sadlier as arbitrary and unjuſt, therefore have diſſented and proteſted againſt the Meaſure. His Repreſentation, in many Particulars, agrees with the Sentiments I have expreſſed in Committee; and doubtleſs very great Allowances ſhould have been made for a Minute, conceived in a critical Situation, when the Writer thought there was imminent Danger. I cannot ſufficiently regret the Inattention ſhewn by the Majority of the Committee to the ſeveral Repreſentations made by Mr. Johnſon and myſelf, expreſſing our Wiſhes to make the neceſſary Preparations for War, on receiving various Letters from his Highneſs the Nabob, informing us of Hyder Ally's hoſtile Intentions againſt the Carnatic, although we did not then record our Sentiments, more particularly on the 17th of July, and alſo in the Minutes delivered in by us on the 19th June and 19th July laſt; as I fear this Inactivity has occaſioned the Alarm and Conſternation which prevailed on the Morning of the 24th ultimo. The general Report of Conferences, held by the Governor General and Umur ul

Omrah (to which Mr. Johnſon and myſelf were not invited) ſerved to confirm that Deſpondency and Diſtruſt which prevails in this Settlement.

An unreſerved Communication of Sentiments from every Member of the Board, appears to me eſſentially neceſſary for managing the Company's Affairs; and every Attempt to reſtrain it, highly improper. To ſuſpend a Member for doing what he conceives to be his Duty, is ſuch an Act of arbitrary Power as cannot be paralleled in the Company's Records. Can it be expected that a Member will deliver his Sentiments with Freedom and Sincerity, whilſt the Terrors of Suſpenſion hang over him? I fear not; and that this violent Meaſure is more calculated to evince the Power of the Majority, than to promote Harmony and Unanimity in our Councils. When I reflect on all that has paſſed on this Occaſion, I find it very difficult to reſtrain my Feelings at the Conduct of the Majority, in endeavouring to ruin the Proſpects of one of their own Members, for having painted our Situation in a Manner which does not accord with their Sentiments.

For the Sake of human Nature, I hope that perſonal Pique had no Share in this Reſolution; but when it is known that the Preſident and General conſider themſelves as reflected on in Mr. Sadlier's Minute, and that no Cordiality has ſubſiſted between him and Mr. Davidſon, I think there will be too much Reaſon for Conjectures, which every Man of Sentiment and Feeling would wiſh to avoid.

The Suſpenſion of a Servant of ſuch Rank as Mr. Sadlier ought to be a Matter of the cooleſt Deliberation, and done without Paſſion or Prejudice.

I cannot conceive that our honourable Employers will approve that a Servant of his Station and Abilities ſhould be diſqualified from ſerving them, at a Time when his Experience and Advice might be of moſt Uſe, eſpecially when they will ſee that this violent Meaſure has been effected without any ſpecific Charge being exhibited againſt him (except that produced by the Preſident and General, who muſt be conſidered as Parties, and in this Inſtance became Judges in his Condemnation) or his being allowed Time for making his Defence, although ſuch Rule of Conduct has been ordered and eſtabliſhed by the Court of Directors.

Madras
the Auguſt 1780.

(Signed)
Charles Smith.

Mr. Johnſon delivers in the following Minute, relative to the Suſpenſion of Mr. Sadlier; and begs Leave to remark to the Board, that he ſhould not have ſuffered ſo much Time to elapſe ſince that Meaſure took place, without entering his Diſſent at large, had not Indiſpoſition and Multiplicity of Buſineſs prevented his doing it ſooner.

Having diſſented in the ſtrongeſt Manner to the Preſident's Motion for the Suſpenſion of Mr. Sadlier, purſuant to this Declaration, I do hereby proteſt againſt the Violence of that Meaſure, for the following Reaſons.

1ſt. Becauſe that Mr. Sadlier's Character ſhould have exempted him from the Violence under which he now ſuffers; his Conduct while a temporary Member of Council, on the Arrival of Mr. Whitehill to take Charge of the Government, and previous to the Return of Mr. Smith and myſelf to the Preſidency, was ſuch as deſerved Applauſe: As Chief of Maſulipatam, he diſtinguiſhed himſelf for his Moderation in the Midſt of long Diſputes, in which he was neceſſarily engaged, relative to the Civil and Military Power; and it is enough to ſay that the Board was ſo much convinced of the Propriety of his Conduct, that their ſubſequent Orders, dated on that Subject, were grounded on his Arguments; for his Attention to the Fortifications and Defences of the Place, when they might be ſubject to an Attack in the Conſequence of the War with France; for Diſintereſtedneſs of Conduct which freed him even from the Imputation of benefitting by his Station; for his Attention to the Company's Inveſtment; and laſtly, for that ſtrict Oeconomy ſo neceſſary to the Company's Affairs.

A Senſe of his Merit in theſe Inſtances, drew from his Succeſſor, a ſenſible, impartial Man, and from the Council of Maſulipatam, the moſt honourable Teſtimony in his Favour; and his Conduct in this Truſt pointed him out as a Perſon whoſe Capacity rendered him amply deſerving of that Place in Government to which he was to ſucceed.

On his Admiſſion into Council, he purſued the ſame honourable Line of Conduct; he ſpiritedly oppoſed the Superceſſion of the Company's Servants, upon the Occaſion of Mr. Caſſamajor's Appointment to the Chiefſhip of Vizagapatam, in Preference to the Right of Four Senior Servants; he delivered in a ſtrong Minute againſt an Alienation of the Company's Revenue, which was made during the late Government nominally in Favour of Mr. Drake, but really in Favour of Trevengadum, the Beetle and Tobacco Farmer, who is now the preſent Governor's Dubaſh: This Act of Favour was ſhewn to Trevengadum in Contradiction to the Report of a Committee appointed to inveſtigate his Accounts, which at the ſame Time proved, that he cruelly oppreſſed the Inhabitants to promote his private

private Emolument. Mr. Sadlier ſhewed his Attention to the Company's Orders, by delivering in a Minute, containing his Opinion of the Mode beſt adapted for inveſtigating who were the Owners of the Elizabeth; this Minute was anſwered by Mr. Whitehill, which drew a Reply from Mr. Sadlier. Mr. Sadlier oppoſed in the ſtrongeſt Manner an Alienation of the Company's Revenue in Favour of Sitteram Rauze; and laſtly, when we were invaded by Hyder Ally, he boldly ſtepped forward in the Hour of Danger, to give his Sentiments of our preſent Danger, and the Meaſures which the Majority of Government ought to purſue.

I ſpeak of theſe Facts with Confidence, as they came within my own Knowledge: I am ſorry the Length, to which I am obliged to confine myſelf, will not allow me to be more explicit: Thoſe who ſee Mr. Sadlier's Minutes, will do Juſtice to his Abilities and to his Intentions; and I doubt not but his unremitting Attention to the Company's Intereſt, his Obedience to their Orders, his Deſire to fix the Attachment of their Servants by preventing Superceſſion, and his Anxiety to promote the Welfare of the Whole when it was in Danger, will inſure him not only the warm Applauſe of the Company whom he ſerves, but the Community, which he was deſirous to ſee protected.

But the Integrity of Mr. Sadlier's Intention neceſſarily drew him into an Cpposition to the Majority of the Government; his Principle we ſee puniſhed as a Crime; and I am ſorry to remark, that the Violence of the Proceedings againſt him too ſtrongly indicate, that the Majority of Government were determined to make uſe of their Power to ſuppreſs Opinions, which they could not contradict by Reaſon or Argument.

2dly. Becauſe, by the Company's Orders, when a Charge is exhibited againſt any of their Servants, they direct that a Time be allowed for their Defence, in order that the Charge may be clearly and ſpecifically proved. If by the Company's Orders this Juſtice is due to any Company's Servant, how much more ought it to be obſerved to a Member of Government? The Laws of England ſtrictly enjoin that no Man ſhall be condemned unheard. But in the Suſpenſion of Mr. Sadlier, Regard was neither paid to Cuſtom, to Law, to Juſtice, or to the Company's Orders; an imaginary Crime was formed againſt him by the Governor, the General, and Mr. Davidſon; they found themſelves a Majority, and thought that a Majority could not only ſupercede Law, but the Orders of that Power which conſtituted them the Government. They ſummoned a Council at 12 o'Clock, without giving Mr. Smith or myſelf the ſmalleſt Intimation of the Buſineſs; which was to be brought before it; they protracted the Buſineſs till near One, that there might be as little Time as poſſible for Argument, and then producing this imaginary Crime againſt Mr. Sadlier, which had been framed by them in private, they ſuſpended him from the Service, without giving him Time either to defend himſelf, if he continued in the Sentiments on which he was condemned, or to retract if he found them erroneous.

3dly. Becauſe, from the Manner of the Charge brought in by the Governor and Sir Hector Munro, and ſeconded by Mr. Davidſon, againſt Mr. Sadlier, theſe Gentlemen made themſelves both Judges and Party in the Deciſion againſt him. They, as Parties, framed the Accuſation in private; and then bringing that Accuſation, with nothing ſpecific alledged againſt Mr. Sadlier, in a Council aſſembled at a late Hour for the Purpoſe, they, as a Majority, paſs Sentence on a Charge which they had thus fabricated, without giving the Accuſed a Privilege not denied by Law to the loweſt Criminal.

4thly. Becauſe Mr. Sadlier was ſuſpended from the Company's Service, though a Member of Government, for giving an Opinion in his Place at the Board, tending, as he thought, not only to the Intereſt of the Company which he ſerved, but to the Community of which he is a Member. According to the Conſtitution of the Company, the Council is inſtituted for the Purpoſe of giving their Opinion; if it is not free, conſtitutional Government does not exiſt. Any Number of the Members of Council, who aſſociate themſelves for the ſuppreſſing Opinion, may be conſidered a Faction, the Conduct of which tends to ſupercede Syſtem and eſtabliſh Tyranny.

5thly. Becauſe the Suſpenſion of Mr. Sadlier appears to be founded in private Reſentment, and not on public Utility. Many Circumſtances tend to corroborate this Fact, already ſufficiently proved by the Weakneſs of the Charge againſt him. The General declared, That *either he or Mr. Sadlier ſhould quit the Board*; and the Preſident, ſoon after Mr. Sadlier's Minute was read, ſaid, That it contained many ſevere and injurious Reflections againſt him and the General, which, for his own Part he ſhould anſwer; and that if the General did not *take proper Notice of it*, he ſhould eſteem him unworthy of a Seat at the Board. How much the Governor has excited the General's Reſentment, is evident from the above Declaration; and it is not unworthy of Remark, the different Line of Conduct which he aſſigns to himſelf and to the General, in conſequence of Mr. Sadlier's Reflections.

6thly. Becauſe if the Majority of a Government can ſuſpend any of its Members for Opinion, that Majority may go on ſuſpending, upon an Idea of Oppoſition, until the Governor, who has Two Voices upon an even Diviſion of the Council, ſhall ſuſpend the laſt Member, and the Government thereby become abſolute and deſpotic.

7thly.

7thly. Becauſe, if Mr. Sadlier was wrong in his Opinion, thoſe who have now acted as Judges and Parties againſt him, might have refuted his Errors, and vindicated their own Conduct. If this Vindication was clear, any Declaration which Mr. Sadlier made to the Public, could only prove a Cenſure againſt his own Judgment, and not againſt Government.

8thly. Becauſe Mr. Sadlier's Idea reſpecting the Nabob, is not without Foundation. The Attack made by a Party of Horſe, which penetrated as far as Triplicane, the Place of the Nabob's Reſidence, without meeting with any Reſiſtance, has evinced the Propriety of Mr. Sadlier's Reflections.

9thly. Becauſe the evident Juſtice of Mr. Sadlier's Opinion vindicated its Propriety: Sentiments nearly to the ſame Effect had previouſly been delivered in, unknown to him, by Mr. Smith and myſelf; but had his Opinion been immediately adopted, the Junction which was not effected at the Mount till the 24th Auguſt, might have taken Place much ſooner; and had the Troops, in Compliance with that Opinion, been ordered up by Sea, the Company would have ſaved the Expence of marching them up from Pondicherry; a Number of Villages might have been ſaved, and People would have brought in Proviſions of all Kinds, had the Meaſures propoſed been at firſt adopted for the Defence of the Black Town; but being neglected, the Cattle are driven away to Woods and Pollams; Grain is ſcarce, and our Army, though in the Neighbourhood of the Preſidency, is indifferently ſupplied with every Thing.

10thly. Becauſe the Language in which Mr. Sadlier expreſſes his Sentiments, is vindicated by the Practice of the Houſe of Commons, and of every popular Aſſembly; the State of our Affairs warranted both manly Warmth and ſpirited Exertion. A generous Mind might naturally be rouzed by a Senſe of public Calamity. If Mr. Sadlier's Language was diſorderly, he ought to have had the Privilege of being brought to a Senſe of Decorum in his Place, and during the Time of Council. The Mode of Reſentment ſhewn, was both irregular and unlawful.

11thly. Becauſe the Suſpenſion of Mr. Sadlier, by the Preſident and Council, was contrary to the 6th Paragraph of the Company's Letter, dated the 10th April 1778; which veſts the Power of Suſpenſion in the Committee. The late Preſident, Sir Thomas Rumbold, expreſsly ſays, in a Minute adopted by Mr. Whitehill and Sir Hector, "the Power of Suſpenſion and reſtoring again, is left *entirely* to them (meaning the Committee) on every Occaſion;" yet theſe Two Gentlemen now act, not only in Contradiction to the Company's Orders, but to their own Opinion.

12thly. To conclude: Becauſe the Preſident and Sir Hector Munro, followed by Mr. Davidſon, have, unconſtitutionally, and contrary to the Company's Orders, ſuſpended a Member of Government, from whoſe Judgment, Abilities, and Aſſiduity, our Councils might have reaped Advantage in the preſent State of our Affairs: Becauſe this Act of Violence cannot be vindicated upon any one Principle tending to public Utility, and can only be accounted for by their private Reſentment againſt him: Becauſe, by this Act of Violence, the Three Members who ſuſpended Mr. Sadlier (one of which ſucceeds to Mr. Sadlier's Station in Rotation) have ſhewn it is their Intention to puniſh as a Crime, that Freedom of Debate and Freedom of Opinion, without which our Government muſt degenerate into Deſpotiſm.

Laſtly. Becauſe the Governor and Sir Hector Munro wiſh that Judgment ſhould be paſſed on Mr. Sadlier's Opinion, and upon their Conduct, from the *Event of the Matter*. This Iſſue is unfair with regard to Mr. Sadlier, and could only hold good if they perſevered in the Meaſures they attempt to vindicate; but notwithſtanding this Indication, they have in more than one Inſtance, deviated from their own intended Plan, and have adopted Meaſures which had been propoſed by Mr. Smith and myſelf in Committee, and by Mr. Sadlier in Council; therefore, this Deviation muſt operate againſt them in the Mind of every unbiaſſed Perſon, and clearly prove that they have ſuſpended Mr. Sadlier for a Minute containing Advice which they afterwards, in ſeveral Inſtances, were obliged to follow.

(Signed)

12th Sept. 1780. True Extracts. Samuel Johnſon.

Cha[t] Freeman, Secy.

Read the following Letter from Mr. Sadlier.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Notwithſtanding the ſtrong Impreſſions of Surprize and Indignation which I have uniformly entertained at the arbitrary and unjuſt Conduct of the Preſident, who ventured to move, and Sir Hector Munro, who thought proper to ſecond, a Motion for my Suſpenſion, on no other Ground than for having exerciſed that Freedom of Debate, which is inherent in every Council under the

British Conſtitution, I did not intend to have addreſſed the Honourable Committee on the Subject, had not Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon entered their Diſſents ſo ſtrongly againſt the Reſolution of Council of the 1ſt Auguſt; and had not the Minute of Mr. Johnſon in particular, ſuggeſted the Neceſſity of this Addreſs, by pointing out the Illegality of the Meaſure, as well as that glaring Contradiction of the Preſident and General, in venturing to exhibit on Record, towards effecting my Suſpenſion, a Line of Conduct ſo diametrically oppoſite to their own Sentiments; delivered in Committee during the Preſidency of Sir Thomas Rumbold. In that Period, the Powers of the Select Committee were diſcuſſed, and Mr. Whitehill, as well as Sir Hector Munro, aſſented to the following Opinion of Sir Thomas Rumbold; namely, "that the Power of Suſpenſion and reſtoring again, is left entirely to the Select Committee on every Occaſion." That Opinion was founded on the Words in the 6th Paragraph of the General Letter of the 10th April 1778, which eſtabliſhed the Select Committee, and which Words are as follows:

"Par. 6th. If our Select Committee ſhall think fit to ſuſpend any Perſon or Perſons from our "Service, ſuch Perſon or Perſons ſhall not be reſtored, otherwiſe than by the ſaid Committee, except "by Orders of the Court of Directors."

How far Mr. Whitehill and Sir Hector Munro were well founded in adopting ſuch an Opinion, it is not now my Buſineſs to diſcuſs. It is ſufficient to obſerve, that as they had adopted ſuch an Opinion, they were bound to act to it, and not to follow a Line in Contradiction to it; as if determined to ſhape their Conduct to their Inclination, without Regard to Juſtice, Conſiſtency, or the Powers wherewith they are veſted; and without conſidering, that by ſo manifeſt an Encroachment on thoſe Powers, and ſo direct a Violation of the Orders of their Superiors, from whom they own Authority is derived, they, in a very high Degree weaken, if not entirely deſtroy, the Conſtitution of that very Government which they are called upon, and bound, to ſupport. To their Reflections, however, I leave them, and have only to regret, that our Honourable Employers at Home ſhould experience ſuch Inconſiſtency, from thoſe Servants in whom they repoſed ſo high a Truſt, and whoſe Situation called on them for a Conduct of Caution, Deliberation, ſound Policy, and ſubſtantial Juſtice; in lieu of which, they have followed the haſty Dictates of Paſſion, Prejudice, and Reſentment.

The honourable Station to which I have been called, and of which I have been diveſted in ſo unconſtitutional a Manner, calls upon me now to make this Appeal to the Honourable Preſident, and to Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, who are the only effectual and conſtitutional Members of the Select Committee now at the Preſidency, and to requeſt you to conſider of the Merits of my Suſpenſion, and to exerciſe that Authority wherewith you are inveſted by the ſaid 6th Par. of the General Letter of the 10th April 1778.

If in your Judgment, or in the Judgment of the Majority of you, I ſhall appear to deſerve that Vote of Suſpenſion, I muſt ſubmit to all the Hardſhips of my Situation, till the Pleaſure of a ſuperior Power is known; but if, on the contrary, the Voices of the Honourable Preſident and Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, or of the Majority of you, ſhould go Hand in Hand with my own Feelings on this important Occaſion, and, by acquitting me of every Charge to my Prejudice, ſhould reſtore me to my Seat at the Board, I ſhall endeavour to diſcharge the Duties of my Station ſo as to merit the Continuance of your Eſteem, and the Approbation of my Superiors.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt humble, and
Moſt obedient Servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Fort Saint George,
13th Sept. 1780.

Agreed, That the foregoing Letter be referred to the Honourable Court of Directors.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Sam[l] Johnſon,
Alex[r] Davidſon.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident, and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

When I gave in my Letter of the 13th September to your Honourable Board, I had Reaſon to hope, that the Merits of that Addreſs would have undergone an immediate Diſcuſſion. A Regard to Juſtice, and the Reſpect due to my Station, ſeemed to claim that Attention from you; nor can

can I ſuppoſe any Thing could have prevented it, but the melancholy Intelligence which arrived about that Period, and of which I was uninformed when I penned the Letter in Queſtion.

The Duty I owed to my Employers at Home, led me on to that Addreſs, in order to be again in the acknowledged Poſſeſſion of that Station, to which, by their Orders, I was called, and of which I was ſo cauſeleſsly and ſo unconſtitutionally diveſted; and to give me an Opportunity of reſuming a Part in the Adminiſtration of Affairs, at a Criſis which ſpoke its own Importance in the ſtrongeſt Light. The Fatality which attended the Operations of the laſt Campaign, and which would have been in a great Meaſure prevented, had my Advice been taken, has thrown the Affairs of this Preſidency into a moſt embarraſſed State.

The more, however, our Difficulties have increaſed, the more I conceive myſelf bound to offer my Services to the Public, and to expreſs my Willingneſs to take upon myſelf a Share of the public Reſponſibility.

The Reaſons offered by Mr. Johnſon, in his Diſſent to the Vote of Suſpenſion, and which firſt urged me to write the Letter of the 13th September, are ſo full, and the general Tenor of my Advice to the Board, as a Member of Government, in that very Minute for which I was ſuſpended, has appeared in the Event to be ſo rational, that I will not ſuffer myſelf to entertain a Doubt of your reſtoring me again to my Seat at the Board, whenever you ſhall think fit to re-conſider the Merits of my Situation.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, and
Moſt humble Servant,
Anth. Sadlier.

Fort Saint George;
7th October 1781.

Mr. Johnſon then moves; That Mr. Sadlier's Suſpenſion be taken off; and Mr. Smith ſeconds the Motion.

Sir Hector Munro againſt taking it off; and likewiſe, that, as Mr. Sadlier mentions his Letter of the 13th ultimo not having been immediately diſcuſſed at the Board, he begs Leave to remind the Committee, that it was at the particular Requeſt of Mr. Johnſon, who wiſhed to converſe with Mr. Sadlier on the Subject of that Letter, before it was taken into Conſideration.

Mr. Smith, for the Motion.

The Preſident ſees no Reaſon for taking off the Suſpenſion.

Carried againſt the Motion, by the Preſident's Caſting Vote; but it is agreed, that all Papers, &c. relative to Mr. Sadlier's Suſpenſion, be referred to the Honourable the Court of Directors, by the preſent Diſpatch.

Extract of the General Letter from Fort Saint George, to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated the 15th October 1780.

At a Meeting of Council, held the 29th July, Mr. Sadlier, who took his Seat at the Board on the Departure of Sir Thomas Rumbold for Europe, delivered in a Minute, cenſuring, in the moſt diſreſpectful Terms, the Conduct of the Select Committee. This, added to Mr. Sadlier's intemperate Declarations at the Time his Minute was read, induced your Preſident, ſeconded by your Commander in Chief, at the ſucceeding Conſultation, the 1ſt Auguſt, after fully ſtating their Reaſons for ſuch a Step, to move Mr. Sadlier's Suſpenſion from the Service until your Pleaſure were known; which was carried in the Affirmative. Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon proteſted againſt this Reſolution of the Majority of Council, and delivered in Minutes to that Effect, at a Meeting held the 8th September following.

That we may not be taxed with the moſt diſtant Idea of Unfairneſs in our Conduct towards Mr. Sadlier, we incloſe you, by this earlieſt Conveyance, Numbers in the Packet, Extracts of our Proceedings, together with Copies of Two Letters, addreſſed by him to your Select Committee; containing every Thing that has paſſed relative to his Suſpenſion, fully to enable your Honours to paſs a final Deciſion on the Merits of Mr. Sadlier's preſent Situation.

APPENDIX, N° 21.

Extract of a Letter from Anthony Sadlier Esq; to the President and Council of Fort Saint George, dated 16th October 1780.

To remind you of the political Situation of public Affairs, when I gave in that Minute to Council which has been the oſtenſible Pretence of my Suſpenſion, I need only call to your Recollection the Contents of that Minute. The Picture was not exaggerated; our Danger, and the public Apprehenſion were not leſs than I deſcribed them; our Reſources were not greater, or our Proſpects brighter than may appear on that Minute. The Facts ſtated upon the Face of that Minute, were obnoxious to thoſe whoſe previous Miſmanagement had involved the Affairs of this Preſidency, elſe the Language I uſed, would not have offended.

To ſlight the Strength of an Enemy, has ever been held to be a moſt dangerous Doctrine; and on the contrary, I know no Man, except Mr. Whitehill or Sir Hector Munro, who could venture to paſs a Cenſure on a Member of Government, for ſtating in fair and full Terms, the Strength of the Enemy, and the Propriety of being prepared to receive him. I agree with thoſe Gentlemen, that the Hour of Danger is the Hour of Reſolution, and it would be well for the Carnatic had that Principle been put in Practice.

Till I had read the Anſwer of thoſe Gentlemen to my Minute, I could not have conceived it poſſible that a Governor of Fort Saint George, and the Commander in Chief of the Army, ſhould have attempted to claim a Merit upon Record, for their Attention to Hyder's Motions, becauſe they had repreſented both to the Company, and to the Gentlemen at Bengal, the Extent of his Views; and had circumſtantially informed the latter of every Step he had taken previous to his Attack upon the Carnatic, to Hyder Ally, to be treated as a Company's covenanted Servant, and to be repulſed from the Carnatic, becauſe Repreſentations have gone Home of his Incurſions on the Nabob's, or the Company's Diſtricts.

Had you arrayed your Armies, collected Proviſions, provided Ammunition for your ſeveral Detachments, our Credit might have been ſaved, and our Poſſeſſions at preſent freed from an Enemy, whoſe Conſequence is increaſed by your Miſmanagement, and whoſe Soldiery are now in ſuch Spirits with their Succeſs, that I doubt much whether any Force which we have, or which we can procure for a Length of Time, will rout them from their preſent Lodgment in the Heart of the Carnatic.

And it ſhould be a Matter of very ſerious Charge againſt the Preſident in particular, for having ſuffered the ſame Vakeel to attend at his Garden-houſe for Three Days, after the Families on Choultry Plain had been driven into the Fort. The Preſident and General avow, that Hyder had threatened an Invaſion of the Carnatic ſo far back as our Attack on Mahé; and ſtill they have ſuffered us to ſpare, for the Operations on the Malabar Coaſt, a large Portion of our Forces, and have neglected to put the remaining Force in a Situation which would inſure to us their ſpeedy and effectual Co-operation againſt Hyder. They ſay, Hyder's uſual Judgment failed him, becauſe he happened to poſtpone his Operations for Half a Seaſon; that under the Certainty of his main Army and the Artillery not having paſſed the Gauts, and under other Circumſtances, in which they appear to avow their Want of Information as to Hyder's Motions, they deemed themſelves vigilant in the Truſt repoſed in them, when they reſolved to aſſemble an Army as ſpeedy as poſſible, when they took Meaſures for their Co-operation with Bengal, and when they got the Nabob to collect Proviſions in his different Garriſons; and in ſhort, when they came to the Determination of exerting every Sinew towards the Puniſhment of a wanton, unprovoked Infringement of the Peace of 1769. I would aſk theſe Gentlemen, how they can reconcile to themſelves, to the Company, and to the Truſt repoſed in them, that they have ſuffered themſelves to be ſo groſly ignorant of the Motions of Hyder? They were bound, from their Station, to be well informed, and they ſhould not have ſpared to proper Perſons the Reward of good Intelligence; by the Want of that Intelligence, no Effort was made to aſſemble the Army, till it was too late; the Place of Rendezvous was too diſtant, the Army was ill ſupplied, the principal Detachment cut off, the Proviſions in the Garriſons of no Service, except to Hyder, who had taken Part of them, and the Co-operation (if any ſuch Plan has been attempted) was ſuggeſted ſo late, that the poor Remains of a fine Army were encamped within Six Miles of the Preſidency, after retreating before the Enemy, and being able with Difficulty to prevent their being cut off; by the Time that the Preſidency of Bengal had received their firſt Information, that Hyder had entered the Carnatic; and thus it is, that they have puniſhed Hyder for his wanton Infringement of the Peace of 1769.

APPENDIX, N° 2.

Extract of a Letter from Anthony Sadlier, Eſquire, to the Court of Directors, dated 17th October 1780.

Hyder Ally has, for a long Time, threatened to invade the Carnatic. I ſaw the approaching Storm; I felt for the Safety of your Poſſeſſions; I ſaw the Majority of the Committee inactive, or incapable of Exertion; I knew the Company's Reſources were exhauſted, and I did not believe that Meaſures would be adopted equal to the Exigency of your Affairs at Home, or the Danger with which they were threatened from Abroad.

A Minute, defining the Power of the Committee, was laid before it by Mr. Johnſon, and was afterwards brought from the Committee to the Council, for their Deciſion. Previous to this Step, the expected Invaſion from Hyder Ally took Place; for ſeveral Days the Government took no one Step to oppoſe the Torrent, yet the Majority was confident of Succeſs, and founded their Hope upon the general Idea of our Strength, without ſeeming to conſider that our Force depended upon the Manner in which it was employed.

The firſt Alarm of the Invaſion was heard from Conjeveram on the 22d, and no Council was held until the 29th of July; during that long Interval every Step taken ſhewed our Weakneſs, and expoſed us to the Contempt of our Enemies.

To the Honourable Charles Smith, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The peculiar Hardſhip of my Situation will, no Doubt, claim your particular Attention; and I therefore beg Permiſſion to lay it before you, with that Candour which is due to myſelf, and that Deference which I ſhall always pay to Government.

The Injuſtice I ſuffered, in being ſuſpended from my Station in the Service, and my Seat at the Board, for delivering in an Opinion in my Place, tending, as I thought, and as the Event has ſhewn, to promote public Safety, at a Time when the Whole was threatened with Danger, is a Subject which has already been ſufficiently diſcuſſed; and it will therefore only be neceſſary for me to make a few Remarks, leading to the Purport of my preſent Letter.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon firſt diſſented, and then proteſted againſt my Suſpenſion; declaring, amongſt other Reaſons, that the Preſident and the General became both Parties and Judges in the Accuſation on which they condemn me; they likewiſe concurred in my Opinions, and were pleaſed to conſider the Plan laid down by me in my Minute, as that which was beſt adapted to prevent the Evils with which we were threatened. In conſequence of the Powers of Suſpenſion and Reſtoration with which the Select Committee is inveſted, and which was allowed by a Minute delivered in by Sir Thomas Rumbold on the Subject, to which I believe no Member diſſented, the Queſtion relative to my Suſpenſion was agitated before the Select Committee: Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon voted, in conſequence of their former Opinion, for my Reſtoration; but the Queſtion was negatived by the late Preſident's caſting Vote.

Actuated by the ſame Zeal which induced me to deliver in the Minute on which I was ſuſpended, I entered into a Correſpondence with the Governor General, upon the then alarming Criſis of the Company's Affairs upon this Coaſt. I made my Appeal publicly to his Station, and to his Juſtice; and as it was neceſſary that the Company ſhould be made acquainted with the ſame Facts, I addreſſed a Letter to the Board here, with Copies of the Letters and Papers ſent to the Governor General, that they might be forwarded to the Court of Directors by the Nymph Sloop of War, then under Diſpatch.

The Opinions contained in theſe Letters were not formed from the Event; they trace future Conſequences, from Cauſes which evidently did exiſt; and whoever will compare them with the Information ſent Home from the Majority of the Board, and conſider, at the ſame Time, that we then had no Account of the Supplies which have ſince arrived from Bengal, will, I hope, do Juſtice to the Zeal which induces me to deliver my Sentiments upon theſe intereſting Occaſions, and to my Diſregard of every Conſequence, when placed in Competition with the ſincere Concern I have in the Proſperity of my Employers, in which the Intereſt of the Nation is ſo intimately concerned.

My Letters to the Governor General, and to the Court of Directors, remained before the Board from the 17th until the 26th of October, the Day after we had official Information of the Reinforcement from Bengal, under the Command of Sir Eyre Coote: Then, and not till then, I received the following Letter from Sir Hector Munro.

APPENDIX, N° 2.

Fort St. George, 26th October 1780.

Sir,

Your Letters to the Court of Directors, and to the Governor General of Bengal, were brought to my Houſe in the Fort Yeſterday, as I was going to Dinner.

What you ſay of me in ſaid Letters, is equally falſe as malicious.

I deſire you to meet me To-morrow Morning, at Half paſt Five o'Clock, behind the Play Houſe on the Iſland, prepared with Piſtols, to give me that Satisfaction which is incumbent on you to give, and on me to demand.

Bring a Friend with you: I will do the ſame.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

Anthony Sadlier, Eſquire.

My Anſwer to him was as follows; which was delivered on the ſame Evening, a few Hours after the Letter was received:

Sir,

I have received your Letter of this Date. Let me recal to your Mind, that we have both filled public Stations in Government: We never had any Differences as Individuals; and our Conduct, in all Situations where we have acted together, is not relative to ourſelves, but to the Eaſt India Company, whoſe Servants we are, and to the Community.

Remember, Sir, that for a public Act, in Diſcharge of the Truſt repoſed in me, you, with others, thought fit to reflect upon my Character, and to degrade me from my Station. Upon this trying Occaſion I felt no perſonal Injury, for I know my Conduct would bear the Teſt of Enquiry. If you were conſcious of the ſame Feeling, your Letter to me would have been unneceſſary. Called upon by Station, and a Senſe of public Danger, I was led to give my Opinion of Men and Meaſures; in doing ſo, I commented upon your Conduct, not in your individual, but your public Capacity; inſtead of concealing what was written, I laid it open for your Inſpection; and allow me to ſay, Sir, that a Man whoſe Actions are marked with ſo much Candour, muſt be regardleſs of Conſequences.

You inform me, you did not ſee my Letters before you were going to Dinner Yeſterday in the Fort, though they were delivered about Noon on the 17th Inſtant, which includes a Space of Nine Days. This appears ſomething extraordinary! We have within that Time heard that General Sir Eyre Coote is coming from Bengal with a Reinforcement of Troops; the firſt official Information in this important Point was received laſt Night, and your Letter was delivered to me about Noon this Day. The Meaſures which the Governor General and Council have reſolved to purſue relative to this Government, are not yet known; one Thing is certain, that after his Arrival you will become Second in Command, and will then be more at Liberty to diſpoſe of yourſelf; what Judgment others may have entertained of your Actions, as yet remains in Doubt, and it is uncertain how ſoon you may be called upon to vindicate your Conduct, or I to juſtify my Aſſertions; the Cauſe of your Challenge is more properly the Subject of a Court Martial than a Duel; private Reſentments will not rub out the Stains of public Miſconduct. You have ſtated no Inſtance in which I have ſaid any Thing either *falſe* or *malicious*; but if I am your Accuſer, I am ſo publicly, not privately. By having written to the Governor General, and to the Court of Directors, and uncertain as I am what Reſolutions they may have come to upon the Credit of my Information, I conſider myſelf accountable to them in the Firſt Inſtance for the Truth of my Aſſertions. It is your Conduct, not your Courage, which you may have Occaſion to defend; and believe me, that our Meeting in the Manner you deſire will not vindicate you upon that Ground.

Both you and I are the Servants of the Public; our Lives are not, and ought not, to be at our own Diſpoſal in the preſent important Criſis of Affairs. In your Condemnation of me, you availed yourſelf of your Seat and Station, and obliged me to vindicate my Opinion, and juſtify my Character by public Appeal. You have in the firſt Inſtance placed me, and I ſhall ſtand upon that Ground until we are publicly acquitted or condemned. The preſent Call, in my Opinion, is neither juſtifiable to your public Station, nor honourable to your private Character. The Appeal being now before the Public, to them I ſhall leave our Conviction or Acquittal; whenever that

Judgment is obtained, if it ſhall appear that I have accuſed *falſely*, or acted *malicioufly*, I will readily, moſt readily, afford you the Satisfaction you require.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Fort Saint George,
26 Oct^r 1780.

Sir Hector Munro, K. B. &c.

Whoever will reflect upon this Letter, and the Anſwer, together with the relative Situation of the Parties, would imagine, that Sir Hector Munro finding himſelf publicly, and as he thought falſely charged, ſhould, upon the Arrival of a ſuperior Officer, have demanded a Court Martial; and having once vindicated his Honour, would entitle himſelf to that Satisfaction from me which he required, and I in ſuch Caſe did not refuſe to give.

Permit me to remark, that my Minute of the 29th July, on which I was ſuſpended, conveyed my Senſe of the Miſconduct of Government in ſtronger and more pointed Terms than any of my ſubſequent Writings. I wrote the former with all the Apprehenſions of approaching Danger to the Company, to the Community, to my Friends, and to myſelf; I wrote the latter with that fixed Concern which takes place in the Mind when the Loſs is certain and irretrievable. Thoſe will judge beſt of my Feelings, and of their Cauſe, who can bring back their Imagination to the Incidents of the Time in which my Minute was written. That Line which the Governor thought the General ſhould have purſued in conſequence of that Minute, is ſtrongly marked by a Circumſtance which gave Occaſion to the Fifth Paragraph in Mr. Johnſon's Diſſent againſt my Suſpenſion; viz.

" Becauſe the Suſpenſion of Mr. Sadlier appears to be founded in private Reſentment, and " not on public Utility; many Circumſtances tend to corroborate this Fact, already ſufficiently " proved by the Weakneſs of the Charge againſt him. The General declared, That *either he or* " *Mr. Sadlier ſhould quit the Board*; and the Preſident ſoon after Mr. Sadlier's Minute was read, " ſaid, " That it contained many ſevere and injurious Reflections againſt himſelf and the General, " which, for his own Part, he ſhould anſwer; and that if the General did not *take proper Notice of* " *it*, he ſhould eſteem him unworthy of a Seat at the Board." How much the Governor has " excited the General's Reſentment, is evident from the above Declaration; and it is not unworthy " of Remark, the different Line of Conduct which he aſſigns to himſelf and to the General, in " conſequence of Mr. Sadlier's Reflections."

Theſe Words, which ſhew the Impreſſions of the General's Friend, ſtill remain unanſwered and unrefuted. If my Arguments were ill-founded, the Governor and the General ſhould have refuted them; if my Language was perſonal, another Mode of Redreſs remained open. But inſtead of purſuing the direct and honourable Line, a clandeſtine Charge was formed againſt me by the Governor and the General; they availed themſelves of their Station to puniſh me by Suſpenſion for my Opinion, and while my Character remained under the Impeachment, the latter, in hopes of vindicating himſelf, called upon me privately to anſwer for Aſſertions conſequent to, and more moderate, than the Opinion on which I ſtood publicly condemned.

It is proper here to fix the Point of Honour, as it occurred to me; and I therefore have Recourſe to Military Practice, as the beſt Criterion: An Officer who is put under an Arreſt, does not think his Honour reſtored until public Reparation is made to him. I was degraded from my Station; I remained under the Imputation of Guilt until I was reinſtated. I had no Channel of Redreſs but from Bengal, or from the Court of Directors. And what muſt be thought of the Man, who having unjuſtly attempted to injure my Fame, called upon me in ſuch Manner, before Redreſs could be obtained?

On the other Hand, I had ſtated Circumſtances of General Munro's Conduct as a Member of the Committee, and while he was at the Head of the Army; which he thought injurious. Did he imagine that I would retract theſe Opinions, to avoid the Conſequences of his Challenge? or did he conceive, that making a Diſplay of his Courage with me in a Duel, would rub out the Stains of public Miſconduct? I imputed partly to Sir Hector Munro, as a Member of Government, the Miſconduct, &c. which occaſioned the preſent Invaſion. I imputed to him in the ſame Situation, a Want of Meaſures, which has rendered the Invaſion ſo formidable; and when he was at the Head of the Army, I gave my Reaſons for thinking that the Loſs of a Detachment of the beſt and moſt gallant Troops in our Service, together with the Diſgrace and Loſs incident to this Diſaſter, was owing to him, and to him only; and will his Challenge to me, or any Conſequence which could enſue from it, vindicate him upon that Ground? he might indeed end a Life which Reflection would render inſupportable; but no private Act can juſtify him in the Opinion of the World.

In conſequence of certain Opinions, in which General Munro was a Party, the Governor General and

and Council thought fit to ſuſpend Mr. Whitehill, and to confer the Government on Mr. Smith. I at leaſt bore a Part with Mr. Smith, in the Opinions which are univerſally ſuppoſed to have give occaſion to this Change; and I therefore thought there was a Juſtice due to me by him, and Mr. Johnſon, with whom I have acted, when they had Power to redreſs the Wrongs I ſuffer.

I underſtood Yeſterday in the Morning, and not till then, that the Queſtion relative to my Suſpenſion, was agitated in Council on the preceding Day; the Preſident and Mr. Johnſon voted for its being taken off; and that Sir Eyre Coote, General Munro, and Mr. Davidſon, voted againſt it. As it is the Conduct of General Munro, in this Inſtance, which has given Occaſion to the preſent Letter, permit me to ſtate the Situation in which he has placed himſelf.

He, in Conjunction with the late Preſident, Mr. Whitehill, clandeſtinely brought a Charge againſt me; and the latter, inſtead of taking the more honourable Mode pointed out by his Aſſociate, availed himſelf of his Station to ſuſpend me from the Service. He was charged with being both Judge and Party in Deciſion againſt me, and he ſubmitted to the Imputation without anſwering it. After contributing to diſgrace me by depriving me of my Station, he ſent me a Challenge, for public Opinions conceived in milder Language than that for which he thought fit to inflict public Puniſhment; he did not ſend this Challenge, until it was heard that his Influence in Government was to be ſuperceded. A Retroſpection and Enquiry might be expected to enſue from a Change; and were it not for his own Aſſertion, that Papers of material Import to himſelf remained Nine Days before the Board, previous to their being read by him, we might be induced to think that an Apprehenſion of Conſequences made him more deſirous to try whether he could not intimidate me into a Retraction of Sentiments, than to revenge an Injury. I told him, that my Line was public, and not private; I deſired him to vindicate his public Honour, and that I would then give him the Satisfaction he required: And yet he lays under every Imputation without (as far as I know) endeavouring to refute them; which implies an Acknowledgment of the Accuſations laid to his Charge.

He ſubmits to ſit and vote in a Council from which another has been diſgraced for holding the ſame Tenets, and being a Party in the ſame Miſconduct with himſelf; and under theſe Circumſtances, which I have mentioned relative to me, he pretends to ſit as a Judge, and give an impartial Vote in what concerns my Fame, my Fortune, and my Station.

Were it poſſible for a Man to diveſt himſelf of all Paſſion and Prejudice in ſuch a Situation, a Delicacy which ever attends the ingenuous Mind, would induce him to decline giving an Opinion where his Judgment led him to condemn. My Opinion of General Munro's public Conduct remains upon Record unrefuted; and how far he can juſtify his private Honour in this Inſtance, I leave to the Determination of others; nor will I judge of it myſelf, for I cannot imitate him by condemning where I am not ſuppoſed to diveſt myſelf of Partiality.

It gives me Concern that I am thus obliged to unfold a Circumſtance which, for a Time, I would otherwiſe have concealed; and that I am under the Neceſſity of marking private Character to throw a Light upon public Conduct. I believe that Means have been uſed to draw a Concluſion to my Prejudice, from the Challenge ſent to me from General Munro; I am compelled therefore by Neceſſity, to publiſh the Tranſaction, as I am determined that no Imputation ſhall be thrown out, unanſwered, either againſt my public or my private Character.

I have but to remark to the Honourable Board, that had General Munro, from Juſtice to me or to himſelf, declined to vote relative to my Suſpenſion, I ſhould now be reſtored to the Seat in Council from which I was arbitrarily driven; and if he acquieſces in the Force of this Repreſentation, and withdraws his Vote, I ſhall of Courſe ſtand reſtored by the Votes which have already paſſed upon the Subject of my Suſpenſion. Whatever may be the Fate of this Letter, I earneſtly requeſt that the Board will come to a ſpeedy Determination; and if the Event is unfavourable to my Application, that they will make this Letter a Number in the Packet, in the Veſſel now under Diſpatch for England.

Fort Saint George,
16th November 1780.

I have the Honour to be, with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and moſt
humble Servant,
Anthy Sadlier.

A true Copy.
Cha' Freeman,
Secretary.

To

APPENDIX, N° 2.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor General, Fort William.

Honourable Sir,

The Part which I have taken, to prevent the Ruin which threatens this Settlement, has placed me in a Situation which renders it neceſſary for me to appeal to your Juſtice and to your Station. I would endeavour to apologize for this Intruſion, did I not know how intereſting the Subject muſt prove to you, who have always ſhewn ſo much Concern for the Company's Welfare.

I can now only give a ſhort Account of my Conduct, and of the Situation of Affairs, and will defer my Juſtification until the Departure of the Duke of Portland, which is to ſail in a few Days.

I ſucceeded to Council on the Departure of Sir Thomas Rumbold. I came there without any Connection which could influence my Opinions or my Conduct; but I found that this Situation, which qualified me as a Company's Servant, made me obnoxious to a Party, which had contributed to bring the Company's Affairs to the Brink of Ruin, and dreaded the Admiſſion of a Man, who might expoſe their Meaſures.

From the Miſconduct of Sir Thomas Rumbold, ſupported by Mr. Whitehill and Sir Hector Munro, and continued by them after his Departure, the Company's Affairs on this Coaſt were involved in almoſt inextricable Difficulties; their Reſources were exhauſted, their Territories were impoveriſhed, their Revenue in Arrear, their Army ſcattered, their Settlement without Trade, and theſe Evils daily increaſing from the heavy Exportation of Specie, both as an Article of Trade and Remittance, at the Rate of 10 and 15 Lacks of Pagodas per Annum.

When our Reſources were in that declining State, owing to the Men at the Head of Government, we found ourſelves invaded by Hyder Ally, at the Head of a formidable Army.

This Attack was no Way unforeſeen; it was encouraged by our Weakneſs and Venality; the ſame Cauſes made us look upon the approaching Storm, without endeavouring to provide againſt it; ſuch a Proviſion would have put a Stop to the immediate and intereſted Views of Individuals; thoſe in Truſt, on Behalf of the Whole, only acted for themſelves, and they hoped to eſcape with the Spoil, and leave others to ſtruggle with the Difficulties which they had occaſioned.

Sir Thomas Rumbold was aſſuredly poſſeſſed of a certain Share of Abilities, and he ſhewed it in nothing more than his timely Eſcape; and you muſt well know, from your own Experience, what Dependance could be placed upon the Integrity, the Foreſight, and the Capacity of his Succeſſors. It may not, however, be unneceſſary to mention, that theſe Gentlemen, as they had aſſented to his Meaſures, thought it neceſſary to ſupport them after his Departure.

When our Territories were thus impoveriſhed; when, deſtitute of Money to ſupport a War, and, I am afraid of the Abilities to conduct it, we heard from Conjeveram on the 22d July, that a Party of Hyder's Horſe had plundered that Place; the Conſternation which enſued is not to be expreſſed; and nothing could more ſtrongly mark the Opinion entertained by the Community, both of the Weakneſs of their Protectors, and the Protection held out by them.

Every ſucceeding Day brought in Accounts of accumulating Evils: Porto Novo was plundered, and the Amount of 4 or 5 Lacks of Pagodas were carried away from it in Money and Jewels; the whole of the Villages round Vellore and Amboor were burnt to Aſhes; while the Garriſons, inſtead of being able to afford Aſſiſtance, tremble for their own Safety. We were incapable of oppoſing theſe Incurſions, through a Want of timely Preparation; even the Village of Poonamalee was burnt and ſacked in the Preſence of the only Body of Troops which we have aſſembled; and we hear To-day, that the Villages within the Bounds of Cuddalore have ſhared the ſame Fate.

Mr. Whitehill and Sir Hector Munro acknowledge, that Hyder threatened an Invaſion of our Territories when we attacked Mahé, and that his Intention ſince was not to be doubted. You will judge of Men who could make this Declaration, and yet delay every Preparation; it is known too, that Hyder prevented the March of our firſt Detachment deſtined to defend Adoni; that he treated our Embaſſador, Mr. Gray, in a Manner which left that Gentleman in no Doubt of his Intentions againſt us; that he has, for a Length of Time paſt, been collecting Stores at Mangulore upon our Frontier, and that his Army has been aſſembling with the Intention to attack us for ſome Months. Still our Credulity prevailed; our Governor would not believe the Invaſion was probable, until the Attack upon Conjeveram, and the General did not give Credit to it for ſome Days after.

I was, from Experience, better acquainted with Hyder's Capacity than any Man now in Council. I had been a Year in the Field, in an active Campaign againſt Hyder, when we had both Men and Money, and when he had not ſo much of either as he has at preſent. I knew his Addreſs, and the Spirit of

Enterprize by which he is animated. I placed no Dependance upon Men who had already ſhewn ſo little Ability; and I ſaw that they loſt the Opportunity which the Fears of the People gave them on the firſt Alarm, to ſecure to themſelves within the Fort, the only Means which could have come within their Reach for ſupporting a War.

To increaſe my Anxiety upon this Head, I learned that the General intended to remain at the Preſidency, and that he aſſented to the Appointment of Lord Macleod to command the Army. We have no Reaſon to doubt Lord Macleod's Merit, but we know that he has no local Knowledge; and I was ſorry to ſee the General, whoſe proper Station is at the Head of the Army, ſo inattentive to the Honour of his Profeſſion, and the Duties of his Station.

The Treaſure, which upon the firſt Alarm ſhould have been conveyed into the Fort, was carried into the Black Town, and that Place was allowed in a Manner to remain defenceleſs.

Notwithſtanding the Governor and Select Committee were ſo well convinced that Hyder was ſerious in his Intention to attack them, they allowed the Army to remain ſcattered, without Guns and Stores for their Defence. The Troops at Pondicherry, from the defenceleſs State of the Place, and their Want of Guns, remained there in the utmoſt Danger; they might have been tranſported here by Sea in a few Days, but inſtead of that expeditious Mode, the Select Committee waited to hear of their Diſtreſs; they then ſent down a Company of Artillery and ſome Guns to them on Board the Sartine; this Reinforcement did not arrive before the Troops there might have joined thoſe that were already near the Preſidency, and now this Detachment is ordered to march to Wandewaſh, within a forced March of the preſent Encampment of Hyder's Army.

The Troops at Pondicherry, and the Detachment under Colonel Baillie to the Northward, were the only Forces which could immediately form an Army for the Defence of the Preſidency, and the Defence of the Carnatic. This Army, when aſſembled, would have been ſo inadequate to combat Hyder's Force, as to render the utmoſt Caution, with reſpect to its Motions, expedient; yet the Governor and Select Committee, without providing the Means of defending themſelves againſt an eminent and apparent Danger, determined to invade the Territories of the Enemy, where the Invaſion could little affect them; and for that Purpoſe ordered Colonel Baillie's Detachment to enter the Cuddapah Country. They have now, it is ſaid, reverſed that Order; and I fancy his Detachment may now be on the Way towards Madras.

As People from all Parts of the Country naturally flocked into Madras with their Property, it was our Duty to have afforded them moſt ample Protection, and to have inſpired them with a Confidence in our Strength. Government thus eſtabliſhed in the Opinion of a People who have long lived under its Protection, might have expected their ready and willing Aſſiſtance to promote its Security; but, inſtead of placing their Hopes of Safety in our Succeſs, Diſtruſt of our Government, founded on a Contempt for thoſe who conſtitute it, has filled the Minds of the Natives with Apprehenſions of the moſt alarming Danger. They have fled from the Walls of the Black Town to Woods and Pollams adjacent, and to neutral Settlements; and they have either carried away their Money and Effects, or have buried and concealed them, which with theſe People is the laſt Act of Deſpair.

The Nabob's Perſon is ſtill allowed to remain at Chippauk, and his Treaſures, as far as I have heard, were allowed to be carried to the Black Town, inſtead of being conveyed to the Fort. What has become of them ſince, is more, I ſuppoſe, than this Government can venture to ſay.

The Troops near the Preſidency were allowed for ſeveral Days to remain in ſcattered Parties; and when they were at laſt ordered to join, it was at Poonamalee, where you know they could prove no Defence to the Black Town; and it might have been plundered, or ſet on Fire, before Troops at ſuch a Diſtance were apprized of its Danger.

We who were making ſuch poor Efforts at Home, and ſhewed ſuch Diſtraction in every Meaſure, could not be ſuppoſed capable of defending Countries at a Diſtance from us. It was foreſeen, on Hyder's firſt Entrance, that he would plunder and deſtoy, if not poſſeſs himſelf of all the Countries South and Weſt of Madras. Daily Intelligence confirmed this Opinion; and yet I underſtood the Intention was formed of aſſembling the Army by Detachment, near Wandewaſh, where we could not expect to collect Proviſions, and where our Detachments might have been cut off one after another, in attempting a Junction.

Theſe accumulated Miſtakes, too great for Blindneſs itſelf to commit, filled me with more Concern than I am able to expreſs. Judge what Dependance could be placed upon Men, who by their Meaſures had brought the Community to ſuch a State of Ruin; and who, ſeeing its approaching Deſtruction, took not one Step likely to prevent it. As a Britiſh Subject, I thought myſelf entitled to convey my Sentiments upon ſuch an alarming Criſis; as a Member of a Britiſh Government, where Freedom of Speech is conſtitutional, I thought this Right doubly confirmed to me.

In this laſt Situation I thought, that if I had concealed an Opinion tending to the general Welfare, I ſhould have neglected a Duty I owed to my Employers, to my own Honour, and to the Community of which I am a Member. It was a Matter of no Concern to me, upon ſuch an Occaſion, whether I was of a Committee, or of a Council; the Alarm was great, the Danger eminent; thoſe who were at the Helm of Affairs ſlept upon their Truſt; and it was neceſſary to ſpur them on by ſome Effort of Shame, who did not ſeem moved by Principle or Ambition.

The Council was not ſummoned from the 22d (when the Alarm arrived from Conjeveram) until the 29th. I had not ſeen Mr. Whitehill or Sir Hector during that Time, nor had I been conſulted by them. When the Council was aſſembled, the Preſident informed them of his Occaſions for Money, and propoſed that ſome ſhould be immediately raiſed by Loan. Mr. Davidſon introduced a Scheme for raiſing it by Subſcription, from the Select Committee, Free Merchants, Company's Servants, Dubaſhes, Conicoplies, &c. Aware of the Neceſſity, I readily aſſented to a Scheme of borrowing, but had neither digeſted or adopted the Mode propoſed; however, to get rid of the Motion, I ſuffered it to paſs without Oppoſition, that Mr. Johnſon might introduce a Minute, given in by him to the Committee, defining its Powers, and now brought from the Committee to the Council, to be entered and recorded on their Proceedings. This being done, I declared that I had ſeen the Minute before; that I adopted the Sentiments it contained, and that Mr. Johnſon's Definition proved, by inconteſtable Arguments, that we had been governed by an Uſurpation. Mr. Johnſon's Minute goes encloſed, N° 1. I then delivered in my Opinion, N° 2. of the preſent State of our Affairs; which was ſoon read. I declared that theſe were my Sentiments; that I wiſhed I could have conveyed them in Language equal to the Senſe I had of our Danger, and our want of Exertion, and that I ſhould hold the ſame Sentiments to the Community at large, that they might be apprized of their preſent Dangers.

As to Supplies; I ſaid that we required Money; that thoſe who had been ſaid to have plundered the Community, on ſuch an Occaſion ſhould contribute moſt for its Relief; that our late Governor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, was reputed to have carried Home 15 or 18 Lacks of Pagodas; that others muſt have received their Proportion; and turning to Mr. Whitehill, I ſaid, that his Subſcription might be expected to be ample, in Proportion to his reputed Fortune; that the Community would look for the Example from the Committee, &c. and that I hoped the Preſident would ſubſcribe a Couple of Lacks. General Munro ſeemed anxious to be gone. I had addreſſed myſelf to him freely about the Diſpoſition made for our Defence, or rather, for the Want of a Diſpoſition for that Purpoſe; and Mr. Whitehill turning to him, ſaid, "If General Munro ſubmits "to ſuch Reflections as are contained in Mr. Sadlier's Minute and Language, I ſhall deem him "unfit for his Station."

The Council, thus agitated, broke up, Mr. Whitehill having ſuggeſted the Idea of a Committee; and a few Days afterwards it was known that the General was to take the Field, and that Baillie's Detachment was ordered to Madras.

Upon any other Occaſion, when the Diſorder was not malignant, and a ſtrong Medicine neceſſary for its Cure, I might not have adopted the pointed Language I made uſe of; but I applied it as a Stimulative to the ſluggiſh Spirits of Men who ſlept in Office, when every Exertion of Activity was neceſſary. I thought myſelf vindicated by the Practice of the Houſe of Commons, and of every popular Aſſembly. Such Words as I have ſaid are often addreſſed to the Firſt Miniſter of State; and if they are not ſaid to the King, they are every Day ſaid of the King.

But no Example, no Senſe of Juſtice, can prevent the Exertions of Power in the Hands of corrupt Men. I was ſummoned to a Council held at Mr. Smith's Houſe, at 12 o'Clock, 1ſt Auguſt. After waiting Half an Hour, to hear the Buſineſs which rendered this late Meeting neceſſary, the accompanying Minute, N° 3, was read by the Secretary; and the Preſident's Motion being ſeconded by the General, and ſuſtained by Mr. Davidſon, in the Manner ſhewn at the Foot of the Preſident's Minute; I was, in conſequence, ſuſpended from the Company's Service, until their Pleaſure is known.

Neither Mr. Smith or Mr. Johnſon had any Intimation of the Buſineſs which was to come before the Board; it was ſettled by a Junto in private, and that Junto knowing it had the Majority, put the Buſineſs to vote, without Regard to what is ſaid in Oppoſition.

Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnſon declared that they adopted my Sentiments, and obſerved, that their Suſpenſion might enſue; but no Regard was paid to their Opinion.

Had I been ſuſpended by the Committee with whom the Charge, ſuch as it is, originated, Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnſon being the Majority, in caſe the General took the Field, the Act might be reverſed: It was therefore neceſſary to call in Mr. Davidſon, who has attentively followed the Preſident, that he might, by this Trick, ſecure to himſelf the Certainty of a confirmed Majority.

It

APPENDIX, N° 2.

It is remarkable, that nothing I said in Council concerning Supplies, is brought in the Charge againſt me. I ſeem to be principally condemned for intending to make the Community acquainted with my Opinion, for daring to arraign the Conduct of General Munro; and for uſing the Word Uſurpation.

The Community know full well the Cauſes of our approaching Ruin; our Enemies know it likewiſe, and avail themſelves of it. I confeſs it might be wrong to expoſe the unavoidable Defects in a Government when the moſt is made of the Means, but when that is not the Caſe, and the Whole is liable to fall a Sacrifice, it is laudable to apprize the Community of the Extent of their Danger, in order that the moſt might be made of the Reſources left them.

With regard to the Word Uſurpation, uſed by me, and which appears the moſt important Crime againſt me; it was before uſed in a Minute given in, reſpecting the Powers aſſumed by the Committee during Sir Thomas Rumbold's Government; and was again uſed by him in his Minute on the ſame Subject, to which I gave my Aſſent upon this Occaſion. I, who but adopted the Motion made by a Member of the Committee, was conſidered as the Principal, while the Principal paſſed without Cenſure.

Inſtead of uſing the forced Declamation, which will be evident to you in the Charge on which I am ſuſpended; inſtead of ſubſtituting empty Sound for Fact, and Aſſertion for Argument; the Committee ſhould have vindicated their own Meaſures, and then I ſhould have deſerved Cenſure for the Injury done them by ſuch an Attack. If my Language was improper, the Manner of the Houſe of Commons might be conſidered as a Standard Rule of Proceeding; which would have left me the Choice of retracting or amending ſuch Language as was adjudged a Breach of that Order and Decorum which the Majority might think proper to eſtabliſh, or leave me liable to the Cenſure I may be thought to have incurred by ſuſtaining it.

Whatever I urged reſpecting the Meaſures purſued or the Powers of the Committee, was but Matter of Opinion. When Opinion is not free, Conſtitutional Government cannot exiſt. It is already ſhewn, that the Three which ſuſpended me, might, with more Juſtice, have ſuſpended Mr. Johnſon, and with equal Juſtice have ſuſpended Mr. Smith, both having adopted my Opinions; and thus a Preſident may proceed by a caſting Voice for Suſpenſion, till the Government becomes deſpotic.

But, inſtead of endeavouring to juſtify themſelves, by vindicating their Meaſures, they ſhew the Neceſſity of my Attack, by an Impeachment of their Conduct.

They avow that they knew of Hyder's Intentions, and that inſtead of making Proviſions againſt the Evil at Home, they have written to Bengal and to England; and no Doubt, becauſe they have written to Bengal and to England, that was a ſufficient Excuſe for leaving their Troops ſcattered, their Garriſons without the Means of Defence, or themſelves without the Means of applying it.

They allow too, that it was their Intention to aſſemble the Army in a Country liable to be hourly over-run by the Enemy, becauſe the Nabob made a Speech, and becauſe the Plan was formed on the *cooleſt Deliberation* by the Commander in Chief. I am ſorry that the Commander in Chief's cooleſt Deliberations are not founded upon better Principles. Lord Macleod thought differently from the Commander in Chief on this Occaſion; he was convinced by Arguments conſonant with his Reaſon and Experience.

The Committee do not ſeem to have been well informed of the Motions of Hyder and his Army, when they drew up the Charge againſt me, though they had Three Days to con over their Intelligence. There was a Vacancy left in the original Minute, to be filled up with the Situation of the Enemy, which was done by Mr. Whitehill in his own Hand; and yet I have Reaſon to believe the Statement is erroneous. If I am well informed, Mr. Whitehill has no direct Communication with Hyder's Army, and receives his only Intelligence through the Nabob, or from Hircarrahs ſent out from hence. Your Experience will convince you with what Safety a Perſon in his Station can depend upon ſuch Intelligence for a Knowledge of the Enemy's Motions, by which his own ought to be regulated.

The Committee ſay "that the Hour of Danger is the Hour of Reſolution, political Timidity "is then the greateſt Evil that can befall a Government;" and again, "whether the Select Com- "mittee, proceeding on their own Knowledge and the Judgment of the Commander in Chief of "the Army, and ſupported therein by the Sentiments of the Nabob, are wrong, or whether Mr. Sad- "lier is right, the Iſſue of the Matter will finally determine."

An Indulgence ought to be granted to my Opinion, in Proportion to the Advantage which the Select Committee have obtained, from aſſuming to themſelves the Management of all Political and Military Affairs; as not being a Member of the Committee, I could not have the Benefit of Information. I was excluded from official Intelligence; the Returns of the Army; the Returns of Stores and Proviſions in the different Garriſons, and ſuch other Means of judging and providing for the Defence

fence of a Country: I was not even confidential upon theſe Points with any Member of the Committee; and therefore my Opinions may be ſubject to ſome Inaccuracies. It was founded upon my general Knowledge of Facts, as apparent to the Community as to myſelf; and I am ſorry to ſay, that upon ſuch Information only, though a Member of Government, was I obliged to truſt when I ventured forth in Behalf of public Safety, to reſtore the Authority which appeared violently wreſted from the Council, and to ſuggeſt ſuch Meaſures as I thought might tend to inſpire Confidence in Government; when our Affairs rendered every vigorous and emulous Effort both laudable and neceſſary. Though under theſe Diſadvantages in giving my Opinion, I am no way alarmed, but ſhall contentedly wait the Conviction of a Crime, for which I have been, by Anticipation, ſuſpended from the Company's Service; I mean the Iſſue of the Matter which is to determine whether the Committee is wrong and I am right, or whether the public Safety is endangered by my political Timidity, or their political Temerity.

It would be endleſs to trace the Charge againſt me through all its Abſurdities; your Judgment will ſuggeſt to you more than I can expreſs, and therefore the Attempt will be needleſs. I ſhall be obliged to enter more fully on the Subject, and upon the Cauſes of our preſent Diſtreſs, in a Memorial I intended to preſent to the Board here, in Juſtification of my own Conduct; and I ſhall take the Liberty of forwarding a Copy to you and to the Council when it is finiſhed. I truſt you will excuſe the Length of this Addreſs, and the Trouble I have given you. I ſhall not venture to ſuggeſt, Sir, the Conduct to be adopted by you in conſequence of it; I humbly offer my Appeal to your Station, and ſhall reſt contented whatever may enſue.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,
Anth. Sadlier.

Fort St. George;
9 Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor General, Fort William.

Honourable Sir,

I have the Honour to tranſmit you Duplicate of my laſt Letter and the Papers which accompanied it.

I intended myſelf the Honour of ſubmitting to you, by this Conveyance, Copy of a Memorial I propoſe laying before the Board here, in my own Vindication; and tracing the Meaſures by which the Company's Affairs upon the Coaſt have been brought into their preſent embarraſſed State. I have not wanted Aſſiduity in my Endeavours to complete the Memorial, but I have had Difficulty in obtaining Records, and the Members who voted againſt my Suſpenſion, have not yet delivered in their Minutes in my Behalf; another Opportunity will ſoon occur, when I expect to acquit myſelf of my Promiſe to you.

Hyder has taken Trinomalee; a ſtrong fortified Pagoda; Polore, a Place at the Bottom of Carnatah Guda, together with Chetpet and Arnie, two very ſtrong Places; and he is proceeding with the Conqueſts of theſe ſmall Forts, garriſoned by Nabob's Troops, who are ill paid and ill diſciplined, and who conſequently are likely to make but a poor Reſiſtance.

The Enemy's Horſe has carried Fire and Sword through moſt Parts of the Province, without meeting any Reſiſtance. A Party penetrated as far as Choultry Plain, and they have deſtroyed the Village of Poonamalee, with many other nearer to the Preſidency. The Plan followed by Hyder, is to drive the Cattle with the Inhabitants from this Country into his own; all Cultivation will conſequently ſtop, excepting by thoſe who carry it on under his Protection, and they will probably be puniſhed with Death if they dare to ſupply either our Army or our Detachments. As to the Grain in the Country, it is moſtly carried away or deſtroyed, ſo that the Proſpect of Famine alarms nearly as much as the Terrors of the Sword. Our ſmall Army now at the Mount has already felt the Want of Proviſions; though ſo near the Preſidency it gets but little from the Country; every Thing is ſent to it from hence, and Bullocks are ſo ſcarce that it is doubtful if the Army will be able to move for Want of them.

At Madras we have ſcarce Paddy enough to ſupply the People for Three Weeks, nor can we depend upon Supplies from any Place, excepting Bengal; the Whole of the Coaſt is ſubject to Incurſions, by which the greateſt Part of the Country has already ſuffered.

The Meaſures propoſed by me in the Minute for which I have been ſuſpended, has been adopted principally by thoſe Men who voted my Condemnation. After ordering the Artillery to Poonamalee from the Mount, they have now ordered it back again with the King's Regiment, and I underſtand that the Army is to be aſſembled there; ſo that the Committee have laid aſide

the Measures they defended so strenuously, of assembling the Army at Wandewash, notwithstanding it was formed in consequence of the coolest Deliberations of the General, and concurring Opinion of the Nabob.

Before my Minute was delivered in on 29th July, it was determined to send the Detachment under Colonel Baillie, and to make a Descent upon Cuddapah; that Opinion was relinquished, and another was formed of ordering that Detachment to invade some Part of the Enemy's Territories where the Attack would be most felt; but Colonel Baillie was at last ordered to join the Army now about forming here, according to my Opinion. Without the Junction of this Detachment, our Army would consist of no more than Five Battalions of Sepoys, and somewhere about 1500 Europeans; and with this Handful of Troops did our Government determine to face an Enemy which we ought to consider equal to our whole Force when assembled.

The Government persevered in ordering the Troops from Pondicherry to march by Land, which exposed them to an Attack from Hyder's Army; he however has not availed himself of the Opportunity given to him, and our Government will no doubt allow themselves as much Merit as if the Safety of the Detachment was owing to the Wisdom of their Precaution.

There are many other Instances in which the Governor and General may give themselves Merit for the Negligence of the Enemy. He probably could not believe that we were so ill prepared to receive him, and therefore acted more from his Opinion of what our Strength was, than what it is at present reduced to. He might have taken Arcot, which being considered as the Capital of the Country, would no Doubt have had great Influence on the different Courts of the Empire, from the Success and Enterprize of the Enemy; but that Place is now reinforced by a Company of Europeans and a Company of Sepoys, so that the Fort may possibly resist the Attack of Hyder, whatever may be the Fate of the Peteph, which I now understand is invested.

I have the Honour to transmit you Copies of a Letter delivered in by Lord Macleod to the Committee, dated 31 July; Sir Hector Munro's Military Opinion, dated the 1st of August, in consequence of Lord Macleod's Letter; a Minute delivered in by the President, endeavouring to prove the Necessity of Sir Hector's remaining at the Presidency; and the Instruction to the Commander in Chief, dated the 1st August. It will not escape your Observation, that Lord Macleod expressed the same Sentiments contained in my Minute, given in 29th July, and after my Opinion was publicly known; Sir Hector's Opinion is a Master-piece, and shews how well he is acquainted with the Geography of the Country which he has to defend; the General voted to himself the Instructions of the 1st of August, both Messrs. Smith and Johnson having dissented to the Permission of returning to the Presidency, therein granted to him.

To convince you to what Length the Governor and Sir Hector Munro can proceed in support of the Measures they have adopted, I have only to inform you, that the latter finding the Necessity he is under of taking the Charge of the Army, has this Day concurred with the former in voting, that Mr. Davidson, their faithful *yes* and *no* Follower, shall be admitted into the Committee to ensure a Majority to the Governor in the General's Absence, in express Contradiction to the Company's Orders, instituting the Committee, conveyed in the following Words:

"And having also thought proper to appoint a Select Committee for transacting our political, "military, and naval Affairs, and likewise all such as may require Secrecy, at our Settlement of "Fort Saint George; it is our Order, and we hereby direct, that the said Select Committee do consist "of Thomas Rumbold, Esq; our President and Governor, or our President and Governor for the "Time being, John Whitehill, Esq; the Second Member of our Council for the Time being, "Major General Hector Munro, our Military Commander in Chief, or our Military Commander in "Chief, for the Time being, and Charles Smith, Esq; the Fourth Member of our Council, or the "Fourth Member of our Council for the Time being.

"If our Military Commander in Chief shall at any Time be absent from the Presidency, then "our Orders is, that our President and Second and Fourth Members of our Council shall be a Select "Committee for the Purposes aforesaid, during the Absence of the Commander in Chief from the "Presidency."

Messrs. Johnson and Smith have dissented to this Resolution, and their Dissent, preparatory to their farther Reasons, makes a Number in the Packet.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir,
Your most obedient, and
most humble Servant,
Anth. Sadlier.

Fort Saint George,
21 August 1780.

P. S. I have

P. S. I have had the good Fortune to get Copies of the Minutes delivered in by the General, and the Governor, upon the Admiſſion of Mr. Davidſon to the Committee, and they make a Number in the Packet. Any Comment from them would be quite ſuperfluous; they are ſufficiently expreſſive of the Character and Conduct of the Authors of them. Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon will, I ſuppoſe, inſiſt upon Obedience being paid to the Company's Orders; as ſoon as the General goes to Camp, they will probably, as the Majority of the lawful Committee, order the Secretary to aſſemble one, and may reverſe the illegal Acts which have been committed by the Governor and General.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſq; Preſident and Governor General, Fort William.

Honourable Sir,

Accompanying I have the Honour to tranſmit you Duplicate of my Letter of 21ſt ultimo, and of the Papers which accompanied it.

I likewiſe did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing a ſhort Letter to you, when on Board the Duke of Portland, with a ſhort Minute, which I then thought was delivered in by Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, againſt the Admiſſion of Mr. Davidſon as a Member of the Select Committee. Upon landing, I found that Mr. Davidſon was not to take the Seat given to him till after the General's Departure to command the Army. Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon have ſince written ſeparate Minutes, as you will ſee by the accompanying Copies taken of them as they were delivered in.

I hinted in the Poſtſcript to my Letter, that I hoped Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon would inſiſt upon holding the Power veſted in them during the General's Abſence, as the lawful Majority of the Committee. But in this Hope I was deceived; they apprehended Conſequences from aſſerting their Right, which deterred them from the Attempt during the preſent critical Situation of the Company's Affairs.

In Addition to the Minutes firſt delivered in, Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon have ſince proteſted againſt the Admiſſion of Mr. Davidſon as a Member of the Select Committee; this Proteſt makes a Number in the Packet.

What Puniſhment is due to Mr. Whitehill, for his Diſobedience to the Company's Orders; how far both he and General Munro, aſſiſted by Mr. Davidſon, have ſubverted the Government, by depriving the lawful Majority of the Power veſted in them by the Conſtitution of the Company; how far the Government has in conſequence become an Uſurpation; and how far Mr. Davidſon is an Inſtrument and Party, are Events which I leave for your better Judgment to decide upon.

Mr. Davidſon, from his Admiſſion into Council, was a ſimple Yes and No Follower of the Preſident and General: Without appearing to have any Opinion of his own; and by ſubmitting to be brought into the Committee, to ſupport the Governor againſt the lawful Majority of that Committee, he tacitly acknowledges that it is his Intention to perſevere in the ſame Mode of Conduct, without any Regard to his own Principle, or the Intereſt of the Company.

How far a Governor acting with a Man avowedly ſubſervient to his Will, and in Oppoſition to the Conſtitution of that Power from which he derives his Authority, may be conſidered a Deſpot; and how far that Deſpotiſm may not be dangerous, when in the Hand of ſuch a Man as Mr. Whitehill; are likewiſe Circumſtances which I ſubmit to your ſuperior Judgment.

The Idea I entertained of the Exertions to be uſed by Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, for preſerving the Government in the lawful Majority of the Committee, and the Plan which I believe they meditated in ſupport of their own Opinion, of reſtoring me to the Place in Council of which I was unjuſtly deprived, prevented me from taking any Step at firſt propoſed by me, until I ſaw the Reſult of their Deliberations; and conſequently the Memorial mentioned by me in my Two laſt Letters to you remains unfiniſhed.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon (but particularly the latter) have delivered in very ſtrong Proteſts againſt my Suſpenſion; theſe Proteſts make Numbers in the Packet.

I am much obliged to theſe Gentlemen for the Strength of Zeal and Argument with which they have ſupported their Senſe of the Injuſtice done me.

Though Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon have declined to inſiſt upon the Powers veſted in them, as the lawful Majority of the Committee, I am determined to bring my Caſe before them for their Conſideration. Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon will no Doubt vote, in conſequence of their former Sentiments, that my Suſpenſion be taken off; their Voice will be over-ruled by the Governor and Mr. Davidſon,

and I ſhall conſequently be kept out by Violence, through the Vote of a Man not entitled to give an Opinion. My intended Letter upon this Subject makes a Number in the Packet.

I thought this Step neceſſary, either to give the Governor and Mr. Davidſon Time to think of their Error, or to mark the Violence of their Conduct in Oppoſition to my Rights, before I take my laſt Step in delivering in a Memorial, fully expreſſive of my Opinion of the Conduct of the Majority of the late and the preſent Adminiſtration.

A Minute from Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, moving for a Reference to the Governor General and Council, makes a Number in the Packet. This Motion was at firſt objected to by the Governor and Mr. Davidſon; but upon having the Paſſage upon this Subject in the Regulating Act read to them, they deſired Time to conſider, and I do not know that they have yet come to a Determination.

I have deferred giving any Detail of the Motions of the Army, that I might not be interrupted in the Narrative. On the 21ſt, when I had the Honour of addreſſing you, we had a ſmall Army at the Mount, conſiſting of about Thirteen hundred Europeans, including the King's Regiment and the Artillery, Four Battalions of Sepoys, and a Regiment of the Nabob's Cavalry. Colonel Baillie's Detachment, conſiſting of about Three Battalions and Six Companies of Sepoys, a Company and a Half of Artillery, and Two Companies of European Infantry, were on the Way from the Northward. Colonel Coſby was ſent to collect ſuch Troops as could be ſpared from the Southward, which has not yet ſuffered from the Invaſion of the Enemy.

Hyder, after taking all the Places mentioned in my laſt Letter, inveſted Arcot, which was garriſoned only with Nabob's Troops, until reinforced with about 100 Europeans, and Two Companies of Sepoys from Vellore; the Nabob felt great Anxiety for his Capital, and it was known that the Army from hence was intended for its Relief.

On the 24th the General received Orders (Copy of which waits on you herewith) to proceed and put himſelf at the Head of the Army at the Mount; he arrived there on the Evening of the 25th, determining to march from thence the following Morning.

When he was about to march, on the Morning of the 26th, the Regiment of Nabob's Cavalry mutinied; their Pay was in Arrears more than Twelve Months; the beſt Terms they could obtain was, that of being paid till the Month of January; they would not accept theſe Terms, and conſequently refuſed to go upon Service. The General, on this Determination, ſurrounded them with Part of the Company's Troops, made ſuch of them diſmount as inſiſted upon Pay, and ſent them, to the Number of Two hundred and Fifty Men, to Madras; thoſe who remained, did not amount to One Third of that Number. The Mutineers (if they deſerve that Name) were, a few Days after, enliſted for the Amier's Body Guard.

On his firſt March from the Mount, the General found himſelf in Want of Carriage Bullocks, and was therefore obliged to leave a conſiderable Quantity of Rice behind him; this, and the Want of the Nabob's Cavalry, were heavy Loſſes in a ravaged Country, where he had Horſe to encounter.

We have had very ſevere Rains for ſome Time paſt, which muſt have very much impeded the March of the Troops; they arrived at Conjeveram about the 29th Inſtant, and were ſurprized to find that Hyder had not left the Country unprovided with Grain (Paddy) for their Uſe.

Hyder, hearing of the Approach of the Army, raiſed the Siege of Arcot, which had been carried on with little Skill, and took Poſt, with his Troops, at Muſſalpaut, a Place about Six or Eight Miles from Conjeveram.

Colonel Baillie's Detachment arrived, without Interruption from the Enemy, at Gumlepunda, about Twelve Coſs from Madras. On his Way from thence to join the General at Conjeveram, he found his March interrupted for Six Days by a River, ſwelled by the Rains, which had become impaſſable.

While detained by this River, a Body of the Enemy's Cavalry lay on the oppoſite Bank, ready to take Advantage of any favourable Circumſtance. About the 3d Inſtant, the Detachment paſſed the River, and proceeded on its March without Interruption, until it arrived at Peerambaucum, at about Thirteen Miles Diſtance from Conjeveram, where the General lay with the main Body, waiting until he was joined by this Detachment.

On the Morning of the 6th Inſtant, while the Detachment lay encamped at Peerambaucum, a large Part of Hyder's Army was ſeen marching to attack it. From Colonel Baillie's diſtinguiſhed military Talents, it cannot be doubted but every Precaution was taken, and every Exertion uſed, to

defeat

defeat the Enemy. The Action began at Eleven o'Clock in the Morning, and continued until Two o'Clock in the Afternoon, when Hyder's Troops were beat off. Colonel Baillie wrote a ſhort Drum-Head Letter to the Select Committee, giving an Account of the Action, before he could learn what Loſs was ſuſtained on either Side.

After this Letter, we had no Information but what was received from Hircarrahs; their Accounts are generally imperfect, but the Want of other Intelligence began naturally to excite our Fears.

From what we could learn, though the Enemy were beat off on the 6th, they encamped near, and almoſt ſurrounded the Detachment, which was in Want of Stores and Proviſions, and could not move without Aſſiſtance.

Though the General was ſo near, and muſt have heard the Action, he allowed the Detachment to remain without Aſſiſtance until the 8th Inſtant. In this Interval of Time, the Enemy were reinforced with freſh Troops; and the General, inſtead of marching the whole Army, ſent only a Reinforcement of One Company of Grenadiers and a Company of Light Infantry from the King's Regiment, Two Companies of the Company's Grenadiers, and Ten Companies of Sepoys, under the Command of Major Fletcher, with a Supply of Stores and Proviſions, but without Field Artillery.

By detaching ſuch a large Part of the Force under his Command, the General left himſelf almoſt as weak as the Detachment. If Colonel Baillie, with a ſuperior Force, could not advance without Aſſiſtance, it was probable that Major Fletcher, with an inferior Force, would not be able to effect a Junction. By ſeparating the Army, he riſked the Safety of the Whole, without any apparent Cauſe.

The Reinforcement under Major Fletcher ſeems to have joined Colonel Baillie on the 9th Inſtant; and the Whole, on the Evening of that Day, ſet out on their March to Conjeveram.

The Enemy employed their Time between the 6th and the 9th, in conſtructing Batteries of Twelve and Eighteen Pounders, in what they thought the moſt proper Situations for obſtructing Baillie's March in the Road through which he was obliged to paſs; theſe Batteries opened upon him in his March with great Effect. From Information, and from what we at Madras heard, the Canonade began in the Night of the 9th, and continued until Ten o'Clock the next Morning.

We have it from Report, that one of the Batteries was ſtormed by our Troops, but that we were obliged to relinquiſh it. The Loſs ſuſtained by a long Cannonade, when a Moon-light Night enabled the Enemy to point their Guns, and afterwards in the Morning, muſt have been very great: Our Troops were already harraſſed with Fatigue; and through the Want of Proviſions, and to encreaſe their Misfortune, the Tumbrils with Ammunition were blown up by the Enemy's Rockets, which added to the Numbers ſlain by the Enemy, and left the Survivors without the Means of Defence.

We have it from Report, that Baillie firſt formed his Men in a hollow Square, with the Baggage in the Center; when the Tumbrils blew up, he altered the Diſpoſition †, and formed them into a ſolid Column, determining to relinquiſh the Baggage, and cut his Way through the Enemy; but no Diſpoſition was able to protect him againſt the Impetuoſity of the Enemy, ſuſtained by Numbers.

He was charged by Hyder's beſt Horſe, commanded by Charum Saib, his Second Son, a Youth of Eighteeen Years of Age, who is ſaid to have ſought this Opportunity of diſtinguiſhing himſelf. The Enemy were received upon the Point of our Men's Bayonets, but Numbers were ready to ſupply the Place of the ſlain, who puſhed on with unremitting Ardour, and broke through the Column; our Men again rallied, but were a Second Time broke; and from what we can learn, both from European and Sepoy Deſerters, a general Maſſacre enſued.

Colonel Baillie was univerſally allowed to be as active, vigilant, and experienced an Officer as any in the Company's Service; it cannot therefore be doubted, that he failed either in Exertion or Precaution; he commanded veteran Troops, and Men who never faced Danger but with Alacrity, and who never before fought without Succeſs: Some of the Grenadiers were ſaid to refuſe Quarter; the Artillery, when their Ammunition was expended, advanced in the Front of their Guns, and defended themſelves until they were cut down. The Number of Europeans killed and loſt to the Service may be about 700, beſides our Sepoys, and ſome of our beſt and moſt experienced Officers had fallen a Sacrifice to Miſconduct.

If what we have heard is true, and we now have little Reaſon to doubt it, what muſt be thought of the General for allowing the Detachment to remain ſo long unaſſiſted; for ſeparating his Army into

† N. B. It is probable the Enemy availed themſelves of the Opportunity given them by the blowing up of the Tumbrils, and that Colonel Baillie had no Opportunity of forming after the Accident; the Accounts given of his Diſpoſition throughout are unſatisfactory.

Three Diviſions, when the Whole was not more than able to cope with the Enemy; for ſending a Reinforcement only, inſtead of ſupporting Colonel Baillie with his whole Force; for not knowing and providing againſt the Strength of the Enemy, and for not having Intelligence of the Preparations making by them to oppoſe the March of the Detachment?

The General made a Move towards Baillie with the remaining Part of the Army, when it was too late; he heard on his March that Baillie was defeated, and immediately directed his March to Chingleput *, where he arrived the Evening of the 11th, with the Loſs of almoſt all the Baggage of the Army; He marched the firſt Day for Twelve Hours, and after a Halt continued it for Twenty ſix Hours, though the Troops were in the greateſt Want of Refreſhment, until he arrived at Chingleput.

The only Letter received from him ſince the Action, was dated the 12th, and received here the following Day. He juſt mentions the Defeat of Colonel Baillie's Detachment, but gives no Account of the Loſs ſuſtained. I underſtand that he waits at Chingleput until his Troops are refreſhed, and then intends, if poſſible, to return to the Mount.

Fortunately, Colonel Coſby, with Ten Companies and a Battalion of Sepoys, Two Regiments of ill paid Nabob's Horſe, containing about 700 Men, and a few Nabob's Artillery, who was on his March to join the General at Conjeveram, heard of his Retreat as he was approaching, and directed his March to Chingleput, joined the General there on the 12th Inſtant; this Detachment might have fallen a Sacrifice, had not Baillie employed the Attention of the Enemy.

If the General does not haſten his March to the Preſidency, he may find himſelf intercepted by Hyder, and the only Army on which we can depend for the Defence of the Preſidency, may ſhare the ſame Fate with Baillie's Detachment; Hyder, if he pleaſes, may march his Army down before him; and the leaſt we can expect in conſequence is, that the Black Town will be ſacked and burnt.

Hyder has certainly loſt many Opportunities; he might have taken Arcot, or might have deſtroyed Braithwaite's Detachment; but he has at laſt ſhewn that he is equal to the Enterprize he has undertaken to perform.

This was what I prognoſticated from the Beginning; but my Opinion was miſconſtrued, and I have ſuffered Suſpenſion for daring, from Experience, to foreſee Events.

Our civil Government in Madras is in a State as deplorable as our Army; we have no Money in the Treaſury, and do not know where we can make Application for a Supply. The ſhort-ſighted Plan of raiſing Money by Subſcription, which for a Day buoyed up Mr. Whitehill and his Adherent Mr. Davidſon, on the light Bladders of Hope, has failed; after the Diſaſter our Army has met with, People will not lend their Money, for they can have no Confidence in thoſe by whom it is to be diſburſed; the Nabob refuſes to advance a Farthing, and the King of Tanjore has no Money to advance; inſtead of about 15 or 18 Lacks of Pagodas due from the Revenues of Maſulipatam, there is only One Lack in the Treaſury there, and about 2 Lacks of Rupees at Ganjam, which Sums are to be brought down immediately; that Money will ſoon be expended, and what then is this Government to do for more? Our Operations in the Field are unſucceſsful, and the Company is threatened with Bankruptcy from the Expence attending theſe Operations.

It was my Opinion, that the Governor and Council (inſtead of contenting themſelves with writing to Bengal and to England, as, on the Defence of their own Conduct tending to accuſe me, they ſay they have done) ſhould have had an Army in the Field to meet Hyder Ally; and had that Army been well commanded and well equipped, it might have proved ſuch a Check as to occaſion an entire Change of Policy in the Enemy.

As they omitted this Precaution, and delayed until the Enemy were in the Heart of the Carnatic, it was their Buſineſs to avail themſelves of the Conſternation which the firſt Alarm occaſioned: The Fears of the People were then excited; they ſaw no immediate Reſource, but in the Defence to be made by the Government under which they lived, and they would therefore have contributed largely for the Defence of that Government.

A Meaſure which at one Time will have the Appearance of Violence, will at another be warranted by Neceſſity. The Nabob ſhould have had a Place aſſigned to him within the Fort, to ſecure his Perſon from Danger and Inſult; his Property likewiſe ſhould have been lodged in a Place of perfect Security within the Knowledge of the Governor and Council. The Nabob has for ſome Time declined all Attention to Buſineſs, excepting through his ſecond Son, and pleads Poverty whenever Application is made to him for Money: The Company ſhould not carry on a War in Defence of the Nabob's Territories at their own Expence; nor ſhould they allow him to throw away the Poſſeſſions which

* N. B. He returned to Conjeveram the Evening of the 10th, and marched from thence to Chingleput the Morning following.

they acquired for him with the Blood of their Country: This Regard for him and for themſelves, argue a different Mode of Conduct; and they ſhould have acted for him upon the preſent Occaſion, as he ought to have acted for himſelf, were he entruſted with, and willing to defend his Poſſeſſions to the utmoſt.

Sitteram Rauze was at Madras; he is known to be very rich, and to have acquired that Riches by plundering Families and Poſſeſſions which ought to be tributary to the Company; his Tribute is no way in Proportion to his Revenue, and he ſhould therefore have been kept here until he paid all his Arrears of Tribute, and made an additional Loan for carrying on the War.

A Reſident ſhould have been ſtationed at Tanjore, to ſee that all the Revenues, not abſolutely neceſſary for the Expences of the Rajah and his Houſehold, was paid into the Company's Treaſury.

The Maſulipatam Zemindars ſhould have been kept at Maſulipatam, and Taſheldars ſent to their reſpective Countries to collect the Revenues, from which a Sufficiency ſhould have been paid to them; the ſame Meaſures were neceſſary at Ganjam.

I apprehend that ſuch Exertions would have made us reſpectable in the Eyes of our Enemies, and would have lent Confidence to our Friends; but they required a Degree of Exertion and Integrity, of which the Majority of our Government is not poſſeſſed. All theſe different People, the Nabob, the Rajah, and the Zemindars, would perhaps, have told by what Means their Countries were impoveriſhed, and the Majority knew that their own Conduct would not bear the Light.

When theſe Meaſures were taken at Home, other Exertions were neceſſary, which would prove ſucceſsful in Proportion to the Opinion entertained of the Faith which could be placed in thoſe who held the Management of the Company's Affairs, the Opinion entertained of their Strength, and the Terms they offered.

The Nizam is undoubtedly jealous of Hyder's increaſing Power, and would be happy if a fair Opportunity offered to reduce that Power, and to increaſe his own; we want no Increaſe of Territory; to place the Nizam and Hyder Ally upon an Equality, and to hold the Balance betwixt them, would certainly be good Policy in the preſent State of the Company's Affairs.

Our Want of Cavalry on this Coaſt, prevents us from being able to face Hyder in the Field with Probability of immediate Succeſs; he can plunder the Country, prevent the Colleſtion of our Revenue, and harraſs our Army without Oppoſition, or without hazarding a Battle; we have no internal Reſources, and our Want of them prevents us from being able to continue a long War.

The Nizam has Cavalry which, when joined by a Part of our Army, might plunder and poſſeſs themſelves of Hyder's Country in his own Way, and oblige him to return thither for its Defence; in caſe this Plan took place, we muſt leave the open Country expoſed, which is the caſe at preſent, and ſhould only ſtrengthen our principal Garriſons ſo as to make them capable of Defence. The Countries taken ſhould be given to the Nizam, with all the Forts, &c. upon Condition that he paid the Expences of our Troops, and made us a Compenſation for our Loſſes in Proportion to the Advantages he acquired.

Such are the Outlines of the only Plan by which it appears to me, that we can retrieve our Affairs in caſe the Maratta War continues.

I have taken the Liberty of writing to you without Reſerve; and I ſhall be happy if my Opinions meet with your Approbation.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient, and
moſt humble Servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Fort St. George,
14th September 1780.

P. S. The General, with the Army, arrived at the Mount this Morning from Chingleput. They began their March about Five o'Clock Yeſterday Evening; the Diſtance is 30 meaſured Miles, and it is really ſurprizing that they could do ſo much, after the Fatigue they underwent on the 10th and 11th; but the General ſhews that he has an Alacrity in retreating before an Enemy. The Campaign has laſted from the 26th Auguſt to the 14th September, and during that Space of 19 Days, the General has contrived to get rid of his beſt Troops, and to leave Hyder the undiſturbed Maſter of the Country.

APPENDIX, N° 2.

To the Honourable Warren Hastings, Esquire, President, and Governor General, Fort William.

Honourable Sir,

I had the Honour of addressing you on the 14th Instant by the Nymph Sloop of War, under the Care of Mr. Sulivan; I hope he has arrived safe, that you may have the earliest Accounts of our disastrous Situation.

I informed you, that the Remains of our shattered Army arrived at the Mount; it has since encamped on this Side of Marmelong, where it remains at present in much Distress for Provisions, though so near the Capital; and may be considered in Danger of being attacked, and its Retreat being cut off by the Enemy.

The scattered Accounts from which I was obliged to gather the Information contained in my Letter of the 14th, has left it incomplete; I have since had an Opportunity of conversing with different Officers who served under General Munro; and I am very sorry to say, that every Report confirms the Idea of his Incapacity.

He was repeatedly urged by his Friends, to allow Colonel Baillie, with his Detachment, to join him at the Mount, by which all Risk would have been avoided, and not to incumber himself with heavy Cannon; he was likewise cautioned of making Detachments; but no Argument would prevail. He marched on to Conjeveram, leaving Baillie exposed to the Danger from which he suffered; he impeded his March, by dragging Four 18 Pounders, and Two Cohorns along with him, and as you already know, instead of marching with his whole Army to support Baillie, it was divided into Three Parts, in the Face of an Enemy equal to the Whole when assembled.

On the 6th Instant, when Colonel Baillie was first attacked, the General's Army was ready, advantageously encamped near Conjeveram; the Tents were struck and lodged within the Pagodas, but Part of the Enemy's Army approached very near him, and he had an Opportunity of bringing them to Action, with every Probability of Success. These Circumstances were so evident to the Officers under his Command, that Colonel Fletcher offered himself to command the Grenadiers, and Major Elphinston to support him with the 73d Regiment, and bring the Enemy on to Action, until the rest of the Army could form and join them. The Arguments used by these Officers were so convincing, that Lord Macleod approved of this Enterprize. The General for some Time appeared convinced, and ordered the Line under Arms, but afterwards countermanded his Orders. At this Time Baillie's Detachment was engaged with that Part of the Enemy which attacked him, and the Firing was heard in Camp. This proved an additional Argument with those who were for drawing the Enemy on to Action; they urged, that if the Army, when joined with Colonel Baillie's Detachment, was equal to Hyder's whole Force, the Army and the Detachment of course was equal to that Force when divided. It was likewise urged, that if Hyder attacked the Army on one Side, while the Detachment was engaged with them on the other, our Troops might be inspired with a mutual Confidence, and the Enemy would be discouraged by the Idea of being caught between Two Fires. These Reasons seemed to have some Weight; the Orders for the Attack were renewed, but they were again countermanded, and the Business of the Day ended in Disappointment to the Troops, who were eager to engage, and in firing a Salute, that Baillie might thereby be informed the General was near him.

The Detachment of Grenadiers under Colonel Fletcher, to reinforce Baillie, did not march from the Camp at Conjeveram until the Evening of the 9th Instant. It must have joined on the same Evening, and the whole began their March on the Morning of the Tenth, so that the General allowed Baillie to remain without Assistance from the 6th until the 9th Instant.

The General, on the Morning of the Tenth, moved with the Remainder of his Army to meet Baillie, but did not take the direct Road. He had advanced about Eight Miles in the Heat of the Sun, when he heard of the Defeat, from a Man who had escaped from the Field of Battle. He immediately changed his Rear into his Front, and made the best of his Way back to Conjeveram, where he arrived about Nine o'Clock at Night, after a harrassing March of 12 Hours.

The General determined to retreat from Conjeveram to Chingleput, but no Orders were regularly given out for that Purpose. It was necessary to leave the 18 Pounders and the Cohorns behind, and, if possible, to render them unfit for Service; but this could not be done, there was no Sledge Hammer to break off the Trunnions of the Guns, nor a Spike to spike them with; the only Precaution which could be used, was to disable the Carriages, and throw them into a Tank, from which they have been taken by the Enemy; the Cohorns were left in Conjeveram Pagoda, with a Three Pounder.

About Two o'Clock in the Morning there was an Alarm in Camp, and the General, with what

what Troops he could get, began marching immediately, without giving any Intimation to thoſe he left behind. Colonel James, who commands the Artillery, heard, by Accident, that the General was gone, and ſent to requeſt that he would halt until the Artillery could join him; but this Requeſt was diſregarded, and every one was obliged to make his Way in the beſt Manner he could.

The Sepoys had been ſupplied with Paddy inſtead of Rice, from the Time of their Arrival at Conjeveram. Under the Idea that Incumbrances muſt be avoided, their Women were not allowed to follow them, ſo that the poor People, when relieved from Duty, inſtead of taking that Reſt which Nature required, were obliged to employ their Time in beating Paddy, and preparing and dreſſing their Food. You may conceive how hard this was upon them, during the confuſed Halt for Five Hours at Conjeveram, on the Night of the 10th, after the Fatigue they had encountered, and were about to undergo: It was, no Doubt, proper to reduce the Number of Camp Followers, but Proviſion ſhould certainly have been made for the People in conſequence.

The Army, from Two o'Clock in the Morning of the 11th, continued its March for 28 Hours, without halting until it arrived at Chingleput. The Rear Guard was attacked the whole Day by Hyder's Horſe, who were ſo confident from Succeſs, that they frequently broke in upon the Line, cut the Sick and Wounded in their Dooleys; obliged the Coolies to throw down their Loads, and plundered a great Part of the Baggage. The Loſs ſuſtained during this March was very conſiderable, and from the low State of the Treaſury, it cannot be eaſily repaired.

Colonel Coſby's Detachments, which joined the General at Chingleput, was ſaved in a wonderful Manner, A Sepoy gave him the Intelligence of Baillie's Defeat, and of the General's Retreat. Coſby diſbelieved, and was ready to puniſh him, but the Man perſevered with ſuch unremitting Earneſtneſs, and deſired his Life might pay the Forfeit, if his Intelligence proved falſe, that Coſby was induced to believe him.

Had Hyder Ally purſued his Succeſs, he might certainly have cut off the General's Retreat, firſt to Chingleput, and afterwards to Madras; but he took no Pains to intercept him, which I am ready to impute to the great Loſs he ſuſtained in the Action againſt Colonel Baillie: The Number of fine Fellows in that Detachment, could not have fallen an eaſy Sacrifice.

Since the Loſs of his Baggage, the Remains of our little Army has been much expoſed to the Inclemency of the Weather, which, added to exceſſive Fatigue, has very much reduced the Number of our Troops. The King's Regiment, which embarked 1,100 ſtrong, has not now above 210 effective Men; the other Corps, though they have not ſuffered in the ſame Proportion, yet they are greatly reduced. The Ardour which animated every private Soldier, while he had a Hope of Victory, is now loſt. The Europeans are diſpirited, and it cannot be expected that the Sepoys will again face Cavalry willingly, while under their preſent Leader.

Though the Troops which remain to us are in no Condition to take the Field, or to face the Enemy, they are kept in Camp at Marmelong, inſtead of being brought into Garriſon. The Ground between Madras and Marmelong is altogether encloſed; the Enemy by coming the Poonamalee Road, from the Weſtward, might poſſeſs themſelves of theſe Encloſures, and cut off the Communication between the Garriſon and the Army.

The Nabob's Cavalry, which made a Part of Colonel Coſby's Detachment, are ſeveral Months in Arrears; the Horſe Keepers and Graſs Cutters are deſerted; and the Horſes are dying for Want of Food. With about three Regiments of Cavalry within our Bound, including the Ameer's Guard, we are ſhut up by the Enemy's Horſe; we already feel the Want of Proviſions, and may conclude ourſelves as blocked up in Garriſon, by ſtraggling Parties of the Enemy's Horſe, who have now the whole Carnatic to range in unmoleſted.

Fortunately for us, the Enemy do not appear to make the moſt of their Advantages; inſtead of following our Army, and ſubjecting us to the Dangers already ſuggeſted, Hyder has returned with Part of his Army, and has laid Siege to Arcot; he ſeems earneſt in his Deſire to poſſeſs himſelf of the Nabob's Capital.

In Addition to our calamitous Situation, we have every Reaſon to apprehend, that our Road will be poſſeſſed by a French Squadron in the Month of December or January, when our Fleet will be abſent on the Malabar Coaſt; in this Caſe, I leave you to conceive what will be the probable Conſequence.

In the Midſt of theſe encreaſing Difficulties, our only Hopes of Relief are from Bengal. A Change of Men, and conſequently of Meaſures upon this Coaſt; a Peace with the Marattas, and an Alli-

ance jointly with them and the Nizam may ſtill leave it in our Power to defend our Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt. Without ſome ſuch Meaſures I fear the whole of our Poſſeſſions here are irrecoverably loſt.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Fort Saint George,
23d September 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 3.

Fort Saint George Seleƈt Committee, 2 Auguſt 1780.

AS it will be of great Importance to have a Detachment of Troops, which may move ſo as to intercept any Convoys of Proviſions or Stores that may be coming through the Paſſes, for the Uſe of Hyder's Army, it is reſolved, That one be formed for this Purpoſe at Trichinopoly, conſiſting of Six Grenadier Companies of Sepoys from Tanjore, and the Four Grenadier Companies of Sepoys now at Trichinopoly, alſo Eight Battalion Companies from the Sepoys of that Garriſon, provided the Two Regiments of Nabob's Cavalry, which are coming from the Trinevelly Country to Trichinopoly, ſhould not arrive there in Time; but if they do arrive in Time to aſſiſt in forming this Detachment, then they are to ſupply the Place of the Eight Battalion Companies.

Reſolved, That Capt. Coſby be appointed to command this Detachment, and that Inſtructions be prepared for him accordingly.

Fort Saint George Seleƈt Committee, 3 Auguſt 1780.

To Captain Henry Auguſtus Montague Coſby.

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed to Tanjore with all Expedition, there to take under your Command Six Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers, and march with them to Trichinopoly, where you will be joined by Four Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers belonging to that Garriſon.

You are to remain at Trichinopoly, until you can know from the Spies you will ſend to Hyder's Camp, that he has moved forwards with his Army from the Neighbourhood of the Paſſes; in which Event you will march from Trichinopoly, taking with you the Six Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers from Tanjore, the Four Sepoy Grenadier Companies from Trichinopoly, and Eight Battalion Companies of Sepoys from that Garriſon, unleſs the Nabob's Two Regiments of Cavalry, with their Infantry and Artillery, ſhould arrive at Trichinopoly before you march; in which Caſe you are not to take the Eight Battalion Companies of Sepoys from that Garriſon, but the Nabob's Cavalry and the Grenadiers, unleſs it be abſolutely neceſſary. The Service we wiſh you to perform is as follows: As we underſtand that Hyder has laid up a Magazine of Grain at Attoor, and that his Supplies will probably come through that Paſs, you are to march the above Detachment, and endeavour to cut off Hyder's Communication with his Proviſion and Stores, by ſeizing them, or rendering them uſeleſs to him, by coming up with them on the March before they can get up to Hyder's Camp, or join the main Body of his Army.

You are always to take Care not to advance too far, or ſo near his Army as not to be able at all Events to ſecure a Retreat.

With reſpect to your carrying Field Pieces with you, that muſt depend upon yourſelf, and the Expedition you will find yourſelf under the Neceſſity of making, from your Intelligence, as well as from the Roads through which you muſt paſs.

We need not mention to you, how much the Succeſs of this Expedition depends upon the moſt inviolable Secrecy.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
3 Auguſt 1780.

To Lieutenant Colonel Nixon, commanding at Trichinopoly.

Sir,

We have ſent Colonel Coſby to Tanjore, from whence he will proceed to Trichinopoly, to execute a Service, the Particulars of which will be communicated to you by the incloſed Copy of our Inſtructions for his Guidance. We deſire you will furniſh him with the Troops intended to be employed from your Garriſon, and give him every other Aſſiſtance in your Power to enable him to fulfil the Object of his propoſed Expedition, in which it is neceſſary that the utmoſt Secrecy ſhould be obſerved.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
3 Auguſt 1780.

To Major Alexander Maclellan, commanding at Tanjore.

Sir,

We have ſent Captain Coſby to Tanjore, and we deſire that on his Arrival you will put under his Command the Six Grenadier Companies of Sepoys belonging to the Battalions doing Duty there; which are to be employed on a particular Service, for which he has received Inſtructions from us. The Companies will return to Tanjore as ſoon as the Service is over.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
3d Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire.

Sir,

I arrived off this Place laſt Night, and as we had heretofore met with very unfavourable Winds, I intended landing here, in order to proceed on by Land; but on writing to Mr. Cuming, he has adviſed me by no Means to think of it, as Hyder, he ſays, has certainly Parties of Horſe about Chilumbram, which would effectually ſtop our Journey; neither could he ſpare me any Sepoys to protect the Money I have with me; I am therefore under the diſagreeable Neceſſity of going on by Sea.

I have the Honour to remain,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Off Cuddalore,
16th Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 24 Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Captain Coſby.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir,

I am ſorry to inform you, that from having every Proſpect of reaching Nagore as this Morning, we were drove off the Land in the Night, and by the Force of Squalls and Currents, were aſtoniſhed to find ourſelves again off Cuddalore; as I deſpaired of getting on by Sea, after ſo many Diſappointments, I requeſted the Captain would let me have his Boat, in order to get aſhore at this Place and purſue my Journey by Land at all Events. After being Ten Hours in her, the

Laſcars

Nearly almoſt ſpent with Fatigue of rowing, I have at laſt accomplished it, and am this Moment ſetting off for Tanjore, which I hope to reach the Third Day from this, and ſhall immediately proceed from thence to Trichinopoly with the Sepoys. I am much mortified at ſo much Time having been already unfortunately loſt, and remain,

Honourable Sir,
Your very devoted and
obedient Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Cuddalore,
Auguſt 21ſt, 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee Conſultations, 30th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident, &c. Select Committee Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

This Morning I had the Honour to receive your Commands of Date the 3d Current, from Captain Coſby, who will march from here this Afternoon at Four o'Clock, with the Six Grenadier Companies from the Battalions in this Garriſon.

I have ordered Lieutenant Eaſtland and Enſign Lloyd to proceed with the Two Companies of the 18th Battallion, to which they belong, on a Repreſentation from the Officer commanding that Battalion, as well as my own Knowledge, that there are not other Officers in the ſame, of ſufficient Rank or Experience to ſupply their Places, were they to proceed to join the Army, as by the Order of the 21ſt Inſtant: In ſo doing, hope I have acted conſiſtent with the Good of the Service, which I hope will meet your Approbation.

By Directions left me by Major Maclellan, I have ordered Mr. Gilleſhie, Surgeon's Aſſiſtant, to proceed with this Detachment.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
very humble Servant,
Hugh Robt Alcock,
Capt. Commanding.

Tanjore,
25th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I ſhall proceed this Afternoon at Three o'Clock, with the Six Grenadier Companies, from this Place to Trichinopoly, and hope to get there To-morrow Evening, and the next Day ſhall begin to croſs the Rivers with the whole Detachment; the Two Regiments of Cavalry are, I am told, expected at Trichinopoly as this Day. I have received Sir Hector Munro's Letter of the 17th, and ſhall, to the utmoſt of my Power, comply with ſuch Parts, or the Whole of it, as Circumſtances may enable me.

I have the Honour to remain, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt devoted humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Tanjore,
Auguſt 25th 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 1ſt September 1780.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In conſequence of the Permiſſion given to me by the Honourable Preſident, I have this Day taken the Liberty of drawing on you a Set of Bills of Exchange, at Ten Days Sight, in Favour of Mr. John Douglas, for Six thouſand Four hundred and Thirty-one current Pagodas, which your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to duly honour, and order it to be placed to the Debt of the Loan made by the Honourable Company to his Highneſs the Nabob of Arcot, for the Uſe of his Cavalry.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt devoted and
obedient Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Trichinopoly,
27th Auguſt, 1780.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 3.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6 September 1780.

Read the following Letters from Captain Cosby:

Trichinopoly, August 27, 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I arrived here Yesterday, and in about Two Hours after, Two Regiments of Cavalry from the Trinivally Country encamped on the Plain; the greater Part of the Grenadier Sepoys belonging to the Garrison, I found were in Camp at some Distance to the Westward, under the Command of Captain Bilcliffe; but Orders are sent to him to return with all Expedition. This Day we have passed the Two Regiments of Cavalry, and the Six Tanjore Companies, over the Caveri, and shall begin early To-morrow Morning to get them over the Cooleroon, but as the Passage of that River will be attended with more Difficulty than the Caveri, cannot promise for their being all over To-morrow Night, though you may depend on every possible Exertion on my Part, being extremely anxious to get the Detachment nearer the Scene of Action. The Intelligence we have here is, that the Guns which Hyder has already sent out of the Carnatic, are only those he took in the Forts which have surrendered to him; therefore the First Part of Sir Hector Munro's Instructions, in his last Letter, I fear we shall be too late to comply with; and as to destroying the Changamah Pass, so as to prevent Hyder's Retreat that Way, presume, from my Knowledge thereof (having gone through it) that it will require a much longer Time to effect it than is imagined: In the First Place, the Pass, though known by that Name, is above Fifteen Miles further to the Westward, and is the most accessible of any I have seen in the Country, and of such a Nature as not easily to be made much better or much worse. I shall, however, march that Way, and as my Route will lead me past Attour, may have an Opportunity of falling in with some of the Enemy's Convoys (should they come that Way) agreeable to my First Instructions. Any Letter that your Honour, &c. may have Occasion to send to me, and that may require Expedition, had better be sent so as to meet me at Volcondah, or on my March farther North. My Movements will, I hope, at any Rate induce Hyder to detach a considerable Party against me, and by that Means lessen his Main Army.

It is reported, that about Two thousand Horse and One hundred Infantry are on their March from Hyder's Army this Way; if so, I think it is probable we may fall in with them.

I have the Honour to remain, with the truest Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obliged and
most devoted humble Servant,
H. A. M. Cosby.

Samiaveram, 29 August 1780, 7 o'Clock, P. M.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs.

The Detachment has now entirely crossed the Rivers, and I shall march early To-morrow Morning to Uttaloor, and continue the Route directed with all possible Dispatch. Happy should I be able to arrive in Time to execute all or any Part of your Honours or the Commander in Chief's Instructions. The Detachment is a very respectable one, and now consists of the Two Regiments of Horse, who, although somewhat fatigued with their late long March, are yet in high Spirits; Four of the Cavalry Guns; the Six Tanjore Grenadier Companies; the Four Trichinopoly Grenadier Companies; and Three Battalion Companies, which I have taken, as Lieutenant Colonel Nixon thought he could spare them (having Four very good Artillery Companies of Sepoys to supply their Place) and being already with the Grenadiers in Camp to the Westward, as I informed your Honour, &c. in my Letter of Yesterday, they joined me here about Four Hours ago under the Command of Captain Bilcliffe.

I remain, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
with the greatest Respect,
Your much obliged and obedient Servant,
H. A. M. Cosby.

APPENDIX, N° 3.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 5th September 1780.

Received the following Letters.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I arrived here this Forenoon at 11 o'Clock; but am much disappointed at not being able to learn any Accounts of our Army, by the Motions of which I was in Hopes of guiding my own with a greater Degree of Success than I see a Prospect of under the above Disadvantage.

The Account which the Honourable the Select Committee had of a Magazine of Provisions having been laid up at Attoor, the Destruction of which was the first Object of this Detachment, I find from many of my People, was without Foundation, which, from my last Orders, the Honourable Committee I presume are now acquainted with, nor has any been sent from thence to Hyder's Camp; what he receives is by the Changamah Pass, and as in my last Instructions from the Commander in Chief, I am directed to attempt to cut off his Convoys on the Changamah Road, and destroy that Pass, or in case of not being able so to do, to join him as soon as possible, but the First recommended as of the greatest Importance to our Army, I intend to attempt it without Loss of Time. I shall therefore leave here all my Tents, Guns, and havy Baggage, and with the Detachment as lightly equipt as possible, with a few Days Rice in their Knapsacks, march from hence by the most private Road I can find directly to Changamah; where, should I be so fortunate as to fall in with any of them, it will be all I can flatter myself with the Hopes of accomplishing, as I am well assured he has, with many thousand People appointed on purpose, repaired the Pass beyond the Power of this Party (unprovided as it is with Tools) to hurt so as to stop him even for Half an Hour.

Should he happen to be on his March back whilst I am at Changamah, it will, from the Situation of the Country thereabouts, require all our Activity to get clear of him, unless our Army is close at his Heels; in that Case, I shall have the Pleasure of co-operating with it to Advantage.

Until my Arrival near this, Hyder had Peons in most of the Villages to collect the Rents, and had given the Inhabitants Cowle, but they made off as fast as possible on my Approach.

I have the Honour to remain, with the greatest Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
your obliged, and
devoted humble Servant,
H. A. M. Cosby.

Tiagar,
Sept^r. 2, 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since writing to you this Forenoon, the People I had sent on to explore the Country between this and the Changamah Pass, in order to find out a short and private Road, are returned; and although they were the People of this Country which I had employed in this Service, they have been unsuccessful, and declare the Impossibility of the Detachment's marching by any but the Trinomallee Road; and as the Enemy have a Garrison there, and we are now Forty odd Miles from it, and the Country between this and that very open, they must unavoidably know of my Approach; besides which, the Distance is such, that I shall be under the Necessity of halting near it, and obliged at last to leave it at least Twenty Miles in my Rear, as Changamah lies nearly West of it; and as I should have no Way but the same to return, should in so doing run a great Risque of falling in with Hyder's whole Army. From these Considerations therefore, I am under the Necessity of giving up my First Intention; and as I am quite in the dark as to the Situation of our Army, having heard nothing of it since the 25th last Month, I shall, as the most likely Way of falling in with it, march directly to Ginjee, and which I hope will meet with the Approbation of your Honour, &c.

I have the Honour to remain, with the most perfect Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your much obliged
and faithful Servant,
H. A. M. Cosby.

Tiagar,
Sept^r. 2, 1780.
5 o'Clock, P. M.

Should I on my March hear of the Army, I shall march to it wherever it is, by the shortest Way.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 3.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th September 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour of addreſſing you Twice on the 2d Inſtant; the laſt of which would inform you, that I had laid aſide my firſt Intention of marching to Changamah, as I found I could not get there but by paſſing cloſe to Trinomallee, which I ſhould be obliged to leave in my Rear, and where the Enemy having a Garriſon, and the Country all about it poſſeſſed by them, I could have no Hopes of ſurprizing any of their Convoys; and as I ſhould alſo be very far advanced to the Weſtward by doing it, and having no Information of either our's or Hyder's Army, I thought it moſt adviſeable, and for the Good of the Service, not in vain to harraſs and fatigue the Detachment, already much ſo by their long March, but to take ſuch a Route as was moſt likely to favour a Junction with the Army (to which ſuch a Detachment as this muſt be a conſiderable Reinforcement) and am now fully perſuaded it is beſt I did ſo. In the firſt Place, the Proviſions that come to him are not in any large Quantities at a Time, and the Loſs of a few Bullocks Loads of very little Importance to him, as, I am well aſſured, he gets Plenty from the Countries he has now got his People in; and unleſs I could have remained there, my barely going and returning would have been of little or no Conſequence; at any Rate, by no Means equal to that of my joining the Army, ſhould what I am told here be true, which is, that it has yet got no farther than Conjeveram; my marching to this Place will therefore, I preſume, give me the beſt Chance of hearing from the General, and forming a Plan for joining him.

I omitted to acquaint your Honour, &c. in my Letter from Tiagar, that a Hircarrah who came to me from Changamah, informed me, that ſome Days before, Six large Guns, which he underſtood were all Hyder had with him for breaching, went paſt that Place in their Way to Bengaloor, as alſo ſome Sick, from his Army; and that within the Courſe of a few Days, Four or Five thouſand Horſe have left his Service on ſome Diſguſt; and that his Army is in general very ſickly. At my leaving Tiagar, I was informed that Hyder's People had poſſeſſed themſelves of Trilacoor; and on my Arrival near it, found it to be true; and by puſhing on ſome of the Cavalry, we ſurrounded the Place before the Whole had Time to get off. The Amuldar, and Thirty Sepoys and Peons, with fine Horſes, were taken in the little Mud Goſt that joins the Pagoda. I brought them to this Place, and have delivered them over to the Killidar. They had been very troubleſome Neighbours to the People here, many of whoſe Cattle they had plundered, and committed many Cruelties. There is no Doubt but that Hyder has, by ſome Means, greatly attached the Inhabitants of the Tiagar and Tricaloor Countries to him, inſomuch that my Hircarrahs tell me, the News of my marching from Tiagar was communicated from Village to Village all the Way to Trinomallee, from whence Expreſſes were ſent to Hyder; and in my March Yeſterday from Tricaloor, the Country being extremely woody, and intermixed with high Rocks, the Line was ſeveral Times fired upon by Match-lock Fellows, collected together, I ſuppoſe, from different Villages by Hyder's Amulders: Some of them, till my Approach, were iſſuing their Orders within Six Miles of this. I have ſent off People in Search of the Army, and hope ſoon to hear from the General; but as they may miſcarry, your Honour, &c. will no doubt think it proper to inform him where I am. In the mean Time, I ſhall be prepared to act as Occaſions may preſent.

I have the Honour to remain, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your very obedient
and devoted humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Gingee,
5th September 1780.

I ſend this by way of Cuddalore as the ſafeſt Road.

Wrote the following Letter to the Commander in Chief.

To Sir Hector Munro, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt.

Sir,

We have Three Letters from Captain Coſby, the laſt dated the 5th Inſtant at Gingee. We inform you of this, that you may ſend ſuch Orders to him as you ſhall judge proper.

9th. Received the following Letter.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I have the Honour to encloſe you a Letter I received from Col. Coſby, at Six o'Clock this Evening, juſt as he was leaving his Ground. I ordered all his Camp Equipage to be brought immediately

ately into the Fort; his Deſign is to ſurprize Chettaput, where there is every Reaſon to expect he will meet with Succeſs. One or Two of the neighbouring Polygars belonging to his Highneſs the Nabob, taking Advantage of the preſent Troubles, ſend their People to plunder all the Villages round; they carried off ſeveral Bullocks that had been ſent out by the Amuldar of this Place, and cut ſome of his Bullockmen's Ears off. I had Intelligence a few Days ago, that One of theſe Polygars had come into a Village a few Miles from this, I marched at about Seven in the Evening (in Expectation of ſurprizing him) with my Company, but he had unluckily got Notice of my Approach, and made off into the Jungal with great Precipitation.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Colin Macaulay.

Gingee,
6 Sept. 1780.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

As from ſome Information I have received from Chittaput, there is Reaſon to think a ſudden and unexpected Attack upon it may be attended with Succeſs; and as I preſume ſhould we ſucceed, it will be an acceptable Piece of Service, I have prepared Ladders, and leaving my Camp ſtanding, ſhall march from here ſoon after dark, and expect to arrive there about One o'Clock To-morrow Morning. In caſe of a Repulſe it is probable I ſhall be obliged to return here; but I mean, if poſſible, to proceed on to Wandewaſh, as a Situation nearer our Army.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt devoted and obedient humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Gingee,
6th September 1780,
5 o'Clock, P.M.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 10th September, 1780.

Received the following Letters:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour of addreſſing you Yeſterday, and informing you of my Intention of ſurprizing Chittaput in the Night. In conſequence of it, I left my Camp ſtanding, and marched laſt Night at Seven, and about Half paſt Two this Morning reached it, and having previouſly made the Diſpoſition for the Attack, with the Particulars of which I ſhall not here trouble your Honour, &c. we had the good Fortune to paſs the Ditch, and mount into the Fauſſe Braye; then our Difficulties commenced: The Fauſſe Braye, from the Bottom of the Ditch to the Top, is at leaſt Thirty Feet, ſo that it proved a moſt laborious Buſineſs to get the Ladders (which being made for Two abreaſt, were heavy) over, and the great Croud, which, anxious to get into the Frauſſe Braye after their Companions, kept conſtantly getting on them; it was Half an Hour before Two could be got over, and even thoſe damaged, they were however planted againſt one of the Baſtions; but by this Time the Enemy's Force was collected to receive us, and Numbers of Blue Lights, all along the Face and Row of Pikes, preſented through every Embraſure, ſo that it now became impoſſible to get the People (excepting a few, who now and then attempted it) up the Ladders, though many Examples were ſhewn them by their Officers; and by Mr. Montgomery and a Serjeant in particular, the Firſt being the Commanding Officer of the leading Party, who got too near the Top of the Ladder, but were obliged to come down again by the Numbers that oppoſed them; the Enemy now alſo kept up a very heavy though not a well-directed Fire, for finding that the Attack on the Pettah Side was only a falſe one, they aſſembled in great Force to the real one. The Troops however in the Fauſſe Braye, ſhewed the beſt Countenance imaginable, and though they could not be prevailed on to mount the Second Wall, ſhewed no Inclination to quit the Ground they had got, ſo that they were a full Hour and a Half, all which Time I was in Hopes ſomething might at laſt be done; but after trying every Thing, and being repeatedly aſſured by the Officer in the Fauſſe Braye of the Impoſſibility of getting their Men to aſcend the Second Wall, the Day beginning to dawn, I ordered a Retreat, which was ſo well covered by the Fire of the Troops on the Glacis, that we brought over even our killed and wounded, and marched off in good Order.

The falſe Attack carried the Pettah, and penetrated to the great Gateway, where they killed upwards of Forty of the Enemy, we hoped to have got Admittance into the Place. The Fort, naturally a very ſtrong and good one, has been greatly improved by Hyder's Orders; the Ditch deepened, and Pits dug all over the Glacis; and there is in it for certain, at leaſt Six hundred Men: Notwithſtanding which, I am perſuaded we ſhould have ſucceeded, had it not been for the Information ſent from hence to the Chittaput Killidar, by a Subadar of the Nabob's, whoſe Family was at Chitteput, to be on his Guard, for that Ladders were making, and he imagined deſigned for an Attack upon him; and this very Man was one of my Guides; he is now miſſing, which confirms the Report. I

flatter

flatter myſelf your Honour, &c. will think it was worth the Trial, as, had it ſucceeded, it muſt have been a great Check on Hyder, and afforded me an excellent Station to make Excurſions from, towards the Forts of Arnee, Trinchinopoly, Paloor, &c. now in his Poſſeſſion.

Our Loſs, conſidering what might have been expected, is very trifling; being certainly (killed and wounded) under Forty; though not having yet got in the Returns, I do not know the exact Number. Amongſt the wounded is Captain Bilcliffe, ſhot in the Arm; Enſign Eaſtland, badly wounded in the Head. I have the Honour to remain,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

H. A. M. Coſby.

Camp, near Gingee,
Sept. 7, 1780.

Should I not receive Orders to the contrary, I mean to march for Wandewaſh this Afternoon, as I am told a heavy Firing was heard towards Conjeveram Yeſterday about 11 o'Clock.

APPENDIX, N° 4.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 26th July 1780.

RESOLVED, That Two Companies of Sepoys be ordered from Nagore, to reinforce the Garriſon at Cuddalore, and that Colonel Braithwaite be deſired to ſupply Guns and Ammunition as far as he can ſpare.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 27th July.

To Major Alex^r Maclellan, commanding at Tanjore.

Sir,

Hyder Ally's Army having entered the Carnatic, we think it proper to adviſe you, that you may be upon your Guard, and uſe every Precaution neceſſary for the Security of your Garriſon.

We ſhall ſend you an Officer and ſome invalid Artillery Men to Tanjore.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George,
27th July.

John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

To Lieutenant Colonel Nixon, commanding at Trichinopoly.

Sir,

Hyder Ally's Army having entered the Carnatic, we think it proper to adviſe you, that you may be as much as poſſible on your Guard.

We now deſire you will immediately ſend One Company of Sepoys to Gingee, and another to Tiagar, to remain in thoſe Places till further Orders.

We are,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servant,

Fort Saint George,
27 July 1780.

John Whitehill,
&c. Select Committee.

To Captain Gibbings, commanding at Madura.

Sir,

Hyder Ally's Army having entered the Carnatic, we think it proper to adviſe you that you may be on your Guard, and uſe every Precaution neceſſary for the Safety of your Garriſon, and the Protection of the Country, as far as your Force will permit.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill,
&c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
27 July 1780.

The ſame to Captain Edington, commanding at Palamcotah.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 29th July 1780.

To Lieutenant Douglas.

Sir,

We deſire you will immediately proceed to your Station in the Guntoor Circar, and diſpoſe of your Sepoys in ſuch Manner as you may think beſt calculated for the Security of that Diſtrict; and ſhould you be abſolutely in want of Reinforcement, you muſt make Application to Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, who will have Directions to ſupply you with ſuch Aſſiſtance as he may be able to ſpare.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
29th July 1780.

Fort George Select Committee, 31ſt July 1780.

To Lieutenant George Mackay, commanding at Chingleput.

Sir,

We deſire you will ſend 100 of the European Invalids from your Garriſon to Vellore, taking the Precaution of marching them when they are likely to meet with the leaſt Interruption from the Enemy.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
31 July 1780.

To the Nabob.

I have juſt received your Highneſs's Letter of the 1ſt Inſtant, acquainting me with the Intelligence you have received of Hyder's Intentions againſt Arcot. I have in conſequence diſpatched proper Orders to Colonel Lang and Engineers to inſpect the Place; and I requeſt your Highneſs will ſend Drections to your Killedar at Arcot, to put the Fort in the beſt State of Defence that he can, and to give every Aſſiſtance that may be requiſite to the Engineers.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Fort St. George,
2d Auguſt 1780.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 2 Auguſt 1780.

Ordered the following Letter to be immediately diſpatched to Colonel Lang, at Vellore.

To Colonel Roſs Lang.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters. As the Nabob writes us that he has received certain Intelligence, that Hyder intends, as ſoon as he is prepared, to march againſt Arcot, we deſire you will ſend

ſend Two Companies of Sepoys immediately to that Place; and, in caſe any further Reinforcement ſhould be requiſite before the European Battalion leaves Velore, we deſire you will furniſh ſuch as in your Judgment may appear proper.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

The Committee are concerned to obſerve ſuch Arrears due to the Nabob's Cavalry, at a Time when their Services are ſo much wanted; but as it is indiſpenſably requiſite to have a Body of Horſe to act with the Army, the Committee are of Opinion, that Meaſures ſhould at all Events be immediately taken to ſatisfy the Nabob's Cavalry for their Arrears, ſo far at leaſt as may induce them to go into the Field: They do not, however, approve the Mode propoſed by the Nabob for raiſing Money upon this Occaſion. If the Nabob cannot himſelf advance it, it were much better for the Company to ſupply what is neceſſary by way of Loan to the Nabob, than to become anſwerable to Individuals for the whole Amount of the Sum which they might be inclined to advance on this Occaſion, with Intereſt, &c. This being agreed upon, and the Preſident informing the Committee, that the Sum which the Nabob deems ſufficient at preſent for ſatisfying the Cavalry, is about 75,000 Pagodas; it is reſolved, upon the Nabob's Promiſe of aſſigning Countries for Payment, to advance that Sum to the Commanding Officer of the Nabob's Regiment; and that all Advances made by the Company on the Account of the Nabob's Cavalry, be a ſeparate Head in the Superintendant's Books, entitled, "Loan to the Nabob, for the Payment of his Cavalry."

Diſpatched the following Letters:

To Mr. William Cuming, Chief of Cuddalore.

Sir,

We deſire you will ſend hither, by Boat, the Cavalry Stores and Accoutrements depoſited at your Settlement.

We learn from Colonel Braithwaite, that he has ſupplied you with ſeveral Articles of Stores from Pondicherry.

We before adviſed you of our having ordered Two Companies of Sepoys from Nagore to reinforce thoſe now at your Settlement; and if you are in Want of any other Aſſiſtance that we can poſſibly give, you will be pleaſed to inform us.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
2 Auguſt 1780.

To Major Alexander Maclellan, commanding at Tanjore.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 26th ultimo; and much approve of the ſeveral cautionary Steps you have taken, in conſequence of the ſudden Incurſion of Hyder Ally's Troops.

Although we do not imagine that Hyder will attempt any Thing in the Tanjore Country for the preſent, we have given Directions to Captain Burrows to march the Sibendy into Tanjore, in caſe the Enemy ſhould proceed that Way in Force.

We have ſent by His Majeſty's Ship Superb, for the Service of your Garriſon, 1 Serjeant, 2 Corporals, and 2 Matroſſes, (Invalids). We approve of your inſtructing the Laſcars in Artillery Practice, as by Reaſon of the ſeveral Detachments of Artillery employed in the Field, we are unable to ſpare any more at this Time for Garriſon Duty.

In regard to the Fortification, any Part that may abſolutely want Repair, you have our Permiſſion to ſet about, obſerving the utmoſt Oeconomy in your Charges.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
2 Auguſt 1780.

To

To Captain Thomas Burrowes.

Sir,

Although we do not imagine that Hyder Ally means to attempt any Thing in the Tanjore Country for the preſent, we think it proper to deſire, in caſe his Troops ſhould come in Force to that Country, that you will collect the Sibendy Sepoys, and march with them into Tanjore.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
2d Auguſt 1780.

To Major George Maule, Chief Engineer.

Sir,

The Preſident and Select Committee are pleaſed to order, that you direct Lieutenant Wickens and another Engineer, to proceed to Arcot, at the ſame Time delivering the encloſed Letter to Lieutenant Wickens for his Guidance.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Charles Oakeley, Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
2d Auguſt 1780.

To Mr. John Wickens.

Sir,

I am directed to deſire you will proceed to Arcot, and inſpect the State of the Fort with reſpect to its Defences, and how far you think it tenable; making your Report to us in conſequence, as ſoon as poſſible.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Cha^{s} Oakeley, Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
2d Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 3d Auguſt 1780.

To Edward Cotsford, Eſq. Chief, &c. Council at Maſulipatam.

Gentlemen,

Hyder Ally Cawn having commenced Hoſtilities againſt the Carnatic, we think it neceſſary to adviſe you thereof; and to deſire you will be upon your Guard, drawing your Troops together as much as poſſible, ſo that they may be able to act in a Body for the Defence of the Circars, in caſe they ſhould be attacked; which however we have no particular Reaſon at preſent to apprehend.

We need not inform you, that it will be highly acceptable to us in the preſent Exigency, to receive Supplies of Money from your Settlement; and we truſt will exert your utmoſt Endeavours to furniſh us with the neceſſary Articles, as we do not ſee how we ſhall otherwiſe be able to provide for the very heavy Expences of the War.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
3d Auguſt 1780.

To Mr. Henry Caſamajor, Chief, &c. Council at Vizagapatam.

Gentlemen,

Hyder Ally Cawn having commenced Hoſtilities againſt the Carnatic, we think it neceſſary to adviſe you thereof, and to deſire you will be upon your Guard, drawing your Troops together as much as poſſible, ſo that they may be able to act in a Body for the Defence of the Circars, in caſe they ſhould be attacked; which however we have at preſent no particular Reaſon to apprehend.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
3d Auguſt 1780.

The ſame to the Chief at Ganjam.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 4.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 3d August 1780.

To Lieutenant Roberts, commanding at Tiagar.

Sir,

I am directed by the President and Select Committee to acquaint you, that they some Days ago ordered a Company of Sepoys from Trichinopoly to Tiagar, which they suppose will be arrived nearly by the Time you receive this Letter. They desire me likewise to inform you, that you have Permission to raise as many Lascars as you shall deem absolutely necessary; and these they hope may be employed, if requisite, in working the Guns.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
Charles Oakeley, Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
3d August 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th August, 1780.

To Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Ships in India.

Sir,

We have had the Honour to receive your Letter of the Instant; and beg Leave to express our Acknowledgements to you, for the great Assistance you have given to Colonel Braithwaite, by Means of the Squadron; which he himself has also expressed to us in very strong Terms.

As there appears much Reason to think, from the Operations of Hyder Ally, that he is still in Expectation of Succours from the French Islands, your present Cruize to the Southward must prove of the utmost Utility; and we would take the Liberty to propose, if it does not materially interfere with any Plan you may have formed for the future Destination of the Fleet, that the Cruize be extended to as late a Period as possible.

We have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
6th Aug. 1780.

To Mr. John Hudleston, Resident at Nagore.

Sir,

We direct that you require of Captain Hughes to detach Two Companies of Sepoys to Cuddalore.

We do not imagine that you are in any Danger of an Incursion from Hyder's Horse at present; should any however approach your Way, we trust that by a proper Disposition of the Sepoys that will remain after the above are detached, you will be able to secure the Company's Property.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
6 August 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th August 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwai., dated 6th August 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

As soon as I saw the Admiral in the Offing Yesterday Evening, I wrote off to him, requesting his Assistance in regard to Money, and the Conveyance of Powder. He brought the Fleet to an Anchor in the Road, and informed me His Majesty's Ships should receive Powder and Shot, but gave me no Hopes of being able to supply me with any Money. This Day, attended by all the Captains, he came on Shore, a Circumstance which employed most of our Boats and Boat People all the Morning: However, I cannot regret it, as, upon a Conversation with him, he determined to go off again, and raise what he could; and I have since had the Honour to hear from him, that

he will furniſh us with Five thouſand Pagodas, which, with what I have before raiſed, will anſwer all our Purpoſes. I have alſo prevailed upon the Captain of the Sartine to take Two hundred more Barrels of Powder, ſo that ſhe takes 450; the reſt of the Ships 890; and 212 I have ſent to Cuddalore, and 50 to Permacoil; in all Sixteen hundred and Two Barrels; but a ſmall Portion of our Stock.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 7 Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lieut. George Mackay, commanding at Chingleput.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir,

I have the Honour of receiving your Orders through your Aid du Camp, Captain Sydenham, reſpecting Grain, &c. for the Uſe of this Garriſon. At preſent I have near 2,000 Cullums in the Fort; and I expect, in the Courſe of Four Days, to have, unleſs any Accidents happen, 10,000 Cullums more. This Quantity will, I think, be ſufficient for the Conſumption of this Place until the Rains ſet in.

As no Steps are taken to ſecure the Grain of the different Villages from being either carrried away or burnt, I humbly conceive it will appear to you, Honourable Sir, for the Good of the Service, that I ſend for as much of it as I poſſibly can, to prevent its falling into the Hands of the Enemy, and to keep it in Store for any Detachment or Part of our Troops who eventually, according to the Situation of Things, may immediately require a Supply they otherwiſe would not have.

The Nabob's Managers will do nothing of themſelves. It therefore becomes a fourfold Duty upon me to take all the Pains I can to prevent a Want of Rice, &c. as it is more than probable we will have Occaſion for more than the utmoſt Diligence can provide.

The greateſt Part of the Horſe have retired to the Grand Army, on the Plains of Trenamally.

I can learn nothing of Colonel Braithwaite's Detachment.

I am, Honourable Sir,
Your obedient and reſpectful
humble Servant,
George Mackay,
Lieut. Com[t].

Chingleput,
5 Auguſt, 1780.

Agreed, that Lieutenant Mackay be ordered to lay in as great a Quantity of Grain and Cattle as he can poſſibly procure.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th Auguſt 1780.

Wrote the following Letter to Lieutenant George Mackay.

To Lieutenant George Mackay, commanding at Chingleput.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 5th Inſtant, and much approve of your Plan of ſecuring the Grain in the different Villages, to prevent its falling into the Hands of the Enemy; and do therefore direct, that you collect as much as poſſible, with ſuch a Number of Cattle and Sheep as you may be able to procure, and keep them in the Gariſon of Chingleput.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
8th Auguſt 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 4.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 16th Auguſt 1780.

This Day Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon delivered in the following Minute:

As ſuch Numbers of the Inhabitants have deſerted the Black Town from Apprehenſions of Danger, ſome Means ought to be deviſed for inducing them to return, and for evincing, that the Government are taking every Precaution to guard their Lives and Property.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon therefore propoſe, that a ſteady and experienced Captain be immediately appointed to the Command of the Black Town, and to diſcipline the Sepoys already raiſed, with Two Subalterns; when the Battalions are compleated, it is probable that it may be found neceſſary to appoint more Officers, that there may be one to command each Force.

Captain Wood we conceive to be an Officer qualified in all Reſpects for this Service.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon will readily concur with the Committee in any other Meaſures which can tend to prevent the further Emigration of the Inhabitants, and quiet their Apprehenſions.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

The 16th Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 17th Auguſt 1780.

In conſequence of Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon's Minute of Yeſterday, the Preſident now ſends round the following Reply:

As the Minute of Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon ſeem to imply that every Method has not been taken to give Security to the Black Town, and to inſpire Confidence into the Minds of the People; I ſhall beg Leave to ſhew in a few Words what has been done, and what is now doing, to anſwer theſe neceſſary Purpoſes.

A ſufficient Number of Guns have been mounted on the Black Town Wall; the Ditch is in ſome Parts cleared, and in a few Days, by the Means of the People now employed, this neceſſary Work will be finiſhed, and ſuch other Meaſures taken as will put the Black Town in a reſpectable State of Defence; there are about 600 Sepoys enliſted for the Uſe of the Black Town; and by the Reports that have been made to me, I underſtand they are already conſiderably advanced in their Diſcipline, and very capable of doing the Duty that is required of them: Beſides this, all the Troops belonging to the Garriſon are in Readineſs to march to the Black Town, if neceſſary: it will certainly be proper to have Officers appointed to the new-raiſed Sepoys; but the firſt Conſideration with us is to complete all the Corps for the Field; whatever Officers are appointed to the new Corps muſt go from this Garriſon; one of them is now conſtantly in the Black Town, and I mean to ſend another there immediately.

Upon the Whole, nothing has been omitted that I can think of, for the Security of the Black Town; I ſee no reaſonable Ground for the Apprehenſion which ſeems to have ſpread among the Inhabitants, or how it is poſſible for us to place them in greater Safety, unleſs we take them into the Fort, or withdraw our Army from the Field for the Protection of the Black Town.

John Whitehill.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 11th Auguſt 1780.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon having delivered in the following Minute:

As the Carnage made Yeſterday by the Enemy's Horſe at St. Thomé, Triplicane, and ſeveral Garden Houſes on Choultry Plain, has greatly terrified the Inhabitants of the Black Town, and Villages adjacent; Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon propoſe, for alleviating their Apprehenſions, to have ſmall Redoubts thrown up in ſuch Situations as ſhall beſt ſerve to protect the Bounds of Choultry Plain, and the Inhabitants of the neighbouring Villages.

As Ameer ul Omrah has a Number of Horſemen unemployed at Triplicane, it is ſubmitted to the Conſideration of the Committee, whether Application ſhould not be made to him for ſtationing Vedettes from theſe, at ſuch Diſtances as ſhall beſt ſerve for the Purpoſe of Alarm Poſts.

11th Auguſt
1780.

Charles Smith,
Sam[l] Johnſon.

Sir

APPENDIX, N° 4.

Sir Hector Munro has ſent the following in Reply.

I have not Time to ſit down now to anſwer Minutes; but as Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnſon have been pleaſed to ſet forth in a Minute of this Date, that in order to quiet the Minds of the Inhabitants of the Black Town, and of the Villages near Madras, as well as to defend Choultry Plain Gardens, they would propoſe building ſmall Redoubts in ſuch Situations as ſhall be judged beſt for protecting the Bounds; as I differ in Opinion with thoſe Gentlemen, I will now beg Leave in a very few Words to give my Reaſons why I do ſo.

1ſt. Becauſe it would require a Number of large Redoubts, and not ſmall ones to anſwer the Purpoſes of theſe Gentlemen; and would at the ſame Time require a Number of Men to defend them, who are not at preſent to be found for that Service.

2dly. Throwing up ſuch temporary Works would coſt ſome Money and ſome Labour, without anſwering any good Purpoſe, for the Reaſons I have already given. I will take the Liberty of telling the Gentlemen what will anſwer much better; and that is, embodying a Militia of Horſe and Foot as ſoon as poſſible, and compleating the Two Battalions of Sepoys now raiſing for the Protection of the Black Town without Delay, and ſtopping up the croſs Roads.

The Ameer ſends out Videts every Night, in conſequence of an Application from the Governor and myſelf ſeveral Days ago; but it is impoſſible for him to do ſo throughout the Day, having here but a Body Guard of Cavalry.

Fort St. George,
Auguſt 11, 1780.

Hector Munro.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon ſent in the following joint Minute:

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon are of Opinion, that whatever Stores are wanted at Maſulipatam, and can poſſibly be ſpared, ſhould be immediately ſent thither by the Duke of Portland, who may at the ſame Time be directed to carry any Stores that may be wanted for Vizagapatam. Some Artillery Men ſhould alſo be ſent to Maſulipatam.

11th Auguſt 1780.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

Fort Saint George Select Committee's Conſultations, 26th Auguſt 1780.

To Lieutenant Walter Douglas, commanding in the Guntoor Circar.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters of the 16th and 18th Inſtant.

We approve of the March of the Troops to Munglegerry, and are glad to find you conducted it with ſo little Loſs.

We have written to the Chief and Council of Maſulipatam, to give you all the Support in their Power; and we deſire you will acquaint them what Reinforcement you require, to keep Poſſeſſion of the ſtrong Holds, which is all we can propoſe, until Circumſtances will admit of our ſparing a ſufficient Force to act upon the offenſive. It will be proper that you correſpond with the Chief and Council of Maſulipatam, and acquaint them, from Time to Time, with your Situation.

The Gentlemen at Maſulipatam have Directions to iſſue Money for the Payment of your Sepoys. You will in conſequence adviſe them in what Manner it may be remitted to you with leaſt Riſk.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill,
&c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
26th Auguſt 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 5.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 31ſt July 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

BY the Intelligence I have this Day received, Hyder Ally was Yeſterday at Caliſpauk. He has taken Polloore, and has ſent a Body of his Troops againſt the Carnatic Gurs.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellour,
30th July 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th Auguſt 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite to the Select Committee at Fort Saint George, dated at Pondicherry, 6th Auguſt 1780.

I have been, and ſtill am of Opinion, that Tiagar, Ginjee, and this Place, are his Objects, to cut off the Southern Countries; I have mentioned this often, and the encloſed Letter I have juſt received from Lieutenant Roberts at Tiagar, confirms me more and more in that Opinion.

Tiagar, Auguſt 4, 1780.
6 o'Clock, A. M.

Dear Sir,

I have this Inſtant received Intelligence of Hyder Ally's whole Army, with a large Train of Artillery, being arrived at Manolorepet, about Thirty Miles from hence, and are clearing the Road to this Place; they have taken Trinomalee, and it is reported alſo a ſmall Fort on a Hill near it, called Sulufgur; a ſmall Mud Fort, called Calicurchy, Seven Miles to the Weſtward of this, is alſo in Hyder's Poſſeſſion, and the People of that Diſtrict are gone over to him. I was favoured with your's of the 1ſt, Yeſterday, and have received the Returns, &c. ſafe; if you have any particular News, particularly of our Troops taking the Field, I ſhall be much obliged to you to favour me with it, but I imagine it will require a clever Fellow to convey it: As long as I am able to ſend Letters, you ſhall hear every Thing that paſſes this Way.

I am, dear Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
G. Roberts.

P. S. Parties of Horſe have been for theſe ſome Days, and are ſtill all round us, carrying off all the Cattle in the Country.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir,

I think it my Duty, though there is nothing particular happened ſince my laſt, to inform you, that the Horſe have entirely left this Part of the Country, and that we are in Peace and Quietneſs.

I am,
Honourable Sir,
Your's reſpectfully, and with
due Obedience,
Geo. Mackay.

Chingleput,
7th Auguſt 1780,
Monday.

APPENDIX, N° 5.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, Auguſt 13, 1780.

Received the following Letters.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Agreeable to Orders I received from Colonel Lang, I marched from Vellore Yeſterday Evening, with a Detachment, conſiſting of Two Companies of Europeans and Two Companies of Sepoys, compleat, for Arcot, where I arrived between One and Two o'Clock this Morning, without the leaſt Obſtruction. As I have received no particular Inſtructions from Colonel Lang, but to aſſiſt in the Defence of the Place, ſhould it be attacked, beg to know if I am to take the Command of the Fort and Nabob's Troops upon me.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
Thoˢ Prendergaſt.

Arcot,
Auguſt 8th, 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In conſequence of repeated Application from the Nabob's Manager at Arcot laſt Night and this Morning, I ſhall this Evening ſend a Detachment of One hundred Europeans and Two Companies of Sepoys, under the Command of Captain Prendergaſt, to that Place. I find that the People are relapſed into their former Fears, ſo that by ſending this Detachment, it will eaſe their Minds, and give the Nabob's Sepoys a Confidence in themſelves; they are good People, and only want Officers they have a Dependance on.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and
devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
9th Auguſt 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

This Morning the Rajah ſent to acquaint me, that Hyder had taken Chittaput Yeſterday, and that he imagined he was on his March to Arcot.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Thoˢ Prendergaſt,
Commanding a Detachment,
of the 1ſt Battⁿ 1ſt Regᵗ.

Arcot,
10th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have this Inſtant received Intelligence of the Fort of Rawretnellore, which I before mentioned to the Honourable Board being beſieged by the Enemy, being given up to them Yeſterday, the Killadar being obliged to ſurrender it by his own Gariſon. The above Information is from a Horſeman of the Nabob's, who was one of about 100 that was ſhut up there by the Enemy, and puſhed his Way through them after the Surrender of the Place. There is no Force of Conſequence of the Enemy's near this Place at preſent, but ſtill Parties of ſtraggling Horſe all over the Country. Hyder Ally, with his Army, has left Trinomallee, and is proceeded on towards Chingleput, as I am informed, having left only a ſmall Force at the former Place.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Geo. Roberts.

Tiagar,
Auguſt 10th, 1780.
At 1 o'Clock, P. M.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 5.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 16 Auguſt 1780.

Received the following Letter.

Honourable Sirs,

I arrived in this Garriſon the 8th Inſtant, with an Order from Lieutenant-Colonel Nixon to take upon me the Command of the Fort, and to uſe my utmoſt Endeavours to put it, with all Expedition, into the beſt State of Defence; to defend it to the laſt Extremity; and by no Means to have any Diſputes with the Nabob's Killedar. I was proceeding to act in Obedience to theſe Orders, but was informed by the Killedar, that he could not poſſibly allow me to interfere with any Thing but the interior Duty of my own Company, until ſuch Time as he had Orders from the Nabob. Every Thing is carried on in an irregular and tumultuous Manner by theſe People; and ſhould an Enemy appear before the Place, you will plainly perceive how difficult it is for me to act up to my Orders. This I thought it my Duty to acquaint you of.

I remain, Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, humble Servant,
Colin Macauley,
Enſign.

Ginjee,
10th Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 17 Auguſt 1780.

To Enſign Colin Macauley.

Sir,

I am directed to incloſe you the Nabob's Order to the Killedar of Ginjee, to deliver over the Command of that Place to you.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Cha^{s} Oakley, Sec^{y}.

Fort Saint George,
17 Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to acquaint you, that I had ſent a Detachment of Troops to Arcot, under the Command of Captain Prendergaſt, which are ſafely arrived there.

I am ſorry now to acquaint you, that the Troops in the Garriſon of Chittaput abandoned it in the Night of the 6th Inſtant, and that it is in the Hands of Hyder Ally. His Horſe has ſurrounded Arnee, and I make not the leaſt Doubt that it will fall immediately, as a large Encampment was formed Yeſterday Evening about Four Coſs from it; there is, I am informed, only One Company and a Half of the Nabob's Sepoys in Arnee. Arcot is the next Place that Hyder Ally intends to attack.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, and devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
11 Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 24 Auguſt 1780.

Received the following Letters.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I am this Morning informed, that the Detachment of Hyder's Army, that moved from Arnee towards Arcot, was within Four Coſs of the latter Yeſterday Evening, and that Hyder himſelf marches this Day, at Twelve o'Clock, for Arcot.

I have the Honour to be,
With all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
16 Auguſt 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 5.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir,* and Sirs,

The continued Firing, as from Arcot, induces me to give Credit to what a Frenchman, a Deſerter from Hyder's Camp, who arrived here this Morning, ſays, of his beſieging the Fort of Arcot.

His Army is reported exactly according to the Number reported ſome Time ago by Colonel Braithwaite. Hyder, it is ſaid, means only this Inſult to the Nabob, whoſe Capital, if he only could poſſeſs himſelf of and plunder, would in a great Degree gratify his Revenge and Ambition. The Frenchman who is now with me, ſays, that all the Europeans in Hyder's Service are guarded and looked after as if they were all Priſoners, and ſuſpected of every Thing that was faithleſs to his Purpoſes. Hyder and his Son are at Arcot. The Firing encreaſes every Five Minutes, and therefore, I will not delay a Minute longer this Information.

I am,
Honourable Sir,
Your's moſt obediently
and reſpectfully,
Geo. Mackay.

Chingleput,
26th Auguſt 1778.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 22d; and Yeſterday at Noon was honoured with a Duplicate of your Orders of the 9th, your Letter of the 14th and Duplicate, your Letter of the 16th, and your Letter of the 17th and Duplicate.

I am ſorry your Orders did not arrive in Time to ſend Sepoys to Arnee, as you will find by my Letters, that it had ſurrendered to Hyder Ally before the Date of your Orders. As to ſending Sepoys now to Wandewaſh, I think it impoſſible, as Dobe Gurr and the Chuckley Fort have been taken ſince Arnee, which ſhuts us up entirely to the South and South Eaſt. Hyder Ally, with his Army, is at Arcot, and a large Body of Horſe at Conjeveram, ſo that I ſhall not attempt it.

The Sepoys I have ordered from Amboor, and I make no Doubt but they will be here To-morrow Morning. They will enable me to take a little more Care of our Pettah, which at preſent is guarded by a Set of mutinous Sepoys of the Nabob, for Want of Pay.

Your Orders regarding the battering Cannon, ſhall be ſtrictly attended to, and every Thing ſhall be ready but Bullocks; we are ſhort of Draught, Sixty, and Carriage, Ninety, which cannot be ſupplied here, nor is it poſſible to get them from Arcot at this Time; but you will be pleaſed to obſerve, that after we have furniſhed Bullocks for the heavy Guns, that we have not one for our Field Artillery.

Hyder Ally, I hear, has begun Three Batteries before Arcot, but there has not been any Firing yet of either Side, ſince he went there. I hope hourly to hear our Army has moved, for ſhould he be able to take the Pettah, he will get great Riches, and will diſtreſs our Army to a great Degree, as the Nabob's Manager has collected every Thing they can want, as far as lay in his Power, into the Pettah. The Manager is a ſenſible clever Man, but he is old, and is not a Soldier.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient,
and devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
25th Auguſt 1780.

P. S. Hyder has diſmounted and taken the Arms from a Regiment of Carnatic's Cavalry, that he ſuſpected was going to deſert.

APPENDIX, N° 6.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 12th Auguſt 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

TO-MORROW Morning at Day-break, my Firſt Diviſion will march from the Cantonment, and at Four in the Afternoon, the Second; when this Place will be entirely evacuated. I have got away all the Powder, and moſt of the valuable Stores; all the Guns, and a great many Shot; the reſt I am now throwing into the Sea, beyond the Surf, as alſo ſuch Things as might be more particularly uſeful to an Enemy. I hope to march the 12th from the Red Hills.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Pondicherry,
Aug. 10th 1780.
9 P. M.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 14th Auguſt 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committe read and approved.

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following Letter:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is now above a Fortnight ſince I communicated to you the Plan I had formed, and judged the beſt and moſt expeditious, for the Rendezvous of the Army from the different Cantonments.

I alſo laid before you, the Conſequences I expected from marching from Conjeveram (the Place of Rendezvous) to cover Vellore and Arcot; and at the ſame Time to watch the Motions of the Enemy, prevent if poſſible, his poſſeſſing himſelf of the principal Forts in the Carnatic; and, ſhould the Force I would have in the Field be found ſufficient to attack him, it was my Intention to do it as ſoon as I could poſſibly bring him to Action.

I foreſaw the Difficulties which would occur, was the whole Army to march from Madras, as well as the Delay it would occaſion. They are ſtill the ſame. I now beg Leave to acquaint you, that notwithſtanding all the Efforts of the Governor and myſelf, notwithſtanding repeated Aſſurances of the Ameer and the Nabob's Dewan, we have not, as yet, been able to muſter up above 200 Bullocks of 800, which are abſolutely neceſſary to carry forward Proviſions for the Troops that were to march from Poonamalee.

The Reaſons aſſigned at the Durbar, for not being able immediately to furniſh a proper Number of Bullocks, is, that the Country People have drove them into the Pollams, to avoid the Enemy's Horſe.

As the greateſt Part of the Troops are now in Motion, it is impoſſible to effect the propoſed Injunctions immediately, for want of Bullocks, as above; and as it would be highly improper, as well as imprudent, to halt the Troops who are now marching, it is neceſſary that Orders be ſent, without Delay, to the Officers commanding each Detachment, to proceed to the Mount, or Poonamalee, where the Whole muſt remain until a ſufficient Number of Bullocks can be had for the Purpoſe of carrying, at leaſt, Eight Days Grain for the Army.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

Fort Saint George,
14th Auguſt 1780.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire,
Governor and Preſident, and Select Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 6.

In conſequence of the foregoing Repreſentation, a Letter is now prepared, and ordered to be ſent to the Nabob, as entered in C. C. N° 76.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Sam[l] Johnſon.

C. C. N° 76. *To the Nabob, 14th Auguſt* 1780.

I have been Day and Night exerting myſelf to get the Army in Readineſs to take the Field and march to the Protection of your Highneſs's Forts, but I am ſorry now to obſerve, that the Want of Bullocks is likely to create Delay, which I muſt confeſs I did not expect from the Aſſurances I have at different Times received from your Highneſs on this Head. Sir Hector Munro repreſented, about a Week ago, that it would be abſolutely neceſſary that the Troops going from Poonamalee, ſhould carry for the Uſe of the Army at leaſt 8 Days Proviſion, which would require 800 or 1,000 Bullocks; and he and I both expected from the Promiſes that were made from Day to Day, that this Number would have been now ready; ſo far from it however, there are not even 100 Bullocks prepared, and the Remainder it ſeems cannot be obtained for ſome Days.

Your Highneſs will ſee, in the moſt forcible Manner, the Conſequence of theſe Delays; and I truſt ſuch Exertions will be made on your Part as to prevent any further Diſappointment. I am told, there are a great Number of Bullocks in the Pollams a few Miles to the Weſtward, and that by ſending out ſmall Parties of Sepoys to different Places, we might be ſucceſsful in procuring what we want. I entreat your Highneſs to forward immediately moſt poſitive Orders to your Amuldars, to aſſiſt in this neceſſary Buſineſs, and if you will acquaint me in what Manner I can be ſerviceable either by ſending Sepoys or otherwiſe, a Moment ſhall not be loſt.

Diſpatched the following Letters.

To the Officer commanding the Europeans at Conjeveram.

Sir,

In caſe Colonel Lang ſhall have ſent the European Battalion to Conjeveram, I am directed to deſire you will leave that Place as ſoon as poſſible, and make to Poonamalee, where you will find Tents, &c. for the Battalion. If you want Biſcuit and Arrack, you will diſpatch a Letter to Lord Macleod at Poonamalee, who has Directions to ſupply you.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Charles Oakeley,
Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
14th Auguſt 1780.

To Colonel Roſs Lang, commanding at Vellore.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee, to deſire you will endeavour, with all poſſible Diſpatch, to throw Two Companies of Sepoys into Arnee, and order Two Companies of Sepoys from Amboor to Vellore in their room.

As you have ſent ſo large a Part of your Garriſon to Arcot, the Preſident and Select Committee would have you keep the Remainder of the Europeans at Vellore till further Orders.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Charles Oakeley,
Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
14th Auguſt, 1781.

APPENDIX, N° 6.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 15th August 1780.

This Day the following Letters were received.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and Presidtnt, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Detachment encamped To-day on the North Bank of the Jungaloo, a small River Nine Miles Southward of Ongole. In consequence of a heavy Fall of Rain last Night, it is become impassable; and we wait with Impatience its Fall, to proceed.

I am most respectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most humble and
obedient Servant,
William Baillie.

Camp, 10 August 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to acquaint you, that the Detachment under my Command encamped at Ramnapatam this Morning; we are Two Days later than I expected, owing to Three Rivers, which from Ongole impeded our March much.

I am respectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most humble and obedient Servant,
William Baillie.

Camp, 13th August 1780.

Dispatched the following Letters.

To Colonel Ross Lang, commanding at Vellore.

Sir,

In case you should not have been able to move the Two Companies of Sepoys, as before ordered, into Arnee, the President and Select Committee desire you will send them to Wandewash, if possible; and that you will order all the Sepoys from Amboor to Vellore, excepting Two Companies, which are to be left for the Defence of Amboor.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
Charles Oakeley,
Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
16th August, 1780.

To Mr. William Cuming, Chief, &c. Council at Cuddalore.

Gentlemen,

We understand, from Captain Geils, that there is a great Number of intrenching Tools belonging to him at Cuddalore: As there will be a Want of these Articles here, we desire, after setting apart such as may be requisite for your Use, that you will send the Remainder to Madras, making an Estimation of their Value. We desire also that you will forward to Madras, by the first Conveyances you can procure, the surplus Stores and Gunpowder sent you from Pondicherry, after reserving such Part as may be necessary to complete the Quantity you stand in need of.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill,
&c. Committee.

Fort Saint George,
16th August, 1780.

To

APPENDIX, N° 6.

To the Right Honourable Lord Macleod.

My Lord,

We requeſt your Lordſhip will march, with all the Troops under your Command, Artillery, &c. to the Mount, ſo as to encamp there To-morrow Night. We think it proper to acquaint your Lordſhip, that the Troops will not return to Poonamalee; there will be a Serjeant ſent from hence, who is to remain with the Company of Sepoys now there, to protect the Barracks and new Buildings. The Deputy Agent will carry with him all the Sheep that he has got, or can be procured.

We have the Honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill,
&c. Committee.

Fort Saint George,
16 Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 17th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to receive your Commands of the 9th, late laſt Night. Your Information about the Horſe having left the Neighbourhood of Arcot, has been wrong, for there has never been leſs than Two thouſand that has kept hovering about, and always ſhewed themſelves every Day in one Part or other; and laſt Night I was informed that they were Yeſterday reinforced, and encamped between Lallapatt and Arcot, which is the high Road from hence to Waulau Jau Pettah.

As to marching the European Battalion to form a Junction with the Army, I think that will be attended with great Riſk at this Time, Hyder Ally having arrived at Arnee at Noon Yeſterday; that it will be improper to order the Europeans out of this, until Sepoys can be thrown in here. To leave this Garriſon with Two Companies only, which is all that is now here, will be running a great Riſk, unleſs the Army was very near; however, whatever your Commands may be, I will execute them to the beſt of my Judgment; and I hope the Honourable the Committee will approve of my not moving the Europeans from hence, as Hyder Ally is now ſituated, until I receive their further Orders.

I have the Honour to be with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
12 Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 18th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Having brought the Detachment thus far, it becomes neceſſary I acquaint you with my Intention of marching for the Preſidency by Naias Pell and Aſkamapett, inſtead of the Route mentioned in your Letter of the 1ſt Inſtant. My Reaſons are as follows: Tripatty and Baumrazes Pollam gives no Proſpect of meeting with any of Hyder Ally's Convoys, becauſe his People, if they at all paſs by the former, muſt afterwards paſs through the Pelatta and Darnalcherrie Ghauts and Land near Vellore; even this ſeems not probable, when he has ſo many and better Roads clear of our Garriſons. Further, the Pollam Roads for Fifteen or Twenty Miles are ſo ſteep, narrow, and ſtony, it would take conſiderable Time to conduct Field Pieces by it, as I know from Experience founded on the March of our Army in 1765, after the Subah, from Arcot to Vantahagurry.

I halt To-morrow for Rice, but proceed early the next Morning.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt humble and obedient Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Camp at Nellore,
16 Auguſt 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 6.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19 Auguſt 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to inform you, that I arrived here this Morning juſt as the Day broke, having marched at Nine laſt Night from my Ground near Carringooly. I have met with no Impediment, nor have any of the Enemy's ſtraggling Plunderers appeared. I had pretty certain Information of a very large Body of Horſe from Conjeveram, that croſſed the River at Shiveram, in order to give me as much Trouble as they could. Have no Knowledge or Suſpicion what diſappointed them, but they have never appeared, and I have brought up every Thing this laſt March very well. Hyder muſt certainly have very bad Intelligence, or muſt be much weaker in Force, or in Spirit, than he is reported to be, or he ſhould have made a Puſh to engage my Detachment, for if he could not attempt that alone, he had little to expect from any Attempt after a Junction. It is true, I do not believe he would willingly engage ſuch a Force as mine in a pitched Battle, unleſs to carry ſome great Point; and ſurely if any Thing could tempt him to riſk a Battle, it muſt be the Hopes of preventing a Junction of the Force of the Carnatic; and had he had any Intelligence, he would have known that the Number of Followers which encumbered us, would have given him every Advantage, for beſides theſe naturally belonging to the Troops, Two or Three thouſand collected with Captain Davis's Battalion in the courſe of his March from Trichinopoly; and there are all thoſe belonging to Colonel Brown's Detachment. In ſhort, I am convinced, that for every Fighting Man, I have Six Women, Children, and old Men, who, upon the leaſt Alarm, in ſpite of every Precaution, fell back upon the Troops, and almoſt rendered it impoſſible to form them for effectual Reſiſtance. If he had had Spirit and Intelligence, he muſt have known, that the laſt March but one I had Ten Miles of as bad a Road perhaps as ever was paſſed, almoſt every Step Knee-deep, till we came to the Plain Mudrunticum, where was the fineſt Spot for him to have formed, with every Advantage on his Side, and when he muſt have attacked us to every Advantage, jaded and fatigued, and in inevitable Diſorder as we came out of the Slough. It is true, I had taken every Precaution, for I fully expected it, as he was within a very convenient Diſtance to have met me on that Spot; and I had a ſtrong advanced Guard, unincumbered, compoſed of his Highneſs's Grenadier Troopers, and Five Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers; but to my Aſtoniſhment not an Enemy appeared. I mention this, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, becauſe I conceive it to be a very ſtrong Proof that this Man is not to be ſeriouſly apprehended; and that, if he is at all faced and puſhed, he will retire out of the Carnatic as faſt as he came into it. I will add another Proof of his Want of Intelligence, or Generalſhip: By ſome ſtrong Inattention the important Fort of Carringooly is at preſent garriſoned by a Havildar and Twenty of his Highneſs's Sepoys only. I have very great Reaſon to believe, from Circumſtances which I cannot here mention, that it would have been yielded the firſt Summons, had Hyder's People from Conjeveram puſhed for it, ſo as to have got Poſſeſſion of it the Night before my Arrival, as it commands the only Road I had to take; that the Conſequences would have been very ſerious. I was much diſpoſed, had I had Powers, to have thrown my Sick Europeans and Sepoys into it, and Two Guns, but I durſt not take ſuch a Step without Authority; the Havildar even objected to receive any Ammunition from me without the Nabob's Orders, although I puſhed him much to receive it: Perhaps he thought if he received Supplies, a greater Defence muſt be expected from him. It is of Importance, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, that that Fort ſhould be looked to; it is very large, has a good Ditch, and Fauſſe Braye, would afford an Aſylum to the Inhabitants of its own Pettah, of the great and populous Village of Madranticum, and to ſeveral neighbouring Villages; and in my humble Opinion, a large Quantity of Grain and Ammunition ſhould be lodged there, from whence an Army in the Field might be ſupplied, as the River here is ſometimes impaſſable for many Days together; and I am confident, that now, if that Place had been capable of affording any Aſſiſtance, my remaining on that Side the River, which we muſt re-croſs to go towards Arcot or Wandewaſh, would have awed the Enemy very much; for Report (but it is only Report of People come from the Arcot Side) ſay, that he counted much upon the well State of the Country I had to paſs; and that upon hearing my Approach, his Infantry and Artillery fell back to Trinomalee, and himſelf, with the Cavalry, to Temmery; but I have no Confirmation of it, yet I do not doubt it, for the Man who would not attack us under the Advantages he had, I am convinced will wait till we attack him; and I ſuppoſe we ſhall hear of his attempting Wandewaſh and Warritpollum, or ſuch Things as he can attempt by Surprize. To the former (in conſequence of Mr. Oakeley's Letter of the 14th, containing your Orders, and which I received the Evening of the 16th) I immediately detached Lieutenants Flint and Parr, Two very diligent and good Officers, with Two Companies of Sepoys, with a Hundred Rounds per Man, at Nine o'Clock the ſame Evening; and as they went without Tents or Baggage of any Kind, and the Diſtance was only Sixteen Malabar Miles, I hope they reached it Yeſterday Morning. Not knowing the Situation of that Place, I thought proper to order Mr. Munro to advance to Lieutenant Flint, Four hundred Pagodas, on account of theſe Two Companies, and I have no doubt the Killedar is pre-diſpoſed to receive him, but I remember he refuſed to let me into the Fort, when I was going down with the Army to Pondicherry; and I have written to him twice for Intelligence, but have received no Anſwer. Warriarpollam requires Attention: The original Poſſeſſor of that Country, and to whom the People are attached, is, I am informed, in Hyder's Intereſt much. Very much will depend upon immediate Collections of Grain being made in the ſeveral Forts, as alſo Sheep, from whence the Army may be

ſupplied. I have no Doubt but his Highneſs the Nabob will exert his Authority in this Buſineſs: But Orders to the Aumildars will little avail for expediting Military Operations; and I could wiſh the Depoſit abſolutely to be made, before the Want is felt. I ſhall, agreeable to my Orders from Sir Hector Munro, wait here, and exert myſelf in the Matter of Bullocks and Proviſions. I have brought an Hundred ſpare Draught Bullocks from Pondicherry, and I have met with Two Hundred here.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
With the greateſt Reſpect,
Your faithful and moſt obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Chingleput,
Auguſt 18, 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 21 Auguſt 1780.

Received the following Letter from Col. Braithwaite.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

As I have written to the Governor and the General, I have not troubled you with Letters; not only on Account of the Uncertainty of their Conveyance, but becauſe I had only Difficulties to deſcribe, which I am not fond of; the Subject Matter of them will, no Doubt, be communicated to you by the Governor and General; and I beg you to reſt aſſured, that if I had not perceived them to wear a very ſerious Appearance, in regard to future as well as preſent Movements, I could not have laid ſo much Streſs on them. I have a fine Force, and in high Spirits, and if the Difficulty I have mentioned is provided for, I am convinced they will know no other; but on this Account they have been a little clamorous. I have the Honour to tranſmit to you this by Lieutenant Yong; who, agreeable to the general Orders, marches with the Men of the Regiment who ſerved in the late Troop. This, and being obliged to ſend ſixteen Sick into Chingleput, has induced me to call upon Captain Mackay to examine his Corps, and I have very good Hopes to collect from him, from Twenty to Thirty effective Men, and Volunteers for the Field.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Camp near Chingleput,
Aug. 20th, 10 P. M.

Wrote the following Letter to Colonel Braithwaite.

To Colonel John Brathwaite, at Chingleput.

Sir,

I am directed by the Select Committee, in conſequence of your Letter to Sir Hector Munro of the 20th Inſtant, to deſire you will exert yourſelf in getting as much Rice as will be ſufficient for your Detachment to Vendelore. You will uſe your utmoſt Endeavours to be there To-morrow Night, where you will find Rice, Biſcuit, and Arrack for your Detachment for one Day, to carry you to the Mount on Wedneſday. It is much wiſhed you may arrive there on that Day.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Chas Oakeley.

Fort Saint George,
20th Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 24 Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letters from Colonel Braithwaite.

To Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt.

Sir,

If ſomething ſerious is not done, I can not only not move from here, but cannot ſubſiſt here. I have this Day not received a Grain from any Body, and have only procured Eleven Bullock Loads

of Paddy, by ſecuring ſome adjacent Villages. No Man of the Nabob's has yet, or will give me any Aſſiſtance. A Spy is come in, and tells me Hyder is encamped on the South Side of the River of Arnee; that he left them the 13th; that they appeared alarmed, and were called to Arms two or three Times, upon trifling Reports. I beg you, Sir, to think ſeriouſly of my Situation.

I have the Honour to be,
with much Reſpect and Eſteem,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Camp near Chingleput,
Auguſt 21ſt. 11 P. M.

To Charles Oakeley, Eſquire.

Sir,

I have this Moment received your Letter of the 21ſt Inſtant and the Duplicate, both together, and I have but juſt this Hour received 80 Bullock Loads of Paddy, having been all Yeſterday without; as ſoon as the People have beat it out and eat, I will march at all Events for Vendalore, which is good Twenty-two Miles from hence, and reach it if I can To-morrow; but to be at the Mount To-morrow is impoſſible.

I am Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Camp near Chingleput,
Tueſday, Aug. 22d, Five in the Evening.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 24th Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lieut. George Mackay:

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

All the Rice and Paddy which I had provided for the immediate Occaſions of this Garriſon, I have ſent out for the Uſe of Col. Braithwaite's Detachment, whoſe Diſtreſs for Rice, Arrack, &c. and I may add for Tents, and almoſt every other Article neceſſary for Service, would, I humbly conceive, induce you, were you upon the Spot, to pity the Situation of a fine Body of Men, capable for the moſt important and honourable Purpoſes. A flying Body of Horſe appeared this Day, and burned ſome Villages near this Place. The Colonel has ordered Two Troops of Grenadiers to attack them this Evening, if within Thirteen Miles of his Encampment. All the Encouragement theſe Troopers have had for proceeding ſo far with the Colonel's Detachment, was his own private Generoſity, and which he muſt moſt liberally purſue for the Safety and Credit of the Service, before a Horſeman is contented, or will leave his Lines. The Renter has had no Directions from the Nabob to ſupply Colonel Braithwaite's Detachment with Rice or Proviſions, and in conſequence of which the Colonel is here now without any more Proviſions than his daily Conſumption; for as there are about Four or Five hundred thouſand Souls about this Place at preſent, who muſt at leaſt have Half a Meaſure of Rice a Piece a Day, how is it poſſible to furniſh a Body of Troops ſuch as his with the Supply he muſt neceſſarily ſtand in want of? All the Arrack, Sheep, and Grain, I had I have ſupplied him with, though much to my own private Diſadvantage, as the Colonel at a proper Time will inform you. The Hurry and Confuſion of Things prevent my having the Time to copy this, which I hope you will be pleaſed to pardon.

I am, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your very obedient Servant,
Geo. Mackay, Lieut. Com^{t}.

To the Nabob.

As the General is on the Point of taking the Field, I beg Leave to mention to your Highneſs how neceſſary it is that ſome Perſon of Conſequence, inveſted with full Authority from you, ſhould accompany him, in order to facilitate the Supplies of Proviſions that will be required for the Army, I underſtand your Highneſs propoſes Nudjif Cawn for this Service; but as he is now at Arcot, it will be expedient until he can join the Army, that ſome one elſe ſhould be appointed. I requeſt alſo your Highneſs will ſend immediate Orders to the Killedars of your different Forts where Grain is laid up, to report to our chief European Officers in ſuch Forts, the exact Quantity of Grain in Store, ſpecifying how much Rice and how much Paddy, in order that they may furniſh the General with a particular Amount thereof.

As

As I understand there is a large Quantity of Stores at Arcot, I beg your Highness will give Orders that the General may be furnished with a List of them, and supplied with any Articles he may want, which shall be afterwards replaced from the Company's Stores.

Fort Saint George, 23d August 1780. I have the Honour to be, &c. &c.

From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 29th August 1780—Received 31st D°.

I have received your Letter dated 23d Instant, acquainting me of the "Necessity there is for "my sending some Person with General Munro, until Nudjif Cawn Bahaudar joins him at Arcot, in "order to facilitate the Supplies of Grain and Provision for the Army. You at the same Time re-"quest I will send Orders to my Killidars, to give General Munro Lists of the Grain and Stores that "are in my Forts, and that General Munro be supplied with whatever Stores he may call for at "Arcot, and that such shall afterwards be returned to me out of the Company's Stores." All this I understand. My Friend! most of the Grain in my Country has been plundered and destroyed by the Enemy, and what is left, remains exposed in the Fields or Villages. The Ryots, from Fear of falling into the Enemy's Hands, or being cut off, have deserted their Homes, and fled for Shelter to the Woods and Mountains. I had previously laid Grain in Store in the Forts of Vellour, Arcot, Ginjee, Wandewash, and Trichinopoly, for the English Army, of which an Account is herewith sent you. General Munro carried from this a Quantity of Grain sufficient to last the Army until it arrives at Arcot, and Nudjif Cawn has my Orders to join it at that Place. He will furnish from the Forts above-mentioned, what Quantity of Grain may be wanted for the Army, at the Desire of General Munro.— My Killidars have already had Orders from me to send the General what Grain he may call for. Nudjif Cawn has my positive Orders for this, and I shall write him again. There was no Necessity for sending any Person of Consequence with the Army from this to Arcot, because I myself supplied them here with Provisions, and the Enemy had so effectually laid waste and plundered the Country between this and Arcot, that there is no Provisions left in any one Place. Yet as you desired it in your Letter, I appointed Mahommed Backer Cawn, a Person of Trust, for this Service, and he was accordingly introduced to General Munro, as the Person appointed by me to go with him to Arcot. With regard to the Lists of Stores which you demand, they are at Arcot, and General Monro will take what Stores he may want, and give Receipts for them. What are not expended may afterwards be returned to me; and in Return for those that are expended, I make no Doubt but I shall, agreeable to what you write me, have others given me out of the Company's Stores. I have already sent Orders to Rajah Burbur, to furnish General Munro with whatever Stores he may want, but as some Accidents on the Road may have prevented his receiving them, I enclose you a fresh Order to him, which you may yourself forward to General Munro. What shall I say more?

Account of Paddy at Arcot, &c.

		Tons.
At Arcot	Cuttums 67,539	2
At Vellour	— 49,101	—
At Wandewash	— 53,537	6
At Ginjee	— 40,587	4
At Trichinopoly	— 200,000	—
	Cuttums 410,764	—

Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 1 Sept. 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We encamped at Arnee, Four Miles South of Gumrahpundy, about an Hour ago, and march on To-morrow Morning for Conjeveram, by the Route of Pereupltam and Tripassore, agreeably to Orders of Major General Sir Hector Munro.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most humble and obedient Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Camp,
24th August 1780.
(Noon.)

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 6.

Fort Saint George Select Committee Consultations, 30th August 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esq; President, &c. Select Committee Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I wrote Sir Hector Munro, in the Morning, that I was prevented marching this Day to Tripassore, agreeably to my Intention, by a most extraordinary Fall of Rain last Night. By way of getting higher Ground, between Twelve and One I moved about a Mile, and discovered, as near as I can guess, Two thousand of Hyder Ally's Horse. I have yet no further Accounts. If this Night proves fair, I shall proceed To-morrow.

I have the Honour to be, with Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most humble
and obedient Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Camp near Vungute,
Aug. 26th, in the Evening.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esq; Governor and President, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On the opposite Side is Copy of a Letter wrote to Sir Hector Munro, of this Date.

I have the Honour to be, most respectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient
humble Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Camp on the N. Bank
of the Cortelcar,
3 P. M. 27th August.

To Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Forces on the Coast.

Dear Sir,

A Second heavy Fall of Rain last Night, has prevented our being this Day at Tripassore. We are encamped on the North Bank of the Cortelcar, waiting its Fall. When we came to it, the Two thousand Horse, mentioned in mine of Yesterday, were upon the opposite Bank, but moved off on the firing of a few Cannon Shot. It seems odd, they neither in our short March attempted any Thing against our Baggage, nor burnt any Villages in our Sight.

I am respectfully, &c.
(Signed) Wm Baillie.

Camp, 27th August,
3 P. M.

Received the following Letters.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esq; Governor, and President, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Detachment remains encamped on the North Bank of the Cortelcar. Every Night seems to increase the Fall of Rain and Depth of the River. Our Provisions, I mean Rice, too so scarce, I have been under the Necessity of opening several Paddy Holes in the Villages for our Subsistence. Where Inhabitants are met with, they are protected, and regularly paid, and not finding any, as far as possible, an Account taken, and the Money collected, or Receipts granted me, occasionally to be produced. I in particular mention this Matter, because surely there will be numberless Complaints, of Quantities taken, whereof there is no Account. Many Villages, too distant for me to guard, must be not only plundered by the Enemy, but our own Followers.

I have the Honour to be, respectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most humble
and obedient Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Camp, 29th August,
1 P. M. 1780.

APPENDIX. N° 6, 7.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 2d September 1780.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esq; Governor and President, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Fall of this Cortelcar ſeems ſo little to be depended on, I wiſh the Honourable Committee would think of ſome Mode to aſſiſt us. Perhaps Boats, or Cattamarans, could be ſent from Ennore to Shullaveram: It is true, it would be a very roundabout Way; but better that, or any, than remain where we are. We have had Two fair Nights; notwithſtanding, the River is quite impaſſable; a ſtrong Indication, or rather Proof, of its being from a great Source, and therefore not likely to fall ſuddenly.

I have the Honour to be reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt humble
and obedient Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Camp, 1 September, 1780,
6 P. M.

APPENDIX, N° 7.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 21ſt Auguſt 1780.

SIR Hector Munro delivers in the following Minute:

The critical Situation, not only of public Affairs, but the intricate Predicament in which I find myſelf at preſent, make it an indiſpenſable Duty, which I not only owe to my Employers, but to myſelf, to have Things carried on in the Select Committee, in my Abſence, ſo that my Reputation as an Officer, and Character as a Man, may have a fair Chance given to them, whenever any Reſponſibility falls to my Share.

The unfortunate Diviſions as well as Difference in Opinion which Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon have held in Oppoſition to the Governor and myſelf, and which have uniformly ſubſiſted of late in our Deliberations both in Council and Committee, added to ſome other Circumſtances which might be mentioned, leave me little room to expect that any Plan or Operation of mine in the Field will be either permitted to be carried into Execution, or their Effects bid the faireſt to have the moſt candid Conſtructions put upon them.

It is therefore my determined Reſolution not to be anſwerable in any Manner whatever for the Actions of others, and which may affect myſelf in Points as an Officer, which I hope I have held untarniſhed hitherto, and which I am determined, as far as in me lies, to keep inviolably ſo while I have an Exiſtence.

Therefore, and with a View to give the greater Efficacy to what the Governor as well as myſelf think the beſt Plan for carrying on the Service at this critical Moment, and endeavour if poſſible, to put it in Execution without Diſputes or Diſſentions which may retard it, I move, That on my Departure to Camp, on the eſſential Duty I am to be ordered upon, that Mr. Davidſon be appointed an acting Member of the Select Committee during my Abſence.

Fort Saint George,
21ſt Auguſt 1780.

Hector Munro.

APPENDIX, N°. 7.

The Preſident alſo delivers in the following Minute.

The Preſident is concerned, at a Seaſon like this, when the Depredations of Hyder Ally Cawn loudly call for Meaſures of Unanimity and Firmneſs, that the Commander in Chief of the Army ſhould have Reaſon to feel the abſolute Neceſſity for moving for the occaſional Admiſſion of Mr. Davidſon into the Committee. The uniform ſettled Appearance of a Determination in Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon to oppoſe every Plan adopted by the Majority of the Committee, is indeed too evident to allow of even the ſmalleſt Heſitation in imagining, that in the Event of Sir Hector Munro's Departure for the Army, every Plan hitherto laid down, will be counteracted, and even perhaps totally laid aſide. Under theſe Difficulties, and ſeeing no Proſpect of a Change of Sentiments in thoſe Gentlemen, and truſting, that the candid and unbiaſſed Judgment of Mr. Davidſon will ſee Matters in a different Point of View, when he comes to be acquainted with them, the Commander in Chief ſeems unqueſtionably to have Expediency ſufficient on his Side, to warrant the Recommendation of a temporary Infringement of the Company's Orders. No Man, the Preſident is free to declare, has a greater Repugnance at acting contrary to the Commands of his Superiors than he has; but there are Times when a Government muſt, however irregular, deviate from the Line which is preſcribed, and uſe that diſcretionary Power which from Neceſſity it is inveſted with. Plain Truths ſpeak for themſelves; the Records of the Board as well as the Committee, are Proofs that little Reliance is to be had on the Concurrence of Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon with reſpect to the Meaſures to be purſued, if they ſhall be left with a decided Majority in the Committee.

The Preſident believes they have made no Secret of their Intentions on this Head; even the ſudden Tranſition of Mr. Smith's Departure by the Way of China, from bodily Infirmity into his Continuance from public Conſiderations, is a Clue to a Suppoſition, that theſe Intentions were not haſtily or immaturely reſolved upon, but that they were the Reſult of pre-determined Deliberation. In ſhort, the Preſident is firmly of Opinion, that the Commander in Chief has Cauſe ſufficient for calling upon the Aſſiſtance of the Committee in the Manner he has done, when the Meaſures he means to recommend, he is apprehenſive in this critical Situation of Affairs, he has Reaſon to apprehend will be fruſtrated the Moment he quits the Preſidency to carry them into Execution, unleſs timely Precautions are taken to prevent it: Wherefore the Preſident ſeconds the Motion of the Commander in Chief, for the Admiſſion of Mr. Davidſon into the Committee during the Abſence of Sir Hector Munro; and further recommends, that he be ſworn in before Sir Hector Munro's Departure for the Field.

At the ſame Time he embraces the Opportunity of returning Sir Hector his beſt Thanks, for the very liberal and conſtitutional Support which he has invariably received from him ſince he has had the Honour of ſitting as Preſident of this Committee.

John Whitehill.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon's Minute.

As the Court of Directors have expreſsly ordered in their Letter to the Preſident and Council of the 10th April 1778, that if the Commander in Chief ſhall at any Time be abſent from the Preſidency, the Preſident, and Second and Fourth Members of the Council ſhall be a Select Committee during the Abſence of the Commander in Chief from the Preſidency, we are of Opinion, that the appointing Mr. Davidſon a Member thereof, is illegal; and do diſſent and proteſt againſt the Meaſures; and we do conſider it as a Diſſolution of the Committee, and reſerve to ourſelves the Liberty of replying to the Minutes of the Preſident and the General.

Reſolved, by the Preſident's caſting Vote, that Mr. Davidſon be appointed a Member of the Select Committee during the Abſence of the Commander in Chief from the Preſidency.

Mr. Davidſon is in conſequence now ſent for, and the Oath of Secrecy adminiſtered to him.

APPENDIX, N° 7.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 22d Auguſt 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following Inſtructions, which he propoſes for the Commander in Chief on his taking the Field.

To Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt.

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed and take the Command of the Troops now aſſembling for the Field, to act againſt Hyder Ally Cawn.

To enable you the more effectually to form a Junction of the Troops, and to employ them as ſhall ſeem moſt expedient to you for the Protection of the Country; we impower you to iſſue Orders to any Officers commanding Garriſons or Detachments of Troops in the Carnatic.

After aſſembling the Troops, you will be pleaſed to move in ſuch Manner as may beſt enable you to cover the principal Forts, and to ſeize the firſt Occaſion that you ſhall think favourable for attacking the Enemy, and obliging him to quit the Carnatic. We confide ſo much in your Military Experience and Abilities, that we mean not to recommend any poſitive Plan of Operations; but ſhall leave you in the free Exerciſe of your own Judgment and Diſcretion, as to the Mode of accompliſhing the Objects we have in view.

We ſincerely wiſh you Succeſs, and are,

Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
22d Aug. 1780.

Reſolved, That the Conſideration of the foregoing Inſtructions be poſtponed till the Day after To-morrow.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 24th Auguſt 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

The Conſideration of the Inſtructions recommended by the Preſident the laſt Committee, for the Commander in Chief, being reſumed; Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon propoſe the Addition to be made to them, which is contained in the following Draught ſubmitted by them to the Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 7.

To Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt.

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed and take the Command of the Troops now aſſembling in the Field, to act againſt Hyder Ally Cawn.

To enable you the more effectually to form a Junction of the Troops, and to employ them as ſhall ſeem moſt expedient to you for the Protection of the Country, we impower you to iſſue Orders to any Officers commanding Garriſons or Detachments of Troops in the Carnatic.

After aſſembling the Troops, you will be pleaſed to move in ſuch Manner as may beſt enable you to cover the principal Forts, and to ſeize the firſt Occaſion that you ſhall think favourable for attacking the Enemy, and obliging him to quit the Carnatic, when we may hope for the ſpeedy Reduction of the Nabob's Forts which Hyder has already taken.

When we reflect on the Opportunity Hyder Ally Cawn had of attacking to Advantage the Detachment commanded by Colonel Braithwaite in its March to Chingleput, we are induced to think he has no Intention to hazard a general Engagement, but means to attack as many Forts in the Carnatic, as he thinks he can reduce before our Army is able to march.

It is reported he is now before Arcot; as this Capital is of the utmoſt Conſequence, we are of Opinion you ſhould march as ſoon as poſſible to its Relief, but ſhould it have ſurrendered before your Arrival, we leave to you the Manner and Time of attempting the Recovery of it.

As the Rapidity of Hyder's Motions have been experienced in our laſt War, we deem it almoſt ſuperfluous to mention the Neceſſity there is for your being extremely vigilant to guard againſt any Attack that he may attempt on the Black Town, with a conſiderable Force of Horſe and Foot.

We confide ſo much in your Military Experience and Abilities, that we mean not to recommend any poſitive Plan of Operations, but ſhall leave you in the free Exerciſe of your own Judgment and Diſcretion as to the Mode of accompliſhing the Objects we have in View.

We ſincerely wiſh you Succeſs, and are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Cha^{s}. Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

Fort St. George;
24th Aug. 1780.

The Preſident and Sir Hector Munro obſerve, that they have no Objection to any Part of the foregoing Inſtructions, except that which begins with " When we reflect, &c." and ends with " before " our Army is able to march." The reſt being approved, is ordered to be copied fair, and delivered as ſoon as poſſible.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, Sunday 3d September 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire,
Cha^{s} Smith,
Sam^{l} Johnſon.
Sir Hector Munro abſent on Service.

Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnſon obſerve, that they had delivered in a Minute, which they wiſhed and meant to have ſubmitted to the Preſident's Conſideration privately, before any Committee was held, or Mr. Davidſon had taken his Seat, as they conſidered the Reſolution of the Committee of the 21ſt ult^{o}, and the Oath then adminiſtered to Mr. Davidſon, were not ſufficient to conſtitute him a Member, that they think contains Matter very worthy the Conſideration of the Preſident, and might poſſibly induce him to alter his Sentiments with reſpect to the Propriety of admitting Mr. Davidſon to be a Member of the Committee; but as the Preſident moves for the Reading of the Letter from the Court of Directors, and as this cannot be done without Mr. Davidſon's taking his Seat, all that they have now left, is to deſire that their Minute may be read and entered on the Proceedings of this Day, and in the mean Time they enter the following Proteſts.

Previous to entering on any Buſineſs, Mr. Smith deſires it may be recorded, that he conſiders the preſent and all future Committees at which Mr. Davidſon ſits as a Member, as unconſtitutional,

and contrary to the expreſs Orders of the Company; and therefore he holds the Preſident and the General reſponſible for all Meaſures which may not be approved by Mr. Johnſon, or himſelf, whilſt Mr. Davidſon keeps his Seat at the Committee.

3d September 1780. Charles Smith.

Mr. Johnſon agrees entirely in Opinion with Mr. Smith; and thinks their conſenting for the preſent to ſit in a Committee which they deem unconſtitutional, the greateſt Proof they can give of their Attachment to the Company's Intereſt; he hopes no Reſponſibility can be required of them for Meaſures concerted by a Committee of which they have ſo explicitly declared their Sentiments.

Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnſon then deliver in the following Minute:

"We are not inſenſible of the Lapſe of Time ſince the 21ſt ultimo, when this Meaſure was reſolved on; we are very ſorry it was not in our Power to deliver this Minute before the General's Departure, but the Nature of the Subject required our moſt ſerious Conſideration, and we were not prepared until Monday laſt. As we are of Opinion it would be more regular to deliver it at Committee we waited ſince in Expectation of a Summons, but none was ſent until Yeſterday, and the Meeting afterwards deferred. As a Committee is now unexpectedly aſſembled, we avail ourſelves of the Opportunity to deliver it."

Charles Smith,
3d September 1780. Sam[l] Johnſon.
Sunday.

When Sir Hector Munro, in the Committee held on the 21ſt Inſtant, moved, "that Mr. Davidſon be appointed an acting Member of the Select Committee during his Abſence," and when that Motion was ſeconded by the Preſident, with this Addition, "that he (the Preſident) further recommends that he (Mr. Davidſon) be ſworn in before Sir Hector Munro's Departure for the Field," our Surprize at a Conduct ſo oppoſite to the poſitive Orders of our Superiors at Home, and our Indignation at the Reaſons on which the General preſumed to make, and the Preſident to ſecond, ſo unconſtitutional a Motion, cannot be expreſſed. However, then we deemed it ſufficient, by a ſhort Minute, to reſerve to ourſelves the Liberty of replying to the Minutes of the Preſident and the General, which we ſhall now do as fully as our Abilities will permit, and in ſuch a Manner as we hope will merit the Approbation of our Honourable Employers; as the Sentiments which we now offer for the Records of the Company, are the Reſult of our beſt Judgment, founded on the plain and unequivocal Orders of the Court of Directors, free from Pique, Prejudice, or Reſentment, and conſonant to the Duty we conceive we owe to our Superiors, and to the Dignity of that Station to which thoſe Superiors have been pleaſed to appoint us.

We regret, as much as the Preſident or Sir Hector Munro can do, that there has been any Diviſion in Committee or in Council; but we poſitively deny that any Sentiment proceeding from us, whether by Motion on our Parts, or by Diſſent to any Motion made by either of thoſe Gentlemen, originated from a Principle of Oppoſition to him.

We pointedly diſavow a Conduct ſo repugnant to our private Feelings, and ſo incompatible with our public Duty.

We believe the Preſident will find it very difficult to ſhew one Inſtance of an Inclination on our Part, to counteract any Plan for the public Safety, or for the Honour or Welfare of the Company; nor has the Preſident any Right to impute to either of us, a Want of Candour, or a Biaſs in our Judgment, from a Principle of Oppoſition.

However, leaſt it might be ſuppoſed that we had ſeemingly formed a Party againſt the Preſident and General, we appeal to the Records for a Refutation of any ſuch Idea; and aſſert, that in theſe will be found many Inſtances wherein we eſſentially differed in Opinion from each other.

The Preſident has advanced, "that the Records of the Board, as well as the Committee, are Proofs that little Reliance is to be had on the Concurrence of Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, with reſpect to the Meaſures to be purſued, if they ſhall be left with a decided Majority in the Committee."

We, in Anſwer thereto, ſay, that no Conſideration can induce us to give up our Judgment to the Preſident or the General, but where our own coincides with theirs; to thoſe Records we appeal for our Juſtification. Our Diſſents have not been wantonly made, or maliciouſly worded; they ſpeak our Sentiments, and the Reaſons on which thoſe Sentiments are founded; they breathe neither Pique, Prejudice, or Reſentment. We need not ſay how eaſy it would be for us to recriminate in this Reſpect upon thoſe Gentlemen; but this is not properly our Province. Recrimination is not Argument, nor is Partiality Juſtice; to our honourable Employers we ſhall leave it to decide, whether our Conduct be cenſurable or Praiſe-worthy.

The

The Preſident ſays, that " theſe Difficulties, and ſeeing no Proſpect of a Change of Sentiment in " thoſe Gentlemen, and truſting that the candid and unbiaſſed Judgment of Mr. Davidſon will ſee " Matters in a different Point of View, when he comes to be acquainted with them, the Com- " mander in Chief ſeems unqueſtionably to have Expediency ſufficient on his Side to warrant the " Recommendation of a temporary Infringement of the Company's Orders. No Man, the Pre- " ſident is free to declare, has a greater Repugnance at acting contrary to the Commands of his " Superior than he has; but there are Times when a Government muſt, however irregular, de- " viate from the Line which is preſcribed, and uſe that diſcretional Power which from Neceſſity it " is inveſted with."

We have not at preſent in India that Sort of Expediency which can warrant the Preſident in acting ſo directly oppoſite to the expreſs Orders of our Superiors; and we are ſo very well ſatisfied of the Ground of this Opinion, that we conſider it as a deliberate Act of the Preſident to ſubvert the Government of this Preſidency. The Orders of the Company are too expreſs, are too pointedly proviſional of the very Situation in Queſtion, to admit of any Deviation therefrom, under a Preſumption of diſcretionary Power.

We think it incumbent upon us to declare, that the Meaſure now adopted is illegal and injurious; and, as far as we know, that it is without Precedent. We are alſo of Opinion, that it tends to introduce Anarchy into the Conſtitution, and into the Conduct of the Affairs of the Company at this Preſidency. Nor do we heſitate to declare, that no Queſtion of greater Extent in all its Conſequences, or more liable to fatal Objections, has fallen to our Lot ſince we have had the Honour of being Members of this Government.

It appears to us incontrovertible, that Mr. Davidſon can have no legal Voice in the Committee; and that every Act done by the Preſident and Select Committee, to which he is a Party, and ſtill more if only ſanctioned by his Opinion, and the double Voice of the Preſident, may be deemed illegal, or at leaſt ſtrongly queſtionable; and it is but too obvious, that this may involve the Affairs of the Company, and even Individuals, in Circumſtances of Confuſion and Difficulty, which at no Time ought to be hazarded, and far leſs under the preſent Circumſtances of our Affairs. Indeed, the Conduct of the Majority of the Committee on this Occaſion appears to us ſo contrary to Reaſon, as well as to the Company's Authority, that we can hardly regard it in any other Light than a premeditated Purpoſe of forming a Diviſion in the Government, the natural Conſequences of which we leave to the Conſideration of thoſe Gentlemen, and to the Reflection of their intended Coadjutor. Our Intereſt in the Queſtion is not greater than theirs; we think that too much is hazarded, and wiſh that there may be no Mixture of Paſſion or Precipitation. It is our earneſt Deſire to act with Prudence and Moderation, and to preſerve Peace in our Councils, by a faithful Adherence to the legal Inſtitution under which we are conſtituted, as the only Mode in which we can proceed with Safety to ourſelves, and to the Intereſts of the Eaſt India Company, having no other Views or Purpoſes to ſerve, than the due Diſcharge of that Truſt which is repoſed in us as Members of their Government; and we doubt not but this will appear in the ſtrongeſt Light, from the Conduct which we have ſhewn in the firſt Agitation of this Queſtion. We then thought it our indiſpenſable Duty to weigh the ſerious Conſequences of a Competition, which, if continued with equal Obſtinacy by both Sides, might end in a Confuſion more eaſily to be apprehended than remedied; and therefore determined to proceed with all poſſible Circumſpection, without betraying our Truſt by a criminal Acquieſcence. We then declared in Subſtance, and now repeat it, that the Committee cannot, by their own Authority, bring any other Member to ſit or vote in that Department, than ſuch as are appointed by the Company; it being incongruous in itſelf, that a Power ſo derived ſhould counteract the Authority on which it is founded, as the preſent Meaſure certainly does. On ſome future Occaſion it may be found neceſſary (as Neceſſity will always prove a convenient Plea to give a Colour to every Meaſure which Men may ſee fit to adopt) to make a ſtill further Addition of Members to the Select Committee, and even to the Number of Perſons limited as Members of the Council. This would only be going a Step further in the ſame Track which is now deviſed; and we believe that the Act, in theſe Caſes, would be as legal as in this, when there is no Rule but the Pleaſure of the Framers, who ſubſtitute their own Authority in the room of that which appertains only to their Superiors, the Conſequences of which, where there is no Check but the Diſſent of a Minority, and no definite Appeal, but to a Power ſo diſtant in Point of Time, that all the Miſchiefs which could ariſe may have their full Effect before any Relief can be applied: And it is worthy of Notice, that the Caſe of an illegal Inſtitution, or ſelf-created Power, as this appears to be, is much ſtronger, and of more dangerous Tendency, than that of a legal Authority, diſpenſing (in extraordinary Caſes) with the Rules and Orders of that Power by which it is conſtituted. If the Inſtitution of the Committee be ſuch as we underſtand, it cannot be altered or qualified by any Arguments or Terms which have been made Uſe of, to give a Colour to the preſent Meaſure. That Authority alone which is competent to appoint it, has expreſsly limited it to Four Members, of which the military Commander in Chief is One; and the Orders by which it is eſtabliſhed, after naming the Firſt Members, and the Rank of all future Members, has this Clauſe: " If our military Commander " in Chief ſhould at any Time be abſent from the Preſidency, then our Order is, that the Preſident,

" and the Second and Fourth Members of our Council, ſhall be a Select Committee for the Purpoſes " aforeſaid, during the Abſence of the Commander in Chief from the Preſidency."

From thence then it is clear, that this Event was both foreſeen and provided againſt; nor need we bring it to Remembrance, that it has already happened under the preſent Inſtitution, during the Siege of Pondicherry; but on that Occaſion no Subſtitute to the empty Chair was ever thought of, although Mr. Smith was prevented by Sickneſs from attending for a conſiderable Time) nor do we believe that any Body entertained an Opinion that it could take Place; it is a Truſt that cannot be delegated or executed by Proxy. The Order expreſsly ſays, that in the Abſence of the Commander in Chief, the Preſident, the Second and Fourth in Council, ſhall be the Committee; but now the Commander in Chief, whilſt he is ſtill in Committee (and of Courſe before that Part of the Order which relates to his Abſence can have any Operation) together with the Preſident (by his double Vote) determine that the Order of the Company in this Reſpect ſhall be ſet aſide, and in Effect abrogated by a new Appointment of their own, which in Reality is making the Committee to conſiſt of Five Members at one and the ſame Time; for it is no where ſaid or pretended, that the Seat of the General is vacated by his Abſence.

In delivering theſe Opinions we have conſidered the great Importance of the Subject to the Affairs of the Company, and indeed to the Exiſtence of their Conſtitution, which is thus wounded: We are conſcious of our Inability to ſpeak of it with that Energy and Preciſion which it deſerves; but we cannot, as honeſt Men entruſted by our honourable Employers, ſatisfy ourſelves with a bare Diſſent to ſo extraordinary a Reſolution, or avoid removing any expreſs or implied Reflection, which this Meaſure may be ſuppoſed to carry with it, in reſpect to ourſelves, as implying a Diſapprobation of our paſt, or Diſtruſt of our future Conduct; which, if thoſe Gentlemen who attempt this Inſult to our Employers, and to their Colleagues, can ſupport, we now call upon them to do, or elſe that it muſt ſtand confeſſed that they have no ſuch Foundation; but upon this Occaſion have adopted a Meaſure no leſs irritating than violent, and ſo we doubt not but the Honourable Court of Directors will regard it; and further, that they will hold thoſe who are Parties in it as we do, fully reſponſible for the Illegality of this Act, and for all the Conſequences which may ariſe from it.

As to the Conduct of Mr. Davidſon in particular, in thus accepting a Duty of ſuch a Nature, and of ſuch high Importance, though clearly excluded by the expreſs Orders of the Company, we doubt not but it will hereafter be a very ſerious Queſtion to him, whether any Act which paſſes under the Sanction of his borrowed Voice, can be free from Exception, or even legal, and whether the whole Tranſaction will not be regarded by that Power which alone can take Cognizance of it, as a groſs Inſult upon their Authority, without overlooking the avowed Purpoſe of this Gentleman's Admiſſion to his temporary Seat, which requires little other Comment from us than our unreſerved Declaration, that we never could have prevailed on ourſelves to act ſuch a Part, without being deemed unworthy of a Seat, either in Committee or in Council. It is true that he is a Member of the Council, but a Seat in that Department is not alone ſufficient to entitle him to ſit and vote in the other, until a Vacancy happens; it is obvious that the preſent Meaſure may, on ſome future Occaſion, be carried ſtill further, and One or more Members may be brought into the Committee, even without being Members of the Council, as it is not *that Character ſolely* which gives them a Qualification, *but the Nomination of their Employers*, who may at their Pleaſure appoint ſuch other Perſon as they judge fit, to that other Station; and of this the Caſes of the Reverend Mr. Palk (at that Time One of the Company's Chaplains) and of Mr. Henry Vanſittart (though then only a Senior Merchant) are in Point, as they were each appointed Members of the Select Committee; indeed, it is well known that the confeſſed Abilities of theſe Gentlemen recommended them to the Court of Directors.

How far ſuch diſtinguiſhed Talents of Knowledge and Induſtry will render Mr. Davidſon conſpicuouſly uſeful to the Company, in the Execution of that important Duty in which it is thought neceſſary that he ſhall take a Part, may have been diſcovered by our Colleagues, we muſt leave to their Deciſion; we are free to declare, that they have not as yet been ſo very apparent to us.

But totally averſe as we are to every Thing that has the Appearance of premeditated Variance in our Councils, and ſincerely deſirous to avoid all Grounds of Complaint, whilſt we can proceed in the Execution of our Duty without a Breach of the Company's eſtabliſhed Inſtitutions, we would now propoſe and earneſtly recommend, that the Proceedings of the Committee in reſpect to this Meaſure, may be reviſed, and that they be corrected and reverſed. The Governor and General have in Effect vacated the General's Seat in the Committee during his Abſence, though our Honourable Employers have determined that it ſhall not be vacated, and their's is the Authority by which we all hold our Seats. Of what Avail then is the Reſolution of forcing a new-created Member into a Seat which is not yet vacant, and which no Authority here can, at their own Pleaſure, make ſo? If there is no ſuch Power, ſhould the Exerciſe of it be aſſumed in any Department? And leaſt of all in that where our Employers have entruſted all their Political, Military, and Naval Affairs. Nor ſhould it be diſregarded, that it is done at a Time when a powerful Invader is in the Heart of the Carnatic, and when the Poſſibility of the Arrival of a Force on the Part of our European Enemies, ought not in Prudence to be forgotten. We do then moſt ſtrenuouſly recommend, that it be well conſidered to what Conſe-

quences ſuch a Reſolution may lead, in many unforeſeen Caſualties and Events, as well as in others, which are more obvious; and how far the Legality of the Reſolutions, and the Authority of the Committee under ſuch a Diſqualification may be queſtioned or impeached. Indeed, we truſt, that the Conſideration of this important Subject has not been hitherto conſidered with that Temper and Attention which it deſerves; and we ſtill have Hopes, that being new reviſed, the Arguments and Reaſons which we offer, will ſtrike with a Force not leſs ſtrong, that they have not before been ſufficiently weighed.

We cannot help obſerving, that although there has been ſuch a conſiderable Lapſe of Time ſince the 23d ult. we have not yet ſeen thoſe Plans of future Operations, which the Preſident and General ſeem to fear may be impeded or fruſtrated by us, therefore can form no Opinion of them; but when they are laid before us, then it will be ſeen what Foundation there is for ſuch Apprehenſions; we call upon the General to mention any Circumſtance in our Conduct which can juſtify him in ſuſpecting us of intending a wanton Interruption of any Plan or Operation of his in the Field, or of a Diſpoſition to miſconſtrue thoſe Plans or Operations by the Effects which may reſult from them.

Our Regard to the Welfare of the Company, to our own Security, and to the General himſelf, enſure him our hearty Co-operation in any Plan which *wears the Appearance of Propriety*; and we ſhall be as ready as any one to ſet down to the Fate of War any Miſchance which may befal him, and as chearful and cordial in our Congratulations and Teſtimonials of Applauſe, for the Succeſs which we ſincerely hope may crown our Arms and his Conduct, as any Member of Government, or of the Community.

But at the ſame Time that the General thinks it proper for him to ſhew ſuch Solicitude in what reſpects his own Duty and Conduct in the Field, we think it incumbent on us not to forget that the Committee have many other Branches of their Duty to attend to, in which the Buſineſs of Negociation and Peace, as well as Military and Naval Affairs, fall within their Province; and that this renders it the more neceſſary to avoid any Infringement upon, or Deviation from the legal Inſtitution thereof.

Mr. Smith's Reſolution to go Home, proceeded from the imminent Danger of his Health, in the Opinion of his Phyſicians, ſhould he continue to ſtay here; and the fortunate and unexpected Turn which his Diſorder took at the Eve of his intended Departure, made him reſolve to riſk a Return of his Complaint, as the Situation of public Affairs was too critical not to ſubject him to a heavy Cenſure from his Employers, was he to quit his Seat in Government in the Hour of Danger, on any other Conſideration than that of labouring under a Diſorder which Change of Climate alone could remove.

Having, we truſt, fully proved the Illegality, Inexpediency, and Impropriety of Mr. Davidſon's Admiſſion into the Select Committee, we move, That the Reſolution which was formed in Committee on the 21ſt of laſt Month, relative to this Buſineſs, may be now reverſed.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

3d September 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th September 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Alexander Davidſon.
The Commander in Chief abſent on Service.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, deliver in the following Minute:

The Preſident having put a Negative on the Motion, which we made at the laſt Meeting of the Committee, "for reconſidering and reſcinding the Appointment of Mr. Davidſon, in the Capacity of "a Member of the Committee, during the General's Abſence in the Field;" and we having then avoided any other Step than a bare Oppoſition to the Meaſure, by entering our ſolemn Proteſt againſt it, after the Delivery of a Minute, previous to Mr. Davidſon's entering upon his new Office, in which we expoſed its Illegality and dangerous Tendency, in the Hopes that the Reaſons we therein offered, might produce a Change of Sentiments in the Preſident; but that having failed, we might deem ourſelves inexcuſable, if we ſuffered the Matter to reſt here; yet, ſenſible that the more we conſider the Contingencies which may ariſe, and the future Effects which theſe may produce, under the ſanctioned Voice of a diſqualified Member, the more we find ourſelves impelled to propoſe and recommend any Step that may correct or leſſen ſuch evil Conſequences; and in that View, we now offer an Expedient, which we hope will not be refuſed: That the whole be referred to the Governor General and Council, and that all Parties ſhall reſt ſatisfied with their Deciſion of the Matter. In

making the Propoſal, we conſider the Nature of thoſe Duties, for the Diſcharge of which the Committee is expreſly appointed, to wit "the tranſacting all political, military, and naval Affairs;" and we aſſimilate the ſame to the Powers with which the Legiſlature has thought proper to inveſt the Governor General and Council, in Matters of War and of Peace, which ſeems to eſtabliſh the moſt direct and poſitive Connection between that Board and this Committee, ſo as to give the former a Superintendance, and even a Controul in the moſt important Functions of the latter; and this naturally leads us to think, that the Reference which we now propoſe (and more particularly in the preſent Situation of our Affairs) will not be deemed improper. We are however aware, that the Aſſent of Sir Hector Munro to this Propoſal, may be deemed neceſſary; and we are willing that it ſhould be obtained. If the Preſident ſees it proper to ſuſpend his own Opinion, as the laſt required in the Order of voting, till that of the General can be obtained, we can have no Objection. We only deſire that Copies of every Thing that has paſſed on the Subject, may be ſent to the General (with the beſt Expedition) to enable him to communicate his Sentiments thereupon, with all convenient Speed, and if then our Propoſals ſhall be adopted, it will follow, that a proper Addreſs ſhall be made to the Governor General and Council, by the Preſident and Select Committee, accompanied by Copies of whatever has paſſed, or ſhall further occur upon the Subject.

The Preſident moves the Queſtion propoſed by Meſſrs Smith and Johnſon, in the foregoing Minute, which is carried in the Negative by his caſting Voice.

Mr. Smith then gives in the following Minute.

As by an Act of Parliament for eſtabliſhing Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the Company, we are directed and required conſtantly and diligently to tranſmit to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, Advice and Intelligence of all Tranſactions and Matters whatſoever, that ſhall come to our Knowledge, relating to the Government, Revenues, or Intereſt of the Company, Mr. Smith moves, That all Papers relative to the Admiſſion of Mr. Davidſon into the Select Committee, may be tranſmitted to the ſaid Governor General and Council of Bengal, that they may have authentic Information of this remarkable, unprecedented, and unauthorized Change in this Government.

The Preſident and Mr. Davidſon being deſirous that the Conſideration of the Motion made by Mr. Smith, ſhould be deferred till next Committee, the ſame is agreed to.

APPENDIX, N° 8.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 2d Auguſt 1780.

MR. Johnſon delivers in the following Minute:

For the Reaſons ſet forth in the Letter from the Supreme Council (dated the 12th June) which appears to me very ſatisfactory, I am of Opinion no Time ſhould be loſt in writing to the Subah, in conciliating Terms, in taking off Mr. Holland's Suſpenſion, and in furniſhing him with Inſtructions to acquaint the Soubah, that we are come to the Reſolution of reſtoring the Guntoor Circar to Bazalet Jung, in the Manner recommended by the Supreme Council. I move therefore, that the Senſe of the Committee be now taken on theſe important Matters.

Agreed, That the Conſideration of Mr. Johnſon's Minute be deferred till next Committee.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Sam[l] Johnſon.

APPENDIX, N° 8.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, Monday 7th Auguſt, 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq. Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Read the following Letter from the Governor General and Council:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

In our Letter of this Date, which has been already ſigned and diſpatched to your Preſidency, you have been informed of the Reſolutions we have taken to effect a Settlement of the Diſpute ſubſiſting with his Highneſs Nizam Ally Khan; but by an official Miſtake, you have not in the ſame Letter been informed of the Means we have determined to employ for the Accompliſhment of this End. We now therefore think it proper to acquaint you, that as you have been pleaſed to remove the only Obſtacle which prevented us from continuing Mr. John Holland as public Miniſter, on the Part of this Government, at the Court of Hydrabad, we have reſolved to employ him in this Capacity again; and having furniſhed him with freſh Credentials, ſent him ſuch Inſtructions as we thought beſt calculated to effect the Purpoſe of the Deputation.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edward Wheeler.

Fort William,
12th June 1780.

Hereupon Mr. Johnſon moves, That the Minute he delivered in laſt Committee, may be taken into Conſideration; and Mr. Smith ſeconds the Motion, That Mr. Holland's Suſpenſion be taken off.

Mr. Johnſon. For the Motion.

General Munro. Againſt it, for the Reaſons he has already given.

Mr. Smith. For it.

The Preſident. Againſt it.

Carried againſt the Motion by the Preſident's caſting Vote.

Sir Hector Munro delivers in the following Minute:

As the giving up the Guntoor Circar after getting Poſſeſſion of it (and that with the Approbation of the Supreme Council of Bengal) may be diſapproved of by our Employers at Home, I am of Opinion the Governor General and Council's laſt Letter ought to be anſwered fully; Reaſons given why the Guntoor Circar ſhould not be given up, and if ultimately they inſiſt upon it being given up, they muſt in every Reſpect be made anſwerable for the Conſequences: And I am of Opinion if it is given up, that Bazalet Jung ought to have it given to him, and not to the Nizam, as we had it from Bazalet Jung; but I am for holding it in our Poſſeſſion until we have an Anſwer to our next Letter on the Subject from Bengal.

Fort Saint George, 7th Auguſt 1780.

Hector Munro.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire.

Honourable Sir,

No Doubt you are well informed that there is a large Body of Marattas aſſembled at Cuttack. Reports are now propagated all over this Province, that their Intentions are hoſtile againſt the Ichapour and Chicacole Countries and Circars in general. Whether this Intelligence be true or falſe, it may not be improper that this Place be put in ſome little State of Defence. The Pittah Wall is in ſuch a ruinous Condition, that the Cattle belonging to the Town paſs over it in all Parts: To make

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it at all defenſible, a Stockade is the only Expedient to be adopted; and as that can be done at ſuch a trifling Expence, as cannot be of any Conſequence, it will be ſet about without Delay.

There is a Circumſtance come to my Knowledge that ſerves juſt to create a Suſpicion, although at any other Period it ought to be treated with Neglect. One Duntaloor Vencaty Kiſtnama Rauze, a Sirdar in the Service of the Vizianagrum Family, who commanded at Curipum, a centrical Fort near two Paſſes leading out of this Diſtrict towards the Maratta Poſſeſſions, has lately left the Command of Curipum in Charge of a near Relation, and is gone to Cuttack, where he has a Brother in a high Military Command of Foot among the Marattas. He gave out that he was going to Worſhip at Jagganaut; but it is well known that a Number of the Curipum Peons (Report ſays 200) armed with Firelocks, are gone after him, and in ſmall Diviſions, that they might be unobſerved. As Curipum belongs to the Rajah, Sitteram Rauze muſt be acquainted with the above Circumſtances.

I am with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
J. H. Caſamajor.

Vizagapatam,
5th Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 18 *Auguſt* 1780.

Wrote the following Letter to the Governor General and Council.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council of Fort William.

Gentlemen,

We had the Honour of writing you in Duplicate, under Date the 26th July, and now forward a Triplicate.

Since that Time, Hyder Ally has employed a conſiderable Body of Horſe in ravaging the Carnatic; and he himſelf, with the reſt of his Army, has advanced as far as Arnee, and taken Three or Four ſmall Forts which were garriſoned by the Nabob's People. Our Troops being divided through a great Extent of Country; it has neceſſarily taken up ſome Time to aſſemble the Army; but this Point is now nearly effected, and in a few Days we hope to have a reſpectable Force in the Field, to act as Occaſion may require. We flatter ourſelves you will excuſe our being earneſt with you upon the Article of Money, but as it will be impoſſible for us to carry on this War without Supplies from Bengal, we are anxious to be informed when, and to what Extent you may be able to aſſiſt us.

We ſent to you by the Duke of Portland, the Four Deſerters, reſpecting whom you wrote us in your Letter of the 1ſt June; and we have given ſtrict Charge to the Commander, to keep them in cloſe Confinement until he receive your Orders to deliver them. We encloſe herewith a Paper, explaining the Manner in which they deſerted, and the Reaſon of their being entertained on this Eſtabliſhment.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Committee.

Fort Saint George,
18 Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 21 *Auguſt* 1780.

Read the following Letter from Mr. Torleſs, Reſident at Anjengo:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Occaſion of this Addreſs is to adviſe your Honour, &c. that laſt Night a Ship called the Free Maſon, ſent on Shore Letters from Mr. Church, the Reſident at Tellicherry, to me; One is a Duplicate, and dated the 17th ultimo, the other dated the 8th Inſtant. In the former of which he ſays, "I diſpatch this Letter to acquaint you, that Sardar Cawn is come from Calicut with a large Body of Troops belonging to the Nabob Hyder Ally, and have joined the Nairs againſt us; they are now attacking Durmapatnam, and we expect they will ſhortly attack us in every Quarter. I deſire you will immediately adviſe the Preſidencies of Madras and Bombay of our Situation, and write to the Governor and Council of the latter Place to ſend, as ſoon as poſſible, our Indent of Stores and Caſh; and we ſhall probably want ſome Rice."

Under the 8th Inſtant Mr. Church writes, "I am ſorry to acquaint you, that laſt Night we evacuated the Iſland of Durmapatnam, which is now in the Poſſeſſion of the Enemy, but we brought off our Troops

Troops with little Loſs. You will pleaſe to adviſe the Preſidencies of Bengal and Madras of our Situation.

I am, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
J. Torleſs.

Anjengo,
11th Aug. 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 22 Auguſt 1780.

Mr. Johnſon delivers in the following Minute:

At a Committee, held on the the Preſident and General were of Opinion, that a Letter ſhould be written to the Governor General and Council, explaining our Reaſons for not complying with their Requiſition for reſtoring the Guntoor Circar to Bazalet Jung.

As conſiderable Time has elapſed ſince theſe Opinions were given, and I am ignorant of their Reaſons, I think it incumbent on me to move, That this Letter be directly drawn out, and forwarded, that an Anſwer may be received as ſoon as poſſible; even a Day loſt in the preſent critical Situation of Affairs may be dangerous. I am of Opinion, that the Governor General and Council wrote to us on this Subject, after the matureſt Deliberation; and that it is of the higheſt Importance to ſecure the Soubah's Alliance at this Juncture, when it is ſo much wanted. It has been my invariable Opinion, that our taking Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar without the Conſent of the Soubah, was contrary to the Fourth Article of the Treaty concluded between the Company and the Soubah on the 12th of November 1766; and therefore very dangerous and impolitic. I think it alſo neceſſary to remark, that this Meaſure was carried into Execution before I was a Member of the Committee, otherwiſe I ſhould have diſſented.

Samuel Johnſon.

Monday, 21ſt Auguſt.

Reſolved, That a Letter be written to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, ſtating the Embarraſſment we have been under in conſequence of their Requiſition to us for reſtoring the Guntoor Circar, and the Objections which occur to us againſt ſuch a Meaſure; acquainting them, however, that in Conſideration of the preſent Poſture of Affairs, we are diſpoſed to make this Sacrifice for obtaining the Soubah's Friendſhip; but that as the Guntoor Circar was, upon its coming into our Hands, let at Rent to the Nabob, it becomes expedient that we ſhould have his Concurrence, which we ſhall uſe our Endeavours to procure.

Reſolved, That a Letter be in conſequence written to the Nabob on this Subject.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon.

Co. Cor. N° 84. *To the Nabob, dated 2d September* 1780.

The Governor and General and Council of Bengal, in a Letter lately received from thence, have repreſented in very ſtrong Terms, how much the Nizam is affected by the Treaty made with Bazalet Jung, for obtaining Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar; that they have in conſequence fully reconſidered all the Proceedings on this Subject; and are of Opinion, that as in the preſent Situation of Affairs, the Company ſhould endeavour, by every Means in their Power, to preſerve the Nizam's Friendſhip; ſo in this Buſineſs of the Guntoor Circar, where he has taken Umbrage at the Manner in which our Connection has been eſtabliſhed with Bazalet Jung independant of him, we ſhould remove the Cauſe of his Uneaſineſs, by placing Things on the ſame Footing as they ſtood before our Agreement with Bazalet Jung took Place; in which Caſe he promiſes ſufficient Security, that no French Force ſhall ever be maintained in the Diſtricts of Guntoor.

The Governor General and Council being anxious to ſatisfy the Nizam on the Point, we have on our Part acquieſced as far as we have the Power; but as the Guntoor Circar is now rented by your Highneſs, under certain Stipulations, ſubject to the Company's Pleaſure, we do not think ourſelves warranted in delivering it back until your Highneſs ſhall have given your Concurrence to the Meaſure, which we accordingly requeſt; and we flatter ourſelves that your Highneſs will have no Objection to it, upon the Principle recommended by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and adopted by this Government.

APPENDIX, N° 8.

N° 85. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 17th Auguſt, received 7th September.*

You have alſo herewith a Letter addreſſed to me by Taje ud Dien, the Aumil of Guntoor, which fully ſets forth the Neceſſity there is for defending that Country; you will, I hope, uſe what Means appear proper to you for that Purpoſe. What ſhall I ſay more?

Letter from Taje ud Dien Cawn Manager, of Guntoor, dated 11th Shaban, or 9th Auguſt, 1780.

I have already ſent your Highneſs a Letter, which you have received. Meer Ally Riza, with Four thouſand Horſe, Guns, Military Stores, &c. marched from Cummum, and arrived againſt the Fort of Purcha, belonging to the Rajah of Vencatgurry, ſituated Six Coſs from Inniconda: Both Parties have fought; about 10 or 15 People in the Fort were killed and wounded, and 10 or 12 Troopers: The Fort was at laſt delivered up to Meer Ally Riza. The Son of Sapponaire, Killedar of Courchain, is arrived at Innicondah, and they are determined to take it; the Zemindars are become diſaffected, and carry on Correſpondence with the Enemy; they have alſo ſent their Vakeels to him. This Diſaffection, joined to the few Troops in the Country of Guntoor, Want of Proviſions and Ammunition, will make it impoſſible to defend the Troops in thoſe Parts, if Troops do not arrive from Maſulipatam and Ellore, &c.

Fort Saint George Seleƈt Committee, 1ſt September 1780.

Extraƈt of a Letter from Lieutenant Walter Douglas, to the Preſident and Council at Fort Saint George.

The Sepoys with me have not received any Pay for theſe Three Months, and are now much diſtreſſed. I have not, on that Account, been able to ſend the Two Companies belonging to the Circars to join their Battalions.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpeƈt,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Walter Douglas.

Munglegerry,
23d Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Seleƈt Committee, 2d September 1780.

Received the following Letter:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident and Governor, &c. Seleƈt Committee, Fort Saint George.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

From the Intelligence I have received within theſe Four Days paſt, I think there cannot be any Doubt that the French at the Mauritius, will receive a Reinforcement of Ships of War and Troops this Seaſon, and that they mean to aƈt offenſively againſt ſome of our Settlements in this Country, either jointly with ſome of the Country Powers, our Enemies, or ſeparately by themſelves. In the laſt Caſe, I am of Opinion, that the Lateneſs of their Arrival at the Mauritius, and the approaching Monſoon on this Coaſt, may make Bombay their Objeƈt.

As it will be neceſſary for the Squadron under my Command, to return to Madras Road, in order to compleat their Proviſions and Stores, ſo as to be in a Condition to quit this Coaſt before the Middle of Oƈtober, to proceed round Ceylon to the Malabar Coaſt, and Bombay, I purpoſe to quit this Station about the Middle of next Month, unleſs an Enemy come on the Coaſt before that Time.

I am, with great Regard,
Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Edw[d] Hughes.

Superb, off Negapatnam,
the 28th Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Seleƈt Committee, 5 September 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Seleƈt Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have been honoured with your Letters, dated 3d Inſtant, adviſing that Hyder Ally Cawn has commenced Hoſtilities againſt the Carnatic, and deſiring that I will be upon my Guard, by drawing

the Troops together as much as poſſible, to act upon the defenſive in caſe the Circars ſhould be attacked.

I have already repreſented to your Honour, &c. the preſent Situation of this Fort, and took the Liberty to recommend what I think is really neceſſary to put us in to a State of Defence.

The Force in this Diſtrict conſiſts of 1 Battalion of Sepoys,
3 Companies Sibbendy D°,
56 Coffries,
3 Private European Frenchmen,
2 Invalid Gunners,
7 Non-commiſſioned Officers.

The Sibbendy are now employed under the Renter, but in caſe of Emergency, or any Apprehenſion of Danger, I ſhall think myſelf juſtified in recalling them; and with theſe and Two Battalion Companies from this Garriſon, there will then remain Eight Companies of Sepoys, and a Party of Coffries, with One or Two Brigades of Guns, to be employed as Occaſion may require in the Field.

I have ordered all ſuperfluous Articles of Stores to be removed from Aſka; and completed the Four Field Pieces with Stores and Ammunition; ſo that the Troops ſtationed at Aſka are ready to move at a Moment's Warning.

By training the Coffries and Laſcars, they are capable of working the Guns; but we want a few Non-commiſſioned Officers and Gunners, who, I hope, your Honour, &c. will think proper to ſend to our Aſſiſtance.

I have received a Letter from Captain Ewen Baillie, informing me he is now in Catteah, in Behalf of the Bengal Government; and as he wiſhes to return to Calcutta from hence by a Sea Conveyance, I expect to ſee him here in a few Days. In regard to News, he cannot be explicit; but expreſsly ſays, it will depend upon our political Manœuvres with the Bhuſlar Rajah, whether the Troops with Chimnajee Booſla are to act in this Quarter after the Rains, or not.

I incloſe the Return of military Stores in this Diſtrict for the Month of June.

I am, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
John Turing.

Ganjam,
21ſt Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th September 1780.

The Preſident lays before the Committee, a Draught of a Letter which he propoſes to be ſent to Bengal, on the Subject of the Requiſition made by the Governor General and Council to them, for delivering up the Guntoor Circar to Bazalet Jung.

The ſame Letter is now read as follows:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſq; Governor General, &c. Council of Fort William.

Gentlemen,
We have the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letter of the 12th June.

The important Requiſition contained in that Letter, added to the Troubles which ſo ſoon followed the Receipt of it, will, we flatter ourſelves, be conſidered by you as a ſufficient Apology for not ſending an earlier Anſwer. The Subject has, indeed, engaged much of our Attention, and we have turned it over and over again in our Minds, with the View of meeting, as far as we poſſibly could, the Objects which you propoſed for our Compliance with your Deſire.

It were needleſs to recapitulate what has paſſed relative to the Guntoor Circar ſince the Year 1775, when the French Fleet ſtationed there, firſt became a Source of Jealouſy to us; ſuffice to obſerve, that the Meaſures which were taken to obtain the Diſmiſſion of theſe Troops, were ſuch as muſt have convinced the Nizam of the ſtrict Regard we paid to our Treaties: Yet the repeated Applications we preferred to him on this Subject availed nothing; the French were permitted to continue in the Guntoor

toor Circar, and when the War with that Nation broke out, he found it neceſſary to appoint a conſiderable Force to counteract their Deſigns. At this Time we alſo made a pointed Requiſition to the Nizam, with no better Succeſs than the former one; and ſeeing there was little Probability of obtaining the End we ſought, by direct Applications in this Channel, we liſtened to the Propoſals made to us by Bazalet Jung; and with your Sanction, entered into a Treaty with him, which freed us entirely from the Inconvenience we had been ſo long endeavouring to remove.

From this Review of Things we confeſs it does not appear to us, that the Nizam has any juſt Cauſe for Complaint. When our Rupture with the French took place, it certainly became a Violation of Treaty in the Nizam, to permit our Enemies to remain in Bazalet Jung's Diſtricts, after we had formally demanded their Diſmiſſion; nor could he, by the moſt rigid Conſtructions of the Treaty of 1768, accuſe us of any Breach of our Engagements in the Mode we purſued in conſequence of his neglecting to do us Juſtice; but what, more than all we have ſaid, convinces us that we are right, is, that our Proceedings, and the Treaty in conſequence, had the Sanction of your Conſent and Approbation.

You now require of us to deliver back to Bazalet Jung, the Guntoor Circar which we obtained on certain Terms by virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty with him: Your Motives ſeem principally to reſt upon the Neceſſity of preſerving the Nizam's Friendſhip; and this indeed is now become ſo urgent, that we are willing to make the Sacrifice you propoſe for effecting it. As to the Mode of requiring us to give up the Circar, we do not wiſh in the preſent Juncture to enter into the ſmalleſt Diſpute about it; the Difficulty which occurs to us in complying with your Deſire, is of another Kind. Nevertheleſs, we are heartily diſpoſed to remove it, and ſhall uſe our beſt Endeavours for that Purpoſe.

When we obtained the Sunnuds for the Five Northern Circars, including that of Guntoor, the Nabob requeſted of the Company that he might have the Guntoor Circar at Rent whenever it came into their Hands, which they aſſented to; and accordingly, after the Delivery of that Diſtrict to us, upon the Concluſion of the Treaty with Bazalet Jung, we farmed it to the Nabob for a certain Term, ſubject to the Pleaſure of the Company; and the Nabob now holds it upon this Footing. We have written a Letter to his Highneſs, repreſenting what you have urged as to the Expediency of giving up the Guntoor Circar in Compliance with the Nizam's Deſire, and expreſſing our Hope that he will relinquiſh his Claim upon it as Renter. So ſoon as we receive his Anſwer, we ſhall acquaint you with it, and do every Thing in our Power to expedite this Buſineſs agreeable to your Wiſhes.

Before we conclude, however, we muſt expreſs the Apprehenſion we feel, leſt Hyder Ally Cawn ſhould, upon its Reſtoration, have Influence enough to acquire the Poſſeſſion of this Diſtrict to himſelf; we know that he has already, both by Temptation and Threats, endeavoured to obtain it; and ſhould he at any Time hereafter ſucceed in his Deſign, we ſhould find him a moſt troubleſome Neighbour, as by the Situation of the Country, he would have it in his Power to ſtop our Communication by Land with the Northern Circars, and in caſe of Bazalet Jung's Demiſe, it might coſt us a War to take Poſſeſſion of our reverſionary Rights to the Diſtrict.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and humble Servants,
John Whitehill,
&c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
September 2, 1780.

Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnſon diſapprove of the foregoing Letter, as inconſiſtent with the Sentiments they have already expreſſed on the Subject of it.

Read the following Letters from Captain Edington, commanding at Palamcotah.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On Receipt of your Letter of 27th ultimo, I judge it my Duty to conſult with and adviſe Ally Noves Cawn, the Nabob's Manager, in reſpect to the future Protection of the Trinevally Country, and offered my Aſſiſtance therein.

I recommend his immediate Reconciliation, in the Nabob's Name, with the Polygars, who, in Place of Enemies, might become uſeful Friends; that he would aſſemble the Nabob's 9th Battalion of Sepoys,

poys, great Part of which are now thrown away by being in Forts that are not defendable; that he would draught the beſt Men out of Forty Sibendy Companies, and form One Battalion of them at leaſt, and recruit the Sibendies to their old Eſtabliſhment; that with this Force, joined to the Polygars, and properly ſtationed, the Country would be protected from Inſults, unleſs a large Detachment came againſt it; and that even then, from the Nature of the Country, much might be done. The Manager ſeemed to agree with me in Opinion, but ſaid it was neceſſary to write to the Nabob. I continue preſſing him on theſe Points, but ſtill he has no Orders. He promiſes to aſſemble the Battalion of Sepoys that they may be put in ſome Order, and to form another Battalion, as I have adviſed. The Polygars, he ſays, have offered of themſelves to aſſiſt the Circar; but Time is waſted, and nothing done.

I do not wiſh to be underſtood as preferring a Complaint of the Nabob's Manager; who, like moſt of thoſe in his Situation, is of an indolent Diſpoſition, and cannot be a Judge of Military Operations.

Your Honours are pleaſed to direct me to protect the Country, as well as defend the Fort. I will not, for obvious Reaſons, enter into Particulars; the Fort and Works are extenſive, and you know the Strength of the Garriſon; my Command is limitted to the Fort, having no Authority out of it. If it is meant I ſhould defend the Country, I requeſt I may have ſufficient Power to treat with the Polygars, that I may give them ſuch Aſſurances of your Honour's Protection, as will induce them to enter heartily into the Company's and Nabob's Intereſt; that the Nabob's Troops may be put under my Orders; and that a Fund for the Payment of them, and Batta for the Polygars (which is all they aſk) be eſtabliſhed; for Troops that are not paid, cannot be depended on.

I muſt obſerve, that on Inquiry who Ally Novis Cawn intended for the Command of the Nabob's Troops and Polygars, he named the Killedar of Colcade, whoſe Brother now commands Hyder Ally's Troops at Dendigul. I was ſo ſtruck with this Circumſtance, that I thought it incumbent on me to acquaint you with it; and it will ſerve to point out the Neceſſity of loſing no Time in giving me ſuch Powers, as from the above Circumſtances you ſhall judge neceſſary.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your reſpectful and obedient humble Servant,
James Edingtoun.

Palamcotah,
Auguſt 17th 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I encloſe your Honours a Copy of Two Letters from Hyder Ally that were intercepted, and which Hyder Ally Novis Cawn brought this Morning opened, and read to me. By the Addreſs of that to the Polygars, it would ſeem that the firſt-named is the moſt conſiderable one of the Country; the Fact is ſo very much the contrary, that he is not even deemed a Polygar, and has not above Fifty Men under him.

He has been for ſome Months refractory, and took himſelf to the Hills; a Circumſtance that leaves Room to believe that the others mentioned in the Letter, who are all conſiderable People, were not concerned with him; but that, to add to his own Conſequence, he made free with their Names without their Conſent.

This Point will be cleared up on the Arrival of the Vakeel, who is ordered here under a ſtrong Guard.

I addreſſed your Honours ſome Days ago, wherein it might appear that I meant to reflect on Ally Novis Cawn; but in Juſtice to him I muſt ſay, that he is now uſing every Endeavour in his Power for the Safety of his Country, without Money, which at ſuch Time may be ſuppoſed cannot eaſily be obtained; he has, as I recommended to him, got the greateſt Part of the Nabob's Troops together.

He has alſo by the Nabob's Order wrote to the Polygars who are coming in, and in Two Days hence there will be near Seven thouſand with their Chiefs in the Neighbourhood of Tinivelly; a formidable Body, could they be depended on; and I cannot help once more recommending to your Honours, impowering me to give the Faith of the Company to the Polygars, in pledge for their future Security on equitable Terms, otherwiſe their being aſſembled might prove a dangerous Expedient in a Country where there are not ſufficient Troops to overawe them.

I am, with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your obedient humble Servant,
James Edingtoun.

Palamcotah,
Auguſt 25th 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th September 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor, and the Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to send you a general Monthly Return of the Troops under my Command, for last Month, and have included the Nabob's Artillery who do Duty in the Garrison. Four Guards of this Corps mount Daily on the Four Angle Bastions of the Fort; they are really very exact, well-behaved People, and notwithstanding they are generally in Arrear of Pay, the Duty goes on chearfully. Their Wants however, begin to pinch them severely now; and as they may be made eminently useful if regularly paid, I take the Liberty of proposing to your Honourable Committee, to permit your Paymaster to issue Monthly Subsistence to them, in like Manner as the Company's Garrison is subsisted, while they continue to do Duty here; or that you will be pleased to settle some other Mode of Payment for them.

I have the Honour to remain,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
your most faithful
and obedient Servant,
Eccles Nixon.

Trichinopoly,
September 1st, 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant Walter Douglas.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President and Governor, and Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Yesterday and To-day there appeared (as far as I can judge) to be about 2,500 Horse, under Meer Saib near this Place, the greatest Part of which went off this Evening to Guntoor, with what Intention I have not been able to learn. It is generally believed that these Troops have been sent with the Consent of all the Zemindars: Two of them have already, I am told, waited on Meer Saib with the usual Salams.

I have the Honour to be, with the greatest Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient
and most humble Servant,
W. Douglas.

Munglegerry,
18 August 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th September 1780.

Received the following Letters:

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Accompanying this, I have the Honour to transmit a general Monthly Return of the Troops, &c. belonging to this Garrison. I also have the Honour to acquaint you that I have compleated the Eight Companies here, with the Twenty additional Sepoys per Company, and that I will endeavour as fast as possible to compleat the Deficiency in the Battalion occasioned by the Detachment serving at Tellicherry. I am sorry to acquaint you, that 300 of Hyder Ally's Horse, and 2000 rascally Sepoys and Peons, have entered the Madura Country, and have burnt 11 Villages. They have not as yet done much more Damage.

The Renter of Madura, with what Troops he could collect, attacked them: He killed Five Horses, wounded Two more, and killed some of their Peons. I have sent One Company of my Sepoys to reinforce him, and hope to have good Accounts from him this Day or To-morrow. I hope my sending the Sepoys to assist him will meet with your Approbation.

I am, with the greatest Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Robt Gibbons.

Madura,
2d Sept. 1780.

From

APPENDIX, N° 8.

From the Nabob to the Governor—No Date—Received 8th September 1780.

I have received your Letter of the 26th July. My Reaſon for having deferred anſwering it was; that I repeatedly expreſſed to you my Sentiments in the Conferences we have had together, on the Subject of the Deſigns of Hyder Ally Cawn. It is now ſome Months ſince I firſt adviſed you of not only the probable Aim, but even of the firſt Determination of that ambitious Chief, to diſturb the Peace and Tranquillity of the Carnatic. The Alliance he had entered into with the French, we were no Strangers to, and his Preparations for War were univerſally known throughout Hindoſtan. The Situation of the Maratta State put it beyond a Doubt that nothing was intended againſt that Quarter; my Country therefore was evidently the Object which attracted his Attention.

In the Conviction that this Opinion was not groundleſs, I ſeveral Times repreſented both to you and Sir Thomas Rumbold (before his Departure) the abſolute Neceſſity there was of providing againſt the approaching Storm. At length the Views of Hyder proved themſelves clearly to be what I had repreſented; and you now inform me that you have given Orders for the Army to aſſemble to ſtop his Progreſs, and likewiſe to chaſtiſe him for the unprovoked Attack he has made upon the Carnatic. This affords me the higheſt Satisfaction.

I am very ſenſible how eſſentially neceſſary it is, that every Exertion ſhould be made in the Articles of Proviſions and Money. With regard to the latter, you know my Difficulties. You know, that ſince the Tanjore Country was arreſted from me, and put in the Hands of Tulja Gee, in Defiance of my Right, that I have experienced every Kind of Difficulty in diſcharging my Engagements to the Company and my Debts to Individuals, and paying my Troops. You are not unacquainted likewiſe with the large Sums I paid during the Government of Sir Thomas Rumbold, which obliged me to anticipate the remaining Reſources of my Country; nor can you be at preſent but an Eye-Witneſs to the Diſtreſs I ſuffer by the Depredations of the Enemy's Cavalry, which have over-run the whole Carnatic from North to South. In this Situation, what can I promiſe? or where am I to ſeek for that Money which you repreſent as abſolutely neceſſary? As to Proviſions, I have already informed you that I have large Quantities of Grain in the Forts of Arcot, Vellore, Wandewaſh, Tiagar, Ginjee, and Trichinopoly, and have not a Doubt but that the Army will be plentifully ſupplied from theſe ſeveral Quarters; but as to the regular Settlement of Kiſt, what am I to ſay? A great Number of Years are now elapſed, ſince the Engliſh and myſelf, in ſupport of each other, firſt engaged the Enemies of the Repoſe of the Carnatic. The Fortune of our Arms was various; ſometimes we were victorious, at others unſucceſsful; at length, by the Bleſſing of the Almighty, the Cauſe of Juſtice ſucceeded, and our Enemies were overthrown. The prodigious Expence which theſe Struggles occaſioned, and which was alone to be defrayed by the Revenues of the Carnatic, was a Load which in the beſt of Times it was difficult to bear; with great Exertions however, at every Interval of Peace, I contrived to diſcharge a conſiderable Part of the Debt which had been contracted, not only in the Defence of my own Country, but likewiſe in the Proſecution of the National War carried on by the Engliſh againſt the French in Indoſtan. Still Matters occurred which required freſh Reſources; the Adjuſtment of an old Account was but a Forerunner of a new one. In the former Expedition againſt Myſore, when my Friends took the Dewannee of that Country for themſelves, which was the Cauſe of Hyder's then invading and plundering the Carnatic, I paid Ten Lacks of Pagodas on account of the Expences of that War, which I had no Concern with: In this Manner our Affairs continued; for I never conſidered them but as inſeparable until the Country of Tanjore, through the glaring Miſconduct of Tulja Gee, was re-annexed to the other Parts of my Dominions, in the Year of Chriſt 1773. I then conceived that for our future Safety, and at the repeated Requeſt of Governor Wynch, nothing was more eſſentially neceſſary than a reſpectable Body of Cavalry; I accordingly raiſed Seven Regiments, each of which was diſciplined by the Officers of the Company, lent for that Purpoſe: Theſe Regiments coſt me, all Contingencies included, upwards of Seven Lacks of Pagodas per Annum. However, upon the Orders of 1775, replacing Tulja Gee, contrary to my Right in the Country of Tanjore, I found that this Expence had been incurred for nothing. The Arrears due to my Troops, and which Lord Pigot promiſed to pay from the Revenues of the Tanjore Country, were not paid, and I was driven to the Neceſſity of calling upon the Governor and Council to be Guarantees for the Loan, which I was compelled to make to ſtop my mutinous Regiment from ruining my Country: Thus, from the unfortunate Moment that the Orders of 1775 were carried into Execution, contrary to the repeated and moſt diſintereſted Repreſentations which I could make, the Affairs of the Carnatic have been declining.

To pay the Company the Balance of their old Debt as well as their Kiſt of current Charges, Neceſſity forced me to draw Aſſiſtance from private Individuals; to thoſe Individuals, excluſive of my new conſolidated Creditors, I was obliged to give all my own Jewels as well as thoſe of my Family, in Security, and they are ſtill retained in that Situation, for I have not been able to repay them: It is well known to you, that Jewels to the Amount of many Lacks of Pagodas, have been ſold much under their Value in the City of my Friends, which has brought great Diſgrace upon me.

When

When the oldeſt and firmeſt Ally of the Engliſh in Indoſtan, is reduced in this Manner to the utmoſt Difficulty and Diſtreſs; when, inſtead of being in a Situation to entertain a Body of Cavalry ſufficient for the Defence of his Country, he is conſtrained to remain inactive while the Enemy is plundering and deſtroying every Part of his Dominions, and many Lacks, Inhabitants, Bullocks, Sheep, &c. ſent off to the Enemy's Country; when, ſo far from being able to pay his Creditors, he is even obliged further to run in Debt for the diſcharging his Engagements to the Company; when, in ſhort, all theſe Troubles and Anxieties fall unmerited upon his old Age; what is he to do? or whither is he to turn himſelf for Relief?

In every Seaſon of Life, in every Hour ſince my firſt Connection with the Engliſh, I have been uniform and invariable in the warmeſt Sentiments of Affection; my Treaſury has always been open at their Command; I ceaſed not to furniſh them every Aid for their Expences, in their Wars; we roſe together in Proſperity, and we had but one common Cauſe; what Pain muſt it therefore give me, at a Moment of Exertion like this, to be unable to give you that Satisfaction on the Article of Money which you require. I have always agreed with every Governor to pay the current Expences in the Time of Peace; I ſee the Expediency of it; but I am deprived of the Ability of conforming to what is right: In this Extremity therefore, let me entreat of you, Sir, to uſe every Exertion in your Power, to procure what may be immediately wanted, and which I will diſcharge in Time of Peace, as has always been the Caſe, conſidering myſelf in every Reſpect as Principal in the War now waged againſt the Carnatic. You are a Judge yourſelf of how little now remains undiſcharged of the current Expences, ſince my Connection with the Company to this Period of Diſturbance. As to that which reſts on me, my Cares ſhall be conſtantly employed; the Proviſions, Bullocks, &c. which I have collected in my different Forts, will ſupply the Army for a conſiderable Length of Time; the moſt poſitive Orders are and ſhall be given, that thoſe Magazines are conſtantly repleniſhed; the Army by this Means will be enabled to keep the Field; and with the Bleſſing of God, and the Wiſdom and Bravery of General Munro, and the Troops under his Command, Hyder Ally will have Reaſon to repent that he, without Provocation, commenced Hoſtilities againſt the Carnatic. What ſhall I ſay more?

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 9th September 1780.

To Lieutenant Walter Douglas, Commander in the Guntoor Circar.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 9th Ultimo.

In our former Letters to you, we have clearly explained our Intention with reſpect to the Guntoor Circar. It is not poſſible for us to ſpare a ſufficient Force to protect the whole Country, and we can therefore only deſire you to keep Poſſeſſion of the ſtrong Holds, particularly Innaconda and Munglegerry; we deſire you will proceed yourſelf with the principal Part of your Force, to Innaconda, and after providing for this Place and Munglegerry, if you can ſpare the remaining Sepoys of Captains Smith's and Bridge's Battalions, we would have you ſend them to the Circars and Ongole.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
9th September 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 9.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 4th September 1780.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

BY the Intelligence I have this Day received, Hyder Ally sent away his heavy Cannon Yesterday Evening towards Arnee; and this Morning about Three o'Clock, he marched himself the same Road. All is now clear about Arcot, and I hear our Army is on this Side Conjeveram.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and
devoted Servant,
Ross Lang.

Vellour,
30th August 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor, and President, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to acquaint you, that the Detachment under my Command crossed the Cortelear this Afternoon, and will march Tomorrow to join the Army.

I am, most respectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most humble and
obedient Servant,
Wm. Baillie.

Camp, on the South Bank
of the Cortelear,
6 P. M. 3 Sept. 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6 September 1780.

Messrs. Smith and Johnson deliver in the following Minute:

Messrs. Smith and Johnson observe, that there has been no public Letter from General Sir Hector Munro to the Committee, since he marched from the Mount (but in Justice to the General, they acknowledge to have seen Three Letters from him to the President;) they therefore think that the President should be desired to mention to the General, that the Committee desire he should correspond with them constantly on all material Points.

Resolved, That the President be desired to write to the General accordingly.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th Sept. 1780.

Camp at Conjeveram, Sept. 5th.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I received Mr. Oakeley's Note, the Nabob's Letters to Rajah Burbur. Colonel Baillie has crossed the River, I will not remain 24 Hours on this Ground after he arrives, but shall march to attack the Enemy, who are encamped about Five Miles in our Front. You will perceive by the enclosed Copy of Prendergast's Note to me, the Cause for Hyder's raising the Siege of Arcot.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

APPENDIX, N° 9.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 11th September 1780.

Received the following Letter from Sir Hector Munro.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Colonel Baillie informs me, that I muſt join him before he can move from his Camp at Peerambaucum. I ſhall march a Detachment from the Army towards him this Evening, and remain with the reſt of the Army here to watch the Motions of the Enemy, and cover Conjeveram. Near 200 Europeans ſick. There is an abſolute Neceſſity for your ſending 200 ſteady Men of the European Battalion in Madras, and one Battalion of Sepoys to Chingleput, there to wait my Orders. If the Proviſions are not ſent, they can eſcort them there. I cannot ſend an Eſcort from the Army, and nothing can hurt Madras at preſent. I foreſee that Want of Proviſions will ſoon end this Campaign, and the Want of a proper Perſon from the Nabob, to attend the Camp, will effectually do it. Order the Contents of the encloſed Indent (it is a Duplicate of one ſent to the Governor) to Chingleput, to wait there with the Detachment and Proviſions. The Enemy Two Miles from us; we are watching each other.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
H. Munro.

Camp near Conjeveram,
9th September 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 12 September 1780.

Honourable Sir,

By the encloſed Note, by Order of General Munro, you will perceive how Matters are. As no Doubt he will particularly explain the Situation of Affairs to you ſo ſoon as he arrives here, I will add no more at preſent, than that there is not Proviſions for the Camp to be had in this Place; and that unleſs Rice, &c. &c. is ſent by Sea to Sadras for them, without Loſs of Time, the Conſequences may be fatal; whereas, if every Aſſiſtance is immediately given in the Way I have taken the Liberty to mention, we will ſoon be in a Situation perfectly to revenge ourſelves for the unavoidable Accidents that have happened.

I am, Honourable Sir,
moſt reſpectfully,
Your obedient Servant,
Geo. Mackay,
Lieut. Comm[t].

Chingleput,
11th Sept[r] 1780.

To Lieut. George Mackay, commanding at Chingleput.

Sir,

I am directed by the Commander in Chief, to inform you that he is within 4 Miles of your Garriſon, with the Army, and that he intends to encamp near the Walls of it during this Night. He deſires you will order Pots, Straw, and Firewood, ready for the Troops on their Arrival.

I am,
Sir,
Your humble Servant,
James Campbell.

On the March,
Attow,
paſt 8 at Night.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 13th Sept. 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Alexander Davidſon,

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read

APPENDIX, N° 9.

Read the following Letter from the Commander in Chief.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

You will probably have heard of the unfortunute Defeat of Colonel Baillie's Detachment. I know not the Particulars; till then muſt be ſilent on the Subject. The Troops now at this Fort have been marched, Two Days paſt, from Day-light till Dark the firſt Day, and the ſecond till Day-light this Morning. No Rice here, therefore they muſt beat Paddy into Rice. Pleaſe on Receipt of this, to ſend Rice to meet us at the Mount, and ſome in Boats to Sadras, as I cannot determine the Route I ſhall take, till ſome Hircarrahs come from the Enemy's Camp, or near it, who are gone to bring Intelligence of their Motions. I will march on their Arrival, or as ſoon after as I can get Two Days Rice beat out of Paddy. Enſign Chalmers is here, and Colonel Coſby arrived here this Morning with his Detachment. I have tne Honour to be,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

Chingleput,
12th Sept. 1780.

Mr. Smith thinks it incumbent on him, in the preſent alarming Situation of Affairs, to ſubmit the following Reflections to the Conſideration of the Committee.

A particular Statement of our dangerous Situation ſhould be immediately tranſmitted to Bengal, acquainting the Governor General and Council, in plain and unequivocal Terms, that we conceive the Company's Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt in imminent Danger, unleſs they reſolve to ſend to our Aſſiſtance, a large Body of Europeans and Sepoys, with all Sorts of Military Stores, and at leaſt 30 Lacks of Rupees, for the Support of the War; that theſe Succours ſhould be ſent to us without a Moment's Delay, that they may, if poſſible be here before the ſetting in of the Monſoon, or as early as they can be riſked on the Coaſt. When we reflect on the large Armament expected from France, even theſe Succours, we fear, will be ineffectual, unleſs Matters are accommodated with the Marattas.

Shipping ſhould be immediately procured, to bring from the Northern Circars all the Troops, except ſuch as are eſſentially neceſſary for the Defence of Maſulipatam, and for the Protection of Vizigapatam and Ganjam; all other Places muſt be left to Fate at preſent, and the Preſidency ſecured. By theſe vigorous Exertions we may ſtill be enabled to take the Field after the Rains, and to make Head againſt Hyder. Sir Edward Hughes, in my Opinion, ſhould be inſtantly requeſted to permit Two of his Ships to proceed to the Northward, to bring up the Grenadiers, and as many more Sepoys as they can take on Board: By the Time theſe Ships can get to the Northward, the Northerly Winds will be ſetting in, and therefore it is probable that we may have a ſhort Paſſage back again; they may alſo bring up what Money there is at Maſulipatam, Vizigapatam, and Ganjam. Should Sir Edward Hughes deem it improper to divide his Squadron, it ſhould be conſidered, whether ſome of the Company's Ships now in the Road, ſhould not be ordered on this Service; and whether private Ships cannot be freighted. Captain Coſby ſhould be ordered to take the moſt effectual Method of making his Way good to the Preſidency, or to join the General; but if no particular Mode or Route can be pointed out to him, it muſt be left to his own Diſcretion, only recommending the utmoſt Expedition. It may be intimated to him, that, if he finds it impracticable to make his Way good by Land, he ſhould puſh down to Cuddalore, and endeavour to procure Veſſels and Boats, to bring his Detachment to Madras; ſuch as cannot abſolutely be brought hither muſt remain there.

Tanjore being of the utmoſt Importance to the Welfare of the Company, ſhould, if poſſible, be ſtrengthened; and for this Purpoſe, Sepoys ought to be raiſed in the Madura and Trinnivelly Countries: It may not be prudent at this Juncture to truſt too much to the Tanjoreans, but to raiſe them in other Places. The Polygars might be induced to permit our recruiting in their Diſtricts.

The Gentlemen at Maſulipatam ſhould be cautioned to be on their Guard, in caſe the Nizam takes up Arms againſt us, and on their hearing any probable Report thereof, to direct the different Preſidents to ſecure the Company's Inveſtments, and in Boats or otherwiſe. It may alſo be neceſſary to give Orders for raiſing Sepoys, in lieu of thoſe they may ſend hither.

It may be prudent to order all the Boats from Pondicherry to Madras, and to uſe Means for preventing the French from procuring Boats at Porto Novo; it may alſo be neceſſary to take Meaſures for ſearching all Veſſels going out of Nagapatam and Nagore, leaſt Monſieur Lally, or ſome other Perſon, ſhould be diſpatched to the French Iſlands.

The proper Diſpoſal of the French Priſoners, is a Matter deſerving the immediate Conſideration of the Committee.

Charles Smith.

The

APPENDIX, N° 9.

The Committee cannot avoid expreſſing the ſincereſt Mortification and Concern at the Loſs of ſo conſiderable a Detachment as this commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Baillie; which, after the joining of the Grenadiers of the Army, muſt have conſiſted of between Five and Six hundred Europeans, and upwards of Three thouſand Sepoys; of whom not a ſingle Officer, very few European Soldiers, and few Sepoys, that as we yet know of, have eſcaped being either killed or taken Priſoners.

As this Misfortune has reduced the Army in the Field to a very weak State, it is abſolutely neceſſary that we ſhould reinforce it, without Loſs of Time: Reſolved therefore, that a Letter be immediately prepared for Bengal, repreſenting our Situation in the ſtrongeſt Terms to the Governor General and Council, and requeſting a Reinforcement, if poſſible, equal to the Number loſt by the Defeat of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 14 Sept. 1780.

This Day the Army arrived at the Mount from Chingleput.

Wrote the following Letter:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſq. Governor General, and Council at Fort William.

Gentlemen,

We have thought it neceſſary to requeſt of Sir Edward Hughes to ſpare us the Nymph Sloop, to convey to you with all poſſible Expedition, the State of Affairs upon this Coaſt.

You were adviſed in our Letters of the 27th July and 15th ultimo, that Hyder Ally had entered the Carnatic with a very conſiderable Force, and that we were preparing, as far as our Means would permit, to repel this unprovoked Hoſtility.

The greateſt Part of the Army entered to act on this Occaſion, was accordingly aſſembled at Conjeveram, and waited only for a Detachment of Troops coming from the Circars, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie.

This Detachment arrived on the 6th Inſtant at Peerambaucum, a Place about 15 Miles diſtant from Conjeveram. Hyder Ally having Intelligence of its March, ſent a large Body of Troops to attack it; but Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, though much inferior in Point of Force, had the good Fortune, after an Engagement of Three Hours, to defeat them. This Action, however, was ſo ſevere upon his Troops, and the Number of the Enemy, which ſeems at this Time to have been reinforced, ſo very ſuperior, that Lieutenant Colonel Baillie deemed it impracticable, without powerful Support, to effect a Junction with the Main Army at Conjeveram; and having communicated this Opinion to the General, a conſiderable Detachment was ſent to his Aſſiſtance. The General himſelf remained with the reſt of the Army near Conjeveram to watch the Motions of the Enemy's Main Body, which was encamped at the Diſtance of Two Miles from him.

Lieutenant Colonel Baillie being thus reinforced, continued his March on the 9th Inſtant, at Night, towards the Army, extremely harraſſed the whole Tme by a large Body of Cavalry, with Infantry and Guns. On the 10th Inſtant, in the Morning, by ſome Accident, Four of his Ammunition Tumbrils blew up nearly at the ſame Time, and the Enemy (as we ſuppoſe, for we have no authentic Account) taking Advantage of the Diſorder which muſt have been inevitably occaſioned by this Misfortune, broke in upon the Troops, and entirely defeated them, having killed or wounded every Man of the Detachment. Nothing could have been more ſevere or unexpected than this Stroke. Lieutenant Colonel's Baillie's Detachment, before it was reinforced, conſiſted of about 130 Europeans, Infantry and Artillery, and upwards of 2,000 Sepoys; and the Troops ſent to his Aſſiſtance were compoſed of the Grenadier Companies of the Army, ſo that we imagine our Loſs upon this Occaſion cannot be leſs than 500 Europeans, and from Three to Four thouſand Sepoys, beſides Officers. General Munro has been under the Neceſſity, in conſequence, of retreating with the Army to Chingleput.

The bare Recital of this Misfortune will, we think, be ſufficient to give you a true Idea of our Situation. It was with the utmoſt Difficulty that we could draught from our Garriſons a ſufficient Number of Troops to reſiſt the Enemy in the Field; and we cannot now, without expoſing our Poſſeſſions to the greateſt Hazard, recruit our Army in any Degree equal to the Loſs it has ſuffered; we muſt therefore have immediate Recourſe to your Honourable Board for Aſſiſtance, and we truſt that the Exigency of the Caſe will induce you to grant it ſpeedily. Four or Five hundred Europeans, with Three Battalions of Sepoys, and One Company of Artillery, may, we hope, be ſpared from the Force of your Eſtabliſhment; and we requeſt this Number, or ſuch Part as you can ſpare, may be ſent us, if poſſible, in December.

But beſides Troops, our Occaſions for Money are very preſſing; we have no Means whatever to

anſwer the extraordinary Expences of this War, and it will be totally impoſſible for us to carry it on, unleſs we can be ſure of receiving Supplies of Money from you. We earneſtly requeſt your immediate Attention to this Object, and that you will do us the Favour to inform us to what Extent we can be aſſiſted. It would be a great Relief to us, if a Sum of Money could be ſent immediately after the Receipt of theſe Diſpatches.

In a former Letter we took the Liberty of ſuggeſting to you the Advantages that might reſult from an Attack upon Hyder's Poſſeſſions on the Malabar Coaſt. A Diverſion on that Side would be the moſt probable Means of forcing him out of the Carnatic; and we ſincerely hope you may have come to ſome Reſolution upon it, in which we ſhould be happy to contribute all that lays in our Power. As the Squadron is going round to that Coaſt, the Opportunity will be extremely favourable, and the Succeſs of ſuch an Enterprize cannot be doubted. But excluſive of this Advantage, which would ariſe from a Diviſion of Hyder's Force, if you could acquire Poſſeſſion of the Forts of Mangulore and Callicut, the French would probably be diſappointed in their Views of aiding Hyder, or the Marattas, by landing their Troops at thoſe Places, and this is indeed an Object of the Firſt Importance; for we have already experienced how much Hyder Ally has benefited by his Connections with the French, of whom there are Four or Five hundred now ſerving in his Army; and a conſiderable Part of theſe, as we are informed, were with the Troops that defeated Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment.

Mr. Stephen Sullivan, the Secretary to the Civil Department, having our Permiſſion to proceed to Bengal, we take the Opportunity of ſending this Diſpatch by him; and we beg Leave to refer to him for any Particulars you wiſh to be acquainted with, and which we may inadvertently have omitted in our Letter.

As the Admiral ſends the Nymph only as far as Baſalore Road, we requeſt the Favour of you to communicate your Sentiments and Reſolutions to us upon the Subject of this Letter, by an Expreſs Pilot Veſſel; or by ſuch other Means as you ſhall deem moſt proper.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
14 September 1780.

Copy of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. to Warren Haſtings, Eſq; Governor General, and Council of Fort William.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

Superb, Exeter, Worceſter, Burford, Eagle, Nymph.

I arrived in the Road on the 12th Inſtant, with His Majeſty's Ships named in the Margin, in order to compleat their Proviſions and Stores for the Paſſage to the Malabar Coaſt and Bombay, at which Place my Arrival is moſt earneſtly preſſed by the Preſidency, by Letters of the 14th Auguſt laſt, incloſing Extracts of Intelligence from the Court of Directors, dated the 24th March laſt, giving Information of Seven capital Ships, with Seven thouſand Regular Troops, and ſuppoſed to be intended againſt Bombay, and which correſponds with Caution given me before I left England, as well as all the Intelligence I have of late received.

On that Day, it was greatly feared ſome untoward Accident had prevented the Junction of a large Detachment of Europeans and Sepoys, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, with the Army under the Command of Sir Hector Munro; ſorry am I to tell you, that laſt Night's Advices from the Army have given Certainty to the Deſtruction, not only of the Whole of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie's Detachment, but alſo of a Reinforcement ſent to ſupport it, conſiſting of all the European Grenadiers and Light Infantry, and all the Sepoy Grenadiers of the Army, making together more than Four hundred Europeans, and Three thouſand Sepoys, with about Fifty Officers; and in conſequence of this Diſaſter, the Army under Sir Hector Munro has retreated to Chingleput, on its Route to the Mount, in great Want of every Thing; and, as the Report is, having loſt the Whole of their Cannon and Baggage. In ſhort, Sir and Gentlemen, as far as my Knowledge of Land Service aſſiſts me, it appears to me, under the preſent Circumſtances, and with all the Force this Preſidency can poſſibly bring into the Field, they will be in no Condition to face the Enemy, unleſs you ſend them a large and timely Reinforcement of Troops; nor will Troops alone ſave this ſinking Settlement, for I am aſſured by the Governor, that they have no Money in the Treaſury, nor any evident Means of raiſing it, in any Proportion adequate to their preſent Exigencies.

Under all these Circumstances, I trust you will not think me importunate, if I recommend to your most serious Consideration, the imminent Danger there is of the Loss of the Company's very valuable Possessions on this Coast, unless you give that effectual and timely Succour of Men and Money, absolutely necessary to save them; for the present Force with Hyder Ally is not all they have to contend with. I have not a Doubt, that a regular Plan of Operations is settled between him and the French, and that a very large Body of regular Troops will, by some Means or other, be sent to Hyder's Assistance.

Strongly impressed as I am with this Certainty, and the Possibility, and even Probability, that the French may bring a superior Naval Force into these Seas, I think it my indispensable Duty to warn you, Sir and Gentlemen, of the evident Necessity there now exists, to guard not only the Company's Territories on this Coast, but even Fort Saint George itself, from the Arms of France and Hyder, at this Time, when the whole national Strength is required to make Head against the combined Force of France and Spain, and our rebellious Colonies; and that this may be the more easily and effectually done, I most earnestly wish and recommend, that, laying aside all other Plans of Operation against the Marattas, or any other Country Powers, the Three Presidencies do heartily concur, by every Means, both of Men and Money, and Treaties, to reduce this habitual Foe to the English Nation within due Bound; in the effecting of which, and every other Service for the public Good, you may be assured of my most ready Concurrence, and best Assistance.

As His Majesty's Sloop Nymph is destined for farther Service of the utmost Consequence to the Public, and which requires her speedy Return to join me here, I have directed Captain Stevens, who commands her, to proceed no further than Ballasore Road; but I trust, Sir and Gentlemen, you will do me the Honour to communicate to me fully, before I leave this Coast, your Sense of the State of the public Affairs, as well as your Opinions on the most proper Mode of conducting them, that my Want of Information may not preclude me from the active Part I wish to take, in all Things for the Interest of the Company and the Nation.

I am, &c.

Edw^d Hughes.

Superb, Madras Road,
14th Sept^r. 1780.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 18th Sept^r. 1780.

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnson.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant George Mackay, commanding at Chingleput:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor, and President, &c.

Honourable Sir,

Hyder's main Army is, I understand, encamped Three Miles on the other Side of Conjeveram: His Intentions are, it is said, to attack and besiege Arcot, so soon as every necessary Peparation has been made. His Loss has been very considerable, and his Ammunition greatly expended.

Every one of our Sepoys who escaped from his Camp, are arrived here, and report, that had our Army had Seven or Eight Days Rice in Camp, Hyder would have retreated (after the Action with Colonel Baillie) towards Trinomally.

It seems he knew of all our Resources, and of every Grain of Rice, &c. we had in Camp, and thereby acted a more daring Part than he otherwise would have attempted.

I was directed by Sir Hector Munro, to collect and form into a Body, all the Sepoys, whether wounded or unhurt, of Colonel Baillie's Detachment, who might come to this Place. In compliance with his Orders, I will do my utmost for the public Good; till such Time as I shall be honoured with your further Orders upon the Subject, I will advance them some little Money, and take every Care of them in my Power.

I am,
Honourable Sir,
most respectfully,
your obedient Servant,
George Mackay,
Lieu^t. Com^t.

Chingleput,
15th September 1780.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 9.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 2d October 1780.

Read the following Minute, delivered in Yesterday by Messrs. Smith and Johnson:

In our Minute of the 3d ultimo, we mentioned, that we should be as ready as any one, to set down to the Fate of War any Mischance which might befal the General. We hope our Conduct since that Period has justified this Declaration, although we were under the greatest Anxiety and Suspence about the State of the Army. We suppressed our Feelings, and waited Six Days after the Commander in Chief's Arrival here, before we entered a Minute on the Subject. We hoped he would see this in a proper Light; but were much disappointed when we found he considered our Requisition, although conceived in the most delicate Terms, premature. After having perused the General's Letter to the Board of the 25th ultimo, we contented ourselves with observing, that it did not contain the Information we wished. We hoped that this Hint would be sufficient, and that he would be more explicit in his subsequent Letters; but we are again disappointed, for his Letter of the 23d ultimo relates merely to the Measures he wishes to be adopted for recruiting the Army.

Under such Circumstances we cannot reconcile it to the Duty we owe to our Honourable Employers, the Public, and our own Safety, to delay any longer giving our Sentiments on the present alarming Situation of Affairs. We hope it will appear, that our Conduct throughout has been uniformly devoid of Pique, Prejudice, or Resentment; and so confident are we of this, that we will venture to appeal to the General's best Friends, whether we have not been guided by the greatest Moderation, amidst the Confusion, Dejection, and Consternation which has prevailed since the Accounts arrived of the Flower of our Army being cut off, and of his Retreat. It is true, we were apprehensive of the Event; we foresaw the Consequences which might result from the Delays that had been used in ordering Lieutenant Colonel Baillie to march directly with his Detachment from the Northward, as we had proposed; and therefore bore the fatal News with more Resignation than we should have done, had it come totally unexpected.

The Disaster which has befallen us, is such as cannot be paralleled since the English had Possessions in India. We have lost a great Part of our best Officers, about 600 Europeans, and 4,000 Sepoys; the Remains of our Army have been forced to retreat with the greatest Precipitation; and Hyder Ally, fearless, and unopposed, now ravages the Carnatic. Surely then, it is incumbent on us to be fully informed of the Extent of our Misfortune, and not to lament in Silence a Loss which we fear cannot be repaired.

It is by no Means our Intention to pass any Censure on what has happened, but wish for a thorough Explanation, so that our Honourable Employers may not complain that the Government were deficient in sending them the necessary Information of this melancholy Event.

We are therefore obliged to reiterate our Request, and to declare, that the General's Letter &c. of the 21st ultimo, does not contain the Information we desired. And we are of Opinion, that it is highly proper and necessary he should lay before the Committee,

Copies of all Letters sent by him to the Governor, to the Select Committee, to Lieutenant Baillie, and to Captain Cosby, also of all Letters he sent to any other Officers, from the Day of his leaving the Mount, until his Return with the Army to Marmalong.

A Return of the Army on the Day he marched from the Mount.

A Return of the Army on the Day after his Return with it to Marmalong.

A Return of the Army now encamped at Marmalong.

A Return of Ordnance, Tents, and other Stores, lost and expended between the 26th of August and the 14th ultimo: And

The last Returns made to the Commander in Chief, by Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, of the Troops and Stores under his Command.

All these Documents are essentially necessary for the Guidance of Government in their future Deliberations for carrying on the War, and will serve to elucidate past Transactions.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnson.

The 1st October 1780.

The General acquaints the Committee, that he means to reply to the foregoing Minute, and that he intends, as far as he is able, to comply with their several Requisitions.

APPENDIX, N° 9.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, dated 6th October 1780.

Sir Hector Munro now delivers in the following Minute and Returns, with Copy of his Correſpondence during the late Campaign; but begs Leave to remark, that there is one Part of Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon's Minute which he cannot anſwer until he is furniſhed with a Return of Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher's Detachment.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, in their Minute of the 1ſt of October, are pleaſed to make the following Remark: "We contended ourſelves with obſerving, that the General's Letter to the Board of the 20th ultimo did not contain the Information we wanted: We hoped that this Hint would be ſufficient, and that he would be more explicit in his ſubſequent Letters; but we are again diſappointed, for his Letter of the 23d ultimo relates merely to the Meaſures he wiſhes to be adopted for recruiting the Army."

The Gentlemen ſeem to have forgot that when Mr. Johnſon made the Obſervation that my Letter did not contain the Information he and Mr. Smith wiſhed, I deſired him to commit them to Paper, and that if it was in my Power to comply with their Demand, I would do it.

Colonel Coſby's Inſtructions are with the Secretary; I wrote him Two or Three Letters, importing little more than what was contained in his Inſtructions, and of which I had no Copy, nor have I any of my Notes (for they were no Letters) to Colonel Baillie, except one or two *Erſe* ones, which the Gentlemen are welcome to whenever they pleaſe. The having no Cypher, made me write thoſe in Erſe, as they were of ſome Conſequence. Colonel Coſby, ſince his Recovery from his laſt Illneſs, has given me the few Letters I wrote to him, and which I now lay before the Committee, as I ſhall my Notes to Colonel Baillie, as ſoon as I can procure them from him. They were written and ſent away in the Night-time in a Hurry, as Hircarrahs could not come into Camp or go out of it in the Day-time, owing to the Number of the Enemy's Horſe which were conſtantly round our Encampment.

In Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon's Minute of the 21ſt September, they only demanded a general Return of the Troops, which I laid before the Committee the Moment I got it from the Adjutant General; they alſo deſired a Return of the Deficiencies of Stores that went with the Army; they got it, and alſo the Strength of the Corps, except His Majeſty's.

They have now aſked thoſe Returns in a different Form, and ſome others, which I now lay before them, and which I could not do before, until they ſignified their Wiſhes. I correſponded with none, to the beſt of my Remembrance, but the Governor, whom I requeſted to keep my Letters, and I now lay them before the Committee, as Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon in their laſt Minute have aſked for them. I wrote a Letter or two to Mr. Flint, and deſired him to ſend to the Committee the Returns the ſaid Letters required of him, and which I believe Lieutenant Flint has done. I ſent a few Notes to Captain Prendergaſt, which were written by Captain Pringle; all the Copies that he kept I now lay before the Committee.

I have only to add, that I think my Letter to the Committee contains ſomething more than merely my Wiſhes to recruit the Army; and had Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment fortunately joined mine, I was not without the moſt ſanguine Hopes that a Correſpondence would ſoon have enſued between the Committee and me, not only of ſuch Conſequence as to demand an Inſpection, but would be ſuch as might reflect Honour and Reputation on their Conduct, and on my Actions.

Fort Saint George, 6th Oct. 1780. Hector Munro.

To John Whitehill, Eſq. Governor, &c. &c. Madras.

My dear Sir,

I received your Note this Moment, and as all the Troops in Camp are much fatigued after a long March, it will be impoſſible for the Eſcort to be ſent to meet the Eſcort from Madras, before Six o'Clock this Evening; they ſhall go then, and keep marching until they meet your Eſcort. I have in the mean time ſent Jack your Boy, and two Hircarrahs, on as faſt as poſſible, to deſire that the Officer who commands the Eſcort may come on until he meets the one from Camp, as above. There will be no Accident happen, for we ſaw but Nine or Ten ſtraggling Horſe of the Enemy's this Day. I ſhall do myſelf this Pleaſure again To-morrow. Beſt Compliments to all our Friends. Believe me,

My dear Sir,
Your's affectionately,
Hector Munro.

Camp near Conditour,
paſt 3 o'Clock Afternoon,
26th Auguſt 1780.

Dear

Dear Sir,

We are juſt arrived here, and intend to march about 4 o'Clock To-morrow Morning. I have had no Complaints ſince we came to our Ground; but our Rear Guard is not as yet come up. I ſend you a Note I received on the March this Day.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's very ſincerely,
Hector Munro.

Putapyer Village,
26th Auguſt,
paſt 11 o'Clock Forenoon.

To Major General Sir Hector Munro.

Sir,

Hyder arrived at Arcott Yeſterday Morning; he has Twelve heavy Guns, and Twenty Field Pieces.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient humble Servant,
R. Lang.

Vellore,
22d Auguſt 1780.

To the Governor, &c. &c. Madras.

Dear Sir,

The advanced Guard is juſt come to the Ground of Encampment. The Rain was ſo heavy laſt Night with us, and the Night before with Colonel Baillie, that neither of us can get to Conjeveram till Tueſday Morning. The Money is arrived. We heard a great many Guns this Day, ſuppoſed at Arcot. I have ſent to Captain Prendergaſt, and will act according as I find his Situation, or that he is near ſurrendering the Place. We march at Two o'Clock To-morrow Morning.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's as uſual,
Hector Munro.

Camp at Triparmadore,
27th Auguſt 1780.
Half paſt 10 o'Clock Forenoon.

My Dear Sir;

Here we are without any Accident happening; I ſhall encamp To-morrow at Conjeveram, where Colonel Baillie will alſo encamp; firing at Arcot as uſual. You will, no Doubt, acquaint the Gentlemen of the Committee with our Motions.

I am truly Your's,
H. Munro.

Camp, Nine Miles from Conjeveram,
28th Auguſt 1780.

To the Governor, &c. &c. Madras.

Dear Sir,

I wrote to you this Morning from our laſt Ground, recommending that Rice, Arrack, Sheep, and Biſcuit, &c. ſhould be laid in for the Army at Chingleput without one Moment's Delay, for if the Polar is up we can get at no Proviſions of any Kind; and it has rained without ceaſing for theſe Four Nights paſt and all this Morning, which is moſt unfortunate for us. The Gentleman (as he is called) whom the Nabob ſent with us, promiſed to get me ſome Rice here and Two hundred Sheep: When I came to the Ground, he told me he had no Orders but to attend me. As I neither want him for a Valet de Chambre, a Cook, or a Butler, or as a Guide, I deſired him to return from whence he came as ſoon as he pleaſed, for that I never would aſk him to do any one Thing whatever; and as I ſhall moſt implicitly keep my Word, he is now a *Gentleman* at large, to go where and when he pleaſes. So much for the Nabob's Gentleman. The Time may come when he may be of Opinion, that all the Gentlemen of his Family ought to have attended this Army; but little ſaid is ſoon mended, according to the old Proverb. The encloſed for the Nabob, from his Gentleman. They are firing away at Arcot as uſual. I hope ſtill to ſave it.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's as uſual,
H. Munro.

Camp at Conjeveram,
29th Auguſt 1780.

P. S. Beſt Compliments to all with you, and to our Friend Oakley.

To the Governor, &c. &c. Madras.

Dear Sir,

We encamped here laſt Night, but as the Waters are up, and Baillie not joined, I muſt wait his Arrival on Two Accounts, the one as the Nabob's raſcally Killidar gave up Coverypauk Four Days ago to Hyder, and he is now Hyder's Killidar there; the other is, that there is a large Encampment on the other Side the River oppoſite to this Place, with a View, I ſuppoſe, as ſoon as they can croſs, to intercept Colonel Baillie. I mean to have a Detachment in the Pagoda with the heavy Guns, to prevent the Enemy from taking Poſt there. I can ſay nothing about the Three Men which were tried by a Court Martial, until I receive the Sentence. Colonel Braithwaite ſays, the Proceedings were ſent to Madras in the Sartine; but I never ſaw it. The Nabob ought to write to Bumrauze and the Venkategery Rajah, to get Grain, Sheep, &c. ready for the Army directly, and let me know when I am to ſend an Eſcort for it; but they muſt find Bullocks.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's, &c.
H. Munro.

Camp at Conjeveram,
30th Auguſt 1780.

Dear Sir,

I had a Letter this Day from Baillie, who has not been able, owing to the heavy Rains, to croſs the Nulah the Day before Yeſterday. Two of Hyder's People were found this Morning in the Front of our advanced Picquets. They poſitively affirm that Hyder, with Tippo Saib, is on the oppoſite of the River to Little Conjeveram with Twelve Battalions of Sepoys, 40 Field Pieces, 6,000 Horſe, and 1,000 Peons. I told the Two Men if their Intelligence proved true I would reward them, if otherwiſe, I would moſt undoubtedly hang them. I have ſent out 10 Hircarrahs, and ſhall acquaint you To-morrow what Accounts they bring in. If it is true that Hyder is come in from Arcot, he muſt intend to prevent, if he can, the Junction of Colonel Baillie with this Part of the Army, or he intends to puſh to Madras: In either Event I ſhall be cloſe at his Heels; and of this you will pleaſe to acquaint the Gentlemen of the Select Committee. Mean Time I am, with Eſteem.

Dear Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

Camp at Conjeveram,
31ſt Auguſt 1780.

P. S. I wiſh you would eſtabliſh a Tapall to come to Camp by the Way of Chingleput.

To the Governor, &c. &c. Madras.

My Dear Sir,

I have not miſſed writing to you a ſingle Day ſince I left the Mount, and I received but one Letter from you, that was Yeſterday, which I anſwered immediately. Hyder is about Eight Miles in Front of this, and he has got about 4000 Horſe and Rocket Boys. About Four Miles from this, in our Front, he is throwing up Redoubts, I ſuppoſe to ſtop our Progreſs if he can, but when the Rain will let one march to the Place, I hope he will quit his Redoubts, *as he has abandoned the Siege of Arcot without Succeſs, which he did Three Nights ago, about* 12 *at Night, when he ſent his heavy Guns towards Arnee,* and croſſed his whole Army over the Polar above Knee deep, and keeps not One Tent ſtanding but his own. I beg you will not let the Nabob forget to ſend to Bumrauze and the Venketagerry Man to provide us with Grain and Sheep; we have not got One Sheep but what we have brought from Pnoamallee. Had I any proper Perſon with me, with proper Powers, we might, during our Stay here, get Sheep from Tripaſore, and ſome might be ſent us from Chingleput; but here we are ſo helpleſs, as if dropped out of the Clouds; as in an Enemy's Country inſtead of a Friend's.

I am, with much Eſteem,
Dear Sir,
Your's,
Hector Munro.

Conjeveram,
1ſt September 1780.

P. S. Keep all my Letters, I requeſt of you.

APPENDIX, N° 9.

To the Governor.—Decypher'd.

Send the Stores to Chingleput as per Indent ſent you.

I ſtay here for Baillie's joining; when that happens I march to attack Hyder, who is now by Report on this Side Coverypauk. We have no Intelligence from the Country; it's both ſhameful and diſgraceful to have it ſaid.

I am,
Your's, &c.
Hector Munro.

Conjeveram,
2d September.

Dear Sir,

I expect to be able to move from hence the Day after To-morrow, unleſs beating of Paddy (for we have no Rice) prevents it. I am ſo vexed and ſo perplexed I have only to offer my beſt Compliments to the Gentlemen of the Committee, and to aſſure you and them that I will embrace the very firſt Opportunity of driving the Enemy from their preſent Situation.

I am very reſpectfully,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

Camp at Conjeveram;
3d September 1780.

To the Governor, &c. &c. Madras.

Dear Sir,

No Change ſince my Letter of Yeſterday, but that many of the Sepoys refuſed this Day to receive Paddy, and I have no Rice to give them; for God's Sake ſend ſome Perſon of Conſequence from the Nabob's Family, unleſs they mean to try Experiments by making an Army live upon Air. I have not miſſed one Day in writing to you ſince I left the Mount, and I have had but one Letter from you, and none from any other Perſon, except a Note from my Friend Davidſon.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's, &c.
Hector Munro.

Camp Conjeveram,
4th September 1780.

Dear Sir,

I had it not in my Power to write to you Yeſterday, as the whole Line was under Arms from 9 o'Clock in the Morning till paſt Dark at Night; when we lay all Night on our Arms, without Tents on the Ground, the Enemy Two Miles in our Front. The Cauſe for this was, that Tippoo Saib detached about 2000 Foot, with ſome Guns, and 4000 Horſe, towards Baillie; and Yeſterday Morning marched his whole Army, in order to ſupport that Detachment; he manœuvred, ſo did we, and his Plan was fruſtrated, by which Means Baillie attacked the advanced Party, and by the Accounts of a Hircarrah that came in laſt Night, he beat them off. The Hircarrah was under the Neceſſity of throwing away a Letter he had from Baillie, ſo that I know not at preſent where he is, but as I am reſolved to keep as near the Enemy's main Body as I can, I expect to ſee Colonel Baillie To-morrow. Before I move at any Diſtance from Conjeveram I muſt get Rice and Sheep. I have now but Two Days Rice.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's, &c.
H. Munro.

Camp, Two Miles and Half
North of Conjeveram,
7th of September 1780.

The Enemy's Army, as nearly as we can gueſs, between Horſe and Foot, amount to above 15,000, excluſive of Lutewallers or Irregulars.

To

APPENDIX, N° 9.

To the Governor, &c. &c.

My dear Sir,

I hope you and my other Friends will be ſo good as to ſuſpend your Judgment reſpecting our late Diſappointment, until we know the real Cauſe; I believe all the Army will do me the Juſtice to ſay, that every Method which could be thought of, was tried to effect that Junction with Col. Baillie; but alas! our Situation in this Country is ſuch, that any unexpected Change of Weather may in a Moment overturn the beſt concerted Plans that human Invention is capable of forming. I am not able to write more, but wiſh to be kindly remembered to all our Friends.

I am always,
My dear Friend,
Your's,
H. Munro.

Chingleput,
12th September.

To the Governor, &c. &c. Madras.

Dear Sir,

Pleaſe to acquaint the Select Committee, That the Troops are encamped here, or rather quartered until I receive their Directions about them. I would imagine, encamping To-morrow on the Madras Side of the Marmalong River, would keep the Communication open with Madras at all Times. If they are to move there, I beg Rice, Biſcuit, and a Buzar may ſent out early in the Morning.

I am reſpectfully,
Dear Sir,
Your's, &c.
H. Munro.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, &c.

Sir Hector Munro preſents his Compliments to Mr. Whitehill; has received his Letter, and alſo one from the Committee; he intends waiting here till he receives their Directions relative to the Army, and its Encampment, To-morrow Morning.

St. Thomas's Mount,
Sept. 14th 1780.

Copies of Letters ſent by General Munro to Colonel Coſby from the 17th Auguſt, till the 7th September 1780.

Sir,

As Hyder is ſending back his heavy Artillery over the Changama Paſs, if you could fall in with them, or if they ſhould have got clear of the Paſs, could you deſtroy the Road through the Paſs, or fill it up, ſo as to ſtop him there in caſe we engage him, and have the good Fortune to beat him, it would be of Conſequence; but all this, or any Part of it, muſt be carried into Execution according as you get Intelligence of his Motions as above, near or at the Paſs, and when you get your Force together.

I am, with Eſteem,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

Fort St. George,
17th Auguſt 1780.

(DUPLICATE.)

Sir,

I ſhall march this Night, and ſhall proceed with the Army to Arcot, where you will let me know your Motions. If you can cut off Hyder's Proviſions, and failing of that, fill up or deſtroy the Road through the Paſs of Changama, to prevent his getting on his Artillery, without being obliged to halt his Army for ſome Days, and may thereby give me an Opportunity of coming up with him, ſhould he decline coming to a general Engagement: Either of theſe Pieces of Service being put

in Execution, will be of very great Conſequence; but if you cannot effect this, I would have you join me as ſoon as you can with the Cavalry.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

Fort St. George,
15th Auguſt 1780.

Sir,

As Mr. Roberts acquaints me you was to be at Tiagar the 2d Inſtant, I wiſh you to march with your whole Force to join me by the following Route; from Tiagar to Trincaloor, Gingee, Wandewaſh, and Conjeveram. Hyder's main Body is now about Three Miles from our Camp, on this Side the Pollar, ſo that if you have formed any Plan which can be put in Execution without retarding your March this Way, you are at Liberty to try it; at ſame Time your joining me ſoon is of great Conſequence.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

Camp at Conjeveram,
7th September 1780.

Captain Prendergaſt.

Dear Sir,

The General deſires me to acquaint you, that your Letter to me of the 29th ultimo gave him great Satisfaction, and he hopes you will take every Opportunity of ſending him all the Intelligence you can from your Quarter. We had had a Rumour of the Siege's being raiſed a few Hours before your Letter arrived; he waits here a little Time for Reaſons you will be made acquainted with by and by; but mean, if any Dangers threaten you, depend on ſpeedy Relief.

I am Your's,
J. P.

Conjeveram,
2d September 1780.

To Colonel Bailie.

There are Numbers of Hyder's Horſe on the Road which you are to come. Set out from Tiipaſore at Night-fall, and do not ſtop, if poſſible, until you arrive at Conjeveram.

Hector Munro.

Conjeveram,
2d September 1780.

The General and I have had the Pleaſure of receiving your Notes of the 31ſt ultimo, laſt Night; I am deſired by the General to acquaint you, that he wiſhes you would have all the Bullocks and Baſs you can muſter, in Readineſs, as alſo as many Sheep as you can collect, in Caſe he ſhould have Occaſion to look towards your Quarter for Proviſions. If the Paddy is not beat out into Rice, he depends on the Zeal you have already diſcovered for the Service, for your ſetting People at Work immediately in preparing that important Article. The General deſires me to acquaint you alſo, that he has certain Intelligence of Colonel Goddard, with his Men, and a great Body of Marattas having laid waſte the greateſt Part of Hyder's Dominions to the Northward.

I am, &c.
J. P.

I got Your's of the 3d and 4th March from Peerambaucum, in the Night-time, ſo as to arrive here by Day-light; and unleſs I know the Night you leave it, ſo as to be back here next Morning at Day-light, every Thing here would be deſtroyed before we could return, the Enemy's Camp being but Five Miles in our Front.

Camp at Conjeveram,
5 September, 8 A. M.

STATE of Officers and Men present with the Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, taken from the Returns for August 1780.

	Artillery.										Infantry.										Sepoys.									
	Captain.	Lieutenants.	Lt. Fire-workers.	Conductor.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Gunners.	Matroſſes.	Total.	Lieut^t Col.	Captains.	Brevet Capt^ns.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Cadets.	Serj^t Majors.	Q. M. Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Privates.	Total.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Drummers.	Puchallies.	Sepoys.	Total.
Artillery —	1	1	2	1	7	8	5	14	43	77																						
European Infantry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	3	—	2	1	1	3	3	7	89	104									
Sepoy Corps	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	7	19	4	—	3	4	17	—	—	—	24	3	32	34	168	171	44	34	2120	2606

N. B. The Company of Guides present with the Detachments not included; Enſign Moncrieff Quarter Maſter, Mr. William Raine and Mr. George Campbell, Surgeons; Enſign M^cAliſter doing Duty the 1ſt Battalion of Sepoys, and William Carr, Private of the 2d Battalion 1ſt Regiment, Camp Colourmen present with the Detachment, and not included in the above State.

Henry Macolm,
Aj^t General.

PRESENT STATE of the Company's Troops encamped at the Mount, Auguſt 26th 1780.

	FOR DUTY.																				SICK.																	
	Europeans.														Natives.						Europeans.												Natives.					
	Commiſſioned Officers.							Staff.			Non-com.d R.&F.				C.o Offi.s Non-c.o R.k & File.						Commiſſioned Officers.							Staff.			Non-c.o R.&F.				C.o Offic.s		Non-c.o R.&F.		
	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	L.t F.te W.rs.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maſters.	Conductors.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Commanders.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	Total.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	L.t F. W.rs.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maſters.	Conductors.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Commanders.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	Total.
Cavalry — —	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	30	33	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Artillery — —	1	—	1	4	3	6	—	1	1	2	2	26	18	250	294	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2d Battalion, 1ſt Regiment —	1	1	1	7	4	—	7	1	1	—	5	24	28	271	323	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	18	19	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grenadiers, 2d Batt.n 2d D.o	—	—	—	1	4	—	—	—	—	—	5	3	92	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cadet Company — —	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	27	3	—	1	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
14th Battalion of Sepoys —	—	—	—	1	1	—	5	1	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	1	6	5	10	9	645	676	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	—	25	29
15th Ditto — Ditto —	—	—	—	1	2	—	4	1	—	—	—	5	—	—	5	1	7	8	10	9	620	655	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	30	32
16th Ditto — Ditto —	—	—	—	—	1	—	4	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	5	1	7	8	11	9	582	618	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	26	27
17th Ditto — Ditto —	—	—	—	—	2	—	4	1	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	1	9	8	12	10	681	721	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	46	47
21ſt Ditto — Ditto —	—	—	—	—	2	—	5	1	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	1	9	10	12	10	615	657	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	18
Company of Markſmen —	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	1	2	5	1	98	107	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

RETURN

RETURN of Tents, Stores, &c. belonging to the different Corps under the Command of Colonel James; Camp, Marmelon, 4th October 1780; loft from the 26th to the 13th September.

	Field Officers Marques.	Walls.	Poles.	Shells.	Marques compleat.	Walls.	Poles, Sets.	Shells.	Sepoy Tents.	Bell Tents compleat.	Fuzees with Bayonets.	D° without.	Muskets with Bayonets.	D° without.	Bayonets.	D° Slings.	Pouches.	D° Slings.	Halberts.	Drums compleat.	Cord.	Braces.	Snares.	Sticks, Pairs.	Bench Vice.	Hand D°.	Screw Plate.	Hammers of Sorts.	Bellows, Pairs.	Pincbers.	Files, Sorts.	Bars, Iron.	D° Shell.	Solder Powders.	Borax.	Copper D°.	Hand Hatchets.	Bills, Hooks.	Mamooties.	Gunny Bags.	Europe Twine.	Bengal D°.	Cotton Rope, Sk°.	Thread, Pounds.	Wax Cloth, Pieces.	Hides of Leather.	Carriage Bullocks.	Private Tents.
Artillery — —	1	—	—	—	1	2	16	2	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14
73 Regiment — ,	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	48
2 Battalions 1ſt Regiment	1	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	10	2	40	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	15	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14
14 Battalion Sepoys	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	10	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
15 D° D°	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	6	20	7	—	70	—	—	70	—	—	3	7	49	22	3	1	1	1	—	—	30	—	—	—	—	20	12	46	16	1	—	—	1	14	—	—	—	—	—	—
16 D° D°	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	6	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
17 D° D°	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	9	22	16	—	24	—	60	30	—	—	1	—	—	50	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	2	—	—	—	30	—	20	—	5	3	5	—	5½	—	—	—	1
21 D° D°	—	—	—	—	2	2	14	—	9	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Total	—	2	—	3	26	4	30	2	40	99	33	2	134	8	60	30	70	—	1	3	7	99	24	3	3	3	1	1	—	37	1	2	—	—	—	52	27	75	16	6	3	5	1	19½	—	—	—	97

The Quarter-Maſter's Stores belonging to the 14th, 16th, and 21ſt Battalions of Sepoys were loſt upon the March, but the Quantity thereof cannot be aſcertained, as the Accounts kept of them were loſt at the ſame Time.

Edward James, Col[l] Com[t].

A RETURN

APPENDIX, N° 9.

A RETURN of Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, iſſued for the Army, and loſt on the Marches; from the 26th of Auguſt to the 15th of September 1780.

QUALITY of STORES.	Iſſued to the Army.	Sent into Conjeveram.	Sent to Col. Baillie.	Loſt on the March.	Total.
Iron Guns,					
18 Pounders — — —	—	4	—	—	4
3 D° — — —	—	1	—	—	1
Braſs Mortars,					
4⅕ Inch — — —	—	4	—	—	4
Field Carriages,					
24 Pounders — — —	—	2	—	—	2
18 D° — — —	—	4	—	—	4
3 D° — — —	—	1	—	—	1
Round Shot fixed to Flannel Cartridges,					
6 Pounders — — —	64	—	100	—	164
3 D° — — —	30	—	60	—	90
Shells fixed to Flannel Cartridges,					
5½ Inch — — —	1	—	—	—	1
Grape Shot fixed to Flannel Cartridges,					
6 Pounders — — —	—	—	42	—	42
3 D° — — —	11	—	28	—	39
Empty Flannel Cartridges,					
12 Pounders — — —	44	—	—	—	44
6 D° — — —	12	—	—	—	12
Filled Flannel Cartridges,					
12 Pounders — — —	4	—	—	—	4
6 D° — — —	46	—	—	—	46
Iron Round Shot,					
18 Pounders — — —	—	800	—	—	800
6 D° — — —	—	—	—	5	5
Empty Shells,					
4½ Inch — — —	—	96	—	—	96
Bottoms for Round Shot,					
12 Pounders — — —	—	—	—	6	6
6 D° — — —	—	—	—	29	29
3 D° — — —	—	—	—	17	17
Spunges with Rammer Heads,					
18 Pounders — — —	—	12	—	—	12
12 D° — — —	—	6	—	—	6
6 D° — — —	—	30	—	—	30
3 D° — — —	—	10	—	—	10
5½ D° — — —	—	4	—	—	4
4½ D° — — —	—	8	—	—	8

QUALITY of STORES.			Issued to the Army.	Sent into Conjeveram.	Sent to Col. Baillie.	Lost on the March.	Total.
Ladles with Wadhooks,							
24 Pounders	—	—	—	2	—	—	2
18 D°	—	—	—	7	—	—	7
12 D°	—	—	—	2	—	—	2
6 D°	—	—	—	4	—	—	4
3 D°	—	—	—	3	—	—	3
Live Fuzees,							
5½ Inch	—	—	—	140	—	—	140
4½ D°	—	—	—	100	—	—	100
Quilted Grape,							
12 Pounders	—	—	—	—	—	17	17
6 D°	—	—	—	—	—	21	21
5½ D°	—	—	—	—	—	2	2
Filled Tubes,							
12 Pounders	—	—	—	120	300	—	420
6 D°	—	—	—	284	—	—	284
3 D°	—	—	—	39	—	—	39
Paper Cylindars,							
6 Pounders	—	—	—	250	—	—	250
Cordages of Sorts,							
Europe, 4½ Inch	—		Coils	—	2	—	10½	12½
——— 3½ D°	—		D°	½	2	—	—	2½
——— 2½ D°	—		D°	—	—	—	7	7
Spun Yarn	—	—	Bolls	32	16	—	60	108
Sennett, 12 Pounders		—	—	—	—	—	2	2
6 D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	8
3 D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4
Country,							
5½ Inch	—		Coils	1	—	—	—	1
4½ Inch	—	—	D°	—	—	—	2½	2½
3½ Inch	—	—	D°	—	—	—	7½	7½
2½ Inch	—	—	D°	2¾	—	—	—	2¾
1½ Inch	—	—	D°	½	—	—	37	37½
Small Coir,		—	Bundles	10¼	—	—	—	10¼
Iron and Steel,							
Flat	—	—	Bars	4½	—	—	25	29½
Square	—	—	D°	½	—	—	10½	11
Bolt	—	—	D°	—	—	—	4	4
Rod	—	—	D°	1	—	—	—	1
Europe Steel		—	D°	5½	—	—	—	5½
Pioneers Tools,							
Mamooties	—	—	—	121	—	—	—	121
Pick Axes	—	—	—	25	—	—	—	25
Bill Hooks	—	—	—	—	—	—	38	38
Hand Hatchets		—	—	65	—	—	—	65
Felling Axes	—	—	—	—	—	—	19	19
Artificers Tools,							
Cross-Cut Saws	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2
Hand D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1

APPENDIX, N°. 9.

QUALITY of STORES.		Issued to the Army.	Sent into Conjeveram.	Sent to Col. Baillie.	Lost on the March.	Total.
Artificers Tools,						
Plains	—	—	1	—	—	1
Augers	—	—	—	—	2	2
Grindle Stone	—	—	—	—	1	1
Beak Iron	—	—	1	—	—	1
Files of Sorts	—	—	32	—	—	32
Screw Plates	—	2	1	—	—	3
Sledge Hammers	—	2	1	—	—	3
Gimblets	—	—	2	—	—	2
Carpenters Adze	—	1	—	—	—	1
Gun Powder,		Bd. Hds.				
Europe, 60 H.	Barrels	20 : 18	30	—	—	50 : 18
Country, 50 H.	D°	20 : —	30	—	5	25 : —
Artillery Small Stores,						
Port Fires	—	49	—	50	—	99
Match Europe,	Sh^{s}	38½	—	—	30	68½
—— Country,	D°	60	40	—	15	115
Twine, Europe,	Sk^{s}	50½	50	—	—	100½
—— Bengal,	D°	8	60	—	102	170
Hambro' Line,	D^{o}	—	—	—	9	9
Muſquet Cartridge-Paper	Quires	46	—	—	230	276
Claw Hammers	—	1	6	—	2	9
Pincers,	Pairs	—	—	3	—	3
Tin Tube Boxes, 6 Pounders	—	3	—	—	—	3
Port Fire Stocks	—	1	4	—	—	5
Linſtocks	—	—	24	—	—	24
Hand Spikes, traverſing						
12 D°	—	—	1	—	—	1
12 D°	—	—	1	—	—	1
Ditto, purchaſing	—	3	49	—	4	56
Haverſacks	—	—	—	13	—	13
Tarpaulins, large	—	—	3	1	—	4
Gun, 12 Pounder	—	—	—	2	—	2
— 6 D°	—	—	—	4	—	4
— 3 D°	—	—	1	3	—	4
Powder Horns	—	—	4	—	—	4
Steel Belts	—	—	8	—	—	8
Gun Flags	—	—	—	—	2	2
Tar,	¼ Duppers	3	7	—	20	30
Greaſe,	¼ D°	3	7	—	20	30
Wax Cloth,	Pieces	99½	—	—	—	99½
Wax Candles	—	370	200	—	380	950
Gunny Bags, Spare	—	14	20	39	—	73
Rattan,	Bundles	—	—	—	18	18
Chalk,	lbs	—	10	—	90	100
Cocoanut Oil,	Gallons	2½	—	—	37½	40
Muſcove Lights	—	—	—	—	2	2
Lanthorns	—	1	6	—	11	18
Tin,	Sheets	1	20	—	—	21
Tanned Hides	—	—	—	—	2	2
Land Aprons	—	2	—	—	—	2
Copper,	lbs	3	—	—	17	20
Knives	—	—	10	—	—	10
Sciſſars	—	1	10	—	—	11
Sail Needles	—	9	86	—	—	95
Gunny D°	—	16	—	—	—	16
Powder Meaſures,	Setts	—	1	—	—	1
Drivers and Setters, 5½ Inch	—	—	8	—	—	8
Palms	—	2	5	—	—	7

Artillery

APPENDIX, N° 9.

QUALITY of STORES.		Iſſued to the Army.	Sent into Conjeveram.	Sent to Col. Baillie.	Loſt on the March.	Total.
Artillery Stores,						
Drag Ropes,	18 Pr	—	6	—	—	6
— —	6 Dº	2	—	—	10	12
— —	3 Dº	—	—	—	1	1
Hand Jack — —	—	—	1	—	—	1
Leather Buckles —	—	—	6	—	12	18
Tompions with Collars, —	18 Prs	—	4	—	—	4
Dº — —	3 Dº	—	4	—	—	4
Dº — —	2½ Inch	—	4	—	—	4
Pewter Solder, —	lbs	3	—	—	—	3
Spunge Staves —	—	1	—	—	9	10
Wood Oil, —	Bottles	—	—	—	4	4
Gin, —	compleat	—	1	—	—	1
Cloth Bags, —	18 Pounders	—	1,700	—	—	1,700
Canvas Aprons —	—	—	4	—	—	4
Shot Gunny Bags —	—	—	116	—	—	116
Copper Funnel —	—	—	1	—	—	1
Ammunition,						
Engliſh Shotted Cartridges	—	68,108	20,000	50,000	28,197	166,205
Carbine Dº —	—	7,627	—	—	912	8,539
Piſtol Dº —	—	—	—	—	2,000	2,000
Blunt Cartridges —	—	—	—	—	1,500	1,500
Looſe Muſket Balls —	—	94,200	10,000	—	4,586	108,786
Muſket Flints —	—	—	1,000	5,000	11,890	17,890
Carbine Dº — —	—	270	—	—	1,750	2,020
Bayonets, ſpare —	—	1	—	—	—	1
Shoulder Belts —	—	2	—	—	—	2
Steel Ramrods —	—	3	—	—	—	3
Hammers — —	—	270	100	100	7,390	7,760
Pickers — —	—	320	100	—	7,150	7,590
Worms — —	—	320	100	—	5,150	5,570
Log Line, —	Skº	3	20	—	—	23
Drum Heads —	—	—	—	—	18	18
—— Cords —	—	—	—	—	24	24
—— Braces, —	Setts	—	—	—	100	100
—— Hoops, Batten —	—	—	—	—	50	50
—— —— Sining —	—	—	—	—	20	20
—— —— Fleſh —	—	—	—	—	20	20
Blue Cloth, —	Pieces	—	4	—	—	4
White Dº, — —	Dº	—	4	—	—	4
Muſket Cartridge Pouches, double	—	7	—	—	135	142
—— Dº Dº ſingle	—	19	—	—	21	40
Looſe Carbine Balls —	—	—	—	—	5,700	5,700
Eſpontoons —	—	2	—	—	—	2
Drum Sticks — —	—	—	—	—	2	2
Mortan Carts —	—	—	2	—	—	2
Piſtol Flints —	—	200	—	—	300	500
Muſkets with Bayonets —	—	12	—	—	—	12
Carbines Dº — —	—	2	—	—	—	2

Joſeph Moorhouſe,
Commiſſary of Stores to the Army.

PRESENT STATE of the Company's Troops encamped near Marmelon, September 15th, 1780.

CORPS.	DOING DUTY. Europeans. Commissioned Officers. Colonels.	Lt. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Lt. Fire Works.	Ensigns.	Staff. Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Conductors.	Cadets.	N.C°. Rk & File. Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Natives. Com.d Offi. Subidars.	Jemidars.	N.Com.d. Rank & File. Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	Total.	SICK. Europeans. Commissioned Officers. Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Lt. Fire Works.	Ensigns.	Staff. Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Conductors.	Cadets.	N.C°. R.& File. Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Natives. Com.d Offi. Subidars.	Jemidars.	N.C°. Rk & File. Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	Total.
Cavalry	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	29	32	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Artillery	—	1	—	1	3	3	6	—	1	1	2	2	25	17	231	274	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	3	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
2d Battalion, 1st Regiment	—	1	1	1	7	1	—	7	1	1	—	3	18	22	166	205	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	20	21	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cadet Company	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	20	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
14 Battalion of Sepoys	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	4	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	5	7	7	6	419	445	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	24	25
15 D° D°	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	4	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	5	6	7	7	383	409	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	21	22
16 D° D°	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	3	1	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	1	6	7	9	7	415	445	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17 D° D°	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	5	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	6	6	8	7	439	467	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	32	33
21 D° D°	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	3	1	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	1	5	7	9	8	388	418	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	11	13
Tanjore Detachment	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	5	—	5	4	12	5	354	380	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	19	20
Trichinopoly D°	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	5	1	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	1	5	7	10	5	471	499	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	13	14
Total	—	2	1	2	13	18	6	33	8	2	2	25	75	39	427	541	6	37	44	62	45	2,869	3,063	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	6	4	—	23	25	—	2	4	1	—	120	127

PRESENT

PRESENT STATE of the Troops encamped at Marmelon, the 1st of October 1780.

| CORPS. | FOR DUTY. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SICK. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX, N° 5.

An ACCOUNT; Remains of Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, under the Charge of the Commissary of Stores to the Army. Camp, 16th September 1780.

Quantity of Stores.	Remains 16th September 1780.
Brass Guns,	
12 Pounders	4
6 D°	16
3 D°	7
Brass Howitzers,	
5½ Inch	4
Field Carriages, with Limbers, Boxes, &c.	
12 Pounders	4
6 D°	16
3 D°	7
5½ Inch	4
Round Shot fixed to Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
12 Pounders	290
6 D°	1712
3 D°	1120
Shells fixed to Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
5½ Inch	139
Grape Shot, fixed Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
12 Pounders	115
6 D°	381
3 D°	241
5½ Inch	56
Empty Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
12 Pounders	69
6 D°	1066
3 D°	119
5½ Inch	50
Field, Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
12 Pounders	108
6 D°	252
3 D°	147
5½ Inch	80
Spunges with Rammer Heads,	
12 Pounders	8
6 D°	39
3 D°	18
5½ Inch	8
Ladles with Wadhooks,	
12 Pounders	4
6 D°	16
3 D°	7
Filled Tubes,	
12 Pounders	1769
6 D°	5832
3 D°	3235
Cordage,	

Dodd and Darley.——15 Battalion, Ensigns Fisher and Graham.——21 Battalion, Ensigns Foulis and Streble, and Messrs. Gulle, Terry, and Stuart, acting Ensigns.——One Jem^dr, 1 Nag, 1 Sowell, and acting Ensign Graham.——21 Battalion, Ensigns Foulis and Streble, and Messrs. Gulle, Terry, and Stuart, acting Ensigns.——One Jem^dr, 1 Nag, 1 Drummer, and 13 Privates, attending Cavalry, doing Duty in the 2d Regiment.

EDW. JAMES, Col. Commandant.

Cordage,							
	4½ Inch, Country	—	—	—	Coils	—	
	3½ D°	—	—	—	D°	—	2½
	1½ D°	—	—	—	D°	—	2
Small Coir		—	—	—	Bundles	—	6
Spun Yarn		—	—	—	Rolls	—	7
Iron Flat,		—	—	—	Bars	—	12
	Square	—	—	—	D°	—	2
	Bolt	—	—	—	D°	—	4
	Rod	—	—	—	—	—	40
Europe Steel		—	—	—	Bars	—	26
Pioneers Tools,							
	Momoatys	—	—	—	—	—	401
	Pickaxes	—	—	—	—	—	69
	Bill Hooks	—	—	—	—	—	148
	Hand Hatchetts	—	—	—	—	—	108
	Broad Axes	—	—	—	—	—	93
	Felling Axes	—	—	—	—	—	122
Artificer's Tools,							
	Cross-cut Saws	—	—	—	—	—	5
	Hand Saws	—	—	—	—	—	3
	Planes	—	—	—	—	—	16
	Augurs	—	—	—	—	—	12
	Chissels	—	—	—	—	—	2
	Compasses	—	—	—	Pairs	—	2
	Grindle Stone	—	—	—	—	—	2
	Beak Iron	—	—	—	—	—	2
	Anvils	—	—	—	—	—	300
	Files, of Sorts	—	—	—	—	—	
Vices,							
	Standing	—	—	—	D°	—	1
	Bench	—	—	—	D°	—	2
	Hand	—	—	—	D°	—	2
Screw Plates		—	—	—	—	—	7
Sledge Hammers		—	—	—	—	—	7
Hand Hammers		—	—	—	—	—	1
Strevis Tinman		—	—	—	—	—	1
Gimblets		—	—	—	—	—	12
Soldering Irons		—	—	—	—	—	3
Brass Adze		—	—	—	—	—	1
Copper Drivers		—	—	—	—	—	2
Vices, Copper		—	—	—	—	—	10
Cooper's Adze		—	—	—	—	—	1
Drawing Knives		—	—	—	—	—	5
Carpenter's Adze		—	—	—	—	—	5
Tumbrils		—	—	—	—	—	37
Artificers Carts		—	—	—	—	—	2
Gunpowder, Europe,		—	—	—	60lb Barrels	—	120
Artillery Stores,							
Port Fires		—	—	—	—	—	2346
Match	Cotton	—	—	—	Skains	—	57
	Country	—	—	—	D°	—	157
Europe Twine		—	—	—	D°	—	148
Bengal D°		—	—	—	D°	—	142
Hamborough Line		—	—	—	D°	—	11
Musket Cartridge Paper		—	—	—	Quires	—	255
Tin Tubes, Boxes with Straps,							
12 Pounders		—	—	—	—	—	8
6 D°		—	—	—	—	—	16
3 D°		—	—	—	—	—	20

Claw

Claw Hammers		34
Pincers for Tubes	Pairs	31
D° for Fuzees	D°	14
Port Fire Stocks		33
Lint Stocks		31
Hand Spikes, traverſing,		
12 Pounders		7
6 D°		31
3 D°		14
5½ Inch		8
Hand Spikes, purchaſing		62
Haverſacks		58
Tarpaulins, large		16
Tumbrils		34
Gun 12 Pounders		4
6 D°		16
3 D°		7
5½ Inch		4
Padlocks with Keys		90
Priming Irons		44
Steel Bits		47
Gun Flags		2
Tar	½ Dupper	4
Greaſe	D°	4
Wax Candles		1500
Wax Cloth	P°	1
Canvas	Bolts	3
Gunny Bags for Muſket Ammunition, ſpare		17
Rattan	Bundles	2
Chalk	lb.	
Cocoa Nut Oil		
Muſcovy Lights		
Lanthorns		
Tin	Sheets	45
Copper Funnels		3
Sal Armoniac	lb.	8
Borax	lb.	8
Pewter Solder	lb.	9
Copper D°	lb.	12
Roſin	lb.	8
Camphire	lb.	2
Marline	Skains	11
Tanned Hides		
Country D°		
Lead Aprons		31
Quick Match	Skains	6
Mealed Powder	lb.	8
Copper		
Spunge Tacks	lb.	6
White Lead	D°	2
Raſps		12
Dredging Boxes		5
Knives		24
Sciſſars	Pairs	24
Sail Needles		100
Hour Glaſſes		2
Gunny Needles		100
Scales and Weights	Sets	2
Calliper Compaſſes	Pairs	2
Boudge Barrels		2
Saws for Fuzees		7
Engine for drawing Fuzees		1
Perpendiculars		2
Spirit Quadrants		1
Common D°		5

Claw

APPENDIX, N° 9.

General Williamſon's Inſtrument		
Drivers and Setters, 5½ Inch	each	2
Sheel Gauges	Set	1
Palms		15
Drag Ropes, 12 Pounders	Set	4
6 D°	D°	14
3 D°	D°	7
5½ Inch D°	D°	4
Hand Jack		1
Leather Buckets		59
Gunſpikes { Round		28
Gunſpikes { Ragged		30
Gunſpikes { Spring		30
Relievers for Spring Spikes		31
Tompions with Collars, 12 Pounders		4
6 D°		16
3 D°		7
5½ Inch		4
Plyers		2
Muſket Ammunition,		
Engliſh ſhotted Cartridge,		81000
Carbine D° D°		23200
Piſtol D° D°		
Blunt Muſket Cartridges		3000
Looſe Muſket Balls		
Flints,		
Muſket Field		11000
Carbine D°		
Piſtol D°		
Quarter Maſter's Stores,		
Muſkets with Bayonets		28
Carbines with Ditto		
Bayonets, ſpare		
Braſs Swords, Serjeants		
Drummers		
Shoulder Belts		170
Bayonet Scabbards		
Lock Caſes		
Steel Ramrods		
Hammers		360
Pickers		2600
Worms		1200
Log Line	Skains	68
Drum Heads		370
Cords		
Braces		
Snares		
Hoops, Batten		
Lining		
Fleſh		
Sticks		48
Double Muſket Cartridge Pouches		65
Europe ſingle D° D°		

Joſeph Moorhouſe,
Com, of Stores.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 9.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 9th October 1780.

Sir Hector Munro gives in the following Minute:

In my Minute of the 6th Inſtant, I reſerved to myſelf Permiſſion to write an Anſwer to one Part of Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon's Minute of the 1ſt of this Month, when I could aſcertain the Strength of Colonel Fletcher's Detachment.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon are pleaſed to ſay, 4,000 Sepoys and 600 Europeans, were loſt to the Service by the unfortunate Diſaſter which happened to Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie's Detachment.

The Native Sepoys of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie's Detachment were 2,606; of Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher's, 706: Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie's Europeans, Non-commiſſioned, Rank and File, 207; Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher's, 301; making in all, of Sepoys 3,312, and of Europeans 508.

It is to be hoped, that One Half of theſe will not be ultimately loſt to the Service, as, by all Reports as yet received, there are between Two and Three hundred Europeans, excluſive of Officers, Priſoners with Hyder, and about 1,000 Sepoys; beſides that there are near that Number of Sepoys come into different Forts in the Carnatic, and more are daily coming in.

Hector Munro.

Lord Macleod to the Secretary at War.

Fort Saint George, 13th October 1780. Received 16th April 1781.

Sir,

I have the Honour to incloſe you Returns of the 1ſt Battalion of His Majeſty's 73d Regiment for Six Months, taking up all Occurrences ſince the laſt Returns I ſent you by the Fleet, which ſailed from Madras the 7th of April of the preſent Year.

You will ſee the heavy Loſs the Regiment has ſuſtained ſince the laſt Returns. Although the Change of Climate muſt have occaſioned the Death of ſome Men, yet I attribute the greateſt Mortality from the Regiment, which conſiſted of above a Thouſand Europeans when landed here, to their being crouded into Barracks, which were never meant to contain above 400 or 500 Men at moſt. Another very great Cauſe of the Sickneſs, in my Opinion, was the Want of an Hoſpital.

Though the Battalion's Deſtination was known to the Government here above a Year before we landed, and Poonamalee was allotted, from the Beginning, for our Quarters, yet the Battalion was actually there on the Spot above Six Weeks before the Foundations of an Hoſpital were laid, which then was ordered on my repeated Complaints and Remonſtrances.

The Five Officers, Seven Serjeants, Four Drummers, and 117 Rank and File, whom you will find taken up as miſſing in the Return ſince the 9th of September, are the Two Flank Companies of my Regiment. They were ſent, together with Two European Companies of Grenadiers of the Eaſt India Company's Troops, Ten Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers, and a Company of Markſmen, on the Evening of the 8th of September, from our Camp at Conjeveram, to join Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, who was advancing from the Northern Circars with Three Battalions and Six Companies of Sepoys, above Two hundred Europeans, and Ten Field Pieces, to join us. Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher commanded the Detachment from the Camp at Conjeveram, and made good his Junction the 9th of September, in the Morning, with Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie.

The 10th of September, in the Morning, Colonel Baillie's Corps was attacked by Hyder Ally with his whole Army, and cut to Pieces. We have certain Intelligence, that the Misfortune was in a great Meaſure owing to ſome of our Tumbrils blowing up, which deſtroyed the little Ammunition that was left, and occaſioned a great Confuſion; of which the Enemy's Cavalry took Advantage, and broke into the Line.

I have pretty certain, though not official Intelligence, that Lieutenants Alexander, Geddes, Mackenzie, and Gun, were killed in the Action of the 10th September; and that Captain Baird, and Lieutenants Lindſey and Melville, were wounded; and that Captain Baird is ſince dead of his Wounds, at Arnee.

Fort

The European Infantry ſtood firm as a Wall while they had a Shot left, and were almoſt all killed or wounded. I do not expect to ſee many of the latter belonging to my Regiment, as I am told they die daily, from Want of proper Care and from harſh Uſage. I hope by the next Ship to get

a good Recruit, as otherwiſe, I am afraid, we ſhall in a ſhort Time not be able to guard our Colours.

As I am ordered, by the King's Inſtructions, to inform you when Opportunities offer, of what Occurrences happen, I think it my Duty, in Obedience to His Majeſty's Commands, to acquaint you of the preſent Situation of the Country, ſo far as is within the Reach of my own Knowledge, and no further.

About the 20th of July, Advices arrived here from different Quarters, that Hyder Ally had invaded the Carnatic with a powerful Army; but no Attention was paid by the People in Power to this Intelligence, which they treated with Contempt. The 23d of July I took the Liberty to tell the Governor, that perhaps Hyder's Invaſion might be true; and that I thought, at all Events, he ought to take ſome Meaſures to oppoſe him. His Anſwer was, What can we do? we have no Money. He then added, We mean, however, to aſſemble an Army, and you are to command it. That Evening put however the Invaſion beyond a Doubt, even with the Government here; for certain Intelligence was then received, that Porto Novo, on the Sea Coaſt, and Conjeveram, not 50 Miles from this Capital, had been plundered by the Enemy.

The 27th of July I received Orders from the Select Committee to march the Troops aſſembling at Poonamalee, conſiſting of the Firſt Battalion of my own Regiment, One Battalion of Sepoys, and the Artillery, with 24 Field Pieces, amounting in all to about 1,650 Men, to Conjeveram and to Enicollen, where I was to be joined by a weak Battalion of Europeans from Vellore, and was then to march to Wandewaſh, where Colonel Braithwaite was to join me, with another weak Battalion of Europeans, and Three Battalions of Sepoys, from Pondicherry. This Order occaſioned my writing a Letter to the Select Committee on the 31ſt of July, of which I have the Honour to incloſe you a Copy.

The 1ſt of Auguſt I received Orders from the Select Committee to march early next Morning towards Conjeveram, Enicollen, &c. provided the Proviſions and Stores ſhould arrive in Camp that Night; but they did not arrive that Night, nor are they yet arrived.—The ſame Letter informed me, that the Select Committee had appointed Sir Hector Munro to command the Army, and that Sir Hector would join me next Day, or the Day following, on the March.

By order of the Governor and Select Committee, I marched the 17th of Auguſt, in the Evening, from Poonamalee to Saint Thomas Mount, where I arrived and encamped the Troops the 18th in the Morning. The 24th in the Morning, I was joined by Colonel Braithwaite with his Corps from Pondicherry. The 25th in the Evening, Sir Hector Munro arrived in Camp, and took the Command of the Army. Next Morning we marched towards Conjeveram, where we arrived the 29th Auguſt, and continued in that Neighbourhood till the 11th September in the Morning, waiting for Lieutenant Colonel Baillie.

The Events of the 8th, 9th, and 10th September, have been already mentioned in Part; I have only to add, that on the 9th the General gave Orders for all the Tents to be ſtruck at 8 o'Clock that Evening, and to be ſent, together with the Baggage, to Conjeveram Pagoda; which was accordingly done; the General declaring, at the ſame Time, to be his Reſolution to march at 10 o'Clock that Evening to join Colonel Baillie. The Reaſon or Intelligence that afterwards induced the General to alter this Reſolution, were, I make no Doubt, very ſolid; but are unknown to me. Between One and Two o'Clock in the Morning of the 10th, a Cannonade was heard from Colonel Baillie's Quarters, which laſted near an Hour, and then all was quiet on that Side; but a great Noiſe was heard all Night from Hyder Ally's Camp. The 10th, at 7 o'Clock in the Morning, we marched by our Right to join Colonel Baillie; after marching 10 or 11 Miles, the Lines faced to the Right about, and returned to Conjeveram. The General had probably then received Advice of Colonel Baillie's Defeat. In the Evening, the Army arrived at Conjeveram, where they reſted on their Arms a few Hours; and the 11th, at Two o'Clock in the Morning, began their Retreat to Chingleput, where we arrived the 12th in the Morning.

The Troops ſuffered very much on this March from the Length of it, from the exceſſive Heat of the Weather and the Want of Victuals for Two Days. We likewiſe loſt a great deal of our Baggage, and ſuffered much from Deſertion of Sepoys, beſides the Loſs of many, both Europeans and Sepoys, who were cut down by the Enemy's Horſe.

The 13th, in the Evening, we marched from Chingleput, and arrived at the Mount next Day. The 15th, the Remains of our Army marched to Marmelon, a few Miles nearer to this Place, where they ſtill continue encamped.

Hyder Ally, who had raiſed the Siege of Arcot on our Approach to Conjeveram, has renewed it, ſince the 16th of laſt Month; and by all Account the Progreſs has hitherto been very ſlow.

I have

APPENDIX, N° 9.

I have never been able to get an exact Account of Hyder Ally's Force. In a Letter he wrote me the 5th of last Month, in Answer to one I had wrote to him, requesting him to take Care of the Officers and Soldiers of the King's Troops, who were Prisoners with him, and promising to refund what Money he should advance them, &c. &c. &c. he tells me, that he had 100,000 Horses; that is certainly a Gasconade. The best Accounts seem to agree, that his whole Force, at the Time of his Invasion, amounted to 85,000 Men of every Kind.

Fort Saint George,
13th Oct. 1780.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
Macleod.

To the Right honourable Charles Jenkinson, &c. &c. &c.

Note, This Letter is also referred to in the Report, under Appendix, N° 42.

Sir Hector Munro to the Secretary at War.

Fort Saint George, 14th October 1780.

Sir,

I would not have troubled you at this Time with a Letter, were it not that Hyder Ally Cawn entered the Carnatic last July in a hostile Manner, with a large Army of Horse and Foot. In the Month of August he besieged Arcot, the Capital of the Carnatic. It was judged proper to assemble an Army as soon as possible to raise the Siege. I marched with His Majesty's 73d Regiment, and about 4,000 of the Company's Troops, from Madras, the 26th of August, to the Relief of Arcot, and was to have been joined by Lieutenant Colonel Baillie on the March, who was coming from the Northward with a large Detachment of the Troops. I settled it so with the Colonel, that were it not for the greatest Fall of Rain ever known at the Season of the Year, he would have joined me the Second Day after my Arrival at Conjeveram, a large Village about 40 Miles from Madras. Unfortunately a little dirty Nullah, or small Rivulet, about Two Days March from Conjeveram, kept Colonel Baillie Seven Days from crossing.

Hyder Ally raised the Siege of Arcot, on my Arrival with a Part of the Army at Conjeveram; crossed his main Body over the Pollar River; and having so much Time given him, owing to Eight Days constant Rain, he marched a Detachment to endeavour to prevent the Junction of our Troops. Colonel Baillie was attacked, and beat off Hyder's Troops.

I received a Letter from the Colonel after the Action, acquainting me with it; and that after a general Review of Things after the Engagement, he could not march until I should join him; for had he crossed some Days before, I intended marching towards him. But the Provisions we carried from Madras being then expended, and none to be had (there being no Magazines in the Country) but some Paddy out of which the Rice is beat, and which Paddy we found at Conjeveram. Had I abandoned that Place, and that the Enemy had possessed himself of the Village (and which he most undoubtedly would have done, his Main Body being at that Time within Two Miles of us) we must have starved or thrown down our Arms.

This, Sir, being our Situation, I sent, with the Approbation of several of the principal Officers with me, a Detachment to reinforce Colonel Baillie with Nine Camels loaded with Ammunition for his Field Pieces and Musquetry. This Detachment consisted of Ten Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers; One Company of Sepoy Marksmen; Three Companies of European Grenadiers (the Grenadiers of the 73d Regiment made One of the Three); and the Light Infantry Company of the 73d, making in all about 1,000 Men. I had resolved to send 4 Field Pieces with the Detachment, but Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher who commanded it, requested I would not send any Artillery, as he would be more expeditious without any Guns. He marched off about 9 at Night, and joined Colonel Baillie next Morning, and the Whole marched next Evening to join me, and were attacked on their March by the Enemy. Upon my hearing some Guns fired, I ordered all our Tents to be struck and the Troops to be ready to march; but after the Firing of some Cannon and some scattered Firing of small Arms, the Whole ceased for near Four Hours. I made no Doubt, but Coloniel Baillie with his Detachment, would arrive about Day-light in the Morning: Instead of which, a very close Cannonading began, and Hyder with his Main Body got on his March, and so did we, and were marching towards Colonel Baillie, but before we had marched 5 or 6 Miles the Firing ceased; a wounded Sepoy came in, who told me, that Colonel Baillie was defeated, owing to Three Tumbrils of Ammunition having blown up. He is a gallant Officer, and nothing but an Accident which human Invention or Foresight could not have guarded against, occasioned this unfortunate Disaster.

There has been no authentic Accounts received as yet from Colonel Baillie, who is with 32 Of-

ficers, about 300 Europeans, and 1,000 Sepoys, Priſoners with Hyder. All I know of it, is from the Report of private Men, who came in daily, and who all agree in the blowing up of the Tumbrils; which Accident might occaſion the Defeat of 20,000 Men as well as of this Detachment.

This Preſidency have ſent to Bengal for a Supply of Men and Money; if that Requiſition is complied with, the Army will be again ſoon in Readineſs to take the Field againſt Hyder, who is now for the Second Time beſieging Arcot.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

P. S. You will be good enough to excuſe my uſing a borrowed Hand to write, having the Rheumatiſm in almoſt all my Joints.

Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies, to Mr. Stephens; dated Fort Saint George, the 15th October, 1780.

Touching at Pondicherry in my Way to Windward, I found that the Garriſon of that Place had received Orders to evacuate it, and march to join the Body of the Army then collecting to oppoſe Hyder Ally. In this Garriſon was a Quantity of Gunpowder, Guns, Shot, and other Military Stores, the Company's Property, which it was neceſſary to remove to prevent their falling into the Enemy's Hands; Part of which I ſent to Madras, in His Majeſty's Ship Sartine, taking the Remainder on Board the ſeveral Ships of the Squadron.

Having been apprized that there was a Number of large Braſs Mortars and Guns, with Shells, Shot, Muſkets, Carbines, Furniture for 2,000 Cavalry, and other Military Stores, the Property of the Nabob of the Carnatic, depoſited at the Daniſh Settlement of Tranquebar, and the Nabob having given his Conſent to their Removal thence to this Place, to prevent their falling into the Enemy's Hands, I ordered the heavy Braſs Mortars, Braſs Guns, Muſkets, and Carbines, to be received on Board the ſeveral Ships of the Squadron, and employed the Sartine in tranſporting the Shells, Shot, Horſe Furniture, and other Military Stores to this Place: And having remained off Negapatnam with the Squadron to the 10th of September, without any Enemy appearing on the Coaſt, I returned to this Road on the 12th, in order to compleat the Ships with Stores and Proviſions for their Paſſage to the Malabar Coaſt and Bombay; and the Whole of the Company's and the Nabob's Military Stores were immediately landed from the Squadron.

On the 17th Auguſt His Majeſty's Sloop Nymph joined me off Negapatnam from a Six Weeks Cruize off the Fryar's Hood on Ceylon; and on the 14th of September, at the Requeſt of this Preſidency, I diſpatched her to Ballaſore Road, with a Gentleman charged with mine and this Preſidency's public Diſpatches to the Governor General and Council of Bengal; giving an Account of the Defeat and total Loſs of a large Detachment of our Army on this Coaſt by Hyder Ally and ſoliciting immediate Succours of Troops and Money for the Support of the Company's Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt. On the 7th I ordered the Sartine to proceed to Vizagapatnam, to bring up a Body of Troops to reinforce our Army. On the 9th of this Month, the Nymph joined me here, having executed her Orders; and on the 13th the Sartine alſo joined me in this Road, but without any Troops, who refuſed to embark, mutinied, and murdered ſome of their European Officers.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes to the Earl of Hillſborough; dated Fort Saint George, 15th October 1780.

This Preſidency is involved in a particular War for the Defence of the Carnatic and the Company's Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt, againſt their old and inveterate Enemy Hyder Ally; who, towards the End of laſt July, entered the Carnatic with an Army of more than 80,000 effective Troops; for a Detail of which, I beg Leave to refer your Lordſhip to Paper No. 1. of this Diſpatch.

The Uncertainty of this Attempt of Hyder's, and the very low State of the Madras Treaſury, are the Cauſes aſſigned here, that the Forces of the Eſtabliſhment were not early collected to repel the Invader on his firſt Appearance; and the great Diſtance of that Force, ſpread in Garriſons from Pallamcottah to the South, to Ganjam on the North, a Tract of Country extending 900 Miles, together with the Suddenneſs of the Invaſion, and Rapidity with which the Enemy's Cavalry overſpread

the open Country, rendered the March of ſmall Detachments impracticable; and as the Event proved, hazardous to large ones, for on the 10th of laſt Month, a large Detachment, which after a March of nearly 200 Miles, arrived within a very ſmall Diſtance of the main Body of our Army, and was joined by a Reinforcement from that Army, conſiſting of the beſt European Troops in it, was overpowered by Hyder's numerous Cavalry, and either cut to Pieces, made Priſoners, or diſperſed. My Letter on this Occaſion of the 14th of September, addreſſed to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, a Copy of which, No. 2. I have taken the Liberty to encloſe herewith for your Lordſhip's Peruſal, will convey to your Lordſhip a clear Idea of what I then felt, and ſtill feel for the State of our Force on this Coaſt. The Remains of the Army, after a precipitate Retreat, has lain within a few Miles of this Place, unable to face the Enemy, who are now employed in the Siege of Arcot, the Metropolis of this Country, defended by a very unequal Garriſon. What Succours will be ſent from Bengal, I cannot ſay; but if a Body of Regulars from the French Iſlands of Mauritius and Bourbon, ſhould land on this Coaſt, to join Hyder Ally, an Event much to be apprehended, not only the Territories of the Company on this Coaſt may be loſt, but even Fort Saint George itſelf will be in imminent Danger.

Extract of Letter from Fort Saint George, 15th October 1780.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

Sir Edward Hughes having adviſed us of his Intentions to diſpatch the Nymph Sloop to the Cape, we embrace the Opportunity of ſending by that Veſſel an Account of the preſent Situation of Affairs upon this Coaſt; and that it may be conveyed to you with all poſſible Expedition, we have appointed Mr. Thomas Lewin, one of your Servants, to take Charge of our Packets, and directed him to proceed with them from the Cape by the firſt ſafe Conveyance that ſhall offer after his Arrival there.

Your Honours were informed in our Addreſs of the 3d April laſt, that the War with the Marattas was carried on, and that Hyder Ally Cawn had for ſome Time held a very doubtful Conduct towards us, In the Months of May and June we had various Intelligence of this Chief's Preparations and Movements, which were given out to be againſt the Carnatic; but there was ſtill Reaſon to ſuppoſe, and in this Opinion the Governor General and Council of Bengal were very confident, that Hyder had really no Intention of breaking with us. Appearances were, however, ſtrongly on the oſtenſive Incurſion, and the Event has verified them.

On the 24th July we received Information that Part of Hyder Ally's Cavalry had actually entered the Carnatic in different Places; and a few Days after, we learnt that One Body had penetrated as far as Porto Novo (a Sea-port near Cuddalore) and plundered it. The principal Part of your Army which was cantoned at Madras, Poonamalee, St. Thomas's Mount, and Pondicherry, was directed to aſſemble at St. Thomas's Mount; and Orders were ſent to Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, who commanded a ſtrong Detachment of Troops in the Guntoor Circar, to march towards the Preſidency, to join the reſt of the Army. In the mean Time Hyder Ally, with the main Body of his Troops, entered the Carnatic at the Paſs of Changama; and having in about a Fortnight made himſelf Maſter of the Forts of Pollour, Chittaput, and Arnee, belonging to the Nabob, and garriſoned by his People only, he ſat down the 22d Auguſt before Arcot. This Place being of great Importance, it was determined that the Army ſhould march as ſoon as poſſible to its Relief. Accordingly, on the 26th Auguſt, Sir Hector Munro took the Field with the Troops then aſſembled at St. Thomas's Mount, conſiſting of 1,184 European Infantry, 294 Artillery, 3,434 Sepoys, with 32 Field Pieces, and moved towards Conjeveram. Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, with the Detachment from the Guntoor Circar, conſiſting of 104 European Infantry, 77 European Artillery, and 10 Field Pieces, was arrived at this Time on the North Bank of the Cortelair, a River about Thirty Miles North weſt of Madras; and the General concerted Meaſures ſo, that the Detachment might reach Conjeveram the Day after he himſelf and the reſt of the Army ſhould arrive there.

From the 26th, the Day of the General's Departure from the Mount, until the 29th, the Day of his Arrival at Conjeveram, and ſome Days after, there fell conſtant and heavy Rains, which are not very unuſual at this Seaſon of the Year: At the Time they began, Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment was on the North Side of a ſmall River called the Cortelair, about Five Miles from Trepaſſore: This River ſwelled ſo much by the Rains, that Lieutenant Colonel Baillie was unable to paſs it until the 3d September, when he ſet forward to join the Army at Conjeveram.

From this Period until the 14th September, the Military Operations became ſo intereſting, that we think it neceſſary to have Recourſe to a Journal of them delivered us by the General, which we ſhall tranſcribe for your Information; [which, however, your Committee have omitted here, as it is inſerted in the Body of the Report, Pages 16, 17, 18, 19.]

By

By the unfortunate Defeat of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment, we have loſt, in killed, wounded, and Priſoners, about 508 Europeans and 3,312 Sepoys. As ſoon as we received Intelligence of this Diſaſter, we tranſmitted a particular Account of it to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and requeſted a ſuitable Reinforcement might be ſent in from thence with all Expedition. We are in daily Expectation of an Anſwer to this Application. After our Army retired from Conjeveram, Hyder Ally proceeded again to Arcot, before which he is now making his Approaches; there are 150 Europeans and Two Companies of Sepoys belonging to you in that Fort, and 5,000 armed People belonging to the Nabob. Hyder has been very ſlow in his Progreſs, and we flatter ourſelves the Garriſon will be able to hold out till the Rains ſet in. The Moment the Army is ſufficiently re-inforced to take the Field, it will march again to the Relief of Arcot.

The Governor General and Council of Bengal are ſtill proſecuting the War with the Marattas; and we underſtand General Goddard is preparing to go againſt Baſſein; the Siege it is imagined will be commenced about the 1ſt of next Month. We cannot yet ſay what Reſolution the Governor General and Council may have taken relative to the War ſince the Diſaſter which befel our Troops; but we ſincerely hope no Pains will be ſpared to put an End to it immediately, as the Succeſs of your Affairs, in our Judgment, now reſts ſolely on that Event.

Sir Edward Hughes is going with the Squadron to Bombay, from whence he means to return the Beginning of February. We ſhall take this Opportunity of giving what Relief we can to the Factory at Tellicherry, which has been cloſely beſieged theſe Two Months by the Nairs, aſſiſted with a ſtrong Body of Troops belonging to Hyder.

Our European Force, by the Defeat of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment, by Caſualties and Sickneſs, and by the Abſence of near 700 Men, who are ſerving on the Malabar Coaſt, is reduced to an alarming State of Weakneſs, conſiſting in Effectives (including what remains of Lord Macleod's Regiment) of only 1400 Men. Thus circumſtanced, with a powerful Enemy in the Heart of the Carnatic, and under the Expectation of a conſiderable French Armament, we cannot help requeſting, in the moſt earneſt Manner, that you will ſend us as large a Reinforcement as poſſible, by the earlieſt Conveyances.

We have been put to the greateſt Diſtreſs for the Want of Money to carry on the War, owing to a total Failure in our uſual Reſources, the Carnatic, waſted by the Incurſions of the Enemy. The Nabob pleads this in Excuſe for not diſcharging any of his Engagements.

The Rajah of Tanjore, whoſe Country hath not been diſturbed in any Shape, has yet given us no Aſſiſtance, nor have we yet obtained any Supply of Money from Bengal, though the Governor General and Council have expreſſed an Intention to aſſiſt us.

Under theſe Circumſtances we had no Alternative for ſupplying the various Exigencies of the Service, but that of borrowing from Individuals, and taking up Money for Drafts upon England. The Reſolutions we came to on this Subject, will be communicated to you from the Civil Department.

As we know not by what Conveyance our Diſpatches may go after their Arrival at the Cape, we have thought it adviſeable not to ſend our Conſultations by this Opportunity.

It may be proper, however, to obſerve, that the Members of the Committee have differed in their Sentiments, upon many material Points which have come before them, both previous to, and ſince the Commencement of the preſent Troubles; but as we cannot, in this Place, enter into any Particulars, we requeſt you will poſtpone your Judgement until you receive our Conſultations, which ſhall be ſent by the firſt proper Conveyance.

The Deſigns of the French in this Quarter being in the preſent Criſis an Object of the utmoſt Importance to your Intereſts, we have judged it proper to appoint a Reſident at the Cape of Good Hope; chiefly with the View of communicating to you, and to the ſeveral Preſidencies in India, the earlieſt Intelligence of their Motions. The Gentleman we have named for this Service, is Mr. Richard Lewin, who has Directions to embark in the Nymph, with an Allowanceof 200 Pagodas a Month.

Mr. John Hollond, Senior—Merchant, having been ſuſpended from your Service, we now tranſmit the Proceedings regarding him; alſo an Addreſs from him to your Honourable Court, which he has requeſted us to forward to you.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your faithful
humble Servants,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon.

Fort Saint George,
15th October 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 9.

Letter from Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. to the Court of Directors; dated 6 November 1780.

Gentlemen,

Excuſe me if I entreat your Indulgence for a few Minutes, reſpecting a Letter addreſſed to you by Mr. Sadlier, dated 17th October 1780, as alſo to ſome Letters written by him to the Governor General of Bengal, Copies of which he has ſent to you; as full of wicked Invectives as they are malicious Falſehoods reſpecting my Conduct.

I do myſelf the Honour of ſending you herewith Lord Macleod's and other Officer's Replies to ſuch Parts of Mr. Sadlier's Letter as relate to them, which will ſhew what Credit ought to be given to the Aſſertions of that Gentleman; and I beg Leave to refer to my Letter of the 21ſt September 1780, to the Committee of Fort Saint George, for the Operations of the Army.

It would be Preſumption in me to take up the Time of the Honourable Court of Directors, as well as paying myſelf a poor Compliment, was I to follow Mr. Sadlier throughout the Labyrinth of Abſurdities he has advanced.

It is not to him, it is to you, Gentlemen, I am reſponſible for my Actions, both in my Civil and Military Capacity; and I can declare in the moſt ſolemn Manner, that I have ever acted according to the beſt of my Underſtanding, for the Intereſt of the Company and the Honour of the Nation. To your ſuperior Judgment I therefore ſubmit my Conduct.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

To the Honourable
the Court of Directors, &c. &c.

Colonel James, to Major General Sir Hector Munro.

Fort Saint George, 29th October 1780.

Sir,

The Report of Alarms in Camp at Night of the 10th of September, I cannot with Propriety contradict, as the Army was then not in Camp, but in the Village of Conjeveram, ſome Corps in one Street, and ſome in another, as ſettled by the Quarter Maſter General, for the Convenience of marching at Two o'Clock in the Morning of the 11th of September, agreeable to a verbal Order from the Commander in Chief, which for many private Reaſons he thought proper to iſſue.

The Occaſion of what has ſince been termed an Alarm, was the Black People collecting the Bullocks for the Stores, &c. ſome of which running down the Streets awakened the Sepoys and Camp Followers till it became general. This to the beſt of my Memory happened about 12 o'Clock at Night; about One I got in my Palaquin, and proceeded to the Right Hand Diviſion of Guns commanded by Captain Regenill, who with other Officers was ſitting in a Pagoda, where the Ammunition and Stores were lodged. The Sub-Conductors were loading the Bullocks, to be ready for marching; after remaining in this Situation for the Space of Half an Hour, the Park Serjeant came and informed us, that the 73d Regiment was on their March; on which we all repaired to the Guns in the Front of the Pagoda, and we immediately marched off. But leſt we ſhould not come up with the Regiment, and it being exceſſive dark, I ordered my Adjutant to ride to the Front or Head of the Line, to acquaint the General; but before Lieutenant Slipper returned, we had juſt joined the Regiment, and all was well. To this I am ready to be on Oath.

Edward James.

Letter from Lord Macleod, to Sir Hector Munro, dated 29th October 1780.

Sir,

I have ſeen the Paragraph of a Letter from Mr. Sadlier to the Governor General of Bengal, dated 3d September 1780; in which he ſays, that when Colonel Fletcher on the 6th of that Month, aſked you Leave to advance with the Grenadiers, to bring Hyder Ally's Army to Action, and that Major Elphinſtone offered to ſupport the Colonel with the 73d Regiment, that I thought the Circumſtances ſo favourable, that I approved of this Propoſal; or Words to that Purpoſe.

Now Sir, I can assure you, that I never communicated my Sentiments on that Subject to Mr. Sadlier, nor has he any Authority to make use of my Name.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your most humble and
most obedient Servant,
Macleod.

Copy of a Letter from Major Elphinstone, to Sir Hector Munro, dated 31st October 1780.

Sir Hector Munro having this Morning shewn me a Copy of a Letter wrote by Mr. Sadlier to the Governor of Bengal, in which he mentions my having offered to support Colonel Fletcher, who commanded the Grenadiers of the Army, with the 1st Battalion of his Majesty's 73d Regiment, on the 6th of September;

I declare the following Circumstance to be the Cause of that Offer: On the Morning of that Day Colonel Fletcher and I had some Conversation, in which I said, I would be happy to have the Honour to support the Grenadiers with the 1st Battalion of the 73d Regiment on any Attack; on seeing the Grenadiers advancing to the Front, I took the Liberty of begging Sir Hector Munro's Leave to join them with the 1st Battalion of the 73d Regiment.

I never heard Sir Hector Munro speak of engaging the Enemy but once; when Intelligence was received that they meant to stand an Action with our Army, he said, he would indulge them when Colonel Baillie's Detachment joined him.

John Elphinstone,
Major 1st Battalion 73d Regiment.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Sulivan, to Sir Hector Munro, dated 2d November 1780.

Sir,

I am honoured with your Note of Yesterday. The Packet from Mr. Sadlier for the Court of Directors, came to the Governor a few Hours after Mr. Lewin had embarked on the Nymph with the Company's Dispatches. After a cursory Perusal of them, they sent round to the Gentlemen of the Council, with a short Memorandum from the President, intimating the Time they were received. From that Day, the 18th, I believe, until the 25th ultimo, your Applications to me for a Sight of Mr. Sadlier's Letters were frequent; I as frequently communicated those Applications to the Governor, but they could not be complied with, as the Papers had not been returned to him; on that Day you told me, that for the first Time you had seen the Letters, the other Members of the Council not having finished the reading of them until then.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Richard Sulivan.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant Moorhouse, to Sir Hector Munro, dated the 4th November 1780.

To Major General Sir Hector Munro, Commander in Chief.

Sir,

In Answer to a Paragraph of Mr. Sadlier's Letter of the 23d September, asserting that Hammers and Spikes to disable the heavy Cannon left at Conjeveram, could not be got;

I declare, that on the 10th of September, in the Evening, in Presence of Captain Rigault and Lieutenant Slipper of the Artillery, I ordered an European Artificer, with Men, Sledge Hammers, &c. to go to the Sub-Conductor in the large Pagoda, and if possible to knock the Trunnions off the 18 Pounders Guns, and to spike them. That he went to the Sub-Conductor with the Men and Implements,

ſmplements, and that the Guns were ſpiked and thrown into a Tank, before the Army marched, the 11th in the Morning.

I have the Honour to be,
With much Reſpect,
Sir,
Your very obedient Servant,
John Moorhouſe,
Comy of Stores to the Army.

Camp at Marmelon,
4th November 1780.

Copy of a Letter from Alexander Davidſon, Eſquire.

Fort Saint George, 17th November 1780.

On reading Mr. Sadlier's Letter to the Board of the 16th Inſtant, I obſerve, that although Mr. Sadlier's Papers were ſent to the Preſident about the 18th of October, they did not come round to me, then the Junior Member of Council, till about the 27th of October, which I attributed to their conſiſting of about Seventy Sheets. I remember perfectly, about a Week or Ten Days after Mr. Sadlier's Papers had been delivered in, I think it was Friday the 27th of October, aſking Mr. Freeman, the acting Secretary (Mr. Sulivan being at Bengal) at the Council Board, concerning them; who replied, that I could not have ſeen the Papers, as they had been near a Week at Mr. Whitehill's and Mr. Smith's. General Munro obſerved, that he had not ſeen them till the 25th of October, in the Afternoon, though he had inquired for them frequently of the Governor's Secretary, Mr. R. J. Sulivan.

Alexander. Davidſon.

Copy of a Letter from Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. to the Court of Directors.

Fort Saint George, 20th November 1780.

Gentlemen,

I beg your Forgiveneſs for this Intruſion, and that you may be pleaſed to read the incloſed. The Cauſe for your ever having had this Trouble, is owing to a Letter given in by Mr. Sadlier to the Governor and Council of Fort Saint George, dated the 16th of this Month.

I will make no other Animadverſion on ſaid Letter, than to ſay, that his Conjectures of my Motives for writing the Letter I ſent to him the 26th of laſt Month, are as erroneous as they are falſe.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

The Honourable the Court of Directors.

APPENDIX, N° 10.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 15th September 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President,
Charles Smith,
Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnson.

THE Command of Tanjore being vacant by the Death of Major Maclellan, Colonel Braithwaite is now appointed thereto by the President's casting Vote; Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnson dissenting.

Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 22d September 1780.

The following Minute of Messrs. Smith and Johnson was this Day sent round for the Perusal of the Gentlemen of the Committee.

When we consented that Seventy-five thousand Pagodas should be issued from the Company's Treasury for the Payment of his Highness the Nabob's Cavalry, we were given to understand that his Highness would assign over to the Company, Districts for the Security and punctual Re-payment of this Sum; and we expected that the President would lay before the Committee a particular Account of the Expenditure of this Money, and of the Security given by his Highness the Nabob. We also consented to a further Advance of Eighteen thousand Pagodas to be made to his Highness the Nabob's Regiment of Cavalry, commanded by Captain Dugald Campbell, as we were assured that these Troopers absolutely refused to march from the Mount without receiving this Sum; but they mutinied before the Money could be sent to them.

Nothing but the dangerous Situation of Affairs, and being fully persuaded that his Highness the Nabob could not make these Advances, would have induced us to give our Consent to this Measure. We are sensible, that Necessity is our only Justification on this Occasion; and therefore are of Opinion, that an exact Account of what has been actually advanced should be laid before the Committee, and that Measures should be taken, without further Loss of Time, for procuring from his Highness the Nabob, Assignments of the Tinnevelly and Madura Countries, not only to secure the speedy Re-payment of this Advance, but also aiding us to carry on the War with Vigour.

The executive Part of Administration being vested in the Majority of the Committee, we can only record our Sentiments, and thereby clear ourselves from all Responsibility for such Measures as have met with our Approbation on being first proposed, but have not been afterwards carried into Execution in the Manner agreed on in Committee.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnson.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Braithwaite.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor, and the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I return you my sincerest Thanks for your Appointment of me to the Command of Tanjore, which I consider at this Time as a Mark of your Approbation and Confidence in me, which I shall study to deserve. I shall hope to be honoured with a Letter of Instructions for my Conduct, before my Departure; and I beg Leave to represent, that in Times like these, when Communication with the Presidency may become precarious, whether it may not be prudent to augment, in mere Military Matters, the Powers of the Commanding Officer there, which, as I am informed, are particularly confined, so that he may be allowed to turn his Thoughts towards the general Protection and Security of the Country, and the Defence of the smaller Forts, as well as the immediate Defence of the Fort of Tanjore. And I should flatter myself this might be done, without in any Way lessening the

Conſequence of the Rajah; who may be adviſed to do in theſe Matters, as from himſelf, whatever may be ſuggeſted to him from the Commanding Officer. We have ſeen, that ſuch of his Highneſs the Nabob's Forts as were not defended by any Officer of the Honourable Company's, or by any of their Troops, have uniformly ſurrendered to the Enemy almoſt as ſoon as he appeared; there is Reaſon therefore to apprehend, that the ſame might be the Caſe with thoſe of Tanjore, if not timely attended to.

The preſent Military Force in that Country, it is true, does not admit of our extending our Views much beyond the immediate Defence of Tanjore itſelf; but as the Seaſon of Military Operations is a little diſtant, there is Time both to augment and improve it. At preſent the Three Sibbendy Battalions, which conſtitute more than Half the Military Strength of that Kingdom as to Numbers, are almoſt without Officers, and, as I am informed, totally without Diſcipline; and are ſo managed and diſpoſed of, that thoſe Officers who ſhould have commanded them, have aſſured me that they ſcarce know of their Exiſtence: I ſhould hope therefore that the Regulations and Eſtabliſhments for thoſe Battalions, which are planned in profound Peace, may merit ſome farther Conſiderations now, more particularly as there has been a Neceſſity for withdrawing from Tanjore the beſt of the Honourable Company's regular Battalions, I mean their Grenadier Companies. Heretofore the Rajah of Tanjore was famous for his Horſe, and maintained ſo large a Body as Four thouſand, which we called regular Horſe, moſt of which, for want of Service at Home, have been obliged to ſeek it in the Service of Hyder, no Doubt much againſt their Inclination. As theſe People have ſtrong local Attachments and Prejudices, I ſhould imagine that were the Rajah now to exert himſelf, he might collect at leaſt Six hundred Horſe, to be officered and paid by the Honourable Company; Five hundred of them to be formed into a Regiment, ever to act with the Army when in the Field, the other Hundred as a ſeparate Troop for Home Service and that of recruiting, in order to keep thoſe in the Field compleat; and I ſhould think that thoſe Six hundred in Peace Time, if kept up, might anſwer all the Revenue Purpoſes of the Three Sibbendy Battalions, which may be put on the Eſtabliſhment now without any additional Expence, as Three Battalions have actually been loſt from it: And this Body of Horſe will, I am ſure, prove the beſt and ſureſt Baſis whereon to form a larger Body, if future Exigencies ſhould render it neceſſary. I ſhall only add to the Liberty I have here taken, and which I truſt you will excuſe, that as I have nothing but black Troops to depend upon, that they may be as much as poſſible compleated with Officers and Serjeants, as on their Alertneſs we muſt repoſe our chief Confidence: Indeed, if Time permitted, it would be well to change the Battalions now there, as they are now rather too much compoſed of Tanjore People; and as I have certain Information that Captain Noodler, from his bodily Infirmities, is at preſent quite incapable of Field Service, and not likely ſoon to recover, that he may be permitted to go with me to ſuperintend all the Ordnance Department, and with Powers to raiſe ſome black Artillery and Laſcars for that particular Service.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Fort Saint George,
23d Sept. 1780.

On his Arrival at Tanjore, he will receive ſuch Inſtructions as have been ſent to former Commandants; ſhould he then repreſent any Deficiency in his Powers as Commandant, the Committee will take the Subject into Conſideration.

Agreed in the mean Time, that he be directed to put the Place in the beſt Poſture of Defence.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 24th September 1780.

To Colonel John Braithwaite.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 23d Inſtant.

With reſpect to the Military Powers of the Commanding Officer of Tanjore, we have endeavoured to make them adequate to the Importance of that Truſt; but if upon your Arrival there, and after peruſing the ſeveral Letters and Inſtructions which have been written on this Subject, and comparing them with the actual State of Things in that Country, you ſhall find the Powers confined, or the Regulations that have been iſſued either reſpecting the Troops in the Garriſon, or the Sibbendy Corps not properly obſerved, you will inform us, that we may give the neceſſary Orders in conſequence. In the mean Time we have only to deſire that you will attend particularly to the Se-

curity of the Fort, by putting it in the beſt Poſture of Defence that your Means will permit, applying to the Rajah as often as may be requiſite for his Aſſiſtance or Concurrence.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th Sept. 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th October 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of the laſt Committee read, and approved.

In conſequence of the Letter written to the Nabob the 3d Inſt. Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon now deliver in the following Minutes.

We do not approve of the Letter written to his Highneſs the Nabob by the Preſident: We are of Opinion that his Highneſs ſhould be requeſted to ſpecify particularly the Medium Rent of each Country which he offers to aſſign over to the Company, and to promiſe that the Revenues ſhall not be alienated for any other Purpoſe whatſoever: We alſo think it is very proper that he be requeſted to deliver in to the Committee, an exact Statement to the 1ſt Inſtant, of the Balance due by him to his Cavalry, by which they may be enabled to deviſe a Mode for diſcharging it.

We think it would have been ſufficient, had the Preſident ſent an Extract from the Company's Letter, relative to Captain Tonyn, without any Recommendation; as Major Coſby, who now commands the Cavalry, we underſtand is much eſteemed by his Highneſs, and alſo by the Officers and private Men of the Corps. He has commanded them for Years; and we are ſorry to ſee the Services he ſo recently performed, and his Conduct at the Siege of Pondicherry, ſhould be forgotten: We conceive this Attempt to deprive him of his Command a particular Hardſhip, and that it will be very diſagreeable to his Highneſs.

Cha' Smith,
Sam' Johnſon.

6th October 1780.

We perceive, with much Surprize, that his Highneſs the Nabob's Letter to the Preſident, of the 1ſt Inſtant, has been materially altered ſince we firſt peruſed it. We are of Opinion, That after Delivery it became a Record, and ought not to ſuffer Change on any Pretence whatſoever. This Mode of tranſacting Buſineſs is pregnant with the moſt dangerous Conſequences, and therefore we think we ſhould be wanting in our Duty, if we ſuffered ſuch an Act to paſs unnoticed.

Charles Smith.
Sam' Johnſon.

6th October 1780.

To the Nabob.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

The Army having been obliged to return to the Mount, in conſequence of the unfortunate Accident which befel Colonel Baillie's Detachment; it becomes highly expedient that the utmoſt Exertions ſhould be made for recruiting the Loſs that has happened, and enabling our Troops to take the Field again as early as poſſible.

For this Purpoſe the Committee have thought it neceſſary to deſire I will write to your Highneſs, and requeſt your immediate Anſwer to the following Particulars.

1ſt. As there is ſtill ſome Arrears of Pay due to the Two Regiments of Cavalry belonging to your

your Highneſs now in Camp, and as the Men may be diſcontented and clamorous if they are not paid up to the preſent Time, it will be requiſite to know from your Highneſs, how far you can ſatisfy them; and whether it be not poſſible for you to add another Regiment from among thoſe doing Duty about the Perſons of your Highneſs and your Sons? The Increaſe of Cavalry is ſo abſolutely neceſſary to the future Operations of the Field, that I am extremely anxious to ſee it effected, if poſſible, to the Number of 1,500 or 2,000. I requeſt alſo that your Highneſs will put your Cavalry entirely under our Orders during the preſent Troubles.

2dly. The Committee wiſh to know from your Highneſs what Aid you can really grant for ſupporting the heavy Expences of the War, and at what Periods; ſpecifying the Sums you think you may be able to pay to the Company in the Courſe the next Three Months.

3dly. In reſpect to Rice, Sheep, and Bullocks for the Army, the Committee would be glad to be informed what Quantity of each your Highneſs can get ready in the courſe of 18 or 20 Days.

4thly. Whether you can engage the Kaleſtry and Vencatgurry Rajahs to join the Army with their People, and at what Time.

5thly. How many of your Highneſs's Sepoys or Sibbendy can be ſent to Garriſons, to compleat our Sepoy Corps for the preſent.

Fort St. George, 19th September 1780. I have the Honour to be, &c. &c.

N° 100. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 1ſt October 1780—Received 2d D°.*

I have received your Letter dated the 19th September, acquainting me of the Army's having been obliged to return to the Mount, in conſequence of the unfortunate Accident which befell Colonel Baillie's Detachment, &c. that it became highly expedient that the utmoſt Exertion ſhould be made for recruiting the Loſs that had happened, that our Army might take the Field again as ſoon as poſſible: That for this Purpoſe the Committee thought it neceſſary to require my immediate Anſwer to the following Particulars, viz.

1ſt. That as there were ſtill ſome Arrears of Pay due to my Two Regiments of Cavalry now in Camp, and as they might be diſcontented and clamorous if they were not paid up to this Time, it was neceſſary I ſhould inform you how far I could ſatisfy them; and whether it were not poſſible for me to raiſe another Regiment from among thoſe doing Duty about the Perſons of me and my Sons; that the Encreaſe of Cavalry is ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that you wiſhed to ſee it effected to the Number of 1500 or 2000; and that you requeſt alſo that I will put my Cavalry under your Order during the preſent Troubles.

The Pain I feel on Account of the unhappy Diſaſter which has befallen Colonel Baillie and the other Officers, I am wholly unable to expreſs. Ever ſince the Engliſh firſt eſtabliſhed themſelves in Hindoſtan, they have acquired an exalted Degree of Reputation. This is the firſt Inſtance in which from Misfortune they have been unſucceſsful on this Coaſt; and I hope, through the Aſſiſtance of the Almighty and the Exertion of my Friends, that it will be the laſt. It is true, my Regiments have been involved in great Diſtreſs for theſe Five Years paſt, ever ſince the Tanjore Country was wreſted from me. They never received from that Country any Satisfaction on Account of their Pay, notwithſtanding Lord Pigot, when he took Tanjore from me, made me a moſt ſolemn Promiſe that they ſhould be paid. They have ſeveral Times mutinied, and ſurrounded the Gates of my Palace in a clamorous Manner, but my Friends took no Notice thereof, nor did they pay the leaſt Attention to the diſcharging the Arrears of Pay that were juſtly due to my Cavalry, or to the Payment of what might become due in future; but on the contrary they declared the ſaid Regiments to be the Source of an unneceſſary Expence, and repeatedly inſiſted on my diſcharging them from my Service, though I then knew the Neceſſity of detaining them. Theſe Troops were raiſed by the Advice of Governor Wynch and General Smith, after the Reduction of Tanjore, when Ragonaut Row with 50,000 Horſe had penetrated as far as Serra, with a Deſign to deſtroy the Carnatic, and Hyder Ally had offered to join them. At that Time I wrote a Letter to the Governor, and told him, that as our Troops were then ſo well prepared and diſciplined, if any Power attempted to diſturb our Repoſe, we ſhould be able effectually to ſtop it. A Copy of that Extract goes encloſed for your Information. My diſbanding theſe Regiments afterwards, was in Compliance with the repeated Deſires and Requiſitions of my Friends. As you now have wrote to me to raiſe other Troops, I am to inform you that all the Horſes which are about me and my Sons, excepting a few immediately neceſſary for our Guards, ſhall be put into the Regiments commanded by Colonel Coſby (who was lent to me by the Company for that Purpoſe) and ſhall be put under the Orders of the Commander in Chief until the War is over.

You

You desire I will recruit the Army to the Amount of Two thousand. It is an established Custom with all Princes, when they first get Intelligence of the hostile Intentions of an Enemy, to prepare and hold in Readiness what Forces they have, to recruit and strengthen them, and to form Alliance with the neighbouring Powers; that is the Time when Exertions can effectually be made: But in an Hour like this, what is it possible for us to promise ourselves? The Enemy has a considerable Footing in the Carnatic, and having previous to that possessed himself of the Countries of Cuddapah, &c. it is almost impossible to procure either Horses or Men. However, in this critical Juncture, such Horses as I and my Sons are possessed of, excepting those I have already mentioned, either here or in the Country, with as many Troops as can be obtained, shall be formed into Two other complete Regiments of Cavalry as soon as possible, and the Two said Regiments commanded by Captains Dugald Campbell and M'Allister, making in all Four under the Command of Colonel Cosby, shall be put under the Order of the Commander in Chief. But I have Two Things to request from your Friendship, 1st. As many Horses may be purchased in the Settlement, if you will be kind enough to provide me soon with 360, the said Two Regiments shall be completed with all Speed. 2d. As in this Time of War it is both necessary, and for the Good of the Service, that the Arrears of Pay due to them shou'd be discharged, and that they should join the Army; but as it is not in my Power to do so while Distractions reign in my Country, I do agree to appropriate to the Company for Repayment of such Advances as have been or hereafter shall be made on Account of my Cavalry, the unassigned Revenues of the Tinnivelly, Shevegunya, Bainadporam, and Trichinopoly Countries, which will yield Annually, should they continue undisturbed by the Enemy, Three Lacks of Pagodas. This Sum shall be paid to the Company by me, from the 1st of October 1780, and shall continue to be paid into their Treasury by regular Kists, for discharging the Expences that shall be incurred during the present War in the Carnatic on the above Account. Moreover, should Peace be re-established in my Country, I will exert myself to the utmost to encrease those Payments from other Districts, that the said Sum disbursed may be the more speedily discharged. The Company ever afforded me their Assistance in Money Matters in Times of Trouble, and I always repaid them in Times of Peace. Upwards of Two Crores have been paid to my Friends in this Manner: I hope therefore, you will not refuse it at this Time, as the public Affairs of the Company and mine are the same.

2dly. The Committee wish to know what Aid I can really grant for supporting the heavy Expences of the War. My Friend! my Faith and uniform affectionate Disposition is known to the whole English Nation; my Friends have at all Times experienced it; most Part of my Life has been spent in assisting my Friends the English; from my first Connexion with them, both my Father's Treasury and mine hath been exhausted in chastizing the common Enemy. In every War, when my Country has been laid waste, my Friends have assisted me with Money, which Money I have repaid in Times of Peace. But when Troubles have visited it unattended by Devastation, the Exertions I have made have been such as to exceed even those which I have exerted myself to make in the Intervals of Tranquillity and Peace; many Instances of which I might mention, but the Sieges of Pondicherry and Mahé will be sufficient, when my Friend was an Eye-witness himself to the Money and Provisions of every Kind which I supplied. As it is now upwards of Two Months since the Enemy entered my Country, possessed himself of many of my Forts, appointed his own Aumildars to the Management of my Country; why should I fail to do every Thing in my Power to chastise him, and drive him from my Dominions? My Friends are not ignorant of my Situation, they knew well that *before* the Enemy had raised Disturbances, *even* when he first began to make Preparations in his Country, in order to invade and lay waste the Carnatic, I repeatedly acquainted my Friends of his Designs, and desired to be informed of what our Army would stand in need of, while my Country remained in Peace, and that I would to the utmost of my Power, provide every Thing necessary; declaring at the same Time, that after the Enemy should enter my Country, it would be extremely difficult to procure Supplies for the Troops that should take the Field: With respect to this however, I continued uninformed. Now after the Enemy has been upwards of Two Months in the Carnatic, I have received a Letter from you, requesting a Supply of Bullocks, Sheep, and Rice. Since the Tanjore Country was taken from me in the Year 1776, I have seen my Affairs decline Day after Day; I have been even in Want of Money for my own private Expences: The whole Produce of my Country has not been sufficient to answer the Demands that have been made upon me. My Business has been carried on by borrowing of Money, pledging of Jewels and Houses, and by giving up Districts of my Country to my Creditors; But in Times of Trouble, like these, no one can be found, who will lend me Money; confiding in my Friends, however, they will lend their Assistance towards the Prosecution of the War. When General Sir Hector Munro marched with the Army to Conjeveram, I furnished him Bullocks, Sheep, and Rice, to as great an Extent as in my Power, and my Agents likewise supplied Colonels Baillie and Lang with the same. After the Departure of Sir Hector Munro, I sent 850 Bullocks to the Army: What more you want, you will be pleased to inform me, that I may give Orders to my Agent to send as many as they can procure. I wrote before to you repeatedly, that there were great Quantities of Provisions in my Country, and I now again repeat that there is more than a Sufficiency in Store for the Use of the Army in the Forts of Arcot, Vellore, Gingee, Wandewash, and Trichinopoly, besides which, there are great Quantities of Grain in different Parts of my Country, which the Incursions of Hyder's Cavalry prevented the Inhabitants from securing in Places of Safety. The Provisions collected at Conjeveram, were seen by Sir

Hector Munro himself, although the Enemy had already plundered that Place. By the Bleſſing of God, there are great Numbers of Bullocks and Sheep in Arcot and Trichinopoly, but the Enemy being in the Road to thoſe Places, they cannot be brought hither. I could alſo ſend for ſome from Nellore, Vencatgurry, Calliſtry, and Baumrauze, but I have received Intelligence that Meer Ally Raza, by Hyder's Orders will march with a Force to thoſe Countries; in which Caſe it will be almoſt impoſſible to procure any Cattle from thoſe Places. The Tanjore Country ſtill remains in a State of Tranquillity; the Rajah have a private Connection with the Enemy: It is poſſible for my Friend to procure Bullocks and Sheep from thence in great Numbers, and to have them brought from thence in Ships. I can ſupply Sheep from the Countries of Trichinopoly, Ramnaut, and Tinnivelly; there are Sea Ports all along the Coaſt; you will be ſo good to have them brought from hence. My writing this to you, is, becauſe all theſe Things ſhould be kept ready at the Sea Ports in great Quantities for future Services, to the End that we may not meet with Difficulty in procuring them in the Monſoon, when the Enemy's Horſe have entirely overrun the Country. You will be pleaſed to inform me as ſoon as poſſible of the Number of Bullocks and Sheep you have already, and what more you will want to ſupply the Army till it ſhall arrive at Arcot, where there is every Thing in Abundance. There are in Arcot, Part of the Troops belonging to the Rajahs of Calliſtry and Baumrauze: As their Countries are contiguous to that of Cuddapah, Meer Ally Raza has ſeveral Times plundered them, and he is now ready again to invade them. Theſe Rajahs have kept Troops in their Pollams, and when they find their Pollams in any Kind of Security, they will come and join the Army, as I have ſent repeated Orders to them to do ſo. At preſent, indeed, it would not be ſafe for them to move, large Bodies of Horſe being diſperſed over every Part of the Country. Every Man in the Carnatic will be ready to give his Aſſiſtance when the Army takes the Field: Now, agreeable to the common Practice in Indoſtan, Fear makes many of the Aumildars and others ſubmit to Hyder, as his did to me in the former Myſore War, when we penetrated into the Balaghaut. This, however, is but a temporary Diſaffection, which they will immediately give Proofs of when our Forces are in a Condition to protect them; and ſuch of them as perſiſt in their Diſobedience ſhall meet with condign Puniſhment the firſt Opportunity.

Thoſe who have nothing elſe to live on but the ſcanty Produce of their own Labour, from Neceſſity are compelled to cultivate the Ground under the Authority of that Power which is ſupreme upon the Spot.

Afflicted at the Diſtreſſes of my Country, there is no Exertion I will not make:—Let me implore my Friends, that no Time may be loſt in chaſtizing the inveterate Enemy of us both: I am a firm and ſteady Friend to the Engliſh, and have been always united with them in their adverſe as well as proſperous Days. What ſhall I ſay more?

N° 107. *To the Rajah of Tanjore, dated 11th October 1780.*

I have had the Pleaſure to receive your Letters, and underſtand the Contents.

You may reſt aſſured, that every Thing in my Power ſhall be done for the Security of the Fort and Country of Tanjore during the Troubles. But it is abſolutely neceſſary at preſent, to bring into the Field a ſufficient Force to encounter the Enemy, and for this Purpoſe, I am obliged to draw Troops from every Part. Orders have however been given for putting Tanjore into the beſt State of Defence, and I flatter myſelf you will readily acquieſce in every Thing that is propoſed by the Commanding Officer, and give every Aſſiſtance in your Power.

As we find great Difficulty in carrying on our Military Operations, for Want of a Body of Cavalry, we are uſing our Endeavours to procure a ſufficient Number, and I ſhall take it as a Favour, if you will give me your Aſſiſtance. The Tanjore Cavalry were always famous for their Exploits, and I have no Doubt, that with proper Exertions, you will be able to raiſe at leaſt a Thouſand Men and Horſes, which would be of great Service at this Juncture, and give much Satisfaction to the Company. You will be ſo good to let me know, as ſoon as poſſible, what you may be able to do in this Reſpect, in what Time, and at what Expence; in the mean while, I requeſt you will begin upon this neceſſary Buſineſs, that not a Moment may be loſt.

Colonel Braithwaite has lately been appointed to the Command of Tanjore in the room of Major Maclellan deceaſed, and I truſt he will prove agreeable to you.

The great Diſburſements neceſſary for the Support of the War, obliges me again to apply to you very earneſtly on the Subject of Money: You know how ſtrongly the Company wrote to you on this Subject, in their laſt Letter; I hope you want no further Inducement to exert yourſelf in giving them an extraordinary Aid at this Juncture, when they are called upon to defend their Poſſeſſions, and thoſe of their Allies, againſt a formidable Enemy. If you cannot poſſibly find Means of pro-

curing ready Money on this Occaſion (which I hope however will not be the Caſe) I truſt you will be able to put into our Hands a Quantity of Grain, with Liberty to mortgage or diſpoſe of it in ſuch Manner as may enable us to raiſe a Supply.

May your Happineſs and Proſperity be ever increaſing! What can I ſay more?

N° 113. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 20th October 1780.—Received D°.*

Out of Friendſhip to me, and a Deſire for the Public Welfare and chaſtizing the Enemy, you were ſo kind as to conſent to diſcharge the Arrears of Pay due to my Three Regiments of Cavalry. I herewith ſend you the Account, and I doubt not you will diſcharge what is due to them, and give them their Pay, and feed their Horſes in future, commencing from the 1ſt October, as per the Receipts ſigned by the Officers, and I engage to repay the Company whatever they ſhall advance for me on that Account. What ſhall I ſay more?

N° 116. *To the Rajah of Tanjore, 24th October 1780.*

As it is expedient at this Time to unite the Sibbendy Corps in your Country to that of the Regular Sepoys, and to put the Whole under the Direction of the Commandant at Tanjore, we have come to that Reſolution accordingly; and I requeſt you will in future make your Requiſitions to the Commandant at Tanjore for ſuch of the Sibbendy as you may abſolutely want for the Revenue Service.

N° 118. *From the Rajah of Tanjore to the Governor, dated 14th Showal, 1194 Hegyra, or 13th October.—Received 25th D°.*

Although the Enemy has over-run the whole Carnatic, he has not yet been able to commit Depredations on this Side the Coleroon, as it is quite full at this Seaſon, and therefore this and the Trichinopoly Country are ſtill in a State of Tranquillity. I know it to be incumbent upon me to give every Aſſiſtance in my Power to the Company at ſuch a Time, but I have neither Money or Troops to do it, which gives me great Uneaſineſs. You will be kind enough to let me know what Quantity of Grain, &c. will be wanted, and I ſhall uſe my utmoſt Endeavours to provide it, and ſend it to you. I am now collecting Sheep, Fowls, Straw, Hay, &c. to put on board of Boats, in order to be ſent to Madras, and I hope they will get there ſoon.

May the Almighty ever grant Proſperity to the Engliſh, and make their Enemies repent of their Temerity! This is my conſtant Prayer, which I hope will prove efficacious. Be pleaſed to regard me conſtantly your Friend and Well-wiſher.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 30th October 1780.

Read the following Letter from the Nabob.

N° 616. *From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 25th October 1780.—Received D°.*

I have applied to my Friends for a Loan of One Lack and Thirty-ſeven thouſand Pagodas, which will diſcharge the Arrears of Pay due to my Cavalry to the End of September (excluſive of the Contract for feeding their Horſes); for the Payments of which, and the Money already advanced on this Account, I have offered to aſſign the unappropriated Revenues of the Diſtricts of Tenavelly, Ramnauh, Sheve, Ganga, and Trichinopoly, yielding Three Lacks annually.

Now that a War has taken Place in my Country, I propoſe for your future Satisfaction, that in caſe when the Country is in Peace the Kiſts are not punctually paid, as ſtated in the accompanying Paper, you may appoint a Perſon to receive the Revenue from my Managers till the Whole is repaid. I have taken all this Trouble purely for the Good of public Affairs. At this Time, when the Enemy has entered into my Country, I agree that my Cavalry, which has for ſome Years been diſciplined and regulated according to the European Manner, may act in Conjunction with the Engliſh Army. What ſhall I ſay more?

APPENDIX, N° 10.

Kiſt Bundy for the Re-payment of the Money which the Company may advance for the Nabob's Cavalry; and, ſhould the Country remain in Peace, the Money will be paid as follows:

From the Diſtrict of Tinnevelly,	Pag^{s}	200,000
From Trichonopoly,		50,000
From Ranmaut and Shuegunga,		50,000
	Pag^{s}	300,000

To be paid as follows:

The laſt Day of February 1781,	Pag^{s}	100,000
The laſt of May,		100,000
The laſt of September,		100,000
	Pag^{s}	300,000

Dated 26th Showal, 1174 of Hygera,
and 25th October 1780.

The Preſident then delivers in the following Minute:

As the above Letter and Account from the Nabob brings the Buſineſs of his Highneſs's Cavalry at length to ſome Sort of Concluſion, and as no Time ſhould be loſt now that Horſes are daily coming in for re-placing thoſe wanting for the Four Regiments, which he has agreed to lend to the Company, the Preſident is of Opinion, that the Balance of Arrears of Pay due to the reſpective Regiments, ſhould be paid into the Hands of the European Commandant; Two Thirds, amounting to Pagodas 91,750, in Notes or Bonds, payable at the Expiration of a limited Time, or on Demand, with Intereſt; and the Reſidue, amounting to Pag^{s} 45,875, in ready Money, for the Uſe of the private Troopers, who are in want of it, and who will not ſerve unleſs their Arrears are diſcharged. The Preſident further propoſes, that the Paymaſter of the Army be directed to iſſue the Pay and Allowance to the Cavalry Monthly, as he does to the reſt of the Troops, the Pay Rolls and Abſtracts, &c. being duly counter-ſigned by the Officers commanding the Regiments. With reſpect to the Contract for feeding the Horſes, the Preſident is of Opinion that the Commanding Officer ſhould ſtill hold them; but that the Allowance for each Horſe ſhould not exceed Six Pagodas per Month. Should this meet with the Concurrence of the Committee, the Preſident will, with their Approbation, requeſt the Nabob to give immediate Directions that the Cavalry be put, without further Loſs of Time, under the Orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army.

Reſolved, agreeably to the Opinion of the Preſident, That the Arrears of Pay due to the reſpective Regiments of Cavalry, be diſcharged in the Manner he has propoſed; viz. Two Thirds, amounting to Pagodas 91,570, in Notes or Bonds, payable at the Expiration of a limited Time, to be agreed on hereafter; and the Remainder, amounting to Pagodas 45,875, in ready Money.

Ordered, That a Return be delivered in of the Nabob's Cavalry in its preſent State, to be ſent to the Paymaſter at Camp, with Directions to pay the Cavalry, agreeably to it, for the Month of October, allowing the Commanding Officers for feeding the Horſes, at the Rate of Six Pagodas each per Month, and to continue the ſame in future.

Extract of General Letter from Fort Saint George to the Court of Directors, 15 October 1780.

On a Review of the State of your Treaſury when Hyder Ally invaded the Carnatic in July laſt, we judged it abſolutely neceſſary to iſſue Advertiſements for receiving Loans from the Inhabitants of this Settlement, for which Company's Bonds were to be granted, payable in Eight Months after Date, bearing an Intereſt Eight per Cent. per Annum. But the Supply raiſed by this Means proving very inadequate to the heavy Expences of Government, and having no Hope of any immediate Relief that could be deemed effectual, either from the Northern Subordinances, from the Nabob, or from Bengal: in this Exigency, after much Deliberation, however averſe we are to act contrary to your Orders in any Inſtance, we found ourſelves under the unavoidable Neceſſity, as the laſt Reſource, to draw Bills on your Honours, to an Amount not exceeding £.200,000.

We

We judged that the moſt adviſeable Method of putting this Reſolution in Force, was to fix the Payment of the Bills at 365 Days after Sight, with an optional Clauſe, impowering you to delay Payment for One Year after the Bills became due, on allowing an Intereſt of £. 5 per Cent. per Annum for that Half Year, and to publiſh Advertiſements for receiving ſealed Tenders, ſpecifying a Rate of Exchange, which on a Medium of the ſeveral Offers, turns out 7ˢ. 9ᵈ. ¾ per Pagoda.

And as we thought it but equitable that thoſe Perſons who had diſintereſtedly contributed to the Support of Government, by lending Money on Bond at a low Intereſt, in conſequence of our former Reſolution, ſhould have every Indulgence ſhewn them; we allowed thoſe who choſe it, to receive Bills on you, at the Medium Rate of Exchange, inſtead of their Bonds, to prevent the ſmalleſt Suſpicion being entertained of any Impoſition on the Public being intended on the Part of Government, in iſſuing the firſt Advertiſement, in conſequence of which thoſe Gentlemen had made their reſpective Loans.

We cannot quit this Subject without expreſſing to your Honours, the real Concern we feel at having been obliged to reſolve on this Meaſure, which nothing but the moſt urgent Neceſſity ſhould have led us to adopt; at the ſame Time we truſt we ſhall meet with your Approbation for putting it in Effect, in a Manner the leaſt detrimental and diſtreſſing to the Company: We have further to Notice to your Honours, that our preſent Draft on you, has exceeded our firſt Intention by the Sums of One thouſand three hundred and Fifty-five Pounds four Shillings and Two Pence Sterling, which Irregularity was inevitable from the Impoſſibility of calculating the Amount of the Offers more accurately amidſt ſuch a Number of Tenders as we received on this Occaſion.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon.
Alexander Davidſon.

APPENDIX, N° 11.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 13th September 1780.

RESOLVED, That Directions be ſent to Maſulipatam and Vizagapatam, to hold the Grenadier Companies of the Sepoys in thoſe Diſtricts in readineſs to be embarked for Madras.

Agreed that the Admiral be requeſted to ſpare the Nymph Sloop to carry our Diſpatches to Bengal.

Wrote the following Letter to Sir Edward Hughes:

To Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in India.

Sir,

As we wiſh to ſend ſome Diſpatches of Importance to Bengal, we ſhall be much obliged if you will ſpare us the Nymph Sloop for that Service, and requeſt of Captain Stephens to give a Paſſage to Mr. Stephen Sulivan, whom we propoſe to entruſt with our Letters.

We requeſt alſo that you will direct Captain Stephens, in his Return from Bengal, to call at Ganjam, Vizagapatam, and Maſulipatam, to bring up from thoſe Places to Madras ſuch Treaſure as may be tendered to him.

We have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
13th September 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 11.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 14 September 1780.

To Mr. James Henry Casamajor, Chief, and Council at Vizagapatam.

Gentlemen,

From the unfortunate Accident which has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment, in its March to join the Army, we find it expedient to draw a Reinforcement from the Troops in the Circars. We desire, therefore, that you will hold the Grenadier Companies of the Two Battalions in your Districts, in Readiness to embark, and inform Captain Lysaught that he is to proceed with them on the Arrival of the Vessels appointed to bring them up.

To supply the Deficiency which will be occasioned by these Drafts, we allow you to recruit as many as to compleat the Strength of the Battalions.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
14th September 1780.

To Mr. John Turing, Resident at Ganjam.

Sir,

We have received your several Letters. The Admiral having at our Request ordered the Nymph Sloop to call at Ganjam in her Way to this Place, we desire you will pack up ready to send by her all the Treasure you have on Hand, and which you do not immediately want for your Civil and Military Disbursements.

The Nymph, when she comes in Sight of Ganjam, will hoist a Union Jack at her Fore-top-gallant Mast-head, upon which you will send on board the Treasure, that she may not be detained One Moment longer than is absolutely necessary.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
14th September 1780.

To Mr. James Henry Casamajor, Chief, and Council of Vizagapatam.

Gentlemen,

The Admiral having at our Request ordered the Nymph Sloop to call at Vizagapatam in her Way from Bengal to this Place, we desire you will pack up, ready to send by her, all the Treasure you can possibly spare, after providing for your immediate Civil and Military Charges.

The Nymph, when she arrives off Vizagapatam, will hoist a Union Jack at her Fore-top-gallant Mast-head; upon which you will be pleased to send off the Treasure, that there may be no unnecessary delaying of the Vessel.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
14th Sept. 1780.

The same to Masulipatam.

To Edward Cotsford, Esq; Chief and Council at Masulipatam.

Gentlemen,

As we find it absolutely necessary to reinforce the Army by Drafts from the Troops in the Circars, we desire you will hold all the Sepoy Grenadiers of your District in Readiness to embark

for the Presidency. To supply the Deficiency which will be occasioned by these Drafts, we give you Permission to recruit as many as may be necessary to compleat the Strength of the several Battalions.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
14th Sept. 1780.

To Lieutenant Walter Douglas, commanding in the Guntoor Circars.

Sir,

The Soubah having requested that the Guntoor Circar might be delivered up again to Bazalet Jung, we have come to that Resolution accordingly; and we enclose you the Nabob's Order to his Manager there, to withdraw from all farther Concern in that Country. You will, in consequence, write a Letter to Bazalet Jung's Agent, if he has any in the Circar, acquainting him, you are authorized by us to deliver over the Country to his Master, and desire him to take Charge of it, until he can receive his Master's Orders. Having thus done, you will collect your Sepoys from the different Parts of the Districts, proceed with them to Ongole, and use your utmost Endeavours to procure Boats to bring them to the Presidency; where we wish them to arrive with the utmost Expedition.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 16 September 1780.

To Mr. James Henry Casamajor, Chief, and Council of Vizagapatam.

Gentlemen,

The Sartine Frigate now proceeds to your Settlement, to bring up the Four Grenadier Companies of Sepoys under the Command of Captain Lysaught, as mentioned in our Letter to you of the 14th Instant; we desire therefore that you will embark them without Loss of Time.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
16 Sept. 1780.

To Edward Cotsford, Esq; Chief, and Council of Masulipatam.

Gentlemen,

We now send the Company's Ship Ponsborne, to bring up the Eight Grenadier Companies of Sepoys mentioned in our Letter to you of the 14th Instant; we desire you will send them on Board with all possible Expedition, and afterwards dispatch the Ship to the Presidency.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
16th Sept. 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 23d September 1780.

Mr. Johnson delivers in the following Minute.

The Letter (of the 21st ult°.) just received from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, evinces the bad Consequences that will probably ensue from the Committee having delayed answering

ing their Letter to them (of the 12th June) relative to ceding the Guntoor Circar to the Soubah: I have already recorded my Opinion of this important Subject; and cannot but regret that it was not adopted, inſtead of writing a vague Anſwer to them, of our being obliged to wait for his Highneſs the Nabob's Determination on the Buſineſs. The Governor General and Council muſt be convinced that this was an evaſive Anſwer to an explicit Requiſition, and will hold us reſponſible for the Conſequences. It was highly impolitic and dangerous to delay gratifying the Soubah in ſo reaſonable a Requeſt; we may probably feel the bad Effects of it now, when Hyder Ally has proved ſo ſucceſsful, and as it affords the Soubah ſo fair an Opportunity to break with us.

I am very apprehenſive that Hyder Ally will take Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar on its being evacuated by Lieutenant Douglas; and I greatly regret that we did not adviſe Bazalet Jung of our Orders to that Officer, ſo that his Troops might have been ready to take Poſſeſſion of it the Moment the Company's ſhould march from it. To remedy, as far as now in us lies, the Evils which may reſult from the Inattention ſhewn by the Committee to this important Buſineſs, I move for writing immediately to the Governor General and Council, that we have obtained his Highneſs the Nabob's Conſent for ceding the Guntoor Circar, and in conſequence have ordered our Troops to be withdrawn.

I alſo move, that Letters be written to the Soubah and Bazalet Jung, acquainting them with all that we have done in this Buſineſs.

Samuel Johnſon.

I ſubſcribe to the Sentiments expreſſed by Mr. Johnſon in the foregoing Minute, and ſecond his Motions.

Charles Smith.

Agreed, That a Letter be written to the Governor General and Council, that we have ordered our Troops to be withdrawn from the Guntoor Circar, and the Country to be delivered to Bazalet Jung; and that a Letter be written to the Nizam in the moſt friendly Terms, that his having intereſted himſelf in the Reſtitution of the Guntoor Circar to his Brother, we have out of Reſpect to him ordered it to be delivered up.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 27th September 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have this Day received your Letter of the 14th Inſt. encloſing a Letter from the Nabob to his Manager in this Circar, which I have forwarded to him at Bezora.

I have written to Bazalet Jung's Agent at Condavir, agreeably to your Commands, informing him that I am authorized by you to deliver over the Guntoor Circar to his Maſter, and deſiring him to take Charge of the Country, until he can receive his Orders.

I ſhall as ſoon as poſſible collect the Sepoys from their different Stations in this Diſtrict, and proceed with them to Ongole, and ſhall uſe my utmoſt Endeavours to procure Boats to carry them to the Preſidency.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,
Walter Douglas.

Innacunda,
21ſt Sept. 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 30th September 1780.

Received the following Letter.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is with much Concern that I find it neceſſary to inform you, that it is my Opinion, that little Service is to be expected from the Independent Companies when ſent to the Southward, as it was expreſsly

expreſsly underſtood when they were enliſted, that they were always to remain in this Quarter. I have carefully kept from their Knowledge that their Deſtination was to Madras, and have only given out, that we were going to Ongole; but I underſtand they are ſuſpicious, and begin to waver. The Senior Subidar, who is a Man in every Reſpect to be depended on, informs me, that the vaſt Numbers of Sepoys of Captain Powel's and Captain Nixon's Battalions who have paſſed this Way, and almoſt all of them wounded, has much alarmed our People. He ſays, that as ſoon as they know for certain that they are ordered to the Southward, that at leaſt One Half of them will deſert if they have an Opportunity. The Two Companies of the 7th Circar Battalion, I believe are inclined to be of the ſame Diſpoſition, but the Two Companies of the 7th Carnatic will readily embark for the Southward, being all of that Country.

No Attention on my Part ſhall be wanting to bring off as many of the Sepoys as poſſible, but I have thought it neceſſary at the ſame Time to acquaint you how far I think they are to be relied on.

There are in this Place 140 Barrels of Muſket Ball Cartridges and Gunpowder, Part of which, together with 1,400 Cartridge Pouches, and ſome other Stores were left by Colonel Baillie, all of which now ſending to Ongole, and ſhall leave them with Captain Edmonds, unleſs I receive your Inſtructions to the contrary.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Walter Douglas.

Innacunda,
24th September 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 4th October 1780.

Received the following Letter from Lieutenant Douglas.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, and Governor, &c. Select Committee Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I arrived here this Morning with the Detachment from the Guntoor Circar. On the 24th ult. I informed you of my Opinion as to the Service to be expected from the Five independant Companies when ſent to the Southward: I have ſince ſounded their Inclinations more particularly, and I find them ſo averſe to going to the Southward, that their being ordered to proceed, I am convinced will be attended with the entire Loſs of ſo many Men to the Service; I therefore beg Leave to ſuggeſt to you, that by leaving them to garriſon Ongole, the Four remaining Companies of the 7th Carnatic Battalion may be ſent to Madras; and I the rather mention this, as I underſtand from Captain Edmonds, that there is no Probability of his being able to raiſe Recruits for that Battalion in his Part of the Country. Should you not approve of this, the independant Companies may be incorporated in the 2d Circar Battalion, which is ordered to be recruited again, and the Two Companies of the 7th Circar Batralion can be left to Garriſon this Place.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servant,
Walter Douglas.

Ongole,
1ſt October 1780.

In conſequence of which, the following Letter was written to Captain Edmonds.

To Captain Edmonds, commanding at Ongole.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee to deſire you will detain the Five independant Companies (lately arrived with you) to do Duty in the Garriſon of Ongole, and ſend up in the Contractor to Madras, in their room, the Four Companies of the 7th Carnatic Battalion.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Charles Oakley, Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
4th Oct. 1780.

Fort

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 9th October 1780.

Read the following Letter from the Chief and Council at Maſulipatam.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your Commands of the 22d and 26th ultimo, and of the 9th, 14th, and 16th Inſtant.

Conformably to your Orders in your Two laſt-mentioned Letters, Six Companies of the Sepoy Grenadiers of this Diſtrict are preparing to embark in the Ship Ponſborne for the Preſidency, the Two remaining Companies will be embarked in another Veſſel, which we have taken up for that Purpoſe. We had urgent Reaſons, as ſuch and will, we hope, entirely juſtify the Deviation from your Orders, to diſpatch the Ponſborne without theſe Two Companies: The bad Weather, and the Condition of the Roads between this Place and Samulcotah, threatened a very conſiderable Delay in their Arrival here; and we diſcovered not only the Grenadier Sepoys of this Place, but amongſt thoſe arrived from the Two other Battalions, a Spirit of Diſcontent and Diſlike to the Voyage breaking out. It has, indeed, ſince proceeded to very diſagreeable Lengths, and involved us in ſome Difficulties, which however have been removed by the Influence and Addreſs of General Stuart, who has been engaged in this Meaſure at our Requeſt, and by the prudent Conduct of Captain Cheſshyre. The whole Tranſaction will be detailed in our next Addreſs to your Honour, &c. The Apprehenſions of new Trouble if we detained the Six Companies for the Arrival of the remaining Two, together with the Conſideration of the Expediency of the Ponſborne's ſpeedy Departure upon other Accounts, determined us to diſpatch her with them. The Captains of the ſeveral Battalions have been directed to uſe all poſſible Diligence to recruit Sepoys to ſupply the Deficiency which will be thereby occaſioned in them.

We have been obliged to lodge the laſt Quantity of Powder (1,320 Barrels) forwarded hither, in a Place out of the Fort, there being no Place of Safety within to receive it; moreover the Quantity we have already of this Article in the Fort, is not lodged ſo ſecurely as we could wiſh, or as it ought to be, being expoſed, by its Situation in the Bomb-proof of one of the Baſtions, both to damp, and to the Danger of Exploſion ſhould the Place come to be attacked. We have found ſince we addreſſed your Honour, &c. laſt on this Subject, that the Bomb-proofs of the other Baſtions are too damp for the Purpoſe of lodging Powder therein, and we have therefore, as in caſe of evident Neceſſity, given Orders for the conſtructing of a Magazine to contain 1,500 Barrels, the Expence of which will not exceed that of the one we lately propoſed for 1,000 Barrels, more than Eight or Nine hundred Pagodas. This Magazine cannot be finiſhed under ſome Months, and when it is, will not enable us properly to diſpoſe of all the Powder now here; we ſubmit therefore to your Honour, &c. what to determine with reſpect to the Quantity of this Article we have on Hand, which for want of a Place of Security wherein to lodge it, may, if left where it is (and we can put it no where better, or even ſo well) poſſibly become a heavy Loſs.

The Storekeeper has repreſented to us, that the Barrels in which the Powder lately ſent to this Place arrived, are in ſo bad a Condition that the Powder muſt be taken out to have the Barrels repaired; further, that many of theſe Barrels are unrepairable; upon this Account, a Quantity of new Barrels will be wanted, not leſs than One thouſand. The Storekeeper has alſo repreſented, that he is diſtreſſed to get Work of the above Kind done, having only one Cooper in pay, and no more being procurable here; this has been before noticed to your Honour, &c. and we muſt more particularly entreat your Attention to it.

Our Inſpector of Stores, Lieutenant William Leybourne Lloyd, being under that Capacity in general Orders to repair to the Preſidency, we have judged it neceſſary, for the Reaſons hereafter aſſigned, to require of him to continue in this Office at this Place for the preſent, and until your further Pleaſure may be known. Theſe Reaſons are, firſt, that to preſerve the various Articles of Military Stores which are lodged in this Garriſon, to a very large Amount, and particularly Gunpowder, free from Damage and in proper Order, it is abſolutely neceſſary an Officer of Artillery ſhould be upon the Spot to ſuperintend the ſame, and to conduct the Buſineſs of the Laboratory. Secondly, that ſuch a Perſon is now more particularly wanted, when by your Orders, a Corps of Laſcars, in Number One hundred, are training to the Exerciſe of the Guns; and when the Condition of nearly half the Powder in the Garriſon is ſuch, that it will be neceſſary to avail ourſelves of the firſt Opportunity of fair Weather to get it dried and examined. Thirdly and laſtly, we are of Opinion, that at the preſent Juncture it would be highly improper to leave a Garriſon of this Importance without one Officer of Artillery, and with only Four or Five Private of that Corps: We humbly

humbly preſume, that it is ſcarcely poſſible we ſhould have done amiſs, in requiring Lieutenant Lloyd, upon theſe Grounds, to remain here for the preſent, particularly, as an Opportunity may probably offer after the Time within which we may hope to receive your final Determination in this Matter, for him (Lieutenant Lloyd) to proceed to the Southward, ſhould that be reſolved on.

Mr. Barnard has tendered to us Twelve Officers Tents and Eighteen Sepoys Tents, both Sorts compleat, which he has received from the Agent of the late Mr. Cadogan, it having been requeſted by Mr. Cadogan, that Mr. Barnard would take Charge of them until further Inſtructions from him, Mr. Cadogan. Mr. Barnard offered theſe Tents at the Price Tents of the ſame Kind have been heretofore charged by Mr. Cadogan in his Diſburſements; or ſhould not Mr. Cadogan at any Time have charged for ſuch Articles, Mr. Barnard then offered them at the Price they have uſually been charged by other Paymaſters; the Amount to be paid by your Honours, &c. to the Executors or Adminiſtrators of the aforeſaid Mr. Cadogan. As we are of Opinion the Service to the Southward may ſtand in need of a Supply of Tents at this Time, we have thought it expedient to receive theſe Tents on Account of your Honour, &c. from Mr. Barnard, on the Terms he has propoſed; they go accordingly in the Ponſborne, and we have given a Receipt for the ſame to Mr. Barnard, and engaged ourſelves that your Honour will make good the Amount as ſoon as it can be ſettled, to the aforeſaid Executors or Adminiſtrators of the late Mr. Cadogan.

We have the Pleaſure to inform you, that the Two Companies of Grenadier Sepoys, of the 7th Circar Battalion, arrived juſt as we were on the Point of diſpatching this Letter, and they now proceed alſo in the Ponſborne.

We ſhall avail ourſelves of the Sloop taken up as a Tranſport for theſe Two Companies, to get ſuch Part of Lieutenant Douglas's Detachment conveyed to the Preſidency, as may be conveniently embarked on her; and we ſhall write to Lieutenant Douglas that they may go on Board at this Port, or ſomewhere near to Ongole, whichever ſhall be moſt convenient.

We are, with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Edward Cotsford,
James Hodges,
John Peter Boileau,
Thomas Barnard,
Alex. Pringle.

Maſulipatam,
2d October 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, Friday, October 13th, 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letters, this Morning received from Vizagapatam:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Juſt as the Grenadier Seapoys were on the Parade, ready to embark on board the Sartine, at about Twenty Minutes before Three o'Clock in the Afternoon, they refuſed to march, and immediately began to fire on their Officers, and all the Europeans they could ſee; which diſperſed the Reſt of the Garriſon. Lieutenant Criſp, Mr. Pennor a Cadet, and Mr. Rutherford, were killed on the Spot, and Mr. Maxtone was wounded in the Head, and got off; their European Officers were of Courſe diſperſed, but they were led on by their Indian Officers. Lieutenant Brown and Enſign Towart got on board the Sartine, after running great Riſks, having been repeatedly fired at; and Lieutenant Brown addreſſed us a Letter, which miſcarried, a Copy of which we now ſend; the other Officers hid themſelves in different Parts of the Town. Captain Lane, who happened to be at Vizagapatam on Leave, is wounded, but was aſſiſted by ſome of his Sepoys in getting off; Mr. Crawford was, by the Fidelity of his Servant, hid in one of their Houſes; Mr. Caſamajor, with ſeveral other Gentlemen, was taken out of his Houſe by ſome Sepoys, and confined in a ſmall Guard Room, and his Life pre-

ſerved by the Attention of a Sepoy, who prevented Two Men from firing who levelled at him; he, with the Gentlemen with him, were taken out ſeparately, at about Seven o'Clock in the Afternoon, and examined by the Subadar Shaike Mahomed, who aſſumed the Command of the Mutineers; he was ordered to inform him where his own Money was, as well as that of the Company's; he was obliged to reply to all theſe Queſtions on Pain of loſing his Life; and a compleat Scene of Plunder enſued, when the Property of every Individual, as well as that of the Company, has ſuffered effectually. This Morning, about Five o'Clock, Mr. Caſamajor was told, that he muſt prepare for Death, but that his Life, as well as the Lives of the other Gentlemen in Confinement, ſhould be ſpared, provided Mr. Caſamajor would ſign a Deed, nominating again Guzzepetty Nazum Deo, the diſmiſſed Zemindar of Kimmedy, to his Station in that Country, and at the ſame Time direct that ſome Sepoys, who had been embarked with the Baggage in the Morning of the 3d, ſhould be ſent on Shore. Theſe Conditions were dictated by the ſame Subadar Shaike Mahomed, and immediately complied with by Mr. Caſamajor. The Mutineers then began their March out of the Town, but took with them Mr. Caſamajor and the reſt of the Gentlemen who had been confined with him; they followed the Mutineers about One Mile out of Town, and were then permitted to return to Vizagapatam, at the Interceſſion of Guzzepetty Nazum Deo; and Mr. Caſamajor cannot in common Juſtice avoid beſtowing every Praiſe on Guzzepetty Nazum Deo, who, as ſoon as he heard the Firing, came into the Fort; and Mr. Caſamajor, and the reſt of the Gentlemen in Confinement with him, attribute their Safety entirely to the Interceſſion of Guzzepetty. The reigning Zemindar of Kimmedy, Jugganut Deo, was in Vizagapatam, and he had with him a Number of Followers, but made off inſtead of rendering any Aſſiſtance. From this Recommendation of Mr. Caſamajor's, of the Service rendered by Guzzepetty, we beg Leave to recommend him to your Protection, even ſo far as to confirm him as the Zemindar of Kimmedy, as the Indiſcretion for which he was expelled was committed at the Age of Thirteen; he is undoubtedly the real Heir, and his Brother Jugganaut Deo has by no Means deſerved the Attention of the Company, which will appear on a Review of his Arrears of Jemmabundy. Mr. Caſamajor has alſo repreſented to us, that during his Confinement, which was in the Guard Room in which Captain Brule was Priſoner, that this Man behaved with ſo much Attention, and rendered him, and the Gentleman with him, ſuch Services as an Interpreter during the Night, that we muſt intercede for him, that he may be releaſed from Confinement, and be allowed ſome Trifle to ſubſiſt on. The Commandant of the Mutineers, Shaike Mahomed, having threatened that if any Succours came from Chicacole, that we ſhould feel his Reſentment. We are now on board the Sartine Frigate, and ſhall return to Vizagapatam To-morrow, where we hope that the Sepoys who ſhewed Attachment will be collected, and we ſhall be in a better State of Defence ſhould thoſe Mutineers return. We know not whither they are gone.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
With Reſpect,
Your obedient humble Servants,
Ja^{s} Caſamajor.
Henry Crawford.
Charles Maxtone.

On Board the Sartine Frigate,
4th October 1780.

To James Henry Caſamajor, Eſquire, Chief, Captain Lane, Henry Crawford, Eſquire, or any Officer or Gentleman by whom this may be received.

Gentlemen,

Finding I could not be of Uſe in quelling the unfortunate Mutiny, after having been fired upon from Houſe to Houſe, with Difficulty I made the Beach, and got on Board the Sartine, accompanied by Enſign Towart. Serjeant Ellis had ſwam acroſs the River, and we took him up from the Battery at the Mouth of it. Serjeant Crouſe I found in a Boat, with ſome Stores, at the Beach, and took him on Board; as alſo Serjeant Collins, who arrived at the Beach juſt as the Boat was puſhing off.

I am authorized by Captain M^{c}Kay to ſay, that he can aſſiſt, by ſending aſhore Fifty Men with Firelocks, provided with Ammunition; Enſign Towart, ſome Gentlemen Volunteers from the Ship, with myſelf, and the Three Serjeants above-mentioned, will make Ten more; in all, Sixty. If this Reinforcement will be of any Service towards re-eſtabliſhing Peace in the Settlement, you may depend on our Appearance and utmoſt Exertion aſhore, at any Hour you may appoint.

I am, Gentlemen,
Your very obedient Servant,
Arch^{d} Brown,
Lieut. 1ſt Batt^{n}.

Sartine, 3d October 1780,
¼ paſt 5 o'Clock.

[Triplicate.]

To

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President, and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We addreſſed you Yeſterday from on Board the Sartine; this Morning we came on Shore. We find ourſelves in a Predicament which we conceive dangerous. The Revolt of the Grenadiers, of which we adviſed you, is in all Reſpects an Event that may lead to dangerous Conſequences: It has annihilated our Power and Influence, in a great Meaſure; at any Rate, it has received ſuch a Shock, that we feel ourſelves degraded as a Government. The Conduct of the Mutineers was adopted by Five Companies of the Firſt Circar Battalion, that happened to be in Garriſon here; they are all gone off with them, except about 40 Men, and even theſe joined the Inſurgents: And as this Revolt took Place when we had not the leaſt Idea that ſuch a Diſpoſition prevailed in the Troops, it is not improbable but that the Remains of the 1ſt Battalion and 5th Battalion, now at Chicacole, have adopted ſimilar Opinions. On a Review of the general State of Affairs on the Coaſt, the War with the Marattas and Hyder, and the Probability of a French Force landing, it is not drawing an improbable Concluſion to ſuppoſe, that the Zemindars may avail themſelves of this Criſis of Events, and throw off their Allegiance. We are here without any Reſources, either of Men or Money; the former we ſuſpect, and for the latter we depend alone on the Zemindars. We have now ſtated to you our Situation; and we add, that all we have to truſt to is, the Attachment of 300 Sibbendy Sepoys, and Half of them are now detached. In this Repreſentation, we have not, in our Opinion, either exaggerated in Points of real State, or Conjecture. We therefore requeſt of you, Gentlemen, that you will determine on ſome Plan of Operations for us to purſue. This Revolt has ſo effectually deranged this Government, and ſo reduced our Conſequence, that we imagine ſome Meaſures ought to be adopted that will give us the Importance we have loſt; and we can think of no other Step ourſelves, than procuring us ſome Sepoys and about Fifty Europeans from Calcutta, or ſending Southern People here, and ordering all the Sepoys in theſe Diſtricts to the Southward. Sitteram Rauze is not yet arrived at Vizigapatam; he keeps away in a Manner that has the Appearance of premeditated Delay. All theſe Matters ſerve to create in us Anxiety about the Fate of this Settlement; and Shaike Mahomed, the Man who heads the revolted Sepoys, is gone off with a great deal of Money, is capable, daring, and full of Enterprize, and what are his Intentions, is not at preſent to be conjectured. By this Day's Intelligence, he has taken the Road to Ankapillee, and it is very probable that he has written to the Sepoys at Chicacole of his Succeſs; at any Rate common Report favours that Suſpicion. Could the Sartine ſtay here until this Government was again re-eſtabliſhed, it would be of much Aſſiſtance to the Settlement in caſe of an unfortunate Event; but the Seaſon is ſo far advanced that Captain M'Kay cannot venture to ſtay here longer than To-morrow without violating his Inſtructions: In juſtice to him, however, we muſt obſerve, that he has been ready in his Offers of Aſſiſtance, and the Preſence of the Sartine contributed to render the Revolt leſs permanent. We have nothing further to add on the State of the Settlement, but that we wait your Orders and Reſolutions with ſome Degree of Anxiety, and the Scene that was exhibited here for Twenty-four Hours warrants us in our Apprehenſions of every Kind.

We have the Honour to tranſmit you a Duplicate of our Addreſs dated Yeſterday.

Captain Brule, of whom we writ Yeſterday, is deſirous of proceeding to Madras, to vindicate his Conduct; and we believe, that had he offered his Services on the Day of the Revolt he would have been attended to. We recommend him for Forgiveneſs, and to have ſome Allowance as a Subſiſtence; he takes his Paſſage on the Sartine.

We are, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
J. H. Caſamajor,
Henry Crawford,
Charles Maxtone.

Vizagapatam,
5th October 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 18th October 1780.

Received the following Letters.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President and Governor of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir,

You have been addreſſed by the Chief and Council here under Date 4th and 5th Inſtant, relative to the unfortunate and unexpected Revolt of the Four Companies of Grenadiers. All ſeems quiet here at preſent, but this Event has raiſed ſuch a general Suſpicion of all the Sepoys, that we know not where to place any Confidence; thoſe at Chicacole are moſt of them related and connected with the Mutineers; and when you conſider that out of Four Companies of Grenadiers, and Five Battalion Companies of the Firſt Battalion, there were but a few who did not join the Mutineers, I am ſure it warrants

warrants every Apprehenſion of the remaining Eleven Companies of the Two Battalions at Chicacole and Maringy. There was an univerſal and complete Plunder of all the Property belonging to the Company and European Inhabitants. All the Company's Caſh in the Treaſury, amounting to Rupees 21,922. 11. 9. and the Money of ſome of the Employs, fell into the Hands of the Inſurgents; and in the Wreck of all Property, all the Company's Broad Cloth, and a large Proportion of the Civil and Military Stores fell into the Poſſeſſions of the Plunderers. The Inhabitants of the Place were as active in this Scene as the Inſurgents, and Quantities of Broad Cloth, Firelocks, &c. are hourly brought in. My own Loſs amounts to 5000 Pagodas, and the other Gentlemen have alſo ſuffered conſiderably.

As ſoon as poſſible a compleete Account of the public Loſs ſhall be tranſmitted, and the Orders and Regulations we have iſſued ſince the Revolt. Among other Expedients, we have raiſed for the preſent 100 Gun Peons who have Families in the Town, and with the Aſſiſtance of the Sibbendy, they at preſent ſerve to garriſon this Place, as our Confidence in the regular Sepoys is for a Time loſt; nor can any Detachment be well ſpared from Chicacole, as the Two Battalions are now reduced to Eleven Companies, and Two of them detached to Maringy. The mutinous Party under Shaike Mahomed were, by the laſt Accounts, entering into the Totapilly Country: The Rajah Viziaram Rauze has written to all the little Zemindars to ſtop them; but they yet compoſe a ſtrong Body, and it is not a trifling Force that can oppoſe them. I have written Mr. Cotsford and Captain Bridges, and as they will probably paſs near Simul Cotah, I am in Hopes ſome of them may be picked up and puniſhed. They evidently are going to the Nizam's Country, or through the Guntoor Circar to Cuddapah.

Captain Lane is directed to recruit up the Battalion to the Eſtabliſhment, and conſider the mutinous Companies as annihilated, and to receive only ſuch of them as preſerved their Fidelity into the Service again, who are alſo to be rewarded with One Month's Pay.

I have the Honour to tranſmit you a Duplicate Extract of the Intelligence tranſmitted on the 24th ultimo. In the Courſe of Correſpondence with Mr. Turing, it has occurred to him that the Nagpore Rajah may be offended at the Seizure of his Letters, and may in conſequence ſtop the Diſpatches to and from Bengal. I am convinced that when Captain Lyſaght intercepted and opened theſe Letters, ſuch an Idea entirely eſcaped his Reflections, and until ſuggeſted by Mr. Turing, I never adverted to that Point. I have in conſequence directed that the Hircarrahs who were detained with the Letters from the Nagpore Rajah, ſhould be diſmiſſed with Preſents, and that they ſhould be told that their Detention and that of the Letter, originated in a Miſtake; and I alſo have forwarded the original Letters to Mr. Turing, that he may ſend them to the Nagpore Rajah, with ſome Apology in caſe he detains the Tappal to and from Calcutta; and I hope what I have done in this Matter, will meet with your Approbation.

Rajah Sitteram Rauze is expected to arrive To-morrow at Vizagapatam.

I am,
Honourable Sir,
with Reſpect,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Js Hy Caſamajor.

Vizagapatam,
9th Oct. 1780.

Honourable Sir,

Since I addreſſed you Yeſterday, I have Advice that Shaike Mahomed, at the Head of the mutinous Sepoys, was given to underſtand by Berah Bundy, the Golconda Man, that he ſhould not paſs through his Country; upon which he moved back with his Party to a Place called Gudderallywauk; and at 12 o'Clock of the Night of the 8th they laid down their Arms, Cloaths, Accoutrements, and immediately diſperſed. I have ſent out Two ſmall Detachments to pick up Stragglers, and as many of the Arms as they can find.

I am, Honourable Sir,
Your obedient,
humble Servant,
Jas Hy Caſamajor.

Vizagapatam,
19th Oct. 1780.

N° 92. *To Bazalet Jung; dated 23d September* 1780.

Your Excellency having ſome Time ago expreſſed your Deſire of having the Guntoor Circar re-

ſtored into your Hands, in conſequence of the Diſappointments which prevented our Troops marching for the Protection of your Country; and your Brother, Nizam Ally Cawn, having alſo intereſted himſelf with the Governor General of Bengal, upon the ſame Account, we have come to the Reſolution of complying with your's and the Nizam's Wiſhes in this Reſpect, and have diſpatched the neceſſary Orders to our Officer commanding in that Country, to put your Agent into immediate and entire Poſſeſſion of it, and to withdraw the Troops entirely from the Diſtrict. I hope this will prove acceptable to you, and tend to ſtrengthen the friendly Diſpoſitions which have hitherto ſubſiſted between us. May your Happineſs and Proſperity daily encreaſe! What can I ſay more?

N° 94. *To the Nizam; dated the 25th September 1780.*

I received your Highneſs's friendly Letter, congratulating me upon my Acceſſion to the Government of Madras, for which I requeſt you to accept my Acknowledgments.

Your Highneſs having intereſted yourſelf with the Governor General of Bengal, to procure the Reſtoration of the Guntoor Circar to your Brother Bazalet Jung, and to have Things put upon the ſame Footing that they ſtood before any Engagements were made between him and the Company; I have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that Orders have been ſent to our People in the Guntoor Circar, to put Bazalet Jung in full Poſſeſſion of that Country, and to withdraw themſelves from all further Concern in it. This Inſtance of Reſpect to your Highneſs will, I flatter myſelf, be conſidered as a ſtrong Proof of the Company's Deſire to live in Amity with you, and, I truſt, will promote and ſtrengthen the ſame Diſpoſitions on your Part.

I am concerned it has not been in my Power to make any Payments to your Highneſs, on Account of the Peſhcuſh for the Northern Circars. You have been acquainted, by former Letters, of the great Failures that had happened in the Revenues of thoſe Diſtricts, and other Circumſtances, which occaſioned this Deficiency. Your Highneſs will, however, do me the Juſtice to rely on the Aſſurances I now make, that every Opportunity will be taken to make good the Balances due upon this Account.

Your Highneſs will doubtleſs have heard of the Troubles created in the Carnatic by Hyder Ally Cawn, without any Cauſe or Provocation whatſoever. We are now making great Preparations to take the Field after the Rains, and, I truſt, by the Bleſſing of God, that the ambitious Views of this Chief, Hyder, will ſoon have Reaſon to repent of his Raſhneſs. The Conqueſts he had made, and the Reſources which he commands, are Subjects that muſt neceſſarily excite Alarm and Jealouſy in all the Powers around us; but I am ſenſible it is unneceſſary to mention theſe Things to your Highneſs, whoſe Wiſdom and Penetration muſt long ago have diſcovered the Truth of them; and I ſhall only obſerve upon the preſent Diſturbances occaſioned by Hyder Ally, that I am ſatisfied your Highneſs will act according to the Treaties ſubſiſting between you and the Company, and endeavour, to the utmoſt of your Power, to check the Deſigns of their Enemies.

May Honour and Proſperity always attend your Highneſs! What can I ſay more?

N° 90. *From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 16th September 1780—Received 17th D°.*

I have received your Letter of the 2d Inſtant, in which you acquaint me, that the Governor General and Council had repreſented to you, how much the Nabob Nizam ud Dowla was affected by the Treaty made with Bazalet Jung, for obtaining Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar independent of him, which had given him Umbrage; that in Conſideration of this, you had determined to give up the Circar of Guntoor to the Nabob Bazalet Jung, as being the Means of preſerving the Nizam's Friendſhip. But as that Circar is rented to me under certain Stipulations, ſubject to the Company's Pleaſure, you do not think yourſelves warranted in delivering it back, until I ſhall have given my Concurrence to the Meaſure; that you therefore hope I ſhall have no Objection to it, for the Reaſons recommended by the Government of Bengal. All this I underſtand, my dear Sir. Out of the ſingle Conſideration that my Friends had for ſome Years paſt earneſtly deſired to get Poſſeſſion of the Circar of Guntoor, for which they had obtained Permiſſion of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, in Mr. Wynch's Time, and at the repeated Requeſt of Governor Rumbold, who knew the Wiſhes of the Bengal Gentlemen in this Matter, I commenced Negotiation with Bazalet Jung, and convinced him of the Friendſhip and ſtrict Adherence of the Company to their Engagements; by which Means I obtained his Conſent to rent the Circar of Guntoor to them, and get the French Troops in his Service diſmiſſed and turned out of that Country. The Letter from Bazalet Jung to Sir Thomas Rumbold and myſelf, are manifeſt Proofs of this.

It was never my Wiſh to have taken Poſſeſſion of the Circar of Guntoor myſelf; but as it borders on the Diſtricts of Pulnard and Ongole, which are in the Carnatic, and that for Ages paſt the Zemindars

mindars of Guntoor pay Duties to the Government at Pulnard, I thought that if Guntoor was rented to any body but myſelf, when it came into the Company's Hands, ſome Innovations from the former Practices might take Place, and it would give riſe to Differences and Complaints. On that Account only I applied for the Rent of that Circar; but ſo far from benefiting a ſingle Pagoda by it, I have hitherto ſuffered a conſiderable Loſs: This you are not ignorant of. My ſincere Wiſh is, and ever has been, that my Welfare may be conſidered as blended with that of my Friends: And you will therefore act reſpecting the Reſolution communicated to you by the Governor General and Council, as appears beſt to you for the Advantage of the Company; for it is my ſincere Deſire to do every Thing which may tend to the Succeſs of their Affairs. It is adviſeable and proper to give back the Circar of Guntoor to Bazalet Jung, and to ſatisfy the Nabob Nizam ud Dowla reſpecting the Balances of Peſhcuſh due to him for the Circar of Rajahmundry, Ellore, &c: that they may have proper Senſe of the ſincere Intentions of the Company towards them. The Treaty made with Bazalet Jung took Place through my Means, and was ſanctified by the Company's Seal, and the Signatures of the Governor and Council, as you well know. If you will conſult of the beſt Means to authorize me with Power to treat with the Nabob Nizam ud Dowla, to bring him to join us, in order to puniſh Hyder Ally Cawn, who has taken Poſſeſſion of my Country, ruined it, and ſeized ſeveral Forts in it; and if you will commence a Correſpondence with the Nizam, as I ſhall adviſe you to, I may be able to try my Endeavours to find at leaſt whether he will join us or not to chaſtiſe Hyder Ally Cawn, and what his Intentions are. Whatever is to be done, I recommend to you to loſe no Time, but do it immediately. What ſhall I ſay more?

APPENDIX, N° 12.

To General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Army.

Sir,

THE Preſident having informed us, that he has juſt received Advice of your Arrival at the Mount, and that you are deſirous of coming to the Fort, we ſhall be glad to have the Pleaſure of ſeeing you as ſoon as you can conveniently leave Camp.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
14th Sep. 1780.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 15 Sept. 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident,
Cha^s Smith,
Major Gen^l S^r Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

The Commander in Chief being returned from Camp, now reſumes his Seat at the Committee.

Fort Saint George, Select Conſultations, 23d Sept. 1780.

Read the following Letter from Sir Hector Munro.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

The Loſs we have ſuſtained in the unfortunate Defeat of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment, both in Europeans and Sepoys, calls on us to exert ourſelves to ſtrengthen the Army as ſoon as poſſible, ſo

ſo as to enable us to oppoſe the Enemy: As Commander in Chief, I therefore conſider it incumbent on me to point out the beſt Mode I can, ſo as to anſwer the End required. The Loſs of the Europeans is the moſt difficult to be repaired; the large Detachment ſent to the Malabar Coaſt, is a great Diſtreſs to us at preſent, and till the Communication is open with Vellore, we cannot avail ourſelves of the Service of the 1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment now there; the only Reſource we have, is to ſtrengthen the European Battalion now in Camp, with as many Men as can be got from the European Battalion now in Garriſon at Fort Saint George. His Majeſty's 73d Regiment, beſides the Loſs of their Flank Companies, are much reduced by Sickneſs; I would hope, that as the Weather is growing cooler, that, and Reſt, may recover them; the Companies of Invalids, the Recruits, and ſuch Sick who are not equal to Field Duty, will form a Body of Europeans ſufficient for Fort Saint George, while the Army is in the Field; the Artillery cannot at preſent be augmented, unleſs there can be found Men equal to that Service among the Recruits in Madras; I would therefore recommend that his Highneſs the Nabob be applied to for 200 of his Artillery Corps now at Trichinopoly, and let them do Duty with the Corps of Artillery in the Field; there will ſtill remain enough for Trichinopoly, and the Commanding Officer at Tanjore ſhould have Authority to raiſe a black Company of Artillery there, which, with a proper Officer and ſome Invalids, may ſtrengthen that Garriſon greatly.

The Battalions of Sepoys that ſuffered with the Detachment, ſhould be recruited as ſoon as poſſible; an Officer ſhould be appointed to the Command of each for the Time being, and an Adjutant on the ſame Terms, and the moſt proper Places ſhould be choſen for their recruiting Quarters: I would alſo recommend the augmenting the Sepoy Battalions to One hundred Sepoys to each Company; the Detachment now at Tellicherry ſhould be ſent for and landed at Anjengo, and march to Palamcottah, and remain there in Garriſon, or for further Orders; but as this will take Time, I therefore propoſe that Orders ſhould be ſent to Palamcottah for Five Companies of the 10th Battalion to march to Madura; and the 3d Battalion now there, to march to Tanjore, there to be joined by the 9th Battalion now in Garriſon there, and both to march to Nagore, and come by Sea to Madras; or their March may perhaps be ſecure by the Coaſt as far as Cuddalore. In order to ſtrengthen the Garriſon of Tanjore, I would have 500 of the beſt Men of Captain Burrowe's Sibbendies, for the preſent, to do Duty in Tanjore, and receive full Pay. If the Nabob has any Sepoys at Trichinopoly, the Three Companies of Captain Belcliff's Battalion now there, may be ordered to Tanjore. Beſides the Twelve Companies of Grenadiers ſent for from the Northward, I would propoſe that Two Battalions more ſhould be ordered from the Circars to join the Army. The Five remaining Battalions, together with Captain Powell's Battalion, which will be recruited, knowing that they will not be moved from the Northward, would ſoon be complete, to the new Eſtabliſhment of 1000 Sepoys each Battalion. I propoſe this as the only Means of ſtrengthening the Army immediately; but as I have no Knowledge of the Circars, the Gentlemen of Committee who have been there, will beſt judge if they can be ſpared. I ſhould imagine Two Battalions in the Maſulipatam, Two in the Vizagapatam, and One in the Ganjam Diſtricts, with Captain Powell's Battalion recruiting, might anſwer, as their Numbers will be daily increaſing; the Two Battalions of Sepoys now in Madras ſhould be ordered to Camp, and the Two weakeſt Battalions be ordered from Camp to Garriſon. Numbers of Sepoys who were in the Action of the 10th September, are daily coming in, and will form a Corps in Madras for the preſent, but ſhould join the Battalions they formerly belonged to as ſoon as they are recruited. The Army then would have the 73d Regiment, 2 Battalions 1ſt Regiment, 7 Carnatic Sepoy Battalions, 2 Circar Battalions, 12 Companies of Circar Grenadiers, and 10 Companies of Carnatic Grenadiers, the preſent Corps of Artillery, and 200 of the Nabob's from Trichinopoly. To this Body of Artillery and Infantry, Cavalry muſt be added: the Europeans are a very ſmall Body, only 33, they may be encreaſed to 40. The Nabob has Two Regiments, but unleſs the Government of Madras ſee that they are ſatisfied as to their Arrears of Pay, they may refuſe to ſerve (as Capt. Campbell's Regiment did) the Moment you want them. The Nabob ſhould form two other Regiments out of his own Guards and Recruits. The Horſes that the Europeans have, are the Nabob's, and very bad; they might be returned, and Horſes purchaſed from the Gentlemen at Madras for them. The Rajah of Tanjore ſhould on this Occaſion be required to raiſe a Regiment of Cavalry, the Expence of which ſhould be allowed in his Kiſts. If they have not Horſes enough in the Tanjore Country, Horſes might be purchaſed of the Gentlemen in Madras, as I am informed they are very willing to aſſiſt all in their Power towards the public Cauſe. The Rajah of Travencore ſhould be wrote to, to know if he will join us againſt Hyder; in caſe of his ſo doing, the Force from Tellicherry, with the Troops the Nabob is raiſing in the Tinnevelly Country, may join with the King of Travencore and the friendly Polygars, and may, under proper Officers, attack Hyder's Settlements to the Southward. We ſhould know what Part the Nizam and Bazalet Jung mean to take in this War. We have Reaſon to expect Men and Money from Bengal. If Troops can be got, it is on the Malabar Coaſt that Hyder ſhould be attacked; it is there he is moſt vulnerable. If once his Coaſt is attacked, he will leave the Carnatic to protect his own Country; and had we no War with the Marattas, they would gladly have aſſiſted. The Places I imagine moſt likely to recruit the 1ſt, 7th, and 11th Battalions of Carnatic Sepoys, and the Second Battalion of Circar Sepoys, are as follow; the 1ſt Battalion to be recruited to the Southward, the 7th at Ongole, there being Four Companies of that Battalion already there, the 11th about Arcot and Vellore; and as the Enemy at preſent are in Poſſeſſion of the Country round theſe Places, Letters ſhould be ſent by the Nabob

to Rajah Burbur, and from the Committee to Colonel Lang and Captain Prendergaſt; and I imagine many Men may be had: The 2d Circar Battalion will of Courſe be ordered to recruit in the Circars. In all Caſes where Men are immediately required to be raiſed for the Protection of a State, and to oppoſe an Enemy, in Proportion to the Exigency of Affairs, certain Advantages are offered to Men to enliſt; I would therefore recommend ſome Plan to be adopted for this Purpoſe; either more Bounty Money to Recruits, or perhaps an Encreaſe of a Sepoy's Monthly Pay would be moſt effectual. It is true that the Company's Sepoys receive more Pay, and are more regularly paid, than any of the Black Powers; but ſtill the Encreaſe of Expence in our Settlements, makes their Pay by no Means adequate to the general Expence of Proviſions. I muſt own, that I imagine an Encreaſe of their Monthly Pay would get you many Recruits, and would be the Means of Sepoys leaving the Enemy's Service to enliſt in yours. The Encreaſe of Expence cannot be avoided; though Œconomy ſhould be attended to in every Department, yet the Articles abſolutely neceſſary muſt be found: It is in Peace we ſhould prepare for War. After the Siege of Pondicherry, I had the Honour of addreſſing the Select Committee by Letter, wherein I ſtated the Defects in their Garriſons and Stores, and pointed out the Neceſſity of putting them in ſuch a State, as to be ready on any Emergency; and I frequently recommended that the Troops ſhould always be ready for the Field. I am ſorry to ſay that any Obſervations of mine had not the Effect I could have wiſhed. I ſhall ſay no more on what is paſt, it is our Buſineſs now to uſe every Endeavour for the public Good. We ſhould have one Voice and one Hand, and if the ruling Power is ſteady and determined in its Reſolutions, the executive Part muſt and will be properly attended to; nor can you make yourſelves more formidable to your Enemy, than by Unanimity in your Council.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

Fort Saint George,
22d Sept. 1780.

Ordered, that the above, and the General's Letter of the 21ſt Inſtant, do lie on the Table, for further Conſideration.

APPENDIX, N° 13.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 15 September 1780.

DISPATCHED the following Letter:

To Lieutenant Colonel Nixon, Commandant at Trichinopoly.

Sir,

We deſire you will exert your utmoſt Endeavours in procuring Sepoy Recruits, which are much wanted to ſupply the Deficiencies that have lately happened in the Sepoy Battalions now with the Army. You will report to us from Time to Time the Number you may obtain; and employ proper Perſons to diſcipline them with all Expedition.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
15th September 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 16 September 1780.

To Captain Edmonds, Commandant at Ongole.

Sir,

The Six Companies of the 7th Carnatic Battalion, which were with Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, having been almoſt entirely cut off in the late Accident which happened to that Detachment, we deſire you will uſe your utmoſt Endeavours to raiſe Recruits ſufficient to replace them, without Loſs of Time; and that you will report to us, as often as you ſhall think expedient, the Number you may obtain; taking Care that they may be diſciplined as faſt as poſſible.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
16th September 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 13.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 18th September 1780.

The Commander in Chief acquaints the Committee, that before he left Conjeveram he wrote a Letter to Captain Prendergaſt, deſiring him to apply to Colonel Lang, if neceſſary, for a further Reinforcement.

Agreed, That Colonel Lang be acquainted with this, and directed to ſend as large a Reinforcement as he can ſpare to Arcot.

Reſolved, That Orders be ſent to the Chief and Council of Cuddalore, to take the neceſſary Steps for bringing from Pondicherry all the Muſſoola Boats and Boat People belonging to that Place.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, September 19th 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Governor, Preſident;
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letter from the Chief Engineer.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I herewith take Leave to lay before you, a Set of Memorandums, and Remarks thereon, reſpecting what ought, without Loſs of Time, to be carried into Execution, in order to enable you to put the Fort into a State of Defence. It has become abſolutely neceſſary that the Black Town ſhould be defended as long as poſſible, that People, and every Means of getting Proviſions and Materials, may be ſecured, to do as far as poſſible what is requiſite in the ſhort Space of Time that we have before the Monſoon. The Troops now in the Black Town, or that could be put into it in caſe of the Abſence of the Army, are ſurely by no Means ſufficient to guard the Town againſt Aſſaults, or ſo far quiet the Apprehenſions of the People, that any of them can be kept to do what is abſolutely requiſite for the Fort. I have for ſome Time been employing the whole Strength of the People under my Direction, to put the Black Town in a State of Defence; much ſmaller Matter remains yet to be done; all the People there at work ſhall ſoon be brought to proſecute what is ſo much wanted in the Fort; but there muſt be a Force in or near the Town to aſſiſt in the Collection of Materials, and to enable us at all to keep the Artificers at work. In the Memorandums and Remarks that I have ſent you herewith, is every Thing put down that hath occurred to me. I earneſtly beg that the very inſufficient State of the Sea Line, the Want of Parapets on ſome of the Works, and the incumbered State of the North Glacis, may meet with primary Conſideration.

Were the Bomb-Proofs on the Eaſt Line cleared of the Earth that is ſtill in them, and an additional Thickneſs of Brick-work put at Top to ſecure them from the Weather, they might be uſed as Barracks, and enable you to clear out the King's Barracks for a Granary, ſo very much wanted in the Fort. After having thus fully ſtated what is to be done, I hope your Honour, &c. will paſs Orders that the Means may be afforded me of carrying them into Execution; in which I deſire to aſſure you my utmoſt Efforts ſhall be exerted.

I have the Honour to be, with all Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt devoted humble Servant,
George Maule,
Ch. Engr.

Fort Saint George,
18th September 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 13.

Memorandums of what is to be done at Fort St. George, 18th September 1780.	Remarks of the Chief Engineer.	Orders of the Select Committee thereon.
Par. 1. The ſeveral Guns to be mounted on the Works where Embraſures are prepared for them.	1. A Body of Laſcars acquainted with the Buſineſs, are neceſſary, and I have earneſtly to requeſt, that the Laſcars now in Camp, be ordered into the Fort for this Purpoſe.	1ſt. Ordered accordingly.
2. Platforms to be laid for ſuch Guns as are to be mounted.	2d. Between 30 and 40 Platforms are ready. The Military Storekeeper ſhould be directed to compleat the original Order for 150.	2d. Thoſe that are ready to be laid, and the Military Storekeeper to be directed to make up ſuch as are wanting to complete.
3. Drawbridges for the ſeveral Gates of the Body of the Place and Outworks.	3d and 4th. Theſe are put in Hand by Order of the Governor ſome Days ſince; but as the Contractor is in Diſtreſs for Money, he ſhould occaſionally be ſupplied, that theſe Works may go on without Interruption.	3d. Ordered accordingly.
4th. Compleating the Paliſadoes in the Covert Way and Sea Line.		4th. Ordered accordingly.
5th. Compleating the Maſonry of the Eaſt Line. The unfiniſhed Arches of the Caſemates therein are, in their preſent State, weak, and not Water-tight.	5th. This is an Object of very great Importance, as the Line is at preſent inſufficient either for Defence, or lodging of Troops. I take Leave to recommend, that the Contractor for Materials (to whoſe Deficiency of Supplies we are indebted for the preſent unfiniſhed State of the Works) be immediately ſent for by the Honourable the Committee, and deſired to inform them what Steps he has taken in Conſequence of the late Advances made to him, and how ſoon a Supply of Materials may be expected. The Army remaining in the Vicinity of the Fort, is the only Ground whereon we can hope to collect a Sufficiency of Materials for this eſſential Work. As the Brick Cutters are at preſent afraid to work at the Kilns, I would beg Leave to propoſe, that a Party of Sepoys be poſted there to protect the Workmen, in furniſhing us with as many Bricks as we can expect to receive before the Rains ſet in. Charcoal ſhould be procured in as large Quantities as poſſible, to burn ſuch Shells as may be received by Water either from the Northward or Southward. I cannot expreſs myſelf too anxiouſly on this Head, as I am convinced the uncompleated Brick Work of the Sea Line cannot withſtand the Shock of any heavy Rains; and I truſt the Committee will ſee it in the ſame ſerious Point of View.	5th. In conſequence of this Paragraph, Mr. Roebuck, the Contractor for Bricks and Chunam, is ſent for, and queſtioned as to the Deficiency of theſe Materials. With reſpect to Bricks, the Contractor ſays that he has nearly ſufficient at the Kilns to complete the Fortifications, and that more might have been ready, were not his People afraid to work on account of the Enemy's Horſe. As to Chunam, he obſerved, in his Juſtification, that he had collected a conſiderable Quantity of Shells in the Country, which he meant to bring hither by Sea; but as they could not be ſhipped without an Order from the Nabob to the Manager of that Part of the Country where they had been collected, he had applied many Days ago for this Order; but, owing to the Delays uſed at the Durbar, it had not been given till a Day or Two ago. We obſerve alſo, that he finds it extremely difficult to procure Veſſels to tranſport the Shells which are now collected to the Northward, partly owing to the Unwillingneſs of the Owners to hire their Veſſels for this Purpoſe, and partly to the great Demand of Muſſoola Boats for the Squadron, which prevents the Paddy Veſſels, now in the Road, from landing their Cargoes, and deprives him of the Opportunity of employing ſeveral which he had been promiſed.
6th. Stockades	Carts	The

Memorandums of what is to be done at Fort St. George, 18th September 1780.	Remarks of the Chief Engineer.	Orders of the Select Committee thereon.
	Carts that can be procured, ſhould be delivered over to the Contractor for the Works, that he may bring into the Fort the Bricks that remain at the Kilns.	The Committee are ſenſible that the Contractor muſt have met with Obſtructions from the Cauſes he mentions, though they cannot judge how far they may have operated to create the Deficiencies complained of. He is however now poſitively enjoined by the Committee, to uſe his utmoſt Exertions to procure the neceſſary Supplies mentioned by the Chief Engineer; in which he is told he will have every Aſſiſtance that the Government can afford, with reſpect to Boats, and every other Article; he is alſo directed, as ſoon as he can get Boats, to go himſelf down with them to the Northward, and ſee that no Time be loſt in putting on Board the Shells which may have been collected by him.
6th. Stockades of Red Wood at the N. E. and S. E. Angles of the Fort.	6th. The Red Wood is ready, but Laſcars are wanted for the Purpoſe of driving the Piles.	6th. Requires no Order.
7th. Eſplanade to be entirely cleared of all the Buildings and Lumber.	7th. The Red Wood is now moving, but there are ſome Bank Sals, &c. that ſhould be alſo removed.	7th. The Chief Engineer is to be directed to take down immediately all Bank Sals, &c. on the Eſplanade.
8th. The Buildings on Hag Hill are only from 230 to 250 Yards, or thereabouts, from the Foot of the Glacis of the N. W. Works; the Houſes ought, I think, to be cleared to 400 Yards from the Foot of the Glacis, and the Ground ſo far levelled as to admit of no Cover.	8th. The Select Committee having referred this Subject to the Court of Directors, I know not how far they may think what I propoſe eligible; if any ſerious Attack is apprehended, it is of the utmoſt Conſequence to the Fort that this Ground ſhould be levelled.	8th. This Paragraph to be taken into Conſideration at a future Time.
9th. The Huts, Houſes, and Horſe Stables at the Foot of the Iſland Bridge, ſhould be removed, and every Thing on the Iſland, as far back as the Burying Ground; the Playhouſe and Powder Platforms ſhould be demoliſhed.	9th. Theſe are now encreaſing daily, and the Iſland is ſo covered with Habitations, that we ſhould be in the utmoſt Danger of hurting our own People were we under the Neceſſity of firing the Guns of the Fort.	9th. Ordered accordingly.
10th. All Cover on the South Front ſhould be removed.	10th. The Boatmen, who have now Poſſeſſion of the Southern Beach, ſhould be removed to the Northward, beyond the Boundary of the Eſplanade.	10th. Ditto.
11th. There are a Quantity of Gabions and Faſcines in Store; theſe are ſo old as to have become entirely rotten and uſeleſs, but as Fire Wood. A freſh Supply of theſe Articles ſhould, with a Quantity of Piquets, be immediately	11th. As the Proviſion of Gabions and Faſcines will be tedious, unleſs more than ordinary Means be uſed, it ſhould be conſidered, whether it would not be adviſeable to ſend an Officer with the Party into the Pollams to the North-	11th. The Chief Engineer to ſend a proper Perſon to the Pollams, on this Duty.

12th Ap-

Memorandum of what is to be done at Fort St. George, 18th September 1780.	Remarks of the Chief Engineer.	Orders of the Select Committee thereon.
diately procured, as well as the Time and Circumſtances will admit.	North-weſt, to collect a working Party, and to make up there the Number that may be neceſſary for the Fort.	
12th. A Body of Gabion-makers, to the Number of Sixty or Eighty, ſhould be immediately collected, and kept in Pay in caſe of Exigency.		12th. Approved, and ordered accordingly.
13th. Three hundred Hurdles ſhould alſo be procured.		13th. Ditto.
14th. Beſides the Paliſadoes for the Covertway, there ſhould be Five or Six thouſand ſpare ones, made of the ſtouteſt Palmiras, or ſuch other Stuffs as can be procured.		14th. Approved, and ordered accordingly.
15th. There ſhould be immediately made up Ten or Fifteen thouſand Wicker Baſkets.		15th. Ditto.
16th. Ten thouſand Cart Loads of Clay ſhould be brought into the Fort.	16th. The Carts of the Inhabitants might be preſſed to bring this eſſential Article into Store. We have no Means of ſupplying ourſelves within the Fort.	16th. Ditto.
17th. Entrenching, Miners, Carpenters, and Smiths Tools; Sand Bags, Crows Feet, and ſpare Timber for Stentions of Galleries; ſhould be provided, if there is not ſufficient in ſtore.		17th. To be referred to the Committee of Works, who are to report the Deficiency there may be in theſe Articles.
18th. A Calculate of Proviſions, Firewood, Straw, Pots, &c. ſhould be made, and proper Places provided for lodging them.		18th. The Preſident is requeſted to enquire into this Matter.

Fort Saint George,
18th September 1780.

Geo. Maule,
Chief Engineer.

To Mr. John Turing, President at Ganjam.

Sir,
We have received you Letter of the 27th ultimo.

As it is is impossible for us to spare any additional Troops for the Defence of your District, we hope, by a judicious Disposition of what you now have, that no material Injury will arise, even should an Incursion take Place. We give you Permission to do what you have represented to be absolutely necessary to the Fort of Ganjam, trusting you will be as frugal as possible in the Expence.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
19th Sept. 1780.

Read the following Letter and Minutes of the Committee of Stores:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Herewith we have the Honour to lay before you, our Proceedings of the 20th Instant.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient Servants,
Hector Munro,
George Maule,
Bryan Scotney.

Fort Saint George 20th September 1780.

At a Committee of Stores;

PRESENT.

Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Major George Maule,
Mr. Bryan Scottney.

1st. Agreed to recommend to the Honourable Select Committee, to direct that the undermentioned Gun Carriages, Mortar Beds, Platforms, &c. wanting to compleat the Statement for Fort Saint George, be made up with all possible Expedition.

		Gun Carriages.		
36	Pounders	—	—	4
12	Pounder Medium	—	—	24
12	Pounder Short	—	—	5
	Platforms	—	—	110
		Mortar Beds.		
13	Inch	—	—	4
10	Inch	—	—	9
8	Inch	—	—	10
5½	Inch	—	—	18

Howitzer Carriages.			
5½ Inch	—	—	2
Blinds of Sorts	—	—	33
Frontlets of Sorts	—	—	35
Baſkets for Mortars	—	—	1000
Mamotics	—	—	691
Pick-Axes	—	—	396
Spades	—	—	838
Shovels	—	—	795
Broad Axes	—	—	39
Sap Hooks	—	—	40
Hand Bills	—	—	210
Sand Bags (ſmall)	—	—	3000
Hand Hatchets	—	—	385

2d. The Military Storekeeper begs Leave to enter the following Minute:

When the Agreement for making of Carriages by Mr. Scottney was accepted, the Price of the Carriages for 10 Pounders to the loweſt Calibre, was fixed at the medium Price of 73 $\frac{6}{10}$ Pagodas each; there were 123 of 6 Pounders, and upwards of 125 ſmaller. The Board having directed a Stop to be put to the making of the ſmaller, Mr. Scottney hopes it will appear reaſonable to the Committee, that he be allowed for the 9 Pounder Carriages, now ready, the loweſt Rate for which any Offers were made by others for providing of thoſe kind of Carriages.

As the making up the ſmall Carriages was ſtopped by Orders of the Honourable Select Committee, and as they would have compenſated for the Expence of making up the larger, the Committee are of Opinion, that Mr. Scottney's Requeſt is reaſonable. Agreed therefore to recommend, that it be complied with.

3d. The Commiſſary of Stores lays before the Committee, the following Liſt of Gun Carriages, Mortars, Beds, &c. received from the Military Storekeeper.

Train Garriſon Carriages, 9 Pounders				41
Truck Carriages, 18 Pounders, with Beds				22
Tranſporting Carriages	—	—		7
Money Tumbrill	—	—		1
Mortar Beds, 4 ⅕ Inch	—	—		4
Platforms	—	—	Sets —	10
Spare Trucks	—	—	Pairs —	8

Hector Munro,
George Maule,
Bryan Scottney.

Orders of the Select Committee thereon.

Par. 1ſt. Approved, and ordered.

Par. 2d. Agreed, That Mr. Scottney be allowed for the 9 Pounder Carriages, now ready, at the loweſt Rate that any Offers were made by others, as recommended by the Committee of Stores; but if Mr. Scottney ſhall hereafter make up the ſmaller Carriages, the preſent Allowance is to be deducted from his Account.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 23d September 1780.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Lang:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 12th, and to encloſe you a Letter from Captain Prendergaſt, commanding at Arcot.

Finding that the Nabob's Sepoys at Arcot have been much diſpirited at the late Accident to Colonel Baillie's Detachment, and that many of them behaved very indifferently when Hyder Ally was before that Place before; and having been informed, that he is determined

mined to return there very shortly; I have thought it highly proper, for the Good of the Service, to send a Reinforcement there Yesterday, of a Captain, Two Subalterns, and Fifty Rank and File; I have also sent Fourteen Privates in the Room of their Sick, and ordered them to be sent here this Night to the Hospital, where they will shortly recover: All which I hope will be approved of.

The Officers and Soldiers that were made Prisoners in the Action of the 10th, are now at Arnee; (except Four) they are in Hyder Ally's Camp; and one of them is said to be Colonel Baillie. They leave Arnee for Bangalore To-morrow. They have all been extremely well treated, by every Account I have had.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Rois Lang.

Vellore,
17th Sept. 1780.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Sam[l] Johnson.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 25 Sept. 1780.

Messrs. Smith and Johnson deliver in the following Minute:

As the compleating the Fortifications is an Object of the highest Consequence, and it is retarded by Want of Chunam, notwithstanding the Chunam Contractor has been paid the Advance he required; we propose that Advertisements be published, giving Notice, "that the President and Council will issue Orders for receiving from any Person or Persons, any Quantity of Chunam, not exceeding 10,000 Parras, at 7 Parras per Pagoda, provided the same be delivered in the Fort on or before the 31st Day of October next; and that Advances of Money will be made to each Person contracting, in proportion to the Quantity he shall agree to deliver, on his giving Security for the Performance of his Contract, under a Penalty of 25 per Cent on the Amount."

We are sensible that this Price is much above what is paid to the Contractor; but an Allowance should be made for the Difficulties attending the Collection of Shells, when the Enemy's Horse are plundering in this Neighbourhood.

Independent of this Circumstance, we think that were the Extraordinary Expence of this Plan, treble the Amount, it ought not to be put in Competition with the Advantages which must result from it, as thereby the Fortifications will be compleated, and the Property of the Company, and of Individuals, secured.

The 25th Sept.
1780.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnson.

Resolved, That an Advertisement be published in the Terms of the foregoing Minute.

The Committee being of Opinion that Six Months Store of every Kind of Provision should be laid up within the Fort as soon as possible, the President is desired to take the necessary Steps accordingly.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro.
Sam[l] Johnson.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 13.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 28th Sept. 1788.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President;
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letter from Colonel James.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have frequently repreſented to your Honour, &c. the Neceſſity of augmenting the Corps of Artillery, and compleating it with Officers and Men. I again beg Leave to point out to you how inadequate the Corps is to the Service expected of it, and which it muſt perform before Peace can be reſtored to the Carnatic.

The Fate of Colonel Baillie's Detachment, which conſiſted of the fineſt Corps of Infantry that ever acted together in this Country, pleads more forcibly for an Augmentation of the Artillery than any Thing I can urge. This Detachment had only Ten Field Pieces, ill ſupplied with Ammunition, owing to the Want of ſpare Tumbrils.

The whole Corps of Artillery ſhould not on any Occaſion be ſent to the Field, becauſe, ſhould the Army be unfortunate, the Defence of Fort Saint George muſt greatly depend on a well-diſciplined Artillery.

For the above Reaſons I beg Leave to ſubmit to your Conſideration, the following Plan for eſtabliſhing the Artillery on a Footing conſiſtent with the Defence of the Carnatic, and the preſent Exigencies of the Service.

The Corps of Artillery to be augmented to Ten Companies, each Company to conſiſt of

Captain,	Lieut.	L. F. W.	Serjeants,	Corporals,	Drummers,	Fifers,	Gunners,	Matr.	Total.
1	3	2	7	7	2	2	12	58	88

To be formed into a Regiment of Two Battalions, each Battalion to conſiſt of

L^t Col.	Major,	Captains,	Lieutenants,	L^t F. W.	Adjutant,	Qr. Master,	Serj. Major,	Q. Mast. Major,	Drill Serjeant,	Drill Corporal,	Drum Major,	Fife Major,	Serjeants,	Corporals,	Drummers,	Fifers,	Gunners,	Matroſſes.
1	1	5	15	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	35	35	10	10	60	290

The Regiment to be commanded by a Colonel, and to be conſtantly kept compleat. One Battalion to be ſtationed at the Mount ready for Field Service, the other in Fort Saint George, and ſuch Out-Garriſons as the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee ſhall judge proper, and to be relieved every Two Years. A Company of Laſcars, conſiſting of One Syrang, Four Tindals, and Eighty Laſcars, to be attached to each Company of Artillery, who is to draw their Pay, and return them the ſame as his Men.

Should there be Reaſons to prevent this Plan being immediately carried into Execution, I beg Leave to recommend that another Lieutenant be added to each Company on the preſent Eſtabliſh-

ment, and that the Corps be compleated with Officers in the room of Abſentees and thoſe in double Employments, who, in ſo ſmall a Corps, ſhould always be conſidered as Supernumeraries.

I am, with much Reſpect,

Fort St. George, 24th Sept. 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and faithful Servant,
Edward James.

Although the Committee approve in general of the Plan recommended by Colonel James, for an Augmentation of the Artillery, they do not think proper to come to any Reſolution upon it, without the Sanction of the Court of Directors. Indeed were they diſpoſed to adopt it, they could not at preſent, for want of Men; but with reſpect to the Propoſal of adding another Lieutenant to each Company on the preſent Eſtabliſhment, the Committee are of Opinion, and it is accordingly reſolved, That it be carried into Execution.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 28th Sept. 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant Flint, commanding at Wandewaſh.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

General Munro having ordered me to tranſmit to you a Return of Grain and Military Stores in this Garriſon, I have the Pleaſure to inform you that it contains

Colomn.	m.	r.		Colomn.	m.	r.	
2,669	7	3	of Rice, and	73,334	5	1	of Paddy.

The Military Stores being compoſed of all Nations, it will take ſome Time in preparing an exact Return. He likewiſe deſires me to acquaint you if any Grain could be collected from the Country round, Hyder being in Poſſeſſion of every Village in the North, South, and Weſt, little can be expected from theſe Quarters: Chitumbrak Pillee, formerly Aumildar of Chittaput, and now Hyder's Aumildar of Tuvatore, being well acquainted with that Country, collected all the Grain of it, and from Time to Time ſent it to Hyder's Camp: This Man has been, and continues to be, of great Service to him in furniſhing his Army with this Article. The Country between this, Chingleput, Atcheweaum, and Permacoil, would gladly bring what Grain they have for Sale to our Army, was it here, expecting hourly to have it ſeized by ſome of Chitcumbrak Pillee's People. I beg Leave to inform you, that ſeveral of the Sepoys who were in the Action of the 10th, have come here badly wounded: Some of them, as they were ſtripped of every Thing by Hyder's People, and in great Diſtreſs, I have paid Two Fanams each daily, and ſhall continue doing ſo till your Pleaſure be known.

I am,

Wandewaſh, 17th Sept. 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and very humble Servant,
W. Flint.

The Committee approve of the Allowance made to the wounded Sepoys who are gone to Wandewaſh, and Lieutenant Flint is to be directed to continue the ſame till further Orders.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant Moorhouſe, Commiſſary of Stores to the Army.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Though it is well known that whatever tends to facilitate the March of an Army, is of Importance to its Succeſs, it frequently happens that for Want of proper Eſtabliſhments, the Means provided for this End at an immenſe Expence to the Service, prove of little Uſe, and unequal to the Buſineſs.

In all Campaigns, the Company are at a conſiderable Expence for Momoty Men to mend the Roads, &c. Theſe Men, for many Reaſons, are under the Charge of the Commiſſary of Stores to

the

the Army; but being occaſionally raiſed, and paid daily as Coolies, they want Strength, Spirit, and Practice, to enable them to perform the Duty for which they are entertained; and on the leaſt Appearance of an Enemy, they throw down their Tools, and run away.

I beg Leave, as this belongs to the Department I direct, to ſubmit to your Conſideration the following Plan for an Eſtabliſhment of Pioneers inſtead of Monoty Men.

Two Companies of Pioneers to be raiſed as ſoon as poſſible by the Commiſſary of Stores for the Army; each Company conſiſting of 2 Serjeants, 3 Corporals, 5 Havildars, 5 Naigues, and 100 Black Pioneers. The Havildars and Naigues to be paid the ſame as thoſe of Sepoy Corps: The Private Pioneers to have Two Pagodas per Month, paid by Rolls, ſigned by the Commiſſary of Stores to the Army: The Pioneers to be cloathed in blue Jackets, and to be armed, 50 of each Company with light Piſtols, and 50 with Pikes, Six Feet long. Theſe Arms would be ſufficient to prevent their being overcome by a ſmall Party of Horſe, and are ſo light as not to impede their working.

I am, with much Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and
faithful Servant,
Joſeph Moorhouſe,
Commy of Stores to the Army.

Camp,
24 September 1780.

The Committee approve of the Propoſal offered to their Conſideration by Lieutenant Moorhouſe; and it is agreed, that the neceſſary Orders be iſſued in conſequence.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th October 1780.

Read the following Letter from Captain Edmonds.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is with Concern I inform you of the Difficulty I find in getting Recruits, in order to re-place the Six Companies of the 7th Batt[n] Sepoys; and can impute it to no other Cauſe, than the Nabob's People recruiting at Nellore for their Sibbendy Corps. This Service is attended with ſo much leſs Danger and Trouble than ours, that I ſcarce expect a Man till they are compleated, or ſome Stop is put to their recruiting. There are Two Companies of good-looking Men belonging to the Nabob, who came with ſome Perſons from the Southward, on Revenue Buſineſs, and ſeem to want Employment much. I did myſelf the Honour, in my Letter of the 20th, to requeſt your Permiſſion for paying Arrears due to ſuch as might return of the late Detachment under the Command of Colonel Baillie, on their re-entering into the Service.

I have the Honour to be, with much Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Edward Edmonds,
Capt[n] Commandant.

Ongole,
27th September 1780.

Agreed, That Captain Edmonds be directed to entertain as many Men from the Sepoys he mentions, as are willing to enter the Service; and to pay the Arrears of ſuch Sepoys of Colonel Baillie's Detachment, as may come to Ongole.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 13.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 12th October 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Mr. Johnson, indisposed.

Minutes of the last Committee read and approved.

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute:

The Losses unavoidably sustained by the Europeans on the March from Conjeveram to Chingle-put, the 11th ultimo, have so impoverished their Stock of Necessaries, as to render the Inconvenience they lie under, on that Account, deserving the Attention of the Committee: I therefore propose, that One compleat Set of Half-Mounting be given to each of the Non-commissioned Officers and private Europeans who were on that Service; which, according to a Calculation made for that Purpose, will be attended with but a small Expence:

And the better to enable the Sepoys to support their Wives and Families when absent in the Field on Service, I could wish to see the Pay of that useful Body freed from as many Deductions as possible. They have hitherto found themselves in Tents, which have often been pitched when there was a Deficiency of Barracks, to their great Detriment and Loss, which has frequently occasioned Murmurings amongst them. I therefore recommend it to the Consideration of the Committee, that in future the Tents for the Sepoys be furnished at the Expence of the Company.

And, as a further Relief to the Sepoys now in the Service, and the more to incline Men to enlist at a Time we so much want Recruits, I propose that in future the Sepoys be allowed to provide themselves with Slops, instead of an Agent's being employed for that Purpose, as they can furnish themselves equally as well for Half what they at present are charged for them; and that the Arrears due to them on that Article be paid in Cash. To deliver out Slops to the Sepoys at this late Day, would be only encumbering him with a Commodity he has already been at the Expence of finding himself in these Two Years past; it would therefore be but just and reasonable to pay him the Money that has so long been kept from him: And these well-timed Encouragements will no Doubt have their due Effects not only on the Appearance, but the Minds of the Soldiery.

But as the Recruit will have no Means of providing himself with a Stock of Necessaries, and as a further Inducement for him to enter into the Service, I am of Opinion that the present enlisting Money for Recruits shall be encreased by One Pagoda each; which Pagoda the Subidar of the Company will see appropriated to the above Purpose.

Fort Saint George,
12th October 1780.

Hector Munro.

N. B. I hope the Committee will take into their Consideration the Losses that Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment must have sustained in the Action of the 10th September last; this I earnestly recommend should be done whenever they are released or exchanged.

Hector Munro.

Resolved, in consequence of the Report of, and the Recommendation of the Commander in Chief, That the Non-commissioned Officers and private Europeans who were on the March from Conjeveram and Chingleput on the 11th ultimo, be allowed a complete Set of Half-Mounting at the Company's Expence.

Resolved also, That the Sepoys be allowed in future to provide themselves with Slops, instead of an Agent's being employed for that Purpose, as the Commander in Chief represents that they can furnish themselves equally well for Half the Price they are now charged for them; and that the Arrears due to them on that Article be immediately paid them.

Resolved likewise, in consequence of the Commander in Chief's Recommendation, That the present enlisting Money for Sepoy Recruits, be increased One Pagoda each, for the Purposes mentioned by the General.

APPENDIX, N° 13.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Lang:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esq; President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 1ſt; and ſince that, I have had ſeveral People in from Hyder Ally's Camp, who inform me, that he is making Batteries round Arcot, but is retarded very much by the Cannon and Mortars from the Fort; they keep up a very briſk Fire on the Enemy. The 2d the Enemy opened a Battery of Four Guns on the Eaſt Side of Arcot; and Yeſterday Morning a Shot from the Fort diſabled one of them, on which they ſhut it up. Accounts differ about the Size of the Guns; ſome ſay they were but ſmall Field Pieces. However, all Accounts agree, that the Enemy's Batteries are at ſo great a Diſtance, that they cannot do any great Injury to the Fort.

This Morning an European Deſerter, a Huſſar belonging to Lally's Corps, came in here with his Horſe. I requeſt to know what is to be done with him, whether the Honourable Company will take the Horſe and his Arms, or whether he may have Permiſſion to ſell them to the higheſt Bidder; a Number of Europeans would come off, if they had an Opportunity, and Encouragement given them; in particular the Germans.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
5th October 1780.

Reſolved to acquaint Colonel Lang, that the Huſſar Deſerter from Hyder Ally has our Permiſſion to diſpoſe of his Horſe for his own Emolument. Agreed alſo to deſire the Colonel will uſe his Endeavours to bring off more Deſerters from Hyder, by ſuch Promiſes of Rewards as may appear to him, reaſonable and proper.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, September 25, 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſq; Preſident;
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read and approved.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, dated this Day, as entered in C. C. N° 95, incloſing Copy of a Letter from Rajah Burbur at Arcot, and requeſting in conſequence that every poſſible Meaſure may be taken to ſuccour that Place.

There are now at Arcot 150 Europeans, and Three Companies of Sepoys, belonging to the Company, beſides Five or Six thouſand armed People belonging to the Nabob: Theſe appear very ſufficient for the Defence of that Place; but if they were not, it would now be impracticable to ſend a Reinforcement, as the Enemy have inveſted the Fort: As ſoon as the Army is in Condition to take the Field, it will immediately proceed to the Relief of Arcot.

Agreed to write a Letter to the Nabob, to the above Effect.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19th October 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I was this Morning honoured with your Commands of the 15th and 16th Inſtant, of the ſame Tenor; and I herewith encloſe a Return of the Men entertained ſince I received the Firſt Order to recruit.

Notwithſtanding my utmoſt Endeavours, I have hitherto had but very bad Succeſs, nor do I ſuppoſe I will have better in future; the young Men here preferring the Nabob's Sibbendy Service, where they get Batta, and little to do. For this Reaſon, were your Honours to prevail on the Nabob to give Orders for my having Permiſſion to draft his Sibbendies (of which there are Forty Companies in this Country of Fifty Men each) Two good Battalions might be quickly formed out of them; and the Phouſdar might complete the Sibbendies again at his Leiſure. I took the Liberty to ſuggeſt to your Honours, in a Letter I wrote Four Days ago, the Company's taking the Nabob's 9th Battalion, at preſent in a State of Mutiny here, into their Pay; and which, I ſhould imagine, his Highneſs would readily agree to, when it evidently appears to be ſo much for the Good of his own and the Company's Service. If this ſhould be approved of, there will be Three Battalions almoſt inſtantly formed out of nothing, for at preſent they can hardly be ſaid to be better; and I will be anſwerable for their being quickly diſciplined, and fit for the Field: Arms and Accoutrements to be ſent from the Preſidency as ſoon as poſſible. I ſhould eſteem it a great Indulgence, ſhould the Scheme take place, to have the naming of an Enſign, who I will alſo recommend as one of the fitteſt Men in the Country for an Adjutant, and who is on the Spot.

The Rajah of Travancore, I hear, has ſent near Two thouſand Men to Tinnivelly, Sepoys and Crickmen for the preſent Service; yet it has not been in my Power to get the Phouſdar and Renter to ſend any Aſſiſtance to Madura, which Captain Gibbings is perpetually preſſing me to do; and, what would alſo be the ſure Means of protecting the Tinnivelly Diſtrict, at preſent entirely open to be plundered, neither will the Polygars give their Aid, unleſs accompanied by other Troops.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your reſpectful and humble Servant,
James Eidingtoun.

Palamcotah,
28th Sept^r. 1780.

Tranſlation of a Writing or Agreement, dated 19th Auguſt 1780.

I Dullavoy Tremalayapak Moodellyar do hereby give this Writing or Agreement to Colonel Eidingtoun, commanding at Tinnivelly: That Ally Navas Cawn had ſome Time ago ſent for the Polygars, on account of the Government Affairs, as likewiſe you alſo wrote them for the ſame Purpoſe; but in the mean Time the ſaid Ally Navas Cawn was diſmiſſed from the Aumildarſhip. At preſent, in conſequence of my being as Aumildar and Commandant, and alſo you are as commanding at this Place for the Company's Affairs, I have deſired you to grant your Writing or Agreement to Ponchalom Coorchy Cotta, Bommo Naig, and Sevaghery Veragana Rama Vannyan, &c. Polygars, in order to make their Appearance at Tinnivelly, and obey ſuch Orders that ſhall be given or granted them by the Government there; but in caſe the ſaid Polygars are unwilling to obey the Orders, and being deſirous to proceed to their reſpective Places, I promiſe that I ſhall make no contrary, nor put them under Confinement, and you ſhall alſo ſecure them ſafely to their reſpective Places. Thus I given you this Agreement; therefore you will ſend for the ſaid Polygars without Loſs of Time. This Agreement or Writing ſhall continue good, until the ſaid Polygars are ſafely arrived to their reſpective Places.

(Signed) Tremalayapak Moodellyar.

Agreed, That the Preſident be deſired to communicate the foregoing Letter to the Nabob, and to requeſt he will permit the Company to take his 9th Battalion into their Service, and to enliſt another Battalion from among his Sibbendy Sepoys.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 26th October 1780.

To Captain James Eidingtoun, commanding at Palamcottah.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters.

The Nabob, at our Requeſt, has conſented to his 9th Battalion of Sepoys being entertained in the Company's Service. As to paying their Arrears, he cannot do it at preſent, nor can we undertake it; but you may aſſure them we will uſe our Endeavours with the Nabob to obtain it, when the Country is on Peace, upon Condition of their enliſting into our Service.

The Nabob has alſo conſented to our enliſting another Battalion from among his Sibbendies, and you will accordingly make Choice of a ſufficient Number for that Purpoſe, and diſcipline them with all poſſible Expedition. On this particular Occaſion we ſhall allow you to nominate the Adjutant.

 Enclosed

APPENDIX, N° 13.

Enclosed is the Nabob's Order to his Manager at Tinnivelly, relative to the 9th Battalion, and to the new one to be formed from the Sibbendies.

We have sent by the Company's Snow Elizabeth to Magore, a Set of Arms (Accoutrements cannot be spared, they must be made up there for the 10th Battalion) and 1000 Stand more to enable you to supply the new Battalions to be raised, and such as may be wanting for the Nabob's 9th Battalion. Whatever Part of them may not be required, you will carefully deposit in the Company's Stores. We shall desire our President at Magore to send the Arms by Boats from thence to Tutocorin, or some Part near to it, and it will be proper that you have an Escort in Readiness to convey them safe to Palamcotah.

Inclosed is a List of the Stores embarked on Elizabeth, as mentioned above.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
26th October 1780.

Sent the following Letters:

To Lieutenant Colonel Nixon, commanding at Trichinopoly.

Sir,

I am directed by the President and Select Committee to enclose you an Account and Bill of Lading of 1221 Barrels of Gunpowder, laden on the Snow Adventure for Adriapatam, and intended for the Use of your Garrison. You will in consequence dispatch an Escort, without Loss of Time, to secure and convey it to Trichinopoly.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
Charles Oakeley.

Fort Saint George,
28 October 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 30th October 1780.

Read the following Minutes of the Committee of Stores:

Fort Saint George 28th October 1780.

At a Committee of Stores;

PRESENT,

Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Colonel Edward James,
Major George Maule,
Mr. Bryan Scottney.

1st. The Honourable the Select Committee having approved of the following Appointments of Field Train, which the Commander in Chief lays before the Committee: Agreed, That the Commissary of Stores in Camp make out a general Indent to be approved of by the Committee.

2d. Colonel James lays before the Committee, an Estimate of a Battering Train, to be got ready with Ammunition and Stores, to march on the shortest Notice. Agreed, to recommend the same to the Select Committee, for their Approbation.

3d. Major Maule lays before the Committee, the following List of Stores, the Provision of which he begs Leave to recommend may be ordered.

All such Laboratory Stores as are necessary for the Defence of the Place,
Platforms for Mortars,
Cloth for Saucissons (brown and not congeed)
Forge and Apparatus for heating Balls,
Miners Tools,
20,000 Sand Bags, in addition to the Quantity before ordered.

4th. Major Maule proposes, that a Box of a Tumbril be made for the Inspection of the Committee,

mittee, plated on both Sides with Copper; and that an Experiment be made on an old Tumbril, whether a Rocket will penetrate it. Agreed, to recommend the ſame to the Select Committee.

The Commiſſary of Stores lays before the Committee Liſts of Stores received from the military Store-keeper, in the Month of July, Auguſt, and September; Muſters of which being examined, are appointed.

Hector Munro,
Edward James,
Bryan Scottney.

A Battering Train to be got ready with Ammunition and Stores, to march on the ſhorteſt Notice.

Iron Guns, 24 Pounders,	—	10
18 D°	—	18
12 D° for Infiladery,	—	12
Braſs Mortars, 8 Inches,	—	4
5½ D°	—	10
Braſs Howitzers, 8 Inches	—	4
4⅕ Inches recommended in preference to Mortars, as they can be occaſionally uſed in the Field, and carry 12 Pounder Grape	—	6
Iron round Shot, 24 Pounders,	—	10,000
18 D°	—	18,000
12 D°	—	24,000
Empty Shells, 8 Inches,	—	1,200
5½ D°	—	2,000
4⅕ D°	—	1,200

Tumbrils complete, with Ammunition for the 4⅕ Inch Howitzers, and Grape for the Battering Cannon and 8 Inch Howitzers.

Ordered that the Battering Train, &c. recommended by Colonel James, be got ready with all Expedition.

Ordered alſo, that Articles recommended to be provided by Major Maule, be got ready as ſoon as poſſible.

Agreed, the Experiment recommended by Major Maule, in the 4th Paragraph, be tried.

N° 95. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 25th September* 1780—*Received 26th D°.*

I herewith ſend you a Letter I received laſt Night from Rajah Burbur, dated the 21ſt Inſtant. He writes me, that as long as he is poſſeſſed of Life, he will do his Endeavours to defend Arcot; but the Safety of that Place, and the holding out of the People who are there, entirely depend upon the Aſſiſtance they receive from this Place. Be therefore kind enough to acquaint me, as ſoon as poſſible, what you wiſh I ſhould write to Rajah Burbur in Anſwer to his Letter, and what you yourſelf propoſe writing to Captain Prendergaſt. The Fort of Arcot is full of Military Stores and Proviſions for the Army, and it is beſides the Capital of the Carnatic. If (God forbid) the Enemy ſhould get Poſſeſſion of that Place, through a Delay of ſending Aſſiſtance from this, the Conſequences may be fatal, as it may deprive the Engliſh Army of the Proviſions, &c. laid in Store there. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from Maha Rajah Burbur Bahauder, dated 21ſt Ramzan, or 21ſt September 1780.

I have addreſſed your Highneſs ſeveral Times within theſe few Days, which I diſpatched by Tappies, &c. and hope you have received them. This Day, being the 21ſt Ramzan, the Myſorean is arrived on the other Side of the River, near Wallajanagur, with a Number of Foot, Horſe, and heavy Guns; he has alſo Monſieur Lally and his Europeans with him. He has ſent his Son, with ſome Foot and

Horſe, with Guns, towards Pudparry; there are alſo ſome of his Horſe and Foot near Mujunpoor, and they are raiſing Batteries and digging Trenches at all theſe Places. Two Days ago, Fifty Europeans, ſent by Colonel Lang, came in here, as a Reinforcement to our Garriſon, and are now in the Fort; there were 80 Europeans here before. I myſelf and Arſhud Beg Cawn, Cheſt Yar Cawn, Fend ud Dien Cawn, Meer Gulam Ally, the Naib of the City, are continually watching and taking Care of the City, and placed Guards on the Gates. As long as I have Breath in my Body, I ſhall be devoted to the Service of your Highneſs; but the ſooner Aſſiſtance is ſent us againſt the wicked Intentions of the Enemy, it will be the better, otherwiſe the Conſequences may be fatal. It may not be in my Power to forward you any more Addreſſes.

N° 96. *To the Nabob.—Dated 26th September* 1780.

We have had the Honour to receive your Highneſs's Letters of the 24th and 25th Inſtant.

Your Highneſs writes that you have received a Letter from Rajah Burbur, dated the 21ſt Inſtant, informing you, that as long as he is poſſeſſed of Life he will do his Endeavours to defend Arcot, but that the Safety of the Place, and the holding out of the People who are there, depend entirely upon the Aſſiſtance they receive from hence: You deſire, therefore, to know what you ſhould write to Rajah Burbur in Anſwer to his Letter, and what I myſelf propoſe writing to Captain Prendergaſt.

Your Highneſs is well acquainted with the Steps that have been taken for the Safety of Arcot: There are now 150 Europeans, beſides Two Companies of Sepoys commanded by the Company's Officers, and I underſtand there are 6 or 7000 armed People belonging to your Highneſs, in the Town. With this Force, if the Garriſon behaves well, which I truſt will be the Caſe, I ſhould ſuppoſe Arcot very ſafe againſt any Attempt of Hyder, until the Rains ſet in, when his Operations muſt ceaſe. As to ſending any Aſſiſtance from hence at preſent, it would be attended with the greateſt Riſk; but your Highneſs may aſſure Rajah Burbur, that as ſoon as the Army is refitted, which I ſuppoſe will be very ſoon, it will march to the Relief of Arcot; and that in the mean Time, with proper Exertions on his Part, it will not be poſſible for Hyder to take it.

Your Highneſs has not yet ſent me any Anſwer to the Letter I wrote you on the 7th Inſtant, reſpecting the Cavalry, and other Matters very neceſſary to be adjuſted: I requeſt your Highneſs will reply to that Letter as ſoon as poſſible.

I have written a friendly Letter to Nizam Ally Cawn, which I hope will be attended with good Effects in the preſent Juncture; and I think it would be very proper in your Highneſs alſo to write to him, and to endeavour by every Means in your Power, to engage him in our Intereſts.

N° 97. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 27th September* 1780.

I herewith ſend you a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah Burbur, dated the 23d Inſtant; acquainting of the Progreſs made by Hyder Ally Cawn in beſieging Arcot, and of his having carried his Approaches cloſe to the City Wall; that he is exerting himſelf to take Poſſeſſion of it as ſoon as poſſible; and that the People there are greatly alarmed. You will thereby be made acquainted with all the Particulars; and I make no Doubt you will take ſuch Steps as you think neceſſary for the Safety of that Place. What can I ſay more?

Letter from Rajah Burbur, dated 23d Ramzan, or 23d September.

I ſent your Highneſs an Arzdaſht on the 21ſt Inſtant, acquainting of Hyder being arrived on the other Side of the River near to Waulaujaunegor, and that he had inveſted the City with his Troops; he is now buſy in digging Trenches to the Eaſtward: We fire Night and Day upon them; but as he has a great many Artillery Men, and Quantities of Stores, he carries on his Approaches with Activity. The People in the Town are greatly alarmed for their Safety and that of their Women, and lift up their Hands to Almighty, imploring his Aſſiſtance. Nejub Cawn and myſelf are exerting ourſelves in your Highneſs's Service, which we ſhall do as long as we have Life. The ſooner the Army arrives the better; but if (God forbid) any Delay ſhould happen in our receiving Succours, your Highneſs is well acquainted with our Situation; many Perſons of both Sexes, to preſerve their Honour, will put an End to their Lives. The Enemy has carried his Trenches nearer to us ſince Yeſterday, and is now within Muſquet Shot of the City Wall.

N° 99. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 1st October 1780; Received 2d D°.*

I ſend you a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah Burbur, dated the 26th September, adviſing me of the Enemy's having dug Two other Trenches on the other Side of the River, and that he has carried on his Approaches to the Eaſtward cloſe to the City Wall; that the People are greatly alarmed; and he requeſts Aſſiſtance may be ſent to him from hence. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from Rajah Burbur—Dated 26th September 1780.

I hope your Highneſs have received the ſeveral Addreſſes I have ſent you, adviſing of the Inveſture of this Place by the Enemy. He is now very buſy carrying on Trenches to the Eaſtward, as alſo to the Weſtward, by the Side of the River, and he has now dug Two Trenches more on the other Side of the River. We fire Shells and Shot at them conſtantly, but they go on vigorouſly with their Work. The People in the City, of all Ranks, truſt in your Highneſs's never-failing Proſperity, and lift up their Hands to the Almighty for Help. The Enemy's Trenches on the Side of the River are cloſe to the City Wall. It would be better if the Army could come here as ſoon as poſſible, otherwiſe if any Delay takes Place, the City may fall into the Enemy's Hands. Notwithſtanding many People were ſent out of it, a great Number of both Sexes remain; and ſhould the Place fall, they know what Treatment is to be expected from the Enemy; it appears to them difficult for them to eſcape alive without being diſhonoured.

N° 103. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 6th October 1780; received D°.*

I ſend you for your Information, a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah Burbur. If the City of Arcot ſhould fall into the Hands of the Enemy (which may the Almighty God forbid!) our Affain muſt ſuffer conſiderably. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from Rajah Burbur, dated Showal, or 3d October 1780.

I have ſent your Highneſs repeated Addreſſes, which I hope you have received. The Enemy has now compleated Two Trenches more on the Side of the River, and he has Numbers of Artillery-men and Materials in plenty; he goes on briſkly in carrying the Approaches, notwithſtanding all the Fire from the Fort. All the People in the City are greatly terrified, and implore Heaven for Aſſiſtance. The Enemy's Batteries are cloſe to the Wall on the Eaſt and Weſt Sides, and they fire their Muſquetry into the Place: Four 20lb. Shot, one of 18, and ſome of 6lbs, fell upon my Houſe; this Day ſeveral Houſes near mine have been deſtroyed: If they fire Rockets from the Eaſtern Side, it will cauſe great Alarm amongſt the People reſiding in that Side. I have heard to Day, that the Myſorean having received Intelligence of the Approach of the Engliſh Army, intends marching to Conjeveram with a large Body of Horſe and Foot; that Meer Ally Raza has joined him with a conſiderable Body of Troops from Cuddapah, and is encamped on the South Side of this Place, from whence he means alſo to begin a freſh Attack. If the Engliſh Army ſhould not come here ſoon, the Conſequences muſt be fatal to this Place, which may the Almighty forbid! A Number of People have taken Refuge here with their Families, and cannot go out of the Place; they will have nothing left for it, but to ſacrifice themſelves to preſerve their Honour.

N° 108. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 22d October 1780; received D°.*

I ſend you a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah Burbur, dated the 6th Showal at Night (5th Oct.) adviſing me of the Enemy's having carried his Trenches cloſe to the Fort Wall; that great Quantities of Shot have been fired into the Court; and that they are waiting with Impatience for Succour from hence. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſht

APPENDIX, N° 13, 14.

Arzdaſht from Rajah Burbur, dated 6th Showal at Night.

I have been honoured with your Highneſs's Commands of the 13th and 19th of Ramzan, adviſing me of General Munro coming here ſoon to chaſtiſe the Enemy. Thanks to the Almighty, and to your Highneſs's never-failing Proſperity, we are ſtill in Safety here! The Myſorean is encamped with his whole Force near Wallajanagur, and has inveſted this Place in all Quarters. The Scarcity of Grain, and all Sorts of Proviſions, are ſuch, that both Men and Cattle within the Walls, are at their laſt Gaſp. The Enemy's Batteries, on the Eaſt and Weſt Side, are cloſe to the Fort Walls; and they fire great Quantities of Shot into the Place, and many of the Houſes are deſtroyed.

We are conſtantly firing on our Side upon the Enemy's Works. Colonel Lang is not come here yet. I hope the Engliſh Army will come here ſoon, or elſe it is difficult to ſave the Place. Captain Prendergaſt has received Two or Three Letters from General Munro, in which he tells him, that he will ſhortly be here to chaſtiſe the Enemy; but no Troops are yet come.

APPENDIX, N° 14.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 12th October 1780.

MESSRS. Smith and Johnſon deliver in the following Minute:

Although the Court of Directors ſeem of Opinion, that the French Armanent fitted out for the Eaſt Indies, is deſtined for Bombay; yet as a Veſſel has ſailed from Pondicherry for the Iſlands within theſe few Days, with Advices of Hyder Ally's Succeſs, and of our Situation, it is very probable their Fleet will proceed to this Coaſt; and therefore it becomes highly proper to conſider how far we are able to reſiſt their Attempts, before the Squadron under the Command of Sir Edward Hughes ſails for Bombay.

Our Eſtabliſhment has been greatly weakened by the Loſs of above 3,300 Sepoys and 500 Europeans, beſides Officers, at Tuccalum, and by the 2d Battalion of Sepoys and 700 Europeans, now on the Malabar Coaſt; excluſive of theſe, we may alſo conſider Colonel Lang's Regiments at Vellore, of about 400 Europeans, as entirely ſeparated from us for the preſent.

When we reflect on the unfiniſhed State of the Eaſt Front of this Fort, on the inadequate Number of Europeans remaining to defend ſuch extenſive Works, on the great Probability of our not receiving Reinforcements from Bengal before the latter End of December, and, what deſerves the moſt ſerious Attention, that we cannot provide Proviſions to ſuſtain a Siege of Four Months; we apprehend this Settlement will be expoſed to imminent Danger, ſhould this Fleet proceed to Bombay.

It is generally allowed that Monſieur Tranjolie's Deſertion of Pondicherry, was the principal Cauſe of its Reduction; and therefore it behoves us to take Warning from this recent Error of an Enemy.

It may be argued, that we have Reaſon to expect Men, Money, and Proviſions, from Bengal; but we think there is juſt Ground for Apprehenſions, that the Troops at leaſt cannot be embarked before December, and then the French Fleet may be on this Coaſt.

The Maratta War, and the low State of the Bengal Treaſury, are alſo Circumſtances very unfavourable to our Expectations of Succour.

In this Situation, we think there is great Reaſon for apprehending Danger, ſhould this Place be ſurrounded by a vigorous and powerful Enemy by Land, and blockaded, if not attacked, by Sea.

If the Squadron goes round to the Malabar Coaſt, the Probability is, it cannot return before March; but ſhould it go to Acheen, there is little Doubt but it could be here early in January;

In which Caſe, ſhould there be no French Fleet on this Coaſt, it can proceed to Bombay, and return in May.

Madras is of the greateſt Importance to the Safety of Bengal, for ſhould the former fall, it is not probable the French would remain inactive, but make vigorous Efforts to eſtabliſh themſelves in the latter. We alſo fear the Northern Rajahs are not well affected to us, and would join the Enemy, in Hopes of gaining by the Change.

Upon maturely conſidering all theſe Circumſtances, we are of Opinion, that the Committee ſhould make a ſtrong Repreſentation to Sir Edward Hughes, on the abſolute Neceſſity they conceive there is for his not proceeding to Bombay, and requeſting he will return the Moment he conceives he can bring the Squadron into this Road with Safety, as thereby the Continuance of the Company's Influence, if not the Safety of this Fort, may be preſerved.

11th October 1780.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

In conſequence of the foregoing Minute, a Note is now ſent to the Admiral, to requeſt his Preſence at the Committee: And the Admiral attending accordingly, is acquainted with the Situation of Affairs, and requeſted to give his Opinion upon the Propriety of the Squadron going to Bombay, or watering at Trincomalé, to be ready, in caſe a French Fleet ſhould come on this Coaſt after the Rains.

Sir Edward Hughes thereupon informs the Committee, That he thinks the Squadron ſhould, upon every Account, proceed to Bombay; that all the Ships, and Two of them in particular (the Exeter and Eagle) muſt go into Dock as ſoon as poſſible, to be repaired; that, excluſive of this, Bombay, and the Settlements on the Malabar Coaſt, are pointed out, by all our Letters from England, as the firſt Object of the French Armament ſaid to be fitting out for India; that the Troubles which now prevail in the Carnatic, having broke out only Three Months ago, and the late Diſaſter which befel Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment, having happened only One Month ago, it is not likely that any Accounts of theſe Circumſtances, which may have been ſent from Pondicherry, will arrive in Time, or have ſufficient Weight to alter the original Deſtination of the Armament planned in France; that ſuppoſing the Deſtination ſhould be changed, yet there is no Probability of any French Armament coming on this Coaſt during the approaching Monſoon, or for ſome Time after, and that he hopes to be here himſelf, with the Squadron from Bombay, by the End of January, or Beginning of February; laſtly, he obſerves, that the Security of Bombay is particularly recommended to him from England, in conſequence of the ſuppoſed Deſtination of the Armament from France.

Sir Edward Hughes then withdraws; and the Committee reſolve, in conſequence of the Reaſons urged by Sir Edward, that it would not be adviſeable to make any Requeſt to him, to alter his former Determination, of proceeding with the Squadron to Bombay.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro.

Fort Saint George Seleƈt Committee, 13th October 1780.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Seleƈt Committee at Bombay.

Gentlemen,

We are ſorry to acquaint you, that on the 10th ultimo a Detachment of our Troops, conſiſting of about 500 Europeans, and upwards of 3,000 Sepoys, was, by an Accident of Three or Four Ammunition Tumbrils blowing up while they were engaged with the Enemy, entirely defeated, and almoſt the whole killed, wounded, or taken Priſoners. This unfortunate Event has ſo weakened our Forces, that we cannot act in the Field without conſiderable Succours: We have written lately to Bengal on this Subject, and doubt not the Governor General and Council will give us all the Aſſiſtance they can ſpare; but as we know not yet what Number of Troops we may expect from thence, we cannot help looking towards the conſiderable Detachments from this Preſidency now ſerving on the Malabar Coaſt: We have 16 Companies of Sepoys, and about 100 Europeans, at Tellicherry; and about 600 Europeans, and a Battalion of Sepoys, with General Goddard.

With reſpect to the Troops at Tellicherry, if that Place cannot be ſupported without ſo conſiderable a Force, we think it would be expedient, in the preſent Poſture of Affairs, to abandon it altogether.

altogether. At all Events, as it is indiſpenſibly requiſite that we ſhould have the Madras Troops upon this Coaſt without Delay, we have requeſted Sir Edward Hughes to conſult with Mr. Church and Major Cotgrave upon the beſt and moſt expeditious Means of tranſporting them to Anjengo. We hope alſo, that the Detachment under Colonel Browne may be ſpared very ſoon; and in this Caſe we earneſtly requeſt you will provide for their Return to this Coaſt the firſt Opportunity.

We think it proper to inform you, that Sir Edward Hughes, and the Captains of the Squadron (excepting Captain Panton and Captain Mitchell) have been paid Allowances from the Company here to the End of September.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
13th October 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 15.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 13th October 1780.

To Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Forces in India.

Sir,

AS the Squadron is on the Point of Departure for Bombay, we think it proper to communicate to you the State of the Company's Settlements at Tellicherry; which, by our laſt Advices from Major Cotgrave, the Commandant there, was cloſely beſieged by the Nairs, aſſiſted with the Force of Hyder Ally. Major Cotgrave has under his Command, of the Troops belonging to this Preſidency, 16 Companies of Sepoys, and about 100 European Infantry and Artillery: We much wiſh to have this Force returned to the Coaſt by the Way of Anjengo; and we ſhall be obliged if, at your Arrival at Tellicherry, you will conſult with Mr. Church, the Reſident, and Major Cotgrave, upon the ſpeedieſt and moſt expeditious Means of executing this Service; in which we are ſatisfied you will give all the Aſſiſtance in your Power.

We beg Leave to incloſe herewith Letters for Major Cotgrave, Mr. Church, and the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, which we requeſt your Care of.

We have directed the Ponſborne to proceed with you to the other Coaſt; and we requeſt ſhe may be employed to aſſiſt in tranſporting our Troops from Tellicherry to Anjengo, and that you will deſire the Captain afterwards to make the beſt of his way to Bombay.

As it is of much Importance that we ſhould, if poſſible, ſend home the Anſwers which we expect from Bengal to the Diſpatches lately ſent thither, we beg Leave to requeſt, in caſe thoſe Anſwers do not arrive by the 15th, the Time you propoſe for the Nymph's ſailing, that ſhe may remain here till the 18th or 20th at fartheſt, when there is ſcarce a Doubt but we ſhall receive the Advices we expect.

We have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
13th October 1780.

To Major John Cotgrave, commanding at Tellicherry.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 21ſt Auguſt. We hope you may have been able to defend the Settlement of Tellicherry until the Arrival of Sir Edward Hughes's Squadron, by which you will receive this Letter. The Situation of Affairs on this Coaſt, renders it abſolutely neceſſary that

the Troops with you ſhould return with all poſſible Expedition, by the Way of Anjengo; and we direct accordingly, that they may be embarked in ſuch Manner as Sir Edward Hughes ſhall judge moſt expedient.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
13th October 1780.

Mr. Richard Church, Reſident at Tellicherry.

Sir,

We underſtand, by a Letter from Major Cotgrave, dated in Auguſt, that Hyder Ally's Troops had joined the Nairs, in their Attack upon Tellicherry. As we conceive it will not be poſſible for you, without powerful Support from Bombay, to keep Poſſeſſion of the Place for any Length of Time, and as from all Accounts we apprehend the Government will not in the preſent Circumſtances be able to afford you that Support, we would ſuggeſt to you, whether it might not be prudent, in this Caſe, to abandon the Settlement, after embarking the Troops, Stores, and Effects belonging to it. As we are much in Want of Major Cotgrave's Detachment, we have ſent Orders to the Major to return; and have deſired Sir Edward Hughes to conſult with you and Major Cotgrave, upon the ſpedieſt Manner of tranſporting it to Anjengo; in which we requeſt you will give every Aſſiſtance in your Power, as its early Arrival on this Coaſt may be of great Importance.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
13th October 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 16.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19th October 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

MINUTES of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon deliver in the following Minute, containing their Obſervations on the general Letter by the Nymph.

We do not know of any Reaſons for ſuppoſing that Hyder Ally had no Intention of breaking with us; but we poſitively aſſert, that the Select Committee were unanimouſly of a different Opinion in October laſt, as appears by their Minute of the 23d of that Month; and that Mr. Smith moſt ſtrenuouſly recommended (in a Minute dated the 10th November) the cantoning a ſtrong Body of Troops at Conjeveram or Vellore, to be held in Readineſs for Action.

Indeed to this partial Account, we ought to candidly own, that the firſt Intelligence we had of Hyder Ally's Motions was accompanied by Accounts that his Cavalry had actually burnt Conjeveram, and finding nothing to oppoſe them, was puſhing on towards Madras; this occaſioned ſo general a Conſternation, that almoſt all the Families on Choultry Plain fled into the Fort, and the Inhabitants of all the adjacent Villages into the Black Town; the very next Day (and not a few Days after) we heard of his having plundered, not only Porto Novo to the Southward, but alſo Ventapollam to the Northward.

The Troops were not ordered on the Alarm to aſſemble at the Mount, they were firſt ordered to aſſemble near Wandewaſh. The Preſident and Commander in Chief perſevered in that Opinion ſome Time, notwithſtanding the Advice given by Lord Macleod and us; the Secretary ought to have referred to the Commander in Chief's Minute of the 1ſt Auguſt on this Subject. Lieutenant Colonel Baillie was firſt ordered to attack Cuddapah; that Order was countermanded, and he was directed to proceed againſt ſome other Fort, as he might think proper. After about Seven Days were loſt in this Manner, definitive Orders were ſent to him for proceeding to Wandewaſh. Had his firſt Orders been for proceeding to the Mount, we believe there is no Doubt but that he would have arrived at the Cortelair while it was Day, and joined the main Body of our Army before the Enemy could be in Readineſs to attack him We might relate what has happened in the moſt favourable Manner our Records will allow, but on no Account to deviate from them; it is by them, and not by partial Repreſentations, our Conduct will be judged: And therefore we totally diſapprove of every Part of this Letter, which cannot be corroborated by the Minutes of the Committee.

This is a very partial Repreſentation of our Situation, and does not imply any Difficulty in reinforcing our Army; but it is a Fact not to be controverted, that we cannot, with the leaſt Appearance of Succeſs, take the Field, until we receive a conſiderable Reinforcement of Europeans and Sepoys from Bengal, that this cannot be reaſonably expected before the latter End of December; and therefore the Fate of his Highneſs the Nabob's Capital of Arcot is very uncertain.

We know that Tellicherry is blockaded by Sea and Land; and that there is a very great Probability of the Garriſon having been obliged to ſurrender for want of Proviſions and Ammunition. We do not expreſs any Anxiety for their Safety, nor do we mention what Relief we intend to ſend them.

We do not write with ſufficient Energy on the ſevere Loſs we have ſuſtained by Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Defeat, nor on the Neceſſity of our receiving ſpeedily a ſufficient Reinforcement from England. To give great Force to this Application, it ought to be mentioned, that the European Regiment at Vellour (near Half of which have been detached to Arcot) may be conſidered as entirely cut off from us until the Army takes the Field, and a Communication is opened with Vellour. We think it would be but common Juſtice to mention the Loſs we have ſuſtained by Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's being made Priſoner, and the Death of Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher, Officers of approved Bravery and undoubted Merit.

We are of Opinion, that we ought to have aſſigned ſome Reaſon for our not immediately ceding the Guntoor Circar to Bazalet Jung, conformably to the earneſt Requiſition made to us by the Governor General and Council, dated the 12th June laſt; as we are apprehenſive our total Silence on that Subject may be imputed to a wilful Neglect and Inability to defend our Conduct: This appears to us the more neceſſary, as it is probable it will be taken Notice of by the Governor General and Council.

Read alſo the following joint Minute, delivered in on the 14th Inſtant by Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon.

As the preſent alarming Situation of Affars on this Coaſt will excite the particular Attention of our Honourable Employers, we think it our indiſpenſable Duty to record our Sentiments on the Mode in which Buſineſs is conducted; that it may be clearly ſeen how far any Reſponſibility can be required of us in particular, who form a Part of this Government.

In ſtating the Conduct of the Select Committee, it may not be improper to ſhew the ruling Influence which that Inſtitution has thrown into the Hands of the Governor; and conſequently how much he is reſponſible for all Meaſures that come before it.

The Select Committee has the Direction of every Military and Political Meaſure. It conſiſts but of Four Members, and any one of them joining with the Governor, gives him a decided Majority, which in Effect places the executive Power in his Hands.

The Governor has always been the Channel through which all Correſpondence has been held with the Country Powers; all Intercourſe with their Vakeels is managed by him; he diſburſes what he pleaſes for Secret Services, and it is to him that Intelligence is brought; all Conferences with the Nabob are entruſted to him; it is his Duty to make himſelf acquainted with the Situation of the Country in which he governs, and all the Countries that are any ways connected with it; it is therefore his Duty to communicate his Information to the Board, who, by having the Whole before them, may be able to judge of the Meaſures proper to be purſued.

As from this important Truſt the Governor becomes the Source of Intelligence and Information to the Board, every political Incident may be ſuppoſed to originate with him.

The Truſt thus repoſed in the Governor, doubtleſs requires that he ſhould be a Man of Abilities, Integrity,

Integrity, Candour, and Experience; the more theſe Qualities are requiſite, every Defect becomes the more dangerous, in Proportion to the Difficulties by which the Government is ſurrounded.

All the official Information comes through the Governor; he may on many Occaſions preſent or ſuppreſs it, as he thinks proper: Without neceſſary Information, the beſt Intentions of a Council may be fruſtrated; and thus a Governor may ſacrifice the Intereſt of his Employers, by not putting it in the Power of his Colleagues to provide againſt approaching Danger.

To obtain Information, to open every Channel through which it may be procured, and to be able to diſcriminate between that which is important or otherwiſe, is one of the moſt eſſential Duties of a Governor. The Meaſures to be purſued in conſequence, after Communication, depend upon the Council, but to procure Information is chiefly the Province of the Governor; and if that is not obtained, it is obvious no Political Meaſures or Military Plans can either be properly conducted or arranged.

We have Reaſon to think the late Preſident expected, before his Departure, that the Company's Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt would be invaded by Hyder Ally: We likewiſe have Reaſon to think, that he knew Magazines were collecting on our Frontiers at Bangalore, &c. We are informed Mr. Grey wrote ſeveral Letters to him upon this Subject, although but one appears on Record; but this Information was never communicated to the Committee.

Mr. Johnſon, in a Minute (ſeconded by Mr. Smith) on the 19th of June, in conſequence of various Reports they had heard of Hyder's Intentions to invade the Carnatic, moved, That the Committee would take into Conſideration the Means for maintaining an Army in the Field, and if that was impracticable, that they would deliberate upon Meaſures for reinforcing our Garriſons, and for keeping up a Force, at leaſt ſufficient to protect the Company's and Nabob's Poſſeſſions: He likewiſe required a Return of the Stores and Proviſions in the different capital Forts, that the Committee might be enabled to judge of what was further neceſſary. Had this Opinion been followed, our Troops which were then ſeparated might have been formed into a Body within the Space of a Month; without Obſtruction or Difficulty they might have marched into the Heart of the Province, and would have been ready to face the Enemy on their firſt Entrance.

But upon this and other Occaſions we had too much reaſon to believe, that a Meaſure ſuggeſted by us, was of itſelf a ſufficient Reaſon for its meeting with Oppoſition from the Majority of the Committee; the Advice conveyed in this Minute was not regarded; our Apprehenſions were thought groundleſs, and the Opportunity loſt which might have totally prevented the Enemy's invading the Carnatic. In this Opinion we were further confirmed, in finding that no more Attention had been ſhewn to the Minute delivered in by Mr. Smith of the 17th July (recommending the ſame Precautions might be taken) than had before been paid to the Minute of Mr. Johnſon.

In a Minute delivered in by the Governor and General on the 1ſt Auguſt (in Reply to one which Mr. Sadlier had entered at Council on this Subject) avowedly with Intention to vindicate their own Conduct, and moving for Mr. Sadlier's Suſpenſion; they ſay, "Hyder Ally, from the Moment we marched againſt Mahé, threatened in return an Invaſion of the Carnatic; his Inclination was little to be doubted," &c. &c. How far this Confeſſion operates in their Vindication, we will leave to our honourable Employers; frequent Information proved, that it was not only the Inclination but the Intention of Hyder Ally to invade the Carnatic. Two Members of the Committee propoſed, that we ſhould make the neceſſary Preparations in conſequence; and yet the Inclinations of Hyder Ally were ſo apparent to the Majority, they neglected to take any one Step by which our Safety might be ſecured, until the Enemy's Cavalry had entered into the Heart of the Country, and penetrated to a great Extent both North and South.

For ſeveral Days after the Invaſion took Place, the ſame unhappy Indifference and Inactivity prevailed; the Troops at Poonamalee and the Mount were allowed to remain ſeparate, inſtead of being aſſembled for the Defence of the Black Town, as we at that Time recommended; the Inhabitants were under the greateſt Alarm, becauſe they thought proper Means were not taken to protect them: Inſtead of finding near our Capital an Aſylum for their Property, their Cattle, and their Effects, they thought themſelves in Danger within the Walls of the Black Town; they fled into Woods and Pollams; they carried their Cattle and their Effects with them; ſuch as could afford it fled by Sea; and we beg to ſubmit it even to the Majority, Whether this is not the Cauſe to which we may principally impute the Difficulty we had in fitting out the Army from the Mount, and our Want of neceſſary Proviſions for that Part of it which has ſince returned?

Lieutenant Colonel Baillie with his Detachment, inſtead of being immediately ordered down to Madras to join the Troops which could be collected near the Preſidency, was firſt ordered into the Cuddapah Country; then into ſome other Part of Hyder Ally's Territories, where the Attack might be more effectual; and at laſt, down to Madras. It is true, when the Expedition againſt Cuddapah was firſt propoſed, we concutred; but within the Space of Three Days we were ſenſible of the Impro-

priety

priety of the Meaſure, and moved, that he ſhould be ordered directly to Madras; but this was not attended to, although if it had, his March towards Cudapah would have been prevented. By theſe different Orders, ſeveral Days were loſt after the Invaſion took Place, and at a Time when every Moment was of Importance.

The Detachment which marched from Pondicherry under Colonel Braithwaite, inſtead of being brought up by Sea, upon the firſt Alarm to Madras, as propoſed by Mr. Sadlier and us, where it might have been landed in the Space of Eight Days, was allowed to remain for a conſiderable Time, as if it were in an open Town, although without Artillery (which was ſent to them afterwards) and then ordered to march through a Country, which might be conſidered in the Poſſeſſion of the Enemy. Colonel Braithwaite, with his Detachment, fortunately joined the Army at the Mount, about the 23d of Auguſt. It is well known that his March was not only attended with inconceivable Fatigue and Hazard, but in ſome Situations, when there was great Difficulty in dragging the Guns over ſwampy Ground, his Detachment was in imminent Danger in caſe of an Attack, as appears by Colonel Braithwaite's Letter to the Committee. We deem it proper to obſerve, that independent of the great Loſs of Time, this March by Land made a very conſiderable Difference of Expence, which might have been ſaved by bringing the Troops by Sea; this in any Caſe deſerved Conſideration, but in the preſent low State of our Finances was really important.

The Majority of the Committee firſt determined to aſſemble the Army by Detachments in the Middle of the Province, although then in the Poſſeſſion of the Enemy; they defended this Meaſure in their Minute of the 1ſt Auguſt, already quoted, but they afterwards found themſelves under the Neceſſity of relinquiſhing it, and of adopting in Part the Meaſure of aſſembling the Army near the Preſidency, as had been propoſed to them.

We conceive, had Mr. Johnſon's Motion of the 19th June (which was ſeconded by Mr. Smith) been attended to, it is highly probable the Enemy would not have invaded the Country, and in any Event, the Army would have been in Readineſs to meet the Enemy on their Firſt Appearance. Had Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment been ordered from the Northward to Madras, when the Invaſion took Place, and had Colonel Braithwaite's Detachment been ordered up from Pondicherry by Sea; the former would have eſcaped the melancholy Fate to which it became expoſed, the Safety of the latter not have been ſo injudiciouſly hazarded; and the Army, when joined, might have been ready to march at leaſt Seven Days ſooner, which would have proved of the higheſt Importance, to the Relief of Arcot: Had the Troops near the Preſidency been aſſembled for its Protection, our Bounds would have been ſtocked with every Neceſſary; we might have felt but little of our preſent Diſtreſs, and our Army might have been eaſily equipped; in fine, we are convinced our Affairs would now have a different Aſpect, and our Honour been ſaved. However, it might be thought uncandid not to do the Preſident and General the Juſtice to obſerve, that although they took no Notice of our Minutes, or made the neceſſary Diſpoſitions in caſe of an Invaſion, they do not forget to vindicate their Conduct, by declaring in their Minute of the 1ſt Auguſt, that they repreſented, both to the Company and to the Gentlemen at Bengal, the Extent of Hyder Ally's Views, and had moſt circumſtantially informed the latter of every Step he had taken previous to his Attack upon the Carnatic. It is true indeed, that theſe Gentlemen in the ſame Minute further ſay, "that under the Certainty that the Main Army and the Artillery of Hyder Ally had not yet got through the Ghauts, and that he himſelf, ſo far from being in the Heart of the Carnatic, was ſtill in the Neighbourhood of the Paſſes, they deemed themſelves vigilant in the Truſt repoſed in them, when they reſolved to aſſemble an Army as ſpeedily as poſſible!" We appeal to our Superiors, whether this is not in Effect an Evaſion of the Queſtion, and whether the introducing theſe Circumſtances (which at this Time we believe were very uncertain) is not intended to give a Colour of Excuſe for the Delay which happened in making the neceſſary Preparations; when it is not denied, as it cannot, that Hyder Ally's Forces had then actually burnt, plundered, and deſtroyed many conſiderable Places in the Carnatic, even down to the Sea Side, and had carried off a very large Booty from Porto Novo to the South, had done conſiderable Damage Northward at another large manufacturing Town called Ventapollam, not far from Maſulipatam, and had ravaged the Country to the Weſtward?

It was not in our Power to prevent theſe Evils; we could do no more, nor can we at preſent, than vindicate ourſelves from having any Part in the Meaſures purſued. From the Departure of Sir Thomas Rumbold, we ſaw the Preſident and General united in every Meaſure which has been carried into Execution, with very little Regard to the Arguments uſed by us; our Oppoſition to theſe Meaſures, though formed upon good Grounds, and conducted with Moderation, was deemed Diſſenſion; our Advice was ill received, and hardly ever followed, but through Neceſſity. The Meaſures by which the Majority ſupported their Power, ſhew that the Means were but little conſidered ſo the End was obtained. We ſhall not ſay how much the Governor endeavoured to inculcate Ideas to our Prejudice, that he might thereby promote his own Views; but of this we are certain, our Conduct was miſconſtrued, and our Endeavours to ſerve the Public imputed to a factious Diſpoſition.

Mr. Sadlier, a Member of Council, convinced that the Meaſures of the Majority were deſtructive, and rouſed by a Senſe of public Danger, gave an Opinion, pointing out the evil Tendency of what

had already been done, and propoſing a Plan of Operations: His Arguments are the ſame as we have already expreſſed; they carried Conviction to our Minds; we joined in them, and we hoped the Majority would do ſo likewiſe: But the Event turned out otherwiſe, and Mr. Sadlier was ſuſpended for giving an Opinion, which, had it been adopted, would probably have prevented every ſucceeding Miſchief.

When we ſaw Power exerting itſelf to ſuppreſs well-grounded Opinion, we could not but feel for ourſelves; we might have fallen the next Sacrifice, and would thereby have been prevented from conveying to the Company our Opinion in Oppoſition to what we thought improper Meaſures.

But the Jealouſy of the Majority was carried to a Height that convinced us it was pre-determined our Opinions ſhould have no Weight.

The General firſt determined to remain at Madras, and Lord Macleod was appointed to the Command of the Army; when, in conſequence of his Letter to the Committee, the General relinquiſhed the Deſign, and took the Command upon himſelf, he joined the Governor in voting, that he ſhould have Leave to return from the Army to Madras when he thought proper: But not thinking this Reſolution ſufficient, and that it might be abrogated in his Abſence, he went ſtill greater Lengths; he expreſſed Doubts of us in a Minute, dated 21ſt Auguſt, without aſſigning any Cauſe, and not only in Oppoſition to the Orders of the Company, which fixes the Members of the Select Committee, but in Violation of the Conſtitution of their Government, which places the Power in the Hands of the Majority (having firſt contributed to this unwarrantable Step by the unjuſt Suſpenſion of Mr. Sadlier) moved, that Mr. Davidſon be appointed a temporary Member of the Select Committee during his Abſence.

The Preſident, in Effect, acknowledged this Act to be violent, and yet ſupported it for the ſuperficial Reaſons aſſigned by the General. We have already delivered in Minutes on this Subject; but we will here take Notice, that it was not alone the Orders of the Court of Directors which theſe Gentlemen deviated from and totally diſregarded; but that on this Occaſion, they acted in direct Oppoſition to an Opinion and Sentiments, which in Decency claimed at leaſt an equal Attention from them; for the Truth of which, we mean to appeal to their own Words in their joint Minute of the 1ſt Auguſt, where they cenſure Mr. Sadlier for Expreſſions, which they conſidered as a Reflection on the Committee. Their Words are theſe: "If in their Wiſdom the Company have thought fit to "eſtabliſh a Select Committee, for the better Management of their Affairs; if in their Diſcretion "they have thought proper to *limit the Number of its Members*; the daring Inſult which is in ſuch "Language ſhewn to their Authority, and that too by a Member of Adminiſtration, is worthy of "the ſevereſt Cenſure that can be paſſed. To encourage a Spirit of Diſaffection, is highly unbe-"coming in any Man, veſted with the Share of the Government of a Country; but to aim at the "Subverſion of a Power *fixed and eſtabliſhed in all its Points by the moſt explicit Orders*, is a Tranſ-"greſſion of that unpardonable Nature, that Government would be treacherous to their Conſtituents, "and negligent of the public Safety, to allow it to paſs."

It is then neceſſary for us to take Notice, that the extraordinary Meaſure of bringing Mr. Davidſon into the Committee, which the Preſident and General thought proper to adopt within a few Days after they had delivered the aforegoing Sentiments, ſtands ſtrongly reprobated by theſe Sentiments, ſo that no clearer Evidence of their Condemnation can be required, than what is contained in their own Words.

We are aware that thoſe Sentiments had been adopted by the Preſident and the General to ſerve the Purpoſe which they had then in View. The Suſpenſion of a Member of the Board, not only for his Temerity in finding Fault with the Conduct of the Majority of a Committee, which the Company in "their Wiſdom thought fit to eſtabliſh, and in their Diſcretion to *limit the Number of* "*its Members*, ſo that it became a Power *fixed and eſtabliſhed in all its Points by the moſt explicit Orders*;" but for the daring Inſult which was ſhewn by him to the Authority of the Company, as theſe Gentlemen then wiſhed it to be ſuppoſed, is offering a Reproach to the Committee.

But it is the leſs obvious that when theſe Sentiments had once been adopted, and applied in Support of the Authority of the Company, and of the Rights eſtabliſhed by that Authority, they recoil with a Tenfold Force againſt thoſe in whoſe Minds they ſeem totally to have been obliterated, when it anſwered their Purpoſe to purſue a different Conduct, by trampling upon that Authority, and thoſe Powers, for which they were before ſo ſtrenuous.

Although we think not only the Commander in Chief's Letter to the Committee of the 21ſt ult. but alſo thoſe he wrote to the Preſident individually, during his ſhort Campaign, contain many material Circumſtances deſerving particular Obſervation; yet we ſhall content ourſelves with only One Remark, which is, that as the General could find Time to adviſe the Governor daily of his Operations, he might with equal Facility and greater Propriety, have addreſſed ſimilar Letters to the Committee; and it is the more to be regretted he did not, as we ſaw but Four or Five of them, and

even theſe were never read at the Board, although it now appears (on their being produced at our Requeſt) that they contain many Matters very neceſſary for our Information, and ſuch as required the moſt ſerious Conſideration.

We will not, however, take upon us to ſay what might have been the Reſult of our Deliberations, or what our own particular Sentiments would have been, had thoſe Letters been then recorded; but from the Attention we have uniformly ſhewn to every Matter of Importance, we perſuade ourſelves the Honourable Court of Directors will do us the Juſtice to believe that our beſt Endeavours would have been exerted to prevent, as far as depended on us, the fatal Diſaſter which has befallen the Company; and here we think neceſſary to mention, that our Anxiety at not hearing from the General for ſeveral Days, forced us to enter a Minute on the 6th ult. wherein we obſerved this Inattention to what we conceived was a very eſſential Part of his Duty.

Having now briefly ſtated the Line of Conduct we have purſued, ſince we were confirmed in our Suſpicions of Hyder Ally's Deſigns, it only remains, that we ſubmit the ſame, with all due Deference, to the Judgment of our Superiors.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

14th October 1780.

We think it neceſſary to requeſt, that the Honourable Court of Directors and the Committee will be pleaſed to refer to the Report of the late Preſident, Sir Thomas Rumbold, relative to Hyder Ally's Diſpoſition and Intentions, as entered in the Minutes of the Committee on the 23d October laſt; to the Committee's unanimous Opinion thereon; to a Minute delivered in by Mr. Smith, on the 10th of November laſt, and to the Committee's Opinion in conſequence thereof.

(Tranſlation.)

From his Highneſs the Nabob Wau Lau Jaw Ummeer ul Hind, Omdat ul Mulk, Aſuph ud Dewlah, Unwur ud Dien, Khan Behauder, Zuphur Jung, Sepoy Salaur, Soubahdar of the Carnatic, Pauyen Ghaut, to the Honourable the Chairman and Directors of Affairs for the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt-Indies.

Honourable Gentlemen,

By your late Preſident Sir Thomas Rumbold, I acknowledged the Receipt of your Letter of the 28th January 1779, and expreſſed to you the great Satisfaction I experienced from the Sentiments of Regard and Affection which it contained. In a reciprocal Dependance upon the Faith of each other, we firſt began our Connection; for upwards of Thirty Years we continued in one uniform Plan of mutual Aſſiſtance and Support; nor would a Difference of Opinion have ever ariſen between us, had not the Deſigns of evil-diſpoſed Men miſguided the better Judgment of the Company, both as to their own and to my Intereſt and Honour. That Cloud, however, I truſt in the Almighty, has long ſince been diſperſed. The Company cannot but have ſeen, in its fulleſt Extent, the Injuſtice, of which I had more than common Reaſon to complain; and I make no Doubt, but in the End I ſhall receive at their Hands the moſt ample Redreſs for thoſe Injuries which have unmeritedly been ſhowered upon an unſhaken Friendſhip. From the Advices which my beſt Friends will receive from their Preſident and Council by this Conveyance, they will perceive, that what I have for many Years predicted, hath at length come to paſs; that Hyder Ally Cawn, the inveterate Enemy of both the Carnatic and the Engliſh Intereſts in Hindoſtan, hath invariably been bent upon the Deſtruction of their Influence and Power. When Repreſentations, not founded in Apprehenſions, or in doubtful Information, are laid before a Government, they ſhould be liſtened to; Suſpicion even ſhould be admitted to have ſome Influence, when the common Safety is at Stake. It is now more than Twenty Years ſince Hyder Ally Cawn entered into a Bond of Amity with the French; and ever ſince that Time, he has been meditating the Ruin of the Engliſh. Anxious about my Friends, as well as about myſelf, I never ceaſed communicating to them, the Certainty I had of his having hoſtile Intentions towards us. I repeatedly told them, it was highly expedient to be prepared againſt ſo formidable a Power; that his Motions would be ſo rapid, when he once began, that they would not find it an eaſy Matter to impede his Progreſs; that he only waited the favourable Moment, and that then he would carry Fire and Deſolation through the very Heart of our Dominions: But every Thing I advanced was attributed either to Jealouſy, or Reſentment againſt that ambitious Chief; my Advice was diſregarded; and nothing would convince them that my Intelligence was true, until he was in Poſſeſſion of a great Part of the Carnatic, and had advanced even as near as Conjeveram. A Force then was aſſembled; but Misfortune attended, for the Firſt Time, thoſe Arms, which had hitherto met with Succeſs: The Flower of the Britiſh Troops were either cut off, or taken Priſoners, and the Remainder compelled to ſeek Shelter in a precipitate Retreat. Unaccuſtomed to ſo ſingular an Advantage, the Inſolence of Hyder hath indulged itſelf in the higheſt Exultation; he hath laid Siege to my Capital of Arcot, his Horſe have penetrated within View of your Fort of Madras, and he

he now ſees himſelf in Poſſeſſion of the whole Extent of Country between the Kingdom of Miſore and this Preſidency. How frequent, and how long unavailing muſt be my Advice to my Friends? From the Dawning of this bold Uſurper's Power, I have pointed out to them the Neceſſity of being watchful of his Motions. I ſaw, and I repreſented to them, the Deſigns he premeditated; I urged them to be prepared; but, unhappily, my Sentiments did not accord with thoſe of their Repreſentatives. At length, the Proof is brought to their very Doors, and they regret they were not more attentive. Joined from my earlieſt Youth in an inſeparable Link of Friendſhip and Affection with the Engliſh, my Heart cannot but bleed when I ſee their Affairs ſo different from the Brilliancy with which they appeared in former Days. The Guidance of Providence then ſeemed evident in their Meaſures, their Councils were uniformly deciſive, and their Name became in conſequence renowned through Hindoſtan. Engaged now in Hoſtilities in every Quarter of the Eaſt, a general Confederacy threatens them with the moſt ſerious Difficulties, nor have they a ſingle Power to rely upon, but their old and faithful Friend the Nabob of the Carnatic. But what Exertions can he be capable of, when a Scene of Devaſtation is exhibited in every Part of his Dominions? Sinking under a Load of heavy Debt, moſtly contracted with Britiſh Individuals for the public Service, exhauſted in Treaſury, and anticipated in Revenue, what are the Reſources of the Carnatic to produce? Had indeed the Voice of Friendſhip been heard, theſe Evils would not have exiſted: The Tanjore Country, in Defiance of every Principle of Right, would not have been wreſted from him: The Body of Cavalry which he raiſed, and was to have paid from its Revenues, and which were commanded by the Officers of his Friends, would have prevented that Ruin which has ſince been ſpread by Hyder Ally; and his numerous Creditors would, in the Proſpect of Payment of their juſt Claims, have been ſatisfied and happy. How fatally are Matters reverſed! But the Hour of Danger demands Exertion, and not Complaint; we are involved in Difficulty, and Spirit and Activity are alone what can extricate us. In this View, I have given my Sentiments freely both to your Preſidency here and to the Gentlemen of Bengal. The former I have begged to aſſiſt me with their Credit, as they have done in all former Periods of Diſturbance; and the latter I have implored to be expeditious in bringing to a Concluſion the unprofitable War which they have, under the greateſt Diſadvantages, waged with the Marattas. Should the Government of Bengal acquieſce in the Propriety of this Meaſure, Hyder may yet feel that Chaſtiſement which he merits for the unprovoked Attack he has made upon us. The Marattas, left to themſelves, will ſoon renew their Hoſtilities againſt him; while we, with the Forces which we have on the Malabar Side of India, and thoſe we may collect here, will, with the Bleſſing of God, be enabled ſo to hem him in, as to render it in future impracticable for him to diſturb the Quiet of his Neighbours. Your Governor and Council will acquaint you, of my having put my Cavalry under their Orders for the preſent War, and of their having aſſiſted me with a ſmall Loan to diſcharge the Arrears which are due to them. To repay this, and to enable them to reap every Benefit from the Cavalry in future, I have agreed to appropriate certain Revenues, which in the Space of a very ſhort Time will entirely clear the Debt that may be contracted on this Account. My Friends know how punctual I have always been in the Article of Money. Since my firſt Alliance with them, I have paid into their Treaſury upwards of Two Crores of Pagodas, Twenty-ſix Lacks of which was in the Government of Sir Thomas Rumbold, ſo that when this War broke out, I was indebted to them no larger a Sum than about Seventy thouſand Pagodas. To accompliſh this indeed, I have been compelled to mortgage all my Jewels, and all my other valuable Effects; and what hath been of greater Anguiſh to my Mind, to ſee the Diſtreſſes without being able to relieve them, the total Bankruptcy of almoſt all my private Creditors. Juſtice, and a Regard to your own Honour, demand that ſomething ſhould be done for thoſe living under your immediate Protection. The Orders of 1775, relative to Tanjore, plunged both them and me into the ruinous State in which we are at preſent. The Hand that uninformed gave the Blow, ſhould, on a full Conviction of the Injury, redreſs the Grievances it hath occaſioned: On this Subject I need not dwell; you yourſelves are ſenſible that little Reliance was to be had on the Man in whoſe Favour thoſe extraordinary Orders of 1775 were paſſed. The Sieges of Pondicherry and Mahé, when he might have aſſiſted, proved to you that he was ungrateful; neither can he now be brought to furniſh you with the moſt trifling Supplies, although he is perfectly aſſured that the Neceſſities of your Government are urgent. Of what Utility then hath the Reſtoration of this Zemindar been to the State of your Affairs in Hindoſtan? Diſſipated, and ſecretly diſguſted with your Authority, he would gladly throw himſelf into the Arms of Hyder Ally Cawn, or any Enemy that might appear againſt you. His Intrigues are ſtill carrying on with your moſt formidable Foes. Even on Hyder's entering the Carnatic, he privately ſent him a Vakeel, with a Preſent of Three Lacks of Rupees. Juſtice out of the Queſtion, is it Policy to continue foſtering in your Boſom, one who hourly wiſhes your Deſtruction? How much better would it be, were the Reſources of that Country turned to the Payment of public and of private Demands; and to the defraying the Expences of a Body of Cavalry ſufficient for the Protection of the Carnatic. The Time may perhaps arrive (but I truſt in the Favour of God it will not) when theſe Sentiments may ſtrike with Weight, but when it may be too late to draw thoſe Benefits from them which they are now capable of producing.

May the Almighty direct you in your Councils, and proſper you in your Affairs. What can I ſay more?

Given at Madras this 17th Day of October 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 17.

Extract—Sir Eyre Coote's Minute, entered on Fort William Secret Conſultation, 4 September 1780.

IN the firſt Place, a Sum of Money, adequate to the Emergency of the Occaſion, ſhould be ſent to Madras, provided they are not able to furniſh themſelves by the Method they are now purſuing, of raiſing Money upon the Company's Bonds; and that there may be as little Delay as poſſible in furniſhing this Supply, if neceſſary, I would recommend that it be taken from the War Depoſit in the New Fort, as being a Fund apparently provided for ſuch Exigencies.

The particular Manner in which our Troops on the Coaſt are diſtributed, in Garriſons ſituated at a Diſtance from each other, and the Communication between them partly cut off by Hyder's Cavalry, may render it a Service of no leſs Difficulty than Danger, to aſſemble an Army ſufficiently ſtrong to riſk an Engagement with the very formidable Force he is reported to have now in the Field. I feel this Circumſtance with the more ſenſible Regret and Concern, as the Diſtance from hence puts it beyond a Poſſibility to give any Aſſiſtance that could afford them immediate Relief. However, in order to lighten the Burden, and to give Spirit and Confidence to ſuch Operations as the Madras Adminiſtration, from their own Diſcernment, and local Obſervation, may find it expedient to purſue againſt Hyder (for to their own Conduct it muſt, in a great Meaſure, now be left) as well as to ſave the Nizam from attempting any Thing againſt the Circars, to deter Hyder from turning his Views towards thoſe Northern Dominions, and to be in Readineſs to act in Concert with what Force may now be in the Circars, againſt the French, who, as they are at this Time expected, may attempt a Landing on that Coaſt; I ſay, for theſe important Purpoſes I would recommend a ſufficient Army being formed to the Southward.

The Governor General's Minute, entered on Conſultation, 4 September 1780.

The other Subjects of the General's Minute being of a different Nature, and wholly unconnected with the Queſtion immediately before the Board, I ſhall conſider as diſtinct Queſtions.

The 1ſt. is, "That a Sum of Money adequate to the Emergency of the Occaſion, be ſent to "Madras, provided they are not able to furniſh themſelves by the Method they are now purſuing, "of raiſing Money upon the Company's Bonds; and that there may be as little Delay as poſſible "in furniſhing this Supply, if neceſſary, that it be taken from the War Depoſit in the New Fort, "as being a Fund apparently provided for ſuch Exigencies." As the Terms of the Queſtion do not admit or require an immediate Conſideration of it, and we have already provided Two Modes of Remittance, which, though not ample, will prove a ſufficient Relief to the immediate Wants of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George; I hope the General will conſent to ſuſpend the final Determination upon it, until the Approach of the Seaſon in which his Propoſal, if approved, muſt be carried into Execution. In the mean Time, we may hope to be informed of the State of that Preſidency, with Relation to its Wants, its Reſources, its Diſpoſition *for repelling the pretended or actual Invaſion, whichever it may prove*, and the other diſtinct Services to which they may propoſe to apply the Sums afforded them by this Government.

Theſe Provinces, already very much exhauſted, will not bear greater Drains, nor can any Thing ſhort of extreme Neceſſity juſtify us in repeating them. It is therefore, at leaſt reaſonable to expect that they will furniſh us with previous Information upon the Points which I have enumerated; nay, it may ſo happen, that by the Neglect of this Precaution, we may furniſh them with the Means of employing the Company's Arms in an unnatural and deſperate Oppoſition, even to the Authority of this Government, which was appointed for their Controul, and to whoſe Protection they muſt finally owe their Exiſtence.

On this Occaſion I muſt remind the Board of the Demand which was made to them ſo long ago as the 12th June laſt, for the Reſtitution of the Circar of Guntoor, or Murtazanagur, to the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, and of the Repetition of that Demand in our Letter of the 21ſt ultimo. Their Silence will juſtify us in crediting the Reports, which, though not of official Authority, have doubtleſs reached every Member of this Board; that the Forces of that Preſidency, which were ſent to take Poſſeſſion of Murtazanagur, ſtill continue there in Defiance of our Orders, and that the Management of it has been aſſigned in Form to the Nabob of the Carnatic. Hence I draw a ſtrong Suſpicion, that they will not eaſily be induced to reſign it; and this is an additional and very

very powerful Inducement with me, to defer the Conſideration of the preſent Queſtion, until we know whether the Preſidency of Madras will yield to our Authority, or compel us to uſe the Means with which we are conſtitutionally armed for that Purpoſe, to ſupport and enforce it; if ſuch ſhall be, as I truſt it will, the Reſolution of this Board.

Sir Eyre Cote's Minute in Anſwer to the preceding, entered on Conſultation the 18th September 1780.

I agree with the Governor General, in the Propriety of deferring to ſend further Supplies for the Relief of the Preſidency of Madras, until the Adminiſtration there ſhall have adviſed us on thoſe Points which the Governor General ſtated, and which are ſo very neceſſary for our Information, in order to guide us, as to the Nature of the Aſſiſtance to be given them.

The Board agree with the Commander in Chief, in the Sentiments expreſſed in the above Minute; and refer it to him, to take ſuch Precautions, and to paſs ſuch Orders, as may be immediately neceſſary to guard againſt the Event of an Invaſion.

Fort William Secret Conſultations, 25th September 1780.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute.

This is not a Time either for long Deliberation at Home, or the formal and tedious Proceſs of Negociation Abroad. The Calamity which has befallen us upon the Coaſt, and the alarming Superiority which Hyder Ally Cawn has acquired in the Carnatic; the Deſpondency of the Government of Fort Saint George; the Conſternation and Diſtruſt which ſeem to have ſpread themſelves among all thoſe who are ſubject to its Authority; its utter Want of preſent Means and Reſources; the Diminution of their Military Strength, and its declared Inſufficiency for the War which it is to ſuſtain; and above all, the authentic Information which we have received of a great naval and military Armament prepared by the Court of France, and deſtined, beyond all Doubt, to co-operate with Hyder Ally; demand the moſt inſtant, powerful, and even hazardous Exertion of this Government, to avert the Event portended by ſo many concurrent Difficulties; to this Point, every other Conſideration muſt now give Place: Without further Preface I propoſe the following Reſolutions:

1ſt. That the Sum of 15 Lacks of Rupees be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George in Specie, and laden for that Purpoſe on the Honourable Company's Ship the Duke of Kingſton, and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras.

2d. That the Treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the Moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the general Treaſury, to be applied to the preceding Purpoſe, and other Exigences of this Government.

3d. That a large Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George by the Duke of Kingſton, and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras. To this Propoſition, as a neceſſary and eſſential Part of it, I muſt add the following, viz. That the Commander in Chief be requeſted, and I do for my own Part make it my moſt earneſt and particular Requeſt, that he will proceed himſelf immediately to the Coaſt, and take the Command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment.

The Commander in Chief will pardon this formal and official Solicitation; I know the Ardour of his Zeal for the public Service, and that this Principle will of itſelf compel him to be wherever it ſhall moſt require his Preſence; but I think this a Caſe in which it would mark too great an Indifference to the public Welfare, and too cold a Senſe of the Utility of his Services, to leave the Offer of them to his unſolicited Option. I make no Scruple to avow, that although I am convinced, that the Danger impending on our Intereſt in the Carnatic, might be eaſily repelled even with the Force which it already poſſeſſes for its Defence; yet I cannot place any Reliance upon it, unleſs it ſhall be properly applied and conducted; *that I do not think that it has been properly applied, nor expect that it will be properly conducted, unleſs Sir Eyre Coote will at this Criſis ſtand forth and vindicate in his own Perſon, the Rights and Honour of the Britiſh Arms.* I mean not to compliment; his Military Experience, and above all, the high Eſtimation in which his Name is held by the World, and eſpecially by that Part of it where it was principally acquired, mark him as the only poſſible Inſtrument to retrieve our paſt Diſgraces, or to preſerve the Britiſh Intereſt and Poſſeſſions in the Carnatic from utter Ruin. Our Armies, which have been ſo long formed to the Habits of Conqueſt, will not eaſily recover from the Impreſſion of the dreadful Reverſe which has lately befallen them, nor be brought to act with their former Confidences under unſucceſsful Commanders; the

Addition of Numbers will not relieve their Apprehenſions, and will but contribute to oppreſs the Hands which have been already proved too weak to ſuſtain the Weight of an inferior Charge.

4th. That an immediate Offer of Peace be made to the Maratta State, in the Mode and on the Conditions following; viz. That as the Miniſters of that State have profeſſed a Deſire for Peace, which has been equally the Wiſh of this Government, even from the Commencement of the War; and as the Attainment of it ſeems to have been hitherto impeded by the Difficulty of managing a Negociation between the Principals ſituated at ſo great a Diſtance from each other; to preclude all further Delays, we do at the ſame Time offer Peace, and bind ourſelves to the Obſervance of it, on their Acceptance and Ratification of the Conditions which ſhall be prepared for that Purpoſe.

This is all I propoſe as immediately neceſſary. The Commander in Chief will offer ſuch a Plan for the Diſtribution of our Troops, and other military Arrangements, as appertain to his ſeparate Province.

Extract from the Secret Proceedings of the Honourable the Governor General and Council, the 26th September 1780.

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieut. General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute on the Propoſitions recorded by the Governor General on Yeſterday's Proceedings:

Mr. Francis. I am earneſtly deſirous of giving every Aſſiſtance and Relief to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, that Prudence, and a due Regard to our own Safety, will admit of. Our Endeavours to provide for the Security of the Company's other Poſſeſſions in India, ſhould always be guided and limited by the fundamental Principle laid down for us by the Court of Directors in our general Inſtructions, *to make the Safety and Proſperity of Bengal the principal Object of all our Deliberations and Reſolutions.* And I truſt, that the Board will not loſe Sight of this Principle in the preſent Debate.

1ſt. I ſee many Objections to the Governor General's firſt Propoſitions; the Sum of 15 Lack in Specie is much too great for this Government to ſpare from its own preſſing Occaſions. Nor do I think ſo great a Sum ought to be truſted at once to the Gentlemen of Madras, if our Treaſury were full. If we ſupply them gradually, and with Moderation, it is probable that they may apply our Money with Œconomy, to the Service for which we intend it; if not, I very much fear that it will not only be miſapplied, but waſted. Before we part with any Thing, we ought to look into the State of our own Treaſury, and ſee what Supplies can be afforded from it, conſiſtently with the immediate Demands, and other indiſpenſible Services, of this Government.

I think the preſent Supply for Fort Saint George ſhould not exceed Half the Sum propoſed, nor could any Thing but their preſſing Neceſſities extort even this Sum from me in the preſent State of our Treaſury.

2dly. If it depended on me, I would rather take Meaſures to increaſe the Depoſite in the New Fort, than proclaim our Diſtreſs to all India, by taking away the little Reſidue now left there. It is a dreadful Conſideration, that a Government, ſuch as this, ſhould not at all Times have a Reſerve of 20 or 30 Lacks in Specie at its Command.

3dly. On the firſt Part of the Third Propoſition, I muſt ſubmit to the Judgment of the Commander in Chief, whether a *large Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery* can be ſpared with Safety from the Defence of Fort William and of theſe Provinces; it is not aſcertained by what Conveyance they are to be ſent. The Kingſton, it is ſaid, may be ready in Ten Days; but this is the only Ship now under Orders for ſailing; and it is to be feared, that even ſhe will arrive on the Coaſt at a Time when it may be very difficult, if not impoſſible, to land either the Stores or Men. I deem this to be a Point of very great Conſequence; and I hope the Board will attend to it, as the Governor General declares, *that he is convinced the Danger impending on our Intereſts in the Carnatic, might be eaſily repelled, even with the Force which it already poſſeſſes for its Defence, if properly conducted.* I concur in the Requeſt propoſed to Sir Eyre Coote; but I do not ſee the ſame Neceſſity for ſending a Reinforcement of Troops.

4thly. I am of Opinion that we ought to make Peace with the Marattas at all Events, becauſe I deem it

it a Caſe of indiſpenſable Neceſſity, which ſuperſedes all other Conſiderations. It is undoubtedly much to be deſired that they ſhould join with us againſt Hyder Ally; but in our preſent Circumſtances it is of itſelf a Point of ſo much conſequence, and will give you ſo great a Relief, to put an End to the War with the Marattas, that I think it ought not to be embarraſſed with any Conditions which they can reaſonably refuſe.

Queſ. If your Maſter is ſo deſirous of Friendſhip with the Engliſh, what Occaſion is there for keeping up a large Army at Cuttack, which he muſt do at a great Expence?

Anſ. My Maſter is obliged to keep up Appearances, in Conformity to a Plan concerted by Nizam Ally Cawn.

Queſ. What is his preſent Strength?

Anſ. I do not know my Maſter's preſent Force at Neſſore, but I know that 30,000 Horſe are at preſent at Cuttack.

Queſ. Will you be anſwerable that if we deſire to ſend a Reinforcement to our Settlement on the Coaſt there, Paſſage ſhall not be oppoſed or interrupted by the Army now at Cuttack, or otherwiſe, by the Rajah?

Anſ. I will be anſwerable that they ſhall not be oppoſed or interrupted by the Army now at Cuttack, or otherwiſe, by the Rajah.

Queſ. Are the whole of the 30,000 Horſe at Cuttack paid by your Maſter, or is any Number of them paid by the Miniſters at Poonah?

Anſ. They are all paid by the Rajah my Maſter.

Queſ. Are they all abſolutely under his Command, and do they receive no Orders from Poonah?

Anſ. They are entirely under his Orders, and have no Connection with the Miniſters at Poonah.

Queſ. Are there not 5 or 600 Horſe in the Army at Cuttack, called Poonah Wollas, as denominated from Poonah?

Anſ. There are Men who have come from Poonah, who may be called Poonah Wollas, but they are all the Rajah's Servants.

Queſ. If Hyder Ally Cawn ſhould have entered into an Alliance with the French King, and have received from him ſuch an Aſſiſtance of Ships of War and Soldiers as would give him a Superiority in the War in which he is engaged with the Engliſh in the Carnatic, how do you underſtand that ſuch an Event would intereſt the Peſhwa, and the other Rulers of the Maratta State?

Anſ. The Peſhwa, and the other Rulers of the Maratta State, would not be pleaſed with ſuch an Event, as they would have every bad Conſequence to expect from ſuch an Acquiſition of Powers and Strength to Hyder Ally, who is their natural Enemy, and has already conquered their Country as far as the Kima, and on ſuch an Acceſſion of Strength would not ſtop there.

Queſ. In the Third of the Requiſitions ſtated by Devander Pundit, on the Behalf of the Peſhwa, it is expreſſed, that no Demand for the Reimburſement of Expences ſhall be made on either Side; Pundit Purdham and the Engliſh Gentlemen ſhall recover their heavy Expences by uniting themſelves, and jointly attacking their Enemies: Whom do you underſtand to be meant by the Term Enemies?

Anſ. Hyder Naig: There is no other Enemy.

The Board proceed to conſider the Governor General's Propoſitions, delivered in his Minute recorded Yeſterday.

Firſt, That the Sum of Fifteen Lacks of Rupees be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George in Specie, and laden for that Purpoſe in the Honourable Company's Ship the Duke of Kingſton, and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras.

Sir Eyre Coote. I agree to the Propoſition.

Mr. Wheler. I am of Opinion that we cannot furniſh from our preſent Funds ſo large a Supply as Fifteen Lacks of Rupees, neither am I fully convinced that the Preſidency of Madras is in immediate Want of it; I am therefore for dividing the Sum propoſed to be ſent into equal Shares, remitting the Half of it by the Ships now deſtined to carry the Company's Troops, and the Remainder after the Change of the Monſoon.

Mr. Francis. My Opinion on the Governor General's ſeveral Propoſitions, is contained in my Minute, which I have already recorded.

The Governor General. I agree to the Queſtion. I ſhould be glad to join with the other Members of the Board, in forming any Means for reſtricting the Preſidency of Fort Saint George to the Application of this Money ſolely to their Military Charges.

Reſolved, That the Sum of 15 Lacks of Rupees, be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George, in Specie, and laden for that Purpoſe on the Honourable Company's Ship the Duke of Kingſton, and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras.

Read the Governor General's 2d Propoſition, viz.

2d. "That the Treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the Moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the general Treaſury, to be applied to the preceding Purpoſe, and other Exigencies of this Government."

Sir Eyre Coote. I agree to the Propoſition.

Mr. Wheler. I conſider the Depoſit of Treaſure now in the New Fort, to have been made for the Purpoſe of defraying ſuch extraordinary Demands as this Government, from Time to Time, might become ſubjected to, either from the Effects of War or other public Calamities. I underſtand, that a Moiety of the original Depoſit hath already been replaced in the general Treaſury, with a View of applying the ſame to our preſent Exigencies, and I do not believe we ſhall be enabled to defray the preſent unſatisfied and growing Demands upon our Treaſury, without the Application of the Remainder, or without every other poſſible Means of Exertion; I am therefore for applying it agreeable to the Terms of the Queſtion.

Reſolved, That the Treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the Moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the general Treaſury, to be applied to the Purpoſe mentioned in the foregoing Reſolution, and to the other Exigencies of this Government.

Read the Governor General's 3d Propoſition, viz.

"That a large Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George, by the Duke of Kingſton, and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras; and that the Commander in Chief be requeſted to proceed himſelf immediately to the Coaſt, and take the Command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment."

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute:

26th September 1780.

Sir Eyre Coote. I cannot help feeling, in the higheſt Senſe, the diſtinguiſhed Terms in which the Governor General has ſolicited me to undertake the immediate Command of the Forces on the Coaſt of Coromandel; nor am I leſs ſenſible of the Honour done me by the other Members of this Board, by their having joined in a Requiſition ſo much to my Credit. I ſhould do Injuſtice to thoſe Motives which actuated my Return to India, and to the Expectations which both my King and my Country formed from it, did I not, on this Occaſion, expreſs the Readineſs with which I now conſent to undertake a Service, in the Succeſs of which the Honour and Intereſt of the Britiſh Nation are ſo materially concerned; and I flatter myſelf I enter upon the arduous Taſk with a Degree of Zeal and Fortitude equal to what I did many Years ago, in a ſimilar Conjuncture of the Affairs of both the Company and Nation in that Part of India; and that my Efforts will be crowned with Succeſs. At the ſame Time I ſcruple not to confeſs, that I feel myſelf embracing the Road to Honour and Glory, under a Diſadvantage which I did not then experience, a Diminution of perſonal Activity, which the Addition of Years has involuntarily entailed upon me.

The other Difficulties which I have to encounter, in taking upon me the Command of an Army diſheartened and diſpirited by the late unfortunate Defeat by Hyder Ally Cawn, the Governor General has ſufficiently elucidated; it only therefore is left for me to add, the further Conſideration of my having to overcome an Enemy who can bring treble the Number of our Forces into the Field, and who, from their late Conduct, appear to be in higher Diſcipline than any we have yet encountered amongſt the native Powers of Indoſtan.

Whilſt the Steps which are neceſſary to be taken for the Security of our Poſſeſſions here, and for the Relief of our Diſtreſſes at Madras, from their Nature obliges us to relinquiſh the Proſecution of the offenſive War which we had commenced againſt the Marattas from this Side of India, I agree entirely in Opinion with the Governor General, that Orders ſhould be ſent, in the Manner and on

the Principle he has pointed out, for a Ceſſation of Hoſtilities in the reſpective Quarters on the other Side of India; and that Propoſals for Peace, and an offenſive and defenſive Alliance, on the Terms he has ſtated, ſhould be immediately offered to them. I cannot help looking upon the preſent Seaſon as one favourable for that Purpoſe; and I conceive the late Victory Hyder Ally has obtained over us, added to his Conduct in latter Years, whereby he has evinced a Diſpoſition to encroach upon the Maratta Dominions, will render them extremely jealous of his Power, and induce them rather to wiſh for a Connection with us, than to act in Concert with him againſt us.

The very accurate and juſt Deſcription which the Governor General has given of the Danger that at preſent impends on the Intereſts of the Britiſh Nation in India, I am perſuaded will have the ſame Influence upon the Mind of every other Member of this Board as it has had upon mine, and tend to produe that Freedom of Deliberation, Concord, and Unanimity in our Councils, ſo neceſſary for the public Good. In full Confidence that no other View can exiſt amongſt us, I with the greater Chearfulneſs undertake that Part of the Service which falls to the Lot of the Station I fill; and, relying on the Support of this Board therein, moſt readily repoſe my Military Character and Credit in their Hands.

In Conformity to the Requeſt made at the Cloſe of the Governor-General's Minute, I now deliver in a State of our Force on this Eſtabliſhment, and of the Diſpoſition propoſed to be made of it, for the Protection of theſe Provinces, and for the Relief of Madras.

The preſent Strength in Troops at the Upper Stations, at and above Chunar Ghur, is as follows:

2 Regiments of Cavalry,
3 Companies of Artillery,
Captain Mayaffre's Detachment,
1 Regiment of Europeans,
2 Battalions Company of Rangers, and
21 Battalions of Sepoys.

Propoſed Diſpoſition of the Corps.

Gualior.

To be garriſoned with Three Battalions of Sepoys, Captain Mayaffre's Detachment of Artillery, and the Company of Rangers.

The Four remaining Battalions, at preſent with Major Camac, to return, and the Detachment of Cavalry with him, to join the 2d and 3d Regiment.

Daranagur.

One Battalion of Company's Sepoys, 1,000 of the Vizier's Infantry, and ſuch a Number of Finula Cawn's Troops as may be thought neceſſary.

An Army to be formed at Allahabad, or in any centrical Poſition thought moſt eligible, of the following Troops:

2 Companies of Artillery,
2 Regiments of Europeans,
10 Battalions of Sepoys,
1,000 of the Vizier Candahar, or beſt Horſe; if 1,000 cannot be obtained, as many as can poſſibly join.

N. B. From the above Two Companies of Artillery, the ſmall Detachments, Daranaghur and Chunar Ghur, to be ſupplied.

Chunar Ghur.

One Battalion of Sepoys as uſual.

Bahar Province.

The Two Regiments of Cavalry to be ordered down here, to be joined by 4 Battalions of Sepoys, the Third Company of Artillery from the Field, and 1,000 Horſe, if they can be procured, from the Rajah of Benauds.—Beggah Battalion to make one of the 4 Battalions for this Service.

Thus the Troops at the upper Stations to be diſpoſed of for the preſent, and there will then remain 2 Battalions of Sepoys from the before-named Number of 21 Battalions, for other Services.

Our Force, with the ſaid 3 Battalions included, at and below Berrampore, will then be,

Artillery

Artillery 6 Companies, and the Remainder of Captain Mayaffree's Company,
First and Third Regiments of Europeans, and 18 Battalions of Sepoys.

To be employed as follows:

At Berrampore, covering the City, or ready for any other Service that might occur,
One Company of Artillery,
One Battalion of Europeans, and
Four Battalions of Sepoys.

Madras Detachment.

The Proceeding of the Troops by Land or Sea for this Service, ought to be determined by the Part the Maratta Force at Catac mean to take. If they are Friends, our Armament for the Coaſt might proceed by Land; but if they are hoſtile to our Cauſe, as one of the firſt Objects is to aſſiſt the Preſidency of Madras as ſoon as poſſible, the Detachment for that Service ſhould proceed by Sea; but whether the Sepoys can be brought voluntary to embark, is by no Means a certain Point. If the Embarkation could be adopted, the Detachment ſhould conſiſt of

2 Companies of Artillery,
1 Battalion of 3d Regiment, completed to 300 Rank and File, and
4 Battalions of Sepoys.

This is on a Suppoſition that the Catac Forces are in Oppoſition to us, in which Caſe, 4 Battalions at leaſt will be wanted on the Midnapore Side, with the preſent Detachment of Artillery there, and the Chain of Troops as above ſtationed, will be able to oppoſe the Enemy whenever they attempt entering the Provinces. There will alſo then remain, for the immediate Protection of Fort William and this Quarter,

3 Companies of Artillery,
1 Regiment of Europeans,
6 Battalions of Sepoys.

But if it can be proved that we have no Oppoſition to apprehend from the Force at Cuttack, then recommend that the Army for the Aſſiſtance of Madras ſhould proceed by Land, viz.

2 Companies of Artillery,
1 Battalion of Europeans,
300 Rank and File, and
8 Battalions of Sepoys, with a light Field Train.

They would arrive by Land in the Carnatic at this Seaſon of the Year as ſoon as by Embarkation, if the Sepoys would without Heſitation embark; for ſuch a Force as mentioned could not with ſafety proceed by Sea from hence till late in November or December, when the Height of the N. E. Monſoon would be abated on the Coaſt. From the Movement by Land, the different Country Powers will alſo be awed; the Nizam particularly kept in Check, and Hyder's Troops oppoſed, if they ſhould again make the Circars their Object. If this Mode is adopted, as it is on the Suppoſition that the Marattas at Cuttack are not inimical, the upper Nations will not then want ſuch a powerful Chain of Troops for their Defence; and from the connected Poſition of the different Body of Troops ſtationed as before-mentioned, any Part of them, when wanted on Exigency, can be drawn down for the Protection of Bengal in general, or of the Preſidency in particular. If the Eight Battalions were to proceed to Madras by Land, there would be no Occaſion for Four Battalions at Midnapore, Two would be ſufficient for the Service required there, and theſe might be drawn from Berrampore, that the Force at the Preſidency might not be weakened.

The Independent Corps at Chittagong, and Ramgur light Infantry, are not included in the above Diſpoſition of the Troops, they are ſuppoſed occupying their preſent Poſts, as well as the Corps of Militia, at their different Stations.

Calcutta,
Sept. 27th 1780.

The Governor General. The Seaſon of the Year, and the marſhy State of the Roads through which an Army muſt paſs from hence to the Carnatic, eſpecially through the Diſtricts of Midnapore, Tellaſore, and the whole Province of Oriſſa, will render it impoſſible to march an Army by Land until late in the Month of November. We have not Shipping to tranſport the requiſite Number of Sepoys by Sea, neither if we had, would it avail us; the Remembrance and Tradition of the paſt Sufferings of thoſe who have been tranſported by that Mode of Conveyance, would be an inſuperable Object on the Part of the Sepoys themſelves, eſpecially at this Seaſon. I muſt beg Leave, therefore, to change the Terms of the Queſtion, and ſubſtitute for what we would wiſh to do, what we can do. I ſhould agree with the General, and do agree with him in the Propoſition for ſending a conſiderable Reinforcement of Sepoys, as

the Principle he has pointed out, for a Ceſſation of Hoſtilities in the reſpective Quarters on the other Side of India; and that Propoſals for Peace, and an offenſive and defenſive Alliance, on the Terms he has ſtated, ſhould be immediately offered to them. I cannot help looking upon the preſent Seaſon as one favourable for that Purpoſe; and I conceive the late Victory Hyder Ally has obtained over us, added to his Conduct in latter Years, whereby he has evinced a Diſpoſition to encroach upon the Maratta Dominions, will render them extremely jealous of his Power, and induce them rather to wiſh for a Connection with us, than to act in Concert with him againſt us.

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Madras Detachment.

The Proceeding of the Troops by Land or Sea for this Service, ought to be determined by the Part the Marattas Force at Catac mean to take. If they are Friends, our Armament for the Coaſt might proceed by Land; but if they are hoſtile to our Cauſe, as one of the firſt Objects is to aſſiſt the Presidency of Madras as ſoon as poſſible, the Detachment for that Service ſhould proceed by Sea; but whether the Sepoys can be brought voluntary to embark, is by no Means a certain Point. If the Embarkation could be adopted, the Detachment ſhould conſiſt of

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6 Battalions of Sepoys.

But if it can be proved that we have no Oppoſition to apprehend from the Force at Cuttack, then recommend that the Army for the Aſſiſtance of Madras ſhould proceed by Land, viz.

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as well as Europeans, to Madras; but this muſt reſt for a future Reſolution; and I mean to add on another Day a freſh Motion to that Effect. For the preſent Queſtion I propoſe, from the Terms of the General's Minute, that Two Companies of Artillery with their Compliment of Laſcars, and One Battalion of one of the Regiments of Infantry, completed to 300 Rank and File, be immediately embarked, as many as can be on Board the Duke of Kingſton, the reſt on any of the Ships offered for that Service by Mr. Fergusson.

Agreed, that the Commander in Chief be requeſted to proceed himſelf immediately to the Coaſt, and to take the Command of the Army upon that Eſtabliſhment.

Reſolved, That Two Companies of Laſcars, and One Battalion of one of the Regiments of Infantry, completed to Three hundred Rank and File, be immediately embarked for the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, as many as can be on Board the Duke of Kingſton, and the reſt on any of the Ships offered for that Service by Mr. Fergusson.

Ordered, That Returns be made to the Commander in Chief of the Number of Ships offered by Mr. Fergusson, and of the Number of Men that each Ship can carry.

Agreed, That a Diſpoſition of the Troops propoſed by the Commander in Chief, and ordered that a Copy of it be ſent to Brigadier General Stibbert, after the Departure of Sir Eyre Coote, that he may iſſue the neceſſary Orders for carrying the ſame into Execution when the Seaſon will permit.

Adjourned till To-morrow Morning at 10 o'Clock.

A true Extract,

E. May,
Acting Secretary.

Extract from the Secret Proceedings of the Honourable the Governor General and Council, under Date the 2d of October 1780.

At a Council;

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires,
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote.

The Secretary lays before the Board, Two Drafts of Letters to the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort Saint George, and to Sir Edward Hughes, for their Approbation:

Gentlemen,

We have received your ſeveral Letters of the 3d, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th ultimo, with the Packets from the Honourable Court of Directors accompanying them, and the other Papers ſaid to be incloſed.

We have not read, without ſenſible Concern, the Account which you have ſent us of the fatal Check which the Company's Arms have received, in the Defeat of a conſiderable Detachment of their Troops by the Forces of Hyder Ally Cawn, and of the conſequent Neceſſity under which the remaining Army was obliged to retreat to Chingleput. We purpoſely forbear at preſent from making any Obſervations on this Event, or on the Step which if taken would in our Opinion have prevented it. The Situation of Affairs in the Carnatic, and the Danger to which the Intereſts of the Company are expoſed by them, are ſerious and alarming, and call on us for every Exertion we can make to aid and ſupport your Preſidency, without hazarding the Safety of our own. Since the Arrival therefore of the Diſpatches which you have ſent us by Mr. Sulivan, our Time has been chiefly occupied in paſſing ſuch Orders and Reſolutions as appeared to us beſt calculated to promote this End; and theſe we ſhall now make known to you.

Unable as we are to ſpare the Services of Sir Eyre Coote at this Juncture, without the greateſt Inconvenience to our own Affairs, we have yet yielded to the Neceſſity of the Occaſion, and requeſted him to proceed immediately to your Preſidency, and to take the Command of the Army under it: He has chearfully complied, and will take his Departure from Bengal in a few Days, on the Ship Duke of Kingſton. We have reſolved alſo to ſend you with the following Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery. The Seaſon of the Year will not now permit of our ſending

ending you Sepoys by Land, not is the Number of Veſſels in the River at preſent unemployed, ſufficient to carry you a Reinforcement of theſe Troops by Sea, even if all Objection to ſuch Mode of Conveyance, ariſing from the Prejudice of the Sepoys themſelves againſt it, were ſet aſide; but we have it in Contemplation to aid your Operations, by ſending you a Detachment of Sepoys in the Courſe of the next or the enſuing Month.

Force under Orders to proceed to Fort Saint George:

European Infantry — — — — — —	330
D° — Artillery, 2 Companies — — — —	200
Complement of Laſcars to the Artillery — — —	630

Beſides the above, a Corps of Volunteers, conſiſting of between 40 and 50 Gentlemen, and the Detachment of His Majeſty's Troops which has lately been on Duty here as a Guard to the Commander in Chief, will ſhortly embark for your Preſidency.

Having underſtood that you was in ſome want of Gunpowder, we have given Orders that 200 Barrels ſhould be ſent you by the Duke of Kingſton; and the following ſmall Supply of Ordnance will alſo accompany the Troops on this Ship:

Two 12 Pounders } with Carriages of a new Conſtruction.
Four 6 D° — }

Your earneſt Application for Supplies of Money from us, and the Dependence which you place on theſe, and theſe only, to anſwer the Expences of the War in which you are engaged with Hyder Ally Cawn, have induced us to reſolve on appropriating to the Service of your Preſidency, the Sum of Fifteen Lacks of Rupees, Ten of which will be ſent on the Duke of Kingſton, and the remaining Five on the Free Maſon, a Country Ship, which will ſail in a few Days. This Treaſure, which we have thought proper to conſign to Sir Eyre Coote, is intended to be employed for the Payment of the Troops under his Command; and though it be our general Purpoſe that it ſhould be excluſively appropriated to anſwer Military Charges, we have authorized him to advance any Part of it upon your Requiſition, ſhould he agree in the Expediency of doing ſo. If therefore the Free Maſon ſhould arrive at Fort Saint George before Sir Eyre Coote reaches it, and the Treaſure be landed, we beg Leave to make known to you, and deſire that it be depoſited in your Treaſury, and remain there untouched until Sir Eyre Coote's Arrival.

With reſpect to Supplies of Grain, our former Letters will have informed you of the Means which we have taken to provide them; and we truſt that the Quantity which Mr. Ferguſon and Captain Roddam have engaged to deliver at your Preſidency, will anſwer your immediate Wants for ſome Time to come. A ſmall Stock of ſalt Proviſions will be likewiſe ſent you on the Duke of Kingſton; it is intended for the Uſe of the Garriſon in the Event of a Siege: We do not think fit to ſend you a larger Supply at preſent, nor until we hear from yourſelves that you are in Want of it. You will not omit to inform us when you may have Occaſion for it, that we may provide you with a further Quantity.

Immediately on Receipt of your Letter of the 9th ultimo, requeſting, that one of the Honourable Company's Ships might be ſent round with half her Lading as ſoon as poſſible; we iſſued the neceſſary Orders for the Duke of Kingſton to be made ready for this Purpoſe. The State of the Ship would not admit of her Departure ſo ſoon as we wiſhed, but we yet hope, that ſhe will be able to ſail in a few Days. She will be accompanied by Two of our Pilot Veſſels, which will carry Troops, and may be of conſiderable Uſe in conveying thoſe ſent round on the large Ships, to a ſhorter Diſtance from the Shore than that at which large Ships can with Safety lie from it at ſo late a Period.

In our Letter to the Admiral of this Date, which we incloſe, and requeſt you will forward it to him by the ſafeſt and ſpeedieſt Conveyance, ſhould he have left Fort Saint George on its Arrival there, we have ſuggeſted the Benefit that might ariſe from the Operations of His Majeſty's Squadron againſt Hyder's Poſſeſſions and Ships on the Coaſt of Malabar, and we doubt not of his ready Attention to this Object, if the immediate Services of the Squadron at Bombay ſhould not appear to him more neceſſary and important.

Having now made known to you, Gentlemen, the Orders and Reſolutions which we have paſſed on Receipt of your laſt Advices, for the Furtherance of the Intereſts of the Company under your Preſidency, and for the Support of the Rights of their Ally the Nabob of the Carnatic, we might be content to cloſe our Letter to you in this Place; but alſo having paſſed an important Reſolution, by which, though this Government is particularly concerned in it, the general Situation of the Company's Affairs at the other Preſidencies may be eſſentially affected, we think proper to make it known to you; and we truſt to your Prudence in withholding it at preſent from public Knowledge, that the Succeſs of our Object may not be baffled by any Attempts of the Enemies of the

Company, who might uſe their Endeavours to oppoſe it; without further Preface therefore, and to conclude our Letter, we now inform you, that we have reſolved on a Peace with the Maratta State, in ſuch Mode and on ſuch Conditions as appeared to us beſt calculated to obtain ſo deſirable an Iſſue to the War, in which we have long been engaged with it.

Fort William,
the 2d October 1780.

We are, &c.

— — — — — —

To Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. &c. &c.

Sir,

We have the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of your ſeveral Letters, under Date the 28th Auguſt, 1ſt, 6th, 13th, and 14th ultimo. We take the earlieſt Opportunity of replying to ſuch as need an Anſwer, and hope that this Letter will reach you before you quit the Coaſt.

We cannot expreſs to you the Concern which we have felt at the Information given to us, in your Letter of the 14th ultimo, and conveyed to us at the ſame Time by the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George. The Occaſion is too important and alarming not to demand our earlieſt Attention to the Situation of the Company's Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel, and every uſeful Exertion which we can make for the Retrieval of their Loſſes, and the Defence of their Rights and Territories, as well as thoſe of their Ally the Nabob of the Carnatic, invaded and attacked by the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn.

We ſhall firſt acquaint you with the Meaſures on which we have reſolved, for the general Intereſt of the Three Preſidencies, at this important Criſis, and afterwards inform you of the Steps which we have taken for the Relief of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George; but in making known to you the former, we rely with Confidence on your Prudence in withholding it for the preſent from public Knowledge, that the Succeſs of the Object may not be defeated by the Arts of thoſe, who may be intereſted in oppoſing it. Having ſaid thus much, we proceed to inform you, that we have reſolved on a Peace with the Maratta State, in ſuch Mode, and on ſuch Conditions, as appear to us beſt calculated for the Attainment of it. It has been long our Wiſh to ſee an early Iſſue to our Differences with them; and we are happy to obſerve, that this Wiſh ſeems to accord with the Sentiments ſtrongly conveyed to us in your Letter of the 14th ultimo.

With reſpect to the Relief which we have determined to afford to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, it ſeems to us ſubſtantial, and we truſt will be attended with the beſt Effects. Sir Eyre Coote will proceed in a few Days to take the Command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment. His high Rank, his former Services, his military Experience, and above all, the high Eſtimation in which his Name is held by the World, and eſpecially by that Part of it where it was principally acquired, mark him as the fitteſt Inſtrument to retrieve our paſt Diſgraces, and to preſerve the Britiſh Intereſts and Poſſeſſions in the Carnatic from utter Ruin.

The following Force is ordered to prepare immediately for a Service on the Coaſt, and will be embarked in a few Days:

European Infantry, — — — — —	330
D° Artillery, 2 Companies, — — — —	200
A Corps of Volunteers, — — — — —	45
And a Detachment of His Majeſty's Regiment, ſerving as a Guard to the Commander in Chief, — — — — —	50
Complement of Laſcars to the Artillery, — — —	630

It is impoſſible, at this Seaſon, to ſend a Reinforcement of Native Troops; but we have it in Contemplation to order a Detachment of Four or Five Battalions to the Coaſt, in the Courſe of the next or the enſuing Month.

We have reſolved on ſupplying the Preſidency of Fort Saint George with 15 Lacks of Rupees, and the ſame will be conveyed thither by the Duke of Kingſton and a Country Ship, that will ſail in a few Days.

We had before engaged for the Delivery of a large Supply of Grain at that Preſidency, in the Courſe of this Month, and that of January and February; and we have lately ordered a Supply of other Proviſions for the Garriſon, in the Caſe of a Siege.

Theſe are the material Points in which we have reſolved to aſſiſt the Gentlemen at Fort Saint George; more could not be expected from us, nor more Aid now given by us; and we have the ſin-

ereſt Confidence, that what we have done, if properly applied, will anſwer many good and uſeful Purpoſes.

We truſt to the Aſſurances which you have given us, and to our Knowledge of your Zeal for the Company's Intereſt and Honour, from which thoſe of his Majeſty and the Nation cannot be diſtinct, when we perſuade ourſelves of your entire Readineſs to co-operate and aſſiſt in diſtreſſing the formidable Enemy to whom they are now oppoſed; and under this Conviction we beg Leave to ſuggeſt to you, the Advantage that might reſult from the Operations of the Squadron under your Command, againſt his Ships, Ports, and Settlements, on the Coaſt of Malabar. This we conceive might be effected in your Way to Bombay; but we ſubmit the Thought only to your better Judgment, which will be guided by Events, by your Expectation of the French on that Side of India, and by the poſſible Neceſſity of your early Arrival at Bombay.

Fort William,
the 2d October 1780.

We have the Honour to be, &c.

Approved the Drafts, and ordered that they be copied fair.

Fort William Secret Conſultations, 10 October, 1780.

Agreed that the following Letter be written:

To the Preſident and Council at Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

Having for good and ſufficient Reaſons, ſtated in a Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee, of this Date, a Copy of which we ſend to you encloſed, reſolved to ſuſpend John Whitehill, Eſquire, from his Office of Preſident and Governor of Fort Saint George, we do hereby order and declare John Whitehill, Eſquire, ſuſpended from his Office of Preſident and Governor of Fort Saint George, agreeable to Powers delegated to us for that Purpoſe by the Act of the 13th of His preſent Majeſty; and to this Order and Declaration we direct you pay implicit Obedience and Attention.

Fort William,
12th October 1780.

We are, &c.
P. Francis.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council at Fort William in Bengal, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated the 13th of October 1780.

1. The Preſident and Council at Fort Saint George having, in a late Letter to us, expreſſed a Deſire that one of the Company's Ships at this Port ſhould be ſent round immediately to that Preſidency, with Half her Lading, to compleat the Remainder of it there, and to convey their Diſpatches to England; we have not only complied with their Requeſt, by diſpatching the Ship Duke of Kingſton to Fort Saint George with all poſſible Expedition, but, for the more ſpeedy Conveyance of their public Packets to you, fitted out one of our largeſt Pilot Veſſels to accompany the Kingſton to the Coaſt, and to proceed from thence to Europe with all Haſte, as ſoon as their Diſpatches ſhall have been put on board. By this Opportunity we think it neceſſary to ſend you a brief Account of the preſent State of your Affairs in India, propoſing to tranſmit you more ample Explanations in the Courſe of the enſuing Month, when the homeward bound Ships in this River will be diſpatched; and carry to you as uſual the Copies of our Proceedings. Mr. Dempſter, who has hitherto been the Second Officer of the Ship Walpole, has been appointed by us to the Command of the Veſſel now going, and has Charge of this Letter.

2. The Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, will doubtleſs ſend you an accurate Account of the State of the Company's Affairs under their Direction, and in particular of a late ſerious Diſaſter, which a large Detachment of your Troops have ſuffered, near Conjeveram, in endeavouring to effect a Junction with the main Army, collected at that Place, under the Command of General Munro. For the Accounts which they have ſent us of it, we beg Leave to refer you to the Secret Conſultations, 22d September. They required from us every Aſſiſtance, and we have freely granted it; we have ſent them Men, Money, and Proviſions, and we have made our Requeſt to Sir Eyre Coote, to the great Inconvenience of our own Affairs, to go round to the Coaſt to aſſume the Command of your Forces on that Eſtabliſhment; he has chearfully complied with our Propoſals, and takes

takes his Departure from Bengal for that Purpoſe in the Ship Duke of Kingſton. The great and ſucceſsful Services rendered by Sir Eyre Coote to the Company on that Coaſt, are well known; and at the ſame Time that they mark him as the fitteſt Inſtrument to retrieve their paſt Diſgraces, and to do Honour to their Arms, afford us the moſt flattering Hopes that your Affairs in that Part of India will ſoon wear a more chearful Aſpect.

3. The Force which we have ſent to Fort Saint George, to reinforce the Army there, is as follows:

Artillery 2 Companies.				
Officers of Artillery	—	—	—	17
Non commiſſioned Rank and File	—	—	—	200
Laſcars attached to the 2 Companies	—	—	—	660
One Company of Volunteers	—	—	—	45
Six Companies of European Infantry.				
Commiſſioned Officers	—	—	—	27
Battalion Staff	—	—	—	10
Non commiſſioned Rank and File	—	—	—	373

4. At this Seaſon of the Year we have not been able to afford them the Aid of any native Troops; the Lands through which Troops marching to Fort Saint George muſt travel, are now rendered impaſſable by the Floods of Water over them, and without any Conſideration of the almoſt inſurmountable Difficulty of prevailing on the Natives to go round by Sea, we are prevented from ſending them by this Means, by the Want of a ſufficient Number of Ships to convoy thither ſuch a Reinforcement of them as would anſwer the deſired Purpoſe of their going; but we have reſolved to detach a large Force, conſiſting of Seven or Eight Battalions of Sepoys, for the Protection and Defence of the Northern Circars, as ſoon as the Seaſon will permit of their travelling by Land, ſhould no Change in the Situation of our Affairs here make it dangerous or impracticable for us to do ſo.

5. With reſpect to Proviſions, we have already engaged for the Supply of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George with a large Quantity of Grain; we have ſent them a ſmall Quantity of Salt Proviſions for the Uſe of their Garriſon; and we have informed them, that as far as we may be able we will ſupply their Occaſions for more, when they make them known to us.

6. With reſpect to the Treaſure which we have ſent to them, as it is a handſome, ſo we truſt it will be a ſeaſonable Supply. We have not ſpared the Sum of Fifteen Lacks of Rupees, the Amount of the Supply, without great Inconvenience to ourſelves. The Demands on us at Home are large and preſſing; but on a general Conſideration of the Company's Intereſts, we have not heſitated, and ſhall not heſitate, to uſe every Exertion within our Power and Ability, both in this and every other Inſtance, to contribute our utmoſt to ſupport them: The Treaſure which has been diſpatched, we have conſigned to the Commander in Chief, and we have nominated a Paymaſter for the immediate Charge of it. It is intended for the Payment of the Troops under Sir Eyre Coote's Command, and is wholly to anſwer Military Expences; but we have empowered him alſo to make uſe of it in ſupplying the Requiſitions of the Preſident and Select Committee, if he ſhall agree in the Expediency of doing ſo.

10. We proceed now to inform you of an important Reſolution, which we have lately found it neceſſary to paſs for the Support of the Authority of our Government, to enforce a due Obedience to our Orders, and to manifeſt to the native Powers of this Country, that the controlling Power, which they know to be veſted in us by the Laws, will, if Occaſion ſhould require it, be effectually exerted for the Honour of the Engliſh Nation, and in Support of our Promiſes and Treaties. The Alternative at our Choice was, the Removal of Mr. Whitehill from the Government of Fort Saint George, or by our Indolence and Inattention to the Support of your Honour and our own Authority, to give Licence and Permiſſion to the dependant Preſidencies to diſobey our Orders, and by Acts done at their Pleaſure, to annul our Treaties and Engagements. For the other Reaſons which have actuated us in the Removal of Mr. Whitehill from the Government of Fort Saint George, and for every Particular immediately neceſſary to your Information, we beg Leave to refer you to our Select Conſultations of the 10th Inſtant; we ſhall only beg Leave to obſerve further on this Subject, that our Letters from Mr. Hollond, our Reſident at Hydrabad, and from the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn himſelf, plainly ſhew us, that the Opinion entertained by the latter of the Extent of our Authority and Ability to ſee Reſpect ſhewn to it, was greatly ſhaken by the Proceedings of the Gentlemen at Fort Saint George, in Oppoſition to the Senſe of our Orders to them; and that it was difficult to perſuade him that we really had the Power we poſſeſs. The Effect of the Continuance of ſuch an Opinion in this Inſtance, and at this Period, when he was impreſſed with the Idea of an Injuſtice done him, is obvious. The Papers and Proceedings referred to in our Conſultations of the

10th

10th Inſtant, have for the moſt Part been tranſmitted Home, and are therefore now before you. The moſt material Paper which you have not yet received on this Subject, is our Letter to Fort Saint George of the 12th June, and that goes a Number in this Packet.

11. We now deſire your Attention to ſuch principal Subjects as concern our own Government in particular, and which we deem important to your Information.

The late Diſtreſſes of your Servants, and of the Company's Affairs, on the Coaſt of Coromandel, having, as we before acquainted you, required every Exertion which we could make for their Relief, we have given them, and ſhall give them, every Support in our Power; but we cannot maintain Armies in all Parts of India, nor are we likely to ſupport a ſucceſsful War againſt all the Powers of it, combined againſt us. The Deſire expreſſed by the Marattas for a Peace, have induced us, on the 26th ultimo, to paſs the important Reſolution of offering it to them. The Means taken to obtain it, and the Terms and Conditions of it, will appear to you in the Copy of the Treaty which we have agreed to propoſe; and we have the great Satisfaction to believe, that the Company's real Honour, and the Preſervation of the Rank which they have ever held in Indoſtan will not only not be impaired, but ſtrengthened, by the Means which we have purſued for cementing an Alliance with the principal Power in it. Orders have been ſent to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, to Brigadier General Goddard, and to Major Camoe commanding a Body of your Forces in the Service of the Rajah of Ghode, to deſiſt from all Hoſtilities and Military Operations againſt the Marattas, on a Requiſition in Writing to that Effect, and a Notification from the Peſhwa, that ſimilar Orders have been given on his Part, to the Officers in Command of his Armies.

12. We have Reaſon to believe that General Goddard's Operations muſt have been commenced, and as we hope, indeed, againſt Baſſim. We beg Leave to refer you to the Treaty for the Stipulations which we have propoſed reſpecting this Place. We know in what valuable Light the Acquiſition of it is conſidered by the Company, and we have done all we could to leave them the Poſſeſſion of it; but we know at the ſame Time, in how valuable a Light it is conſidered by the Marattas, and we were not willing to throw further Difficulties in the Way of an Accommodation, at this dangerous Criſis of your Affairs, by inſiſting poſitively on the Preſervation of the Acquiſition to the Company.

13. The Poſition of a large Body of Troops belonging to the Rajah of Berar, in our Frontier, having occaſioned a good Deal of Alarm in the Provinces, and the ſuſpicious Appearance which it bore of their Deſigns to invade them, has taken up much of our Attention. It is impoſſible to declare, with Certainty, what their real Intentions are, but we have every Aſſurance given us, and a ſtrong Evidence to induce us to believe, that the Rajah of Berar is not hoſtile to the Company. The Part which he is taking to effect a Peace between this Government and the Maratta State, is a ſtrong Proof of his friendly Diſpoſition towards us; and there is other Teſtimony, of the fulleſt Nature, to confirm us in the Belief of it, and ſufficient to announce him the worſe Character in India if he prove himſelf the Company's Enemy. We beg Leave to aſſure you, that every Meaſure will be taken for providing againſt the worſt Event; and the Diſpoſition made of the Troops by the Commander in Chief, appears on our Conſultations of 26th September herewith ſent you. An Examination of Benerana Pundit, the Rajah's Miniſter, at one of our late Meetings; being particular and important, we beg Leave to deſire your Attention to the Queſtions put to him, and his Replies.

Signed { Warren Haſtings, P. Francis, Edwd Wheler, Eyre Coote.

Extract of General Letter from Bengal to the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

We take this Opportunity of again ſubmitting to your Obſervation, Copy of a Letter which we wrote to Fort Saint George on the 20th January 1778, reſpecting the Diſpoſition of the Troops on that Eſtabliſhment. Had this Diſpoſition been attended to, or had the Advice contained in this Letter been obſerved, we are of Opinion that the ſad Calamity which your Troops, and the former Superiority of your Arms, have lately ſuffered, would not have happened. The melancholy Diſaſter to which we allude, has been owing to a Diviſion of your Troops at a Moment of Emergency: Had our Recommendation been attended to, they would have been ſo diſpoſed as to have been able to effect a Junction on the ſhorteſt Notice.

We are ſorry for ſo fatal an Occaſion, to prove the Truth of the Prediction which induced us to give this Advice.

We are,

Fort William, the 17th Oct. 1780.

Honourable Sirs,

Your moſt faithful humble Servants,

Warren Haſtings
P. Francis,
Edw.d Whele.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor General and Council of Fort William to the Preſident and Council at Fort Saint George; dated 20th January 1778.

Gentlemen,

We have received from the commanding Officer of your Troops, a general Return of the Forces on your Eſtabliſhment; on which ſome Obſervations have occurred to us, which we think it incumbent on us to impart to you.

In the Diſtribution of the Army, we remark, that numerous as the Garriſons dependent on your Preſidency are, each has its Proportion of European Infantry and Artillery, which are thereby ſo diſperſed that their conſtitutional Strength (we mean that Strength which they derive from the ſuperior Diſcipline) muſt be greatly diminiſhed. The following Abſtracts will better amplify this Remark, and the Concluſion which we have drawn from it, than any Reaſoning on the Subject.

Abſtract Diſpoſition of the Europeans and Artillery.

	Europeans.	Artillery.
Mount	—	266
Fort Saint George	538	19
Poonamalee	399	
Trichinopoly	329	40
Tanjour	243	46
Veloor and Amboa	547	
Vizagapatam	172	88
Inferior Garriſons	129	55
	2,357	505

Thoſe, who when united together will form a moſt reſpectable Corps, loſe almoſt their whole apparent Conſequence, and much of their real Subſtance, by ſuch a Diviſion and Diſſipation of them. We believe that the want of Accommodation for the whole of your European Eſtabliſhment, may have rendered this, in ſome Degree, an Act of Neceſſity; and we have no Doubt but it has been occaſioned by ſome powerful Cauſe; but whatever it may have been, we cannot help recommending it as an Object moſt worthy of your Attention, to deviſe the Means by which your European Forces may be collected and kept entire at your Preſidency, or within its Reach; for in that Light we regard the Quarters of Poonamalee and the Mount, that all the other Forts and Paſſes be garriſoned by native Troops, and not a Man of the ſeveral Ranks of European Soldiers and Artillery be detached from their proper Corps. You will agree with us in Opinion, that it is on the European Forces which the Company maintain in India, that the preſent Exiſtence of their Power, the future Safety and Duration of their Poſſeſſions, eſſentially depend; and that theſe muſt loſe both their Diſcipline and Strength by being divided.

For the ordinary and more active military Duties in Time of Peace, the native Troops may be as uſefully employed as the European, and therefore ought to be ſo employed as to eaſe and ſpare the latter; the Loſſes of which cannot be ſo eaſily recruited, eſpecially at this Time.

Theſe Reflections we ſubmit to your Judgment, deſiring you to receive them not as intended to cenſure your preſent Arrangements, but as occurring naturally from the apparent Inſpection of the Return unaſſiſted with any Explanation.

We requeſt you will favour us with a Return of the Nabob's military Eſtabliſhment and Diſpoſition in the Carnatic; that we may be better enabled to form and offer you our Opinion on the Plan of Defence and Operations to be mutually followed by the ſeveral Preſidencies, in caſe of a general War, or any Commotions in the Country, which may require the Troops of the Preſidencies to co-operate for the more effectually quelling them.

In our Letter of the 17th September laſt, we requeſted you would tranſmit us a Return of the actual State of the Forces at your Preſidency, with your Sentiments on the Means of completing your Eſtabliſhment, of co-operating in the moſt effectual Manner with this Preſidency and that of Bombay, and mutually aſſiſting each other in caſe of an Invaſion of either, and of the moſt eligible Plan for making a Diverſion in favour of your Settlement, if an Enemy ſhould appear on that Side India.

We ſhall likewiſe be glad to receive an Account of the Views and Connections of the Country Powers, their Strength, and Revenues, together with the Opinion of ſuch Alliances as you would recommend to be formed with them, in caſe of any Emergency; to this Letter we have received no Anſwer; we therefore beg Leave again to repeat the Subject to you.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
(Signed) Governor General and Council.

Fort William,
the 20th January 1778.

A true Copy.
E. Hay,
Acting Secretary.

APPENDIX, N° 18.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Seleft Committee at Fort Saint George, to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company; dated 29th November 1780.

Honourable Sirs,

BY the Nymph Sloop, which ſailed for the Cape the 18th October, we did ourſelves the Honour to addreſs a Letter to you, adviſing of the Hoſtilities that had been commenced by Hyder Ally in the Carnatic, and the unfortunate Defeat of a conſiderable Detachment of your Troops, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie. A Duplicate of this Letter was ſent to Bombay, to be forwarded by the Way of Buſſorah; and we now incloſe a Triplicate herewith.

The Check given to your Arms by the Diſaſter which befel Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, and the real Loſs of Men ſuſtained on that Occaſion, were Circumſtances ſo alarming, that we loſt not a Moment in applying to the Preſidency of Bengal for Succours; and we have the Satisfaction to obſerve, that the Governor General and Council were extremely zealous and active in affording them.

Immediately on the Receipt of our Advices, they came to the Reſolution of ſending Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, with a Reinforcement of Troops, to the Coaſt by Sea. He arrived here accordingly on the 5th Inſtant, and brought with him Two Companies of European Artillery, with their Complement of Laſcars, a Battalion of European Infantry, conſiſting of 370, and 40 Gentlemen Volunteers, together with 15 Lacks of Rupees for the Services of the War, the Diſburſements of which is left by the Governor General and Council ſolely to his Direction.

Before Sir Eyre Coote left Bengal, it was alſo reſolved that a Detachment, to conſiſt of Eight Battalions of Sepoys, and One Company of Artillery, ſhould march from thence ſo ſoon as the Weather would permit; and by Letters from Bengal of the 28th ultimo, we learn, that Orders had been iſſued for forming that Detachment, to be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Pearce, the Commanding Officer of Artillery on that Eſtabliſhment. It is imagined that at ſooneſt this Detachment cannot have begun its March until the 15th Inſtant; and allowing it meets with no Oppoſition from either the Troops of Moodajee Booſla, the Raja of Berar, or of thoſe of Nizam Ally (which it is impoſſible to ſay it may not, although as neither of theſe Powers have broke with us, we hope and wiſh the contrary) it cannot poſſibly reach this Place earlier than March.

We informed you in our Letter by the Nymph, that when our Army had retired from Conjeveram,

in conſequence of the Defeat of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, Hyder Ally moved towards Arcot, and laid Siege to the Pettah of that Place; which fell into his Hands by Aſſault the 31ſt ultimo, after a Reſiſtance of Six Weeks: The Fort ſurrendered to him by Capitulation the 3d Inſtant.

The Fall of Arcot is certainly an Event of great Importance to Hyder; it is the Capital of the Nabob. There were lodged in it a very large Quantity of military Stores, which muſt prove highly ſerviceable to Hyder in proſecuting his further Views of Conqueſt; and it is large enough to afford Protection and Accommodation for his whole Army. But theſe are not the only Advantages accruing to him from the Capture; he has conducted himſelf with a Degree of Policy which was hardly to be expected from a Man of his tyrannical and ſanguinary Diſpoſition. The Inhabitants of Arcot and other conquered Places, have been treated with great Lenity, and he has continued the Nabob's Manager, and the ſeveral inferior Amuldars, in their reſpective Offices, with a View of attaching them to his Intereſts.

Under theſe Circumſtances we cannot but be apprehenſive that the Embarraſſments we have to ſurmount, are much greater than thoſe which would ariſe merely from Hyder's Superiority of Force. The whole Country too being completely over-run and laid waſte by large Bodies of Cavalry, is another Circumſtance extremely diſtreſſing to us, as it cuts off our chief Supplies of Proviſions and Draught and Carriage Bullocks for the Uſe of the Army, and renders the Nabob in a great Meaſure unable to give us that Aſſiſtance in thoſe Articles which are abſolutely required.

We cannot obtain any Money from the Nabob, or the Raja of Tanjore; the Nabob is indeed, we believe, very much diſtreſſed by a total Failure in the Revenues of that Part of the Carnatic which has been ſubject to the Incurſions of Hyder's Horſe; but the Raja of Tanjore has not yet had a Grain of his Country touched. Thus from our paſt Diſappointments and preſent Proſpects, we can place but little Dependance on any Reſource than that of Bengal for carrying on the War; and as to the Expences of the Civil Department, we have very ſlender Hope of procuring ſufficient to anſwer them from any Quarter.

From the beſt Accounts we have obtained, Hyder Ally's Force conſiſts of Foot, and
Horſe, and Pieces of Cannon.

All the Forces we have that could be carried into the Field, leaving but a ſmall Garriſon at Fort Saint George, would not, including all Denominations, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, exceed 5000 effective Men; they are at preſent cantoned in Three Grand Diviſions upon Choultry Plain, on account of the Monſoon. Every poſſible Arrangement is making by us, and by Sir Eyre Coote, to act defenſively, and if practicable, to act offenſively after the Rains, but the General thinks our Force as yet inadequate to this laſt.

Sir Eyre Coote has written Letters to Sir Edward Hughes, to the Select Committee at Bombay, and to General Goddard, to unite in diſtreſſing the Poſſeſſion of Hyder on the Malabar Coaſt, by every Means in their Power.

(Signed) Charles Smith,
Eyre Coote,
Samuel Johnſon,
Hector Munro,
Alexander Davidſon.

Extract of a Letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir Eyre Coote to the Honourable the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, &c. Committee of Correſpondence, Eaſt India Houſe; dated Fort Saint George, 30th Nov. 1780.

Gentlemen,

I had not reached Calcutta in my Return from a diſagreeable and fatiguing Journey, which I undertook in order to viſit the different Military Stations under your Bengal Preſidency, and to make ſuch Arrangements at each, as might appear neceſſary for the preſent and future good Management of ſo important a Department of your Service, when I received Intelligence of Hyder Ally Cawn's having invaded the Carnatic; and which was ſoon followed by the melancholy Accounts of his having completely defeated a very conſiderable Detachment of the Troops of this Eſtabliſhment, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, and compoſed of ſome of the beſt Men, both Officers and Privates, in the Army.

The News of this Diſaſter, and the further Diſtreſſes in which it had involved your Intereſts on this Coaſt, induced the Governor General and Council to requeſt of me to proceed hither, and to take upon me the Command of the Army. The Manner in which this Call was made on me, with other Particulars, will be beſt explained by your Peruſal of the Proceedings of the Governor General and Council upon the Occaſion; to which permit me the Liberty of referring you, and alſo of adding,

that

that the Principle upon which my Return to the Charge of your Military Affairs in India was ſolicited, the Expectations the Public naturally entertained therefrom, were, excluſive of my own Deſire to render every Service in my Power to my King and Country, too powerful Incentives for me to heſitate a Moment about entering upon the Undertaking, however difficult or hazardous.

I accordingly left Calcutta on the 13th ultimo, and embarked on Board the Kingſton Indiaman, with a Detachment from the Bengal Army, of Two Companies of European Artillery, and their Complement of Laſcars; brought along with me, on other Veſſels, a Battalion of European Infantry, conſiſting of 370 Men, 40 Gentlemen Volunteers, and 15 Lacks of Rupees for the Services of the War, and which, together with the future Supplies which will be ſent me from Bengal, you may depend upon my applying to the moſt uſeful Purpoſes, and diſburſing with all poſſible Œconomy.

I arrived here on the 5th Inſtant; and, I am ſorry to ſay, found your Affairs here in a more diſtreſſed State than I had formed any Idea of. It would be an endleſs Taſk for me to enter into a minute Diſcuſſion either of the Conduct of thoſe who have been inſtrumental to our preſent Difficulties, or of the Cauſes to which they may be aſſigned. I muſt truſt to your own Diſcernment, in peruſing the Proceedings of this Government, to diſtinguiſh between both; and I ſhall not be diſpleaſed to learn, that you therein find ſufficient Matter to enable you to redreſs yourſelves for the Injuries done to your Intereſts.

When I had the Honour of addreſſing you on the Fall of Pondicherry, whereby the Intereſts of the French Nation in India were moſt effectually eradicated, and thereby every Advantage given to us that could poſſibly be wiſhed for, of eſtabliſhing our own on a firm and permanent Baſis, by forming Alliances, and preſerving a friendly Intercourſe with the Native Powers; I little imagined that there was even a Poſſibility of working ſo ſpeedy a Revolution as that which has happened. To aſcribe it to any other Cauſe than Mal-adminiſtration in your Affairs, would be to deceive you, and to miſlead the Public.

It was not enough that we had confirmed our own Intereſt, by annihilating the Influence of our common Enemy, the French (a Circumſtance in itſelf ſufficient to awaken the Jealouſy of every Native Power in India) but we muſt proceed to open Inſult and Indignity; and as if a Policy inſeparable from our real Intereſts, every Pains ſeem to have been taken to offend both Hyder Ally and the Nizam: They both, with the greateſt Candor, declare the greateſt Senſe they have of Injuries done them, upon the Grounds of the Treaties ſubſiſting between them and the Company, and their ſerious Intentions of avenging themſelves of us. By Means of a ſeaſonable Interpoſition of the Authority of the Governor General and Council, you will find, from their Proceedings, that the Nizam has hitherto been reſtrained from coming to an open Rupture. And although every preſent Redreſs has been given him, which was in their Power to grant, I can by no Means conceive his Reſentment to be entirely removed; and did I not perceive the great Probability there is of Hyder's Succeſſes againſt us alarming his Fears for his own Poſſeſſions, I would not enſure his Neutrality for an Hour.

To excite Hyder Ally to become an avowed Enemy, was a Piece of bad Policy, for which no Excuſe can be alledged. Ever ſince the Treaty of 1769, this Government has been circumſtantially informed, from Time to Time, of the Improvements which he was daily making in his Military Service, both in point of Numbers and Diſcipline; your own Sentiments, nay Orders, for cultivating a more intimate Friendſhip and Connection with him, have been long in its Poſſeſſion. His Conduct and Converſations, and I may add Writings, ever ſince our Refuſal to aſſiſt him againſt the Marattas, which we were virtually bound by Treaty to do, and more particularly ſince the Reduction of Mahé, have been uniformly declaratory of his Enmity towards the Engliſh; and latterly, although the Intelligence they received from all Quarters pre-adviſed them of Hyder's real Intentions, and were further warned by Occurrences, which were to all the reſt of the World convincing Proofs of his hoſtile Diſpoſition, ſtill did they chuſe to diſcredit the Whole themſelves, and to diſcourage the Idea in others. The conſequence was, that no Steps were taken to oppoſe Hyder's Entry into the Carnatic: The Army was left in the ſame divided State as in the Time of the moſt perfect Peace and Tranquillity; and the Places of Strength, which, whilſt we maintained, he could never become Maſter of the Carnatic, were entirely neglected.

Having, by the above Preface, diſcharged my Duty to you, Gentlemen, as my Employers, in guiding your Attention to the Sources from whence you may trace the Origin of the preſent Diſtreſſes in your Affairs, I ſhall now proceed to acquit myſelf of the further Debt I owe you, and my own Credit, as a Military Man, from whom great Expectations are entertained, by informing you of the Situation in which I found every Thing on my Arrival.

With an Enemy at the Door, even the neceſſary Arrangements for the Security of Fort Saint George, the very Foundation of our Exiſtence on this Coaſt, had not been made; no Pains had been taken to repair the ſhattered Condition of the very ſmall Army that remained for our De-

fence; I found it few in Number, and the Sepoys ſo diſpirited from Want of proper Care and Encouragement, as to be daily deſerting: The Field Artillery requiſite for a Campaign, ſo far from being in Readineſs, that the Carriages, &c. are only now making up: The Draught Bullocks deficient in Numbers, and of what there are, many ſo weak as to be inadequate to the Service required of them: Proviſions of every Kind ſo ſcarce, that the Troops in Camp could only procure a ſcanty Supply for One Day's Expence: The whole Country around, within 5 Miles of Madras, entirely plundered and laid Waſte by Hyder's Cavalry, large Bodies of which ſtill continue to infeſt it; of Courſe no Proviſions are to be procured beyond that Circle: Both the Army and Inhabitants maintained chiefly by Supplies from Bengal; and upon which, I am ſorry to obſerve, they muſt principally depend for their future Support; a Circumſtance than which we can have no more convincing Proof of the bad Policy in renting the Company's Lands under this Preſidency to the Nabob, and of thereby rendering ourſelves ſo entirely dependant upon him for every Kind of Supplies; and which, by keeping them in our own Hands, we might ourſelves command: It is a Syſtem which, from the preſent Experience of its bad Effects, I am induced to recommend to your ſerious Conſideration for Remedy.

Obſerving the enfeebled State of our Army here, and the abſolute Impoſſibility of reinforcing it from any of the Detachments ſtationed either to the Northward or Southward of this Place, of which the Fate of that under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie furniſhes you with a melancholy Proof, I naturally turned my Eyes towards the Nabob Mahomed Ally; but, figure my Diſappointment, when, inſtead of finding him in a Condition to aſſiſt our Exigences, I learned from his own Mouth, that he had neither Men, Money, nor Influence; and that he looked to the Company for the Support of both his Intereſts and Credit! Add to this, I can neither find from himſelf, nor diſcover from my own Enquiries, that he has a ſingle Friend or Adherent in the whole Country; on the contrary, the very Villagers of the Company's Jaghire Lands interrupt and moleſt the Meſſengers going to and from the Forts in which we have Garriſons, as alſo thoſe who are ſent out to procure Intelligence; ſo that the very People who we ought to find our Friends, are become more injurious to us than if they were avowedly to take up Arms againſt us. Thus, you perceive, we muſt entirely depend upon our own Exertions.

Two Days before my Arrival, Arcot, the Capital of the Carnatic (which, knowing its Importance for the Support of our Influence in the Country, I eagerly wiſhed to have been in Time to have relieved) fell into the Hands of Hyder; an Event which, whilſt it has given to him almoſt every Thing he could wiſh, has effectually ruined the Nabob's Intereſts in the Country, and produced other Effects which tend in particular to encreaſe my Embarraſſments. He has by this Capture got Poſſeſſion of a City ſufficiently large to canton his whole Army, of a Number of fine Cannon, and a very conſiderable Quantity of other Military Stores, which muſt prove highly ſerviceable to him in either maintaining what he has already acquired, or in proſecuting his further Views of Conqueſt. The Polygars, as well as the Officers of the Nabob Mahomed Ally, who were ſtationed at different Places for the Collection of his Revenues, are all attending at Hyder's Durbar, and have been uniformly confirmed in their reſpective Offices. Beſides Arcot, many other Garriſons of the Nabob's have fallen; and, although capable of Defence, without offering the ſmalleſt Reſiſtance; in ſhort, have moſt of them ſurrendered upon the Appearance of Hyder's Horſe before them. Such ready and unconditional Submiſſion to the Enemy, muſt ariſe either from Treachery or a Diſaffection to the Nabob's Government; but for which the unpardonable Neglect of every Thing neceſſary to the Defence of the Forts, has furniſhed thoſe who were ſtationed in them, with an eaſy Excuſe for having ſo tamely given them up. Hyder has thrown in them very adequate Garriſons, with a Sufficiency of Military Stores, and is now ſtocking them with Proviſions, and repairing the Works. He is alſo putting Arcot in the beſt State of Defence poſſible, and is at the ſame Time employed in compleating his Artillery Park. His Army, upon the moſt moderate Computation I have yet had given to me, does not conſiſt of leſs than 70,000 Infantry (common Report makes them 100,000) of which there are 20,000 in regular Battalion; 400 Europeans under the Command of a Mr. Lally; 100 Pieces of Cannon of different Calibres, which are worked by Europeans, in Number 300, and Black Artillery diſciplined by us, and formerly in the Service of the Nabob Mahomed Ally, and at the Siege of Arcot were ſo well ſerved as repeatedly to have diſmounted our Guns upon the Batteries. His Approaches upon that Occaſion were as well carried on as if conducted by the moſt ſkilful Engineers. He has got 30,000 Cavalry, of which 2,000 are Abyſſinian Horſe, which conſtantly attend his Perſon; 10,000 Carnatic Horſe well trained, Half of which, we are well informed, are compoſed of thoſe Regiments which were diſbanded from and deſerted the Service of the Nabob within theſe laſt 4 Years, and which were all diſciplined by Engliſh Officers; the Reſt of his Cavalry are the common Horſe of the Country under different Chiefs. Every Avenue leading from hence to Arcot, and from hence to thoſe Forts in which we have ſtill Garriſons, is occupied by large Detachments of Horſe, and where neceſſary alſo by Infantry, and the Places at which they are poſted fortified; ſo that beſides being deprived of the Means of getting good Intelligence, we are totally cut off from all Communication with our Garriſons, and conſequently unable to ſend them Supplies of either Stores or Proviſions, in both of which they have been kept ſcandalouſly deficient. In ſhort, Hyder has taken every Meaſure

Measure that could have occurred to the most experienced General to distress us, and to render himself formidable in his present Situation.

Hyder's Conduct in his Civil Capacity, has been supported by a Degree of political Address unequalled by any Power that has yet appeared in Hindostan. To the Inhabitants in general he affords every Protection; and particularly on the Capture of Arcot, he issued a Proclamation against plundering the People of the Town, sent Guards from his own Army to protect the Houses of the Bankers, cut off the Heads of several of his People who were found plundering in Defiance of his Authority; and after making Enquiry who had been Sufferers (who proved to be chiefly the petty Merchants) he distributed amongst them to the Value of about £. 3,500 Sterling, and which he only required should be repaid to him when they were able. Such well-timed Lenity cannot fail of attaching the People to his Government.

It may possibly be asked how he contrives to find Provisions for so numerous an Army? Besides what he is able to collect in the Carnatic, and besides what the Merchants bring of themselves from his Country, he has got 30,000 Bullocks of his own, which are constantly employed in bringing him Supplies from thence.

I have been thus circumstantial in my Accounts of Hyder's Strength, and of his Mode of Conduct, that you may see in the fullest Manner what we have to combat against, and what Difficulties I in particular have to surmount. The unprepared State in which I found the Army here on my Arrival, is already set forth to you in the preceding Part of this Address; nor will I enter upon a Discussion of its Inferiority, when compared with that of the Enemy, or of its Incapacity to attack Hyder in the strong Posts he now occupies; but leave you to form your own Judgment from a particular Return of the Force which I could have carried into the Field, and which I herewith inclose. Nevertheless, had Arcot held out a short Time longer, I should not have delayed a Day beyond what must unavoidably have been taken up in the necessary Preparations for a March, to have proceeded immediately towards raising the Siege. There is One Effect which has been produced by the Fall of Arcot, and which I cannot omit mentioning to you, viz. a Disaffection amongst the Sepoys, who are principally Natives of that Place, and have got their Wives, Families, and other Relations in it. Many have already evinced their Aversion to the Service, by deserting; a Circumstance which affords too much Room to apprehend Infidelity when we take the Field, and the more particularly as I shall probably make Arcot my first Object.

From the Disappointment I naturally suffered on finding Things so situated as to prevent me from entering immediately on Action, I have experienced a temporary Relief and Consolation, by the Setting-in of the North-east Monsoon, which has commenced with very heavy Rains, and furnished me with a good Pretence for throwing my little Army into Cantonments: And for obviating an Idea prejudicial to our Interests, which it might otherwise have given Birth to, of my having deserted the Field, I have formed Three Grand Divisions on Choultry Plain, which lays at the Distance of between Three and Four Miles to the Southward of Madras, and have myself taken up my Residence with one of them, in order to be in Readiness to embrace the first Opportunity that may offer, of gaining an Advantage over the Enemy. I have also occupied and strengthened what were originally the advanced Posts from the Army, that no Ground might be lost by cantoning.

I am employing the Time afforded by this Interval of Inactivity, in the most useful Manner in my Power, by making every necessary Arrangement for the Security of your Garrison of Fort Saint George, and by repairing, by every Means within my Reach, the shattered Condition of the Army, and endeavouring, by granting every possible Encouragement to the Sepoys, to attach them to our Service.

As the only present Measure which can tend to facilitate my Operations against the Enemy, and one which promises the fairest Prospect to the general Success of the War, I have written to your Bombay Administration, to Sir Edward Hughes, and to Brigadier General Goddard, to unite in distressing his Possessions on the Malabar Side of India; and to be particularly assiduous in promoting Peace with the Marattas. The Particulars of the Resolution which the Governor General and Council came to on this latter Subject, you are fully informed of by their own Letters and Proceedings. It only therefore remains for you to be assured, that no Endeavours on my Part shall be left unexerted to forward so important and desirable an Accommodation.

If we can only make Peace with them, Hyder Ally will repent but once of his hostile Operations against us. On the contrary, should the Marattas continue our Enemies, and to act against us, and the French Armament arrive with the Troops to join Hyder, it is impossible to say to what Difficulties we may be reduced.

You will naturally imagine and expect that Pondicherry is no longer in a Condition to be useful to the French, in case of their landing in this Country: What then must be your Surprize, on being informed, that (except in Point of Fortifications, which you are already advised have been destroy-

ed) it is in every other Reſpect open and convenient for their Reception. It was evacuated on Hyder's Invaſion of the Carnatic, without deſtroying the public Buildings, and without removing one of the French Inhabitants, who are left in full and undiſturbed Poſſeſſion of their Houſes, with only a Reſident to tend over them; the Conſequence of which, as I have been informed by a Letter from the Third of your Factory at Cuddalore, has been, that they have aroſe in Arms, have robbed the Reſident, and obliged him, with fixed Bayonets at his Breaſt, to ſign a Paper, the Contents of which he knew not; have raiſed Two or Three Battalions of Sepoys, which they call Hyder's, and which he no Doubt pays for, but which bear evident Marks of the Choice of Men being French, as they are chiefly compoſed of thoſe who were formerly in their Service. Large Quantities of Proviſions are now laying up at Caringoley, in the Neighbourhood of Pondicherry; and which, as Hyder cannot, from the Situation of the Place, being on the Sea Coaſt, poſſibly mean for his own Uſe, muſt be intended for the Service of the French on their Arrival.

I do myſelf the Honour to incloſe you a general and ſubſidiary Return of your Forces in India, formed upon the lateſt Advices I have received from the ſeveral Stations; you will find alſo amongſt them, a Return, ſhewing the State of the Army on my Arrival here, and its preſent State; you have likewiſe a Return of the Detachment which was defeated under Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, with the Caſualties thereof, drawn from the moſt authentic Accounts I have been able to procure.

I would do Injuſtice to the Ability and Aſſiduity with which Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Owen has acquitted himſelf in his Office of Adjutant General, and to the Services I have received from him in that Capacity, did I omit, on this Occaſion, recommending him to your Notice; and as an Officer of military Knowledge and Experience, he is highly deſerving of whatever Countenance or Favour you may at any Time think proper to ſhew him.

I hope that by the next Opportunity which offers, I ſhall have it in my Power to ſend you more agreeable Accounts; in the Interim reſt aſſured, that I ſhall uſe my utmoſt Endeavours to re-eſtabliſh your Intereſts, and to ſupport the Honour of the Britiſh Arms in this Part of India.

I have the Honour to be,
with much Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Eyre Coote.

Fort St. George,
30th Nov^r. 1780.

P. S. Since writing the above, having obtained Perſian Copies of Articles of Treaties ſaid to ſubſiſt between the French and Hyder Ally Cawn, and between him and the Marattas, and which being poſitively aſſured are real, I herewith incloſe you Tranſlates for your Information.

E. C.

East India Houſe,
11th May 1781.

A true Copy.
Sam. Wilks,
Clerk to the Committee of Secrecy.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to the Right Honourable Charles Jenkinſon, Eſq; His Majeſty's Secretary at War, &c.; dated Head Quarters Choultry Plain, the 1ſt December 1780.

Sir,

When I did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you, on the 30th of January and 27th of February laſt, I troubled you with ſome Detail of my Situation in this Government, both with reſpect to political and military Matters; and ſhall now take the Liberty of informing you further, that the inimical Proceedings of the Board towards me, during the Stay I was neceſſarily obliged to make in the Upper Provinces, increaſed ſo much, as at length to exclude me entirely from all Knowledge of their Tranſactions, and to deprive me of every military Power whatever, from the forming Armies, and placing Officers at the Head of them, down to the common Details of the Service. I was, in ſhort, conſidered at laſt as nothing more than a Channel for the Conveyance of their Orders, and many of thoſe were ſuch as I too plainly ſaw the evil Tendency of to the Army, and the Service in general, and therefore doubly felt the Want of Power to prevent them.

As my Motives for coming to this Country were purely Public, and I had no Wiſh to gratify but that of ſhewing my Zeal, and exerting every Faculty in the Service of His Majeſty, and for the Good of my Country, ſuch a Situation accorded but ill either with thoſe Views, or, I may venture to ſay, with my Character in Life. Truſting, therefore, to the well-known Indulgence of my Sovereign, where he ſees the Motive juſtify the Meaſure, I determined to quit a Scene, where I was waſting both Time and Health in vain. For what Purpoſes could I hope to effect, when I ſaw a Coali-

tion formed between Gentlemen, whoſe Ideas and Opinions had hitherto been ſo oppoſite, that I never had been able to bring them to any Degree of Conciliation, apparently with the View of ſetting me aſide, both as a Member of the Board, and as Commander in Chief.

I may be excuſed the giving it this Interpretation, from the uniform Courſe of ill Treatment I met with, and from not having obſerved any Fruits ariſe in conſequence of this Union. But by the Time I reached the Preſidency, Events had happened of ſuch a Nature, as rendered it impoſſible for me to leave the Country without uſing my beſt Efforts to aſſiſt in averting the Evils which threatened it on all Sides.

The unfortunate Affair between the Governor General and Mr. Francis, had greatly weakened the Credit and Conſequence of our Government here; while the Irruption of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic, where he has burnt and pillaged the whole Country, even to the Gates of Madras, demanded its moſt immediate and ſpirited Exertions.

My own Feelings would have urged me, and juſtly ſo, at a more favourable Period of Time, to demand of the Board their Reaſons for their extraordinary Conduct towards me, that both their Acculations, if they had any to make, and my Juſtifications, might appear to our Employers at once, whoſe Judgment upon my Conduct I rather ſolicit than dread: But under ſuch Circumſtances, I could not heſitate to ſacrifice every private Claim to the Neceſſities of the Public, and, turning my whole Cares to the forming ſuch military Arrangements as might beſt ſecure our valuable Poſſeſſions here, I called for the Attention of the Board to the Plans I laid before them, and offered the moſt ready Concurrence in every Meaſure which was ſuited to the Exigencies of our Situation.

I had the Satisfaction to find them thoroughly diſpoſed to unite in providing for our Safety, and in giving every poſſible Aſſiſtance to the Government of Madras; while, from being aware of the ill Conſequences already reſulting from them, they voluntarily reſcinded thoſe Reſolutions, which had paſſed in Contradiction to my military Regulations during my Abſence.

This Change in Conduct, and the real Hazard we are in, encourages me to look forward with more Hope of proper Support in the Field. An unfortunate Check we have met with upon the Coaſt, obliging me to repair thither with a Reinforcement, which, though by no Means adequate to the Service I am going upon, is as much as can be ſpared from this Eſtabliſhment, while the Mahratta War continues, it is at length agreed to enter into another Negotiation for Peace with them, which, if we can effect upon proper Terms, and induce them to join us againſt Hyder, who is certainly their Rival in Power and Conſequence, this War may be brought to a happy, and perhaps ſpeedy Concluſion; but ſhould they prefer taking Advantage of our preſent Situation, to aſſiſt in diſtreſſing us; ſhould the Nizam ſeize the ſame favourable Opportunity to act againſt us; and ſhould the French appear with Force ſufficient to encourage and ſupport their ſeveral Operations, all of which are Events too likely to happen, it is impoſſible for me, Sir, to anſwer for the Conſequences, reduced as we now are in the Strength of our European Troops, and under the greateſt Difficulties to find Money, even for our current Expences.

Thus far in this Addreſs I wrote in Bengal.

I arrived here the 5th Inſtant, and am ſorry to ſay, I found Affairs in general in a more diſtreſſed State than I had formed any Idea of.

It would be an endleſs Taſk for me to enter into a minute Diſcuſſion, either into the Conduct of thoſe Perſons who have been inſtrumental to the preſent Difficulties, or of the Cauſes to which they may be aſcribed. I truſt, however, that both may be in good Time brought forward to the public View, and that the Nation may thereby have an Opportunity of redreſſing themſelves on thoſe who have wantonly injured their Honour and Intereſts.

By the Fall of Pondicherry, the Influence of our common Enemies, the French, may be ſaid to have been annihilated in this Country; and every Advantage thereby given to us for eſtabliſhing our own upon a ſolid and permanent Baſis, by forming Alliances, and preſerving a friendly Intercourſe with the Native Powers. Thus circumſtanced, it was not to be imagined that there was even a Poſſibility of working ſo ſpeedy a Revolution as that which has happened. Regardleſs of the Jealouſy which would naturally ariſe in the Mind of every native Power in India, from our having removed the only European Competitor we had in this Quarter of the World, they proceed to offer them Inſult and Indignity; and as if a Policy inſeparable from our real Intereſts, every Pains have been taken to offend both Hyder Ally and the Nizam; both of whom, ſenſible of the Injuries done them upon the Grounds of the Treaty ſubſiſting between them and the Company, with the greateſt Candour avow their Intentions of reſenting them. By Means of a ſeaſonable Interpoſition of the Authority of the Supreme Council, the Nizam has hitherto been reſtrained from coming to an open Rupture. They redreſſed him as far as was in their Power; but I by no Means conceive his Re-

ſentment to be entirely removed; and did I not ſee the great Probability there is of Hyder's Succeſſes againſt us, alarming his Fears for our own Poſſeſſions, I would not inſure his Neutrality for an Hour.

To excite Hyder Ally to become an avowed Enemy, was a Piece of bad Policy in the Agents of this Government, for which no Excuſe can be alledged. Ever ſince the Treaty concluded with him in 1769, they have been circumſtantially informed of the Improvements which he was daily making in his military Service, both as to Numbers and Diſcipline. His Conduct and Writings, ever ſince they refuſed to aſſiſt him againſt the Marattas (which by Treaty they were virtually bound to do) have been uniformly declaratory of his Enmity towards the Engliſh.

Deſerving as theſe Circumſtances were of the Conſideration of a well-meaning Government, the Men in Authority here perſiſted in their ill-judged Policy, until they had provoked him into open Hoſtilities. And although Informations were tranſmitted them from all Quarters, of his Intention to invade the Carnatic, nay Occurrences convincing to all the World of ſuch being his Views, ſtill did they chuſe, from a determined Obſtinacy (for ſuch I muſt call it) to diſcredit the Whole themſelves, and to diſcourage the Idea in others; and that they might not appear, by their public Conduct, to contradict what they were deſirous the World ſhould believe, they moſt perceptibly avoided taking any Steps towards oppoſing Hyder's Entry into the Carnatic, and made not the ſmalleſt Preparations for their own Security.

It is hardly credible, but no leſs true, that even after Hyder Ally's Invaſion, the ſame Inactivity prevailed in this Government; and what ought to have been their firſt Care, lay as much neglected as if no Enemy had been near. Even the neceſſary Arrangements for the Security of Fort Saint George, the very Foundation of our Exiſtence on this Coaſt, had not been made; no Pains had been taken to repair the ſhattered Condition of the very ſmall Army that remained for our Defence; I found it few in Number, and the Sepoys ſo diſpirited from Want of proper Care and Encouragement, as to be daily deſerting. The Field Artillery requiſite for a Campaign, ſo far from being in Readineſs, that the Carriages, &c. are now making up; the Draught Bullocks deficient in Numbers, and of what there are, many are ſo weak as to be inadequate to the Service required of them: Proviſions of every Kind ſo ſcarce, that the Troops in Camp could only procure a ſcanty Supply for One Day's Expence: The whole Country around, within Five Miles of Madras, entirely plundered and laid waſte by Hyder's Cavalry; large Bodies of which ſtill continue to infeſt it, of courſe no Proviſions are to be procured beyond that Circle: Both the Army and Inhabitants maintained chiefly by Supplies from Bengal; and upon which, I am ſorry to obſerve, they muſt principally depend for their future Support.

Obſerving the enfeebled State of our Army here, and the abſolute Impoſſibility of reinforcing it from any of the Detachments ſtationed either to the Northward or to the Southward, of which the Fate of that under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie furniſhes us a melancholy Proof, I naturally turned my Eyes towards the Nabob Mahomed Ally; but figure my Diſappointment, when, inſtead of finding him in a Condition to aſſiſt our Exigencies, I learnt from his own Mouth, that he had neither Men, Money, nor Influence, and that he looked to the Company for the Support of both his Intereſt and Credit! Add to this, I can neither find from himſelf, nor diſcover from my own Enquiries, that he has a ſingle Friend or Adherent in the whole Country; on the contrary, the very Villagers of the Company's Jaghire Lands interrupt and moleſt the Meſſengers going to and from the Forts in which we have Garriſons, and alſo thoſe who are ſent out to procure Intelligence; ſo that the very People whom we ought to find our Friends, are become more injurious to us than if they were avowedly to take up Arms againſt us; which might not have been the Caſe, had the Government here kept thoſe Lands in their own Hands, inſtead of renting them to the Nabob. Thus you ſee we muſt entirely depend upon our own Exertions.

Two Days before my Arrival, Arcot, the Capital of the Carnatic (which, knowing its Importance for the Support of our Influence in the Country, I eagerly wiſhed to have been in Time to have relieved) fell into the Hands of Hyder; an Event which, whilſt it has given to him almoſt every Thing he could wiſh, has effectually ruined the Nabob's Intereſts in the Country, and produced other Effects which tend in particular to encreaſe my Embarraſſments. He has by this Capture got Poſſeſſion of a City ſufficiently large to canton his whole Army, of a Number of fine Cannon, and a very conſiderable Quantity of other Military Stores, which muſt prove highly ſerviceable to him, in either maintaining what he has already acquired, or in proſecuting his further Views of Conqueſt. The Polygars, as well as the Officers of the Nabob Mahomed Ally who were ſtationed at different Places for the Collection of his Revenues, are all attending at Hyder's Durbar, and have been uniformly confirmed in their reſpective Offices. Beſides Arcot, many other Garriſons of the Nabob's have fallen, and, although capable of Defence, without offering the ſmalleſt Reſiſtance; in ſhort, have moſt of them ſurrendered upon the Appearance of Hyder's Horſe before them. Such ready and unconditional Submiſſion to the Enemy, muſt ariſe either from Treachery or Diſaffection to the Nabob's Government, but for which, the unpardonable Neglect of every Thing neceſſary for the Defence of the Forts, has furniſhed

thoſe

those who were stationed in them with an easy Excuse for having so tamely given them up. Hyder has thrown into them very adequate Garrisons, with a Sufficiency of Military Stores, and is now stocking them with Provisions, and repairing the Works: He is also putting Arcot in the best State of Defence possible, and is at the same Time employed in completing his Artillery Park. His Army, upon the most moderate Computation I have yet had given to me, does not consist of less than 70,000 Infantry, (common Report makes them 100,000) of which there are 20,000 in regular Battalions; Four hundred Europeans under the Command of a Mr. Lally; One hundred Pieces of Cannon of different Calibres, which are worked by Europeans, in Number 300, and Black Artillery disciplined by us, and formerly in the Service of the Nabob Mahomed Ally, and at the Siege of Arcot were so well served, as repeatedly to have dismounted our Guns upon the Batteries: His Approaches on that Occasion were as well carried on as if conducted by the most skilful Engineers. He has got 30,000 Cavalry, of which 2,000 are Abyssinian Horse, which constantly attend his Person; 10,000 Carnatic Horse, well trained, Half of which, we are well informed, are composed of those Regiments which were disbanded from and deserted from the Service of the Nabob within these last Four Years, and which were all disciplined by English Officers; the rest of his Cavalry are the common Horse of the Country, under different Chiefs.

Every Avenue leading from hence to Arcot, and from hence to those Forts in which we have still Garrisons, is occupied by large Detachments of Horse, and where necessary, also by Infantry, and the Places at which they are posted fortified; so that besides being deprived of the Means of getting good Intelligence, we are totally cut off from all Communication with our Garrisons, and consequently unable to send them any Supplies, either of Stores or Provisions, in both of which they have been kept scandalously deficient. In short, Hyder has taken every Measure that could have occurred to the most experienced General to distress us, and to render himself, in his present Situation, as formidable as possible.

Hyder's Conduct in his Civil Capacity, has been supported by a Degree of political Address unequalled by any Power that has yet appeared in Hindostan: To the Inhabitants in general he affords every Protection; and particularly on the Capture of Arcot, he issued a Proclamation against plundering the People of the Town, sent Guards from his own Army to protect the Houses of the Bankers, cut off the Heads of several of his People who were found plundering in Defiance of his Authority; and, after making Enquiry who had been Sufferers (who proved to be chiefly the petty Merchants) he distributed amongst them the Value of about £. 3,500 sterling, and which he only required should be repaid to him when they were able. Such well timed Lenity cannot fail of attaching the People to his Government.

It may possibly be asked, how he contrives to find Provisions for so numerous an Army? Besides what he is able to collect in the Carnatic, and besides what the Merchants bring of themselves from his Country, he has got Thirty thousand Bullocks of his own, which are constantly employed in bringing him Supplies from thence.

I have been thus circumstantial in my Account of Hyder's Strength, and of his Mode of Conduct, that you may see in the fullest Manner what we have to combat against, and what Difficulties I in particular have to surmount.

I do myself the Honour to inclose a general and subsidiary Return of the Forces in India.

The Army which I immediately command, and can now carry into the Field, including Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, does not exceed 7,000, of which 1,700 only are Europeans, and the Remainder Sepoys and Black Cavalry. The Smallness of this Force, when compared with that of the Enemy, and the great Disadvantages under which it must take the Field, with respect to Provisions, are Circumstances which I am persuaded are in themselves sufficiently convincing to render all Comment of mine unnecessary, to prove to you its Inequality to the Undertaking of attacking Hyder in the strong Posts he now holds. Nevertheless, had Arcot held out a short Time longer, I should have made an Attempt towards raising the Siege.

I am at present employed in making every necessary Arrangement for the Security of the Garrison of Fort Saint George, and in repairing, by every Means within my Reach, the shattered Condition of the Army; and am endeavouring, by granting every possible Encouragement to the Sepoys, to attach them to our Service.

As the only present Measure which can tend to facilitate my Operations against the Enemy, and one which promises the fairest Prospect to the general Success of the War, I have written to the Bombay Administration, to Sir Edward Hughes, and to Brigadier General Goddard, to unite in distressing his Possessions on the Malabar Side of India; and to be particularly assiduous in promoting Peace with the Marattas.

After the Mention which I have already made of the Fall of Pondicherry, you will naturally imagine

Imagine and expect that it is no longer in a Situation to be useful to the French, in case of their landing in this Country: What then must be your Surprize, on being informed that, excepting the Fortifications, which have been destroyed, it is in every other Respect open and convenient for their Reception? It is hardly possible to suppose, that with so many and obvious Reasons for the Government here, to have rendered that Place totally incapable of any immediate Service to either a Native or Foreign Power, they could have acted so impolitickly, and with so little Foresight, as they have done. They evacuated it on Hyder's Invasion of the Carnatic, leaving behind all the French Inhabitants in undisturbed and ample Possession of their Houses, with only a Resident to tend over them; the Consequence of which has been, that they have risen in Arms, have robbed the Resident, and with fixed Bayoners at his Breast, obliged him to sign a Paper, the Contents of which he knew not; and have raised Two or Three Battalions of Sepoys, which they call Hyder's, and which he no Doubt pays for, but which bear evident Marks of the Choice of Men being French, as they are composed of those who were formerly in their Service. Large Quantities of Provisions are now laying up at Carigolly, in the Neighbourhood of Pondicherry, and which, as Hyder cannot, from the Situation of the Place, being on the Sea coast, mean for his own Use, must be intended for the Service of the French on their Arrival.

You will observe from the Returns, the very reduced State of His Majesty's 73d Regiment, which presents to us too strong a Proof, that Highlanders Constitutions are not suitable to this Climate, although they are apparently Men of robust Habits: The same Mortality prevailed in Colonel Morris's Highland Regiment, when I commanded it here last War: I must therefore recommend, that in future, in recruiting for the India Service, as few as possible of them be sent out. Whilst on this Subject, I am sorry to remark, that on an Occasion, when a Reinforcement of Europeans was considered as necessary for the Protection of the British Possessions in India, this Battalion of Lord Macleod's Regiment should have been allowed to leave England 150 deficient of its full Complement, at the same Time that another Battalion was raised, from which it might, without Difficulty or Detriment, have been completed.

I hope it will be in my Power to give you more favourable Accounts by my next Dispatches; and request you will in the mean while rest assured of my utmost Endeavous to support the Honour of the British Arms in India; observing however, that nothing effectual can be expected, without great Exertions from Government at Home.

I have the Honour to be,
with much Esteem,
Sir,
You most obedient, and most
humble Servant,
Eyre Coote.

Head Quarters, Choultry Plain,
the 1st December 1780.

P. S. You will observe, that you have likewise a Return of the Detachment which was defeated under Lieut. Colonel Baillie, with the Casualties thereof, formed from the most authentic Accounts I have been able to procure.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to the Earl of Hillsborough, dated Head Quarters, Choultry Plain, 1st December 1780.

I am preparing to exert my best Abilities for the Defence and Security of these valuable Possessions.

Our actual Situation in respect to Hyder Ally, the Marattas, and the other Country Powers, and the unfortunate Check we have met with from the former upon the Coast, I have already mentioned to the Secretary at War; therefore shall not take up more of your Lordship's Time than is necessary, by repeating either those or other Matters relative to myself; but as a Means of giving you a clear View of our Proceedings, I beg Leave to inclose in your Lordship's Packet, some Minutes which have been given in at our Board since my Return from the Upper Provinces, upon those Subjects.

Thus far in this Address I wrote in Bengal. I arrived here the 5th Instant, and am sorry to say I found Affairs in general in a more distressed State than I had formed any Idea of. It would be an endless Task for me to enter into a minute Discussion, either of the Conduct of those Persons who have been instrumental to the present Difficulties, or of the Causes to which they may be ascribed. I trust, however, that both may in good Time be brought forward to the public View, and that the Nation may thereby have an Opportunity of redressing themselves on those who have wantonly injured their Honour and Interests.

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Obſerving the enfeebled State of our Army here, and the abſolute Impoſſibility of re-inforcing it from any of the Detachments ſtationed either to the Northward or Southward of this Place, of which the Fate of that under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Baillie furniſhed a melancholy Proof, I naturally turned my Eyes towards the Nabob Mahomed Ally; but figure my Diſappointment, when, inſtead of finding him in a Condition to aſſiſt our Exigencies, I learnt from his own Mouth, that he had neither Men, Money, nor Influence; and that he looked to the Company for the Support of both his Intereſt and Credit! Add to this, I can neither find from himſelf, nor diſcover from my own Enquiries, that he has a ſingle Friend or Adherent in the whole Country; on the contrary, the very Villagers of the Company's Jaghire Lands, intercept and moleſt the Meſſengers going to and from the Forts in which we have Garriſons, as alſo thoſe who are ſent out to procure Intelligence; ſo that the very People, whom we ought to find our Friends, are become more injurious to us than if they were avowedly to take up Arms againſt us; which might not have been the Caſe, had the Government here kept thoſe Lands in their own Hands, inſtead of renting them to the Nabob. Thus you perceive we muſt entirely depend upon our own Exertions.

Two Days before my Arrival, Arcot, the Capital of the Carnatic, (which, knowing its Importance for the Support of our Influence in the Country, I eagerly wiſhed to have been in Time to have relieved) fell into the Hands of Hyder; an Event which, whilſt it has given to him almoſt every Thing he could wiſh, has effectually ruined the Nabob's Intereſt in the Country, and produced other Effects which tend in particular to encreaſe my Embarraſſments. He has, by this Capture, got Poſſeſſion of a City ſufficiently large to canton his whole Army, of a Number of fine Cannon, and a very conſiderable Quantity of other Military Stores, which muſt prove highly ſerviceable to him in either

maintaining what he has already acquired, or in profecuting his further Views of Conqueſt. The Polygars as well as the Officers of the Nabob Mahomed Ally, who were ſtationed at different Places for the Collection of his Revenues, are all attending at Hyder's Durbar, and have been uniformly confirmed in their reſpective Offices. Beſides Arcot, many other Garriſons of the Nabob's have fallen, and, although capable of Defence, without offering the ſmalleſt Reſiſtance; in ſhort, have moſt of them ſurrendered upon the Appearance of Hyder's Horſe before them. Such ready and unconditional Submiſſion to the Enemy, muſt ariſe either from Treachery or a Diſaffection of the Nabob's Government; but for which, the unpardonable Neglect of every Thing neceſſary to the Defence of the Forts, has furniſhed thoſe who were ſtationed in them with an eaſy Excuſe for having ſo tamely given them up. Hyder has thrown into them very adequate Garriſons with a Sufficiency of Military Stores, and is now ſtocking them with Proviſions and repairing the Works: He is alſo putting Arcot in the beſt State of Defence poſſible, and is at the ſame Time employed in completing his Artillery Park. His Army, upon the moſt moderate Computation I have yet had given to me, does not conſiſt of leſs than 70,000 Infantry (common Report makes them 100,000) of which there are 20,000 in regular Battalions; 400 Europeans under the Command of a Mr. Lally; 100 Pieces of Cannon of different Calibres, which are worked by Europeans, in Number 300, and Black Artillery diſciplined by us, and formerly in the Service of the Nabob Mahomed Ally, and at the Siege of Arcot were ſo well ſerved, as repeatedly to have diſmounted our Guns upon the Batteries: His Aproaches on that Occaſion were as well carried on as if conducted by the moſt ſkilful Engineers. He has got 30,000 Cavalry, of which 2,000 are Abyſſinian Horſe, which conſtantly attend his Perſon; 10,000 Carnatic Horſe well trained, Half of which, we are well informed, are compoſed of thoſe Regiments which were diſbanded from, and deſerted the Service of the Nabob within theſe laſt Four Years, and which were all diſciplined by Engliſh Officers. The reſt of his Cavalry are the common Horſe of the Country under different Chiefs.

Every Avenue leading from hence to Arcot, and from hence to thoſe Forts in which we have ſtill Garriſons, is occupied by large Detachments of Horſe, and, where neceſſary, alſo by Infantry, and the Places at which they are poſted, fortified; ſo that, beſides being deprived of the Means of getting good Intelligence, we are totally cut off from all Communication with our Garriſons, and conſequently unable to ſend them Supplies of either Stores or Proviſions; in both of which they have been kept ſcandalouſly deficient. In ſhort, Hyder has taken every Meaſure that could have occurred to the moſt experienced General to diſtreſs us, and to render himſelf formidable in his preſent Situation.

Hyder's Conduct in his Civil Capacity has been ſupported by a Degree of Political Addreſs, unequalled by any Power that has yet appeared in Hindoſtan. To the Inhabitants in general he affords every Protection, and particularly on the Capture of Arcot, he iſſued a Proclamation againſt plundering the People of the Town; ſent Guards from his own Army to protect the Houſes of the Bankers; cut off the Heads of ſeveral of his People, who were found plundering in Defiance of his Authority; and after making Enquiry who had been Sufferers (who proved to be chiefly the petty Merchants) he diſtributed amongſt them the Value of about £. 3,500 Sterling, and which he only required ſhould be repaid to him when they were able. Such well-timed Lenity cannot fail of attaching the People to his Government.

It may poſſibly be aſked, how he contrives to find Proviſions for ſo numerous an Army? Beſides what he is able to collect in the Carnatic, and beſides what the Merchants bring of themſelves from his Country, he has got 30,000 Bullocks of his own, which are conſtantly employed in bringing him Supplies from thence.

I have been thus circumſtantial in my Account of Hyder's Strength, and of his Mode of Conduct, that you may ſee in the fulleſt Manner what we have to combat againſt, and what Difficulties I in particular have to ſurmount. The Army which I immediately command, and can now carry into the Field, including Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, does not exceed 7,000, of which 1,700 only are Europeans, and the Remainder Sepoys and Black Cavalry. The Smallneſs of this Force when compared with that of the Enemy, and the great Diſadvantages under which it muſt take the Field, with reſpect to Proviſions, are Circumſtances which I am perſuaded are in themſelves ſufficiently convincing to render all Comment of mine unneceſſary, to prove to you its Inequality to the Undertaking of attacking Hyder in the ſtrong Poſts he now holds; nevertheleſs, had Arcot held out a ſhort Time longer, I ſhould have made an Attempt towards raiſing the Siege.

I am at preſent employed in making every neceſſary Arrangement for the Security of the Garriſon of Fort Saint George, and in repairing, by every Means within my Reach, the ſhattered Condition of the Army, and endeavouring, by granting every poſſible Encouragement to the Sepoys, to attach them to our Service.

As the only preſent Meaſure which can tend to facilitate my Operations againſt the Enemy, and one which promiſes the faireſt Proſpect to the general Succeſs of the War, I have written to the Bombay Adminiſtration, to Sir Edward Hughes, and to Brigadier General Goddard, to unite in

diſtreſſing his Poſſeſſions on the Malabar Side of India; and to be particularly aſſiduous in promoting Peace with the Marattas.

After the Mention which I have already made of the Fall of Pondicherry, you will naturally imagine and expect, that it is no longer in a Situation to be uſeful to the French, in caſe of their landing in this Country: What then muſt be your Surprize, on being informed that, excepting the Fortifications, which have been deſtroyed, it is in every other Reſpect open and convenient for their Reception? It is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe, that with ſo many and obvious Reaſons for the Government here to have rendered that Place totally incapable of any immediate Service, to either a Native or Foreign Power, they could have acted ſo impolitically, and with ſo little Foreſight as they have done. They evacuated it on Hyder's Invaſion of the Carnatic, leaving behind all the French Inhabitants in undiſturbed and ample Poſſeſſion of their Houſes, with only a Reſident to tend over them; the Conſequence of which has been, that they have riſen in Arms, have robbed the Reſident, and with fixed Bayonets at his Breaſt, obliged him to ſign his Name to a Paper, the Contents of which he knew not; and have raiſed Two or Three Battalions of Sepoys, which they call Hyder's, and which he no Doubt pays for, but which bear evident Marks of the Choice of Men being French, as they are chiefly compoſed of thoſe who were formerly in their Service. Large Quantities of Proviſions are now laying up at Caringolly, in the Neighbourhood of Pondicherry, and which, as Hyder cannot, from the Situation of the Place, being on the Sea-coaſt, mean for his own Uſe, muſt be intended for the Service of the French on their Arrival.

I cannot bring this Letter to a Concluſion without expreſſing the Concern which, as a Member of the ſuperior Government in India, I muſt feel, in its being ſo long after the Expiration of the laſt Extenſion of its Powers, kept ſo entirely in the dark, as to the Line of Conduct which, in managing thoſe important Poſſeſſions of the Britiſh Nations, ought to be purſued. We act, no Doubt, to the beſt of our Judgment in every Inſtance, where it appears neceſſary we ſhould exert ourſelves for the Support of good Government and the public Intereſts; but it is natural to imagine that were we honoured with a Communication of what are the Views of the Crown relative to the future Diſpoſal of theſe valuable Poſſeſſions, we ſhould execute the Truſt repoſed in us with greater Confidence; and, conſidering the preſent Situation of the Britiſh Dominions in the Weſt, ſurely thoſe here cannot be deemed unworthy of the Notice of Government.

I hope it will be in my Power to tranſmit to your Lordſhip more favourable Accounts of Affairs here, by the next Opportunity which may offer; but I beg Leave to repeat, that nothing effectual can be done without great Exertions from Government at Home.

Your Lordſhip will in courſe lay the Subject of this Addreſs before His Majeſty, and permit me to requeſt you will, at the ſame Time aſſure him that no Efforts or Endeavours ſhall ever be wanting on my Part, to promote the Intereſts and Welfare of the Britiſh Nation in India, and to ſupport the Honour of His Majeſty's Service.

Head Quarters, Choultry Plain,
the 1ſt Dec. 1780.

I have the Honour, &c. &c.
Eyre Coote.

P. S. Since writing the above, having procured Copies of Articles of Alliance ſubſiſting between the French and Hyder Ally, and the Marattas and Hyder Ally, and having been aſſured they are real, I beg Leave to incloſe Tranſlates of them for your Lordſhip's Information.

(Tranſlate.)

Articles of a Treaty of Alliance between Hyder Ally Khan and the Marattas, given by the latter.

1ſt. That a mutual and perpetual Friendſhip take Place between us, in good Faith and Confidence.

2d. That you pay the full Amount of your Tribute, and likewiſe the annual Sum of 12 Lacks of Rupees.

3. Having determined to attack Surat, you muſt not preſerve a Friendſhip with the Engliſh, nor countenance Ragonaut Row. Whilſt we are employed on this Buſineſs, you are to invade the Carnatic.

4th. After we have conquered Surat, we will then proceed to your Aſſiſtance. On the other Hand, ſhould you firſt accompliſh your Buſineſs in the Carnatic, you will of courſe come to our Aſſiſtance,

Assistance. The Conquest of Surat and the Carnatic being finished, we will proceed together against the Country of the Nizam; and having conquered it, divide it equally between us.

5th. Should the English propose Peace with us, we will not conclude it without your Advice; but we will first interpose our Endeavours to accommodate Matters between you and them, and then conclude Peace ourselves.

6th. We observe the Friendship subsisting between you and the French, the Countenance you shew them, and your Desire to assist them. If you are serious in this Business, it is well. In the Event of a War, whatever Troops they may want, we will supply them; but all Expences attending these Troops are to be paid by you.

7th. Any Person shewing Enmity towards us, we will unite together, and chastize them; and as a Compensation to you for agreeing to this Business, we relinquish to you the Country on this Side of this River Kistnah.

8th. Upon the Payments to the present Time, you require a Discharge for the Choute. Give us Two Years Advance of the Sum of 12 Lacks, to be paid annually, and we will grant a Discharge.

9th. Should we prevail over the English, we shall then consult about future Arrangements.

10th. In Course of the War, should Ragonaut Row be taken Prisoner, you require him to be given up to you. This, as he is our particular Enemy, we cannot agree to; but on knowing your Reasons, we will endeavour to accommodate ourselves to them.

11th. You require that Reza Ally * Cawn be delivered up: Provided you will engage by every solemn Vow, such as shall be to us a sufficient Security, that he be not ill-treated or disgraced, we will send him to you.

East India House,
11th May 1781.

A true Copy.

(Translate.)

Articles given by the French to Hyder Ally Khân, of Treaty and Alliance.

1st. That a lasting Friendship take Place between us; and that we unite to chastise the English.

2d. When the Ships with our Troops arrive, you will fix upon † Coreal Bunder for their landing.

3d. After their Arrival our Fleet shall join your's, and proceed to Madras.

4th. A small Body of our Troops to attend you by Land, and be obedient to your Orders.

5th. Whatever Bunders (Seaports) we shall conquer, Guards shall be placed in them by each of us; but the executive Power to rest with us, and you are not to interfere.

6th. Whatever other Places may be conquered by us, such as Arcot, &c. we shall lay no Claim to, but be entirely at your Disposal.

7th. Whatever Bunders (Seaports) we may conquer, you shall share an equal Proportion of the Plunder which may be thereby acquired: That all Military Stores taken in the Forts shall be yours; nor will we make any Claim on them.

8th. Should Terms of Peace be at any Time proposed betwixt us and the English, we shall first accommodate your Disputes before we finally decide; nor will we hold such Intercourse without your Consent and Approbation.

9th. After we have conquered the English, and concluded every Thing, we will station with you

* Son of Chunda Saheib, the former French Nabob of the Carnatic.

† Seaport on the Malabar Coast, near to Mahé.

2,000

2,000 Europeans, with Officers, who shall be paid by us; but you are to defray the Expences of Ammunition and other Stores for their Use.

10th. Whatever Expences in the present War with the English may be incurred on our Account, we will grant a Bond for, and as Security for the Payment, you keep in your Hands, such of the Acquisitions by Conquest as you may judge proper. We shall never undertake any Measure without your Advice and Approbation.

11th. With respect to Tanjore, knowing your Wishes, ours are the same: In this Business we are highly satisfied, nor will we enter any Part of that Country.

12th. That in the Affairs of the Country we act in concert.

East India House,
11th May, 1781.

A true Copy.

APPENDIX, N° 19.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, 4th April 1769.

At a Consultation:

PRESENT,

Charles Bourchier, Esquire, Governor, President,
Josias Du Pré,
Alexander Wynch,
Samuel Ardley,
George Dawson,
John Call,
John Andrews,
George Stratton,
James Bourchier,
George Mackay.

MR. Stracey being returned, lays before the Board the Treaty executed on the Part of Hyder Ally Cawn; which is ordered to be now entered. The Board then proceed to make such Observations on the several Articles of the Treaty, as may be necessary for the Information of our Honourable Masters; in doing which it is necessary to consider,

1st. The Motives and Reasons which induced us to accede to them.

2d. The natural Consequences to be expected therefrom.

With regard to the first Point proposed to be considered, we have, in the Course of our Proceedings, urged the Reasons which induced us to adopt Measures for bringing about a Peace, and as it is intended to collect together the several Arguments that have been used to shew the absolute Necessity of that Measure, that our Honourable Masters may see at one View the Motives for our Conduct, it will only be here necessary to shew, that the several Articles of the Treaty are as favourable as in our present Situation could be obtained; and to recite in a summary Way the Consequences which may naturally be expected therefrom.

APPENDIX, N° 19.

A Treaty of perpetual Friendſhip and Peace, made and concluded between the Governor and Council of Fort Saint George, in Behalf of the Honbourable English East India Company, for all their Poſſeſſions, and for the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, on the one Part; and the Nabob, Hyder Ally Cawn Behawder, for the Country of Myſore, Hyder Nagur, and his other Poſſeſſions, on the other Part; on the following Conditions.

Treaty.

Article 1ſt. That all Hoſtilities ſhall immediately ceaſe on the Concluſion of this Treaty, which is to be perpetual, or as long as the Company may exiſt: That Peace and Friendſhip ſhall take Place between the contracting Parties (particularly including therein, the Rajah of Tanjore, the Malavar, Ram Rajah, and Morari Row, who are Friends and Allies to the Carnatic Payen Ghaut) alſo all others the Friends and Allies of the contracting Parties, provided they do not become the Aggreſſors againſt either of them; but if they are Aggreſſors, they are not to be aſſiſted by either Party.

Article 2d. That in caſe any of the contracting Parties ſhall be attacked, they ſhall, from their reſpective Countries, mutually aſſiſt each other to drive the Enemy out. The Pay of ſuch Aſſiſtance of Troops, from one Party to another, to be after the following Rates: Viz. To every Soldier and Horſeman, 15 Rupees per Month, and every Sepoy 7½ Rupees per Month. The Pay of the Sardars and Commandants, to be as it ſhall be agreed on at the Time.

Art. 3d. The Preſidency of Bombay, and all the Factories and Places which were before or are now under their Government, are included in this Treaty of Friendſhip; and the Nabob Hyder Ally

Obſervations.

It muſt appear remarkable, that when the Carnatic is included in the preſent Treaty, that the Nabob, who is the Governor thereof, is not made a Party. To illuſtrate this Matter, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that we were very deſirous that the Nabob ſhould be inſerted as One of the contracting Parties, but the Enmity ſubſiſting between him and Hyder Ally, is ſo deeply rooted in their Hearts, that we believe nothing can ever induce them to be on fair Terms with each other, much leſs to enter into any ſincere Engagements of Friendſhip; and although we have repeatedly repreſented to the Nabob, the abſolute Neceſſity of concluding a Peace, yet we are convinced he would rather ſuffer his whole Country to be laid waſte, and ſubmit to all the fatal Conſequences ſo juſtly to be apprehended from proſecuting the War, than conſent to a Peace with a Man he ſo much deteſts. He has, it is true, given his Aſſent to the ſeveral Articles of the Treaty, and promiſed to authorize us, by a Writing, to ſettle for the Carnatic, but that proceeded entirely from his ſeeing us determined to conclude a Peace; and he had no other Alternative to purſue.

Article 1ſt. The Reaſon why the King of Tanjour, and the other Perſons mentioned in this Article were inſerted, has already been explained in the Reaſons which Mr. Du Pré gave us on his Return from the Conference with Hyder Ally, the 30th of March, at Night. And as Hyder Ally ſo ſtrenuouſly inſiſted on the King of Tanjour's being particularly mentioned, it appeared neceſſary that he, as well as the others, ſhould be inſerted as Friends and Allies to the Carnatic, that we might make a Merit with them, our having included them in the Treaty.

Article 2d. As we have Reaſon to believe that Hyder Ally's principal Motive for concluding a Peace with us, was, that he might, in caſe of Need, obtain our Aſſiſtance; it is not to be wondered at that he ſhould ſo ſtrenuouſly preſs that the Alliance ſhould be made both offenſive and defenſive, as hath in our former Proceedings been ſet forth. The offenſive Part we abſolutely rejected; and wiſhed and endeavoured to decline the defenſive as far as could be done without abſolutely breaking off the Treaty, as we were fully ſenſible of the Difficulties in which we might thereby be involved: But no Peace could be expected without it: And it was with the utmoſt Difficulty Hyder Ally would conſent to the Article even in its preſent Form. We are ſorry to ſay it leaves us but too much cauſe to apprehend future Troubles and Embarraſſments, which will require our utmoſt Care and Attention to obviate. This Article muſt therefore be conſidered as ariſing from political Neceſſity, not Choice.

Art. 3d. The Difficulty which attended adjuſting this Article, appears fully on the Face of our Proceedings. Upon the whole, we have Reaſon to be well ſatisfied with the Manner in which

APPENDIX, N° 19.

Ally Cawn Behauder engages, out of his Friendship and Regard to the Company, to grant to them (the Factories) Privileges, and Exemptions in Trade, in the same Manner as they before held them; moreover to release all the Sardars, Europeans, Sepoys, &c. who may have been taken on that Side, and this immediately on the Arrival of a proper Person from the Governor and Council of Bombay for that Purpose; and also to settle the Particulars of the Privileges of Trade and other Matters relative to the Sandal Wood and Pepper, &c. Articles of Trade. And as there is now established between the contracting Parties (the Company and the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn) a perpetual Peace, there is no Doubt but the Presidency of Bombay will exchange with the said Nabob, a Treaty to the same Purport as this, respecting the Affairs of the said Place, &c. and all the Factories on that Side, in the Course of this War, it is hereby agreed and stipulated, that they shall be mutually forgiven, and no Claim or Demand on any Account made for them hereafter.

Art. 4th. The above Nabob engages, that all the Officers, Europeans, and Sepoys, belonging to the Presidency of Madras, shall immediately be released on the Arrival of a proper Person at Bengulure to demand them; also, that all the Sardars and People belonging to the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, who may have been taken in this War, shall likewise be released. The English Company engaging on their Side to release the People belonging to the said Nabob, who may have been taken also in this War.

Art. 5th. The contracting Parties mutually engage and agree, that the Forts and Places which may have been taken by either Party from the other in this War, shall be mutually restored except the Fort of Caroor and its Districts. And whereas the English Company have in the Forts of Colar and Vencatigherry (exclusive of the former Stores therein) many Cannon Shot, Powder, Ball, and Muskets; the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn engages, that the said Company shall have Permission to bring away the same without any Loss or Molestation being given them therein; and as soon as they are withdrawn, the said Forts shall immediately be evacuated and restored to the said Nabob.

Art. 4th. Requires no other Remark, than that the Release of so many Europeans both on this and the Malabar Coast, who had during the War been taken by him, was a very material Motive for our concluding a Peace, as those poor People must otherwise have continued to languish in Confinement, and of the War had lasted much longer, would probably have perished in Prison.

Art. 5th. The mutual Restoration of Places, we have Reason to think equally advantageous to the Nabob as to Hyder Ally; considering that the Places we held in the Balla Ghaut could not be maintained without more Expence than they would yield Advantage, and that the Advices we received daily from the Tinnevelly Country, of the Progress made by Meer Phazel Ulla Cawn, Hyder's Officer, the Defection of the Nabob's Troops there, and the Combination of the Polygars to favour the Enemy, gave us just Reason to apprehend the Loss of that whole Country, as many principal Forts had already been given up to the Enemy. With respect to Caroor, it did belong to the Mysore Country, and was taken during the Siege of Pondicherry, and retaken latterly by Hyder Ally, and now claimed as an Appendage to the Mysore Dominions; we wished, and used all possible Endeavours to get it restored to the Carnatic; but finding Hyder Ally inflexible on this Article, we thought it more adviseable to yield the Point, than risque the Continuance of the War.

In Witness whereof the said contracting Parties have interchangeably signed and sealed Two Instruments of the same Tenor and Date, viz. the said President and Council, on Behalf of the English East India Company and the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, in Fort Saint George, this 3d Day of April, in the Year of the Christian Æra 1769, and the said Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn Behauder, at his Camp at Madavaram, the Twenty-fifth Day of the Moon Zeckyd, in the Year of Hegyra 1182.

The President is desired to apply to the Nabob for Orders for his Officers at Kittagherry, Vaniambady, and Tripetore, for the Delivery up of those Places to the Officer we may appoint to receive them, that they may be restored to Hyder Ally, agreeable to the Treaty.

Agreed that Messrs. Du Pré, Andrews, and James Bourchier, be appointed a Deputation to proceed to Hyder Ally Cawn, with proper Presents on Behalf of the Company.

Cha. Bourchier,
Jos. Du Pré,
John Call,
Saml Ardley,
George Stratton,
Jas Bourchier,
Geo. Mackay,

Extracts from Fort Saint George Country Correspondence.

N° 210. *From Hyder Ally Cawn.—Dated 29th May; received 10th June 1769.*

I have acquainted Major Bonjour of some Circumstances relative to the joining and uniting of Three Sarders, Ianojee, yourself, and me; a Memorandum of which I made the Major take down in Writing, that he might be very particular thereof in his Account to you. By Veenajee's Means also, I have sent you a Letter lately received by me from Ianojee, which I am to request you will return after taking a Copy of it in the English Language. In consequence of the Peace and Alliances which by God's Blessing has been concluded on between us, to our mutual Satisfaction, we ought both to be in the strictest Union, and together consider of such a Plan as may weaken and disgrace our Enemies, and prevent them from entering either into your Country or mine. Actuated therefore by that Friendship and Regard subsisting between us, I take the Liberty to acquaint you that Ianojee Bhosilla has for this long Time been on a Footing of Friendship, and is desirous of an Alliance with me; when we Three therefore are joined, so far will it be from the Power of the Fourth to penetrate into either of our respective Countries, that he will be afraid even for his own Safety. Let me recommend therefore to you, to send to Ianogee a proper Vakeel with Letters, in order to establish a Treaty of Union; and I will send one to him to perfect a Treaty, purporting the Junction and Alliance of us Three, and our assisting each other when necessary. I am convinced that after our Vakeels are gone to him, he will send a trusty one in Return, whom I shall send to you on his Arrival with me.

I am desirous of recovering Four of my Places, which for these Two Years past have been in the Hands of Maudavarow, and the taking of which, by God's Blessing, will not require above a Day each. You will therefore (consistent with that Friendship and Regard subsisting between us, and the good Appearance thereof in the Eyes of the World) send Major Bonjour to me for Form's Sake, with a Battalion of Sepoys and Two Field Pieces. As the above Four Places are situated near our Countries, and as it is by no Means adviseable that Maratta Garrisons should be therein, on the contrary, absolutely necessary for them to be cleared, I have therefore, induced by my Friendship, mentioned this Circumstance to , repeating at the same Time my above Request for the Major, &c. and referring you to him and Venajee Pundat for further Particulars. Always let me be made happy by the Receipt of Letters from you, advising of your Health. May your Happiness encrease!

N. B. The Letter from him to Mr. Dupré is of the same Purport, and the same Date.

A Letter from Ianojee Boonsilla to Hyder Ally Cawn.—No Date.

It is a long Time since I had the Pleasure of receiving your agreeable Letters, which will afford Joy and Encouragement to the Hearts of sincere Friends; a Neglect of which I impute to no other Thing but your being engaged very much in Business. The following Occurrences have lately happened; Maudavarow entertained long Animosity against me, for which Reason this Year he feigned a greater Friendship than former Years, and first swore the customary Oath upon green Leaves, called Bala, and a yellow Stuff, called Bandah; and maintained a Correspondence of Letters, and sent proper Vakeels; the mutual Presents were sent: Thus through his deceitful Means, sent his Divan Devucara Pundet, and gained me under his Influence, which made me remain quite unprepared with regard to the Troops and Stores. In the Interim, the said Modavarow on a sudden, and by long Marches, arrived in the Subah of Barad and Gonovoyah, with an Army of 40,000 Horse, and plundered them. I depended upon the Grace of God; and within a little Time I collected an Army of 15,000 of the best Horse, and by the Assistance of Modajee Bhoonsillah, Samajee Bhoonsillah,

ſillah, and Nembajee Bhoonſillah, who are now in perfect Union with me; and likewiſe by the Aid of the old Sarders, am waiting for a proper Opportunity, and Troops are daily gathering together from different Parts. Whatever may be the Will of Providence, ſhall come to paſs. But as this is an Affair of great Importance, it cannot be managed with a better Succeſs, without a Junction of ſome good Friends and brave Sardars. There is a Proverb which ſays, That if Two Hearts are united, they may break the Mountains to Pieces, and diſperſe great Multitudes of People. The ſaid Modavarow gave you many improper Treatments. I on my Part ſhall alſo proceed with continual Marches, in order to arrive at the Places where that faithleſs Man (meaning Modavarow) remains, in a ſhort Time. I wonder you are paying large Sums of Money every Year to him, notwithſtanding which, you are under the ſame Apprehenſions: This can produce no Benefit. If you reſolve to ſpend the Sum which you are paying to him, and do ſome Buſineſs, your Name and Reputation ſhall be rewarded in this World, and remain firm to the Day of Judgment; wherefore, if we unite and endeavour to extirpate that faithleſs Man, it will be very proper. Anna Punt, Son to Daven Wolcar, and Gopal Parry, Brother to Raganaut Row, who are Enemies to Maudavarow, with a large Army, and by the Aſſiſtance of Ranah and Jaut, attacked ſome of Modavarow's Sardars and Managers, ſuch as Sindiah, &c. agreeable to the Great Mogul's Command and the Vizier's Directions, and expelled them from the Country of Worjan Malva, and other Parts of Indoſtan; and as Modavarow is engaged in War with me, he could go to their Aſſiſtance. If you at this Juncture endeavour to remove his People from the Management of the Country in your Neighbourhood, it will be very adviſeable. You cannot meet with ſuch an Opportunity as this again. I remain in this Expectation. You'll ſend me a ſatisfactory Anſwer by a ſenſible Man, to whom I may communicate my Intentions. After I know your Anſwer, I ſhall act accordingly. Don't let this fair Opportunity be loſt.

N° 216. *To Hyder Ally Cawn; dated 16 June 1769.*

I have had the Pleaſure to receive your Letter of the 29th ult. the Contents of which I obſerved. Major Bonjour alſo being arrived, has acquainted me with the Matters you gave him in Charge; and I have converſed with your Vakeel Venajee Pundut on the ſame Subjects.

It gives me great Satisfaction to obſerve, that the free Communication of Thoughts, the Soul of Friendſhip, which has and is likely to take place between us; your imparting to me your Sentiments on ſuch important Affairs, and tranſmitting to me your Letters from Janogee, are ſtrong Proofs thereof, and are eſteemed by me in the higheſt Manner, as Tokens of that Sincerity of Regard which is both our Intereſts ſo much to cultivate: On my Part, in every Thing conſiſtent with the Company's Welfare, and what they owe to their other Friends and Allies, you may depend on my utmoſt Endeavour to promote this good End. But I ſhould be wanting in that Openneſs you have ſet me the Example of, did I not inform you of what occurs to me reſpecting the Troops you deſire; which is, that the ſame would be doubtleſs an open Declaration of War againſt the Marattas, for which the Company have no juſt Ground: This being the Caſe, I am ſure you will agree with me in the Impropriety of this Step on my Part, and therefore decline aſking of it; for Friends ever conſider each others Situation and Intereſt. Reſpecting my ſending a Vackeel to Janogee, and the Alliance you propoſe making between us Three, I muſt inform you (as indeed you have before been during the Courſe of the late Negotiation) that although the Company's Affairs in India are conducted under Three diſtinct and independent Governments, yet in all Undertakings of Conſequence, the Three muſt unite in Support of the Whole; you will therefore, I am certain, concur with me in Opinion, that in a Matter of ſuch Importance, and which may ſo eſſentially affect their Departments, it is abſolutely neceſſary for me previouſly to conſult, and have the Approbation of, the other Two Branches. Your Vakeel Venajee Pundut is fully acquainted of my Sentiments in this Reſpect; and to him I beg Leave to refer for further Particulars; aſſuring you, that you will ever find me ſteady to my Engagements; and requeſting, till I can have the Pleaſure of ſeeing you, I may have that of frequently hearing from you, adviſing of your Health and Proſperity. What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX, N° 19.

Extracts of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, the 24th July 1769.

PRESENT,

Charles Bourchier, Esquire, Governor, President,
Josias Du Pré,
John Call,
John Andrews,
Samuel Ardley,
George Stratton,
George Dawson,
James Bourchier,
John Whitehill.

Letters from Hyder Ally Cawn to the President, Mr. Du Pré, and his Vakeel, as entered in Country Correspondence, N° 237, 238, and 239: Advising, That as we had judged it improper to assist him with the Battalion of Sepoys he requested, in recovering the Places which had been taken from him, as such a Step would cause a Rupture with the Marattas, which we had no just Cause for, he had acquiesced, and would lay aside for the present his Intentions against those Places; representing, that the Marattas purpose entering both his Country and the Carnatic to collect Money; that in case the Marattas have any Designs against the Carnatic, he would be ready to assist us with a large Force; and that, on the other Hand, should they attack his Country, he expects we should assist him against them; representing, that no Time should be lost in coming to a Resolution, and taking Measures accordingly; and that after the Enemy have entered the Country, it will be needless to say, we must consult with the Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay; desiring we would acquaint him immediately with our Determination, and send Moodu Kistna to him, to whom he has some Matters to communicate.

There is not the least Doubt but that Hyder Ally will employ every Means to induce us to join him against the Marattas; the late Proposal he made of our assisting him with a Battalion of Sepoys, and Two Guns, could only be intended to surprise us into a Rupture with Maudavarow, well knowing that were we once to take up Arms, we could not lay them down at Pleasure. It is therefore necessary that we should use every possible Precaution to avoid engaging in any Dispute whatever. Should Hyder, by any unjustifiable Measures, draw the Marattas upon him, we may with great Reason refuse him any Assistance, as being the Aggressor. Resolved therefore, That a Letter be wrote, Thanking him for the Caution he has given us, to be upon our Guard against the Designs of the Marattas, but which we hope will not be directed against the Carnatic, as we shall on our Part studiously avoid giving them any just Cause to attack us; that he is the best Judge how far the Operations he is now employed in against the Cuddapah, Cannoul, &c. Districts, may excite a Jealousy of his Intentions, and produce the Effect we apprehended from the Attack he proposed against the Places taken by the Marattas. As to his Desire that Moodu Kistna may be sent to him, he is to be informed, that Moodu Kistna, through Sickness, is unable to undertake such a Journey, which indeed is unnecessary, as his Vakeel Venajee resides here, through whose Means all Matters may be transacted. Ruccun ud Dowlah having, in a Letter dated 30th ultimo, N°. 251, represented, that the Cuddapah, and other Countries against which Hyder Ally has directed his late Operations, and is now employed on, are dependant on and tributary to the Soubah of the Decan, and desired we will write to him on the Subject; it is resolved that he be acquainted, that his Proceedings against those Districts are contrary to the 1st Article of the Treaty, the Soubah being in firm Alliance and Friendship with the Company.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, as entered in Country Correspondence; Representing, That Ally Zeman Cawn, One of Hyder's Sardars, had wrote a Letter to Bangar Yachem Naigue, Polygar of Vencatagerry, advising him to send a Vakeel to Hyder Ally, that a Friendship might be settled between them, which is contrary to the Custom of all Nations, and inconsistent with the Treaty lately concluded; advising also, that although near Four Months are expired since the Conclusion of the Treaty, yet that he retained in his Hands Cuttaloor and Cautputtoor, belonging to the Circar of Trichinopoly: Agreed, That these Matters be represented to Hyder Ally, and that he be informed we are induced to believe, that these Proceedings, so contrary to the Treaty of Friendship lately established, are without his Orders, but which it is necessary he should be advised of.

Ch^{s} Bourchier,
Jos. Du Pré,
John Call,
Sam^{l} Ardley,
Geo. Stratton,
Ja. Bourchier,
John Whitehill.

N° 237.

N° 237. *From Hyder Ally Cawn; dated 1st, and received 8th July 1769.*

I have had the Pleasure of your Letter, and observe what you say respecting the sending the Battalion of Sepoys I desired. As Maudavarow had since these Two Years taken Three or Four of my Places, which I proposed recovering, I mentioned this Circumstance to you, prompted by my Friendship and Regard, and likewise made the above Request relative to the Sepoys. Your Answer to which is, "that you should be wanting in that Openness I had set you the Example of, did you not acquaint me with your own Thoughts on this Subject; which were, that the same would have the Appearance of a Rupture with the Marattas, which the Company did not think proper to cause at this present; and that you were convinced, on Reflection I should be of the same Opinion with you." It is very certain, where Friendship and Sincerity prevail between Parties, there the Advice or Counsel of either are considered in the Light of both; I shall therefore, agreeable to your Desire, lay aside for the present my Intentions against those Places: But as it is expressed in the Treaty of Peace, "That in case any Enemy raises Disturbances either in your Country or mine, both are to join in the Expulsion of such an Enemy," I now acquaint you, that the Marattas, envious and jealous of the Friendship and Alliance established between the Company and me, are desirous of breaking the same, and by penetrating into both our Countries, reap the Advantage thereof. You must have heard from others, of their having for this long Time had in their Heads an Expedition to the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, and to collect from it Lacks every Year. Such being the Case, as I am a Well-wisher to the Company as well as you, I propose, out of the Sincerity of my Regard and Attachment, that should the Marattas after the Rains shew any sinister Views against the Carnatic, to join with you a large Force to repel their Disturbances; desiring you at the same Time, that should they on the contrary proceed to my Country, that you join me also with a proper Force for the same Purpose; for where Friendship subsists in Perfection, the Countries of each other are one. I hope, therefore, from this Time you will begin to reflect on all this, and acquaint me with the Result, as after the Enemy's penetrating either into your's or my Country, your then pleading an Excuse *that you must consult with the Governors of Bengal and Bombay*, can be of no Benefit; the Saying, you know, expresses, that "the Remedy should precede the Disease." My mentioning this to you is not solely from the Consideration of my own Interests, but from my Attachment to the Company also; in short, for both our Goods and the Detriment of the common Enemy. Give me Leave to repeat again therefore, my Hope that you will consider, and will reflect on all this, and acquaint me with the Result. For further Particulars I refer you to Venajee Pundut, my Vakeel. Always favour me with Letters, advising me of your Health, that I may rejoice and be glad. May your Happiness increase.

P. S. Send Moodoo Kistnah Moodelery to me here, as it is necessary for me to acquaint him of some certain Matters.

N° 238. *From Hyder Ally Cawn to Mr. Dupré; dated the 1st of July 1769.*

I had the Satisfaction of receiving your kind Letter, and observe what you write me of the Battalion of Sepoys I requested of you. Maudavarow took Three or Four Places from me Two Years ago, and is still in Possession of them: I want to get them cleared from his Hands; for which Reason I acquainted you, by Way of Friendship, and wrote for a Battalion of Sepoys. The Governor returned an Answer to me, importing, that if the same is sent, it will set on a Quarrel with the Marattas; that the Company do not think it adviseable at present; and that he is certain I will be of the same Opinion as himself. Out of Regard to what you and the Governor was pleased to write me, I shall decline taking those Places for the present. When late a Peace was concluded, it was specified in the Treaty between us, that if any Enemies attempt to disturb my Countries or yours, we must endeavour to expel them jointly with each other. The Marattas knowing that Friendship and Union were established between the Company and myself, entertained a Hatred and Malice, and Design to cause a Difference between the Company and myself, and disturb our Countries, and benefit themselves by it. They have had a Design for this long Time past, to undertake an Expedition against the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, and procure several Lacks every Year; of which I suppose you heard by other Hands. You are a Well-wisher to the Company, I am also a Well-wisher to them; for which Reason I write to you by Way of Friendship and Union, that after the Monsoon, if the Marattas make any Attempt against your Country, I shall endeavour to remove them, by joining you with a proper Army; should they enter my Country, you should on your Part join me with proper Force, and remove the Enemy, because in Matters of Union and sincere Friendship, each other's Countries are to be deemed in the same Light; I hope therefore that the Governor and yourself consult upon this

Matter at this very Time, and ſettle proper Meaſures beforehand upon this Buſineſs, and adviſe me with it; becauſe, that after the Enemy's Entrance either into your Country or mine, it will be to no Purpoſe to plead an Excuſe of knowing the Advice of the Governors of Bengal and Bombay. One ſhould be mindful of proper Remedy before any Diſorder happens; and I do not write this with a View of Self-intereſt, but with a View of the Company's Welfare, the mutual Good, and the Deſtruction of our Enemy. I hope therefore, that you and the Governor will conſider, hold a Conſultation, and ſettle a Method upon the Subject, and adviſe me. For other Matters I refer you to Venajee Pundat, my Vakeel. Continue your kind Correſpondence of Letters, adviſing me of your Welfare, that I may rejoice. May your Happineſs increaſe.

N° 239. *Extract of a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn to Venajee Pundat.*

I received the Governor and Mr. Dupré's Letter, and obſerve the Contents, but could not underſtand any Particular by it. Since a Peace was concluded between me and the Engliſh, I think they ſhould aſſiſt me againſt the Marattas if they were to march againſt me; I ſhould in like Manner aſſiſt the Engliſh if the Marattas were to march againſt them. As it was agreed that both ſhould remain in Union, it is better that both ſhould be of one Mind; but it is not proper to keep one Thing in Heart, and ſpeak another by Mouth. I received certain Intelligence from ſome creditable Perſons in the Maratta Army, that their firm Reſolution is to come into the Carnatic, after the Monſoon, with a Deſign to get a large Sum of Money in theſe Parts. It is not to be thought that they will decline coming into theſe Parts; if I let them remain in Poſſeſſion of Three or Four Places belonging to me, which they have already poſſeſſed, they certainly will come. As to my Part, I am paying them every Year the Money agreed on. It is my Opinion, if they come, their Deſire is to get a large Sum of Money from the Engliſh. If the Engliſh and I ſhould act jointly and ſincerely, it can't be in their Power to do any Thing. If the Marattas march againſt the Engliſh, I ſhall aſſiſt the Engliſh; the Engliſh ſhould aſſiſt me, if the Marattas come againſt me; all this was agreed on before. If the Marattas come, and act againſt me, the Engliſh will certainly ſay in that Juncture, That they muſt write to Bombay and Bengal, and muſt hear from them to aſſiſt me; wherefore, if I know their Intentions clearly at this Time, it would enable me to conſult proper Meaſures for my future Proceedings. While we both, the Engliſh and I, are Friends, we ſhould not give Room for others to do any Thing. I write all this with a View of the mutual Safety and Welfare of the Company. I have Force enough to retake the Three or Four Places the Marattas are in Poſſeſſion of, as aforeſaid. I lately requeſted the Engliſh to ſend me a Battalion of Sepoys, thereby to make a Trial of their Intentions, whether they would aſſiſt me with their Troops, according to their Agreement, in caſe the Marattas began a War with me in future. I repeat, that after the Monſoon, the Marattas will certainly come; and I hear their Intention is to receive a large Sum of Money from the Engliſh; wherefore, if the Engliſh and I be in Union to prevent their Schemes, it will be for our Safety. For all which, we ſhould talk Face to Face, and determine it; wherefore, I deſired the Governor to ſend Mooda Kiſtna Moodalier to me; you will alſo ſpeak to his Honour about it. I ſent Anſwers to the Letters received; you will deliver them to the Governor and Mr. Dupré, and ſpeak yourſelf in a proper Manner. The Governor and Council may conſult again upon the Subject, and write me their real Intentions clearly. You will, on your Part, write me very fully.

N° 255. *To Hyder Ally Cawn.—Dated 27th July 1769.*

I have received your Letter of the 1ſt Inſtant; the Contents of which I fully obſerved.

You tell me, that the Marrattas, jealous of the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Company and you, are deſirous of breaking the ſame; and by penetrating into both our Countries, to reap the Advantage thereof. You therefore deſire I would conſider well, as the Remedy ſhould ever precede the Diſeaſe. This I underſtand.

Your putting me in this Manner upon my Guard, by acquainting me thus early of the Danger you think I have to apprehend, I eſteem a ſtrong Proof of the Sincerity of your Regard; and you may be aſſured I ſhall take Care accordingly to put Matters on a proper Footing; and for that Purpoſe, and conformably to your Advice, ſhall continue to write to the Governors of Bengal and Bombay, to concert Meaſures with them for the Peace, Security, and Advantage of the Company and their Allies; the good Effects of all which will appear in good Time. Meanwhile it is my

Hopes,

Hopes, that the Intentions which you ſuppoſe the Marrattas to entertain at this Time, of diſturbing your Government, and that of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, will not take Place; they ſhall have no Provocation on my Part. You are certainly the proper and beſt Judge of your own Affairs; and knowing as you do, perfectly, the Connections and Intereſts of the Powers of Indoſtan, can with a diſcerning Eye penetrate into the future Conſequences of preſent Actions, and determine how far they may excite Jealouſies. I am not ſo competent a Judge of this Matter; nevertheleſs, out of Regard to the firm Friendſhip ſubſiſting between us, I thought proper to give you this Hint, leſt your preſent Operations, by creating a Jealouſy of your Intentions, ſhould produce in the End the ſame Effect as the direct Attack you inform me you had meditated upon certain Places, which Mandavarow took from you ſome Years ago; but from which Attack you now ſay you will deſiſt, agreeable to my Deſire. I am farther induced to mention this to you, as I have lately received a Letter from the Subah's Court, informing me that Cuddapah, &c. Diſtricts, againſt which your late and preſent Operations have been and are directed, are tributary to and under the Protection of the Subah of the Decan; and that the Sardars of thoſe Places are faithful Servants of the Circar, and Jaghirdars of the King. Upon this Subject, conſidering your Regard for Juſtice, it will be ſufficient I refer you to the firſt Article of the Treaty of Peace, and inform you, that before the Concluſion of that Treaty, the Company had entered into a firm Alliance and Friendſhip with his Highneſs.

I do not know whether it was by your Orders, or to your Knowledge, that one of your Sardars, Ally Zaman Cawn, wrote a Letter lately to Banjar Yachem Naigue Polygar of Vencatagerry, adviſing him to ſend a Vakeel to you, and promiſing his Intereſt to ſettle a Friendſhip between you and the ſaid Naigue. This is very ſtrange. It is known to all the World, that the ſaid Naigue is an immediate Dependant and faithful Servant to Carnatic Payen Ghaut; and as that Circar is in firm Friendſhip and Alliance with you, of courſe the ſaid Naigue muſt be ſo likewiſe. What further Views your ſaid Sardar may have had, I am unacquainted with; but as it is contrary to the Cuſtom of Nations, for one Sovereign or his Officers to write in ſuch Terms to Dependants and Servants of another, while Peace and Friendſhip is ſubſiſting, I thought it neceſſary I ſhould inform you of this Matter, that you may enquire concerning the ſame; which I hope you will do, and adviſe me thereof.

Although Four Months are elapſed ſince the Concluſion of the Peace, whereby it was agreed, that all Places taken on both Sides ſhould be mutually reſtored, yet I am informed that Cuttala and Cautpattoor, Places belonging to the Circar of Trichinopolly, are not yet, or very lately were not, given up. This, I am perſuaded, muſt be contrary to your Order; but it is fit you ſhould be informed of all theſe Circumſtances.

I ſhould very willingly ſend Moodookiſtnah to you, as a further Means of cementing and increaſing the Friendſhip between us; but he is grown ſo infirm and ſickly, that he is utterly unable to endure the Fatigue of ſuch a Journey; and indeed it ſeems to me the leſs neceſſary, as you have here ſo capable and faithful a Servant as Venajee Pundat, through whoſe Means all neceſſary Intelligence may be conveyed reciprocally between us.

APPENDIX, N° 20.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, 12th March 1770.

PRESENT,

Joſias Du Pré, Eſq; Governor, Preſident,
Warren Haſtings,
Samuel Ardley,
George Stratton,
George Dawſon,
Rich[d] Brickenden,
George Mackay.
General Smith, abſent,
Mr. Brooke, indiſpoſed.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

ALTHOUGH little hath been ſaid on our Minutes in the courſe of the laſt Two Months, touching the State of our political Affairs, the Board have not been unattentive thereto; but as the Seaſon is now approaching when the Marattas muſt determine either to remain the whole Year on this Side the Kiſtnah, or to repaſs it, the Board think it expedient now to review what hath paſſed, to conſider the preſent State, and to form from thence what Judgment they can of the future. It has been noticed in our Minutes, that Application has been made to us by Hyder Ally, both by Letter and by his Vakeel, for Aſſiſtance. It has alſo been mentioned that a Vakeel has been ſent by Maudavarow to the Nabob, and to us, to demand our Friendſhip and Aid againſt Hyder; and it has been often repeated, that notwithſtanding the Treaty with Hyder, we had a juſt Plea for not ſending any Succours to him, conſidering him as the Aggreſſor; and that the Marattas have no Claim upon us for Aſſiſtance. There is little Cauſe to doubt but that the Marattas would demand the Chowte of the Carnatic, if they were diſengaged from the War with Hyder; and it is moſt probable they would do ſo, and detach a Party of Horſe to enter the Carnatic even during the War, if they were not apprehenſive that ſuch a Step would induce us to join our Forces to Hyder's; on the other Hand, Hyder ſeems to have been under great Apprehenſions of our uniting with the Marattas againſt him, and, as has already been obſerved, both have been earneſtly preſſing us for Aid. The Part we have acted has been that of endeavouring to keep alive the Hopes and Fears of both Parties, by not determining in Favour of either, and without promiſing Aſſiſtance to the one or the other, giving both Grounds to hope we would not aſſiſt his Adverſary; which is in Reality the Fact, and our Deſign in this Conduct has been to protract the Time and the War until the Seaſon ſhall make it neceſſary for the Marattas to return, or reſolve to remain on this Side the Kiſtnah; the Seaſon is now at hand, and Six Weeks more will probably determine that Point, to us ſo important. The Queſtions at preſent are, Whether it is adviſeable ſtill to perſevere in the ſame paſſive Conduct, without taking any other Meaſures? or, Whether any other, and what, Meaſures ſhall be taken? We have now for Two Months perſevered in the ſame Conduct, with a View to delay the Time. With Hyder Ally our Pleas have been, firſt the Diſpatch of the Britannia to Europe, and the Departure of the late Preſident; then the great Avocations of the new Preſident in reviewing and taking Charge of his new Department; and laſtly, that however well inclined we might be to ſupport the Friendſhip eſtabliſhed, yet the late Orders received from Europe reſpecting the Gentlemen coming out with full and unlimited Powers over all the Company's Affairs in India, made it neceſſary that we ſhould wait for their Arrival. With the Maratta Vakeel, the Negociation has paſſed through the Nabob; as Madavarow's Letter to the Preſident only enforces in general Terms that Maintenance of inviolable Friendſhip, and refers for other Matters to the Nabob; the Preſident has ſeldom ſeen the Vakeel, ſpoke reſervedly on every Subject but that of general Friendſhip, and left the reſt to the Nabob, who has aſſured the Vakeel of our Good-will to his Maſter, but that our Forms of deliberating upon every Meaſure repeatedly in Conſultation, eſpecially in Matters of ſuch Importance, neceſſarily demanded Time.

Theſe Excuſes and Delays cannot ſtand us in ſtead much longer; and what we have to apprehend is, that ſhould the Marattas gain any ſignal Advantage over Hyder, the Deſpair of our Aid may induce him to ſubmit to their Terms, whilſt yet they have Time enough left to turn their Arms againſt the Carnatic; or if Hyder gain the Advantage of them, ſo as to oblige them to retire, his Pride would be ſo much exalted, and his Spirits raiſed, that it is to be doubted whether Reſentment againſt us for not aſſiſting him, might not induce him to diſturb our Tranquillity; or, laſtly, if the Two Parties remain equal, whether they may not unite to invade the Carnatic, perceiving

ing that we amuſed both without Deſign to aſſiſt either. It is therefore propoſed, that in order to raiſe freſh Doubts, new Fears, and new Hopes in both Parties, as well as to be prepared for every Event, that a certain Number of the Troops at Vellour, and of thoſe at Trichinopoly, be ordered to hold themſelves in Readineſs to take the Field; that a light Field Train for each be alſo prepared, and Draught and Carriage Bullocks, with all other Neceſſaries, be got ready; that a Camp be marked out at a convenient Diſtance from each Place, and Tents pitched, but that the Troops remain in Garriſon till further Orders.

And the Preſident having deſired General Smith to prepare a State of the Troops to be ſo held in Readineſs, and of thoſe to remain in Garriſon, the ſame is now laid before the Board.

The Preſident acquaints the Board, that after the laſt Letter to Hyder Ally was wrote, and before it was ſent away, he received one from him, as entered in Country Correſpondence; to which a Draught of an Anſwer is now laid before the Board, which is approved.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 84. *From Hyder Ally Cawn.—Dated 7th March* 1770; *and received 14th April* 1770.

I was extremely glad to receive your agreeable Letter. Your Succeſſion to the Government, which was my long Deſire, gave me ſuch an infinite Joy and Satisfaction, that it is impoſſible for me to expreſs them by Words; if ſo, how is it poſſible to commit them in Writing? May God grant you Joy upon the Occaſion, and daily increaſe your Name and Reputation, and that the Company's Buſineſs may be diſpatched or regulated with daily Succeſs through your good Conduct and Management.

I lately wrote to you fully, concerning the Circumſtances of War between Maudavarow and myſelf. Now, by Way of Friendſhip, I take the Liberty to adviſe you what happened afterwards to this Day. When it was reported of Maudavarow's coming to theſe Parts, I, with my whole Army and Artillery, lay encamped near Maſſoor, belonging to Shanore, oppoſite to his Way; but he, turning from that Road, marched by the Way of Cheetal Durg, 25 Coſs Diſtance from the Place of my Encampment, into my own Territories, and took Poſſeſſion of Five or Six Forts inhabited by ſome Inhabitants, and put his own Garriſon in them; and then having left Gopall Row, Reelcant Row, Shajee Boonſela, Ananda Row Raſte, and Devalet Row Gorpada, who were his Sandars, with 10 or 12,000 Horſe for the Defence of them, proceeded forward; and as the ſaid Gopall Row, &c. lay encamped within 20 Coſs from me, I, by the Help of God, went and attacked them by Night; but they, not being able to maintain their Ground, rode upon the Horſes without Saddles, and fled. A large Number of Horſes, Camels, Pallenkeens, Tents, Flags, and other Goods, were taken as a Prize by Muſſelmen; and after their Camp was thus plundered, I halted One Day at the Place of their Encampment; and on the next Day I returned to the Place of my own Encampment. Maudavarow's People who were in the ſaid Fortreſſes, were entirely taken Priſoners and cut off; and the Fortreſſes were retaken. A Body of 8000 Horſe belonging to me, which were ordered lately by Way of hurting Party round Maudavarow's Army, fell upon his Catchee or Supply of Straw, &c. and ſkirmiſhed about his Army, and ſeized about 3000 Horſe: To this Day, by the Bleſſing of God they are ſeizing more every Day, at 100 or 200 Horſe at a Time. I ſhall alſo march towards Maudavarow; and, by the Help of God, whatever may happen hereafter, you will here of it. In Conſideration of the Union between us, the Army and Artillery which are with me, are your own; notwithſtanding, out of Regard to the firm Agreement mentioned in the Treaty between us, if the Company be but pleaſed to ſend but a ſmall Force to join and act in concert with me, to ſave the good Appearance, and to be talked of by the People, it will be very proper. It is a Thing very apparent, that the good Harmony and ſincere Friendſhip between the Company and myſelf, will be beneficial to many Affairs, and be a Means to ſtrike a Terror into the Enemy, and to increaſe the Friendſhip and regulate the Affairs of both Parties. By the Bleſſing of God, you are acquainted with all Matters, and it will be needleſs for me to write.

By Way of a Friendſhip and Freedom, I take the Liberty to ſend 4 Horſes of a good Colour, that came from Velayet or Turkiſh Country, and bought by myſelf, together with 5,000 Star Pagodas, as a Price for a Kalet or rich Veſt, &c. and deſire your Acceptance of the ſame, that I may be glad, as I remain in the Campaign with my Army clear of Baggage, and have not with me my Joſhacana and Feelcana (that is, Cloth and Jewels, Tents and Stable of Elephants) for which Reaſon I ſend you the above Money as a Price for the Kalet and Elephant. Make no Difficulties, but be pleaſed to accept them that I may be glad. Continue your Correſpondence of Letters adviſing me of your Health, as it will afford me an infinite Satisfaction. May your Happineſs and Gladneſs increaſe.

A Note

A Note encloſed.

3 Horſes of Abaras Colour.
1 D° Abluck Black Colour.
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4
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Letter from Meſſrs. Church and Sibbald, to the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George.

To the Honourable Joſias Dupré, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs.

Encloſed is Duplicate of our laſt Addreſs, under the 21ſt February. Agreeable to what we therein wrote you, we ſet out from Urgona ſhortly after, and arrived at this Place Yeſterday, where we found the Nabob. We had an Interview with him in the Evening, when we acquainted him, that we were ready to attend on any Matters he might have to offer, regarding your Side, and ſhould communicate them to your Honour, &c. agreeable to your Orders. He deſired us immediately to inform you, that as there is at preſent the ſtricteſt Friendſhip between him and the Honourable Company, which *he* will punctually maintain on his Part, he expects you will aſſiſt with a Body of Troops, agreeable to Treaty, againſt the Marattas, who, not ſatisfied with the Chout which he ſays he has duly paid them, ſtill continue moſt unjuſtly to ravage and plunder his Territories. The Force he requires is 300 Europeans and 3,000 Sepoys, with the uſual Artillery to ſuch a Body; and ſays, their Pay ſhall be according to the 2d Article of the Treaty; beſides which, he engages to give the Honourable Company the Sum of Three Lacks of Rupees. Through the Hopes and Expectations of their Aſſiſtance, he now ſeems well inclined to ſettle our Privileges on this Side on an advantageous Footing; but we much fear, ſhould your Honour not come into his Meaſures, that his former Coolneſs will return again. He waited at this Place for our Arrival, and ſet out this Morning for Siringapatam, where, at his earneſt Requeſt, we have agreed to accompany him; and it is moſt probable we ſhall be with him, ſhould no Orders from the Preſident and Council of Bombay to the contrary, till we can have the Pleaſure of receiving your Anſwer to this, which he has deſired us to requeſt may be ſent with all poſſible Expedition. As we are informed by the Nabob, that the Honourable Joſias Dupré, Eſquire, has ſucceeded the late Preſident, we beg Leave to offer our Congratulations on that Occaſion, wiſhing him all imaginable Succeſs in his Government.

We are, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Richd. Church,
J. Sibbald.

Belloor,
21 March 1770.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, Monday 30th April 1770.

PRESENT,

Joſias Du Pré, Eſq; Governor, Preſident,
Warren Haſtings,
Samuel Ardley,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Richd Brickenden,
George Mackay,
General Smith abſent.

Letters from Meſſrs. Church and Sibbald.—Received the 20th Inſtant; read as follow:

Triplicate, dated 21ſt March at Bellour: Adviſing, that in a Conference they had had with Hyder Ally, he had demanded that we ſhould aſſiſt him with 300 Europeans and 3,000 Sepoys, with the uſual Train of Artillery to ſuch a Body of Troops, the Expence of which he would defray according to Treaty, and moreover make the Company a Preſent of Three Lacks of Rupees; that from the Hopes of ſuch Aſſiſtance, he ſeemed inclined to ſettle the Company's Privileges on the Malabar Coaſt on an advantageous Footing; and repreſenting their Apprehenſions, that in caſe we ſhould not

not comply with his Demand, that his former Coolneſs will return; and deſiring our Anſwer with all Expedition.

Duplicate, dated at Nurſingpoor the 25th March: Acknowledging the Receipt of our Letters of 13th and 26th February, which they had communicated to Hyder Ally, and with which he ſeemed well ſatisfied; dated at Syringapatam the 2d Inſtant: Repeating their Requeſt, at the Deſire of Hyder, to be furniſhed with an expeditious Anſwer to their Letter of 21ſt March; and adviſing of their Intentions of continuing with him at leaſt Three Months longer.

We have hitherto, under various Pretences, deferred giving a poſitive Anſwer to the repeated Demands made by Hyder Ally for Aſſiſtance, as well from a Deſire to avoid engaging in freſh Troubles, as from the Hope of being able to gain Time until the Arrival of the expected Commiſſioners, without whoſe Concurrence we ſhould be unwilling to determine finally on the Part we are to act; but as it is uncertain when they may arrive, and as Hyder Ally will probably expect a deciſive Anſwer to his Demands, eſpecially if the Marattas ſhould not return this Seaſon, and it may not be in our Power to obſerve any longer the ſame neutral Syſtem; it becomes neceſſary to ſtate the Motives and Reaſons for and againſt our taking Part either with the Marattas or Hyder Ally, and the Conſequences to be apprehended from our engaging with the one or the other. It has already been obſerved (and we believe it will not admit of a Doubt) that our Aſſiſtance added to the Marattas, will enable them to reduce Hyder Ally entirely; but what are the Conſequences to be expected, were Hyder Ally ſubdued, and the whole Myſore Country added to the Dominion of the Marattas? The Power of the Marattas, which is already too great, would be thereby encreaſed, and rendered more dangerous. We could not expect that the Marattas would, in Conſideration of the Aſſiſtance afforded them, ſuffer the Carnatic to remain in Peace and Tranquillity; on the contrary, it is moſt juſtly to be apprehended that they would take the firſt Opportunity of exacting whatever Demands they might think proper from the Nabob, and which their Situation would then enable them to do at Pleaſure, and the Carnatic muſt of Courſe be conſtantly expoſed to their Ravages and Devaſtations. Theſe are certainly the very obvious Conſequences to be apprehended, were the Marattas to conquer the Myſore Country, and which, with our Aſſiſtance, they could not fail doing. Let us now conſider what Effects our aſſiſting Hyder Ally againſt the Marattas may produce.

It has always been allowed that Myſore is the moſt effectual and natural Barrier to the Carnatic againſt the Deſigns of the Marattas; and although our Aſſiſtance given to Hyder Ally would not enable him to reduce the Marattas Power, it would nevertheleſs prevent their gaining Poſſeſſion of that Country; which ought to be a principal Object of our Attention, for were that Barrier removed, it is not the Conſideration of our having acted for or againſt the Marattas that would ſave this Province from their Depredations. Another, and that too not the leaſt Conſideration that ſhould weigh with us in this Matter, is the Article of the Treaty: It is certain the Treaty was an Act of Neceſſity, and the Impoſſibility of our engaging to furniſh any certain Quota of Troops when demanded, was fully and clearly explained to Hyder Ally at the Time of our entering into it. But although we thus in ſome Meaſure reſerved to ourſelves the Option of aſſiſting Hyder Ally, or not, in caſe he were attacked, as it ſuited our own Conveniency, we certainly cannot, without a manifeſt Violation of that Treaty, take Part with the Marattas againſt him. Should Hyder Ally be able, without our Aſſiſtance, to withſtand the Attempts of Maudavarow, and after all oblige him to return to his own Country without effecting his Deſigns on Myſore, we muſt in that Caſe expect that Hyder Ally will thereby acquire greater Power and Influence than ever; and that he will not only tax us with the Breach of Treaty in not having aſſiſted him when his Country was ſo much endangered, but will take the firſt Opportunity of revenging himſelf on the Carnatic, for the Devaſtations of his Country by the Marattas.

It has always been allowed, and that too with juſt Reaſon, that nothing can reduce the Maratta Power but Diſſentions among themſelves; and it is fortunate for the other Powers in Indoſtan, that the Maratta Chiefs are always ready to take every Advantage of each other; if therefore Maudavarow ſhould determine to remain in the Myſore Country after the ſwelling of the Rivers, we may reaſonably hope, that even the Appearance of our aſſiſting Hyder Ally againſt him, will encourage the Maratta Chiefs to avail themſelves of his Abſence, by attacking his Country when they are ſenſible he cannot return to its Protection; by which Means their Differences would be encreaſed, and they would thereby be engaged in Quarrels among themſelves, which alone can enſure the Peace and Tranquillity of their Neighbours.

Having thus expreſſed our Sentiments with regard to the Conſequences to be expected from our aſſiſting either the Marattas or Hyder Ally, and as we would wiſh to have the Advice and Opinion of the Commiſſioners on a Matter of ſo much Importance; it is agreed to defer coming to any Determination thereon, in the Hope that thoſe Gentlemen will arrive before Matters are brought to ſuch a Criſis as to oblige us to reſolve finally on the Part we are to act. In the mean Time, the Preſident is

desired to request of the Nabob to give the Committee a Meeting, in order that his Opinion may be obtained with regard to the Measures to be taken.

Jos. Dupré,
Warren Hastings,
Sam[l] Ardley,
Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Rich[d] Brickenden,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, the 29th October 1770.

PRESENT,

Josias Dupré, Esquire, Governor, President,
Warren Hastings,
Joseph Smith,
Sam[l] Ardley,
John Smith,
Rich[d] Brickenden,
Henry Brooke,
George Stratton,
Geo. Mackay.

Read a Letter from Messrs. Church and Sibbald, dated at Syringapatam the 10th Instant: Advising, That Hyder had earnestly represented to them the Necessity of our assisting him; that the Marattas would hearken to no Terms of Peace; and requesting they would represent the same to us: Advising, that he had given out his Intentions of proceeding to Bengaloure, but that they rather think he will remain where he is, and endeavour to make a Stand against the Marattas there, or in some Parts of the Beddinine Country, from whence he can draw sufficient Supplies of Provisions.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, the 14th January 1771.

PRESENT,

Josias Dupré, Esquire, Governor, President,
Warren Hastings,
Samuel Ardley,
John Smith,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
John Whitehill,
George Mackay.

Read the following Letter from Mr. Sibbald, at Onore:

To the Honourable Josias Dupré, Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Enclosed is Duplicate of my Address of the 15th Instant; and Yesterday I received a Letter from the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn, in which he has so very pressingly desired me to address your Honour, &c. on the Subject of Assistance, that I am under the Necessity of troubling you with this, as I could not evade the Appearance of complying with his Request, without giving him some Disgust. As the Nabob's Letter to me fully contains all he has desired me to represent to your Honour, &c. on the above Subject, and in some Measure sets forth his present Situation, I have thought it not improper to enclose you a Translate thereof; to which I beg Leave to refer you.

The Nabob will, I believe, leave Syringapatam ſhortly, and fall back with his Army towards Nagar, as a very large Body of the Marattas are within Ten Coſs of that Place; their preſent Demands are reported to be of ſo very extraordinary a Nature as to afford no Probability of a ſpeedy Accommodation.

I remain, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
James Sibbald.

Onore,
17th December 1770.

The Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn, as entered in Country Correſpondence, N° 11, is alſo read, and which being very expreſſive of his Situation, it is ordered that a Copy thereof be tranſmitted to the Court of Directors by the Firſt Opportunity.

N° 11. *Tranſlate of a Letter from the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn to Mr. James Sibbald at Onore; dated in Seringapatam the 18th of the Moon Shawbem, and received the 16th of December 1770.*

I have received your Letter, and obſerve that you have ſent that from the Honourable Governor and Council of Chinuputum to Bombay to be explained, and as ſoon as you receive the Anſwer, I deſire you will ſend it me. I now deſire you will write again to the Honourable Governor and Council of Chinuputum, and deliver your Letter immediately to my Hircarrah, and I will forward it. You know what I have often told you, that my Country is a Wall to the Carnatic, and I have theſe many Years kept the Marattas employed, ſo that they could not give Trouble to your Circar; therefore it is the Intereſt of your Company to defend me againſt the Marattas, for if they were to get Poſſeſſion of my Country, the next Thing would be to give your Circar Trouble: But when the Engliſh and my Circar is one, then who ſhall be our Enemies, or who ſhall give us Trouble? You know my Dermurdar with your Circar is to aſſiſt them againſt all their Enemies, either Europeans or others; and if I was at any Time to receive but one Note from the Governor of Chinaputam, that they wanted my Aſſiſtance, I ſhould be immediately ready; and this I have told and aſſured you many Times. In like Manner I hope they will always act by me, as our Dermurdar in this Requeſt is the ſame; and as the Engliſh Word and Faith is a Virtue, I have to this Day aſſured myſelf that every Thing will be done as I could wiſh. You have the News of my Country, and that the Marattas are every Day giving more Trouble, and that Gopul Row, with his Horſe, is burning my Country about Annuntfroor, and coming nearer every Day to Naggeer. All this you write to Chinaputum, to the Honourable Governor and Council, and deſire that they will not make Delay, but ſend an Anſwer ſoon, for the Marattas are Enemies to every Body, and the ſooner the Buſineſs is done, the better for all. In the ſame Manner you muſt write to Bombay, and do the Buſineſs quickly, as you are Dawlutſhew of my Circar, and the Engliſh and I are now one. Deliver your Letters to the Hircarrahs, to be forwarded to me, as I have before deſired, and let me hear every Day of your Health, &c.

APPENDIX, N° 21.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 29th November 1771.

PRESENT,

Josias Dupré, Esquire, Governor, President.
Warren Hastings,
Samuel Ardley.

RECEIVED this Evening, Advice that a Party of Maratta Horse had advanced as far as Calachavacum, which they had plundered.

The President lays before the Committee the following Letters, &c. delivered to him by the Nabob.

Translate of a Letter from Trimbuck Row to Maudavarow Sadasive, the Maratta Vakeel, dated 20 November, as entered in Country Correspondence, N° 166.

N. B. This Letter is worthy of Attention, and is therefore entered here also at full Length, with Remarks.

Extract of a Letter from Trimbuck Row to Maudava Row Sadasive, dated 20th November 1771.

LETTER.

A. In the Beginning of your Letter you tell me, that the Nabob had sent his Troops to Tanjour, to demand the annual Peshcush from thence, which had not been received for Two Years past; and that although it was by no Means the Nabob's Design to take that Country, still there was no Doubt but I should receive Letters from them, purporting, in various Modes, their Inability of making Resistance; to which, however, I should pay no Regard, but keep in View the Nabob's firm Friendship, and that of Aunundarow, whom you had dispatched, would acquaint me of all Particulars.

REMARKS.

A. The Nabob, it is certain, did inform the President, in the Beginning of the Expedition against Tanjour, that it was necessary to amuse the Maratta Vakeel, who expressed his Apprehension that the great Preparations which had been made, and the formidable Army which was assembled, were not intended merely to recover the Peshcush and Charges of the Rajah, but in fact to conquer the whole Country, a Measure of which the Marattas would certainly not remain peaceable Spectators. Accordingly, the Nabob did assure Maudavarow Sadasive, that his Intention was only to call the Rajah to a proper Account for his disobedient Conduct, take from him the Peshcush, and some Consideration for the Charges of the Expedition, as other Soubahs had done: That, no doubt, the Rajah seeing his Errors, would repent, and comply, and Matters would end properly: but if the Marattas interfered, the Rajah would be encouraged in his Obstinacy, and compel us to the Necessity of taking his Fort from him. At the same Time, the Nabob said these were only Pretences to quiet the Marattas, and prevent their disturbing our Operations, but that it was necessary to take the Fort, and totally reduce the Rajah, who was now become dangerous.

B. You doubtless remember what you wrote me, and the Message you sent me by the said Row. In hopes of the Nabob's Friendship agreeable to what I wrote to you, I did not agree to send Assistance to the other Side, but dismissed Aunundarow

B. About the same Time the Nabob informed the President, but desired it might be then kept a profound Secret, that he had so settled Matters with the Maratta Vakeel, that he hoped he should have no Disturbance from the Marattas during

LETTER.	REMARKS.
Aunundarow with all Speed: No Effect, however, of your Negotiations have I yet ſeen.	during the Expedition. The Charm by which it was effected, was a preſent of a Lack of Rupees to Trimbuck Row, and near Three Lacks more in Preſents to other Sardars, and to the Vakeel; upon which the Vakeel had promiſed to write Trimbuck Row. At the Time of writing the Letter on which we are now remarking, this Money had not been paid, and therefore, ſays Trimbuck Row, *no Effect of your Negociation have I yet ſeen.* The Money however is now paid, which may probably appeaſe the angry Chief for awhile. See the Nabob's Letter to Trimbuck Row, entered in Country Correſpondence, N° 165, and dated 29th November.
C. And I am continually receiving your Letters from Tanjour, adviſing of the Batteries being advanced cloſe to the Ditch of the Fort; that every Morning or Evening it was expected to be ſtormed; that they (the Tanjoreans) had no further Ability of Reſiſtance, and that the Gentoo Government there would be loſt. It appears to me, that the Nabob keeps you by Promiſes, ſweet Words, and a great deal of kind Treatment, and carries his Views to the Reduction of the Place, having entirely eraſed from his Mind the Promiſe which he made to you; and as to us, he thinks we are totally engaged in the Expedition againſt the Naigue.	C. Notwithſtanding what he ſays in this Paragraph, Trimbuck Row had actually received the News of the Peace with Tanjour, but it ſuited his Purpoſe to conceal it. The plain Meaning is this, You, ſays he to the Vakeel, are receiving Douceurs from the Nabob, and join with him in deceiving me. As I cannot march the Army profeſſedly to enforce the Payment of my promiſed Douceur, I will come under Pretence of ſuccouring Tanjour, which I find the Nabob means to take.
D. His Engagement to you was, that in Six Weeks Time Meaſures would be taken for aſſiſting Serumunt *; that Orders were coming from Europe, and that he would give you an Anſwer; and that in the Interim the Country in the Payen Ghaut, which was to have been given to him as a Jaghire, ſhould not be laid waſte. All which were political Expreſſions, and I am ſurprized that you, with all your Wiſdom, did not ſee into them: At all Events however I am not to blame. What has been ſaid on this Side has been done. You ſwallow Deceit, and write what is not performed. Now alſo you have wrote me a long Letter, but do not mention a Syllable of Matters being adjuſted with Tanjore; the War ſtill continues; God forbid it ſhould ſo happen, but if the Fort of Tanjore, which Serumunt eſteems in the ſame Light as Poonah, ſhould be loſt, which Way ſhall we be able to ſhew our Faces? At laſt, inſtead of Friendſhip, we muſt have Enmity with the Nabob. I ſee by your Manner of Writing, that after the Buſineſs is ruined, you will tell me, you did not imagine it would be ſo. I think it neceſſary to ſend an Army in the Payen Ghaut, to lay waſte the Country of the Naigue. Acquaint me now of the real State of Matters there, and do not bring upon yourſelf a bad Character in the Opinion of the Serumunt. You tell me, that Peace has probably been made with Hyder Naigue. I am aſtoniſhed! What when there is ſuch a Well-wiſher and truſty Perſon as you here on the Part of Serumunt, and the Nabob, ſuch a firm Friend of his alſo, keeps you there in	D. About the Beginning of September, at the Time the Army was in Motion, and about the Time that the Arrangements related in the Notes A. and B. were made, the Nabob informed the Preſident, that the Maratta Vakeel was more urgent than ever for a deciſive Anſwer to this Propoſition about Aſſiſtance; and it was neceſſary, at all Events, to find ſome Expedient for a Delay, that would carry us near the Time of the Rains, as we might hope the Tanjour Expedition would be at an End; he deſired the Preſident would give the Vakeel a Meeting, and endeavour to put him off with Hopes: Accordingly the Nabob and the Vakeel met the Preſident at the Garden Houſe; after much Converſation in the uſual Aſiatic Manner about it, and about it, the Vakeel ſaid, he had been waiting a long Time here to little Purpoſe; that our waiting for Orders, put him in Mind of a Debtor who, as a general Anſwer to all his Creditors, wrote over his Door, "Come, and be paid To-"morrow;" they came again and again, and found it was ſtill To-morrow. He was anſwered, That our latter Ships might certainly be expected to arrive before the Change of the Monſoon, which would be in about Six Weeks; that no Doubt, in that Time we ſhould receive Orders, and he ſhould have an Anſwer, whether we would or would not aſſiſt them: He replied, And ſuppoſe at the End of Six Weeks you ſhould not have received theſe ſame Orders, what then? Why then, he was told, they might take what Steps they thought proper: We could ſay no more. This, but much more effectually, the

* Maudavarow.

LETTER.

in hopes of Assistance, how should Peace be made? Even now our Friendship still remains, and if the Nabob looking forward will make Peace with the Rajah of Tanjore in an equitable Manner,

E. And send to the Assistance of the Serumunt the same Body of Troops as is employed there; he will acquire a Name, and experience the Friendship of the Serumunt.

I have left 10,000 Horse opposed to Hyder Naigue, and am advanced myself, with the main Body of the Army, near to Bengalore. I have dispatched Kisthun Row Bulawunt with 15,000 Horse and 10,000 Pundaras towards Kistnagherry, and it is my Design likewise to proceed there myself by and by. Send me an Answer to this Letter with the utmost Expedition.

The Report of the Hircarrahs who brought this Letter:

They say they set out the 20th of November, and at Cudapanatam met the Hircarrahs who carried the News of the Peace with Tanjour. Trimbuck Row's Army was then Three Days Journey from Cudapanatam.

Translate of a Letter from Morari Row to the Nabob, dated 24th November, as entered in Country Correspondence, N° 167: Urging the Nabob to send Assistance to Trimbuck Row, and either to pay a Visit to him, or send his Son Omdat ul Omrah; advising of Trimbuck Row's Arrival near the Passes, whom he had prevailed on not to enter them; recommending to the Nabob to pay Trimbuck Row a Visit, or send his Son; and offering to come himself to the Nabob, when every Thing will be settled.

Translate of a Letter from Morari Row to his Vakeel Sacreeputrow, dated 23d November, N° 168: Directing him to represent to the Nabob, the Impropriety of his having undertaken an Expedition against Tanjour, and neglected that on the other Side the Passes; that he and Trimbuck Row would have obliged the Rajah to submit to proper Terms; that Trimbuck Row had proposed sending 15,000 Horse to the Rajah's Assistance, and to enter the Passes with 20,000 more; that he had accordingly arrived between Boodicotah and Ancagerry; that he had dispatched 12,000 Horse into Hyder's Country, on this Side the Passes: Recommending, that the Nabob send an Army of Europeans, Sepoys, and Artillery, to the Assistance of the Marattas, when the Management of the Country on the other Side the Passes will fall into the Nabob's Hands.

The following Extracts of Intelligence received by the Nabob, and delivered by him to the President at the same Time, are also now read.

Extracts of Intelligence received by the Nabob from the Maratta Army, under Date the 28th November 1771.

Advise, That the 25th, in the Evening, Trimbuck Row asked Hyder Naigue's Vakeel, what his Master had wrote? that the Vakeel told him his Master had mentioned he would pay the Sum of Fifty Lacks of Rupees in ready Money, and give Soucar Bills for Twenty more, payable at a fixed Period, and would also send his Son Teepo with a Force to meet him. To which Trimbuck Row replied, telling him to inform his Master, in Four Days he would acquaint him. The

REMARKS.

the Palliative mentioned in Note B, produced a Promise from the Vakeel, that we should not be disturbed for Six Weeks.

E. It is worthy Remark, that not only in this Letter, but in the whole Course of the Maratta Negotiation, very little Attention has been paid by them to the Company's Government here. We have been invited to an Interview just when it suited a present Purpose, but every Thing has been managed by the Nabob; and when Sir John Lindsay was here, much Court was paid to him also. Accordingly the Company's Forces are generally spoken of in all the Letters and Advices from the Maratta Camp, as if they were at his Command: "We expect you "to join us, and bring with you the Fringues or "English;" this is the usual Style.

Intelligencer then ſays, that Trimbuck Row's Intention is this; that as by the *advancing of his Troops* the Affair of Tanjour has been adjuſted, a Terror muſt now be ſtruck in the Arcot Country, the Choute that is to be given by the Nabob paid (a Lack of Rupees, more or leſs) Aſſiſtance obtained, and if the Nabob will not come to ſee him, that one of his Sons would come, and Peace being eſtabliſhed, that he then ſhould proceed againſt Hyder, with the Troops of Aſſiſtance ſo obtained; and if the Nabob ſhould neither give Money nor Aſſiſtance, but be in Friendſhip with Hyder, in that Caſe, ſome Favour muſt be ſhewn to Hyder, the Ghauts paſſed, and an Expedition undertaken againſt the Arcot Country. That the 26th of November, Appajee Ram received further Letters from Hyder; telling him, at all Events to make Peace, and that he would agree to ſend Aſſiſtance; in conſequence of which, the ſaid Appajee Ram went to Morarow, and acquainted him thereof; after which they both went to Trimbuck Row, and the former told him, You have hitherto, Sir, been of Opinion your Deſires were not complied with; I have now a Letter from my Maſter, ſaying, that he will comply therewith; ſhew your Kindneſs therefore, and make Peace; the Sum of Fifty Lacks of Rupees ſhall be paid to you, in ready Money, and a Soucar's Bill given, and Teepo Saib will come to your Aſſiſtance with 2,000 Horſe, 4,000 Sepoys, and Ten Pieces of Cannon. That after this, Morarow alſo told Trimbuck Row, Hyder's Vakeel ſays he will act agreeable to your Deſire; give us therefore ſuch of the Diſtricts you have taken, as may appear to you proper, and ſome how or other make Peace. To which Trimbuck Row replied, After my Arrival in the Arcot Country, I will give an Anſwer reſpecting the Buſineſs. The Caſe is, that if the Nabob will make Peace, and ſend his Aſſiſtance, Bengalour muſt be taken; but if they *, being in Friendſhip with Hyder, neither make Peace, nor ſend Aſſiſtance, but on the contrary come to make War againſt us, in that Caſe ſome Favour muſt be ſhewn to the Naigue, the Whole of the Countries I have taken from him, Checkballapore excepted, reſtored to him, what Money he gives accepted, his Aſſiſtance taken, and then we muſt proceed againſt the Arcot Country. The Nabob, it is true, is in Friendſhip with the Serumunt; but he may poſſibly think I am inſolent, and muſt be puniſhed, and on that Account has entered into no Negotiation, nor even ſent away my Vakeel. That after this Converſation, Trimbuck Row and Morarow had a private Conference together, and it was determined to diſpatch Letters to the Nabob, which accordingly each of them has done. That Teepo, Hyder's Son, had attacked the Detachment under Waumaurow (which had attempted the Siege of one of Hyder's Forts) defeated the ſame, took Fifty Horſes and an Elephant; in conſequence of which, Waumaurow had wrote to Trimbuck Row for a Reinforcement of 4,000 Horſe, but no Anſwer had been ſent to his Letter at the Time of this Intelligence being diſpatched. That upon the March of the Maratta Army lately, Hyder's Horſe had attacked the Rear thereof, and had carried off Three Camels Load of Artillery Stores, and Four Camels, and between 50 and 60 Bullocks Load of Baggage belonging to the Army. That ſecret Advice had been received at the Maratta Camp, that Hyder had collected together 4,000 Horſe, 10,000 Sepoys, and 10,000 Carnatic Peons, and had got Fifty Pieces of Cannon, ready mounted upon their Carriages. That upon the Repreſentation of a Perſon in the Maratta Camp to Morarow, that if the Army was to proceed to the Arcot Country (where there are a great many Pagodas) the Country would be plundered, and that he, as a Friend to the Nabob and Maudavarow, ſhould prevent the Army paſſing the Ghauts; Morarow ſaid, that he had wrote a Letter to the Nabob, to which, if a proper Anſwer was received, it was well; if not, he would go himſelf to the Nabob, taking with him only a Palankeen and Two Horſes, perſuade the Nabob, and bring him back with him. The Intelligencer here ſays, he is of Opinion, that Anſwer ſhould ſoon be diſpatched to Mararow's Letter; for if not, he thinks the advanced Part of the Army will paſs the Ghauts. That Trimbuck Row had received a Letter from Opparow, adviſing of his having croſſed the Paſs of Baudecotah, and Arrival in the Country towards Paulcout and Singarapitta; and that Trimbuck Row, in conſequence of the great Diſtance Opparow's and Womaurow's Corps were from him, would march from Huſſoor by the Road of Boodecotah, croſs the Coopum Paſs, and proceed towards Cauveripatam and Kiſtnaghery.

The Committee think it neceſſary to obſerve, that the Advices we receive from the Nabob upon any critical Occaſion, generally lead to the Queſtion, and ſupport the Meaſures the Nabob wiſhes us to take. Hyder Ally in the above Intelligence Paper, is repreſented as not only ſoliciting for Peace, but offering to join the Marattas to enter this Province. This is contrary to our Advices; and the Preſident acquaints the Committee, that Hyder Ally's Vakeels had aſſured him, that although their Maſter had a Vakeel with Trimbuck Row, yet there was One Article inſiſted on, which their Maſter would not conſent to, viz. to join the Marattas to invade the Arcot Country. How far the Nabob's Intelligence may be depended on, or what Credit may be given to our Advices, and the Aſſurances of the Vakeel, we cannot ſay.

The Preſident acquaints the Committee, that the Nabob had informed him, that from the above Letters and Intelligence, he thought there was no Room to doubt but the Marattas would enter the Province; and therefore deſired that the Committee would immediately deliberate on the Meaſures to be taken.

* Suppoſed to mean the Nabob and the Engliſh.

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APPENDIX, N° 21.

It is with infinite Concern the Committee obſerve the repeated and earneſt Repreſentations of the Board and this Committee, in their ſeveral Addreſſes of the 31ſt of January, 6th of April, 4th of June, 10th of Auguſt, and 29th of September, to the Court of Directors, of the very critical Situation of Affairs with reſpect to the Marattas and Hyder Ally, which were ſo fully and clearly explained, in order to enable them to give us their Sentiments and Orders, with reſpect to the Conduct they would wiſh us to obſerve in ſo important and intereſting a Matter, we ſtill find ourſelves not only without Orders, but without the leaſt Intimation of their Opinion thereon. It is true, that the Expectation and Non-arrival of thoſe Orders, have furniſhed us with a Plea for Procraſtination for ſome Time paſt; but we fear that will not long avail us, at leaſt with regard to the Marattas, whom (as we are told) nothing will divert from the Intention of entering this Province, but our ſending a Force to aſſiſt them in reducing Myſore. The Committee therefore think they can no longer delay taking under their moſt ſerious Conſideration, the Meaſures neceſſary to be purſued in this critical Juncture; and although our Sentiments ſhould not be conformable to the Orders we may hereafter receive, yet we can never be accuſed of raſhly adopting Meaſures, without having firſt fully explained all Circumſtances to the Court of Directors, and waited their Orders as long as poſſible, conſiſtently with the Safety of the Carnatic, and the Security of the Company's Poſſeſſions.

The better to enable the Committee to determine on this important Subject, it is neceſſary to ſtate in brief, the preſent Situation of the Marattas, Hyder Ally, the Nabob, and ourſelves.

The Marattas have now been engaged in a continued War of Two Years with Hyder Ally, and have ſhewn a determined Reſolution to deſtroy him, and annex the Myſore Dominions to their preſent Poſſeſſions. The Myſore Country is already impoveriſhed and depopulated, and all but the principal Forts have fallen into the Hands of the Marattas. The Nabob aſſures us that they have cut off all Communication with the Biddenure Country, from whence Hyder uſed to draw his Supplies, and as he is unable to oppoſe them in the Field, he can have nothing to depend on but the Proviſions laid up in his principal Forts, which muſt of courſe be greatly exhauſted. The Marattas have publiſhed their Intentions of invading the Carnatic; and have actually advanced to the Borders, and ſome ſtraggling Parties have plundered Caleſpuck, the Nabob is of Opinion they certainly will enter the Province as ſoon as the Seaſon ſhall favour them, which will be about the Beginning of January, when the Crops are on the Ground, from which Time they will have till the latter End of April to ravage and lay waſte, even ſhould they propoſe returning into their own Country this Seaſon. By late Advices we learn, that Narrain Row, with a Body of 20,000 Horſe, was on his March to join them; and whether they be intended to reinforce the Troops now in the Bala Ghaut, or to relieve ſome of thoſe who have been long on Service, ſuch a Body of freſh Troops will be great Addition to this Strength.

With reſpect to the Nabob, he ſeems, as well he may, to be under great Apprehenſions of the Conſequences of their entering the Province; and declares, that as the Country will be entirely ruined, the Army will have nothing to ſubſiſt on but the Grain in the Forts: That it will be utterly out of his Power to furniſh any Money for the Expences of the Troops, beyond that now due from him for the current Charges, amounting to about Four Lacks of Pagodas.

With regard to ourſelves, we have not the Means of providing Supplies for the Army, or of procuring Money for our current Expences, but by the Aſſiſtance of the Nabob. The whole Revenues and Reſources of the Carnatic are in his Hands, and when the Country is ravaged and deſtroyed, they muſt of courſe fail.

This being the preſent State of Affairs, it remains to be conſidered, what Meaſures appear the moſt eligible for the Security of the Carnatic, and the Company's Poſſeſſions in it; and for this End, there appears but Three Modes to be purſued:

1ſt. Either to join the Marattas, which, for the preſent, may prevent their entering the Province; or,

2dly. To join Hyder Ally, provided he can furniſh Money for the Expences of the Army, and can procure ſufficient Supplies of Proviſion for their Subſiſtence; or,

3dly. To collect together a Body of Troops, in ſome central Poſition, where they may beſt oppoſe the Enemy, either by Detachments or otherwiſe, and be enabled to cut off the Supplies from the Maratta Army.

With reſpect to the Firſt Propoſition, of joining the Marattas, it might here appear needleſs, after having ſo fully and clearly expreſſed our Sentiments on the Subject, in many Parts of our Proceedings, and in our Letter to the Court of Directors, to enter into a freſh Diſcuſſion thereof; it might ſuffice to declare, that our Sentiments continue invariably the ſame. Nevertheleſs, the Committee think it neceſſary now, to recite the Reaſons and Motives which have weighed with them againſt ſuch a Meaſure, that the Whole may appear at one View, and which will come properly under the following Heads:

1ſt. The

1ſt. The Orders of the Company.
2dly. Our Treaty and Engagements with Hyder Ally.
3dly. The Opinion of the other Preſidencies. And
4thly. The Dangers and fatal Conſequences to be apprehended from ſuch a Meaſure.

Although we have not yet had any Anſwer from our Conſtituents, to our repeated Repreſentations of the Embarraſſments we labour under, for want of their clear and preciſe Inſtructions with reſpect to our Conduct in the preſent critical Situation of Affairs; yet it is evident from the whole Spirit of their Orders to this and the other Preſidencies for ſome Years paſt, that they look upon the growing Power of the Marattas with Jealouſy and Apprehenſion; and that they eſteem it a very dangerous Syſtem to lend them any Aſſiſtance, to reduce or weaken the few remaining Powers of India, capable of oppoſing their ambitious Views, which evidently tend to the Conqueſt of all Indoſtan. In theſe Sentiments we have repeatedly expreſſed our clear and hearty Concurrence. We cannot therefore ſuppoſe that the Orders we may receive will be contradictory to or inconſiſtent with them, eſpecially when it will appear to the Court of Directors, from our late Advices, that there is every Day freſh Cauſe to be apprehenſive of the growing Power of the Marattas, by reaſon of the Advantages they have acquired in the Northern Provinces, and the Superiority they have gained over Hyder Ally.

We come now to the Second Conſideration, which has weighed with us in refuſing to aſſiſt the Marattas, viz. Our Treaty and Engagements with Hyder Ally.

In the Article of the Treaty with Hyder Ally, reſpecting the Aſſiſtance to be afforded to either Party, it is provided nevertheleſs, That if the Party requiring ſuch Aſſiſtance ſhall have been the Aggreſſor, the other Party ſhall not be obliged to furniſh any Aid. This Clauſe was inſerted, as we expected he might, by Acts of Hoſtility, bring a War upon himſelf, and we ſhould then ſtand excuſed from aſſiſting without a Breach of our Engagements, in caſe we found it inconſiſtent with the Intereſt of the Company, or inconvenient to our Affairs to afford him any Support. We will not pretend to ſay, that the Attack made on him by the Marattas was occaſioned by the Steps he took after the Concluſion of the Peace in 1769, which however was ſufficient to give Umbrage. We believe that their Attempts to ſubdue him would have been equally the ſame, had he refrained from whatever might be conſtrued an Aggreſſion againſt them. He had not diſcharged the Sum he had agreed to pay them upon a Compromiſe with them in 1767; his military and enterprizing Genius made him a dangerous Neighbour to them, and ſuch a one as might, if ſuffered to acquire more Strength, moſt effectually oppoſe their Plan of Conqueſt in the South; theſe were ſufficient to draw on him the Maratta War, which has oppreſſed him now more than Two Years. Nevertheleſs, as his Conduct towards his Neighbours in levying Contributions on them, and even not ſparing ſome Diſtricts belonging to the Marattas, or under their Protection, may, without forcing the Senſe, be conſtrued an Aggreſſion with reſpect to them, the Clauſe in the Treaty furniſhes us with a juſt Plea to decline aſſiſting him. But although we thus ſtand excuſed from complying with his Requiſitions for Aid, we are clearly of Opinion that we could not, without a manifeſt Breach of the Treaty, aſſiſt his Enemies; and we have declared to him, that although many Circumſtances have prevented our uniting with him, yet that he may be aſſured that we will not take Part with the Marattas againſt him.

We next proceed to the Third Conſideration againſt aſſiſting the Marattas; viz. the Opinion of the other Preſidencies.

The very valuable and extenſive Poſſeſſions which the Company enjoy in Bengal, together with the Advantage derived from the Trade on the Malabar Coaſt, are certainly Objects which demand our moſt earneſt Attention, to the Security and Permanency of which, we ought to pay the greateſt Regard in all our Engagements. The Nabob is deſirous of aſſiſting the Marattas, and is ſupported by the King's Miniſter: He is not under any Compulſion or Reſtraint from us, and is at Liberty to purſue ſuch Steps as he ſhall judge moſt conducive to his own Intereſt; but if his Plans and Meaſures are oppoſite to the Syſtem recommended by the Company, ſhall we ſuffer ourſelves to be dragged into them contrary to our Judgment, and contrary to every Warrant of our Conſtituents. It was from an earneſt Deſire that the Three Preſidencies might act upon one uniform Plan, and that no Meaſures might be adopted at one Preſidency, that ſhould anyways claſh with the Intereſts or Views of the others, that we have conſtantly communicated to the Gentlemen of Bengal and Bombay our Ideas and Opinion on the State of Affairs; and there is no Point which has been more attentively diſcuſſed by the ſeveral Preſidencies than that now before us, and no one in which we have more clearly and expreſsly concurred in Opinion: We could therefore never be juſtified in an Alliance with the Marattas in direct Oppoſition to the Sentiments of the other Preſidencies, and after a clear and manifeſt Conviction of the Dangers of ſuch a Meaſure. It has been the conſtant and uniform Tenor of the Company's Reccommendation to this, and we believe alſo to the other Preſidencies, to be mutually aſſiſting to each other, and concert Meaſures for that Purpoſe; and they expreſsly tell us, that Bengal is the Object of their greateſt Attention, and that this Preſidency is only valuable as a Barrier to it. [Vide Seperate General Letter, dated 17 March 1769, Par. 25, and Letter to Select Committee, 17 March 1769, Par. 2 and 3.]

APPENDIX, N° 21.

We have in former Minutes referred to the many Paſſages in the late Letters from the Court of Directors which expreſs their Senſe of the Power of the Marattas, the Danger of raiſing that Power, and the Expediency of ſupporting the Power of Myſore, as a Barrier againſt the South; We refer to them again.

Extracts of Letters from the Honourable the Court of Directors.

Separate General Letter, 25th March 1768.

Par. 45. The Marratas, inſtead of being reduced, are like to be aggrandized by their Conqueſts of the Myſore Dominions, which brings them ſo much nearer to the Carnatic, the Soubah's Weakneſs and Indigence ſeems beyond all Relief; and Hyder Ally, if leſs formidable to the Soubah and the Marattas, is more likely to be an Enemy to us, and to embrace every Opportunity of diſturbing the Carnatic.

General Letter, 13th May 1768.

Par. 7. It is with the utmoſt Concern we find that the Victory you have gained tends to involve us ſtill farther in this Chaos of Treaties and Engagements, and you ſhould ſtill think your Enemy ſo formidable as to call in foreign Aſſiſtance, though you have a moral Certainty that the Attack of the Soubah's Dominions from Bengal, muſt oblige him to a precipitate March to his Capital, and the Myſore Dominions and Hyder Ally's Poſſeſſions on the Malabar Side, all lay expoſed to your Attacks: That you ſhould have Recourſe to the Marratas for that Aſſiſtance, is ſtill more alarming, and from the Spirit of your Negotiations with Maudarow, and your wild Propoſal to Bengal, of putting up one of Shaw Allum's Sons, we fear all the Barriers of the Maratta Power will be broken down, and they will add the Decan and Myſore Dominions to their extenſive Empire, and haſten that Event you deſigned to avert, we mean their Conqueſt of the Whole.

Par. 8. We ſhould have hoped, that the Experience of what has paſſed at Bengal, would have ſuggeſted the proper Conduct to you; we mean, when our Servants, after the Battle of Buxar, projected the Extirpation of Shujah Dowlah from his Dominions, and the giving them up to the King. Lord Clive ſoon diſcerned the King would have been unable to maintain them, and that it would have broken down the ſtrongeſt Barrier againſt the Marattas and the Northern Powers, and therefore wiſely reſtored Shujah Dowlah to his Dominions: Such too ſhould be your Conduct with reſpect to the Nizam and Hyder Ally, neither of whom is it our Intereſts ſhould be totally cruſhed.

Separate General Letter, 17th March 1769.

Par. 3. In our Letter of the 25th March laſt, we gave you our Sentiments at large with reſpect to the Negotiations with the Soubah of the Decan, and the Conſequences apprehended from the Treaty you had entered into with him; and by our beforementioned Letter, under Date 13th May, we expreſſed the Dangers we apprehend from your calling in the Marattas to your Aſſiſtance.

Par. 17. Your Proceedings of the 28th April, ſtill leave us Reaſon to apprehend you may enter into Engagements with the Marattas for a Body of Horſe, which we think will have very fatal Conſequences, by harraſſing and laying waſte your own Country as well as the Enemy's; and we apprehend, notwithſtanding the vaſt Sum of Money they will coſt, they will be of very little Uſe, it not being probable they will expoſe themſelves much for our Service; and when you have Occaſion to diſengage yourſelves from them, Diſagreements may ariſe of dangerous Conſequences.

Letter to Select Committee, 17th March 1769.

Par. 4. Judge then our Anxiety at ſeeing a Syſtem adopted, ſo repugnant to our Views as that of ſupporting Mahomed Ally in the Myſore Country. We repeat, we ſhall not think ourſelves ſecure while we have a Soldier or Sepoy in that Country; nor till we ſee it given to ſome Power who may preſerve it as a Barrier againſt the Marattas, and who may be an uſeful Ally, ſhould we ever have Occaſion to call in the Aſſiſtance of a Country Power.

APPENDIX, N° 21.

General Letter, 30th June 1769.

Par. 5. We muſt ſay, that upon Principles of Policy, we wiſh for a Peace with Hyder Naigue, whenever it can be obtained upon the moſt moderate Terms; for our Policy is to avoid every Thing that tends to the Increaſe of the Maratta Power, which is evidently the Misfortune of this War; for you are reduced to the Neceſſity of being yourſelves the Propoſers of new Provinces to be added to the Dominion of the Marattas, already poſſeſſed of Half the Mogul Empire.

Par. 6. Whether the Marattas have accepted or not of your Offer, certain it is they will make the moſt Uſe they can of the Embroils of others; it is by this Conduct they have arrived to their preſent Degree of Power, and our beſt Policy is to check their Growth by every Opportunity, or at leaſt to avoid lending our Force for their Aggrandizement, which we certainly do, as often as we engage in Wars with the few remaining Chiefs of India, who are yet capable of coping with them.

Par. 7. Nizam Ally and Hyder Naigue are Two of thoſe Chiefs, and it is our true Intereſt to preſerve a good Underſtanding with them.

Separate General Letter, 23d March 1770.

Par. 12. The Marattas and Hyder you ſay were at War, and it undoubtedly was our Intereſt, on many Accounts, to ſee the Power of the Marattas, if not of both the contending Parties, weakened, but by no Means to interfere in the Diſpute. Every Maratta that fell in the Conteſt might almoſt be conſidered as one of our Enemies ſlain. But you have diverted Hyder.

The Court are, if poſſible, ſtill more explicit in their Orders to Bombay: (See Extracts ſent us by the Select Committee there, in their Letter of the 5th May 1771, from the Honourable Company's Commands, under Date 30th June 1769, entered in the Minutes of this Committee, 5th June laſt) in which they expreſsly ſay, that the whole Tenor of their Letters to the other Preſidencies is to the ſame Effect; accordingly in our Correſpondence with thoſe Preſidencies on the Subject of the Marattas, it appears that they adhere to the Syſtem recommended by the Court of Directors; and Bombay enters heartily into their Ideas, that they are on the Eve of actually declaring War in Favour of Hyder Ally Cawn, in Oppoſition to the Marattas. Suppoſing then that we were ever ſo well inclined to gratify the Nabob, to indulge his Revenge againſt Hyder Ally Cawn, and gain him the preſent Favour of the Marattas, by ſending the Company's Forces to conquer for them the Myſore Country, and eſtabliſh their Power at our Door; how could we juſtify the oppoſing the Company's Forces of the Bombay Preſidency that may be acting with Hyder Ally; for we have Reaſon to believe from their laſt Letter of the 21ſt October, that they will ſend him Aid if he ſupplies them with Money. We are aware of the Anſwer, for it is already uſed by Perſons of high Character. It is this: Orders from Home can only be temporary; and as Times and Circumſtances change, ſo Meaſures and Syſtems ought to be changed. It is a ſenſible Obſervation, and as a general Maxim we adopt it. Let us conſider how it may be applied to the particular Caſe before us. When this Preſidency, in the Year 1769, was on the very Brink of Ruin for want of Money, and by that Want was compelled to conclude a diſhonourable Peace, ſtrongly impreſſed with the Neceſſity of eſtabliſhing ſome Reſources in Time of Danger, and in Failure of ordinary Supplies, we ventured to recommend to Bengal the making a prudent Reſerve; and Bengal, as ſtrongly convinced as we, concurred in Opinion with us. Private or perſonal Motives could not poſſibly have any Part in this Propoſal; Safety to the Company's valuable Poſſeſſions was the ſole Object. It is true we had no Authority to make ſuch a Propoſal; but there were Orders againſt it; and we ſurely had the general Authority implied in our Truſt, of doing the beſt in our Judgment for its Preſervation in Caſes unprovided for. Had we erred in Judgment, as the Intention was laudable, and on public Motives, we ſhould have thought it might have ſufficed to ſay, The Plan was not ſuitable to the Circumſtances of the Company's Affairs at Home, and therefore at all Riſks muſt be laid aſide; but we are not to expect ſuch Gentleneſs. We are ſtigmatized for making a Peace, to which we were compelled for want of Money to wage War. We are harſhly cenſured for propoſing Means to avoid ſuch another Diſgrace, or worſe. This is the Language in which we were reprimanded. We are told, that nothing but *Infatuation* could have produced a Syſtem of guarding againſt diſtant Evils abroad, by ſuffering the Company to ſink under *immediate Diſtreſs* at Home. The diſtant Evils were thoſe of War with the French, the Marattas, or other powerful Neighbours, of which we are in conſtant Danger. The *immediate* Diſtreſs at Home, is the Neceſſity of paying a large ſpecific Sum to our Government, which ought to protect us; and a large Dividend to the Proprietors of Stock, who have their Capital at Stake. We were commanded to lay aſide *ſo deſtructive a Plan*; to wit, that of guarding againſt Dangers Abroad, by curtailing preſent Advantages at Home. *And a poſitive Injunction* is added in theſe Words; "That you do not "at any Time engage in Plans of *ſo important a Nature*, without our Knowledge and Concurrence, "as

"as it behoves you to *concert with us only* such Systems as materially affect the very Existence of the "Company." And after this, shall we either deviate ourselves, or *concert with the other Presidencies*, a Deviation from a general System established for all of them; a System which does indeed most materially affect the very Existence of the Company? Forbid it Prudence!

We now come to the Fourth and last Consideration against an Alliance with them; viz. the Dangers and fatal Consequences, to be apprehended from such a Measure.

We believe no one can doubt but the Views of the Marattas evidently tend to the Subjection of all India; this has been manifested by their Conduct for some Years past, but more especially of late; and the Advantages they have gained over the Jauts and Rohillohs, the obtaining Possession of the Person and Family of the Mogul, together with the Superiority they have acquired over Hyder Ally, are Circumstances but too favourable to their ambitious Designs. Their Purposes would be answered in several Ways, if we could be prevailed on to send the Company's Forces to their Assistance; first, it would insure to them the Conquest of the Mysore Country, the principal Forts of which, without our Aid, may yet hold out a long Time, and put them to the Expence of a great Force to starve them out. If we join them, we must see that neither Bengal or Bombay can oppose them, for they cannot think the Company's System so absurd, as that one Presidency shall oppose another; but if we do not join them, they know that Bengal and Bombay too look upon them with jealous Eyes; if we once join them, we must not expect that our Labours will end with the Reduction of Mysore; we must follow them to the Conquest of Biddenure, and wherever they please to carry us, or fight our Way back through them, and through a vast and desolate Country without Provisions; and thus our Strength being wasted in making Conquest, and acquiring Wealth and Strength for them, what shall afterwards give Protection to the Carnatic, and the Company's Possessions under this Presidency? The Nabob will answer it in Two Words; and the late Plenipotentiary would echo back this Reply, Maratta Faith! Maratta Faith! Of all the faithless Powers on Earth, the Marattas are the most faithless; and shall we then submit our Necks to such a Yoke? Some Excuse may be made for the Nabob; but what shall be said to the late Plenipotentiary, who, charged with the Honour of the Crown, could nevertheless humble himself before the Musnud, and submit to become the Instrument of insulting us; wantonly insulting us with the *Time when, the Place where*, and the Manner *how*, the Peace was made with Hyder? A Peace to which the want of Aid from his Idols compelled us; and yet, without a Blush, could urge us to comply with the Threats of a Maratta Chief; and at all Perils send the Company's Forces, the British Forces, to his Aid! Such are the Honours the late Plenipotentiary endeavoured to acquire for the Crown of Great Britain; the Honour of humbling the East India Company before the Throne of Mahomed Ally Cawn. Hyder Ally was the Power in the South best able to withstand their Efforts, and oppose their Designs: The Reduction of him they therefore looked upon as a necessary Step to their Views of universal Conquest. And it is certain, that were they once possessed of the Mysore Country, the Carnatic would be next exposed to their Ravages; by which Means the Country must be ruined. And if we have not Money to pay our Troops, and Provisions to subsist them, the Forts must soon fall into their Hands. The Decan has now but little Power of Resistance, and would become an easy Prey to them; and they would then be enabled to bend their whole Force against the Northern Powers. These are the Consequences naturally to be expected from the Reduction of Mysore; and although the Nabob may flatter himself, that a Junction with the Marattas, to enable them to accomplish it, might for the present free himself from their Ravages, we are fully persuaded that such a Measure would in the End be productive of Ruin to the Carnatic and the Company.

From all which Reasons and Considerations the Committee are clearly of Opinion, that they ought not to enter into an offensive Alliance with the Marattas; and that the Nabob should be acquainted, that we never will engage in such a Measure, unless commanded so to do by the Court of Directors.

We come now to the Second Proposition; viz. to join Hyder Ally, provided he can furnish Money for the Expences of the Army, and can procure Supplies of Provision for their Subsistence.

Hastings's opinion of the support of Hyder Ali

We have in our Deliberations on this Subject, repeatedly declared it as our Opinion, that the supporting of Hyder Ally, that is the Mysore Government, as a Barrier to the Maratta Power, would tend the most effectually to secure the Peace and Tranquillity of this Province; and that in case the whole Power and Resources of the Carnatic were at our Command, such a System would be the most prudent and eligible; but while the Nabob not only objects to such a Measure, but urges the Propriety of joining the Marattas to subdue Mysore, and in which he has been supported by His Majesty's Minister, it would be imprudent in the Company alone to undertake it, as not having the Means of carrying it in Execution, and as it might cause a Separation of Interests, which we ought as far as possible to avoid. We have annexed to the Proposition the Condition of Hyder's being able to furnish Money and Provisions, since without them it would be impossible to undertake any Thing in his Support. With regard to Money, we know not how far his Abilities may extend; but as to Provisions, we think it impossible he should be able to furnish such Supplies as would suffice for our Army, unaccustomed to the Hardships the Country Troops often suffer. We had Proof enough of this in the

last

laſt War. In this State of Uncertainty, and conſidering the Nabob's utter Averſion to any Meaſures in Support of Hyder Ally, we think we ought not to join him, or make any Declaration in his Favour, particularly as ſuch a Declaration would in Fact be an open Declaration of offenſive War againſt the Marattas, which might endanger the Company's Charter: At leaſt ſuch has been the Doctrine of His Majeſty's late Miniſter. If we are attacked, it will be neceſſary we ſhould take Meaſures for our Defence, and whatever Steps ſhall appear expedient for that Purpoſe, will be juſtifiable; which brings us to the 3d and laſt Propoſition; viz.

Nabob's averſion to it

To collect a Body of Troops in ſome central Poſition, where they may beſt protect the Country, either by Detachments or otherwiſe, and diſtreſs the Enemy by cutting off their Supplies.

We have frequently declared it as our Opinion, that it is impoſſible for Infantry effectually to prevent the Ravages of Horſe. In theſe Sentiments we *ſtill* continue. We are nevertheleſs of Opinion that we ought to oppoſe them as far as we are able; and it is not impoſſible but that, by vigorous and active Meaſures, ſome Advantage might be gained, or at leaſt that the Enemy may be ſo diſtreſſed by having their Convoys intercepted, as to be obliged to abandon the Province. Whereas, were we to put the Troops into Garriſon, and ſuffer the Enemy to ravage and lay waſte at Pleaſure, our Reſources and Proviſions would be exhauſted to no Purpoſe, and no one Advantage could accrue. We are therefore of Opinion that General Smith ſhould be inſtructed, after placing ſufficient Garriſons in the Forts in the South, to hold the Remainder of the Army in Readineſs to march; that the Nabob be conſulted with regard to the moſt proper Station, and the Supplies of Money and Proviſions he can furniſh. And as it will be neceſſary to prevent, if poſſible, Hyder Ally from making up Matters with the Marattas, which he will no Doubt do if he hath no Aſſiſtance from us, the Committee are of Opinion that a Letter ſhould be wrote, expreſſing our good Inclination towards him, but that we are at preſent unable, for Want of Orders from Europe to take any Meaſures; that thoſe Orders are ſhortly expected; and that in the mean Time he be deſired to inform us, what Aſſiſtance of Money and Proviſions we may expect from him, in caſe the Orders we receive ſhould authoriſe us to join him.

Agreed that the foregoing Minutes be communicated to the Council.

The following Letters from Trimbuck Row and Morari Row to the Nabob, which were received Yeſterday, enclоſed in a Note from the Nabob, are now read:

N° 170, from Trimbuck Row: Accuſing the Nabob of making Uſe of Excuſes and Evaſions, inſtead of ſending Aſſiſtance, which is contrary to the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Nabob and Madarow; that he, Trimbuck Row, had underſtood from Morari Row, that the Nabob was determined to join him, to be revenged of Hyder; that Madarow Sadaſive had wrote him Two Months ago, that the Nabob and the Preſident had ſolemnly promiſed that Aſſiſtance ſhould certainly be ſent in Six Weeks, inſtead of which the Nabob had proceeded againſt Tanjour; that he had ſent a Force to ſuccour the Place, and propoſing to mediate between the Rajah and the Nabob, and to unite in the Circar's Affairs.

pretending to join the Marattas he attacks Tanjour.

N° 171, from Morari Row: Accuſing the Nabob of not performing his Engagements, recommending the ſettling with Tanjour, and joining in the Circar's Buſineſs, agreeable to his Promiſe.

The Committee think it only neceſſary to obſerve on the above Letters, that without forcing an Inference, it ſhould ſeem from them, as well as from other Letters and Advices from the Bala Ghaut, that the Nabob has not contented himſelf with barely making Excuſes for not complying with the Demands of the Marattas for Aſſiſtance, but that he has gone further; that he has actually promiſed it; and which he might be induced to do from Three Motives: The Firſt, that by promiſing to aſſiſt the Marattas in the Reduction of Myſore, in which they would acquire great Advantages, he hoped to prevail on them to defer their Demand on him for Choute: Secondly, as he hoped to annex to his Poſſeſſions the Barhamaul Country, &c. which appeared by the Letters he lately received from Trimbuck Row, had been promiſed him as a Jaghire: And Thirdly, to gratify his Revenge, as expreſſed in Trimbuck Row's Letter.

Nabob's motives

The Nabob, it is true, well knew how averſe we have conſtantly been to ſuch a Meaſure, but he has all along entertained Hopes, that either by the Influence of His Majeſty's Miniſter, or the Diſtreſſes to which he might be able to expoſe us, he ſhould compel us to adopt his Plan.

Joſ. Dupré,
Warren Haſtings,
Sam[l] Ardley.

APPENDIX, N° 22.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, the 27th July 1772.

PRESENT,

Joſias Dupré, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Smith,
Henry Brooke,
John Whitehill,
John Maxwell Stone,
George Mackay.

Mr. Stratton abſent.
Mr. Charles Smith indiſpoſed.

READ a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn, N° 130, adviſing of his having made Peace with the Marattas. Ordered that the Receipt thereof be acknowledged.

N° 130. *Copy of a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn; dated 9th, and received 23d July 1772.*

You have probably learned from others, in what Manner the victorious Troops of the Circar, ſurrounding the Maratta Army, uſed to make frequent Attacks upon it, carrying off Horſes and Camels, and intercepting its Proviſions. The Marattas at laſt, finding it difficult to procure a Sier of Rice for a Rupee, and Grain, &c. Articles being ſcarce in Proportion, greatly diſtreſſed, made Propoſals for Peace, and Morarow Rauſtya, &c. Sardars, were the Mediators, and ſtrenuous for the ſame. Accordingly, in conſequence thereof, and particularly in Conſideration of what you wrote to me ſome Time ſince, I concluded a Peace with them; of which I adviſe you, in Conformity to the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between us. Always let me have the Pleaſure of receiving friendly Letters from you, and adviſing of your Health.

May your Happineſs and Proſperity encreaſe.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 16. *Copy of a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn; dated the 31ſt December 1771.*

The 29th Inſtant I had the Pleaſure and Satisfaction of receiving your Letter of the 11th, acquainting me, that "the Marattas, for theſe Two Years paſt, have been ſoliciting you with Intrea-"ties and with Threats, to join them with the Company's Forces, which you have refuſed; and "that, in the Space of a Month or Six Weeks, you ſhould receive the Company's Inſtructions, "when you ſhould comply with my Propoſal," all which I duly obſerved. By God's Bleſſing you are a wiſe Sardar, and well informed of all Circumſtances. I am entirely convinced both of your Friendſhip, and the Sincerity of your Engagements, and that you will act conformable to your Promiſe, and to what you write me. The Marattas have, by various Modes, likewiſe deſired my Aſſiſtance, as you have been adviſed by ſeveral Letters lately ſent; and they have not even yet laid aſide all Thoughts of it, although my Anſwers to them, both before and now, have been and are clear and explicit. Indeed, this Matter of Aſſiſtance is now the chief Point in Diſpute between the Marattas and me, and the Bar that prevents the Adjuſtment of Matters. Conſidering therefore the keeping of a Vakeel with their Army, as entirely to no Purpoſe, I ſent for him to me; and accordingly he arrived here the 27th Inſtant. With an Eye to the future, as well as for both our Benefits, I informed you that the Marattas were all Deceit, watching the Opportunity of taking Advantage of others; that their Aim was to ſpread their Ravages as far as poſſible, that their coming into this Country was attended with various bad Conſequences, and therefore, that the Company's and my Troops ought to be joined in the puniſhing and expelling them therefrom. I now alſo, conformable to the Sincerity of Friendſhip ſubſiſting between us, and with a View to our mutual Good in future, beg Leave to mention, that by our Junction and Union, the Enemy, impreſſed with the utmoſt Awe and Dread, will deſiſt from their Troubles, and Requiſitions, and Demands, and with Shame be expelled from theſe Parts without the Attainment of their Object; but ſhould it ſo happen that the Marrattas this Time acquire even the ſmalleſt Thing from the Company's Terri-

tories,

tories, it will be a bad Precedent; for in that Caſe, having once got a Taſte of the Sweets, they will every Year, prompted by their Inſatiableneſs, invade this Country, requiring Impoſſibilities; whereas, ſhould their Hopes of this Nature be now entirely cut off, they will never dare to caſt ſo much as a Look towards the Company's Poſſeſſions, and both our Countries will ever remain in Tranquillity and Security; the Conſideration of which (agreeable to the Friendſhip and Union between us) induces me to mention, that if, conſulting your Name and Reputation, and the Good of Affairs in future, you ſhall poſitively determine on the Junction of our Forces, to expel the Marattas, and will adviſe me thereof, I will come myſelf, with my Troops and a conſiderable Artillery, into the Bana Mehaut Country; when, the Junction of our Forces being effected, by God's Bleſſing, the Expulſion of the Marattas will, with the greateſt Eaſe, be accompliſhed. I have been informed by my Vakeels, agreeable to what you mentioned to them, that it is moſt probable I ſhall be aſſiſted by the Governor of Bombay, as he had wrote to you on this Subject; He has alſo wrote to me thereon. And what is conſiſtent with the Friendſhip and Engagements ſubſiſting between us, is this, that in Time of Need we ſhould join and aſſiſt each other. The Plan that occurs to me for the Company's Benefit, the extending the Reputation of all their Sardars, and the reducing the Power of the Enemy, is, that the Troops dependant upon Madras, and my Troops, ſhould join together, and take, as their Line, the oppoſing and puniſhing the Marattas here; and while this is doing, that the Troops dependant on Bombay begin their Operations from thence, towards conquering and reducing the ſeveral Places in the Cocun Country, a Country worth a Crore of Rupees, and ſituated near to Bombay. Conformable to this Plan, I have lately wrote to the Governor of Bombay, telling him that the Marattas were engaged in theſe Parts, and had left the Cocun Country entirely expoſed; that ſuch another Opportunity would never offer for the Conqueſt and Reduction thereof. That having therefore firmly reſolved on the ſame, he ſhould acquaint me of it, when I would diſpatch my fighting Ships, with Four or Five thouſand experienced People, uſed to the Sea, on Board, and under the Command of a truſty Sardar, to join him; and whatever Forts belonging to the Cocun Diſtricts, ſituated either on Hills, or on the Plain, or might be taken, together with whatever Money or Effects ſhould belong to the Company, I have nothing to do therewith, my Object being the Increaſe of the Friendſhip between us." As this is the Time for Buſineſs, and acquiring a Reputation, you will alſo write to him ſeparately on this Subject, whatever may be proper, in Conſideration of the Friendſhip and Freedom of Communication (void of Ceremony) ſubſiſting between us. You tell me, "that Proviſion is eſſentially neceſſary for the Subſiſtance of the Troops, &c. and that, as my Country has ſuffered through the Incurſions of the Marattas, in caſe of the Company's Forces proceeding there, it will be difficult, if not impracticable, to procure the ſame." The Marattas, it is true, have taken and plundered Five or Six ſmall weak Forts belonging to my Country, Places of Reſidence for the Inhabitants; but, by God's Bleſſing, in the principal Forts and Places thereof, Proviſions of all Sorts are in ſuch Quantities, as to lay in Heaps; indeed, I may ſay that each Place has enough for the Conſumption of the Company's and my Armies for the Space of a Twelve month. Make yourſelf, therefore, entirely at Eaſe in this Reſpect. By the Almighty's Favour, in caſe of the Company's and my Troops joining, not only the Marattas will not be able to remain in this Country, but immediately on our ſaid Junction, they will ſet off, nor ſtop even to take Breath, till their Arrival at the River Kiſtna. I flatter myſelf that you will reflect on all theſe Circumſtances, and ſoon let me have the Pleaſure of receiving a favourable Anſwer to this Letter, in Expectation of which I ſhall wait. For further Particulars I refer you to my Vakeel. Always let me have the Pleaſure of receiving Letters from you, adviſing of your Health.

May your Happineſs and Proſperity encreaſe.

Encouragement to the Marattas

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, the 23d January 1772.

Read a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn, as entered in Country Correſpondence, N° 16: Setting forth the Advantages of our joining him againſt the Marattas, and the Meaſures neceſſary to be taken by the Troops of this Coaſt and Bombay; repreſenting, that there are ſufficient Supplies of Proviſions at his principal Forts, to which a Draft of an Anſwer is now read and approved; informing him, that the Orders we have received from the Company, prevent our ſending their Troops out of the Carnatic, to the Aſſiſtance of any one.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, as entered in Country Correſpondence, N° 15, in Anſwer to the Preſident's of 11th December, on the Subject of aſſiſting the Marattas; and containing the Nabob's Reaſons for ſuch a Measure, which being only a Repetition of the Arguments which have been repeatedly urged by him, and anſwered by us, the Board think it unneceſſary to make any Remarks thereon.

APPENDIX, N° 23.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultation, the 22d April 1771.

PRESENT;

Josias Dupré, Esquire, Governor, President,
Warren Hastings,
Sam^l Ardley,
John Smith,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
John Whitehill,
George Mackay,
Mr. Brickenden indisposed.

THE following Letter received from Sir John Lindsay the 19th Instant, is now read.

Gentlemen, Madras, 18th April 1771.

Notwithstanding the little Success of my last Address to you, my Zeal for the public Good, and that Duty which I think inseparable from the Character with which I have the Honour to be invested, will not suffer me to be silent when the British Influence in this Country seems so evidently on the Decline. I mean to write, however, in the greatest Friendship, and though we may differ in Opinion, it is by no Means any Part of my Intention to give the smallest Offence. In the Discharge of that very important Trust reposed in me, you must allow that I am obliged to give every possible Attention to the political Concerns of this Country; and though I cannot obtain from you that Confidence I could wish, yet I should be happy to give you mine, as it is my earnest Desire to remedy, as much as lies in my Power, every Inconvenience you may think you labour under. As Things are at present circumstanced, suffer me then to be open, and to communicate my Thoughts to you freely. Should we think differently, you will readily ascribe it, I hope, to my being unacquainted with the secret Springs of Action; and I flatter myself it will be a sufficient Apology to you for this Representation, when I tell you, that I think it a Duty I owe to my Sovereign, to the Public, and to myself.

To attempt an historical Detail of the Transactions of this Presidency with the Nabob of Arcot, and the surrounding Powers, since the definitive Treaty, would be a Kind of Presumption. To you who are so well informed, to mention the Light in which every one of these appear to me, and to give you my Opinion of them all, would be tedious, and I think unnecessary at present. I shall however take the Liberty to mention a few which appear to me to be more immediately necessary to be attended to in the present Situation of Affairs; which I hope you will forgive, especially as this will serve to give you some Idea of the Opinion, which may be formed by unprejudiced Minds, of Transactions, the secret Motives of which they are totally unacquainted with.

The Peace which this Presidency thought proper to make with Hyder Ally, especially when I consider the Place where, the Time when, and the Manner how, I cannot help thinking exceedingly dishonourable; nor from all that I know, can I be convinced of its Expediency. That it was impolitic to the last Degree is evident, for in itself it laid the Foundation of new Wars, and gave the severest Blow which the English Reputation could experience in India.

Besides, from his old Friendship and present Connections with the French, Sincerity to the English is not to be expected from Hyder Ally, however his distressed Situation may induce him to make Offers and Proposals, which on a future Day he may neither have Inclination or Ability to execute; and it does not appear to me at all unnatural, to suppose that he will think it consistent to join our Enemy, should ever a National War happen in this Country.

I never have been able to form what appears to me occasional Conjecture, why the Offers of the Marattas have been treated with so much Contempt and Neglect; and that the Carnatic should be exposed to their Depredations, and the Company's Interests in it, to Ruin and Destruction, when advantageous Terms, and very tempting Offers of Friendship, have been repeatedly made. I was willing to persuade myself, that the Reason of such an apparent Disposition to support Hyder Ally without any Appearance of present or future Advantage to the Company, in the least, to be compared with the Proposals of the Marattas, could only be to restrain their Power, and to attempt the Esta-

ment of a Kind of Balance in India. Had I been Witneſs to vigorous Meaſures; had I ſeen the Appearance of Preparations in the leaſt equivalent to ſo great an Undertaking, I ſhould in all Probability have conceived you thought you had good Reaſon for ſuch Conduct. But when I am not able to diſcover ſcarce any Thing like warlike Preparations, though it is now Eight Months ſince you expreſſed your Apprehenſions of an approaching War with one of the moſt formidable Powers in India; when I am told by your Preſident, that Carriages for a Battering Train are wanting, and that even Two Months would ſcarce be ſufficient to put ſuch a Body in Motion as might be neceſſary to overawe the Rajah of Tanjore; what can I think? I acknowledge it was my Opinion from the Beginning, that to ſupport Hyder againſt the Marattas, the utmoſt Exertion of the whole Force of this Preſidency would not have been ſufficient: That in ſpite of his utmoſt Efforts, joined with them, the Carnatic would have become a Prey to this powerful Enemy; that both the Nabob and Company would have been Sufferers to what Extent is difficult to ſay. And I cannot help obſerving, that there are too many good Reaſons at this Day to juſtify my Opinion. Though at firſt I was anxious to ſuppoſe a Poſſibility of maintaining the Peace of the Carnatic, by aſſiſting neither; yet I could alſo foreſee that good Policy would ſoon require a Part to be taken: That joining neither, from the Diſpoſition of the contending Parties, was by no Means the Way either to obtain or preſerve Advantages: That it was more than probable, the Marattas of themſelves would in a ſhort Time oblige Hyder to come to their Terms, even ſhould their Power be inſufficient to take his Country from him: That then the Time might come, when the Company's Friendſhip, being no longer wanted, their Poſſeſſions, Trade, and Revenues in the Carnatic, would become a Prey to that Power whoſe Friendſhip they had deſpiſed; and in all Likelihood to the additional Revenge of Hyder Ally, for a Breach of that Treaty which he was ſuffered to dictate at the Gates of Madras.

I do not mean, Gentlemen, to give you a poſitive Opinion of the Part you ought to take, or in the leaſt to direct your Conduct. But if you will be ſo obliging to indulge me with Permiſſion, I will take the Liberty of mentioning what occurs to me, with reſpect to the preſent Situation of Affairs in this Part of India.

The Marattas are acknowledged to be the moſt formidable Power in India, and are, in a Manner, Neighbours to all the Three Preſidencies; it would appear then, that their Friendſhip was, for every Reaſon in the World, preferable to a War; they ſeem anxious to eſtabliſh a Friendſhip with the Engliſh; they have made very conſiderable Offers to obtain it, which the Nabob, I underſtand, has communicated to you, and which appear to me very advantageous: And I know not whether ſtill more conſiderable Conceſſions might not be obtained, if there was the leaſt Appearance of an Inclination to pay any Attention to their proffered Friendſhip: They have always ſhewn a friendly Diſpoſition to the Company, and if there ſhould be any threatening Appearance to the contrary at this Time, the Connection of this Preſidency with their Enemy, may in ſome Meaſure account for it.

Hyder Ally's Propoſals I know not, neither indeed can I conceive what Offers he can make, by any Means of ſo much Advantage to the Company as theirs; but his former Friendſhip, and even his preſent Connections with the French, are not unknown; and with reſpect to his Power, I acknowledge I cannot ſee that it ever could have been ſuperior, nor can I conceive at preſent, that it is by any Means equal to a vigorous Exertion of the Force of this Preſidency and the Carnatic. As there does not appear to me any Advantage from his Friendſhip, nor much Danger from the contrary, I cannot ſee any Reaſon for ſupporting ſo dangerous a Connection. As the Offers of the Marattas appear to me advantageous, and as a Refuſal of their Friendſhip will be next to a Declaration of War, which will be deſtructive to the Carnatic, and may be dangerous to the Company's Intereſts in this Country; where is the Choice? Should it be between Peace and War, it would be eaſy, but ſhould an inevitable War be the Conſequence even of aſſiſting neither, which do you think would be the moſt eligible Friend, and which the moſt dangerous Enemy? I beg Leave, Gentlemen, to put you in Mind, that you are at preſent Judges in a very great Court; and that there is ſcarce a Poſſibility of any temporary Advantage whatſoever, being an Equivalent to that permanent Influence, which it is the Intereſt of your Employers, which is the Intereſt of the Nation to maintain in this Country. I will not take upon me to adviſe you to aſſiſt the Marattas; but I think I can venture to ſay, their Friendſhip ought not to be deſpiſed; and that a War with ſuch a formidable Power ought, from every Principle of ſound Policy, to be avoided. If you do not think yourſelves in a Condition to aſſiſt with the Company's Forces, or if you have any other Reaſon for refuſing them, I ſhould think ſome Expedient might be fallen upon to ſatisfy them, and to clear yourſelves, by ſuffering the Nabob to follow ſuch Meaſures as he may think proper for the Peace and Tranquillity of his Country, and that the Troops under your Orders, which he pays, may be put under his Direction for that Purpoſe. As I am fully perſuaded it is for the Advantage of the Company, let me intreat of you, in Friendſhip, to conſider the Nabob's Intereſts and the Company's as connected; and when I reflect upon the long Friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Nabob and the Company, the mutual Obligations they are under to one another, and that their Intereſts are inſeparable and the ſame; when I know and conſider that he has given large Jaghires and a conſiderable Revenue to maintain Troops to defend the Carnatic, where the Company hold ſuch Poſſeſſions; every Reaſon in the World appears to require that Defence and Aſſiſtance of their Repreſentatives. But can you really think that it is in your Power to maintain Peace in the Carnatic, and your Influence in India, by aſſiſting neither? If ſo, it will make me exceeding happy;

and if the Conſequences prove it, it will be much to your Honour indeed; however, ſhould the Situation of Affairs point out the Neceſſity of taking a Part, and ſhould an unequal, deſtructive War be the Conſequence of not embracing deciſive Meaſures in Time, I ſhould be apprehenſive you will find ſome Difficulty of juſtifying ſuch Conduct, either to your Employers or to your Country.

With reſpect to your internal Management (if I may be allowed the Expreſſion) I ſhould have thought it political to have been at ſome Pains in convincing the Nabob how much the Company had his Proſperity at Heart, and inſtead of giving him Cauſe to be apprehenſive of his Safety, and that of his Country; inſtead of giving Encouragement by Inactivity to his rebellious Subjects to throw off his Authority, and even to attack his Territories; had there been no Treaty in the Caſe, I ſhould have thought it ſound Policy to have encouraged, ſupported, protected, and aſſiſted him. But, when a poſitive Treaty is made, under your Auſpices, and guaranteed by the Governor and Council of Fort Saint George, he appears to me to have an evident Claim on your Juſtice, from that good Faith which every one has been accuſtomed to expect from the Engliſh.

And in the preſent Caſe, when I conſider that Ten Lack of Pagodas are to be paid to the Nabob's Creditors within this Year, provided his Country remains in Tranquillity, it appears to me not only a great national Object to do every Thing in our Power to enable the Nabob to fulfil his Promiſe, but it is even a Duty which we all owe to the Widows and Orphans, whoſe diſtreſſed Circumſtances ought to awaken every generous Sentiment within us. How am I to account then, Gentlemen, for your extraordinary Inactivity in ſuffering a rebellious Subject to over-run one Part of his Country, and in calmly looking on while the Marattas are ready to enter another, without uſing the leaſt Endeavour to prevent a Rupture with them, which may be attended with the worſt Conſequences, both to the Intereſts of your private Friends and public Employers?

I am the more particularly called upon to addreſs you at preſent, becauſe I underſtand you have acquainted the Nabob, That as His Majeſty had ſent out ſuch extraordinary Powers to India, you can do nothing. I ſhall therefore take the Liberty to tell you, Gentlemen, that the Powers deputed to me from His Majeſty, were intended to ſerve the Intereſts of the Nation, and of your Employers; and it is natural to think that the Sanction of your Sovereign's Name, by a ſpecial Power commiſſioned for that Purpoſe, might be of Advantage in regaining a Conſequence and a Reputation, which it was the Opinion at Home the Company's Servants had loſt in India. But if ever there was any Opportunity of anſwering thoſe Intentions, your want of confidential Communication has almoſt, if not altogether, prevented it. However, as you have abſolutely refuſed to co-operate with me as King's Miniſter, in any One Thing for the public Good, I cannot ſuffer you to avail yourſelves of that Subterfuge, and by that Means to charge me with the Conſequences, that the Powers I had from His Majeſty prevented you from doing your Duty. I therefore beg Leave to ſay, as I have on every Occaſion laboured to eſtabliſh Harmony in all our Tranſactions, as it has been my conſtant Wiſh to have thoſe political Points in which we differed in Opinion, explained to me, and as I never have in the ſmalleſt Degree uſed any One Endeavour to counteract your Operations to ſerve the Public; ſo now I declare, that the Plenipotentiary Powers deputed to me from the Crown, ſhall be wholly directed for the public Good, to ſerve the Intereſts of the Company, if you will but give me the ſmalleſt Hint how this can be done to the beſt Advantage. And as I value not either perſonal Conſideration or perſonal Conſequence, I ſhall willingly reſign to you the Honour, the Merit, and Reputation; but permit me to entreat of you not to allow the Influence of your Conſtituents materially to ſuffer, either by an Attachment to a Party which may be judged ſo very detrimental to their real Intereſts, or by perſiſting in a dangerous Inactivity, till all Opportunity of re-eſtabliſhing the Company's loſt Reputation and declining Intereſt be for ever gone.

I ſhould be happy to do Good with the Power with which His Majeſty has thought proper to inveſt me; but ſhould that be prevented, I never can conſent to ſuffer any ſuppoſed Reſtraint from His Majeſty's Authority to be made uſe of as a Plea to juſtify Inactivity, or any other Conduct which may not be approved. Therefore, though you will not accept of the Aſſiſtance which I have offered you in His Name, it ſhall never be ſaid that His Miniſter oppoſed any one Meaſure you ever took to ſupport the real Intereſts of your Employers, the Character of the Company, or the Reputation of the Nation, while I have the Honour to be inveſted with that Character in India.

Under the Sanction of the Character of His Majeſty's Miniſter, I have taken this Liberty. I have alſo recommended a generous Support of the Prince of this Country, whom you had taken under your Protection, which I know to be perfectly conſiſtent with the Views of His Majeſty, and even the Directions of your Maſters. I have recommended Fidelity to the Treaty between him and the Rajah of Tanjore, you yourſelves made and guaranteed; and I have endeavoured to point out what appeared to me very ſtrong Reaſons for doing ſo, beſides that good Faith for which the Engliſh were once ſo famous in India.

The Peace and Tranquillity of this Country, Gentlemen, are in many Reſpects in your Power; I would have aſſiſted, and am ſtill ready to do ſo to the utmoſt Extent of my Commiſſion, and to the beſt of my Abilities. But if I ſhould be ſo circumſtanced, as not to be able to ſerve the Company according

according to His Majesty's most gracious Intentions, no Consideration whatever shall induce me to sacrifice the public Interest; therefore, whatever you do for yourselves, I am now to take the Liberty to tell you, that no Purpose whatsoever, of saying that I have either opposed or prevented you, or should any Misfortune happen from the very extraordinary political Arrangements in this Country. You will forgive me for saying, that hitherto the Cause must be sought for somewhere else, and not either in the Application or Misapplication of the Powers which our Sovereign has thought proper to send to India.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient and
most humble Servant,
John Lindsay.

The principal Points in the foregoing Letter which demand our Consideration are, the Recommendations contained therein of an offensive Alliance with the Marattas; and the Reflections on our Conduct with respect to the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore. It may not however, be improper previously to remark, that from the Similitude of Arguments and Expressions which appear in the above Letter, and in that from the Nabob of the 7th Instant, there is great Room to believe that they are a Joint-work.

Although Sir John Lindsay tells us, that he does not mean to give an Opinion of the Part we ought to take, or in the least to direct our Conduct, and that he will not take upon him to advise us to assist the Marattas; and although he does not indeed in express Words, recommend an offensive Alliance with them, but urges the Necessity of embracing their Friendship, which he unjustly accuses us of having contemned, neglected, and despised; nevertheless, it is evident from the whole Tenor of his Letter, that he means to engage us in an offensive Alliance with the Marattas against Hyder Ally, and all his Arguments clearly tend to urge and press us to such a Measure.

We have frequently in our Deliberations on this Subject, expressed our Opinion very clearly and fully against an offensive Alliance with the Marattas. In this we are justified by the repeated Sentiments of the Court of Directors, expressed in their Commands for several Years past, against distant Operations, and engaging in Alliances with the Country Powers. These Sentiments of the Court of Directors, it is true, are not expressed in such Terms as naturally convey the Idea of absolute and determinate Orders: Nevertheless, we stand in so unhappy a Predicament, that we have no Safety, but considering them as such, for the whole Tenor and Spirit of the Dispatches of last Season (as we have noticed in other Instances) are Proofs that Sentiments so expressed are absolute Orders. At the same Time, Candour obliges us to acknowledge, that the Sentiments of the Court of Directors are perfectly conformable to our own.

Their Orders of the 27th June last, received per Dolphin, are very positive and express; they are as follow: "We have only here to enjoin you to avoid, as far as in you lies, becoming Parties in "any Disputes between the Powers of India, and to pay the most strict Obedience to our Orders, for "confining your Views to our present Possessions; the Peace and Security of which are the utmost "Scope of our Wishes, as they will necessarily tend to advance the Commercial and Vital Interests "of the Company."

These, if there were no other, would be very sufficient Motives to induce us to be very cautious of entering into Alliances or Engagements with the Country Powers in general. But with regard to the Marattas, the Honourable Court have very clearly in many Parts of their Commands, expressed their Apprehensions of the Danger of an Alliance with them, or of adopting any Measures which may tend to encrease their Power. We have in different Parts of our Proceedings, referred to their Commands on this Head: But as the Matter comes now before us, recommended so earnestly by the Nabob and Sir John Lindsay, we think it necessary to recite here at Length the Sentiments of the Court of Directors thereon: They are as follow;

Separate General Letter 25th March 1768.

Par. 45. The Marattas, instead of being reduced, are likely to be aggrandized by their Conquest of the Mysore Dominions, which brings them so much nearer the Carnatic, the Soubah's Weakness and Indigence seem beyond all Relief; and Hyder Ally, if less formidable to the Soubah and Marattas, is more likely to be an Enemy to us, and to embrace every Opportunity of disturbing the Carnatic.

General

General Letter, 13th May 1768.

Par. 7. It is with the utmoſt Concern we find that the Victory you have gained tends to involve us ſtill farther in this Chaos of Treaties and Engagements, and that you ſhould ſtill think your Enemy ſo formidable, as to call in foreign Aſſiſtants, though you have a moral Certainty that the Attack of the Soubah's Dominions from Bengal, muſt oblige him to a precipitate March to his Capital; and though the Myſore Dominions, and Hyder Ally's Poſſeſſions on the Malabar Side, all lay expoſed to your Attacks; That you ſhould have Recourſe to the Marattas for that Aſſiſtance, is ſtill more alarming; and from the Spirit of your Negociations with Maudarow, and your wild Propoſal to Bengal, of putting up one of Shaw Allum's Sons; we fear all the Barriers to the Maratta Power will be broken down, and that they will add the Decan and Myſore Dominions to their extenſive Empire, and haſten that Event you deſigned to avert; we mean their Conqueſt of the Whole.

Separate General Letter, 17th March 1769.

Par. 3. In our Letter of the 25 March laſt, we gave our Sentiments at large with reſpect to the Negociations with the Soubah of the Decan, and the Conſequences apprehended from the Treaty you had entered into with him; and by our beforementioned Letter, under Date the 13th May, we expreſſed the Dangers we apprehended from your calling in the Marattas to your Aſſiſtance.

Par. 17. Your Proceedings of the 28th April ſtill leave us Reaſon to apprehend you may enter into Engagements with the Marattas for a Body of Horſe; which we think will have very fatal Conſequences, by harraſſing and laying waſte your own Country as well as the Enemy's; and we apprehend, notwithſtanding the vaſt Sums of Money they will coſt, they will be of very little Uſe, it not being probable they will expoſe themſelves much for our Service, and when you have Occaſion to diſengage yourſelves from them, Diſagreements may ariſe of dangerous Conſequences.

Letter to Select Committee, 17th March 1769.

Par. 4. Judge then our Anxiety of ſeeing a Syſtem adopted ſo repugnant to our Views, as that of ſupporting Mahomed Ally in the Myſore Country; we repeat, we ſhall not think ourſelves ſecure while we have a Soldier or a Sepoy in that Country, nor till we ſee it given to ſome Power who may preſerve it as a Barrier againſt the Marattas, and who may be an uſeful Ally, ſhould we ever have Occaſion to call in the Aſſiſtance of a Country Power.

General Letter, 30th June 1769.

Par. 5. We muſt ſay, that upon Principles of Policy we wiſh for a Peace with Hyder Naigue, whenever it can be obtained upon the moſt moderate Terms; for our Policy is to avoid every Thing that tends to the Increaſe of the Marratta Power, which is evidently the Misfortune of this War; for you are reduced to the Neceſſity of being yourſelves the Propoſer of new Provinces to be added to the Dominion of Marrattas, already poſſeſſed of Half the Mogul Empire.

Par. 6. Whether the Marrattas have accepted or not of your Offer, certain it is they will make the moſt Uſe they can of the Embroils of others; it is by this Conduct they have arrived at their preſent Degree of Power, and our beſt Policy is to check their Growth by every Opportunity, or at leaſt to avoid lending our own Force to their Aggrandizement; which we certainly do, as often as

as we engage in Wars with the few remaining Chiefs of India, who are yet capable of coping with them.

7. Nizam Ally and Hyder Naigue are Two of thoſe Chiefs, and it is our true Intereſt to preſerve a good Underſtanding with them.

Separate General Letter, 23rd March 1770.

Par. 12. The Marrattas and Hyder, you ſay, were at War; and it undoubtedly was our true Intereſt, on many Accounts, to ſee the Power of the Marrattas, if not of both the contending Parties, weakened, but by no Means to interfere in the Diſpute. Every Maratta that fell in the Conteſt, might almoſt be conſidered as one of our Enemies ſlain. But you have diverted Hyder.

The Dangers of Alliance with the Marattas, or any other Meaſure which may tend to encreaſe their Power, are fully and clearly expreſſed in the foregoing Extracts; and the late Conduct of the Marattas in Bengal, and in the Bala Ghaute, not only juſtifies, but adds great Weight to the Apprehenſions expreſſed by the Honourable Court on this Head; ſince it is evident, that their Operations are not now merely for the Purpoſe of collecting their Choute, but that their Views therein are to conquer the whole Peninſula. Of this the Nabob muſt be ſenſible; and that were we only to make an Appearance of joining the Marattas againſt Hyder Ally, the only Power in theſe Parts capable of making any Oppoſition againſt them, the Reduction of the Myſore Country to the Maratta Yoke would be accelerated, if not the immediate Conſequence of ſuch a Meaſure. Notwithſtanding which the Nabob can perſevere in preſſing us thereto, and Sir John Lindſay take upon him, under the Sanction of His Majeſty's Name, to ſecond the Nabob's Solicitations, although he muſt be ſenſible we could not acquieſce therein, without a moſt manifeſt Breach of our Engagements with Hyder Ally. Indeed, we are clearly of Opinion, that if the Company were to take a Part with either, and the Power and Reſources of the Carnatic would be united, or brought to co-operate heartily with the Company, the ſupporting of Hyder Ally, as a Barrier againſt the Marattas, would be far more eligible than to throw the whole Power into the Hands of the Marattas, by uniting with them to reduce Hyder Ally, and add the Myſore Dominions to theirs: But we have not had, and have not, an Idea of attempting it, in Oppoſition to, or even independantly of, the Power and Reſources of the Carnatic.

As to the Alternative propoſed, and which the Nabob has alſo recommended; viz. That thoſe Troops under our Orders, and which the Nabob pays, may be put under his Direction; it is only neceſſary for us to refer to the Company's Orders relative to the Sepoys in their Service, paid by the Nabob (which much be the Troops meant by Sir John Lindſay) which Orders we here think it neceſſary to write at Length, as well as ſuch Parts of the Commands of the Court of Directors as relate to the Expediency of the Nabob's depending on the Company for the Protection of the Carnatic.

Extracts of a Letter from the Honourable Court of Directors; dated 19th February 1766.

Par. 32. The Nabob's Requeſt, which you communicate to us in the 2d Paragraph of your Letter of the 27th March, has engaged our moſt ſerious Attention. He is deſirous, you ſay, that about 10,000 Sepoys may be continued in our Service, the Charges of which Corps the Nabob will undertake to defray. The Subject is of great Importance; for although the Advantages immediately reſulting are obvious, nevertheleſs we are apprehenſive that Conſequences dangerous, though remote, may enſue, if wiſe Precautions be not taken to avert them. However, as upon the Whole we truſt that Prudence and Circumſpection may guard againſt them, we have reſolved to comply with the Nabob's Deſire; and do accordingly allow you to retain that Number in our Service: And that you may clearly underſtand our Reaſoning on this Subject, we ſhall point out to you the Advantages we expect the Company will receive from this Meaſure; and on the other Hand the Conſequences we apprehend, to obviate which, we ſhall lay down ſome Rules for your Obſervance.

Policy in regard to the Nabob's troops

33. The Benefits we expect to receive, are, that the Company will be diſburthened of the Expence of maintaining a Body of 4000 Sepoys, which by our Regulation of the 30th December 1763, were to be kept up in our Pay on your Eſtabliſhment; for we underſtand that 10,000 Sepoys to be maintained at the Nabob's Charge, are not to be excluſive of the before-mentioned Eſtabliſhment, but are deemed ſufficient for all Purpoſes; and if this Corps be properly trained and attached to us, ſo as that we may have at all Times a Dependance on them, we hope from thence to be ſo much the more powerful on the Coaſt, in caſe of a War with France, and at all Times to keep the Nabob more firmly in our Intereſt, by thus having under our own Orders and Controul, almoſt the whole Military Force by which the Province is to be protected and kept in Obedience; an Ad-

vantage which cannot fail to render the Company ſo much the more reſpectable in the Eyes of the neighbouring Powers.

34. The Dangers we apprehend ſpring from this Conſideration, that theſe Troops being Natives of India, it may well be doubted whether much Dependance can be placed on their Affections when oppoſed to Country Powers; for if they feel (as it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe they do) the ſame natural Bias towards their Countrymen which is ſo prevalent in all Men, we fear they may incline to deſert our Cauſe, ſhould any Difference ariſe hereafter between us and the Nabob; an Event, which although we ſee not at preſent any Cauſe to ſuſpect, ſhould not however be deemed chimerical, ſince our Competitors are ſo nearly intereſted in ſuch a Diviſion, and ſo capable of Arts to effect what Intereſt dictates; ſhould that Event, we ſay, take Place, a Defection in this Corps, thus armed and diſciplined, might be productive at ſuch a Criſis of more miſchievous Conſequences than all the Benefits we may ever receive from them can compenſate. But as their Superiority over Sepoys in the Country Service conſiſts only in their Diſcipline, which (wanting European Officers) they ſoon loſe under the Country Government, as we are aſſured, theſe Apprehenſions, ſtrong as they are, do nevertheleſs yield to our firmer Hope and Expectation that ſuch general Regulations may be eſtabliſhed, and ſuch temporary Expedients be adopted, as may obviate thoſe Dangers, and ſecure the Company's real and permanent Advantages. You on the Spot may probably be able to form a Plan more conducive to theſe ſalutary Purpoſes than any which can ſuggeſt itſelf to us here; nevertheleſs theſe Articles ſeem to us eſſential.

Article 1ſt, 2d, and 3d. relate to the Eſtabliſhment as to Number, and the Appointment of Officers.

to be dependent on the Company

Article 4th. That the utmoſt Care be taken, as well at the Time of enliſting, as at all Times afterwards, to inculcate the Opinion, that they are wholly and ſolely dependent on the Company, ſubject to their Order and Controul, and no other Power whatſoever, and, as much as poſſible, it ſhould be concealed that the Nabob is under Agreement to reimburſe the Company for their Pay.

Article 5th. That they be cloathed in an Uniform, remarkably diſtinguiſhed from ſuch Sepoys as the Nabob himſelf may entertain for the Guard of his Perſon, or for any other Purpoſe.

Article 6th. That a Paymaſter of Sepoys be appointed from amongſt our covenanted Servants at the Preſidency; that we have an Office for tranſacting the Buſineſs of that Department; and that ſuch of the Sepoys as ſhall from Time to Time be at the Preſidency be monthly and regularly paid at the public Office, not by iſſuing the Pay of each Company to the Subadar, but that each Man be paid by the Paymaſter himſelf; and that ſuch Sepoys as are in the Out Garriſons be in like Manner paid, every Man ſeparately by the Paymaſter of the Garriſon, who (as has been the Cuſtom for ſome Time) muſt continue to be appointed from amongſt our covenanted Servants.

Article 7th. That the Britiſh Colours, ſuch as are carried by our European Battalions without any Diſtinction, and that ſuch diſtinguiſhing Colours as the Companies of the ſeveral Battalions may bear, be alſo very remarkably diſtinguiſhed from the Colours borne by the Nabob's own Sepoys.

Article 8th. That as theſe Sepoys muſt be divided in different Parts of the Country, great Care muſt be taken that the ſame Body do not remain too long in one Place, but that at certain convenient Times, thoſe in one Garriſon be relieved from another, that ſo all in their Turn may do Duty in our Forts and Settlements.

Article 9th. That in the Nabob's principal Forts, the Garriſon do conſiſt of a Number of Europeans and Sepoys ſo proportioned, and with ſuch Precautions, as may beſt prevent the ill Conſequence that might otherwiſe enſue in caſe of a Revolt in the latter.

Article 10th. Regarding Articles of War.

Article 11th. The Money for Payment of theſe Troops, for cloathing them, and all other incidental Charges, muſt be iſſued from our Caſh, in like Manner as practiſed in reſpect to our European Troops, and the Amount thereof, Monthly or Annually, at the Cloſe of your Books, muſt be transferred to the Debt of the Nabob's Account, by whom you are to be reimburſed in ſuch Manner as ſhall be ſettled and agreed on.

Par. 35. Theſe are the principal Articles which occur to us; if you can add or ſubſtitute any others more conducive to the Ends we have in view, you are at Liberty to do ſo, giving us your Reaſons. We expect that you will not treat this Subject lightly, but give us your Opinion very particularly concerning the Doubts we have expreſſed.

APPENDIX, N° 23.

Extracts of Letters from the Honourable the Court of Directors, regarding the Necessity of the Nabob's Dependance on the Company.

Separate General Letter, dated 24th December 1765.

Par. 8. By the Reduction of the Rebel Usoff Cawn, we have at length the Satisfaction to find the Nabob placed in full and peaceable Possession of all the Provinces subject to his Government; and we have given you our Thoughts above, of some of the Measures which appear necessary to check Attempts from without, and preserve Peace and Tranquillity within. Another Object which should equally engage your Attention, is the Conduct of the Nabob himself towards the Company. It has hitherto been his immediate and undoubted Interest to act in concert and close Alliance with us; and as it is our firm Intention to support him in his Government, we hope he will continue to think himself bound by the same Tie to depend on our Support, solicit our Friendship, and unite with us in Measures for the common Benefit; nevertheless, as Opinions are apt to change with Times and Circumstances, and perhaps the Seeds of Ambition, which have hitherto been choaked by Distresses of various Kinds, may in Prosperity and Affluence arise and shoot into Excesses, not altogether compatible with the System we should approve, it seems therefore very necessary that such a precautionary Plan should be adopted as may, without giving the Nabob any reasonable Cause of Disgust or Complaint, preserve to the Company such a Degree of Power and Influence in the Province, as may make any Attempts to our Prejudice dangerous to him, and consequently subject his Actions to Controul, so far as may be necessary. He has hitherto desired, at least acquiesced with seeming Approbation, that Garrisons of our Troops should be placed in his Forts; it is not improbable, but that after having some Time enjoyed " the Blessings of Peace, he may forget his own Weakness, and not seeing Danger immediately before him, " wish to have his Protectors removed, that he may seem to figure in a higher Character in the Eyes of his " Subjects and Neighbours. Should such an Event happen, it may require some Address to avoid giving " him Disgust, and at the same Time a Degree of Firmness to persist in your present Plan: But persist " you must; for we establish it as a fundamental Point, that the Company's Influence and real Power in " the Province cannot be any Way so effectually maintained as by keeping the principal Forts in our " Hands. But this should be so managed, as that he may always think they are, as in Reality we mean they should be, kept for him as Nabob of the Province; and to that End, amongst other Regulations, let the commanding Officers be confined solely to the Duty of the Garrison, and subjected to such Rules as that the Nabob may have no reasonable Cause of Complaint.

Separate General Letter, dated 25th March 1768.

Par. 8. The entire Reliance of the Nabob on the Company for the Protection of the Carnatic, you are, according to our former Orders, by all prudent Steps, to endeavour to effect; and doubt not of your benefiting yourselves of his apparently favourable Disposition to that Measure. We are desirous of his embracing our Protection, rather than his own Inclination, than that he should unwillingly be prevailed on by you to order it.

9th. The Force of Arguments advanced for placing the Defence of the Country in our Hands, discharging most of his Sepoys cannot, from Experience, admit of Controversy, and the introducing that System is of the utmost Importance, from your Conclusion that Twelve Battalions less would be sufficient for the Defence of the Carnatic against all Invaders. These are now kept up by the Company and the Nabob, and as it appears it would be the Means of establishing Peace and Tranquillity, encreasing his Revenues, and very considerable diminishing his Expences.

10. We are very sensible that in a Matter of such Delicacy, you will have many Difficulties to encounter; from his Apprehension that his Reputation and Authority will be lessened by it, and the Obstacles which his Dependants will throw in your Way to excite his Suspicions and Jealousy. Such Impediments, we depend upon your cautious Management to remove; and that you will, with the Tenderness and good Grace the Nicety of the Case requires, engage him without Disgust, and by Degrees, to discharge the whole of his useless Rabble, and depend entirely on our Troops for the Defence and Security of his Possessions.

Separate Letter, dated the 19th of March, 1771.

Par. 31. From the whole Tenor of your Proceedings, and from the whole Course of the War, we perceive the many Disadvantages the Carnatic labours under from the Want of some Uniformity of System between the Nabob and the Company, with respect to the Military Establishment and Operations,

rations. As the Defence of the Carnatic always reſts on the Company in caſe of an Invaſion, ſo it is reaſonable and proper that the Nabob ſhould ſubmit to be controlled by them, with reſpect to the Number and diſciplining the Troops.

We come now to conſider the Reflections made by Sir John Lindſay, on our Conduct, with reſpect to the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjour.

Motives to the Jayger War.

We have already ſaid, and we repeat, that we look upon the Rajah's Conduct in taking up Arms againſt the Maraver or Nalcoty Man in the Manner he has done, as unjuſtifiable: But we muſt at the ſame Time declare it as our Opinion, that the Nabob's earneſt Solicitations for our proceeding immediately againſt him, do not ariſe from any Regard to the Maravar, or Nalcoty Man, or from any Deſire of obliging the Rajah, to make them Satisfaction; but from the Hopes he has, that when we have once taken up Arms, we may be led to perſevere, until we have annexed Tanjour to his Poſſeſſions. This, we ſay, we believe to be One among the many Motives that influence the Nabob's Conduct. We are fully juſtified in theſe Sentiments, from the whole Tenor of the Nabob's Behaviour towards the Rajah, ſince the Concluſion of the Treaty in 1762, with which the Nabob was much diſſatisfied at the Time, and he has taken every Opportunity ſince, of endeavouring to engage us in a Quarrel with the Rajah; and it has required the utmoſt Attention of this Government, to preſerve even the Appearance of Harmony between them. The Court of Directors have fully expreſſed their Senſe of the Treaty, and of the Nabob's unfavourable Diſpoſition towards the Rajah in the following Paſſages of their Commands.

Extracts of Letters from the Honourable the Court of Directors, regarding the Nabob and Rajah of Tanjour.

Separate General Letter, 30th December 1763.

Par. 2d. Your making a Peace between the Nabob and the King of Tanjour, was an Event ſo much to be deſired, that we cannot but be highly pleaſed with it, eſpecially as the Terms are not only agreeable and advantageous to both Parties, but as in all Probability a Rupture with that Prince would have engaged us in a Quarrel as an Ally of the former; and when once the Flame was lighted up, there is no knowing how it might have ſpread, at a Time too when the State of our military Force was not in a Condition for undertaking a new War, beſides involving us in moſt heavy Expences, the certain Conſequence of military Operations.

3d. Your Proceedings in the Whole of this Negociation have been judicious, and Mr. Dupré has acquitted himſelf therein in a very able and ſatisfactory Manner.

4th. The Twenty-ſix Lacks of Rupees, which have been recovered by the ſaid Treaty, and are in full for all Arrears due to the Nabob from the King of Tanjour, is in Fact an happy Acquiſition to the Company, as it is to be applied towards the Diſcharge of the Nabob's Debt.

Separate General Letter, 26th April 1765.

Par. 13. We are very ſorry to find the Nabob ſo unreaſonably oppoſe the Repairs which the King of Tanjour is deſirous of making to the Banks of the Caviny. If the Nabob ſaw his Intereſt in the ſame Light we do, he ſhould be deſirous, above all Things, of maintaining a Peace and Friendſhip with the King of Tanjour, content himſelf with what he now poſſeſſes, and ſtudy the Means of eſtabliſhing Order, and maintaining Tranquillity in his Government. It is certain that the Nabob's Exiſtence, as ſuch, depends on the Strength of the Company; he is too ſenſible not to feel this, and will not, we hope, take any Steps that may bring on new Troubles without your Concurrence. It is neceſſary that a reſpectful Decency ſhould be obſerved in all your Negociations with him; but at the ſame Time it is juſt and proper, that in ſuch a Caſe as this you ſhould ſhew a Firmneſs becoming the Power you repreſent. You have guaranteed the Treaty made in 1762 between him and the King, and have therefore a Right to interfere in the Subjects of Contention that may ariſe between them, though not immediately expreſſed in the Treaty. In the preſent Diſpute it ſeems to us very reaſonable, that the King ſhould have the Liberty of repairing the Banks of the Caviny, ſo far as he has in former Times been allowed to do, and even more, if new Encroachments of the River ſhould require it, provided the Nabob ſuſtains no Damage or Injury thereby; and ſo far you will do right to inſiſt on. This Juſtice requires; and, conſidering the Two Powers in a political Light, we think it is for our Intereſt that each ſhould be maintained in his proper Rights.

APPENDIX, N° 23.

Separate General Letter, 24th December 1765.

Par. 4. We are well pleaſed to learn that you have at laſt made the Nabob ſenſible how much it is his Intereſt to maintain a Friendſhip and Harmony with the King of Tanjour. Whether he is ſincere or not in theſe Profeſſions, it is well that he ſeems ſo; and it muſt be your Care to keep him in that Temper, and prevent his attempting any Thing unjuſtly to the Rajah's Prejudice. The great Reluctance he has ſhewn to ſuffer the Banks of the Caviny and Annauil to be repaired, is no favourable Proof of the Diſpoſition he bears toward the Rajah's Government. The Improvement and Extenſion of our Commerce on the Coaſt (an Object we have greatly at Heart) depends ſo much on the Peace of the Carnatic, that it is become a neceſſary Part of our Syſtem to watch over and preſerve its Tranquillity. This being eſtabliſhed as a fundamental Principle, you muſt endeavour to form your Conduct thereon, and prevent, as much as you prudently can, one Power from encroaching on another.

Separate General Letter, 4th March 1767.

Par. 17. We are well pleaſed that the King of Tanjour has fulfilled his Engagements, and that there ſubſiſts a friendly Intercourſe and Correſpondence between you and him; you muſt loſe no Opportunity of raiſing in him the Idea of a firm Dependance on our Friendſhip. You will not want Opportunities we apprehend, of giving Proofs of your Impartiality; for we diſcover, in many Inſtances, a Want of Cordiality between him and the Nabob: Amongſt others of great Injury the Trichinopoly Country was like to ſuſtain by the Tanjoreans breaking down a Stone Annauil, which upon Enquiry was found to be of no Conſequence, we fear the Nabob will ever be ſeeking Pretences to provoke him, in Hopes of annexing ſome Part of the Tanjour Country to his own; and the River Caviny will afford numberleſs Subjects. It would therefore be well worth your Endeavours to obtain as preciſe an Account as can be got of the ancient Uſages and Rights which were acknowledged by the Kings of Trichinopoly and Tanjour reſpectively, touching the Waters iſſuing from that River; and thereby you may be enabled, on good Grounds, to mediate in ſuch Diſputes, without injuring the Nabob, or (to gratify his Paſſions) ſacrificing the Rights of the King.

K. of Tanjour fulfills Engagements

It is true, the Honourable Court have ſince, in their Commands per Duke of Grafton, urged the Reaſonableneſs that the Rajah ſhould bear a Proportion of the Expence of laſt War, and that Meaſures ſhould be taken to compel him.

However, whatſoever may be the Nabob's Motives for thus preſſing us to a Meaſure for which we are not prepared, and at a Time when we are threatened with Danger, which our utmoſt Efforts will, we fear, be inſufficient to avert, we are clearly of Opinion, that the Proceedings of the Rajah againſt Maravar and Nalcooly Man, and his Conduct in withholding the Tribute due from him, would fully authoriſe our calling him to a ſevere Account; and we ſhould not defer taking Meaſures for that Purpoſe, if our Situation in other Reſpects warranted ſuch an Expedition: But in the preſent State of Affairs, when we are threatened by the Marattas in theſe Parts; and the Soubah, inſtigated by Fazel Beg Cawn, is watching an Opportunity of raiſing Diſturbances in the Circars, it would be the Height of Imprudence to ſuffer either the Nabob's Solicitations, or the Taunts and Reflections of Sir John Lindſay, to drag us into a Meaſure which appears to us to be attended with ſo many Difficulties and Dangers.

A Draft of an Anſwer to the above Letter being prepared, it is agreed to meet again To-morrow Morning, to read and conſider the ſame.

Joſ. Dupré,
Warren Haſtings,
John Smith,
Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
John Whitehill,
Geo. Mackay.

APPENDIX, N° 23.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 12th June, 1771.

PRESENT.

Josias Dupré, Governor, President,
Warren Hastings,
Samuel Ardley.

Wrote the following Letter to the Select Committee at Fort William:

To the Honourable John Cartier, Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your Favour of the 20th April, reached us the 28th ultimo.

We are much concerned at the Resolution you acquaint us the King has taken to put himself into the Hands of the Marattas; as such an Event must, we apprehend, greatly increase their Influence, and of course promote their Views, which evidently tend to the entire Conquest of Indostan.

Nothing material has happened between the Marattas and Hyder Ally since our last Advices of 20th May; the former still remain some Cos's distant from Syringapatam.

Hyder Ally still continues to press us for Assistance, which we have it not in our Power to grant, as it is impossible for us to attempt any Thing without the Revenues and Resources of the Carnatic, which are entirely under the Controul of the Nabob; who, on the other Hand, earnestly presses us to a Junction with the Marattas to subdue Mysore: In this System he is warmly seconded by Sir John Lindsay, who has urged every possible Argument to induce us to come into the Nabob's Measures. We have told them plainly, that we can never acquiesce in a Plan which appears to us so dangerous in itself, so inconsistent with our Engagements, and so contrary to the Interests and Views of the Company's other Settlements.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient humble Servants,
Josias Dupré, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
12th June 1771.

Extract of Fort St. George Select Consultations, the 14th December, 1771.

PRESENT,

Josias Dupré, Esquire, Governor, President,
Warren Hastings,
Samuel Ardley.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, as entered in Country Correspondence N° 180, on the present State of Affairs; and containing his Reasons for joining the Marattas.

As there are some Passages in the said Letter which require Explanation, independant of the Arguments urged by the Nabob in support of his Plan, the Committee think it proper to enter the said Letter on their Proceedings, with such explanatory Remarks as appear necessary; and which is accordingly done as follows:

N° 180. *From the Nabob; dated and received 13th December 1771.*

LETTER.	REMARKS.
A. In my Letter some Time ago, I acquainted you particularly of the Force and Power of the Marattas; and their Promise, that in case we assist them in punishing Hyder Ally Cawn, they will deliver up the Country belonging to the Payen Ghaut	A. 'Tis true, the Nabob has told us so; but when, at a Conference with Mauderow Sadasheo, as appears by Minutes of Committee the 4th February 1771, he was desired to explain what Advantage he had to offer, he declined to mention any

LETTER.

Ghaut and ſhew us other Inſtances of their Kindneſs. Hitherto by our joint Scheme of informing them that the whole Matter had been wrote to the Gentlemen in Europe, and that Orders were expected from thence, we have paſſed the Time over in ſuch Manner, that they have not thought of entering into this Country, but have always inquired concerning their Requeſt. Now, however, conſidering the great Length of Time, which it has taken to receive the Letters from Europe, they are come into the Payen Ghaut Country; and intend, if Aſſiſtance is granted them agreeable to their Deſire, to perform their former Promiſe of Kindneſs; but if not, ſuſpecting the ſame to proceed from a Conſideration of an Engagement of Friendſhip to Hyder Ally Cawn, they intend to lay waſte my Country. Accordingly, whether it was with a View of ſtriking a Terror throughout the Country, or that the ſame was done through a Miſtake of the Pundauras (from whichever it proceeded) but immediately on their paſſing on this Side of the Ghauts, and making a Motion in ſome of the Villages, ſuch as Caliſpauk, &c. the Inhabitants of the Country (on whom its Cultivation depends, and who, in this dry Seaſon, with the Water from the Wells, had ſowed a little Grain, and were waiting for the Time of reaping the ſame) greatly alarmed, fled, with their Women, Children, and Cattle, to Places of Safety, by which the Grain ſo ſowed has ſuffered greatly. My Situation is ſuch, that out of the Collections to the Company, may be paid, in lieu of the current Charges to the Creditors, alſo may be given, and the Charges of the Sepoys in my Service with my own neceſſary Expences, may likewiſe be carried on: (God forbid it ſhould ſo happen) but if nothing is received from the Country, I have no Means whatever of ſupporting all theſe Charges; and in caſe of the Maratta Army coming into this Country, and Diſturbances happening therein, I do not think that a ſingle Village will remain in Quiet, nor the Inhabitants, or their Cattle, be in Safety; for the Country in a very ſhort Time may be laid waſte, and cannot recover itſelf for a great Length of Time; in which Caſe, it will be out of my Power to procure either Grain or Money, even from any Part, or to ſend Proviſions from one Place to another. In thoſe Forts indeed, where Grain has been laid up in Store, in ſome ſufficient for the People there for the Term of Six Months, and in others ſtill more, ſufficient for the fighting Men in the Company's Army that is ready; but my Apprehenſions are, where we are to get Grain after the Army and Garriſons ſhall have expended the above. I underſtand from you, that the Company likewiſe have no Money. Should it be thought, that by joining with and the Aſſiſtance of Hyder Ally Cawn, theſe Ravages may be ſtopped, the ſame is by no Means practicable; for even when the ſaid Cawn was in the higheſt of his Power, he could not ſtand againſt them, and what can he do now that Power is ſo much curtailed? What Motive can there be to induce me to conſent to my Country being ruined, and its Inhabitants plundered of Lacks, by being at Enmity with the Marattas?

2 B. Their

REMARKS.

any Thing until we ſhould firſt declare our Intentions to join, or not to join the Marattas.

B. When

LETTER.

B. Their Chaſtiſement, by the Mode you propoſe, does not appear to me poſſible.

C. If the Plan indeed I have repreſented, mentioned in Converſation, could be adopted, in ſome Meaſure, the Eſſentials for that Purpoſe, might be got together; but in the preſent Situation of Affairs, I think the entering into a War with them, is begetting freſh Diſturbances in the Country; and after ſuſtaining vaſt Loſs, ſacrificing the Lives of many Europeans, and exerting

REMARKS.

B. When the Preſident communicated to the Nabob the Opinion of the Board (ſee their Minutes of 13th Inſtant) the Nabob ſaid, "that ſince we were reſolved not to join the Marattas, his Country muſt be totally ruined, for he was of Opinion that we could not prevent their plundering and burning, neither could we come up with them, for they would not fight us;" which brought on the following Converſation:

Preſ. I think ſo too.

Nab. Then how can you think of making War with them?

Preſ. I do not; but if they make War on us, we muſt defend ourſelves.

Nab. Well, and how will you defend yourſelves?

Preſ. In the firſt Place, all the Grain in the Country muſt be ſecured in the Forts.

Nab. The Circars Grain has been laid in ever ſince July; there has been little ſince.

Preſ. What belongs to the Inhabitants ſhould alſo be ſecured.

Nab. There is but little remaining; the Inhabitants have been living on it, and it is very near conſumed by this Time.

Preſ. So much the better, the Marattas will find nothing here to ſubſiſt on; how will they be able to obtain Supplies of Proviſions?

Nab. Oh! They have Lacks of Bungarys that bring them conſtant Supplies. All the Country is open to them, through Cuddapah quite to Poonah.

Preſ. Then I think the Plan of Operations ſhould be this: Inſtead of harraſſing our Troops, as we did the laſt War, and by which I think we could not prevent their plundering the Country, we ſhould keep in their Rear, and apply our whole Attention and Endeavour to cut off their Supplies. Great Pains ſhould be taken to obtain good and timely Information of their Convoys of Proviſions; and as they muſt come through ſome of the Paſſes, we ſhould endeavour to intercept them. I think this Plan may be attended with Succeſs; and though it will not prevent their ruining the Country this Time, it may oblige them ſoon to retire from it.

Nab. You never can prevent their getting Supplies.

C. This Plan is for the Three Preſidencies to form a general Confederacy with the Powers who are jealous of the Marattas, and attack them at once on all Sides; Bengal on the Side of Malva, Bombay to march to Poonah, and this Preſidency on the Side, only aſſiſting the other Preſidencies.

APPENDIX, N° 23.

LETTER.

erting ourſelves in War for Years, it does not pear to me poſſible to extirpate them. As I n, in every Senſe, the Company's firm Friend, they are my Benefactors, and the Protectors th of myſelf and Country, and as the Tran-illity of my Country is the Means of carrying their Trade, I have therefore, for the Infor-ation of you, the Company's Repreſentatives re, wrote thus plainly, in order that you may viſe me (whoſe Good is included in that the Company) of what you may think oſt beneficial for the Tranquillity and Proſ-rity of the Country, the Safety of the Inha-tants, and the Company's Trade. It is not th a View of ſupporting the Marattas I write is; my Objects therein are the Tranquilli-and Protection of my Country (the Inhabi-nts of which it is my Duty to take care of) and e Conſideration, that in the preſent Situation of ffairs, thoſe Objects cannot be obtained but by ving them Aſſiſtance. Every Letter and every ntelligence I have received from the Marattas, c. I have immediately ſent to you, that you ight be informed of its Contents; now like-iſe I ſend you incloſed, the following Letters, iz. from Maudhoorow Pundut Purdhaun, both you and to me; a Tranſlation of one from Maudhoorow Sudaſkes, and a Letter from ajah Burbur, regarding the Situation of the eople. What can I ſay more?

REMARKS.

The Committee think it neceſſary here to recapitulate the many Arguments and Reaſons againſt cquieſcing in the Plan recommended by the Nabob, of joining the Marattas againſt Hyder Ally. It ill be ſufficient to return him an Anſwer, acquainting him, That we can by no Means impute the reſent Conduct of the Marattas to any Suſpicions they have entertained that our Refuſal to omply with their Demands and Threats, is in conſequence of our Engagements. This is evinced y their Conduct in engaging in a Confederacy againſt this Province in 1768, when we were actually t War with Hyder Ally; and which we have no Doubt they would have carried into Execution, had ot Madava Row been called off to reduce Iannojee. It will be alſo neceſſary to acquaint the Nabob, hat notwithſtanding the Inſult offered to this Government, in demanding Aſſiſtance with *Threats* in aſe of Refuſal, and which the Nabob ſtiles a *Requeſt*, we are utterly averſe to War, and are de-irous of living in Peace with the Marattas; that we are determined not to commence Hoſtilities until we are actually attacked, when we muſt defend ourſelves in the beſt Manner we are able; that he Orders of our Conſtituents, which muſt be our Guide, will not allow us to entertain a Thought of aſſiſting the Marattas; that theſe Orders can, however, only affect the Troops under our Com-mand; that the Nabob is at Liberty to take ſuch Meaſures as he ſhall judge beſt for the Security of his own Country; though we cannot avoid declaring it as our firm and clear Opinion, that what-ever Advantages he may promiſe himſelf, by gaining the preſent Favour of the Marattas, in aſſiſting them to reduce the Myſore Country, that ſuch a Meaſure will, in the End, be productive of certain and utter Ruin to this Province.

Hastings's opinion of the reduction of Mysore

A Draft of a Letter to the Nabob to the foregoing Effect, being prepared; Reſolved, That it be communicated to the Council for their Approbation.

Joſ. Dupré,
Warren Haſtings,
Sami Ardley.

APPENDIX, N° 23, 24.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 18th December 1771.

Received the following Letter per Tappals from the Select Committee at Fort William:

To the Honourable Josias Dupré, Esq; President, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee, at Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have been favoured with your Letter under Date the 28th September, enclosing an Extract of one to you from the Select Committee at Bombay.

By the latest Advices, his Majesty was encamped at Naby Gunge, some Distance beyond Furruckabad. The slow Progress he has made in the Prosecution of his Expedition, seems to have been occasioned by the total Want of Unanimity in the Maratta Councils. The Dissentions among their several Chiefs procrastinate the Plan of giving him Assistance, and will prevent their undertaking any Thing of Consequence in the Course of the present Season; at least nothing appears to us that can at this Time enable us to form any Opinion of their Intentions.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient,
humble Servants,
John Cartier,
Samuel Middleton,
Claud Russel.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 10th June 1773.

To Thomas Moystyn, Esq; at Poonah.

Sir,

The Commands of the Honourable Court received this Year, earnestly recommend our observing, as far as possible, a strict Neutrality between the Marattas and Hyder Ally Cawn.

We are, with Esteem,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servants,
Alex. Wynch,
John Smith,
Jos Smith,
J. M. Stone.

Fort Saint George,
10th June 1773.

APPENDIX, N° 24.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, the 8th December 1774.

THIS Day the following Letter was dispatched to the Governor General and Council at Fort William:

To the Honourable Warren Hastings, Esquire, Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William.

Gentlemen,

We have already had the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letter of the 24th October; and shall now proceed to give you the clearest Information in our Power of the Posture of Affairs under this Presidency, respecting the Country Powers, their Interest, and probable Connections with each of them, with the Company and other European Nations.

We

APPENDIX, N° 24.

We ſhall firſt ſpeak of the Marattas. This State has been involved for ſome Time paſt, in Conteſts reſpecting the Perſon who ſhould hold the Office of Peſhwa. The Objects of One Party have been to ſupport Ragonaut Row, the Uncle of the late Mahadarow, in the above Office; and the Objects of the other, to procure it, nominally at leaſt, for the Family of Narrain Row, who was aſſaſſinated at Poonah in the Courſe of laſt Year. Until lately, the latter Party, by the Aſſiſtance of the Soubah of the Decan, ſeemed to have greatly the Superiority: Ragonaut Row was obliged to fly the Decan, and a Son of Narrain Row, ſince the Commencement of thoſe Diſſentions, was appointed to the Office of Peſhwa, the Buſineſs of the Government being conducted by the leading Men of that Party. By late Advices, however, we learn, that Ragonaut Row, having found the Aſſiſtance of Two powerful Maratta Chiefs of Indoſtan, has re-entered the Decan, and, if we may form any Judgment from Appearances, ſeems likely, in a great Degree, to recover his Authority. For further Information, we beg Leave to incloſe to you a Letter, which the Select Committee have lately received from Mr. Moſtyn, the Company's Reſident at Poonah. What Changes the Diſſention in this State may cauſe in the political Intereſt of this Part of India, we cannot take upon us to ſay; we may have our Hopes, that the Loſſes which each Party has ſuſtained in the Conteſts, and the Attention which each will be obliged to pay to the Re-eſtabliſhment of his particular Intereſt, will, for ſome Time at leaſt, confine this reſtleſs Power within the Limits of their own Country, and give Peace to their Neighbours.

As the Maratta Poſſeſſions are extended through almoſt every Part of India, it cannot be expected that we ſhould be able to give either an accurate Account of their Revenues, or their Force which, upon an Emergency, and when their Government is united, they can bring into the Field.

We know of no Connection that this Power has with any European or Country Power; the temporary one formed by one of the Parties with the Soubah of the Decan, excepted.

The Marattas at Nagapore, ſince the Death of Iannogee, have been divided into Two Parties; at the Head of one is Sabajee Bhoonſalah, and Moodagee Bhoonſalah at the Head of the other, each contending for the Regency. The former has co-operated with the Soubah and the Party at Poonah, and has been ſupported by them; and the other has taken Part with Ragonaut Row. This State, we underſtand, is tributary to the Maratta Government at Poonah, at leaſt nominally ſo. The Force it is able to bring into the Field, when in its Vigour, may amount to, it is ſaid, Thirty or Forty thouſand Horſe. The Revenues are conſiderable. We know of no Connection this Power has with any European Nation.

The Soubahſhip of the Decan, which, in the Time of the Father of the preſent Soubah, was ſo powerful, and had ſuch rich Poſſeſſions annexed to it, has now loſt the greateſt Part of its Strength. In the Diſſenſions which prevail in the Maratta Government, the Soubah, tempted by the Promiſes made to him, has taken an active Part, and joined the Party, called the Miniſterial Party at Poonah, againſt Ragonaut Row. He has lately, we underſtand, received Aſſignments of Countries from that Party, to the Amount of Twelve Lacks and Fifty thouſand Rupees; and ſome Money, we are informed, has alſo, at different Times, been advanced to him.

Of his Forces and Revenues we can ſay nothing with Certainty; his Collections from his Tributaries are chiefly made by Military Force, which of Courſe muſt exhauſt a conſiderable Part. With this Cawn the Company entered into a Treaty in the Year 1768; in conformity to which, they now pay him an annual Peſhcuſh of Five Lacks of Rupees for the Circars of Muſtaphanagar, Rajah Mundry, Ellore, and Chicacole; a Copy of which Treaty was before tranſmitted to your Preſidency, and to which we beg Leave to refer. We do not know that this Cawn has any Connection with other European Nations: As Soubah of the Decan, the Nabobs of Cuddapah and Cannoul, alſo the Nabob Bazalet Jung, are his Tributaries, and are bound, we underſtand, to aſſiſt him when called upon.

Bazalet Jung, the Brother of the Soubah of the Decan, holds the Circars of Adoni and Murtazanagur as a Jaghire; the latter, by the Treaty of March 1768 with the Soubah, is to revert at his Death, or on his Miſbehaviour, to the Company. In the Murtazanagur Circar is a Sea Port Town, called Mootapilly, from whence he is ſupplied by the French with Military Stores, &c. His Country yields about Twenty Lacks of Rupees yearly; he has a Force of about Three hundred Horſe and Foot, beſides Sepoys and Black Cavalry. He is ſaid to be attached to the French.

Mararow is a Maratta Chief, whoſe Country is ſituated to the Southward of the Kiſtnah; reſpectable on account of his Family, and Reputation as a Soldier. His Force at preſent is not conſiderable: He is Tributary to the Poonah Government.

Hyder Ally Cawn poſſeſſes a valuable, extenſive, and well regulated Government. We cannot give you an accurate Computation of his Revenues or Forces, but all Accounts agree that he can bring into the Field a very numerous and well-equipped Army; that he is no leſs exact in the Payment of his Forces, than attentive to their Diſcipline; and that his Revenues are ſaid to amount to Three

Crores

Crores of Rupees. He has taken the Opportunity while the Attention of the Marattas has been engaged by their Diſtractions at Home, to recover the whole of the Countries which they had, within theſe few Years paſt, wreſted from him. As we cannot ſpeak with Certainty of the Reports which prevail of his Connections with the French, it is almoſt improper for us to touch upon them; but thus much is evident, that by their Means he is plentifully ſupplied with Military Stores, and that Adventurers of their Nation are allowed, if not encouraged, to enter into his Service.

With this Cawn the Company entered into a Treaty in the Year 1769, which ſtill ſubſiſts; a Copy thereof was tranſmitted to your Preſidency.

Nabob's force

We come now to ſpeak of the Nabob of Arcot, the Company's antient Ally. The Poſſeſſions he holds, including the Tanjore Country, are eſtimated by the laſt Accounts at upwards of Two Crores of Rupees: The Force, by the beſt Information we can procure, conſiſts of Ten Battalions of Sepoys, who may be conſidered as Regulars, being commanded by European Officers, accoutered and diſciplined after the European Manner; and a Battalion of Five hundred Topaſſes; he has alſo Four Regiments of Cavalry, with Guns and Artillery Men attached to each, and he is at preſent raiſing Two more, beſides the Irregulars he maintains, which muſt be eſtimated at between Ten and Twelve thouſand. The Regiments of Cavalry are his beſt Troops, having been diſciplined by European Officers lent to him from this Eſtabliſhment.

As the Company's Intereſts on this Coaſt are ſo materially affected by their Connections with the Nabob, and as Miſunderſtandings and Jealouſies have long ſubſiſted, which, notwithſtanding our utmoſt Endeavours to remove, do ſtill exiſt; we think it neceſſary to enumerate ſome Circumſtances which may ſerve to give you an Idea thereof.

His Conduct

Some Time after the Capture of Tanjore, when they had Reaſon to be alarmed by the Preparations of the Dutch, in collecting a conſiderable Force at Nigapatnam, and when an Army of Marattas was threatning the Peace of the Carnatic, we thought it neceſſary to repreſent to the Nabob the Neceſſity of putting a Garriſon of the Company's Troops into Tanjore, for the better Security thereof; but although every Argument was uſed for that End, he would not conſent to it, declaiming, that he conſidered the Place ſufficiently ſecure in the Charge of his own Troops. When any Meaſures are adopted by the Nabob, which in our Opinion are inconſiſtent with good Policy or the Intereſt of his Country, we never fail to uſe our Endeavours by Reaſon and Argument to perſuade him from them; but having no controlling Power over him, the Option ſtill remains with himſelf, either to acquieſce in our Ideas, or to adhere to his own Opinion.

To this Inſtance of want of Confidence he has ſince added another: It has been reſolved to ſurvey the Roads of the Carnatic, as the Inconveniencies reſulting from the Want of a thorough Knowledge of the Country, has been moſt ſeverely felt during the Myſore War; and a Part had actually been ſurveyed without any Objections from the Nabob; but when Meaſures were lately taken for accompliſhing this Work, and the Nabob was requeſted to give ſuch Orders to the Amuldars for aſſiſting the Surveyors as he might think neceſſary, he appeared to be ſo alarmed at the Idea of ſurveying his Country, that, however unwilling, we found ourſelves neceſſitated to poſtpone this uſeful Undertaking.

reduced to a Dozen
Power over him

We are not only reſponſible for the Safety of the Company's Poſſeſſions, but we are alſo charged with the Protection of the Carnatic, without any certain Reſources to provide for the Exigencies of a War: To the Nabob we are obliged to look for Money, Proviſions, Bullocks, and in ſhort, for almoſt every Article neceſſary to enable us to equip and maintain an Army in the Field; and conſequently it reſts with him, either to give thoſe Supplies, or not, as the Meaſures we recommend may coincide with his Views. The Truth of this was fully evinced upon a recent Occaſion, when we were threatned with an Invaſion by the Marattas, as we have mentioned before. The Nabob ſeemed averſe to every Meaſure which in Prudence we thought neceſſary to adopt for the Safety of the Country; and we were given to underſtand, that as his Reſources depended ſolely upon the Revenues of his Country, in caſe that was involved in War, it would be out of his Power to ſupply us with either Money or Proviſions; and that it was in conſequence of his Declaration, that we applied to your Preſidency for a Supply of Money, when it was uncertain how ſoon the Carnatic might be attacked. + The Danger of ſuch a Syſtem is too apparent to require animadverting on. Theſe are Circumſtances which materially concern the Company's Intereſt, and we have repeatedly repreſented them in the moſt earneſt Manner in our Diſpatches to the Court of Directors.

Our Expences on the Coaſt in Time of Peace, are generally about Fourteen Lacks of Pagodas, and the Inveſtment for Europe requires Six Lacks, which makes the Diſburſements on the Coaſt amount to Twenty Lacks of Pagodas. The annual Accounts of the Revenues upon a mean Calculation, may be eſtimated at upwards of Sixteen Lacks; and the Sums paid by the Nabob in certain Kiſts, in the Courſe of the Year, for the Pay of the Troops kept by the Company on his Account, and the Expences of the Garriſons defrayed by them, at about Four Lacks, making in all Twenty Lacks of Pagodas; But of theſe Receipts, near Eight Lacks are to be paid by the Nabob; for excluſive

clusive of the Money advanced on his Account, eſtimated as above at Four Lacks, he has, by the Company's Orders, the Enaum Lands at Rent for Pagodas 3,68,350 per Annum, which is likewiſe received in certain Kiſts payable in the Courſe of the Year; but this Reſource, from the Nabob's own Declarations, muſt become precarious in Time of War.

Enaum

With regard to the Connexions of the Nabob with other Europeans and with the Country Powers, we encloſe you herewith Copies of the Treaties ſubſiſting between him and the French, the Dutch, and the Rajah of Travencore. We know not of any other Alliances that he has entered into independant of the Company: A Correſpondence has, for a conſiderable Time paſt, been carried on between him and Hyder Ally Cawn, but from the Jealouſies which they entertain of each other, there appears little Probability of a hearty Union ever taking Place.

The Force of the French at Pondicherry is nearly as follows: Between Nine hundred and a Thouſand Europeans, and about Four hundred Blacks, including Sepoys, Coffries, and Sibbundars; their Revenues and Cuſtoms are ſaid to be One hundred and Thirty-four thouſand Rupees a Year; and their annual Expence Two hundred and Sixty four thouſand Rupees.

With reſpect to the Dutch, they have ſent back the Troops which we have before obſerved they had collected at Nigapatnam, ſoon after the Reduction of Tanjour, and have reduced their military Eſtabliſhment to its former Force, and the Sepoys which they entertained at the ſame Time have ſince been diſbanded.

We learn by private Advices, that the Portugueſe at Goa have lately received a conſiderable Reinforcement of Troops from Europe, and Two Men of War; and that Two others are expected, with a farther Supply of Troops on Board.

We have the Honour to be,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servants,
Alexander Wynch, &c. Council.

Fort Saint George,
7th December 1774.

APPENDIX, N° 25.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, the 23d January 1775.

PRESENT;

Alexander Wynch, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident;
Joſeph Smith,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnſon,
John Maxwell Stone,
Edward Stracey,
Francis Jourdan.

READ Letter from the Nabob, N° 7, Country Correſpondence, dated 17th Inſtant.

The Nabob repreſents, The formidable Preparations of Hyder Ally Cawn; the Nabob's Appre-

hensions of the Consequences of his Alliance with the French, in case of a War with that Power, and Reports of Hyder Ally's Intention to attack the Travancore Rajah.

A^r Wynch,
Joseph Smith,
Geo. Dawson,
Henry Brooke,
Sam^l Johnson,
J. M. Stone,
Ed^d Stracey,
Francis Jourdan.

Fort Saint George Country Correspondence.

N° 7. *Extract of a Letter from the Nabob, dated 17th January 1775.*

Hyder Ally Cawn, taking Advantage of the Civil Dissentions and Broils among the Marattas, has for these Two Years past been raising numerous Forces, and has taken Possession of Countries that belonged to them. He is still raising Horse, Sepoys, and other Troops; and as the English have not supplied him with Succours, agreeable to the Terms of the Treaty of Peace, he has taken great Offence. Enclosed I send you Copies of a Paragraph of an Arzdasht I received from Seid Mohammed Cawn, the Manager of Tirunnavelly, and of the Copy of a Letter which came enclosed therein from the Rajah of Maleavor. It is probable that Hyder Ally Cawn, in Confidence of the Number of his Forces, the Wealth of his Treasury, and the good Understanding he maintains with the Portuguese, French, and Dutch, will make an Attack upon Maleavor. Formerly, Objections were raised against assisting the Marattas, on account of the Cause there was to apprehend their becoming too powerful a Neighbour; but Hyder Ally Cawn is already grown so strong, as to give fresh Grounds for such an Apprehension with regard to him. He is not a Person that will sit quiet, when he finds an Opportunity of acting; and pray God, that in case of a War with the French, his Alliance with them produce not Effects to the Country that it will be hard to remedy!

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Nabob to Governor Wynch—Received 4th December 1775.

I have repeatedly informed you, both verbally and by Letter, of the extraordinary Increase that Hyder Ally is making in his Horse, Sepoys, and Peons, as also of the Reinforcements he is drawing from other Countries, by sending People with Money to entertain Soldiers for his Service, and of the great Quantities of Artillery and Military Stores he is preparing. It is likewise well known that he has employed People to entice into his Service the Company's Europeans, by offering them Money, many of whom have deserted to him; but, by the Blessing of God, they are prevented by my People, who catch them upon the Road.

The Maratta Troops used formerly to enter the Mysore Country every Year, and plunder it, and frequently cantoned their Troops there, which much weakened Hyder, and prevented his making Disturbances in other Countries; but for these Three Years past they have made no Incursions into this Country, on Account of their domestic Quarrels, by which he has had an Opportunity of daily encreasing his Forces, and re-taking the Countries which the Marattas formerly possessed themselves of; and not content with that, he has lately encroached on the Territories of his Neighbours, and has taken Possession of Ratungeery, the Zemindar of which is subject to Visapoor; but still not satisfied, he marched against the Troops of Bazalet Jung, who were besieging the Fort of Ballary, the Zemindar of which is subject to Adoni. He has defeated and plundered the said Troops, and has taken Possession of the Fort of Ballary, as you have been fully informed of by the Paper of Intelligence that I some Days ago enclosed to you. In case Hyder should attempt to take Adoni, Cannoul, and the Territory of Morarow, those Three Powers cannot pretend to defend their Possessions, but must submit to him.

APPENDIX, N°. 25.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, the 21st October 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable George Stratton, Esq; Governor, President,
Henry Brooke,
James Stuart,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Read a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel James, commanding at Trichinopoly.

To the Honourable George Stratton, Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to transmit to you my Monthly Returns for September, which I hope will prove correct, and be received in due Time.

I think it my Duty also to transmit to you the Intelligence just received from Seringapatam, as interpreted by Mr. Swartz.

I remain with true Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient and most devoted Servant,
Edw^d James.

Trichinopoly,
5th October 1776.

Intelligence from Seringapatam.

Hyder Ally resides in the Fort with his Son Teepo Saib, and his younger Son Karam Saib; the Garrison consists of 5,000 Sepoys, 10,000 Matchlock Men, 130 Guns, 50 of which are very large, 100 Elephants, 300 Camels, 40 Europeans, 30 Topasses, commanded by the European Officers.

Out of the Fort, at the Distance of Four Miles, is Hyder Ally's Camp, consisting of 40,000 Horse, 5,000 Sepoys, 60,000 Matchlock Men, 4,000 Spear Men, 30 Guns, 900 Elephants, 1,200 Camels, 20 Europeans, 1,000 Topasses, commanded by Fourteen European Officers.

Hyder Ally is daily recruiting and collecting of Troops from all Quarters, he has compleatly repaired Seringapatam in those Places which were damaged by the Flood.

Hyder Ally has sent a strong Detachment to Savenor Bengavanam, and those Northern Parts of his Country, to keep the Marattas quiet; the Detachment is commanded by Meer Saheb.

There is Peace between Gobiatonaj and Rogoba; it is said they are joined Nizam Ally; it is also said that Marawar's Son, whom Hyder Ally has taken Prisoner, has made his Escape, and will join Nizam Ally. It is currently reported at Dindegall Carroor, Satam, &c. that Hyder Ally's Preparations is for this Place and Madura.

Trichinopoly, 5th October 1776.

Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 4th November 1776.

Extract of Intelligence from the Nabob, 2d November 1776.

That Hyder Ally Cawn was making great Preparations, and had ordered all his Vassals and Tributaries to hold themselves ready to march, as it was imagined, against the Carnatic.

The President acquaints the Board he understands, from the best Intelligence, that the Preparations now making by Hyder Ally are intended against the Marattas, 20,000 of whom he is informed were advanced to the Banks of the River Kistnah on their Way to the Mysore Country.

APPENDIX, N° 25.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, the 18th November 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable George Stratton, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Arch° Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.
Colonel Stuart indiſpoſed.

To the Honourable George Stratton, Eſquire.

Sir,

A Sepoy, in Eleven Days from Seringapatam, has juſt brought me the following Intelligence; viz.

That Hyder Ally has a Body of 10,000 Horſe aſſembled at Seringapatam, and has iſſued Orders for 15,000 Men to be embodied with all Speed: That his Stores, Field Pieces, Tents, and other Field Equipage, are all compleated; that it is the common Opinion at Seringapatam, that he intends entering the Carnatic, and by the Way of Changamah, as his Arcan have been lately examining that Paſs. That great Rains have fallen in the Myſore Country, and from the Badneſs of the Roads, it will be impoſſible for Troops to move in leſs than a Fortnight.

I ſhall order out People immediately to the different Paſſes into the Carnatic, that I may give you timely Notice (ſhould his Intention be againſt us) which Way he enters.

I remain,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient and humble Servant,
Wm Champneys.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, the 2d Jan. 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable George Stratton, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Henry Brook,
James Stuart,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Read Letter from Captain Bruce, commanding at Amboor.

To the Honourable George Stratton, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir,

I have the Honour to acquaint you, that a Sepoy of my Battalion returned this Morning from Seringapatam, and informs me that he left that Place the 15th Inſtant; that Hyder Ally and his Son were there, and that Orders were given ſome Time ago to keep every Thing in Readineſs to take the Field. There ſeemed to be no particular Preparation at preſent for doing ſo, as moſt of his Artillery were diſmounted; that their Cavalry were at their different Cantonments, ſome of them at a conſiderable Diſtance from Seringapatam; but that Sepoys were in the Neighbourhood without their Guns, and that he was entertaining as many People as he could get to compleat his Infantry. He has, I am aſſured, ſeveral of his Subidars in the Bermault Country recruiting; and that they ſend their Recruits into the Myſore as they get them. 'Tis ſtill certainly reported, that he ſhortly intends to take the Field, and that his Intentions are againſt the Carnatic; I ſhall keep conſtantly People at Seringapatam, and flatter myſelf ſhall be able to give you the earlieſt Intelligence of his Motions.

I remain, Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Tho° Bruce.

APPENDIX, N° 26.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, the 21st April 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable George Stratton, Esquire, Governor, President.
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

BY Intelligence lately received of the Motions of the neighbouring Powers, we are given to understand, that the Marattas are in the Field with an Army of 60,000 Horse; that they have passed the River Kistnah, and in Two Actions which they have had with Hyder Ally Cawn, they have been successful; that Hyder has been obliged to march the greatest Part of his Forces against them, and from an Apprehension for the Safety of his Family, has removed them to Reddeuore, and Morarrow, whom had been long confined at a strong Fort, called situated on a Rock; that the Nizam has taken the Field, with a very considerable Army, and on being joined by the Nabob of Cuddaph and Cannoul with 4,000 Horse, proposes marching against Hyder, to retake some Places, which he was dispossessed of last Year.

Hyder being reduced to this Situation, it is natural to suppose he would apply to the French for Assistance; and indeed, we have every Reason to believe Military Stores have lately been sent to him by the Way of Mahé, and it is not improbable but the People embarked on Board the Man of War that carried their Stores, are intended for his Service, though the French give out they were sent to relieve that Garrison; and in this Conjecture we are confirmed by the mysterious Manner in which Hyder's Vakeel has visited Monsieur Bellecombe, the present Governor of Pondicherry; he was received in a secret Manner at Midnight; and after holding a Conference with Monsieur Bellecombe, shortly departed from Pondicherry; first having every Assurance of Support and Assistance from the French Nation, and that if more Troops than could be spared him should be wanting, that French Supplies should be ordered from the Islands.

From this State of the Posture of Affairs on this Side of India, we have no Reason to believe that the Carnatic will be visited with Troubles, unless a Peace, which is very improbable, should be concluded between Hyder, the Marattas, and the Nizam. Should, however, the Designs of Hyder, against these Two Persons, prove unsuccessful, it is not improbable to suppose the French would deem it a favourable Opportunity to afford him the Assistance which we have Reason to believe they have long premeditated against the Carnatic.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, the 7th November 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Geo. Stratton, Esquire, Governor, President,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
George Mackay,
Colonel Stuart and Mr. Jourdan indisposed.

The following Draft of a Letter to the Nabob, read, and approved. Entered in Co. Con. N°

To the Nabob.

Your Letter of the Instant, with News of the Intention of Hyder Ally Cawn, I have received: This Intelligence has given me much Concern.

As your Highness is of Opinion, that the Preparations making by that Power are with hostile Intent to the Peace and Tranquillity of these Parts, I cannot but deem it necessary, considering this Government as the Guardian and Protector of your Affairs in the Carnatic, to represent to you, that your ill Success and great Losses in the late War with Hyder Ally Cawn, were, amongst other Causes,

in ſome Meaſure owing to your Highneſs's not having laid up in the different Garriſons, ſufficient Stores of Proviſions, at the Beginning of the War.

This your Highneſs is well acquainted with, and it is therefore expedient I ſhould take every Precaution in my Power to prevent the like Misfortune, ſhould this Country be again viſited with Trouble; and to enſure this, I muſt recommend the following Matters to your Highneſs's moſt ſerious Conſideration:

Firſt. It is neceſſary that your Highneſs ſhould immediately order your Killedars, in ſuch Forts as are garriſoned by the Company's Troops, to ſhew to the Commanding Officers in thoſe Forts, ſuch Magazines of Powder and Proviſions as may be collected in them; and upon no Account whatſoever to expend any of thoſe Stores without the Knowledge and Conſent of the reſpective Commandants.

Secondly. To enſure Succeſs to our Operations, your Highneſs ſhould order to be collected in thoſe Forts above-mentioned, Proviſions ſufficient not only for the Expenditure of their reſpective Garriſons, but likewiſe for our Army, ſhould it take the Field.

The Proviſions I would recommend to your Highneſs to have collected, are Sheep and Bullocks, Rice, Salt, and Curry Stuff, alſo Draught and Carriage Bullocks, with their Bags; and that this may be accompliſhed with Diligence and Care, your Highneſs will be pleaſed to ſend proper Officers of the Circar to the different Garriſons, whoſe whole Attention ſhould be confined to that Object alone. At the ſame Time your Highneſs will do me the Favour to inform me, what Quantities of Proviſions are already in Store, and what Addition you may be enabled to make to them.

Thirdly. As Money is the great Spring of Action in Time of Trouble, it is eſſentially neceſſary for me to be acquainted with Preciſion from your Highneſs, the Mode you mean to adopt for the Payment of the Company's Kiſts, and of the Expences of the Army, ſhould it take the Field. My Mind is anxious in this Reſpect, for without a Certainty before-hand, how can I promiſe myſelf Safety to your Country, in caſe of War, when your Highneſs knows ſo well the Manner in which the Kiſts, now in Times of Peace, are paid into the Company's Treaſury?

APPENDIX, N° 27.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, 27th October 1777.

READ the following Letter from Bengal:

To the Honourable George Stratton, Preſident, &c. Council, Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

Although we have no immediate Proſpect of a Rupture between Great Britain and any of the States of Europe, yet as ſuch an Event is by no Means improbable, we think it of the utmoſt Conſequence to be prepared againſt it; we therefore requeſt that you will be pleaſed to tranſmit us a Return of the actual State of the Troops at your Preſidency, with your Sentiments upon the Means of compleating your Eſtabliſhment, of co-operating in the moſt effectual Manner with this Preſidency in caſe of Invaſion, and of the moſt eligible Plan for making a Diverſion in Favour of Bombay, if an Enemy appear on that Side of India.

We ſhall likewiſe be glad to receive an Account of the Views and Connections of the different

Country Potentates, their Strength and Reſources, together with your Opinion of ſuch Alliances as you recommend to be formed in caſe of Emergency.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Rich^d Barwell,
P. Francis.

Fort William,
17th September 1777.

Although we think the late Advices from England (with which the Governor General and Council of Bengal could not be acquainted at the Time they wrote the above Letter) do not afford any Ground to believe there is a Probability of a Rupture for ſome Time with any of the European Powers, yet it is certainly very proper to be as much as poſſible on our Guard, by concerting with Bengal, Meaſures neceſſary to be taken in caſe ſuch an Event ſhould happen; Reſolved, therefore, That the beſt Account we can obtain, upon the Points mentioned in the above Letter, be ſent to the Governor General and Council of Bengal; and that we communicate our Sentiments to them, as far as we are yet enabled from the ſhort Experience we have had to form a Judgment of the Views and Connections of the different Country Powers, their Strength and Reſources, and the Alliances neceſſary to be formed in caſe of Emergency.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, the 16th January 1778.

Diſpatched the following Letter to the Governor General and Council:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſq; Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In our Letter of the 9th December, we acknowledged the Receipt of your Favour, dated the th September, and informed you of our Intention to reply to it in a ſhort Time. We ſhall now, Conſequence, proceed to give you our Sentiments in the cleareſt Manner we are able, upon the veral Points ſtated in that Letter.

Although we do not find, from the lateſt Intelligence that has been received, that there is any robability of an immediate Rupture with any of the States of Europe, yet the unſettled Situation of ffairs at Home, which, by the laſt Accounts, was likely to continue for ſome Time longer, ought rtainly to put us, as much as poſſible, upon our Guard againſt an Event of ſuch Importance to e Well-being of the Company's Poſſeſſions in India. We ſhall therefore, on our Part, communicate th you on this Subject moſt chearfully, and be ready at all Times to join our beſt Endeavours to aintain the preſent Security.

Agreeable to your Requeſt, we have ordered a Return of the actual State of the Troops and this reſidency to be made out; by which you will perceive, that in Europeans we are deficient of the roper Eſtabliſhment Two hundred and Twenty Men. The few Recruits ſent out by the Company r theſe Two or Three Years paſt, have proved very inadequate to our Wants. Our Force is become ll more weakened by our late Engagements with the Rajah of Tanjore, for the Protection of his Fort d Country; ſo that we apprehend, were there any Occaſion to call for the Exertion of our whole rength in the Field, we ſhould be very deficient in the proper Complement of Europeans. With ſpect to the Means of completing the Eſtabliſhment (concerning which you deſire our Sentiments) e can only ſay, that repeated Repreſentations have been made to the Court of Directors on this bject; but the Difficulties they are under in procuring Recruits on Account of the American ar, has, we believe, hitherto prevented their ſending the proper Number; we have therefore no eans or Proſpect of completing our Eſtabliſhment of Europeans, but with your Aſſiſtance; and e ſubmit it to your Conſideration, whether it may be expedient to afford ſuch Aſſiſtance at this Time om your Preſidency.

Our preſent Eſtabliſhment of Sepoys, conſiſting of Twenty-nine Battalions or upwards, of wenty-three thouſand Men, are, in general, compleat; Five of thoſe Battalions were raiſed laſt ar, on account of Tanjore, and the late Commander in Chief recommended alſo, that Three giments of Black Cavalry ſhould be maintained by the Company on the ſame Account, as ſoon as fficient Funds could be provided for their Support; but this Meaſure hath not yet been adopted; d the Subſidy paid by the Rajah of Tanjore will not, at preſent, admit of our raiſing any addi- nal Force for the general Protection of the Carnatic.

As

As it is not unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, in caſe of a War with France, that the earlieſt and moſt formidable Attack will fall on our Poſſeſſions in India, we deem it an Object of great Importance to be effectually prepared for reſiſting the firſt Efforts of the French, which will probably be directed againſt our Settlements on this Coaſt. In this View it may be proper to apprize you of the particular Situation in which we ſtand with reſpect to Supplies of Money.

The Revenues of the Company under this Preſidency amount, by the moſt favourable Computation, to ſomewhat more than 15 Lacks of Pagodas; of which about 12 Lacks are under the immediate Management and Controul of the Company, and the Remainder ariſing from the Jaghire and Poonamalee Farm, are under the Controul of the Nabob, and are accounted for by him to the Company in certain ſtipulated Kiſts; beſides this, we receive annually about 2 Lacks from our Imports and Drafts on England. With theſe Funds, ſuppoſing the Nabob regular in the Performance of his Engagements we are able to defray our ordinary Charges in Time of Peace, and provide an Inveſtment of near 6 Lacks of Pagodas: More we cannot do; and our Treaſury, with the beſt Œconomy, is never in a Condition to anſwer any extraordinary Demand that may come upon it.

Being dependant on the Nabob not only for the Revenues of the Jaghire of Poonamalee, but alſo for the Reimburſement of near Four Lacks of Pagodas, expended annually in the Payment of the Troops expreſsly maintained by the Company for the Defence of the Carnatic, we are frequently ſubject to great Inconveniencies for Want of Money, and we feel them particularly at this Time, from the Situation of the Nabob; which appears to be, and we believe really is, a good deal embarraſſed by an enormous Load of private Debt, for which he had given Aſſignments and Orders upon almoſt the whole Revenues of the Carnatic, and thereby deprived himſelf of the Means of fulfilling his Engagements punctually to the Company. The Nabob has lately written us a Letter, informing us, that he has concluded certain Articles of Agreement with his private Creditors, which have enabled him to diſengage his Country entirely from theſe Incumbrances; and he promiſes to grant no further Aſſignments of any Kind whatſoever upon his Revenues. We have not yet had Time to deliberate on the above Letter, and can only ſay therefore at preſent, we ſhall think it our Duty to take all poſſible Care that the Nabob's Arrangement with his private Creditors does not interfere with or impede the Payment of his Debt to the Company, for which we ſhall endeavour to obtain ample Proviſion.

Whilſt we continue thus dependant on the Nabob for Money, and have no Reſources within ourſelves to anſwer any Failure on his Part, the Company's Affairs will be continually expoſed to Danger, and we can be at no Certainty even for Money to pay the Monthly Charges of our Troops; a Circumſtance which cannot fail of impreſſing us with very diſagreeable Apprehenſions: But if we are liable to this State of Inſecurity in Time of Peace, how much more Reaſon have we to be alarmed, ſhould a War find us in a Situation ſo incapable of employing the Forces of the Company with Effect? Having no Money in our Treaſury, and poſſeſſing no Controul over the Reſources of the Carnatic, we ſhould probably, in ſuch an Event, be reduced to the utmoſt Diſtreſs before we could receive the Benefit of foreign Aid.

This Subject has been frequently treated of in former Advices to the Company from this Government; and many forcible Arguments drawn from the Experience of paſt Times, have been produced, to ſhew the Propriety of having always a ſufficient Fund in our Treaſury to anſwer the Exigencies of War. The more we think upon the Subject, the more we are convinced ſuch a Fund is neceſſary, and that without it, under the preſent Syſtem, we might be unable, were the Carnatic or the Poſſeſſions of the Company ſuddenly invaded, to put our Troops in the Field ſo as to employ them to any good Purpoſe. We flatter ourſelves, that what we have ſaid will engage your ſerious Attention; and as the Company's Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt lie more open to a powerful Invaſion than thoſe of Bengal or Bombay, and will, in all Probability be the Firſt of Attack in caſe of a War with any European States, we doubt not you will conſider of the Propriety of ſending us a ſufficient Supply of Money, to enable us on any Emergency of this Kind, to act with Vigour, until we can be further ſupported from Bengal.

You are pleaſed to deſire our Opinion upon the beſt Means of making a Diverſion in Favour of Bombay, ſhould an Enemy appear on that Side of India. We think the French are the only European Power in a Condition to form Deſigns againſt any of our Settlements, and were they to meditate an Attack upon Bombay, the only Diverſion which it appears to us could be made, would be by ſending our Troops againſt Pondicherry, which, in its preſent State, would be an eaſy Conqueſt.

With reſpect to the probable Views and Connections of the different Powers around us, their Strength and Reſources; theſe are Subjects upon which we can write with little Degree of Certainty, for the Means we have of procuring Intelligence are not to be depended upon, and we cannot put the Company to that Expence which is neceſſary to procure good Intelligence, without the Hazard of incurring Blame; however, we ſhall, as you deſire, give you all the Information in our Power upon theſe Points.

APPENDIX, N° 27.

We ſhall ſpeak firſt of the Maratta Government, which holds the firſt Rank amongſt the States of India for real Strength and powerful Reſources for War. Their preſent Views ſeem principally turned to the Conqueſt of Hyder Ally, who has been the moſt troubleſome Opponent they have met with in the South; fortunately for Hyder, the late inteſtine Diviſions amongſt them, have enabled him to recover the greater Part of the Countries of which he was diſpoſſeſſed before theſe Diviſions took Place; and he appears now in a Condition to reſiſt them with ſome Proſpect of Succeſs. He has at this Time in the Field, as we are informed, a Force conſiſting of about Thirty thouſand Sepoys with ſmall Arms, Fifty thouſand Matchlock Men, Twenty-eight thouſand Horſe, and Thirty-ſeven Guns; and the Marattas have aſſembled a Body of Sixty-ſeven thouſand Horſe and about Fifty thouſand Matchlock Men, and are encamped within Five Miles Diſtance from him. In this Situation, it is probable, an Engagement will very ſhortly happen, which may prove deciſive; the Marattas expect to be reinforced by Troops from the Soubah of the Decan, and his Brother Bazalet Jung; and if this Reinforcement arrive in Time, there is little Doubt but they will be greatly an Overmatch for their Opponent.

With reſpect to any Connections which may have been formed by the Maratta State, we can only ſpeak from Conjecture: It ſeems probable, that ſome Engagements may be in Agitation, or perhaps concluded between that State and the Soubah, and they have lately maintained, we believe, a cloſe Correſpondence with the French, as appears from the Proceedings of M. Saint Lubin, at Poonah, and the Grant which they have given to the French at Choule on the Malabar Coaſt, of which you have been already adviſed.

Hyder Ally's Military Strength, as appears by the Force he has now in the Field, is very powerful; and the Revenues ariſing from his Poſſeſſions are immenſe, amounting, we believe, to Three Crores of Rupees. His whole Attention ſeems at preſent engaged by the Marattas, and his Views confined to the Preſervation of his own Dominions. He has a Vakeel at Pondicherry with M. Bellecombe, from whom he receives every Aſſiſtance the French can at preſent afford him. M. Bellecombe, as we are adviſed, keeps up a conſtant Correſpondence with Hyder, and endeavours all in his Power to engage him in the Intereſts of the French.

The Government of the Soubah Nizam Ally Cawn, is ſo weak, that we believe his chief Views are chiefly confined to his own Preſervation; and it is not probable that he has lately formed Connections with any of the other Country Powers, except perhaps ſome temporary Engagements with the Marattas. The Nabob has however juſt received Intelligence, that a Perſon of ſome Conſideration lately arrived from the Soubah's Court at Pondicherry, and was received with great Reſpect and Civility by M. Bellecombe, but the Purpoſe of his coming is not yet known.

With regard to our Friend and Ally the Nabob, we ſhall only ſay a few Words, as his Situation is ſo well known. He has lately reduced his own Troops conſiderably, and inſtead of Seven Regiments of Cavalry which he before kept up, he has now only Four. The Revenue of his Country may be reckoned from 25 to 30 Lacks of Pagodas Annually. The Nabob has no Connection but with the Engliſh; we believe him ſincerely and ſteadily attached; and, as far as we can judge, he has no Views independant of their Friendſhip and Support.

Our Sentiments upon the proper Alliance to be formed with any of the other Powers in caſe of Invaſion, are briefly theſe:

The Maratta State is already too powerful, and we are of Opinion that no Alliance could be formed with them for our Advantage, without entering into Engagements which would lead to aggrandize them ſtill more, and ultimately prove dangerous to ourſelves.

We think Hyder might on ſuch an Emergency be made an uſeful Ally, as his Troops are more warlike, better diſciplined, and better appointed, than thoſe of any other Power; but we are afraid the Nabob could never be brought to act cordially in ſuch an Alliance, as he has long entertained a rooted Enmity towards Hyder, and hath on ſeveral Occaſions manifeſted it in Oppoſition to his own Intereſts. As to the Soubah, little could be gained by a cloſer Union with him; and our Opinion both in reſpect to him and the Marattas is, that we ſhould endeavour, in caſe of a War, to prevent their taking Part againſt us, but that we ſhould prefer Hyder as an Ally, whoſe Aſſiſtance might be the moſt ſerviceable.

We think it neceſſary to inform you, that we have juſt received a Letter from the Gentlemen at Bombay; requeſting, that 200 Europeans, a Battalion of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery Men, may be held in Readineſs at Palamcotah, to march to Anjengo at a Moment's Warning. We have the Honour to encloſe a Copy of their Letter, and to acquaint you, that upon careful Deliberation, we are clear in our Sentiments, that ſuch a Force could not in Prudence be ſent from the Coaſt at the preſent Juncture, when we have ſo near a Proſpect of War, when our Eſtabliſhment is incomplete, and when our Fortifications here and the Fortreſs at Tanjour are not in ſo finiſhed a State (which you will obſerve by the encloſed Reports) as to render it ſafe to detach any Part

of the Troops ſtationed for their Defence: But were there not theſe powerful Motives for declining a Compliance with this Requeſt of the Gentlemen at Bombay, we ſhould in another View conſider our Acquieſcence as improper; for we conceive the Meaſure in Agitation there, will not be undertaken without your Conſent and Approbation, and we ſhould be very unwilling, were it even in our Power, to make ſuch Preparations before the Meaſure had the Sanction of your Concurrence, unleſs the Exigency of the Caſe were very preſſing; which is not apparent from the Letter we have received.

We lately took under Conſideration the Nabob's Claims on the Rajah of Tanjour, which were repeatedly brought before the Gentlemen of the laſt Adminiſtration, and frequent Demands were made of the Rajah, to depoſit a Sum of Money upon that Account into the Company's Treaſury, until the Deciſion of the Court of Directors on the Nabob's Claims could be had; but the Rajah was ſo poſitive in his Refuſal to make any Payments on Behalf of the Nabob, that nothing was obtained from him. When the Matter came before us, we thought it ſo reaſonable that the Rajah ſhould depoſit a Sum of Money for the Purpoſes abovementioned, that we came to the Reſolution of requiring from him Four Lacks of Pagodas on this Account; and we were the more induced to this Step from a Review of the low State of our Finances, and the Conſideration that ſuch a Sum remaining even in Depoſit within our Reach, would be acceptable to the Company.

Upon theſe Principles we proceeded; and thinking that the Buſineſs might be ſooner and more effectually concluded by deputing a Member of our Board to negotiate with the Rajah, than by a Correſpondence of Letters, we ſent Mr. Perring on that Service; which he executed in a few Days, very much to our Satisfaction.

The Rajah ſhewed the ſame Averſion to the Nabob's Claim that he had manifeſted upon every former Application, but conſented to depoſit the Money from a Motive of Friendſhip to the Company, ſubject to whatever Orders they might ſend out. On the controverted Claims, the Rajah repreſented his Inability to complete the Payment of ſo conſiderable a Sum from his Revenues in leſs than Six Months, having, beſides this Money, Three Lacks of Pagodas to pay in the Courſe of the next Four Months, on Account of his annual Subſidy to the Company; we therefore agreed to receive the Depoſit from him in the following Payments, viz.

On 30th January,	Pag^{s}	50,000
28th February,		100,000
30th March,		50,000
30th April,		50,000
30th May,		50,000
30th June,		100,000
		400,000

We have formerly explained to you particularly, the Influence acquired by the French in the Guntoor Circar, and the Troops of that Nation entertained in the Service of Bazalet Jung. The preſent State of this Force, which is commanded by M. de Lally, is One Troop of European Cavalry, One of Indian, conſiſting of One hundred each; Two Companies of Topaſſes, Two thouſand Sepoys, and Four thouſand Peons. The Zemindar of Gumſoor ſituated in the Diſtrict of Ganjam, having frequently withdrew his Tribute, and being now conſiderably in Arrear to the Company, we have deemed it neceſſary to aſſemble a Force conſiſting of Two Battalions and Six Companies of Sepoys, in order to compel this Zemindar, if neceſſary, to pay his Arrears; but we hope he may be induced by theſe Preparations to diſcharge what is owing from him without reducing us to that Neceſſity.

Since writing the foregoing, we have received Intelligence from Hyder's Country of ſo late a Date as the 8th Inſtant, by which we find that Hyder attacked the Maratta Army on the Night of the 5th Inſtant, and gained a conſiderable Advantage over them. The Particulars are explained in the Paper of Intelligence, and we have the Pleaſure to tranſmit a Copy of it for your Peruſal.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, and
Moſt humble Servants,
John Whitehill,
&c. Council.

Fort Saint George,
16th January 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 28.

Extracts of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 12. *Copy of a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn.—Dated 5th Jan*y *1778; received 25th D*°.

AT this fortunate Time the Almighty Diſpoſer of Victories has been pleaſed to crown my Arms with Succeſs. My victorious Followers, bent upon the Chaſtiſement of the Maratta Infidels, were in purſuit of their Leaders, Hurry Pundet Perker and Puriſiram, who had entered the Bala Ghaut Country by the Road of Sannere, with an Army of 50,000 Horſe, committing their uſual Depredations in the Zemindary of Purnelly, yet not daring to face the approved Warriors of Iſlam, they fled before our victorious Army till they came in the Diſtrict of Adoni, where they pitched the Tents of their adverſe Fortune. I was at this Time in the Bulhar Country, about 12 Coſs diſtant, from whence I directed my March againſt theſe Plunderers, and ſoon came up with them: The Fire of my Artillery and the brave Conduct of my Officers were ſuch, that the Enemy were ſeized with a Panic and fled at our Approach. The Alligators of the Sea of War [meaning the Cannon] did ſuch Execution againſt them, that they were entirely routed; ſeveral of their principal Chiefs were ſlain and wounded and made Priſoners; moſt of the Survivors in croſſing the Tungbudra at Hugely, in their Flight were drowned in that River; our Army found an immenſe Booty in their Camp, conſiſting of Horſes, Camels, and valuable Effects: We, however, kept purſuing them as far as the North Side of the Kiſtna; and at this Time are only within a few Coſs of them.

Islam viz the Faith

It is from my Conſideration of our Alliance and Friendſhip, that I have given you the above Account of the Succeſs of my Arms. I hope and beg you will not fail to let me have Accounts of your Welfare, which will always give me ſincere Pleaſure. May your Fortune and Happineſs be ever increaſing!

N° 25. *To Hyder Ally Cawn.*

I have the Pleaſure to inform you I arrived here the 8th Inſtant from England, and have taken Charge of this Government, agreeable to the Company's Orders: You may always reſt aſſured of my Endeavours to ſtrengthen and promote the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Circars of the Company, the Payen Ghaut, and the Bala Ghaut.

I am happy to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letter of the 5th January to Mr. Whitehill, wherein you inform him of the Victory obtained by your Army over that of the Marattas; permit me to offer you my Congratulations upon your Succeſs, which appears in a particular Manner to have been owing to your own wiſe Conduct, and the great Bravery of your Troops. I beg you will conſtantly adviſe me of your Proſperity that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

Fort Saint George,
13th February 1778.

Thomas Rumbold.

N° 67. *From Hyder Ally Cawn to the Governor.—Dated 24th Suffor, or March 1778; received 4th May.*

I have received your agreeable Letter, congratulating me on the Victory obtained over the Marattas, and acquainting me of your Arrival at Madras, and your having, agreeable to the Company's Orders, taken Charge of the Government of that Place, which has given me infinite Satisfaction. Your Congratulations, I make no Doubt, are ſuch as proceed from a real and ſincere Friendſhip; and I am well convinced the Affairs of your Settlement will receive new Luſtre from your Management of them. You have been pleaſed to write me, that I may be aſſured you will, as far as in your Favour, promote the Friendſhip and Union which now ſubſiſts between the Company and me.

It is a Length of Time ſince the Company and me have been allied by Ties of Friendſhip, and I entertain no Doubt of your confirming and ſtrengthening them. I have ſent you a few Trifles as Marks of my Friendſhip, which I beg your Acceptance of. Believe me ever deſirous of hearing of your Welfare, and pleaſe to continue to give me Accounts of it.

May your Happineſs ever encreaſe!

N° 72. *To Hyder Ally; dated 18th May 1778.*

I had the Pleaſure to receive your Letter of the 24th March. I beg Leave to repeat again my Aſſurances to you, that I ſhall be happy to ſtrengthen the Ties of Union between the Company and your Circar, as I am ſenſible it will be for the Advantage of both; and I doubt not on your Part that every Thing neceſſary will be done to effect this deſirable End. I have opened myſelf more fully on this Subject to your Vakeel, who will write you particularly. Continue to ſend me Accounts of your Welfare, that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX, N° 29.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 141. *From the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn to the Governor.—Dated 6th Rejub 1192, or 31ſt July 1778; received 16th Auguſt 1778.*

I HAVE received your friendly Letter, which has given me much Pleaſure, and I underſtand the Contents of it. You write me, that my Vakeel, Venagie Pundit, has repeatedly informed you of the Sincerity of my Friendſhip for the Company, and that the ſame Sentiments are impreſſed in your Heart; that it is therefore neceſſary that we ſhould come to an Explanation of Means by which we may advance our mutual Friendſhip, which may be for the Good of both. It is a Truth that from the Beginning a ſincere Friendſhip has ſubſiſted between the Company and myſelf; Venagie Pundit has perhaps mentioned this to you, and it is my Deſire to be in Friendſhip with the Company. You write me, that the above mentioned Vakeel has on my Part mentioned ſome Propoſals to you, which you would conſider of and write me afterwards; I on my Part ſhall alſo conſider of the Propoſals mentioned by you to my Vakeel. You write me particularly concerning this, that I would give you an Opportunity of an Interview with me; I alſo deſire the ſame, but the Diſtance is ſo great between us, that at preſent it is impracticable; yet with the Aſſiſtance of the Almighty, ſome Time after this we ſhall have a Meeting together. You ſay that a Perſon of Conſequence will be ſent here from you, if it is agreeable to me: Upon this Subject I ſhall write you after the March of my Army is fixed. What can I ſay more?

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, the 4th July 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

The Preſident deſires to enter the following Minute.

In conſequence of the complimentary Letters that paſſed between the Nabob Hyder Ally and myſelf, on my Arrival, he referred me to his Vakeel, to explain fully to me ſome particular Circumſtances not

APPENDIX, N° 29.

mentioned in his Letters. His Vakeel has accordingly communicated to me the following Propo-
, which he has been directed to make to this Government by his Master.

st. That he will accompany any Troops we may send to assist the placing of Ragonaut Row in Government of Poonah, and to negotiate for such Assistance through the Brother-in Law of Ragonaut Row, who has the Command of 4,000 Horse in Hyder's Service.

2d. He has desired his Vakeel to propose to this Government the supplying of him with Military ores, Artillery, and Small Arms, for which he will pay the Company in any Manner the Board y approve.

3d. He is desirous of receiving the Assistance of a Body of our Troops, the Expences of which will agree to defray and satisfy the Company, either by paying them in Specie or Grant of nds.

4th. He has desired his Vakeel to assure this Government, that his Wishes ever have been to culate a Friendship with the English; but that he has been debarred from Causes, there is no Neity for him to point out; but that he is now ready to negotiate in any Manner this Government ll devise, and to conclude that Treaty of Alliance and Friendship which must be binding upon th, and replete with Advantages to the English East India Company and to himself.

It appears from the Records, that the Advantages of a Treaty with Hyder, who, from the Situation his Country should be considered as our natural Ally, and from his Strength and Resources alost the only one who could prove of real Service to us, has been approved and wished for almost every successive Government for some Years; but some ruling Influence has always thrown Obcles in the Way of every Attempt to bring about so desirable an Event; of this Hyder seems lly sensible, and his Vakeel takes Occasion to hint at the Disappointments his Master has been bject to whenever he has shewn a Desire to cultivate a Friendship with the English; this probably s made him on all Occasions more attentive to the French than he otherwise would have been, had met with proper Encouragement from us. Before my Arrival, the Board fully gave their Sentients, and the Advantages likely to result from a firm Connection with Hyder Ally in their Letter the Supreme Council, under Date 16th January.

Hyder a natural ally

I entirely on that Point coincide with them in Opinion; and the present Situation of Affairs adds eight to every Argument in favour of such an Union; for which a Neglect on our Part obliges m to side with the French, and enter into a closer Alliance with them; I am persuaded it would a Circumstance of fatal Tendency, and almost the only Event that would endanger the Carnatic, d the Safety of our Possessions on this Coast.

I therefore submit to the Consideration of the Board, whether such a Letter should not be wrote Hyder, in answer to the Representations made by his Vakeel, as may be the Means of falling on me Method, either by proposing a Meeting with him, or in whatever other Manner may appear gible, to see if any Engagements for the mutual Benefit of the Company and himself, can be entered o, that may not too much embarrass us with respect to the Disposition of our Forces, and the eps we shall be obliged to take in case of a Rupture with France; and I also submit to the Board, ether it will not be expedient to address the Supreme Council on the Occasion, and acquaint them the Proposals made by Hyder, and the Letter we have wrote to him in consequence.

The Board approve of the President's Proposals; and it is resolved, that Letters be prepared accordingly.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnson,
P. Perring.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correspondence.

N° 95. *To Hyder Ally, dated 8th July* 1778.

I had the Pleasure of writing a Letter the 18th May, in answer to one from you, containing many kind Expressions of Friendship and Congratulation upon my Accession to this Government; your Vakeel has since in repeated Declarations confirmed to me your Assurances of Regard to the Company, and desire of strengthening the Union that has so long happily subsisted between them and your Circar. These Sentiments correspond so justly with my own, which are equally strong in

Favour of this Union, that there remains nothing now but that we should come to a more particular Explanation of the Means by which we may advance our mutual Intereſts on this Subject. Your Vakeel has made ſome Propoſals to me in your Name, which I ſhall conſider maturely, and write you in conſequence thereof. Here I cannot help expreſſing my Wiſh that you would afford me an Opportunity of having an Interview with you, or of ſending ſome Perſon of Conſequence to explain my Intentions fully, and conclude ſome Agreement with you, that may tend to the mutual Intereſt of yourſelf and the Company. Write me conſtantly of your Welfare that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX, N° 30.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, the 16th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Letter from the Governor General and Council;

To the Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Council, Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

The Preſident and Council of Bombay, in a Letter dated the 9th May, have informed us, that from the friendly Intercourſe which has appeared for ſome Time paſt to ſubſiſt between the French and Hyder Ally Cawn, they think it would be a very proper Meaſure to keep a Reſident at his Durbar, to endeavour to penetrate and counteract their Schemes; and they requeſt to know if we approve of this Meaſure, to which they preſume the Nabob can have no reaſonable Objections, as they are aſſured both the French and Dutch maintain Reſidents at his Court.

"In reply, we have told them, that we have no Objection to their making the Appointment they "propoſe, if the Nabob of the Carnatic can be brought to give his Aſſent to it, but conſidering the "perſonal Animoſity which he has conceived againſt Hyder Ally, we think he might juſtly take "Umbrage at the Appointment of an Engliſh Reſident to his Court, without his Knowledge and "Acquieſcence. We cannot agree to give our Sanction to the Execution of any Meaſure that might "be diſagreeable to him, particularly where the Intereſt of his Government appear to be ſo much "involved, without conſulting him, and endeavouring, if poſſible, to obtain his Participation and "Concurrence. We therefore requeſt, that you will uſe your Endeavours to convince him of the Propriety of this Appointment, and to obviate any Jealouſy that it might create. When you ſhall have obtained his Conſent, you will immediately adviſe the Preſident and Council of Bombay, who will wait for ſuch a Notification from you; and as the Meaſure is not indiſpenſably neceſſary, we have deſired them to decline carrying it into Execution without ſuch Authority.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw^d Wheeler.

Fort William,
25th June 1778.

Extract

APPENDIX, N° 38.

Extract of Fort Saint George Military Consultations, the 19th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, Governor, President.
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnston,
Peter Perring.

Dispatched the following Letter to Bengal:

To the Honourable Warren Hastings, Esquire, Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have had the Honour to receive your Letters of the 1st and 25th ultimo; and beg Leave to make our Acknowledgements to you, for the Supply of Treasure we have received by the Seahorse.

We consider it important, and particularly at this Time, when we are on the Eve of a War with France, that every proper Means should be used to strengthen our Connection with Hyder Ally, by such Engagements as may effectually secure him to our Interest. Hyder has long solicited, and even importuned, this Government, to enter into a closer Union with him; but the Consideration of temporary Inconveniencies arising from such an Union, which could only be formed upon Engagements of mutual Assistance and Support, has hitherto obstructed the Measure, and Hyder has consequently been left, in Times of Difficulty and Distress, to seek Aid of Foreign Nations, particularly the French, who have always yielded him Supplies of Men and Stores, as far as their Ability would permit.

The Reluctance on our Part, to accept the repeated Offers made by Hyder at a Time when our Assistance might have been useful to him, will, no Doubt, render it more difficult to obtain advantageous Terms from him at a Juncture when we shall probably stand in Need of Assistance, or at least of a neutral Conduct, on his Part. However, whilst we continue to preserve so great a Superiority in India, it appears to us that the Interests of Hyder will always point out our Nation as the most useful Ally, and from that Cause only can we expect that he will enter into new Engagements with us. His Vakeel has lately made some Proposals to our President, and we wrote, in consequence, a friendly Letter to Hyder, expressing, in general Terms, our Desire to strengthen the Connection between him and the Company, and desiring him to afford us an Opportunity of coming to a more particular Explanation of the Means by which this Object might be accomplished to our mutual Satisfaction. A Copy of Hyder's Proposals, and of Two Letters written him in consequence, are inclosed for your Information; and we beg Leave to request your Sentiments on the Subject, and Sanction, if you approve the Measure, to conclude a fresh Treaty with him, upon such Terms as may be advantageous to the Interests of the Company and the Nabob.

We are of Opinion, considering the Situation of Hyder with respect to the Carnatic and the Company's Possessions on the Coast, that it would be more proper to send an intelligent Person from this Presidency, to reside at Hyder's Court, than from Bombay. Whatever personal Dislike the Nabob may have entertained against Hyder, we think he must see the Advantage and Necessity of a closer Union with him at this Juncture, if only to detach him from the Interests of the French; and in that Case, we are persuaded it must be more agreeable to the Nabob, to have a Resident sent from hence to Hyder's Court, than from any other Settlement. We shall urge the Matter to him, and acquaint you with his Sentiments.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient, and most humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Sam[l] Johnson,
P. Perring.

Fort Saint George;
19th July 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 30.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 2d Auguſt 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, to the Preſident and Council in Bengal.

In your Letter of the 7th ultimo, you recommended it to us to negotiate and conclude ſuch Conditions with Hyder Ally, in Addition to the preſent Treaty, as may ſerve to cement a good Underſtanding with him, and to enſure his Aſſiſtance in caſe of Neceſſity; carefully avoiding any Engagements with him that may draw the Company's Forces from the Defence of their own Poſſeſſions, and of the Payen Ghaut.

We acquainted you, in our Letter of the 19th ultimo, that we did not imagine it would be poſſible to conclude any Engagements with him, but on Terms of mutual Aſſiſtance; and it is certain, that this has been his only Motive for ſeeking a cloſer Connection with us for ſome Years paſt; indeed, the Treaty concluded with him in 1769, appears to us fully to expreſs the Conditions on which we may now ſecure his Friendſhip; and if that Treaty had not been evaded by the former Government here, we do not believe that Hyder would deſire any new Engagements at this Time, or that it would be neceſſary for us to conclude any with him.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold,
&c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
2 Auguſt 1778.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 19th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith.
General Munro abſent on Service.

Read the following Letter from Bengal.

To the Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council of Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Favours of the 19th and 23d ultimo.

We very much approve your Propoſals of forming a new Alliance with Hyder Ally, on the Condition of mutual Aſſiſtance and Support; of which you will have underſtood, by our Letter of the 7th ultimo, to have been entirely conſonant to our Sentiments; and for this Purpoſe we agree with you in Opinion, that it will be more proper to ſend an intelligent Perſon from your Preſidency to treat with him, than from that of Bombay, where their Attention and all their Means are likely to be ſo much occupied with the Care of their own Safety, as to leave them little of either for foreign Engagements.

The Articles propoſed by Hyder Ally Cawn, though very equitable to the Situation of Affairs to which they are adapted, require at this Time a total Alteration, with reſpect to the immediate Objects of your Alliance.

We have never regarded the Support of Ragobah as the End but as the Means of accompliſhing our Deſigns in the Weſt of India. The Plan which was propoſed by the Preſidency of Bombay, and adopted by us, in that View having failed, we know not from what Cauſe, and the impending War

War with France rendering it impracticable for that Presidency, in its present State, and under their present Expectations, to take any direct Part in the Support of Ragobah, who appears to have no reasonable Ground to expect any from the Partizans of his own Nation, we conceive that the Attempt to reinstate him in the Government of the Maratta's Dominions, would not only oblige us to withdraw our Forces from the immediate Defence of the Company's Possessions, but involve us in the Support of a War for the Benefit of his Pretensions, which might be attended with endless Difficulties: He could afford us no Assistance, but would rather incumber than contibute to forward our Operations, by the Influence of his Name. Besides, any Engagement of this Nature which you might form with Hyder, would possibly lead you into Measures repugnant to the Conditions which Mr. Elliot may conclude with Moodagee Boosla, and in that Case could not consistently be fulfilled; and as you have neither a Force you can immediately spare to co-operate with Hyder in the Service proposed, nor he has, we imagine, any strong personal Attachment to Ragobah, or immediate Interest in his Success; we recommend, that the first Article remain to be finally adjusted by the Communications which your Deputy may receive from Mr. Elliot, whom we shall order to correspond with him. In the mean Time, that a Conformity may be preserved in the Instructions which you shall give to the Person you may appoint, and the Objects which we have committed to the Charge of Mr. Elliot's Negotiations, the Governor General will transmit to your President a Copy of Mr. Elliot's Instructions: We have not yet entered them on our Proceedings; and we wish that they may continue in the Possession of your President alone, until the Ends of them shall be so far attained, that no Inconvenience can result from trusting them to the Records of the Select Committee; we shall then also insert them in our own.

Mr. Elliot's Instructions

We approve in general of the other Conditions proposed to you by Hyder Ally's Vakeel, but leave it to you to accept or amend them in such a Manner as you shall judge most conducive to the Company's Interest.

As it is impossible that any Supply of Men or Money which we might now resolve to send you, could arrive upon the Coast in Time to be of Service in conducting the Expedition against Pondicherry, which, if begun so early as you give us Reason to expect, must, we think, have terminated before any Reinforcement could be thrown into it by the French, which should render such Succours from us indispensable; we trust, that our late Supply of Money will have been sufficient for the present Occasion. That we may be the better enabled in future to judge of our Exigencies, we request, that you will transmit to us a compleat Estimate of your Revenues and other Resources and Disbursements for the present Year, including the 30th April next, which we have repeatedly applied to you for, but have not yet been furnished with; we also request that you will send us an Estimate of the Revenues of the Carnatic, and an Account of the Manner in which they are applied, because, as we know that the Nabob is largely indebted to the Company, we think that they ought likewise to be in some Measure appropriated to their Service.

As our Establishment of Europeans is greatly deficient of Men, and as we observe, by the Letter which you have received from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, that a Reinforcement of Regular Troops will be sent to your Presidency by the Ships now on their Way, we request that you will not detain any of the Recruits intended for this Place.

We have ordered 630 Barrels of Powder to be taken on Board the Jason, which will sail to your Presidency in a few Days: This is all that we can possibly spare from our own Magazines.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servants,

Fort William,
4th August 1778.

Philip Francis,
Warren Hastings,
Edward Wheler,
Richard Barwell.

APPENDIX, N° 31.

Extract of Fort St. George Select Conſultations, the 27th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

THE Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

The Preſident recommends to the Committee to take into ſerious Conſideration the ſeveral Points neceſſary to be determined on, previous to an Expedition taking Place for the Reduction of the French Fort and Factory of Mahé; and if they find it practicable to purſue the Scheme, that we deſire the Attendance of Sir Edward Vernon, to aſſiſt us with his Opinion reſpecting the beſt Mode of carrying our Reſolution into Execution. The Preſident is perſuaded the Objects are of material Conſequence to our Poſſeſſion, and that if we prove ſucceſsful, the French will not have a Foot of Land in India, and their political Views and Intereſt will be entirely fruſtrated; but the Preſident doubted from our preſent Situation, whether we ſhall be able to undertake the Expedition, ſo provided in every Reſpect as to render our Succeſs certain; and he ſtates to the Committee the following material Queſtions for their Determination:

1ſt. Whether our Treaſury, in its preſent State, and the Reſources we expect, will be able to furniſh the Sum abſolutely neceſſary to provide for the Occaſion?

2d. Whether we have ſufficient Ammunition and Stores to furniſh the Detachment with the Quantity that will be required, without leaving our Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt not properly provided, in caſe of any Attack or Invaſion?

3d. Whether the Force neceſſary for the Reduction of Mahé, as mentioned in General Munro's Letter, can be ſpared without Riſk, in caſe any Diſturbances happening in the Carnatic from the Views of the ſurrounding Powers, or in caſe of any Attempt from the French?

4th. Whether it will not be prudent to wait till we hear from Hyder Ally, or have more certain Accounts of the Diſpoſition of the different Rajahs, whoſe Countries border on Mahé, and through which our Troops muſt march?

5th. Whether, if the French from the Iſlands, on hearing of the Reduction of Pondicherry, ſhould have landed a Body of Troops at Mahé, before the Arrival of our Squadron and Land Forces there, our Detachments may not run a Riſk of being defeated by a ſuperior European Force, would in every Reſpect be attended with ſerious Conſequences to our future Operations and preſent Safety?

In order that the ſeveral Points recommended in the foregoing Minute, may be conſidered with proper Attention, and the Members fully prepared to give their Sentiments upon them, it is agreed that the Minute ſhould be ſent round for their ſeparate Peruſal, and that the Subject be again introduced before the Committee on Monday next. As Sir Edward Vernon's Preſence will be neceſſary on this Occaſion, it is reſolved to requeſt his Attendance on Monday.

The Article of Money appearing the firſt and moſt material Object to be conſidered in the preſent Undertaking, it is agreed, in caſe the Expedition to Mahé be otherwiſe found practicable, to repreſent our Wants to the Nabob, and endeavour, if poſſible, to obtain from him a Lack, or a Lack and Fifty thouſand Pagodas, in Advance for this Service; but as the Committee are extremely doubtful whether they ſhall be able to procure any Thing extraordinary from that Quarter, the Preſident propoſes the following Queſtion to the Committee:

Whether, in caſe they cannot obtain any extraordinary Supply from the Nabob, or by way of Loan upon the Company's Bond, the Expedition to Mahé is of ſuch Conſequence, that we ſhould be authorized in drawing Bills upon the Company for the Sum which ſhall be found abſolutely neceſſary to defray the Expence of that Expedition, ſuppoſing, in other Reſpects, it ſhould be found eligible to purſue it?

Reſolved unanimouſly in the Affirmative.

APPENDIX, N° 31.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 30th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President,
John Whitehill, Esquire,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

Extract of General Munro's Minute.

With respect to the President's 3d Query, it is impossible for me to say what the Views of the surrounding Powers in the Carnatic may be, or what Attempts the French may make from Europe (from any Part of India they can obtain none) but as Affairs stand at present, I think it impossible that any bad Consequences will happen before the Reduction of Mahé, providing the Expedition against it is set on Foot immediately.

With regard to hearing from Hyder Ally, respecting the March of the Troops through his Country, or that of any other Country Powers, it may be too late if we wait for Answers from them; and I would give them that as a Reason for not waiting their Answer, at the same Time they should be acquainted with the March of the Troops. If Hyder Ally and the King of Travencore do not interrupt the March of the Troops, I would not fear what any of the whole Rajahs on the Malabar Coast could do.

Extract of Mr. Smith's Minute.

Although I think we may expect considerable Assistance from Bombay, I would not reckon upon it in our Calculations of the Force necessary to undertake the Expedition, because it is possible that intervening Circumstances might prevent the timely Junction of the Troops, and so the whole Enterprize prove abortive; but I beg Leave to recommend to General Munro to reconsider his Estimate, and reflecting on the Necessities of the Carnatic, make such Diminution as he possibly can, without hazarding the Success of the Undertaking.

I think it probable that we shall hear from Hyder Ally before all Things necessary can be prepared, and the Army in a Condition to march, though, whatever his Answer may be, I am of Opinion that we should persist in our Resolution. It is seldom the Policy of an Eastern Prince to support a foreign Power, and the more he may be inclined to favour the French, so much the more necessary becomes it for us to destroy their Channel of Communication.

We have as yet no Reason to suppose that considerable Supplies have arrived at Mahé; and we may, I think, hope that a Force sufficient for its Defence will not arrive before it may be invested by us. We have no certain Accounts of any Force from Europe; and for Want of Shipping at the Islands, they were not in a Condition to afford Relief to Pondicherry. But should they be inclined to support Mahé from thence, it is in my Opinion an additional Inducement only to adopt and execute our Measures with Vigour.

Upon the whole, after weighing the Expence of the Undertaking in Men, Money, and Stores; the Danger in which the Carnatic may be exposed by the Absence of such a Force; the probable Temper and Conduct of the Country Powers; and the Chance of meeting from the French unsurmountable Opposition, I am firmly of Opinion that those Considerations are light in the Scale, opposed to the Danger to be apprehended from their Intrigues while they remain Masters of Mahé; and therefore, that the Expedition be undertaken as soon as the Weather and other Circumstances will admit.

30th November 1778. Charles Smith.

Resolved, That a Letter be prepared to Sir Edward Vernon, to desire he will inform us how far he can assist with the Squadron in forwarding an Expedition to Mahé.

APPENDIX, N° 31.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 4th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President,
John Whitehill, Esquire,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

This Day the following Letter was sent to Sir Edward Vernon:

To Sir Edward Vernon, Commodore and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships in India.

Sir,

You have been acquainted with our Reasons for wishing to form an Expedition against Mahé; and we have had the Pleasure to receive from you the strongest Assurance of Co-operations on the Part of the Squadron, in case we find it practicable to put our Design in Execution.

The greatest Difficulty that occurs to us at present, is to find Means of conveying our Force to Mahé with all the Ammunition and Stores necessary for the Undertaking. General Munro is of Opinion, that the Force ought to consist of a Battalion of Europeans, Two Companies of Artillery, and Two Battalions of Sepoys (in all about 400 Europeans and 1600 Sepoys.) The Time necessary to collect this Body of Men, and march it over Land to Mahé, supposing it to meet with no Obstruction in the Way, would be Two Months; but the principal Objection to this Mode, is the Difficulty of marching Men through such a vast Extent of Country belonging to the Rajahs and Chiefs, with whom the Company have no Connection, and on whose Good-will no Sort of Dependance can be placed. The Europeans would be utterly unequal to the Fatigue only of so large a March, and were they to attempt it, One Fourth Part would not reach Mahé in Condition to act. Our Sepoys might be more successful in this Point; but when we consider that their proposed Number is not large, that there is every Reason to apprehend Opposition on the March, and that they can be at no Certainty in regard to Provisions, an Article in which it is in the Power of every petty Rajah to distress them, we perceive many Difficulties in the Way of sending even this Part of our Force over Land.

Our Opinion therefore is, that the whole ought to be transported by Sea, if possible; and we should be glad to be informed by you, what Assistance the Squadron might be able to render in a Service of this Kind, with the Addition of the Two Bengal armed Ships which have joined it. We could, if necessary, assemble our Troops as far South as Nagore, and embark them at that Place; and we might be also able by the End of the present Month, to provide Two or Three large Ships, by way of Transports.

If the Squadron, with this Assistance, could convey the whole, or nearly the whole Force we have mentioned, to Mahé, we think every Nerve should be strained to set the Expedition on Foot before the French have Time to strengthen themselves in that Quarter; and we are accordingly disposed to exert ourselves to the utmost, in executing the Part which may depend on us; but should the Squadron be unable, from any Causes whatever, to afford the Assistance required, in that Case, the only Plan remaining for our Consideration, is that of marching the Sepoys over Land, and transporting the Europeans and Stores by Sea.

We have already mentioned the Difficulties that may be apprehended by sending any Part of the Force over Land; but we wish also to know how far the Europeans only might be accommodated with a Passage by the Help of the Squadron.

To save Time, and avoid the Uncertainty of any Attempt to bring the Squadron at this Season of the Year from Trincomaley to the Coast, we might be able to procure Transports sufficient to convey the Europeans and Stores from hence to Trincomaley, provided the Squadron could there assist in taking Part of the Europeans, and accommodating them for the Remainder of the Voyage. In this Case, it would be proper that we should know how long you mean to continue the Squadron at Trincomaley, or how long you would continue it there, consistently with the Plan you may have formed for its future Destination.

It would be impossible for us, at this Season, to procure Ships for Transports, in Time to put all the Troops, Stores, and Provisions on Board before the End of this Month, as we do not expect a single

ſingle Veſſel in our Road till the 25th, ſo that it might be the 10th January before our Troops could be at Trincomaley.

We requeſt likewiſe, that you would be pleaſed to inform us, how long you could continue with the Squadron on the Malabar Coaſt for the Purpoſes of the Expedition; and whether we might, in caſe of Neceſſity, expect any Aſſiſtance from it in conveying our Troops back to this Coaſt.

We have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
4th December 1778.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 7th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident;
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

Read the following Letter from Sir Edward Vernon:

Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

I have had the Honour to receive your Letter of Yeſterday, upon the Subject of the intended Expedition to Mahé, and requeſting to know what Aſſiſtance I could render in a Service of that Kind, with the Squadron under my Command, in tranſporting the Troops, &c. thither. His Majeſty's Ships being ill calculated for Tranſports, and the Squadron conſiſting only of the Rippon and Two Frigates, with Charlotte armed Ship (having ſent the Reſolution to the Streights of Malucca) I cannot give you any certain Hopes of conveying the whole Force by Sea, even if you ſhould be able to provide the Ships you mentioned by the End of this Month; for I do not think an Attempt of the Squadron to get up to Nagore ſhould be hazarded, becauſe if it ſhould miſcarry, of which there is a great Probability, it might render the Expedition abortive: But if you will pleaſe to procure Tranſports of any Kind, to convey the European Troops to Trincomaley, I will wait there for them until the 10th of next Month, or longer if the Service require it, and ſtrain every Nerve to afford the whole of the Number you mention, a Paſſage in the Squadron to Mahé, and to give the Expedition every other Aſſiſtance in my Power.

I am ſorry, Gentlemen, that the Seaſon is ſo far advanced as to render it exceedingly inconvenient for the Squadron to afford you the Aſſiſtance I could wiſh, in conveying your Troops back to this Coaſt. In the Midſt of a War, I think it highly neceſſary to keep the Ships under my Command, clean and ready to proceed on any Service; and for the Purpoſe of docking them at Bombay, I muſt endeavour to gain that Port by the Middle or latter End of March. The Time taken up in the performing that Service, may be ſo much as to render it hazardous for the Squadron at that Seaſon of the Year to touch at Mahé, on their Return to this Place.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Edward Vernon.

Fort Saint George,
the 5th Decr. 1778.

The Committee being of Opinion that the Expedition to Mahé may be undertaken in conſequence of the Aſſurances given by Sir Edward Vernon in the foregoing Letter; it is Reſolved accordingly, That Preparations be made for it with all poſſible Expedition.

General Munro is deſired, with the Aſſiſtance of the Committee of Stores, to prepare a Liſt of the Warlike Stores neceſſary for the Expedition; he is alſo requeſted to lay before the Committee, an Arrangement of the Troops neceſſary, that they may be collected as ſoon as poſſible.

APPENDIX, N° 31.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 10th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

General Munro recommends that the following Troops be ordered on the Expedition to Mahé.

The 1st Battalion 1st Regiment, now at Tanjore, to be relieved by the Battalion Regiment now here.
The 4th Battalion of Sepoys now at Pallamcotah.
The 20th Battalion of Sepoys now at Trichinopoly.
Three Companies of Artillery.
Two hundred Lascars.

The General also recommends the following Movement of Troops.

The 10th Battalion of Sepoys to march from Tanjore to Trichinopoly, there to remain till relieved by the 19th Battalion, and then to proceed to Pallamcotah, there to remain.
The 20th Battalion to march to Pallamcotah and wait there for Orders.
The 18th Battalion to march from Pondicherry to Tanjore.
The 9th Battalion to march from Cuddalore and Villinour to Tanjore.
The 19th Battalion to march from Cuddalore to Trichinopoly.
Colonel Braithwaite is appointed to command on the Expedition to Mahé.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correspondence.

N° 190. *From Hyder Ally Cawn to the Governor.—Dated 9th Zecaycole, or 29th November 1778; received 16th December, ditto.*

I have received your Letter, acquainting me of your having taken the Fort of Pondicherry; which has given me Pleasure, and I doubt not but that it will give Satisfaction to your Friends. I understand what you have wrote respecting an Interview with you. I am at present engaged in an Expedition, and when I have finished it, I shall write to you. Continue to give me Accounts of your Welfare. What can I say more?

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 17th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

Read the following Letter from the Company's Agent at Tellicherry.

To the Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President and Governor, and the Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your Letter of the 8th November I received this Morning from the Resident at Anjengo, and beg Leave to congratulate your Honour, &c. on the Success of our Arms against Pondicherry.

In Addition to what I have informed you in my last Letter, I am now to advise you, that the French have continued, with the greatest Diligence, putting Mahé, Fort Saint George, &c. in the best

beſt State of Defence, particularly ſince they have heard of the Surrender of Pondicherry, and of the Rumour that Troops are coming from your Preſidency to attack Mahé. Of the 300 Europeans that were in Garriſon there, 150 of them were ſent to Mangalore on the 16th of September, to join the Army of Nabob Hyder Ally, for whoſe Service they arrived from Mauritius in July laſt; their own Troops conſiſt of 150 Europeans, 300 Sepoys and Tiveys, beſides 300 of Hyder Ally's Sepoys, 300 Nairs from the Prince of Chirrika, ſent them ſince my laſt Letter.

The ſeveral Princes in our Neighbourhood, as already adviſed you, are the Prince of Cherrika, King of Cartenaddu, and Country Nair, all Tributaries to Hyder Ally, who has ſent them, as I am well aſſured, Orders to aſſiſt the French with Troops in caſe they are attacked by us. The Force each of thoſe Princes can raiſe, is as follows: The Prince of Cherrika 3,000 Men, King of Cartenaddu 3,000 Men, and Country Nair 300 Men, Nairs, Tiveys, and Meplas; but they cannot bring any Artillery into the Field of any Conſequence. However poſitive the Nabob's Orders are to thoſe Princes to aſſiſt the French, I think I am warranted to ſay, from the general Conduct of the Malabar Powers, and the Overtures that have been lately made me by the King of Cartenaddu and Country Nair, that they will aſſiſt us, or at leaſt remain neuter, unleſs the Nabob ſhould ſend a further Force to Mahé, capable of enforcing his Orders, or that the French ſhould receive a Reinforcement from the Mauritius, both which they give out that they expect. I cannot entertain the ſame favourable Idea of this Prince of Cherrika's Diſpoſition towards the Honourable Company, as the Honourable Governor and Council of Bombay have thought proper to reject the Claim, of levying a Sum of Money on the Province of Rhandatariah, which has been long mortgaged by his Predeceſſors to the Honourable Company, and which is ſtill under their Protection, for he has already ſent 300 Men to Mahé as before noticed, and is daily ſending them Coolies to aſſiſt upon their Works; though the Force of thoſe Princes may appear large upon Paper, yet they are in general but an undiſciplined Rabble.

I now cloſe you a Return of this Garriſon: We have not a Gun in it larger than a 12 Pounder, One Eight-Inch and Three Five and-a-Half Howitzers, beſides Royals and Cohorns, and only Two or Three Pounder Field Pieces. On the 3d ultimo, the Day we received private Advice of the Surrender of Pondicherry, and of Troops coming from the Coaſt for the Siege of Mahé, the Honourable the Governor and Council of Bombay were informed of the Want of heavy Cannon and Gunpowder, in caſe the Expedition took Place.

Your Honour, &c. may depend upon our making every Preparation in our Power to aſſiſt the Troops with Proviſions, and ſuch other Articles as they may require, and our Commanding Officers may point out.

I cannot avoid expreſſing my Hopes, that no Obſtacle will ariſe to prevent your carrying your Intentions into Execution againſt Mahé; for ſhould the French be re-inforced from the Iſlands, which they are daily in Hopes of, this Settlement in all Probability will be immediately attacked.

I am, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Richd. Church.

Tellicherry,
2d December 1778.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 29th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident,
Sir Eyre Coote,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

Extract of Sir Eyre Coote's Minute.

Sir Eyre Coote expreſſes great Satisfaction at the Succeſs of our Operations hitherto, and warmly approves the Expedition we have ſet on Foot to deprive the French of their laſt Hold at Mahé.

Sir Eyre is then particularly acquainted with the Number of Troops intended for this Service, and the Diſpoſition we had made for aſſembling at Anjengo: That we had ordered the 3 Battalions of

Sepoys

Sepoys to march over Land, and intended, if we could poſſibly procure Conveyances ſufficient, to ſend the Battalion of Europeans with 3 Companies of Artillery, by Sea, to join the Squadron at Trincomaley, and proceed with it round to Anjengo; that to execute this laſt Part of our Plan, we had been totally at a Loſs hitherto for want of Conveyances, as no Ships that could be engaged for that Service, had yet arrived in our Road ſince the breaking up of the Monſoon; and that if the Stafford, which is juſt arrived, could be employed in tranſporting the Europeans to Trincomaley, it might be of Uſe to the Expedition.

Sir Eyre Coote obſerves hereupon, that every Meaſure which could tend to expedite the general Plan which has been formed for the Reduction of Mahé, ought undoubtedly to be purſued; and if the Employment of the Stafford for any Purpoſe relating to it be found expedient, he ſhould on his Part chearfully acquieſce; but he thinks it deſerving the Conſideration of the Committee, whether the Stafford can unload her Cargo for this Place and Bengal, which is conſiderable, and be properly fitted as a Tranſport in Time, for the Purpoſe ſhe may be wanted.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 10. *To Hyder Ally; 16th January* 1779.

I had the Pleaſure to receive your Letter of the 29th November, and underſtand the Contents.

Conſidering the firm Friendſhip that ſubſiſts between the Company and your Circar, and the Neceſſity there is for the Intereſt of both, that it ſhould continue ſteady and unſhaken to the End of Time, I now write you on a Subject which appears to me of Importance, ſo far as it tends to promote a more regular Intercourſe and Correſpondence between us.

The Subject I mean is this: The Government here has appointed a Gentleman of Rank in the Company's Service to proceed to your Durbar, and remain there in a public Character, in the ſame Manner, and for the ſame Purpoſe, that your Vakeel reſides in Madras. He will be empowered to give you the ſtrongeſt Teſtimonies of our Friendſhip, and to repreſent and explain every Particular that you may wiſh to be acquainted with. I can have no Doubt of your chearful Acquieſcence in a Meaſure that will tend ſo much to a mutual Benefit; and all, therefore, that I have to requeſt of you is, that you will pleaſe to order the neceſſary Paſſports to be ſent me as ſoon as poſſible, that the Gentleman, who is intended to go to you, may depart without a Loſs of Time.

I think it proper to adviſe you, that we are preparing to attack the French Settlement at Mahé; and I am confident, from the Regard you have always expreſſed for the Company and the Engliſh Nation, that you will rejoice at every Inſtance of our Succeſs againſt their avowed Enemies. May your Health and Proſperity ever increaſe. What can I ſay more?

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 4th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.
Sir Eyre Coote indiſpoſed.

Extract of the Preſident's Minute.

The Situation of Affairs, the Diſtreſs we are in for Money, and the Uncertainty of what Steps may be taken by the French or the Country Powers, and in particular Hyder Ally, who does not ſeem to be very well pleaſed with our Conqueſt of Pondicherry, makes it appear to me to be imprudent to move from the Seat of Government at this Juncture.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 5th January 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the President and Select Committee at Bombay, to the President and Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

The Conduct of the Nabob Hyder Ally manifests a Diſpoſition very favourable to the French; he has ſent Supplies of Proviſions, and even Money, we believe, to Mahé; and we have had Intimation, that he has given the French Governor there Permiſſion to hoiſt his Colours in the Place, ſhould it be attacked by the Engliſh; for which we hear, by private Advices, you are making Preparation. It is ſaid alſo he intends ſending his Fleet with Proviſions to the French Iſlands; and that his Ships will be armed with Detachments of French Soldiers, which were ſent to him from Mahé before the Account arrived of the Rupture with England.

We know not what Effect your Succeſs againſt Pondicherry (which we have alſo learnt by private Advice) may have on the Nabob's Conduct; but we have now a Gentleman, Mr. James Sibbald, under Orders to proceed to his Dubar, whom, however, we propoſe detaining until we are at ſome Certainty with reſpect to your Intention regarding Mahé, and the Part the Nabobs will take if that Settlement ſhould be attacked.

We conclude, that if his Highneſs the Nabob of Arcot, had any Objection to our ſending a Deputy, you would have ſignified the ſame to us. The Governor General and Council acquaints us, under the 25th June, they had written to you on the Subject; and we beg Leave to aſſure both you and him, that our only View, in this Meaſure, is to endeavour to counteract the Schemes of the French, and to bring Hyder into a Diſpoſition more favourable to the Honourable Company; for which Purpoſe we have a Latitude from them to furniſh him with Supplies of Arms and warlike Stores.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 11th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.
Sir Eyre Coote indiſpoſed.

Extract of Mr. Smith's Minute:

I ſhall take this Opportunity of ſaying a few Words on a Subject, which though not immediately connected with the Affairs of Tanjore, is touched upon in his (the Preſident's Minute) and appear to me to require our moſt early and moſt ſerious Conſideration. The Preſident obſerves, "That Hyder Ally is not pleaſed with our Conqueſt of Pondicherry." The preſent critical Situation of Affairs, in daily Expectation of receiving Intelligence from Europe of our actual Declaration of War, at a Time when we have no Money in our Treaſury, nor any certain Reſource to ſupport even our Peace Eſtabliſhment, on the other Hand, Hyder Ally's proſperous Situation, being at Peace with the Marattas, and freed of all Apprehenſions from them by their own internal Troubles; his Power and Reſource, and above all, his ſuppoſed favourable Diſpoſition towards the French, from whence only they can derive the leaſt probable Hope of regaining their Poſſeſſions in this Country, or keeping the only one that now remains to them; theſe Conſiderations ſtrongly evince not only the Policy of cultivating a good Underſtanding with Hyder Ally at this Juncture, but alſo the Danger of neglecting it. I am therefore of Opinion, that no Time ſhould be loſt in ſending a proper Perſon to negotiate a Treaty with Hyder Ally, agreeable to what has been long ſince unanimouſly determined by the Committee.

Charles Smith.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 14th January 1779.

PRESENT:

The Honourable Tho' Rumbold, Esquire, President,
Sir Eyre Coote,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.
Mr. Whitehill absent.

Extract from the President's Minute:

Before I conclude, let me add, that there is now a dull Calm before the Engines of War are thoroughly set in Motion, which point them out as the Criterion for taking our Measures; if after all it should appear in the Sequel not to have been necessary, there is no Harm in having endeavoured to supply our Treasury; but if it should appear to have been a wise and prudent Measure, we shall have the Merit of saving the Company from Destruction. The next Consideration to supply our Treasury, is to form such Alliance as may secure us from any Attempts if our Endeavours, with respect to Money, should not succeed.

The Council General have strongly recommended our forming a Treaty with Hyder, and have given us a full Power to conclude one. Our Correspondence with him has not been attended with that Readiness on his Part which we expected from him; but I am persuaded we should not lose Sight of the Object, and nothing will so effectually bring it about, as sending a Person to him; a proper Pretence may be made use of, and we shall be able to judge of his Intentions; it is better to know him for an Enemy than a doubtful Friend; and I must confess I shall be under some Apprehensions for our Detachments now proceeding to Mahé, unless we are assured what Line of Conduct he means to observe.

I have always been of Opinion, that the not keeping up a proper Communication with the Country Powers, has been a principal Error in our Politics. The French have never neglected having an Agent at the different Courts of Indostan, whose Representatives have often proved detrimental to our Interest, and whose Insinuations of our ambitious Designs have operated to our Disadvantage.

I think it highly necessary that some proper Person, at this particular Time, should be sent to the Nizam, as well as to Hyder, that we may be fully acquainted with their Views and Designs; to send one to Hyder is, on many Accounts, more particularly necessary, his infirm State of Health render his Life every Moment in Danger; nay, it is asserted, that at any Rate he cannot live many Months: It is more than probable from the distracted State his Possessions will fall into on his Demise, that his Son Teepo Saib will look to us for Support; the Situation of his Country render him a natural Ally, a Barrier against all Invasions, and being important as a Friend, he is dangerous as an Enemy.

I am happy to call the Committee's Attention to the several Points I have mentioned, while we have the Assistance of the Knowledge and Abilities of Sir Eyre Coote, who is destined to take a Part in the Management, in so considerable and valuable a Part of the British Empire as our Possessions in Indostan.

Extract of Sir Eyre Coote's Minute:

The Attachment of Hyder Ally to the Interests of the French, which has been manifested upon several Occasions, and which there is Reason to believe may shew itself more conspicuously in case they should hereafter be in a Condition to act against us with any Probability of Success, renders it highly necessary that we should be minutely informed of his Motions, in order that we may be prepared to counteract them, should they prove hostile towards the Company. For this Purpose it is resolved, that one of the Company's Servants be sent to attend at the Court of Hyder Ally in a public Character, and that a Letter be immediately written to Hyder informing him of this Appointment, and requesting the necessary Passport.

APPENDIX, N° 31.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 18th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thos Rumbold, Esquire, President,
Sir Eyre Coote,
Charles Smith,
General Munro absent on Service,
Mr. Whitehill absent.

Extract of a Letter from the President and Council at Fort Saint George, to Colonel Braithwaite.

You will observe that the foregoing Instructions are framed on the Supposition that you will meet with no Impediment in the Execution of our Design from any other Power but the French, and we sincerely hope this may prove to be the Case; but as it is impossible to say at present how far Hyder Ally may be disposed to favour the Interests of our Enemy by strengthening or attempting to relieve the Garrison of Mahé, or how far our Operations may be affected by the War in which the Gentlemen of Bombay are engaged with the Maratta Government, we deem it expedient to communicate to you our Ideas upon both these Points, and to prepare you as well as we are able against every Event that may possibly happen in the Course of this Service.

We are inclined to think from the passive Conduct of Hyder Ally during our Operation against Pondicherry, that he has no real Design of supporting the French Interest at present in Opposition to us; indeed it seems unreasonable to suppose that Hyder, if he had any such Intention, would reserve it only to be employed when the French were driven to their last Stake, and beyond almost the Possibility of recovering even the Ground they had lost; whatever Appearances therefore he may assume in their Favour, we are warranted on every Ground to conclude, that he will not break with us, by openly assisting the French on the present Occasion; and as to secret Support that he may be able to afford them, either directly, or by Means of his Tributaries in the Neighbourhood of Mahé, we think our Force is sufficient to encounter his.

Though we have such strong and convincing Reasons to believe Hyder Ally will in the present Situation of Affairs take no open and direct Part in Favour of the French, yet should he, from any Motives that cannot now be discovered, be induced to swerve from the Conduct he has hitherto observed, and declare openly in their Favour, and should you be of Opinion from that Declaration, or from his Actions, that he means to oppose our Undertaking with a sufficient Force to render the Success of it in your Judgment too hazardous; in that Case we would have you immediately desist from the Enterprize, without exposing our Troops to the Risk of a Defeat.

Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 19th September 1778.

Read the following Letter from Mr. Richard Church, the Company's Agent at Tellicherry.

To the Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esq. President and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

On the 1st Instant I was honoured with your Letter of the 4th ultimo.

I shall now, agreeably to your Request, give you all the Information I am able, of the Settlement of Mahé, its Fortifications and Garrison.

The inclosed Paper which I have received from our Commanding Officer, is an Account of the present State of the Fortifications at Mahé; it should have been executed with more Exactness, had Time permitted.

The Garrison consists of about 300 Europeans and 300 Sepoys and Tivies; they have Three Companies of Militia, mere nominal Force, being composed chiefly of the Natives, upon whom they can place no great Dependance.

Mahé ſtands in the Territory of the King of Cartinadu, whoſe Anceſtors gave the French a Grant of a Factory there. The preſent Prince is not in their Intereſt, and would, I have every Reaſon to believe, join us, or remain neuter, as he did in the laſt War, if we were to attack Mahé, for he is very highly incenſed on Account of their not aſſiſting him agreeable to Treaty againſt Hyder Ally, to whom he is now tributary. The Country on this Side Mahé River belongs to Country Nair, whoſe Diſtrict comes within 800 Yards of our Fort of Moylan, which is near Two Miles from Tellicherry, and Six Miles from Mahé. This Nair is under the Influence of the French, as his Country is commanded by Fort Saint George, and the Redoubts of Chimbrah and Corichee on this Side the River. The Nair may be able to raiſe about 200 Nairs and Tivies, and in all Probability would remain quiet, as he did laſt War, if he thought we had a Force here ſuperior to the French.

The Prince of Cherricka, by whoſe Country we are ſurrounded to the Northward and Eaſtward, is an ancient Ally of the Company's; but as this Prince is tributary to Hyder, whichever Side Hyder embraces, the Prince muſt take at firſt. I have been well aſſured, that Hyder has already ſent Orders to the Prince and King of Cartinaddu to aſſiſt the French, but whether offenſively as well as defenſively againſt us, I cannot learn.

I am informed that the Fort of Mahé, the Redoubts and Batteries belonging to it, would require at leaſt 1000 Europeans to garriſon them properly; but unleſs the French can make a firm Friend of the King of Cartinaddu, Mahé could not at any Time make a long Defence againſt an European Enemy, as the King can cut off their Proviſions by Land.

I am very reſpectfully,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient, and
moſt humble Servant,
Richard Church.

Tellicherry,
2d September 1778.

The Fortifications of Mahé and Fort Saint George are nothing like what they were in 1761, when it was ſurrendered to the Engliſh, except Battery de Roach A, which is in the ſame Place and Manner as in 1761; and the Bound Hedge from A to B, the ſame as the Two Hills C C, whereon ſtood Forts Dauphine and Caude, the French have fortified within theſe Two Months, but only with a Stockade of Cocoanut Trees and Earth. The principal Fort D is but ſmall, about Sixty Yards each Face of the annexed Figure, with about Ten Embraſures on each Face, and Caſemates all round within; the Fort Walls high and built of Stone and Chunam, without any Ditch or Covered Way; under the Fort by the River Side is the Battery, marked E; the Aſcent without to the Bamboo Hedge, from the South Eaſtward, is ſteep and high; the N. E. Side by the River is plain, but commanded by the Two Hills C C, and Fort Saint George, F. Fort Saint George appears to me to be of the annexed Figure E, the Fort about 200 Yards round within; the Works are of Earth, and high, with a very little Slope to them at preſent; and having been cleaned and repaired ſince the Month of July, within are Barracks, Magazine, and Store Room of Stone and Tiles; it ſtands on a high Hill, about Eight or Nine hundred Yards from the Center of Mahé, and commands the whole Town; the Beach G G G, cannot be ſeen from Fort Saint George. Curachy Redoubt erected on the Beach, about Three Miles on this Side Mahé, is the ſame as formerly; but the French have lately raiſed a Parapet thereon; it is high, may hold Four ſmall Cannon, and a Shed for Troops.

J. W.

Agreed, That a Copy of Mr. Church's Letter, and of the Account of Mahé, be ſent to General Munro, and his Opinion requeſted in reſpect to an Expedition to that Place, and the Number of Troops neceſſary to be employed on it.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 166. *To Hyder Ally Cawn, dated 30th October 1778.*

The French Nation, jealous of the great Power of the Engliſh, and diſregarding the Treaties ſubſiſting between them, have lately, by various Acts, in Europe, broke the Bands of Friendſhip, and ſet themſelves as Enemies againſt us: In conſequence thereof, we have commenced War upon the People of that Nation in India, and have ſeized upon all their Factories and Settlements in Bengal, and upon this Coaſt the capital Fortreſs of Pondicherry has been ſubdued by victorious Troops, and the Governor, with all the European Officers and Soldiers in that Garriſon, have fallen into our Hands, and will be ſent to Europe very ſhortly. Knowing you to be a ſincere Friend and Well-wiſher

to

the Company, I write you this Intelligence, that you may rejoice. The Power of the French in Indoſtan being at an End, and that of the Engliſh raiſed to a Degree that cannot be equalled by any other European Nation, the Company now have a fairer Opportunity than ever, of ſhewing their moderation and Sincerity of their Friendſhip towards thoſe who have given them Proofs of their good-will and Deſire to live in Amity with them. I have always conſidered the Alliance between the Company and you as favourable to the Intereſts of both, and on that Account have written you friendly Letters, expreſſing my Inclination to unite with you upon a more ſolid and permanent Foundation. Your laſt Letter upon this Subject was not ſufficiently explicit; I therefore now write to requeſt you will acquaint me with your Sentiments, and if you continue in the ſame Deſires that you have formerly communicated to me; I ſhall be glad to meet you myſelf in any convenient Place that you may appoint, or ſend ſome proper Perſons to confer with you, and adjuſt ſuch Matters as may tend to ſtrengthen the Alliance between us. May your Happineſs and Riches be ever encreaſing! What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX, N° 32.

Extracts of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 17. *From the Nabob.—Dated 29th January 1779; received 30th January 1779.*

HEREWITH ſend you ſome Papers of Intelligence, which I have received from the Court of the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla, and the Country of Kennoul. What can I ſay more?

Intelligence from Kennoul. Dated 19th Zebudge 1192; received 26th of ſame Month.

Adali Cawn, an Afgan Officer of Horſe, formerly in the Service of the Nabob of this Place, returned here lately from Hyder, and ſays, that it is Hyder's Intention to march againſt this Place whenever he has taken Chilluldurg, which he is beſieging at the preſent. After he takes this, he will go againſt Cuddapah, and from thence march into the Nellore and Arcot Countries. If the Engliſh and the Nabob Wallau give Protection to the Cuddapah and Kennoul People, by ſending ſome Troops to their Aſſiſtance, Hyder will be prevented from taking the Fort of Sedhout, in the Cuddapah Country, and will in all Likelihood relinquiſh his Deſign againſt theſe Places, and the Arcot Country. The Safety of the latter depends on the Fall of Sedhout and the Cuddapah and Kennoul Countries.

N° 18. *From the Nabob.—Dated 30th January 1779; received 31ſt January 1779.*

I herewith ſend you a Letter I have juſt received from Maha Rajah Burbur, my Manager at Arcot, which contains Intelligence from Balla Ghaut: What can I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from Maha Rajah Burbur.—Dated 10th Mohrem 1193, or 29th January; received 30th January.

Intelligence has been received by the Merchants of Wallajanagur from Balla Ghaut; that it is the firm Intention of Hyder Ally to oppoſe the Engliſh Troops whenever they came into his Country, to take the Fort of Mahé; and that he will give every Aſſiſtance in his Power to the French: He has accordingly appointed a Body of Four thouſand Horſe to march to the Twelve Mahls on the Borders of the Carnatic, and another Body of his Troops is ſhortly to march to Mahé, to the Aſſiſtance of that Place; it is likewiſe his Intention to march himſelf with a large Army into the Carnatic, whenever Accounts are received of the Engliſh Troops being arrived at Mahé. The Overthrow of

your Highness's Enemies and your own Success are Things never to be doubted; but yet as the present Situation of Affairs require Caution and timely Management, I think it necessary to represent to your Highness that there are very few Stores of any Kind in the Fort of Arcot. The Wall of the City has fallen down in Two Places in the South Side. I am greatly in want of Bricks to repair the Wall, but it will take up some Time to make them. I therefore request your Highness's Permission to take some from the House of the late Sifder Ally Cawn, in order to set about repairing immediately the Breach in the City Wall.

N° 20. *From the Nabob.—Dated 4th February 1779; received D°.*

Considering how you are at all Times anxious to have Intelligence from the different Country Powers in Hindostan, I enclose for your Perusal some Papers of News, which I have just received from Hydrabad: However disagreeable this Intelligence may be to you, I thought it necessary you should be made acquainted with it. In my Letter to you of 3d December last, I mentioned, that a Proposal had been made to me by some of the People of Poonah to have the Difference accommodated. If my Friends had at that Time wrote an Answer to the Advice I gave them, I hoped to have been able to have settled it in a Way the most honourable for them. What shall I say more?

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 4th February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, Governor, President,
Sir Eyre Coote,
John Whitehill.
General Munro absent on Service,
Mr. Smith indisposed,

The President lays before the Committee the following Minute, with Intelligence just received from the Nabob.

I am concerned to lay before the Committee, a Letter from the Nabob, containing Advices from his Vakeel at Poonah, of a very serious Nature; and though we may suppose the Account of the unfortunate Situation of the Bombay Army is greatly exaggerated, and that when we hear from Bombay, we shall be informed of some favourable Circumstances, still from the circumstantial Account received, we have no Reason to doubt but the Event of the Expedition for conducting Ragonaut Row to Poonah, has been unfortunate and disgraceful both to our Arms and Councils; and our present Situation, with respect to the different Powers of Hindostan, renders it absolutely necessary that we should immediately take into Consideration our own State and Resources, as well for the Defence of the Carnatic, as to afford Assistance to any other Parts where the Company have Possessions or Alliances that may stand in Need of our Support. The first Consideration is the State of our Treasury; I have already on many Occasions represented to the Committee the Difficulties we have to struggle with, and that the utmost we can expect, is to supply our Exigencies on a Peace Establishment, and provide our Investment, which being an Object of Consequence to the Company, ought not to be neglected. Our Situation has been represented to the Governor General and Council, but I am of Opinion, we may still in a more particular Manner address them again on the Subject, and request that they will not only afford us Assistance from the Bengal Treasury, that we may be supplied with a Fund to enable our Army to take the Field, should Circumstances make it necessary, but that they will give us their Opinion on those Points we have already submitted to their Consideration, and upon such others as we may now propose to them: 1st. I would recommend, that we fully state to them the Situation of the Tanjore Country, and the Measures we have taken in consequence, in order to secure the regular Payment of the Rajah's Subsidy, and the Nabob's Peshcush, which, if punctually remitted to our Treasury, will not only greatly assist in keeping up our present Establishment, but will contribute, with other Means, to secure in Time such a Supply as will enable us to act with Vigour as Occasion may require. The Tanjore Resources ought to be taken Care of; Necessity obliges us to watch over them with Attention, and should the present Negociation entrusted to General Munro fail of producing the desired Effect, I am persuaded it is our Duty to take such Measures that no Mismanagement, or any Cause whatever, may deprive us of that Support which is absolutely necessary to contribute to the Protection of the Carnatic, Tanjore, and our Northern Settlements; for where is the Force for the Defence of those several Countries, but what is kept up, disciplined, and paid by the Company?

Nabob's payments & deficiencies

2d. It will be neceſſary that we take the Opinion of the Governor General and Council, how we are to act in caſe of a Failure in the Nabob's Engagements. I hope we ſhall never be drove to take any Meaſure inconſiſtent with his Rights, or diſagreeable to his Feelings; but without we ſtate with Preciſion our Difficulties, we may find ourſelves embarraſſed, and at a Loſs to act in particular Points, when our Diſtreſſes preſs with Force upon us. It is true, we have lately received a very conſiderable Sum from the Nabob; but the Account delivered in by me to the Committee, dated the 30th of November laſt, will ſhew that he was, at the End of January, greatly in Arrears of the Amount which, by his own voluntary Agreement, he engaged to pay to that Period, and the Debt is Monthly encreaſing. Our Expences are certain, and muſt be provided for; our Burthens at preſent are great, for excluſive of our Standing Army, upwards of Twenty-ſeven thouſand Men, we have the heavy Expence of completing our Fortifications, which muſt not on any Account be neglected, and we have the Maintenance of the French Priſoners, Military and Civil, with a Number of Articles to be provided for, which the Capitulation of Pondicherry oblige us to fulfil. All Attention and Support is certainly due to the Nabob, as our old and faithful Ally, connected with us by every Tye, and demanding from us every Indulgence; for if we take a View from the Southern Boundary of Indoſtan to the Northern Extremity, where the Engliſh Forces have proved victorious, where ſhall we find one Native Prince who has not ſeverely felt the Effects of our Power, and that is now lamenting the rapid Succeſs of our Arms, and the Credulity that ever induced him to truſt to our Engagements? Mahomed Ally can alone boaſt, that we have not entirely violated every Principle on which he has depended, and who, with his Family, it is to be wiſhed, may long remain Inſtances of our National Faith. But at the ſame Time I expreſs theſe Sentiments towards the Nabob, it is neceſſary that we inſiſt on a Punctuality in fulfilling his Engagements, or that the Committee are furniſhed with ſome Line to guide their Conduct, when they find him fail in his Engagements. To various Cauſes may be imputed his Reluctance to part with Money, and the ſeveral Circumſtances may have contributed to give him Diſguſt. We have no Right or Ground to ſuppoſe his Reluctance proceeds from Diſaffection; we are to conſider his Load of Debt, the encreaſed Expences of the Eſtabliſhment, the Decreaſe, from various Cauſes, and perhaps from ſome Miſmanagement, of his Revenue, the Diſappointments he has been ſubject to, in Matters where he conceived himſelf to be juſtly entitled to Deciſions in his Favour; and laſtly, to the Impoſitions of Individuals, and the attendant Paſſion ſo common to them of advanced Stages in Life, of hoarding up for future unforeſeen Contingencies; all theſe may have operated to encreaſe the Difficulties of obtaining from him the neceſſary Supplies of Caſh. That ſuch Difficulties have frequently exiſted, no one acquainted with this Government can doubt; but the Reflection alone of our depending on precarious Circumſtances for certain and unavoidable Expences, on which our very Safety depends, render it abſolutely neceſſary to have the Advice of the Governor General and Council, to aſſiſt our Reſolutions, if ever we ſhould be obliged to go beyond the Line that we wiſh to be preſerved.

his Debt
Decreaſe of Revenue

Another material Circumſtance in the preſent State of Affairs, I am of Opinion, may with Propriety be mentioned to the Council General; the Bengal Detachment deſtined to aſſiſt our Operations on the Malabar Coaſt muſt now of Neceſſity return, even if they had not the Difficulties to encounter in their further Progreſs, which we have received Intelligence muſt attend them in caſe they attempt to proceed. It is probable a more ſafe, eaſy, and ſhorter March, may be effected by their obtaining Permiſſion to paſs, under certain Reſtrictions, through the Berar Country, into our Northern Circars, from whence by Sea they might return to Calcutta; or they may march with Safety along the Coaſt through Cuttah. The Preſence of ſuch a Force to the Northward would prove a ſufficient Check on the Soubah, ſhould he be induced by the late News from Poonah, which there is no Doubt has been agreeable to him, from his open Declarations in Favour of the Peſhwa, to form any Schemes to our Diſadvantage, or to interrupt the Peace of our Northern Circars; at any Rate, Four or Five Battalions of Sepoys from Bengal, or even the Detachment which we underſtand has been ſent by another Route to reinforce Colonel Goddard, would give Security to that Part of the Country, and enable us to act with more Vigour, ſhould the French, with Hyder Ally, form any Deſign of entering the Carnatic. It will alſo be proper to acquaint the Governor General and Council of our having ſent Mr. Hollond to the Nizam, with our Reaſons for the Meaſure, that they may correſpond with him on any Points they deem neceſſary.

Having now fully given my Sentiments on what I think neceſſary to be repreſented to the Governor General and Council, I ſhall proceed to conſider another Object of great Importance; I mean the Expedition that has been ſet on Foot for the Reduction of Mahé; and I ſhall ſtate to the Committee the ſeveral Circumſtances that appear to me for and againſt the March of the Detachment deſtined on that Service.

There can be no Doubt but the Reduction of Mahé is a very material Object, if it can be effected without Riſk to the Carnatic, by parting with ſo conſiderable a Force at this particular Period. The Detachment is far advanced on their Way. Every Meaſure is taken to ſecure their Paſſage to Tellicherry. His Majeſty's Squadron is probably by this Time at Anjengo, and the Difficulties we had to ſurmount, are now moſtly got over by our having a Ship ready to convey the Stores round to Tellicherry. The Rajah of Trevancore has aſſured us of Supplies of Proviſions for our Troops till they

embark

embark from Anjengo; and I think there is no Doubt the Place must fall, unleſs the Garriſon is conſiderably reinforced from the Iſlands, or aſſiſted openly by Hyder Ally. The Capture of Mahé muſt leave the French without Hopes of an Eſtabliſhment in India, unleſs aſſiſted by a very conſiderable Force from Europe. Theſe ſeveral Reaſons are ſtrong Inducements for purſuing the Plan we have formed. The Detachment will alſo be ready to aſſiſt the Preſidency at Bombay, ſhould the late unfortunate Meaſures have occaſioned more Diſtreſs and Danger to that Settlement than we have as yet had Accounts of; and could we depend on the Arrival of Sir Edward Hughes with the expected Regiment from Europe, I am of Opinion the Force we have ſent againſt Mahé may with Safety for a Time be ſpared from the Carnatic, as the putting a Stop to the Expedition at this Juncture would have too much the Appearance of having done it from the Apprehenſions ariſing from the late bad Succeſs of the Bombay Troops againſt the Marattas. On the other Hand, in our preſent uninformed State of the Views of the French, or of any Attempts they may make with their Forces from the Iſlands on this Coaſt or to the Northward, we certainly run ſome Riſk in dividing our Force, which if kept together will be ſufficiently formidable to repel any Attempts, either from the French or Country Powers. The Lateneſs of the Seaſon before our Operations againſt Mahé can poſſibly commence, with the Probability that the Bombay Preſidency will have, immediately after their late Diſtaſter, ſtrongly requeſted Sir Edward Vernon to proceed with the Squadron for the Protection of Bombay, who will moſt likely think it his indiſpenſable Duty to afford that Object a Preference to all others, are Points worthy of Conſideration. Our Detachment, if they march on to Anjengo, from the Accounts we have received, will not be able to remain there long, from the Difficulty of ſupplying them with Proviſions; and the moſt material Circumſtance to be conſidered, is the Chance of the Failure of the Enterprize, which would be attended with the worſt Conſequences, eſpecially following ſo cloſe on the late unfortunate Check the Bombay Troops have met with. It appears to me, that the Succeſs of the Marattas will rather incline Hyder to a Connection with the Engliſh; for he has always been a Well-wiſher to Ragonout Row, and his Country has only been releaſed from the Incurſions of the Marattas by the late Diviſions amongſt the ſeveral Chiefs. He will, from their preſent Junction, have to dread their Reſentment, joined to that of the Nizam's, who has uniformly declared himſelf in Favour of the Peſhwa, and who has for ſome Time been made uneaſy by Hyder's Attempts on the Confines of his Country. I am perſuaded that it is impoſſible, from the different Intereſts of thoſe Powers, the Marattas, the Nizam, and Hyder Ally, that they can ever be united; and that the latter, having very little if any Hopes of Support from the French, will the more readily endeavour to ſtrengthen himſelf by an Alliance with us. I have ever conſidered ſuch an Alliance as our firſt and principal Object, and Mahé would then fall into our Hands of courſe, and every View of the French be entirely fruſtrated. I have been thus particular, that the Committee may immediately come to ſome Determination, either that the Expedition may proceed, or be countermanded. Not an Hour is to be loſt. I hope the Gentlemen of the Committee will give their Sentiments fully on this Queſtion.

One Circumſtance I ſhall beg Leave to add, which is, if we deſiſt from proſecuting the Expedition, it is probable the Factory of Tellicherry will fall into the Hands of the French.

Extract of Sir Eyre Coote's Minute.

The Governor, in his Minute, having requeſted the Gentlemen of the Committee to give their Sentiments fully upon the Meaſures which ought to be purſued by this Preſidency, in order to ſupport our national Honour and the military Reputation we have acquired in this Country, both of which have received ſo ſevere a Shock from the Defeat of the Bombay Army, and the mortifying Treatment they have met with from the Marattas in conſequence of it, I feel myſelf, as Commander in Chief of the Forces in India, more particularly called upon to offer my Opinion upon ſo intereſting a Subject.

I might touch upon the Meaſures which have been purſued by the Gentlemen of Bombay, and perhaps juſtly and properly obſerve, how much to the Benefit of the Company, and the general Good, that Army might have been employed againſt the National Enemy; which has now, from its Failure in an ill-timed Expedition, encreaſed the Difficulties we have to Struggle againſt, and expoſe us to Dangers, which could not have approached us but through their Means; I ſhall leave theſe Matters, however, to the wiſer Diſcuſſion of our Employers, and proceed to ſay,

I agree entirely with the Governor's firſt Propoſition, in Regard to the Neceſſity there is for repreſenting to the Supreme Council the State of our Treaſury, and the Situation of the Tanjore Country, as well as to require their Sentiments upon the Meaſures which the Board here ought to adopt, in caſe the Nabob's Engagements ſhould not be ſo punctually fulfilled as the Neceſſity of our Affairs may demand; and I imagine thoſe Repreſentations cannot fail to have the deſired Effect, in inducing them to give ſuch ſpeedy and proper Aſſiſtance as may enable the Governor and Council here to purſue the diſintereſted and ſpirited Plan, which they have hitherto ſupported alone, ſo much to their National Benefit, and to their own Honour.

The

The Propriety of ſecuring our Northern Circars, is next recommended to our Conſideration; and I ſtrongly feel the Neceſſity there is for having a ſufficient Body of Forces in thoſe Parts, to check Attempts which at this critical Juncture may poſſibly be made upon them. As Affairs are now circumſtanced, I do not ſee from whence that Force can be ſupplied, unleſs from the Bengal Army; and as I am of the Governor's Opinion, that their Return to the Preſidency may be effected with Safety by either of the Routes he mentions, I alſo entirely agree with him, that a Requiſition of them ſhould be immediately made to the Supreme Council.

I confeſs I feel myſelf particularly embarraſſed in giving my Sentiments upon the Mahé Expedition; the Governor has ſtated the Reaſons for and againſt it, with his uſual Candour and Preciſion.

The Dangers to which we may be expoſed upon this Coaſt, by ſuch a Diviſion of our Forces, is a Matter worthy of ſerious Conſideration; nor, though we feel that the parting with ſo large a Body of Troops weakens us very conſiderably, do I think it adequate in Strength to the Buſineſs it is meant to effect; remembering that we cannot hope now for any Aſſiſtance from Bombay, where we ought to have found it, and that we proceed merely upon Speculation in regard to the Oppoſition we may meet with from the French, from Hyder Ally, or from both.

If the French either mean to moleſt us here, or to oppoſe us on the other Coaſt, with the conſiderable Force they have aſſembled at their Iſlands, they muſt arrive before the Capture of Mahé can be effected, and in ſuch Caſe, we ſhall of Courſe be too weak to reſiſt them in either Place.—If they give up all Thoughts of retrieving their Affairs in this Part of the World, which I think it can be hardly imagined they ſhould, even in that Caſe the Neceſſity for the Expedition ceaſes, as Mahé muſt ſoon fall of itſelf, more particularly ſhould we form any Connections with Hyder Ally; a Meaſure which cannot but prove of great Utility to us, and for the effecting which, I heartily give my Opinion and Concurrence.

For theſe Reaſons I cannot but acknowledge I feel myſelf againſt the Expedition, and had I been preſent at the Time it was planned, ſhould moſt certainly have diſſented from the Meaſure.

But when I conſider that the Detachment have now proceeded ſo far on its Way, and feel with the Governor, that to recal them at this Time might carry the Appearance of Apprehenſion in conſequence of the Advantage lately gained by the Marattas; when I reflect upon the Bravery of the Troops, the Spirit and Abilities of the Officers who conduct them, and truſting that they will continue under the Orders of this Preſidency (for on no other will I ever conſent to have them placed) I am again encouraged, and aſſure myſelf, that although they may not ſucceed in the Enterprize they undertake, we can never meet with Diſgrace from their Miſconduct.

Upon the whole, as Things are at preſent ſituated, I am againſt recalling them, but think it might be very proper for them to remain at Anjengo, until ſome better Information of what the French are meditating, or a Knowledge of Hyder's real Intentions towards us, may allow us to decide with Safety and Certainty as to their future Motions.

Eyre Coote.

Reſolved, that the Expedition to Mahé be proſecuted, notwithſtanding the Diſaſter that has befallen the Bombay Troops; and that a Letter be immediately prepared for Bengal, communicating the Intelligence received from Poonah, and ſtating our own Situation, and the probable Views of the ſeveral Country Powers, in conſequence of the Succeſs obtained by the Marattas over the Bombay Army; alſo the Reſolution we have taken in Regard to the Expedition to Mahé.

Thomas Rumbold,
Eyre Coote,
John Whitehill.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 7th February 1779.

Diſpatched the following Letters.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council, Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Enclоſed we have the Honour of tranſmitting to you a Paper of Intelligence, received by the Nabob from his Agent at Poonah: Its Authority is too ſtrongly marked to leave any Doubt on our Minds concerning the Particulars; and as we have now only to hope that the Effects of ſo conſider-

able a Check in the Progreſs of the Company's Arms, may not create ſome Attempts to diſturb our Poſſeſſions on this Side India, or to fruſtrate the Expectations we had formed of putting a final and ſpeedy Period to the Power of the French.

The Subject indeed is of ſuch a Nature as to awaken all our Reflections; and we ſhall beg Leave here to ſtate to you briefly, what occurs to us from a Review of our Situation, with reſpect to the Powers around us, and a Conſideration of the probable Effects that may have been cauſed by the unfortunate Enterprize in Support of Ragonaut Row.

It will admit of no Doubt that Hyder Ally at preſent bears no favourable Inclination towards the Company; and that he is very ſtrongly in the Intereſts of the French. Had we not commenced the War in this Country with ſo great a Superiority, Hyder would moſt likely have appeared and taken an active Part againſt us in the Beginning; The Succeſs of our Arms againſt Pondicherry, probably determined him to perſevere in the Line of Neutrality he had adopted, and we had every Reaſon to think we might have purſued our Operations to the Point at which we aimed, without any Moleſtation whatever from him, had not the Misfortune of the Bombay Troops cauſed ſo material a Change in the Face of Affairs. Hyder now perceiving ſo glaring an Inſtance of Weakneſs and Diſgrace, may be encouraged openly to reſiſt our propoſed Attempt on Mahé, which he conſiders in ſome Sort as under his Protection.

With reſpect to the Nizam, his avowed Attachment to the Poonah Miniſters, and the Warmth with which he remonſtrated to your Board and to this Government, againſt the Deſigns which he underſtood had been formed in favour of Ragonaut Row, ſufficiently ſhew how he muſt have received the News of our Diſaſter, and how materially this Misfortune will contribute to ſtrengthen the Inclinations he will naturally have conceived to our Prejudice.

The Diſpoſitions of the Peſhwa and the Miniſters at Poonah, upon this Event, may be eaſily conceived: The Effects of their Reſentment may be ſuſpended for a Time, but we can never ſuppoſe they will reſt ſatisfied with the Advantages they have acquired, much leſs can we expect they will unite in Friendſhip, or in Meaſures with thoſe who have attempted ſuch dangerous Deſigns againſt them.

Thus by one ill-timed and unfortunate Enterprize, the Reputation of our Arms is ſullied, and the Friendſhip of the principal Indian States hazarded or loſt for ever, and that too at a Period when we are engaged in a War which calls for the Exertion of all our Force, and the Good-will of every State in Alliance with us.

In the Midſt of theſe unpleaſing Reflections, we feel no ſmall Degree of Satisfaction at the ſucceſsful Meaſures that have been purſued againſt the French; by removing them from our Neighbourhood, we are at Liberty to act with much greater Spirit and Security, and we yet too flatter ourſelves that it is within the Power of the Two Preſidencies of Bengal and Madras, by prudent and vigorous Meaſures, to repair the Miſchiefs that have been occaſioned by the Miſcarriage of the Bombay Troops, to wipe away the Diſcredit that has fallen on the Company's Arms; and to keep in Awe the Powers that may be diſpoſed to take Advantage of our ill Succeſs on that Side of India.

On the Receipt of the Intelligence from Poonah, it became a Queſtion with us, Whether it would be ſafe or prudent to purſue the Expedition we had ſet on Foot againſt Mahé? We ſaw the additional Riſque to which it was expoſed, and the Inconvenience of ſending ſuch a Body of Troops at this Time out of the Carnatic; but we perceived alſo the particular Advantages that would reſult from the ſucceſsful Execution of our Meaſures; we ſaw, that this was the only Opportunity that might offer for removing the diſadvantageous Impreſſions which have been occaſioned every where by our late Defeat: That the Appearance of Diffidence or Timidity on this Occaſion, would ſtrengthen and confirm thoſe Impreſſions, which have been occaſioned every where by our late Defeat, and probably operate more to our Prejudice than any Failure that could happen from the Proſecution of the Enterprize. And laſtly, that the withdrawing our Troops would be inevitably followed by the Capture of our Settlement at Tellicherry, which, though perhaps not important in itſelf, would, in the Eyes of the Country Powers, be conſidered as a Victory of no ſmall Conſequence to the French; and perhaps induce thoſe who are now wavering, to declare openly in their Favour. Upon the Whole, our Concluſion was, that the Expedition ſhould be proſecuted; and we came to that Reſolution accordingly.

We have ſome Hopes that Hyder Ally, who ſecretly favoured and wiſhed well to the Cauſe of Ragonaut Row, ſeeing the Danger to which he may be expoſed from the Reſentment of the Maratta State, will be glad to avail himſelf of our Support; and in that Caſe we may be able to detach him entirely from the Intereſts of the French, and render him a moſt uſeful Ally to us: Indeed we are ſo convinced of the good Policy of uniting cloſely with Hyder in a defenſive Alliance, that we ſhall embrace every Occaſion to effect it. We have lately appointed one of the Company's Servants to proceed to his Durbar, and have written to him for the neceſſary Supports, which we expect daily.

As our Northern Circars lie ſo open to Invaſion from the Dominions of Nizam Ally, and as there is but too much Reaſon to doubt the Sincerity of his Friendſhip for the Company, we think it highly expedient at this Juncture to have the beſt Intelligence of his Deſigns, and to be timely informed of any Motions he may make towards thoſe Provinces; for this Purpoſe, as well as to ſettle every Thing that may be neceſſary for obtaining the Guntoor Circar for the Company, and procuring the Diſmiſſion of the French Troops from the Service of Bazalet Jung, we have appointed one of the Company's Servants to proceed to the Court of Nizam Ally in Quality of Reſident; he will have Inſtructions to correſpond with your Board, and to communicate every Information you may require from that Quarter. The Northern Circars being too extenſive to be properly defended by the ordinary Force maintained there, and the Protection of the Carnatic and Tanjore requiring all the Troops that are ſtationed for their Security; we are apprehenſive, were any ſudden Attack made on our Poſſeſſions to the Northward at this Juncture, while we have ſo large a Detachment employed on the Expedition to Mahé, we might not be able to collect a ſufficient Force in Time to repel it. Conſidering the Value and Influence of thoſe Poſſeſſions to the Company, we think it our Duty to attend particularly to their Safety; and with that View we beg Leave to communicate a Thought which has occurred to us, and which may poſſibly be improved by you to ſome uſeful Purpoſe.

We underſtand that Colonel Goddard's Detachment, by the laſt Accounts, was ſituated near the Confines of the Berar Revenue; ſhould it be found neceſſary to withdraw that Detachment from the Object to which it was deſtined, we would propoſe to your Conſideration, whether it might not be an eligible Meaſure to march it towards the Coaſt of Orixa, ſomewhere about the Chicacole Circar: How far it might be practicable to direct its Progreſs through the Countries dependant on the Rajah of Berar, we cannot determine; but we are of Opinion, if that could be done without much Difficulty, the Plan may be deſerving of your Attention; the March of the Detachment by that Route would be the moſt effectual Means of checking any hoſtile Deſigns of the Soubah upon the Circars, or of repelling any actual Invaſion that may be attempted on our Poſſeſſions there; and we think it poſſible too that by marching your Troops towards the Coaſt, they might reach Bengal nearly as ſoon, if not ſooner, than by any other Route.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Tho'. Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
7th February 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 33.

Extracts of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 25. *From the Nabob.—Dated the 11th of February, 1779; received Ditto.*

I HAVE hitherto communicated to you every Intelligence which I thought of Importance, and now ſend you incloſed, Copy of a Paper of News I have received from the Balla Ghaut. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence from Hyder Ally's Camp; dated the 7th of Mohrem, or the 26th of January, 1779.

Intelligence was brought to Hyder Ally while he was beſieging the Fort of Chitteldurg, that the Engliſh were ſending Forces againſt Mahé, a French Factory, which is in his Country. Upon this, he immediately determined to make it up with the Zemindar of Chittledurg, and it was agreed between them, that the latter ſhould pay Hyder a yearly Peſhcuſh of Two Lacks of Rupees; the Brother of the Zemindar is to join Hyder's Army with a Body of Troops, and what Diſtricts have been taken from the Zemindar, are to be reſtored to him. Hyder Ally is raiſing freſh Forces, and is ſending People every where with Money for that Purpoſe. It is his firm Intention to make one Attack

againſt the Engliſh, whatever be the Conſequence. He has wrote to his Vakeel at Poonah, to ſettle a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Miniſters. It is ſaid that the Engliſh have been totally defeated by the Marattas, near Poonah. Five hundred Europeans and Three thouſand Sepoys have been killed, and the reſt of the Engliſh Army diſperſed, and Ragonaut Row made a Priſoner. Two Engliſh Gentlemen are at Poonah, endeavouring to make Terms with the Marattas.

N° 28. *From the Nabob.—Dated the 16th of February 1779; received the 17th Ditto.*

I conſider any Loſs of the Company as my own, and therefore think it my Duty to give you inſtant Advice and Intelligence from Hydrabad and Hyder Ally's Camp. I now beg Leave to encloſe you ſome Papers of News juſt arrived from Hydrabad. I have received Accounts that Hyder Ally Cawn has not agreed to the Terms which were to have taken Place between him and the Zemindar of Chitteldurg, by which the latter was to ſend his Brother with a Body of his Troops to join Hyder's Army: The Particulars of this Intelligence I now alſo encloſe you. Hyder Ally is now exerting all his Endeavours to reduce the Fort of Chitteldurg as ſpeedily as poſſible, and after he hath taken it, it is his firm Intention to aſſiſt the French, if the Engliſh Troops are ſent againſt Mahé, for he will not let that Place be taken by them. He will march Thirty thouſand Horſe into my Country and that of the Company, which he will lay waſte. He has repeatedly wrote to his Vakeel to this Effect, and enjoined him to make you and me acquainted with his Intention. The Vakeel has accordingly waited Twice upon me, and told me what his Maſter ordered him. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence from Hyder Ally's Camp, dated 10th Mobrem.

Hyder Ally Cawn had entered into Terms of Accommodation with the Zemindar of Chitteldurg, but they have diſagreed again, becauſe the Zemindar refuſes to ſend a Body of his Troops to join Hyder's Army. The Son of the Zemindar, Bermha, ſaid, that Life was but ſhort, and that he would give Hyder Ally more Trouble, but never would make Peace with him to aſſiſt him with Troops. There is a Tank cloſe to the Fort, and Hyder's Horſe are encamped under the Shelter of the Bank of this Tank. The Guns of the Fort are ſilenced. Hyder will not retreat, without taking the Place.

Ragonaut Row and the Miniſters of Poonah are reconciled, and they now meditate ſome Expedition, and to ſend away Sinde and Holkar with their Forces, but it is not yet known where they are intended for. Hyder Ally intends ſending up Part of his Army, under the Command of his Son, to the Borders of the Jung Buddura; and Meer, his Son-in-Law, is to be ſent towards Coripattam, and the Twelve Mahals. There are at preſent Two or Three French Gentlemen with Hyder Ally; they preſs him to give them his Aſſiſtance, and he has told them they ſhall have it, after he has taken Chitteldurgh. They are preparing to get Powder and all Manner of Ammunition and Stores ready in his Camp; and they are daily levying freſh Forces. He has ſent Orders to the different Forts near the Payen Ghaut, to have them well ſtored with Proviſions; and has ordered the Zemindars of Pungnour to join his Army with their reſpective Forces.

N° 29. *From the Nabob.—Dated 18th February 1779;—received 19th D°.*

I now ſend you encloſed a Letter from Maha Rajah Burbur, adviſing me of the Arrival of Hyder's Troops at a Place Twelve Coſs diſtant from Chingum, which is in the Carnatic, and that ſome more are expected. I have beſides received repeated Advices of the Arrival of Hyder's Horſe at Kiſhengurry and other Places on the Borders of my Country. If theſe Horſe are intended to invade this Country, as has been intimated to me in the Meſſage delivered by Hyder's Vakeel, the Situation of the Ryots will be a moſt deplorable one, for they will loſe all that they have. It is therefore adviſeable to collect all your Forces from the Circars and other Places in the Carnatic, and to form Encampments in one or two Places; for when the Alarm of the Enemy's Horſe is ſpread through the Country, it will be difficult to get Train Bullocks for the Artillery and Coolies; I ſhall not then be able to provide them: I am poſſeſſed of no Treaſures, and have no Bodies of Horſe. The Crop is in moſt Part of the Country fit to be cut; in others, where it is cut, it has not yet been converted into Money. I have not yet collected what I am to pay the Company. I am your Ally, and your Loſs is mine. May the Almighty avert the preſent Evil! What can I ſay more?

Copy

Copy of a Letter from Maha Rajah Burbur.

I have received a Letter from the Aumil at Chingum, acquainting me that he had received Intelligence that the Troops of Hyder Ally were arrived at the Village of Cenayettoor, Twelve Coss distant from Chingum [a Pass S. W. of Madras] and that they expected more Horse along with fresh Men: This has given great Alarm to all the Inhabitants of Chingum.

Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 18th February, 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President,
Sir Eyre Coote,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith.

Extract of Mr. Smith's Minute.

The Measure of appointing Persons to go to Hyder Ally and the Soubah, has already taken Place; and I agree with the President, that our having hitherto neglected it, has been a principal Error in our Politics. The good Policy of framing an Alliance with Hyder Ally, must be obvious to every one who reflects on the general Situation of the Company's Affairs, the relative Situation of Hyder and the Marattas, and the very particular Circumstances which mark the present Juncture. Hyder Ally being the only Barrier against the enormous Power of the Marattas, should always have been considered as our Natural Ally. The late War against him, which cost the Company so many Lacks, was a War against ourselves, not only as it almost ruined the Company's Affairs, but as it so strengthened the Hands of the Marattas, by weakening Hyder's, that he had nearly sunk under their Force, in the Contest between them which immediately succeeded the Peace of 1769. Had the Marattas entirely subdued him, the Conquest of the Carnatic would have been their next Object, at least it would always have been at their Mercy. If then an Alliance with Hyder be eligible at all Times, how much more so is it at this alarming Juncture, when there is Reason to apprehend, that without his Alliance we may be obliged to cope singly with the Marattas, joined by whatever Forces the French may bring into their Country? In Addition to these Circumstances, let it be considered, that Hyder has it in his Power to prevent our giving the last Blow to the French Power in India, by obliging us to desist from the Expedition now on Foot against Mahé; and that he has actually threatened to do it, which I consider as a Stroke of Policy, calculated to force us to seek his Alliance, or should we neglect to make him our Friend, to prevent our becoming more formidable to him as an Enemy. This is the only Interpretation I can put on his late Message, for I have too good an Opinion of him as a Politician, to suppose that he would take Part against us merely for the Sake of supporting a desperate Cause. He knows our Power, and that our Assistance would effectually secure him against that of the Marattas, which he has so severely felt. But I am sorry to observe, that Experience has perhaps rendered him cautious of trusting implicitly to any Assurances we may make him; and that being the Case, it is not at all wonderful that he should be averse to letting a Place fall into our Hands, which is situated in his Country; and while it continues with the French, is the same as if in his own Possession. But could we once remove the Doubts he entertains of our Sincerity, and convince him that we really mean to establish an Union and Alliance with him, I am persuaded, that instead of succouring Mahé, he would assist us in reducing it. These weighty Considerations should, I think, be decisive with us, for instructing the Person who is to go to Hyder Ally, to assure him, in unequivocal Terms, of our Desire to cultivate the most perfect good Understanding with him; of the Sincerity of this Assurance, as well as to strengthen and consolidate the Friendship subsisting between him and the Company, we are willing to enter into a fresh Treaty of Alliance with him, on such Terms as shall be for the mutual Advantage and Security of both Parties. The Instructions to the Resident might contain the Outlines of the Treaty, and such Terms as we should be willing to accede to. In the mean Time to facilitate the Negociation, and to shew Hyder we are determined to act with Vigour, and to support and persevere in the Measures we have taken, I would submit to the Committee, whether it might not be adviseable to cause a strong Detachment to be assembled at Vellore, under the Command of an active and experienced Officer, and encamped without the Walls, where it would occasion little additional Expence, except the Bullocks for the Guns, which should be procured and kept in Readiness, as it is very difficult to collect them at a short Warning. I shall only add, that our late Disgrace on the Malabar Coast, is an additional Argument for our immediately forming an Alliance with Hyder, and for our being prepared to act against him in case his Conduct make it necessary.

Charles Smith.

APPENDIX N° 33.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 22d February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President,
General Sir Eyre Coote,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith.

The President reports to the Committee, that Hyder Ally's Vakeel has formally acquainted him, that he had received Instructions from his Master to declare to this Government, that he, Hyder Ally, considers the Settlement of Mahé as bordering and dependent on his Country, and of Course as under his Protection, together with all the other European Settlements on the Malabar Coast; that he cannot therefore suffer Hostilities to be commenced against any of them; and if we persist in executing the Design we have formed against Mahé, it is his Intention to oppose it immediately, or by detaching a Body of Troops into the Carnatic.

The President lays before the Committee, Three Letters from the Nabob; by which it appears, that some of Hyder's Horse are arrived near the Borders of the Carnatic, and that more are daily expected.

The President proposes, that an Answer be wrote immediately to the Nabob, in consequence of his Letter; thanking him for the early Intimation he has given us of the Intelligence he has received, and to assure him, in case Hyder should attempt to enter the Carnatic, that we will take such Measures in consequence of his Recommendation, as we find proper and necessary for the Defence of his Highness's Dominions, and the Possessions of the Company; and that the first and most material Step to be considered, is a proper Supply of Treasure, and that we therefore most earnestly request his Highness will immediately fulfil the Engagements he entered into, and pay up the Balances due from him to the End of this Month: That it is with Concern we observe the Remonstrances his Highness is pleased to make in his Letter, that he is without Treasure and without Horse; that it appears the more extraordinary to us, when we consider the Length of Time that the Carnatic has remained in Tranquillity without any Interruption to the Collections; and that it is a general Complaint from the Creditors of his Highness, that they have not been able to obtain any Payments from him, notwithstanding his frequent Promises to them; that with respect to the Company's Demands, we are sorry to observe, that his Highness's Debt to them is Monthly accumulating, notwithstanding our repeated Representations to him, arising as well from our own Distress for paying our Military Establishment, as from the repeated Orders of the Company to insist on his Highness's punctual Compliance with his Engagements; that with respect to Horse, was his Highness to keep his Regiments compleat, and regularly paid, on the Footing we have so often recommended to him, that they would be excellent Troops, and of infinite Service in case of any Invasion of the Carnatic; but their being always in Arrears, is a further Proof how small are the Supplies of Cash that issue from his Highness's Treasury, and makes us at a Loss to account for the Expenditure of the Resources of the Carnatic.

call for Nabobs Balances

at a loss to account for his expenditure

Thomas Rumbold.

The Committee approve of what the President has proposed; and it is agreed to write a Letter to the Nabob accordingly.

The President requests the Gentlemen of the Committee will take into Consideration our present Situation, and the Intelligence we have received of a threatened Invasion of the Carnatic; and give their Opinions, whether it will not be prudent and proper to send Directions immediately to Colonel Braithwaite not to embark from Anjengo till further Orders, unless he should have received such Advices from Tellicherry as may remove every Idea of Hyder Alley's Design of supporting the French at Mahé, and that he has the greatest Probability of making an easy and speedy Conquest of that Place.

Thomas Rumbold.

The Committee agreeing in Opinion with the President, the following Letter is now written, approved, and ordered to be immediately dispatched.

APPENDIX, N° 33.

To Colonel John Braithwaite, commanding the Troops marching to Anjengo.

Sir,

I am directed by the Honourable the President and Select Committee, to desire you will not embark the Detachment at Anjengo till you receive their further Orders, unless you should have had received such Advices from Tellicherry as may remove every Idea of Hyder Ally's Design of supporting the French at Mahé, and that you have the greatest Probability of making an easy and speedy Conquest of that Place.

Extracts of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 25th February 1779.

Extract of a Letter from Major Maclellan at Tanjore, to the President and Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

The Reports of Hyder's having thrown Men into Mahé, are without Foundation. The Force said to be in Garrison there, consists of 150 Europeans, 250 disciplined Sepoys, and 30 Country Peons, belonging to the Caleftry Rajah; the Lower Fort appears strong towards the Sea Line, and Fort Saint George seems in good Order.

It is the general Opinion on the Malabar Coast, that Hyder is dead. The Governor's Renters, &c. have been ordered to settle their Accounts at Mangalore; however some People, who have dared to say that he was dead, have had their Tongues cut out.

The latest Accounts received at Tellicherry from Bombay, say, that the Army was surrounded above the Ghauts, and their Communication with the Sea cut off; 150 Europeans and 500 Sepoys, with Two Field Pieces, under the Command of Captain Eames, had marched to endeavour to join them.

To Colonel John Braithwaite.

Sir,

Although the Honourable the President and Select Committee, from the Anxiety they were under in consequence of repeated Intelligence received of the Designs of Hyder Ally, in Favour of the French, were induced to send you the Orders they did through me in a Letter dated the 22d Instant; yet from other Circumstances, which have since been communicated to them, and particularly from the Forwardness to which the Expedition is advanced, they are much inclined to proceed vigorously in the Execution of their Design, trusting that your Judgment and Discretion will supply the rest. They have directed me therefore to refer you again to their First Instructions, and to desire you will govern yourself as nearly as possible by them, attending particularly to the Necessity of executing the Enterprize with the greatest Dispatch, that they may have the Benefit of your Force early again for the Protection of the Carnatic, and the valuable Possessions of the Company on this Coast.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
Cha' Oakley,
Sec'.

Fort Saint George,
25th February 1779.

Extract from Fort Saint George Country Correspondence.

N° 33. *To the Nabob.*

May it please your Highness.

I have had the Honour to receive your Highness's several Letters of Intelligence relative to the Motions and Designs of Hyder Ally, and beg Leave to return you many Thanks for your early Communication of it. Should Hyder make any Attempt to enter the Carnatic, and disturb the Tranquillity of the Country, we shall certainly take every Precaution in our Power for its Security. The first and

most

most material Thing to be considered, is a proper Supply of Money for the Expences of our Army which may be obliged to take the Field. I am no less amazed than concerned to hear from your Highness, before even the Approach of Danger, and before you have lost a Grain of your Revenues, that you are totally without Resources for the Protection of your own Dominions, which have been Ten Years in a profound Peace; this is a discouraging Circumstance to the Company, who entertain so large a Force for the Defence of the Carnatic, trusting to your Engagements, and to the natural Resources of the Country for the necessary Funds both in Peace and in War. I am willing to believe your Highness's Declaration of Inability to supply Money or Troops to oppose the Incursions of an Enemy, proceeded hastily from the first Impressions caused by the Report of Hyder's Intentions, and not from a deliberate Review of your Situation: To suppose the Carnatic in so weak a State as your Highness represents by that Declaration, would be to reflect severely on your Government, and to judge you incapable of that prudent Foresight, which prompts every wise Prince to be on his Guard against the worst that can happen. By the Blessing of God the Company were never better able to protect you against your Enemies than they are at this Moment, provided you will only furnish that Assistance and Support to their Endeavours which the Resources of the Carnatic may and ought to afford for its own Protection. Having thus touched generally on the Subject of the Advices which you have transmitted me, I must request Permission to remind you again of your Engagements, and the Arrears into which you are fallen. Your Highness may well remember the large Balance due from you at the End of November, and what passed in consequence, when the Select Committee requested you to give them a Meeting. At that Meeting, as will appear by the enclosed Copy of the Proceedings, your Highness, after many Excuses for the repeated Failures that had happened in your Payments, promised in the most solemn Manner to send us the Sum of Three Lacks of Pagodas in the Month of January, exclusive of the Balance of Soucar Bills, which your Highness had given in Payment of former Kists, and which were not answered by the Soucars; instead of performing this Promise, your Highness paid in the Month of January little more than Two Lacks, besides the Balances of the Soucars Bills, so that the Demands on your Highness for Arrears are as great now as they were in November, though this be the Period for the Collections at which your Highness promised to make good all Deficiencies. What can be said in Answer to your Highness's Plea of Poverty and want of Resources, when at the most fruitful Season of the Year, and at the Period when you seemed not yourself to entertain a Doubt of your being able to satisfy all Demands, your Highness is yet as backward in your Payments as you were in the Month of November? If we observed any Money issued to your private Creditors, or any Thing extraordinary to your Troops, we might in some Measure account for the Deficiency; but knowing as we do, that your Creditors, new and old, have received nothing, or next to nothing, and that your Troops are all in Arrears, we are totally at a Loss to account for the Expenditure of the Revenues. Your Highness will be so good to excuse the Freedom of these Remarks, which arise naturally out of the Subject of the Company's Distress for Money, and the Causes to which it may be attributed. This is the End of February, nothing has been received from your Highness in the Course of the Month, and there is a large Balance due.

Soon after my Arrival here, I wrote repeatedly to your Highness for Accounts of the Provisions and Stores laid up in your different Garrisons, but never could obtain them. If the Carnatic be invaded, we shall without these Accounts be totally at a Loss how to take our Measures; with regard to your Troops, under proper Regulations they might be of essential Service, and I hope and request therefore that your Highness will see them regularly paid, and well appointed for Service. In their present Situation, there is great Reason to apprehend that Hyder, were he to enter the Carnatic, might be able to draw the Whole, or the greatest Part, to his Standard.

Fort Saint George,
25th. February 1779.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Letter to the Governor General and Council at Fort William.

We intended closing our Letter in this Place, but having received some important Intelligence relative to the Designs of Hyder Ally, we lose not a Moment in communicating it to you. The Vakeel of Hyder has formally acquainted the President, That his Master, considering the Settlement of Mahé, together with all the European Settlements on the Malabar Coast, as under his Protection, means, in case we are determined to proceed in the Expedition we have formed against it, to oppose our Troops directly, or by an Invasion of the Carnatic; and we have actually received Accounts from the Nabob, of which we enclose a Copy, advising that some Bodies of Hyder's Horse are arrived near the Borders of the Carnatic, and that more are expected daily.

The plain and explicit Declarations of the Vakeel, added to this Intelligence, leaving us in little Doubt respecting Hyder's Intentions, we have written to Colonel Braithwaite, who commands the

Expedition

xpedition to Mahé, to be particularly on his Guard; attending to all the cautionary Orders which e gave him in our original Instructions for the Expedition.

We cannot fay now (as we may yet be able to avert Hyder's threatned Invaſion of the Carnatic) it certainly an alarming Circumſtance, when we conſider our total Inability to prevent the Ravages Horſe, and that our Reſources for War will be inſtantly cut off by their Incurſions. In the preſt Situation of this Preſidency, we muſt endeavour, if poſſible, to avoid a Quarrel with Hyder; d we truſt, that by a proper Firmneſs with regard to the Expedition to Mahé, we ſhall not haſten it any Degree; we have therefore determined not to relinquiſh the Enterprize upon the mere Threats Hyder, though we have thought it expedient by our Inſtructions to guard Colonel Braithwaite ainſt the Riſque of a Defeat.

The Conduct of Hyder on this Occaſion is, however, ſuch as calls ſtrongly for Reſentment, parcularly when we conſider the late friendly Intercourſe that has been obſerved between him and this overnment; and could we entertain a reaſonable Hope of Support from the Carnatic, and of Funds ficient to carry on an active War againſt him, we ſhould certainly recommend the neceſſary Prerations for it.

So it is that we labour under Diſcouragements, which will not permit us to act with ſo much igour, and though it ſeem highly probable from our Situation, that we ſhall be obliged in the preſt War to ſuſtain the principal Efforts of our Enemies; and that the future Succeſs of the French this Coaſt may determine their Succeſs in every other Part of India; yet it is certain that we are no Means in a Condition with reſpect to Reſources, even to oppoſe any powerful Attempt, either the French or of Hyder Ally; we ſhall notwithſtanding exert ourſelves to the utmoſt of our bilities, truſting that the Difficulties of our Situation will plead our Excuſe for any Failures that ay happen.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Tho^s Rumbold,
&c. Council.

Fort Saint George;
25th February 1779.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 37. *From the Nabob.—Dated 28th February 1779; received 2d March D°.*

Hyder Ally Cawn's Vakeel acquaints me, that he has received a Letter from him, in which he ys, that when Governor Rumbold arrived here from Europe, he wrote to him in friendly Lanage; and now, in Contradiction to that, Mr. Rumbold was ſending Engliſh Troops againſt ahé; that he had received Intelligence that the Troops had actually marched, and that he [meaning mſelf] had ordered his Troops to march alſo; and he deſired his Vakeel, in the ſame Letter, to acaint the Governor and me of this: The Vakeel likewiſe told me, he had already informed you of it. now ſend you the Intelligence Papers I have received from the Nabob Nizam ud Dowla's Camp, lative to the Affairs at Poonah. You have alſo incloſed, Advices received from my Aumils in difrent Parts of the Country, from the Camp of Hyder Ally Cawn; all which mention his invading this ountry. All theſe Papers of Intelligence, which are Twelve in Number, I ſend you for your nformation. What can I ſay more?

Intelligence from Hyder's Camp, dated 25th Mohrem.

Hyder is ſtill at Chitteldurg; he had confined the Zemindar at that Place, and the Zemindar's rother had found Means to eſcape. Hyder on that Account returned to Chitteldurg, from Scra; d was greatly diſpleaſed with his Son, and ordered the Zemindar to be ſent to Seringapatam. ccordingly the Zemindar, and all his Dependants, chained Neck and Foot, were put in a hundred oolies, and ſent away to Seringapatam, with 500 Sepoys, under the Command of Mahomed Ally. yder will ſoon go back to Scra. He has ſent for Mukdoon from Bednor: It was his Intention to ve ſent the Forces of Corcalbunder with Mukdoon to Mahé; but he received in the mean hile, that Sunda Walla, a Zemindar, had come into his Country, and plundered ſome Villages: e has therefore ordered Muckdoon to go againſt the Zemindars. Hyder has ſent for the General luſter Reports of his Forces; it appears by it, that they conſiſt of 21,761 Horſe and 31,400 Foot; d Carnatic Peons about 60,000; of theſe laſt about 4,000 were killed before Chitteldurg. He w wants to complete the Number, and is ſending every where Money to enliſt Frenchmen. Hyer is determined to make War againſt the Engliſh, if they come to Mahé; and if they deſiſt, he will

will go againſt Sonda. The Zemindars of Mahé, and Couché, and Conleot, and other of the Malabar Country, have wrote to Hyder Ally, that they only will to keep in Terms with him, and have nothing to do with the Engliſh, whom they will not allow to paſs through the Country. Hyder has wrote to them in Anſwer, that he will give them his Protection.

Intelligence from Sera; dated 26th Mobrem.

Marargee Mana is come, by Orders from Hyder, with 2,000 Horſe, to Coveripatam; Sirnowar Row Berki is ſoon to join him with 8,000 Horſe; they are ordered to go afterwards to the Ghaut of Chingum, and to divide into Four Bodies; one is to remain there, another is to go towards Trichinopoly, the third towards Amboor, and march into the Carnatic, the other is to enter by the Ghaut of Chingum; they are ordered to lay waſte the Country, and Hyder himſelf will remain encamped in the Bala Ghaut. A Friend of mine in Hyder's Camp has given me this Intelligence. Three Frenchmen are in Hyder's Camp, and they do all in their Power to perſuade Hyder Ally to march into the Carnatic. Every thing that paſſes Madras, or at your Highneſs's Durbar, is known to Hyder; how he comes by this I know not.

Letter from the Aumil of Chingum, dated 18th Mobrem.

The Aumil of Tripatoor has received Orders from Hyder Ally to place Chokies in all the Ghauts where there are none; the Aumil accordingly came Yeſterday to Singarpetta, and ſtopped up the Ghauts with Hedges of them, and placed Guards every where. I hear that ſome Horſe are come to forage at Kiſthengurry. I have ſent a Man to bring me Intelligence, of which I ſhall advise your Highneſs when I receive it.

Letter from the Aumil of Caliſpach, &c. received 2d Suffer.

I hear that 1,000 Horſe are at Mottoor, in the Diſtrict of Tripatoor, near the Ghaut of Chingum. The Inhabitants thereabouts are greatly alarmed, and leaving daily their Habitations with their Effects. The People here have received the Alarm from them; all Intercourſe is ſtopped between the Country People here and thoſe of Chingum.

Letters from Amoar Ally Cawn, the Killedar of Vellour; dated 29th Mobrem.

I underſtand from Mahomed Behauder, the Naib Killedar of Muttipally, that Hyder's Horſe, which are ſtationed at Kiſthengarry, plunder the Country as far as Muttipally, and greatly diſtreſs the Inhabitants. The Aumil of Mourotgand has wrote me of the Arrival of Hyder's Horſe at Trippatoor, and that the Inhabitants of Chingum are much alarmed, and bringing their Cattle and Effects to the Mills and Woods thereabouts; and he deſires me to ſend a Company of Sepoys to him, to prevent that Place from the Ravages of the Horſe.

APPENDIX, N° 34.

Extract from Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 36. *From the Nabob.—Dated 23d February 1779; received 28th D°.*

I HAVE lived in ſtrict Friendſhip and Alliance with the Company and Engliſh Nation near Forty Years, during which Time I have ſpent the beſt Part of my Life, and all my Treaſures, in reducing their Enemies. When thoſe Enemies were ſuperior to them in Force by Ten to One, I have in

every Reſpect continued the unalterable and firm Friend of the Engliſh, and conſidered their Loſs my own. When the King and the Princes of this Country ſaw the Rectitude which the Engliſh obſerved in all their Dealings, and their Attachment and Sincerity, they deſired to make Friendſhip with them, through my Mediation, and to have their Protection. I have repeatedly given Aſſurances of this to former Governors, and we have had frequent Opportunities of trying who were our Friends and Foes, and of ſettling our Affairs in Indoſtan in ſuch a Manner, that we ſhould have no Fear of having our Tranquillity afterwards diſturbed. In all the Letters which I wrote after the firſt Reduction of Pondicherry, to Meſſrs. Pigot, Palk, Bourchier, Dupré, and Winch, to which I refer, I never omitted the leaſt Circumſtance, tending to ſhew the rooted Enmity which Hyder Ally entertained againſt us, and his Attachment to the French. What greater Proof could there be of his Enmity to us, where he had no Power, than his adviſing the Zemindar of Tanjore to break with us, and not remit me the Peſhcuſh due to me? In my Letter to Governor Pigot, of the 13th Auguſt 1762, I forwarded to him the Original of a Letter, under Hyder Ally's own Seal, to the Zemindar of Tanjore, adviſing him not to pay me the Peſhcuſh, and that he would aſſiſt him with Ten thouſand Horſe. The Copy of that Letter is upon Record. I have taken every Opportunity to ſhew the Propriety of leſſening the Power of Hyder Ally Cawn, and agreed to give every Aſſiſtance my Circar could afford, in Money, Troops, and Proviſions, for the Army. Beſides this, I engaged to bring 70,000 Maratta Horſe, and 50,000 Foot, to join us. Some truſty Perſons, on the Part of the Marattas, were here with the Governor and Council and me for Seven Years together, and intreated us to give them our Aſſiſtance, making us the moſt ſolemn Aſſurances of Friendſhip, and agreeing to give us up ſome Countries on this Side the Ghauts, which belong of Right to the Carnatic; and the ſecuring thoſe Ghauts had been recommended ſtrongly to me by the Company in their Letter of the 4th March 1767, and by Governor Pigot in his Letter of the 8th November 1763: The Marattas alſo agreed to give the Company the Privilege of the Sandal Wood and Pepper Trade in the Bednoor Country, in the Manner they wiſhed for. But my Friends were deceived by the plauſible Language and Appearance of Friendſhip uſed by Hyder Ally Cawn, and ſuppoſed him their Friend, and were not acquainted with his inward Hatred to them; ſo that we loſt the fair Opportunities which had offered to us when Hyder Ally marched againſt Morarrow, with an Intention to reduce him (although he was expreſsly included in the Treaty made with Hyder Ally Cawn.) Morarrow wrote us in the moſt intreating Terms, that he was the Friend of the Company, and was included in the Treaty between them and Hyder Ally, and begged us to give him our Aſſiſtance, or at leaſt to write to Hyder Ally Cawn to deſiſt from his hoſtile Deſigns againſt him: I myſelf gave Lord Pigot the Paper of Intelligence received from Goully at that Time, and talked to him a great deal upon that Subject, but it had no Effect. Had not Morarrow been reduced, he would at this Time have given us his friendly Aſſiſtance. Hyder Ally is ſince much increaſed in Power, Riches, and Dominions: War is commenced in Europe between the French and Engliſh; he is certain that French Troops will very ſoon arrive here, and he will give them every Aſſiſtance he can, by ſupplying them with Money, and every Thing elſe. His Vakeel brought us a Meſſage agreeable to the Orders received from him; what greater Declaration of his Enmity to us can there be than this? If you will be kind enough to peruſe the Copies of my Letters from the Beginning of Mr. Pigot's Government to the End of Mr. Wynch's, and thoſe which I wrote to the Company, you will do me the Juſtice to acknowledge, that I wrote what was juſt and true; and that the Diſpoſition ſhewn by Hyder Ally is very little different from what I repreſented it would be in thoſe Letters. How am I to relate every Circumſtance that has happened in the Courſe of Thirty-two Years? I took every Opportunity to write to my Friends on this Subject, on the ſhorteſt Terms, and the Company's Records and mine are full of it. When Hyder Ally had only 5,000 Horſe, and the Rajah of Myſore was in full Poſſeſſion of his Dominions, and the Marattas had worſted Hyder, ſo as to oblige him to fly to Bungalore, notwithſtanding the Marattas had 16,000 Horſe in the Serra Country, Hyder ſent ſome of his Horſe with Muckdoom Naik to the Aſſiſtance of Pondicherry, and plundered the Carnatic, without minding the Power of the Engliſh, and the Forces under Admiral Stevens and Corniſh: Pondicherry was taken by the Means of the gallant Conduct of General Coote, and the Aſſiſtance I offered in ſupplying the Army with Proviſions; but Hyder neglected nothing to prevent its Fall; ſince that Time he has ever diſplayed his rooted Enmity to us: It is not therefore aſtoniſhing that he ſhould, at this Time, when he is a hundred Times more powerful and rich than he was then, avail himſelf of the Opportunity, when his Enemies the Marattas are engaged on the Bombay Side, to give his Aſſiſtance to the French at Mahé. Had he not been taken up at Chitteldurg, there is no Doubt but he could have ſent Forces to the Relief of Pondicherry. If the Engliſh Troops go againſt Mahé, he will act up to the Meſſage ſent us, by deſtroying my Country, and that belonging to the Company; he has ſent for Troops from the Mauritius, which he will employ in his Service. My preſent Situation is ſuch, that I cannot bear any freſh Troubles or Misfortunes: I underſtand from the public Accounts, that the Engliſh Troops are returned to Bombay, without executing the Purpoſe which they intended; and the Peace of the Marattas is broke. The Officers of the Engliſh Troops have done wiſely in returning to Bombay, for there were but a few Troops left in that Place; had any Misfortune happened to the Army, it would have been attended with great Danger. It is not neceſſary that the Governor and Council of Bombay give up Salſette, and the other Places. The Bengal Troops are on the Borders of the Nirbddas; I know not what may happen to them, or how long the War may laſt with the Marattas. There is no Money

in the Company's Treaſury here. The Crop is ready to be cut and ſold; but it will take Three or Four Months to collect the Revenues of this Seaſon. The Expence of our Troops muſt be defrayed. If (God forbid!) any Trouble ſhould happen in the Country, we ſhall have the greateſt Difficulties to encounter, and all our Reſources will be ſtopped. When you ſee how earneſtly I adviſed in my Letters to former Governors, to make War againſt Hyder, and to leſſen his Power, you will find plainly that in ſo doing, I had no other View than the Good of my Country, as well as that of the Company, and the Happineſs of my People. At that Time I inſiſted that Peace ſhould be made with Hyder, after having brought him low, that there might be no Danger in future of his raiſing freſh Troubles. My Country had been laid waſte by him, and there was no Occaſion to make Peace with him on diſgraceful Terms. What I have now wrote you is merely to preſerve Peace in the Country. Some, from intereſted Motives, have given out, that I am prompt to this by my Hatred to Hyder Ally, and a Deſign againſt his Country. I have no Intereſt in Alliance or War with Hyder Ally or the Marattas; and my only Conſideration is the Good of the Company, and the Preſervation of my Country. As I am better acquainted than others with the Situation of Affairs in this Country, I now tell you plainly, that although it may be very proper to take Mahé, it is adviſeable, at this Time, to defer it to another Opportunity, and anſwer the Meſſage delivered by the Vakeel, in ſmooth Language; and to write to Hyder Ally, that as there ſubſiſted a Treaty of Friendſhip between him and you, you did not imagine that there was any Difference between you; that the one's Enemy was the Enemy of the other; that the Maratta Troops, which had often entered into his Country with hoſtile Views, had often demanded your Aſſiſtance; which, out of Regard for the Friendſhip you entertained for him, you had refuſed; and that Marattas diſpleaſed with this, had plundered the Carnatic: That yet you had not forſaken your Friendſhip for him; and, agreeable to the Treaty with him, you had ſent your Troops againſt them; that you had ſince received his Meſſage by his Vakeel, by which you underſtand that it was contrary to his Wiſh, and that it might be the Source of a Miſunderſtanding between him and you; that this had greatly ſurpriſed you, becauſe that you had conſidered the Puniſhment of your Enemies would have been pleaſing to him, and that it was but Friendſhip to do ſo; you may write to him, that it was (God forbid) your Intention to Circar; but that ſince his Vakeel had delivered ſuch a Meſſage, and that you had a great Conſideration for his Friendſhip, you would leave the Puniſhment of your Enemies to himſelf.

By this Hyder Ally Cawn may be induced to deſiſt from the hoſtile Intentions he entertains. If you ſhould think of taking Mahé juſt now, it is only bringing a War into the Carnatic and the Circars. If you mean that the French ſhould not have a Settlement on the Sea Coaſt, when Hyder is diſpoſed to ſerve them, and be our Enemy, he has many Places in his Country that he can give them. You ſhould avail yourſelf of the preſent Opportunity, and collect, as ſoon as poſſible, what Money you can from Tanjore and the Circars, to provide for your future Expences. Any Troops which may be ſent to your Aſſiſtance by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, may with Eaſe be ſent into the Northern Circars; and the Troops there and the Carnatic may be diſpoſed of properly; before that Time we may expect the Regiments from Europe, which muſt be kept here. Peace muſt be made with the Marattas; and we ſhall have their Horſe, and thoſe of the other Sardars, with whom I am in Friendſhip, to join us, and Mahé may then be taken, and Hyder Ally will be afraid of us. In my Letter of the 3d December laſt, mentioned to you the Propoſal made by the People of Poonah; had my Friends acted conformable to my Advice, perhaps Affairs would not have been in the Situation they now are in. Even now, although much Time has been loſt, if my Friends will declare their Intention, I may be able to carry on a friendly Negociation with the Marattas, and try again what I can do.

My Reaſon for troubling you with this long Letter, ariſes from a Conſideration of the Duty I owe to my Subjects, and the Regard I have for my Friendſhip for the Company, and the Succeſs of their Trade, and the Neceſſity of a Peace in the Carnatic and Circars; and I have not ſpared any Thing in offering my Advice. I have juſt received Intelligence, that Hyder Ally intends to go againſt Cuddupah and Kennoul; the Phouſdars of both theſe Places are not in a Condition to reſiſt him; it is therefore, without Doubt, that he will reduce them very ſoon. Cuddupah is an Appendage of the Carnatic; and if he takes it, the Communication with the Northward will be ſtopped by him, in the ſame Manner as it is to the Weſtward, where I cannot ſend a ſingle Morcerror with Diſpatches, without being ſtopped. In this Caſe the Carnatic is as if it was blockaded. Hyder Ally only does this to diſtreſs me as much as poſſible. What other Proof can be wanted of his Enmity, than reducing to his Obedience all thoſe whom he thinks are my Friends, and declaring that he will aſſiſt the French, who are the Enemies I fear, and that he will join them to invade the Carnatic? What ſhall I ſay more?

APPENDIX, N° 34.

Letters referred to by the Nabob, in the foregoing Letter.

To Governor Pigot, dated 2d September 1760, 14th June 1761, 8th March 1761, 1st January 1762, 27th July 1762, 13th Auguſt 1762, 2d April 1763.
To Governor Palk, dated 19th March 1764, 5th April 1764.
To Meſſrs. Smith, Call, and Makay, 10th October 1767, 30th September 1768.
To Governor Bourchier, 28th January 1769, 4th February 1769, 15th March 1769, 20th March 1769.
To Governor Dupré, 7th June 1770, 17th Auguſt 1770, 25th November 1770, 24th March 1771, 7th April 1771, 19th July 1771, 5th December 1771.
To Governor Wynch, 31ſt January 1775, 2d June 1775, 4th December 1775.
To Governor Rumbold, 3d December 1778.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 40. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 1ſt March 1779; received 5th Ditto.*

You repeated lately your Requeſt, that I would write to Iſwahi Modoo Row, the Pundit Purdhaun, and other Miniſters at Poonah, to eſtabliſh a Treaty of Friendſhip between them and the Company. It is ever my ſincereſt Deſire, that the Princes of Indoſtan and the Decan, ſhould be friendly connected with the Engliſh Nation and the Company, and that I ſhould be the Means of ſecuring and eſtabliſhing Friendſhip between them; and that an Alliance with the Marattas may through my Endeavours prove agreeable to the Engliſh Nation: Out of the above Conſiderations, I now beg Leave to encloſe Drafts of Letters, which I propoſe writing to Iſwahi Madoo Row, the Pundit Perdhaun, Inkkaram Pundit, one of the Miniſters of Poonah, and to Madoorow Sadaſhair, a Man of Diſtinction, who was formerly a long Time here, in order to ſettle a Treaty of Friendſhip and Alliance between us and the Marattas, and who lately, when Colonel Upton made the Treaty of Peace, was the Means of forwarding it.

I beg you will be kind enough to inform me, whether you approve of theſe Letters, that I may immediately diſpatch Kiſhenrow, a Man of Truſt, with them, who will exert his Endeavours to bring about renewing the Treaty which was made with Colonel Upton. When the Marratas commence Hoſtilities againſt Hyder Ally Cawn, the Engliſh Forces will join them, and aſſiſt in diſpoſſeſſing Hyder of his Country; and if Hyder come againſt us, the Marattas will engage to join us. If my Friends will determine to do this, the Power of our Enemy may with great Eaſe be reduced through the Aſſiſtance of the Marattas, and even may expect great Advantages from it. If you ſhould not approve of it, I beg you will ſpeedily communicate your Sentiments upon it to me, that I may not remain in a State of Doubt or Suſpence. What ſhall I ſay more?

N° 78. *To the Nabob.—Dated 21ſt May 1779.*

I have received your Highneſs's ſeveral Letters, acquainting me with the Motions of Hyder Ally, the Particulars of his Conqueſts in the Cuddapah Country, his Intentions againſt Kinnoul, Adoni, and Raychoor, and lately his Determination to invade the Circars and the Carnatic; from all which you infer the abſolute Neceſſity of reducing him before he ſhall have gained more Strength; and recommended, that Alliances be formed with the Soubah and the Marattas for that Purpoſe. I am obliged to your Highneſs for the Intelligence you have ſent me from Time to Time, relative to the Motions and Deſigns of Hyder; and I am confident the Means you recommend for oppoſing them, are ſuggeſted no leſs by your Regard for the Welfare of the Company, than by your anxious Deſire to ſubdue a Power which is become ſo formidable to the Carnatic: Although, from the Intelligence which has come in to us, we had great Reaſon to expect an immediate Invaſion from Hyder; yet I have now the Pleaſure to acquaint your Highneſs, that Hyder has ſuddenly retired from the Cuddapah Country, and is marching towards Seringapatam. The Cauſe of his Departure, it is ſaid, proceeds from the Approach of a large Body of Marattas towards his Country, though poſſibly it may have been occaſioned

sioned by the Disturbances on the Malabar Coast, where the Rajahs tributary to Hyder have taken up Arms, and besieged his Fort at Callicut.

Thus, for the present, the threatened Danger is removed, without having Recourse to the Alliances proposed by your Highness; but as the late Proceedings of Hyder, both towards the Company and your Highness, may possibly lead to a War with him, I think it highly necessary that we should know beforehand what Resources we can depend on for conducting it; and here I can have no Doubt, from the earnest Manner in which your Highness has been pleased to recommend to us to unite with the Soubah and the Marattas in a general Attack on Hyder, even before he has invaded us; that you have well weighed the Extent of such an Undertaking, and considered the vast Sums that will be required to execute it. I may therefore with Confidence request your Highness will inform me, what Provision you have made, and whether we can depend on you for the extraordinary Supplies that will be required on this Occasion.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 12th March 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the President, &c. of Fort Saint George, to the Governor General and Council of Bengal.

We send enclosed for your Information a Copy of a Letter received a few Days ago from Hyder Ally.

N° 42. *From the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn to the Governor.—Dated 29th Mohsem, 17th February; received 7th March, 1779.*

I have had the Pleasure to receive your Letters, the Contents of which I understood. I see what you write concerning your Intention against the French Factory of Mahé. In my Country there are Factories belonging to the English, Dutch, Portuguese, Danes, and French, and besides them, there are many Merchants here, who are considered as my Subjects; if any one entertains Designs against these Traders, I will, without Doubt, take the best and most considerate Methods to give them Assistance; if you are not already acquainted with this, you may inform yourself of those who have been Members of your Council. What shall I say more?

will not suffer the factories to be attacked.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correspondence.

N° 59. *From Hyder Ally Cawn, to the Governor.—Dated the 30th Suffer, or 19th March 1779; received the 7th April D°.*

The Gentlemen of your Council have no Doubt given you an Account of the former War, and the Treaties agreed to on both Sides.

As the Frontiers of both our Countries join, it is proper in case of a Peace or good Understanding between us, that there should be no Encroachments or Violence used on either Side; yet your Killadars and Talookdars, not conducting themselves as was fit, have raised Troubles, and behaved like Thieves in the Country on this Side of my Frontier. In order to put a Stop to these Mal-practices, I wrote at different Times to my Vakeel, to represent this to Sujah ul Dowlah (the Nabob) and you and the Council; which my Vakeel accordingly did, and made you acquainted with it; but nothing has yet been done, and the Outrages committed by your People, still continue. The Cattle belonging to the Inhabitants of my Country is carried away, and many Villages have suffered by these Depredations. Out of Consideration for my Friendship for the King of England and the Gentlemen of the Council, I took no Steps to retaliate the Injury. Now you have set on Foot an Expedition against Mahé. There are many Factories in my Country, belonging to the Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Danes, who trade in my Country on the footing of Subjects; none of those possess Forts or Countries which should give Cause to any other to attack them, and if any one should attack them, it will be proper for me to give Assistance to those whom I consider my Subjects. You and the Gentlemen of Council are acquainted with this, and at any Rate will act as you think proper. What shall I say more?

APPENDIX, N° 34.

N° 62. *To Hyder Ally.—Dated the 19th of April 1779.*

I have received Two Letters from you, dated the 17th of February and 19th of March; both on the Subject of the Expedition we have formed againſt the French Settlement at Mahé: Your Vakeel has alſo acquainted me with your Sentiments and Intention on that Head.

Conſidering the Treaty of Friendſhip ſo long eſtabliſhed between the Company and your Government, and the Aſſurances that have been ſo often given by you of your Determination to cultivate and improve the Connection by every Means in your Power, I could not but imagine, that it would prove agreeable to you to hear of the Succeſs of our Arms againſt the French, and that you would be pleaſed with our proſecuting it, by an Attempt againſt Mahé, the only Settlement that remained with them after the Reduction of Pondicherry. Under theſe Circumſtances, I leave you to judge of the Surprize I felt on peruſing your Letters, and on hearing the Meſſage delivered by your Vakeel, in which you declare, that you conſider the French Settlement at Mahé as under your Protection, and that it is your Intention to oppoſe any Attempt we might make upon it, to the utmoſt of your Power. Is it the Part of Friendſhip to aſſiſt and ſupport the Enemies of your Friends? Surely not. Relying upon the Treaty concluded between us, I did ſuppoſe, if you thought it neceſſary to interfere in our Quarrel with the French, that you would take Part with us, and not againſt us. I am not fully acquainted with the Nature of your Claims on the Country in which Mahé is ſituated; but I never underſtood them to be ſuch as could juſtly authorize any Interference in Diſputes between European States which have Settlements there, or in its Neighbourhood.

In regard to what you write in your Letter, concerning ſome Irregularities committed in your Country by the Nabob's People ſituated near its Borders; I never heard before of any Complaints of this Nature, otherwiſe I ſhould have examined into them, and given you all reaſonable Satisfaction, ſince, if any Irregularities were committed, the People who were guilty of them ſhould have been puniſhed.

It has been the conſtant Aim of my Government to promote a good Underſtanding with you, from a full Conviction that it is for the mutual Intereſt of the Company and your Circar, that the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between us ſhould be perpetual; but if you perſevere in the Conduct you have obſerved of late, I do not ſee how it can be much longer maintained. By the Bleſſing of God, the Company and their Allies are ſufficiently powerful to avenge every Kind of Injury that is offered to them; at the ſame Time, it is their Wiſh and Deſire to be on Terms of Friendſhip with all the States of India; and upon this Principle they will carefully avoid being the Aggreſſors in any Quarrel; but once provoked into Hoſtilities, they will not fail to exert all their Strength to puniſh the Offender; and, with Juſtice on their Side, they entertain not a Doubt of Succeſs.

If I am diſpoſed to complain, you have furniſhed me with ample Grounds in the Reduction of Morarow Row, who was included in the Treaty made with you in 1769, as a Friend and Ally of the Carnatic; and by your Proceedings againſt the Zemindars of Cuddapah and Cannoul; with reſpect to Bazalet Jung, againſt whom I hear alſo you have ſome Deſigns, I muſt inform you that the Company have entered into Engagements of Friendſhip and Alliance with him, and having promiſed to aſſiſt him in the Defence of his Country, I hope your will lay aſide your Intentions, if you have formed any againſt him.

May your Health and Happineſs always increaſe! What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX, N° 35.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations; the 2d April 1779.

WE have particular Satisfaction in acquainting you that Mahé, with all its Dependencies, surrendered to Colonel Braithwaite the 19th ult. Colonel Braithwaite dispatched the Advice to us as soon as the Governor of Mahé had acceded to his Terms, which are in general, that the French shall be Prisoners of War, to be transported to Bombay, from thence to France or England, as the President and Select Committee may deem expedient, and the Fortifications, public Buildings, &c. are to be disposed of as the Company shall think proper; Colonel Braithwaite was in consequence preparing vigorously to destroy the Fort by Mines; and he tells us that the greatest Part of our Force will be with us again in about Three Weeks, from the Date of this Letter, 19th March. As soon as we receive the Articles of Capitulation, we shall send you a Copy of them.

The Success of this Expedition has indeed exceeded our warmest Expectations, and cannot fail at this Juncture of being attended with important Advantages; we beg Leave to congratulate with you on the Occasion.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient
humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
2d April 1779.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 5th April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Tho' Rumbold, Esq; President,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

The following Letter from Colonel Braithwaite, dated 19th, was received on the 31st ult.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to acquaint you, that I arrived here on the 14th Instant. I found Major Kelly had occupied and fortified Two Hills in our Bounds advancing towards Mahé, and had that Morning advanced Four Companies of Grenadier Sepoys into the French Bounds. I went to the advanced Posts that Evening, and determined upon one farther advanced. The 15th I determined on a Spot for a Battery to reduce the Fort Couretry, a new Work, formed by the scraping, only accessible either as to the lower or upper Fort but by Rope Ladders, which were very long, and which the Enemy drew up after them. To reduce this Part was absolutely necessary, as it secured my Rear, as I should advance further, and kept open my Communication by Sea with Tellicherry. Having determined to begin my Battery that Night, I wrote to Monsieur Picott, the Governor of Mahé, summoning him to surrender; to which he answered, that he would defend the Place as long as he could. The Alacrity with which our People worked was great, and the whole Country was astonished at their working, in Day-light, within Five hundred Yards of the Enemy's Guns.

The French fired a few Shot from Courchy, Fort Saint George, and Chimbana, but without Effect, and I found their black Allies began to make Overtures to come over to me. Our Battery would have opened with Four Eighteen Pounders as To-morrow, but Monsr. Picot sent out Propositions to surrender. I own I was astonished, for we have not fired even a Musket Shot, and the Hills yet between us were such that I thought it an Herculean Labour even to get the Guns to it unexposed. I did not chuse to accept the Terms, but dictated others, which he must sign by Four o'Clock, or abide the Consequences, as I was determined after that Time to receive no Propositions: And the first of mine was, that Courchy should be immediately surrendered, and our Colours hoisted as a Signal to me that every Thing else was accorded to. All this was done, and Captain M'Leod, with his Sepoy Grenadiers, took Possession of it about Two o'Clock, and before Four the Articles came back, by which I shall To-morrow Morning be put in Possession of Fort George and Chimbara, very high and strong Situations commanding Mahé and the Approaches to it; and To-morrow Evening I shall receive the Forts Dauphiné and Conde, with all their Dependencies. Monsr. Picot had done every

every Thing that Man could do; and had they had Men, Money, Ammunition, and Proviſions, I ſhould have deemed the Place impregnable, it conſiſting of a Number of Forts, upon almoſt inacceſſible Heights, ſtrongly fortified in themſelves, and protecting each other; fortunately for us, I believe they wanted all theſe Things: I have not now Time, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, to ſend you Particulars; the French and Priſoners of War to be tranſported to Bombay, from thence to England or France, as the Governor and Select Committee ſhall think proper: If they go to England, they are not to carry any Merchandize or Effects which may be contraband, or anywiſe interfere with the Honourable Company's Trade. The Fortifications, public Buildings, &c. are to be diſpoſed of as the Engliſh East India Company may think proper. I ſhall as ſoon as poſſible diſpatch to you my Aid de Camp, Mr. Bate, with the Colours, Capitulation, &c. I am already preparing to return to you directly to Madras Two Companies and Two Battalions, except the Grenadiers; I ſhall find it abſolutely neceſſary, from the State of the Country, and the Reports of Hyder's Troops coming, to keep One Company of Artillery, One of Infantry, One Battalion of Sepoys, with the Grenadiers of the other Two Battalions; this will make me ſtrong, and not weaken you very much; the Troops I ſend will be with you I hope in Three Weeks from this Day; in the Interim I will go on vigorouſly in Preparations to deſtroy the Fort by Mines. I beg your Excuſe for this haſty Scrawl;

And am, with Reſpect,

Your faithful Servant,

Moylen, 19 March 1779. John Braithwaite.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 22d April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Tho' Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letters from Colonel Braithwaite:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to addreſs to you an haſty Letter written on the 19th Inſtant, informing you of the Surrender of Fort Mahé and its Dependencies, in conſequence of which I now diſpatch to you Lieutenant Bate, my Aid de Camp (whom I ſhould think it a great Indulgence to have returned if I remain) with the Colours and Capitulation; a Copy of which I have ſent to the Honourable the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay. I never was more aſtoniſhed than when I received the Propoſals for the Surrender of the Place; Monſieur Picot had but Two Days before declared, in Anſwer to my Summons, that he would defend the Flag of his King as long as he could. We had not as yet fired a ſingle Shot, not even from a Muſket, and the French only about Forty, without any Effect. It is true we had almoſt completed a Battery of Four Eighteen Pounders againſt the Fortreſs of Courchy, which was garriſoned by One French Officer, Three Artillery, and Fifty of what they call Hyder's Sepoys; it conſiſted of an Hill projecting to the Sea, which was cut into Two Sort of Batteries, one above another, neither of which were acceſſible by Rope Ladders; even the loweſt was a great Height, and they were perfectly ſteep or ſcarped away, and the upper one was prepared with Hand Grenades, Carcapes, &c. to be thrown upon the loweſt, if carried; between our Camp and Courchy was a Jungly Country, interſected with a Salt Scouler, and the Ground marſhy, except on the Height, and between Courchy and Mahé high Hills, which hid one from the other; all this Country was committed to the Courchy Nair, who had about Nine hundred Men. I found Means to bring him over to our Intereſt. His Attachment to the French had made him very poor, they having been obliged to levy Contributions on all their old Friends. I believe Monſieur Picot muſt have diſcovered my Intercourſe with this Man, and what might follow was ſuſpected, I ſuppoſe, but could not in his Situation be remedied or reſented. The People of this Country pay implicit Obedience to their little Chiefs. I threatened on one Hand, and addreſſed his Poverty on the other, and he gave us no Moleſtation, though our People worked cloſe up to the Nair's; he retired as we advanced. Monſieur Picot could not but ſee that he was betrayed on this Side, and had Reaſon to ſuppoſe he ſoon would on all Sides, as all the Nairs or little Lords of this Country are in Arms to ſhake off Hyder's Government, and joining each other daily begin to form Armies thereabout; Mahé might be expected ſoon to join with their Brethren, and to betray the French, who are here conſidered as Hyder's Friends. The Nairs about Calicut are beſieging it, and Hyder's Governor is under great Apprehenſions, as they grow more numerous daily. A Day or Two ago the

Honourable Company's Resident there, Mr. Freeman, was ordered to quit it at a very short Notice, and was obliged to come away in an open Boat. I believe the same is threatened at Onore; and a Black Servant of Mr. Church, who was sent to Mangalore to buy Rice, has been whipped and confined. They rumour here that Hyder's Forces are coming this Way; some are coming I know, with Two Guns, and I believe by their Numbers they are only meant for the Relief of Callicut; this State of the Country has induced me, though it does not come within the Letter of your Instructions, to keep some Europeans in Mahé, agreeable to the Opinion of Mr. Church; whether the Honourable Company shall determine to stand neuter, or to take a Side, is not so much the Thing as to take Care that neither Party, in this Time of Warfare, may be able to possess themselves of any of these strong Holds; indeed it is become as much a Matter of Necessity as Resolve, as I find great Difficulty in procuring Shipping for those I mean to send round. The Troops which I have fixed upon to stay here, till I receive your Orders, are, Captain Noodler's Company of Artillery, One Company of European Infantry as they stand, Captain Maishead's Battalion of Sepoys, and the Grenadier Companies belonging to Captain Fraser and Captain Walker's. This, with the small Force at Tellicherry, will enable you and Gentlemen at Bombay, to pursue any Plan which you may resolve on. I shall push on the Business of mining Mahé, and shall be ready to destroy it, or deliver it over to the Orders of Bombay, as you shall determine. You have a Wish, that it should be destroyed as soon as taken: It is not possible to do it, with fewer People than I keep, without working a very tedious Operation; nor could it be done at any Rate, before I can hear from you in Answer to this, although the People work constantly. I ought to add to those above-mentioned to stay here, Mr. Brook the Engineer, Two Pioneer Officers, and One hundred Lascars; and I beg Leave to be indulged with Lieutenant Cotton, as Brigade Major in the Field, or Town Major in the Place, as Circumstances may happen, and Ensign Samson as Quarter-Master; and that you will allow Mr. Thewles to act as my Secretary, as he draws no Pay for it. I request it also as a particular Favour, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, that if you think it improper that I should remain here, as under your Orders only, that you would recall me to the Coast. I am sensible that, acting under the Bombay Presidency, from my Rank, and the State of their Officers, I should be the senior Officer on the Establishment; but having considered that Matter well, and knowing how much I have suffered in my Health by going to the Northward, I am apprehensive that I should be miserable to myself all the colder Months, and useless to my Employers, from an asthmatic Complaint which constantly oppresses me in certain Latitudes and Situations, but never affects me in others. I hope therefore, that if you destroy Mahé, or remove the commanding Officers here from under your immediate and only Command, that either being done, I may be removed back to the Coast, and, if possible, employed to the Southward, where I have always enjoyed good Health. The Troops I send back to you are, Major Clifton, with the Stores, and Two Companies of Artillery; Major Kelly, with Engineers and Pioneers Officers, except those before named; Major Short, with the Battalion of Europeans, save One Company; Captain Fraser, with the Fourth Battalion of Sepoys, the Grenadier Companies excepted. These will proceed directly to Madras; and Captain Walker, with the Third Battalion of Sepoys, Grenadiers excepted, will proceed to Anjengo, and, advising you of his Arrival there, and to Madura, and wait your Orders. The Plan I am endeavouring to carry into Execution, in regard to the Shipping, is, that as His Majesty's Ships must go to Bombay, they can only be useful in conveying the French Prisoners to Bombay, which the Commodore having consented to, I have embarked them, agreeable to the inclosed List. All are gone, but those marked in the Margin, to whom I have given Leave to stay a few Days, till the Royal Admiral sails, as also Monsieur Picott, who will stay in Tellicherry, and the Commodore will sail this Night with them, of which I have sent Advice, with a Duplicate of this List, to Bombay. The European Ten Companies, with the Stores, detaining the Powder and Musket Ammunition, on Board the Royal Charlotte and Resolution; the Fourth Battalion on the Ravensworth, taken up for that Purpose; and the Third on Board the Revenge and Bombay Grab. When I had the Honour to address you last, my Anxiety to get the Troops back, as it was a Matter about which you expressed a Solicitude, made me venture to say, that they would be with you in Three Weeks; but the Sea Gentlemen will not be hurried, I mean the Commodore; and are so jealous lest my Request should be understood as Orders, that we make but a slow Progress, and it will be reluctantly that they crowd their fighting Ships. Captain Baddam, in the Ravensworth, is the only Merchant Ship that will be detained, or taken up; he does not much like going round to your Coast, and demands high Terms, though not in Proportion, if he carries a Battalion, to that asked by the Manchors, who will not carry a Man to Anjengo under Fifteen Rupees. I hope, however, to get all settled off by the End of the Month.

Every Thing has been done at Mahé that Art could do, to add to the natural Strength of the Garrison of Mahé. To think how much has been done, and how small the Means, is astonishing! Had Reinforcements arrived, every Thing was prepared for them, and Mahé would have required a very large Force to reduce it. The Handful of Europeans the French had in India was such, that they could not place any Confidence in their Allies; they feared the Consequences, and it deprived them of Spirit, and the Event has proved their Suspicions were not without Foundation, and they abuse Hyder as the most treacherous of Villains; nor are they less sparing in their Censure on

Monſieur Picott; they ſay he ought to have expended his Powder, though but little, and that he will be hanged. I think, as he did not ſurrender at the Firſt Summons, let the Suſpicions of the Natives have been what they would, he might have tried at the Defence of ſome one Part with his Europeans. Mahé is, as Lieutenant-Colonel Brown reports to me, extremely well found in Artillery and Stores of all Kinds, of the beſt Sorts, and judiciouſly arranged; they are now under Examination; and as ſoon as I receive the Returns, I ſhall tranſmit them to you, and Bombay. Colonel Cupelipſis tells me, there are above an Hundred Pieces of Cannon, all in excellent Condition; but as he is a great Enemy of Monſieur Picott's, he perhaps exaggerates Things; and, in Truth, many Things were wanting, ſuch as Confidence in their Allies, more of them, Money, and Power; and I can clearly exculpate Monſieur Picott from one Aſperſion, which is, that he ſold the Place to me.

I have congratulated you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, on the Reputation your Forces have acquired; I am confident that the Idea of not being able to reſiſt Troops which had taken Pondicherry, worked more upon the Minds of the whole than they are willing to allow; and Monſieur Picott did not find them ſo brave, before the Capitulation, as they would be thought, ſince their Reſiſtance from the Beginning was like that of Blackmen, who expected to be taken, and are therefore unwilling to provoke the Enemy; and finally, they ſurrendering without putting us to the Expence of a Cartridge: All this could not be the Fault of one Man: Agreeable to the Deſire of the King of Travencore, who expreſſed a great Deſire to have early Information of my Succeſs, I write a few Lines by this Opportunity, as alſo to the Nabob, who, I believe, expects ſuch Marks of Attention; and this I hope you will approve. I cannot, in juſtice to Major Kelly, conclude this Letter without expreſſing my Approbation of his Merits. I found he had been very active before my Arrival, and his Exertions ſince have been unremitting. And here, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, let me entreat you to take into Conſideration again, as this Expedition has been ſo ſhort, in caſe of the Officers and Soldiers upon it, the Expence they have been at, and the Loſs they have ſuſtained on the March by the Deſertions of their ſalainous Servants, and by the haſty and careleſs Manner in which their Baggage was obliged to be embarked, ſo that there are but Five Trunks that have not been broke open and robbed; and I can freely aver as a Truth, that they have all been Loſers, and ſome conſiderably ſo. They have not aſked me to make this Application, nor have I told I will; but it would give me great Pleaſure to hear that you think thoſe who return at leaſt entitled to double Batta.

I am juſt this Moment honoured with your Letter of the 3d Inſtant, encloſing the Warrants neceſſary to hold Courts Martial, which I hope I ſhall never have Reaſon to uſe; and the Remarks of the Commander in Chief. I will not trouble you upon ſo diſagreeable a Subject, further than to ſay, that the Order complained of was given with Major Clifton's previous Knowledge, as a Compromiſe of a Point hitherto doubted; after Conſideration he objected to it, and it never took Place at all; for to avoid an Iſſue on the Buſineſs, I changed the Mode, and appointed Major Short, his Senior, to command the Diviſions. Major Clifton ought therefore not to have complained without ſhewing me his Letter. I think, I wrote to General Munro, who was then to the Southward.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful, and
obedient Servant,
John Brathwaite.

Maylon,
March 23d 1779.

The Committee muſt approve of Colonel Brathwaite's Conduct on this Expedition
the Officers and Troops under his Command.

Every Thing has been done at Mahé that Art could do to add to the natural Strength of the
Ground to which the Gentlemen of Bombay, in reply to theirs on the 24th January
Paragraph, attention
Caſtle. Force to reduce it. The Number of European
could not place any Confidence in their Allies; they feared the
of Spirit, and the Event has proved their Suſpicions were not without
as the moſt treacherous of Villains, nor are they leſs ſparing in their

Honourable

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I have the Pleaſure to inform you, that I have juſt received Information that all the Stores are out of the Concord, and are either already embarked on the other Ships, or are in Boats for that Purpoſe, anſwerable to the Invoices from Madras and Pondicherry, and will arrive in the ſeveral Ships at the ſame Time with the Troops. Had the Situation of the Country not required the Detention of the Troops mentioned in my laſt, I do not ſee how I could have ſent more, as there are no more Ships to be had, and thoſe now employed will be much crowded.

I cannot, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, give you at preſent a better Account of Mahé and its Dependencies, than by ſending you a Copy of Mr. Picot's Letter to me on the Subject. Monſieur Marain, the Perſon referred to in that Letter, being too much indiſpoſed to do any Buſineſs. Of the Parties mentioned, the Courchy and Caungolty Nair, and the Payapartoo Nair, have been to acknowledge their Submiſſion to the Company, and have promiſed Fidelity, and I hear the King of Cartinattu is on his Way: Theſe are poor Princes, their Domains of no great Extent, and their Eſtate conſiſts in Pepper and Cocoa Nut chiefly: I have recommended to them a temperate and mild Behaviour, to avoid Quarrels with each other, and ſo to conduct themſelves as to deſerve the Company's Protection and Good-will, aſſuring them, that it will be their own Fault if they do not meet with it. In Regard to the Rice and Rupees paid to them by the French, I have told them, that theſe are Matters which I muſt receive Orders about, and that they by their good Behaviour ſhould endeavour to deſerve favourable ones; and in regard to thoſe Matters, I ſhall do nothing without your Orders.

The Report is ſtill ſtrong, that Hyder is ſending down a large Body of Troops this Way; if he does ſend any, I believe it will only be to reduce the Nairs, who govern the Multitude of little Principalities here, and ſeem to be united in a Deſign to revolt. Theſe I have often ſpoken to having hinted ſomething of the Kind, I anſwered, that I had not been long enough in the Country to ſay any Thing concerning the Politics of it.

Callicut is ſtill inveſted, and I have heard a conſtant Firing not far off, which I find to proceed from a Party of about 500 of Hyder's People ſurrounded by the Nairs: Theſe People of Hyder were endeavouring to reach Callicut. This State of the Country obliges me to keep the Troops cantoned here, ſo as to occupy the ſeveral Poſts, in Readineſs for any Service. I know the Batta, and neceſſary Charges conſequent to ſuch a Situation, are more than you would wiſh to pay; but I do not ſee how it can as yet be avoided. Indeed, with regard to the Batta, without it the Troops could not well ſubſiſt, every Thing being very dear and ſcarce; however, I have told the Officers, that the Quarters occupied by the Troops muſt be repaired and roofed out of it at their own Expence; and I believe, as to what Expences paſs under my Inſpection, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, you will not have Cauſe to complain of any; the expenſive Charges which will ariſe from this Expedition, will come from Tellicherry and Anjengo, and of thoſe I have never been informed in any Way, of courſe have given no Voucher, and I ſuppoſe that I ſhall not be deemed in any Way reſponſible.

I am aſſured by Mr. Picot and others, upon Honour, that Hyder ſtood engaged to ſend 34,000 Troops to Mahé, of which 8,000 were to be Horſe, to ſcour the Country all round, and to cut off all Supplies of Proviſions attempted to be ſent us; he alſo promiſed to ſend them a large Supply of Rice from Mangalore. The Troops were daily aſſembling, as they heard by Meſſenger after Meſſenger, and the Rice was ſhipping, but neither ever came, and they abuſe him as the greateſt Villain upon Earth.

I have the Honour to be, with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Mahé,
April 3d, 1779.

The Committee much approve of Colonel Braithwaite's Conduct on this Expedition, and that of the Officers and Troops under his Command.

Agreed alſo to acquaint Colonel Braithwaite, that he is not to interfere in the Diſputes between Hyder and the Petty Rajahs on the Coaſt, but to confine his Attention entirely to his own Security.

Agreed to write to the Gentlemen of Bombay, in reply to theirs of the 13th January and 12th February, acquainting them of the apparent Intentions of Hyder Ally to diſturb the Peace of the Carnatic.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 30th August 1779.

PRESENT

The Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Bart. President,
John Whitehill,
Sir Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Braithwaite.

To the Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esq. Governor and President, and Select Committee, of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to address a Letter to you June 5th, by Way of Anjengo; but the Weather proved so bad, that after repeated Trials, the Boat put back again; since that Time no possible Means of sending a public Dispatch have occurred.

I began the Explosion here on His Majesty's Birth Day, on which Occasion the whole Sea Face of Fort Mahé was blown up; since then, notwithstanding a Continuance of the heaviest Rains I ever saw, our Work of Destruction has gone on; and the several Forts and Works of this Colony which had been so lately put in Order at great Expence, are now in Ruins.

The King of Cartinatte, who had applied to me for Assistance against Hyder's People, finding I would not interfere, abandoned his Country, and took to the Hills, and a new one was put in his Place; with whom, and all Hyder's People round us, we have been upon very bad Terms; they have pressed close upon us on every Side, and established themselves in Redoubts around us at about a Mile Distance. I was informed through several Channels, that secret Orders had been given by Hyder, to keep a large Force near us; and that, if a favourable Opportunity offered to surprise us, they were to do it: His principal Objects were (as alledged by my Information) the Ordnance and Stores here. At the first setting in of the Monsoon, they sent in to buy Rice in such Quantities, that it plainly appeared they meant something more than barely supplying themselves. To avoid the Distress and Desertion which must have followed a Failure in that Article, I prohibited the Exportation of it, upon which my Neighbours stopped all Provisions and Bazar Articles of every Kind, from coming in. After some Days Correspondence, a Report prevailing of our having entirely defeated the French Fleet, they allow us to be supplied again, but with a very bad Grace. I then found, that among Hyder's Sepoys, there were some who had Relations with us; these, and Women, were employed to seduce our Sepoys away, with Offers of great Pay and Promotion, however, with very little Success, and some of our Sepoys secured the Persons employed to seduce them, for which I rewarded them. I wrote to a Bramin, Manager of Hyder's, residing in the Cartinatte Country, a few Miles from hence, to inform him, that I had secured a Number of People in Hyder's Service, who had been using every Art to seduce our Sepoys, of which I had Proofs, some of them having advanced to some Sepoys Ten Rupees each; that I should be justified in hanging these, but that I was no Friend to Cruelty or violent Measures, and that if some few Men that had deserted from me, were returned, I would send back those I had secured. He promised to answer my Letter the next Day, but has left the Country without doing it; and the King of Cartinatte has again stopped all our Provisions; but, I should imagine, will soon alter his Stile, as Hyder suddenly called all his People from this Country, and about Callicut, to Seringapatam, where he is making great warlike Preparations: One of my Spies has been killed, and others have returned, saying, that so good a Look-out is kept, that there is no Possibility of getting, just now, through the Passes. My Intelligence is, that the Berar Marattas have entered Hyder's Country to the Northward, to the Amount of Sixty thousand; that he thinks War inevitable with the Nizam and our Nabob, who are united against him; that he is making great warlike Preparations; that he is to have Three Armies, One destined to protect Mangalore and manage us on this Coast, One to enter the Carnatic, and One to oppose the Marattas; by all Accounts, he is very uneasy and very ill. An European Portugueze, his Commandant of Artillery, deserted from him some Days ago, and passed through here in his Way to Goa, where he was a Captain: He says, Hyder is never communicative to any Europeans, nor can they well discover what is going forward, but that he is uneasy, and making great Preparations for War, and gives out, that a large French Fleet and Force will arrive on this Coast in the Course of next Month. Some Persons tell me, that this Captain has not deserted, but is proceeding to Goa on Hyder's Business. If War with Hyder is intended, this is his weak Side; the Disaffection of the Country is such, could they hope for any Support from us, they would (very few excepted) revolt. From this Side, Hyder's Dominions may be attacked to the greatest Advantage; if it were meant totally to reduce him, it is not to be doubted, but in the present Situation of Affairs, even that might be effected, before any French Force will appear in this Country. Were we once Masters of the Avenues leading from this Coast to Hyder's Country, his Power and Conse-

quence would be just so much as we pleased to give him, and no more; his Communication with the Sea being cut off, his Resources would be at an End; it is this Coast that has constantly recruited his Armies with Numbers of Europeans, it has borne the Brunt of his most serious Military Operations, and have made him what he is; and it is from this Coast that he supplies himself with all his Military Stores.

I hope I shall be pardoned in thus offering my Sentiments to you, Honourable Sir and Sirs; which I do not in the Supposition that you can want Information in those Matters, but that I think, as it has fallen in my Way to be assured of Hyder's urgent Necessity for Possession on this Coast, it is my Duty to inform you of it; as also, that I have been told by a Frenchman, whose Veracity I will not vouch for, that when Hyder found that both Bengal and Madras were sending such large Force to the Malabar Coast, he considered it in a very precarious State, and formed the Intention of opening a Communication with the Sea on the Coast of Coromandel, by the Reduction of Cuddapah and Bazalet Jung's Country, that he might still act unitedly with the French, and that a Dispatch had been sent from Mangalore to Mauritius, soon after the Reduction of this Place, with the Plan of Operations intended, the first Object of which was the Circars; and that Mr. Bellecombe and Hyder kept up a constant Correspondence. However, I have uniformly maintained a strict Neutrality on this Coast, and have resisted every Effort used to induce me to interfere; and am sorry to say, that the Consequence has been, that those who shewed themselves willing to owe their Existence to the Honourable Company, have been scattered and dispersed, while those who have been uniformly attached to the French Interests, have triumphed; and by their Insolence on all Occasions, indicate that they impute our Non-interference rather to the Fear of Hyder than any thing else. Hyder himself has, I believe, a very different Sense of the Matter; but the precarious State in which his Affairs are in this Country, has obliged him either to countenance such an Opinion, or give up his Expectations from the French, and throw himself upon the Company. The Insolence of his People round us, has been such that they must either have known that I had positive Orders not to take any Party, or they have depended on my not being able to march out and leave the great Quantity of Ordnance and Stores here in so defenceless a Situation; for I cannot help observing, that their Arrogance has increased in Proportion as I have destroyed my Defences; and our Situation here has been for some Weeks past, during a most inclement Season, extremely fatiguing to the Troops, there having been every Reason for the Exertion of the strictest Duty and Alertness: The Soldiers have been sensible of the Necessity for this Fatigue, and have gone through it without murmuring, and resisted every Temptation to desert. But now that Hyder's People are gone, the Weather fine, and the Duty easier, the Sepoys become more and more anxious to return to their Families; and I cannot but be of Opinion, that if they are not very soon called Home, or employed on some active Service, the Desertion from them will be very general. Not having heard any thing from either the Presidencies of Madras or Bombay, since the Beginning of May, I know not what Measures have been taken for our Return, or when we are to move. However, to encourage them, I have made every Disposition as if we were very soon to move, by going on most rapidly with the Destruction of the Works, and moving down the greatest Part of the Ordnance to the River-side, and arranging Things for Embarkation.

I cannot, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, too much commend the Behaviour of this little Detachment, in a very fatiguing and uncomfortable Situation; in particular that of the Sepoys, who have maintained their Attachment to the Honourable Company, although (now almost in Rags) constantly exposed to the heaviest Rains, in a Series of severe Duty, and while every Temptation was thrown in their Way, to induce them to leave it; and I hope the Honourable Board will be induced to shew them some particular Mark of their Approbation; and I could wish that in particular, that when they return they might be allowed to return the whole, or as much of the Way as possible by Land: I am convinced, that besides their natural Aversion to the Sea, it would gratify their Pride exceedingly; which I am sure it would not be expensive to do, as the March is practicable by the Coasts, and the Seas become so smooth, as to allow of Boats keeping up with all the Equipage. When I request this, it is in the Opinion that their Return will be the Result of peaceable Measures having been determined on with Hyder. Should you not approve this, I would yet request that they may be landed at Anjengo, as the Wives and Families of all the Sepoys now here are living in the Palamcottah, Madura, or Trichinopoly Countries. Should War be determined on with Hyder, and should you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, determine to take an active Part in it on this Coast, I flatter myself you will entrust the Execution of your Resolves to me; and you will permit me to observe, that the Navy and Army might operate on this Coast to most Advantage at a Season when you have little to do or fear. During the Height of your Monsoon, this Coast enjoys the mildest Weather; the Months of October, November, December, and January, are not only fair, but extremely temperate as to Heat, on this Coast. Three Companies of Artillery, One Battalion of Europeans, and Five compleat Battalions of Sepoys, I am confident, with a good Field Train, would effectually conquer this whole Country, provided they had the Assistance of the Navy and a Battering Train, for the Reduction of Mangalore; and their Force, provided the Bombay Gentlemen took the Garrisons here off their Hands, would then be equal to the Reduction of the Coimbatore Country in its Return, or to enter the Mysore Country in Favour of other Operations; and I think the Time required for the Operations would fall within the Season for acting on either Coast. Were such a Measure ever to be adopted, the Kings of Travancore and Cananore might be depended upon, from

from Views of aggrandizing themſelves; and I ſhould imagine that the Honourable Company might, with great Safety and Advantage, divide Hyder's Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt between them. In my Idea of the Reduction of this Country, I ſuppoſe Hyder to have his Attention in ſome Meaſure drawn off by an Incurſion of the Marattas, or the Soubah of the Decan; and I am confident that he muſt fall under ſuch a joint Attack. But it is ſuppoſed here, that doubting of the French Support, he is anxious to make not only Peace but an Alliance with the Berar Marattas. The French here, who have been conſtant Correſpondents with Seringapatam, ſay he will ſucceed, becauſe the Berar Marattas are averſe to Ragobah, who has eſcaped to Colonel Goddard's Army at Surat. Should your Intentions, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, be to continue any Forces on this Coaſt, I could wiſh that an Offer were made to the Sepoys here now, to return, if they preferred it; ſuch an Offer would greatly encourage ſuch as were coming, and in my Opinion would effectually ſecure thoſe we have here; whereas, ſhould they be obliged to ſtay beyond the Time which I diſcover them to have as it were fixed in their own Minds, I fear I could not depend on them; in ſpite of all our Art to infuſe a contrary Belief, they are of Opinion, that if they do not return before the Monſoon on the other Coaſt, they ſhall never go back at all. I make every Preparation in my Power for the embarking the Ordnance and Stores, but the Boats are ſo ſmall, and the Boat People ſo much more awkward than at Madras, that I fear it will take me up Fifteen Days at leaſt, let the Ships come when they will; ſo that if Ships do not arrive early in next Month, I doubt if they will venture round to our Coaſt, but will carry the Whole to Bombay; and there are Two Iron Thirteen-inch Mortars with Iron Beds, ſo compleat and good of their Sort, that I muſt own I am anxious in particular that you ſhould have them at Madras. You will find that I have not had Occaſion to uſe any of the Powder ſent from Madras; that found here more than ſufficing for all our Purpoſes, which pleaſes me, as I am convinced it is an Article you muſt have great Demand for, as little or none was found in Pondicherry.

In caſe of their not being wanted on this Coaſt for the Honourable Company's Service, it might perhaps pleaſe the King of Travencore, and be to the Advantage of the Captors, if we were permitted to make an Offer of the Firelocks to him, and ſave the Honourable Company the Expence of tranſporting round ſuch Arms as they will not iſſue to their Troops; this I mention merely as an Idea that has occurred to ſome Gentlemen here. I have never hinted any Thing of the Kind myſelf, nor am I at all convinced in my own Mind that he would purchaſe them, were I permitted to offer them.

I cannot conclude this Letter, without mentioning One Circumſtance to the Honour of the Madras Sepoys: Out of Fourteen Companies here, on hard Duty, with every Temptation offered them, we in the laſt Month loſt only Two, and they were Chucklers, out of Three Companies at Tellicherry, (which came from Bombay) in the ſame Time they loſt Fourteen.

I have the Honour to be,
With the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Mahé,
4th Auguſt 1779.

Ordered to lie on the Table.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

Extract

Extract of Fort Saint George Consultations, the 29th of September 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, President,
John Whitehill,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B
Charles Smith.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Braithwaite.

To the Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the Honour to address you by the Mercury Packet, under Date the 14th ultimo. The Day after she sailed, the King of Cartinatte advanced a Chain of Guards all around us, within Musket Shot; they stopped every one from going in or out of this Place, and turned back Officers who were to take their usual Walk, with great Insolence. One of these Guards was between us and a Place where the French used to dry their Powder, of Course within their Limits, although no Bound is actually marked on that Side; at all Events their Guards were posted, as I could learn, near enough to pick off our Centinels, at the same Time a large Body of Nairs crossed the River, and were posted in all the Houses about the Hill whereon Fort Saint George stood, and which entirely commands this Place, and where I only kept an Havildar and Twelve Sepoys. As I saw the different advanced Guards of the Nairs, seemingly about to establish themselves, I sent to them to desist and retire, or I should fire upon them; they agreed to desist from Work, but said they would not retire without Orders from the King. On the 16th I sent to the King, to acquaint him, that it was not customary with us to allow People with Arms to advance so near us; that as he had stopped all Provisions, and shewed himself as hostilely inclined towards us as his insignificant Situation permitted, I must consider him as an Enemy; if he did not cause his People to retire, I should drive them off. He sent me Word that he acted by the Nabob's Hyder's Orders, and that he was taking Care of his own Country; that Tellichery assisted his Enemies; that where his People were, they were necessary, but that he should not do any Work or Harm. Although it was very galling to be thus shut up, and our Sepoys began to grow dissatisfied at the Insolence of these People, and wished ardently to drive them, I remained quiet all the 17th; that Evening I learned that Hyder's Killedar had, on the 15th in the Morning, stopped at Mangalore a Pattemar from Bombay to Tellichery. On the 18th I had Intelligence, that the Prince of Cherical was preparing with the Force sent over to him by the King of Cartenatte, to establish himself on Fort Saint George Hill, and to erect a Battery there of Guns, which he was to bring from a Fort at Twelve Miles Distance only; and that having done so, he was to leave the Cartenatte and Courchy Nairs to defend it, and cut off our Communication with Tellicherry, at least to plunder the Bounds and great Pettah there; that Sardar Cawn was to move with Hyder's Forces from Callicut, only 36 Miles from us, into the Cartinatte Country, under Pretence of defending it against any Attempt of the old King of Cartinatte; and that then (Sardar Cawn being at Hand, and Fort Saint George secured) the King of Cartinatte, with his Nairs, was to make a desperate Attempt on this Place; but that Hyder's People would not appear, and would condemn the Affair if unsuccessful. Mr. Church at the same Time informed me, that the Prince of Cherical now stopped every Thing from coming into the Tellichery District, and that Sardar Cawn was preparing to move this Way; my Spies also brought me Information that Forty Boats were ready for Sardar Cawn's Order, on a River about 15 Miles from hence, to pass his Army this Way; that the Report was, that he had some Business with the King of Cartinatte, and was then to return to Syringapatam.

I immediately dispatched over the River One Company of Grenadier Sepoys and Two Companies of the 20th Battalion under Lieutenant Abbot, with some Artillery, Two Field Pieces, and a very strong working Party, with Tools to put that Hill in some State of Defence. I likewise strengthened my Posts on the Ruins of Chimbara and Courchy, to preserve my Communication with Tellicherry, and set about securing myself in the best Manner I could, working incessantly. While on the 19th the King of Cartinatte's advanced Guards early in the Morning seized Two of our Lascars at a Tank between us and them, and also a Horse Keeper of Mr. Baker's, and detained them: I immediately wrote to the King to complain of this Outrage, to insist upon the Release of my People, desiring him to withdraw his Guards, or take the Consequence upon himself; that I would, as long as possible, avoid Bloodshed, but that the English Company must not be insulted. This Letter I sent by a Peon of my own, the King's House being in Sight of this Place. My Peon did not return; but in the Evening the King sent One of his own People to me with a Letter, in which he took no Notice of having received any from me; but advanced, that the French had always paid a Kind of Tribute in Rice, and a Kind of Capitation Tax on his Subjects who lived in their Bounds; that nothing had been paid since August last; that August was the Time of Payment; that he desired I would send him the Amount immediately, and he would send me a Receipt. I wrote him

him for Anſwer, that I had nothing to do with any King of Cartinatte; but that one Day one Man was King, another Day another; that it was quite indifferent to me who was the King, provided he gave no Offence; but the French had received every Aſſiſtance they wanted from the Country, whereas every Impediment was thrown in the Way of the Engliſh: That if he had any Demands on the French, he muſt ſettle it with them; and that if the Engliſh meant hereafter to allow any Thing to a King of Cartinatte, it would be in conſequence of his good Behaviour and their future Arrangement with the Nabob (Hyder); that it was no Subject for me and him to enter into the Diſcuſſion of at that Time; that I deſired the Return of my Peon with an Anſwer to my Letter, and exhorted him to avoid a Conduct which could only end in Bloodſhed. I heard nothing from him all the next Forenoon. In the Afternoon the Waſherman of Lieutenant Roſs's Company of Grenadier Sepoys, went out to a Tank between us and their advanced Guard with ſome Linen to waſh; the advanced Guard of Nairs ſeized him, and carried him and his Linen off about Five in the Afternoon. I waited till near Sun ſet, when hearing nothing from the King, and finding that the Guards had erected Pandals, as if firmly reſolved to maintain their Guard, I ordered Lieutenant Roſs's Company under Arms, and to go out and recover their Waſherman. I gave Lieutenant Roſs Orders in writing to advance within Muſket-ſhot and then to halt, and a Perſon forwarded to demand the Waſherman and Linen, and to order the Guards to retire; and in caſe of Refuſal, to drive them off and burn their Pandals. Lieutenant Roſs accordingly advanced to within Muſket-ſhot, and ſent to demand the Waſherman, and that they would retire; they anſwered, they knew nothing of the Waſherman and could not retire, becauſe they had Orders to ſtay there. He then produced a Man that was with the Waſherman when he was ſeized, but had eſcaped; they then ſaid, that if he would wait an Hour, they would try to find the Waſherman. At this Time he ſaw great Numbers aſſembling to a Tope behind the Guard, which conſiſted of Forty Men; and he (having only with him Fifty) ſaid he would not wait a Moment, unleſs they delivered up one of their Men, as an Hoſtage for the Delivery of the Waſherman; this they poſitively refuſed, and told him, if he advanced, they would fire upon him; he did advance, and they fired and wounded Three Sepoys, one of whom died immediately after his coming in here; he then gave his Fire, and killed Eight on the Spot, and wounded ſome who were ſeen to ſtagger and limp off with the others. In Obedience to my Orders, he did not purſue them an Inch, but burnt the Pandals, and returned. At the ſame Time, all the other advanced Guards ran away, as did alſo the King. He retired to a Fort about 12 Miles off, where he is collecting all his People; but every Thing in this Neighbourhood has remained quiet ever ſince that Afternoon; no more Guards have advanced, and we begin by Stealth, little and little, to get in a few Things from the Country. The King of Cartinatte wrote immediately to Sardar Cawn, who ſeemingly put himſelf into a great Paſſion; confined the Company's Interpreter at Callicut, and his Guard of Sepoys, and vowed Vengeance againſt Mahé and Tellicherry; however, within theſe few Days, the Boats which were ready for him to paſs the River, have diſappeared: There is no Report of his coming this Way; he has releaſed the Company's Interpreter and his Guard; and the Killedar of Mungalore, after detaining her about 20 Days, has releaſed the Pattancar from Bombay to Tellicherry.

A few Days after our little Diſturbance, the Prince of Chericall's Nairs made an Incurſion into the Tellicherry Diſtrict, near Mount Dilly, where we have a ſmall Fort commanded by a Serjeant. The Serjeant writes Mr. Church, that he killed about Forty of them with Grape Shot; ſince then every Thing has been quiet: In all this, Hyder's People did not appear, nor have they written a Line, either to Mr. Church or me, before or ſince this Affair.

Hyder's Situation is much as it was when I had the Honour to addreſs you laſt; he has, however, poſitively prohibited the Exportation of Rice from any Place on this Coaſt, either to Tellicherry or Mahé, and the Nairs, his Tributaries, prevent every Thing from coming by Land, ſo that I am obliged to fit out Two Prize Gallivats, which belonged to the French, and arm them, leſt we ſhould be ſtarved. One of them (the ſmalleſt) carries this Diſpatch to Anjengo, and a Letter to the King of Travencore from me, requeſting that he will allow M. Torleſſe to get Rice from his Country for our Uſe, and the larger will be ready to ſail in about a Fortnight, to fetch the Rice away. At preſent we are not in immediate Want, as we are ſupplied by Boats from Tellicherry; but as this is the Seaſon at which the Supplies were always laid in, the Store was not calculated to laſt much longer, and it becomes abſolutely neceſſary to provide againſt ſuch a Calamity as Want. The Rice we now get from Tellicherry is Thirty per Cent. dearer than I laid in before the Monſoon, which laſted till the 5th of this Month. Our Sepoys would grow very uneaſy if they had not a Proſpect of a Supply on lower Terms.

I am ſorry that the Situation of the Country, and the Conduct of our Neighbours, has put it out of my Power to curtail any of the Expences of this Detachment. The Troops have thoroughly earned their Batta, and I am convinced that both Officers and Men would be heartily glad to be rid of it, to be on the other Coaſt; for we are here pent up, wanting many of the Neceſſaries of Life, and the whole has been on Duty at their Stations, with Half the Officers awake every Night for upwards of Six Weeks paſt: Indeed I begin to be very anxious for Shipping to carry away our Stores, being convinced that the Appearance of a very ſmall French Squadron would induce Hyder to make a Puſh for them openly: That he has tried by every Means to get hold of them,

is not to be doubted, and probably flattered himself, as our Defences were so ruined, the Nair would be able to effect it without his appearing. I have the most assured Information, that every Measure was settled for the Attempt on this Place, if I had not taken first the Steps I did to prevent it, since which they seem quite disconcerted, but seem obstinate in the Article of Provisions and in detaining my Peon, &c. Prisoners.

The Gourchy Man, (whatever might have been his Intentions before) as soon as I had again taken Possession of Fort Saint George, and was establishing my Posts there, which command his Country, came over to me, though I could not see him for Two Months before; and told me, that I did right, for that Mischief was intended, but that I should effectually disappoint my Enemies, and he hoped I would protect him.

The late Kings of Cartinatte and Cattiole warned me of my Danger, and hoped for the Honourable Company's Support.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
with Respect,
Your faithful
and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Mahé,
Sept. 8th, 1779.

As the Season will not admit of Letters being sent to Colonel Braithwaite by the Way of Anjengo;

Orde ed, That the Receipt of his several Letters be acknowledged; that he be told we approve of his Conduct in the Execution of the Trust reposed in him, and are much pleased with the Steadiness which they have shewn upon this Service. That with respect to the Stores, we would have him embrace the first Oportunity that offers of sending them either to this Place, Bombay, or Bengal, and, if necessary, to write to Bombay for Vessels to bring them away. That we cannot at present write to him determinately as to the future Destination of the Troops under his Command, but hope to be able to do so in 10 or 15 Days at fartherst.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 18th October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Bart. President,
John Whitehill,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Charles Smith.

Resolved, That Directions be given to Colonel Braithwaite, to obey any Requisitions that may be made by General Goddard, for the Force at Mahé.

This Force, which consists of One European Company of Infantry, One Company of Artillery, Six Grenadier Companies, and Eight Battalion Companies of Sepoys, is all that we can spare in the present Situation of Affairs with Hyder Ally, and the Uncertainty we are in with respect to the Arrival of Sir Edward Hughes's Fleet with the King's Troops.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Braithwaite to the President; dated Mahé, 17th September 1779.

Honourable Sir,

I find that for a Month past Portuguese and others settled at Calecut, this Place, Tellicherry, Onore, and Mangalore, who used to correspond with Seringapatam, have received no Answers to their Letters. Some Sepoys Wives, and other Travellers, who have come through Hyder's Country from the Carnatic, have all been stopped and searched for Letters; those who had any, were obliged to deliver them up, when they were suffered to pass on: Among them was a Sepoy from Bencoolen, on his Return to Bombay; he had several English Letters, which were taken from him by a Commandant of Hyder; he desired a Receipt for them, that he might not be punished at Bombay, and was chabooked. I cannot hear any Tidings of Persons I sent out some Time since to procure Intelligence from Seringapatam; and I fear, after this Outrage to my Peon, I shall not get any Person to stir among these People; our Sepoys, who on our Coast used to procure Intelligence, can do nothing here, as their Want of the Country Language immediately discovers them. I have spared no Pains or Expence for Intelligence, but cannot say I depend much on any I receive in regard to

Hyder; the best I get is from a Frenchman; he is positive that Hyder aims at these Stores, but says he expects a French Force, and does not think he will act if they do not arrive. Mr. Church, as far as I can learn, is as much puzzled to get good Intelligence from that Quarter as I am, although so long Resident of a populous District in this Country. He discovers, as well as myself in general, that Hyder is very averse to the English, and is making great warlike Preparations; and that he himself is expected at Nagmer; and that he persecutes with Violence such Country Powers as he thinks have any Attachment to the English, who, for Want of Protection, are obliged to take Refuge among the Hills. A small Country Vessel, from Mocha to Tellicherry, and now going for Anjengo, gives me this Opportunity of writing; Mr. Church assures me it is a safe one; and I think no Time should be lost in informing you of this late Insult, and the Situation of Things here, which I could not venture to do by a Coasting Boat, and our larger armed Gallivot will not be ready to sail before the 24th at soonest. You certainly, Sir, have much better Grounds to go upon in regard to Hyder's Intentions than any we can have; but as Things appear here to me, it looks as if Hyder only waited for the Arrival of a French Force, or till your Monsoon begins, when, if your Fleet goes to Trincomalee, and the Bombay Gentlemen are sufficiently engaged with the Marattas, that then he will, with a very large Force, endeavour to dislodge the English from their Settlements on this Coast; in the mean Time he is endeavouring to reduce us to every Distress by the Means of his tributary Nairs, and to take every Advantage of the particular Situation of this Detachment, and the Stores here; and then, should he have Occasion to alter his Plan, he will blame the Nairs and his Officers in this Country, and disavow them. I hear from all Quarters, that the Artillery and Stores here are a great Object with him: He is upon no Terms with the Dutch; has no Opinion of the Portuguese; and does not know where to look for Supplies, which he thinks the English will never supply him with.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 15th November 1779.

Read a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite, as follows:

To the Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, President and Governor, Committee, at Madras.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Not long after dispatching a Duplicate to you this Morning of my Letter of Yesterday, I was honoured with your Letter of the 29th ultimo, by the Arrival of the Success Ketch, from Anjengo.

I cannot find Words, Gentlemen, to express my Thankfulness on the Testimony of your Approbation which that Letter contains; I hope to have Opportunities of doing it more essentially in the Course of my Duty. So flattering a Letter from you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, of so late a Date, has almost done away the Chagrin occasioned by the Letters I received from Bombay. I anticipate from it, that I shall not be reduced to the disagreeable Necessity of quitting a Service which I have hitherto had so much Reason to be satisfied. I am confident, that you will have adopted some Plan, if my Detachment must go on, to employ me elsewhere. I am confident that you will not disgrace an Officer whose Conduct you have honoured by your Approbation, by subjecting him to the Orders of one who is his Junior, although now become his Superior, by the Partiality of the Presidency to which he belongs. I have the highest Respect for the Character which Brigadier General Goddard bears; but I cannot forget the Respect due to my own, from myself least; could I for a Moment, I should cease to be worthy of your Service.

By the Means of my Gallevats, and the Attentions of the Governor of Cochin, I have collected about a Month's Stock of Provisions; and it is well I did, for so far from supplying me, I am told, they are beginning to cry at Tellicherry, and I have just heard this Evening, that the Prince of Cherical, Hyder's Manager, has entered their Country with Four thousand Nairs, and is laying it waste and driving off their Cattle: This I heard from the Portuguese Dubash to the Company here, not from Mr. Church himself.

The King of Cartinatte sticks close to me still, with about Five thousand Nairs and Raggamuffins, which he calls Sepoys. He threatens us every Day, that he will attack all our Posts in the night; but he never will, unless Hyder sends a Force down; whereas, on the contrary, Hyder is calling up Forces from hence in great Haste, and sending large Bodies to the Northward. It is possible when we have blown up our Works, and retreating, the King of Cartinatte may endeavour to disturb us, but I think I can cover the Embarkation so as to receive very little or no Damage. The Malabar Powers who expected the Support of the Company, being disappointed, are making up Matters

with Hyder daily. I believe he means to unite them against our Interest, and foreseeing that we shall have other Employment, will leave this Country totally to the Nairs, keeping some of their Head Men as Hostages at Seringapatam, and withdrawing from them all the Money he can.

I have the Honour to be with Respect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your faithful and

obedient Servant,

John Braithwaite.

Mahé,
20th October 1779.

Fort Saint George, Select Consultations, 30th December 1779.

Received the following Letter from Colonel John Braithwaite.

To the Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, Governor and President, Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Ships being now arrived from Cochin, and sundry Boats from the Northward, and no Account of the Success Cruizer, which was charged with Dispatches from me, and on Board of which were Passengers, Doctor Beckett and Ensign Lucas, in order to return to the Coast for their Healths Sake, there is too much Reason to believe that she is totally lost; I therefore now, by a Puttamar, transmit to you Duplicates of the Dispatches I sent by her, hoping, that in the mean Time the Governor and General have received Letters which I wrote to them since.

Our Embarkation of Ordnance, &c. went on extremely well till the Storm, which is said to have been the most dreadful that has happened on this Coast within the Memory of Man. The Succes and Happy Cruizers are now given over as entirely lost; the Bombay Grab was totally dismasted, the Drake lost her Mainmast, and was obliged to throw some of her Guns overboard; but the Eagle, Half full of Water, and near foundering, escaped with the least real Damage; Four of the Shybars, on Board of which was Shot and Shell as Ballast, have been lost; as also the large armed Gallivat, which I used to send to Cochin for Provisions; several Country Ships were lost, and among them Four Gallivats of Hyder's, said to be freighted with Ammunition, &c. for the Nairs, and some European Gunners; how true this may be I cannot say, but the Bodies of Two Europeans were found near one of the Wrecks.

As soon as the Vessels were again in a Condition to receive Stores, &c. (which was the 22d) we again commenced the shipping-off, and compleatly carried away every Thing (except some Anchors) and blew up the remaining Works, and embarked the 29th. To have transported the Anchors would have taken us up One Day more, which in the present Situation of Affairs, I did not deem expedient. We burnt all the houshold Furniture, Timber, Cordage, and Civil Stores, as they could not be carried away. Tellicherry was at this Time hard pressed by the Nairs, and calling out for Assistance; the Resident and Factors had delivered over the Keys and Charge to Captain Whippey the Commandant, who by a Council of War, called for all the Forces I could bring, that was not designed for General Goddard. I wrote to him and the Factory, to know if they had good Intelligence in regard to Hyder; I was unwilling to embroil the Madras Establishment in a Quarrel, which had been, according to my Idea of Things, wantonly brought on, by giving Protection at Tellicherry to the deposed King of Cartinatte, and Refuge to all the Coliole People, against whom Hyder was incensed. I found also, that the Factory had called in to their Assistance Two thousand Coliole Nairs, to most of whom they had delivered out Arms and Ammunition. I was of Opinion, that if they had only the Nairs to deal with, they were strong enough, and I wished to be clear of the Business; as, if my Sepoys returned to the Coast, another Battalion would be sent to reinforce Brigadier General Goddard; and I had private Intelligence that Sardar Cawn had Orders not to enter into the Disputes between Tellicherry and the Nairs, unless the Madras Troops at Mahé took it up, in which Case he was to join the Prince of Chericall. The Commandant and Factory both wrote me, that they did not believe that Hyder would interfere; but the former still required Assistance. I then proposed to him, that I would send him Four Companies of Grenadier Sepoys under Captain M'Leod, with Lieutenant Saxon of the Artillery, One Corporal, Four Gunners, and Thirty Lascars, with Two Field Pieces; and with these Captain Whippey was perfectly satisfied; but the Grenadier Sepoys, as soon as they knew my Intention, were a little discontented, though no Order had been yet given. I then wrote to Captain Moore, commanding the Ships and Vessels, to inform him of my Design to send the European Infantry and Artillery with 70 Lascars to Surat, under the Command of Captain Lamotte, of the Force I meant for Tellicherry, and requesting Boats under Convoy for the 20th Battalion of Sepoys to Anjengo, and by that Means another Battalion might be there embarked for Surat.

It would be tireſome to you, and an almoſt endleſs Labour, were I to attempt to tranſmit to you the laborious and diſagreeable Correſpondence I have been involved in, in the Courſe of my Duty here; it will ſuffice to ſay, that Captain Moore reſiſted every Application for carrying any of your Troops to Anjengo; ſaid it was a Paradox to him, how carrying Troops to the Southward would forward the Diſpatches of any to the Northward; that his Orders were to carry Troops to the Northward; and finally, that it was the Opinion of the Gentlemen at Tellicherry, that our Preſence was neceſſary there, and that he would carry none to the Southward; but that as I objected to the then State of Proviſions at Tellicherry, he would leave the Eagle and Eight-boats there, to carry away the Madras Troops before they could experience the Miſeries of a Famine. Accordingly I ordered the Detachment for Surat, as before deſcribed, to proceeed to Surat, and landed here the 30th with the Sepoys, the remaining Laſcars, and Two Field Pieces. The Keys and Charge were delivered up to me by Captain Whippey; and the Reſident offered me a dark Room in the Corner of his Houſe, the uſual Office of a Portugueze Writer, telling me all the reſt of his Houſe was taken up by Gueſts, whom he had received in ſince the Troubles. I found this Place in the extremeſt Confuſion. Multitudes of People in Arms, without any viſible Sign of Utility, ſcattered every where, and without Leaders; nor was it eaſy to know, whether they were Enemies or Friends; a prodigious uſeleſs Expenditure of Ammunition; and that every Man, be him whom he would, who brought a bad Firelock to the Company's Stores, got a good one in Exchange; ſo that out of upwards of 1,500 Stand of Arms (1000 of which I had furniſhed) not above 200 remained. I found the Fort itſelf choaked up with Buildings; and what they call the Limits or Place, incloſed by an outward Wall, ſtill more crowded, without any Street, or even a Communication to move a Gun, or ſupport any of the Baſtions; the Houſes crowded within up to the very Walls, and even touching them; without the Gate of which was a ſhort Eſplanade, about a Quarter Muſket Shot; after which all was thick Topes, and the Petta, or very extenſive Town and Buzar, extremely populous, and no Place of Refuge for the Inhabitants; who, if the Nairs broke in, muſt all be maſſacred, or preſs in ſuch Crowds toward the Limits, as to prevent their being defended. Captain Whippey had therefore taken the Advantage of an exterior Defence without the Petta, formed to the Left by the River and ſome ſmall fortified Poſts, and an extenſive Range of Paddy Fields between him and the Enemy, with tolerable defenſive Banks on our Side, terminated by Hills and an high Road to the Right, which was covered by Maylon Fort; this Line of it could be defended; covered the Whole, and kept the Inhabitants tolerably quiet; but it was extenſive, I think at leaſt Four Miles; the Enemy had fortified themſelves on the oppoſite Hills, from whence they fired from ſmall Guns, and had lined the Topes on the oppoſite Side of the Paddy Fields, whence they had twice attempted to force over; in which Attempt they had been repulſed, but the Tellicherry People had an Officer wounded, and many People killed and wounded; the Enemy had alſo attempted to lodge themſelves on the next Hill to Moylon. A Party, with Succeſs, went out to prevent them; but the Officer commanding it (Lieutenant Williams) and a great many of his People, were killed. I found that Captain Whippey had advanced a Battery of Sand Bags, intended for Two Eighteen Pounders, for the Purpoſe of diſlodging the Enemy from a neighbouring Hill, where they had a Gun which was inconvenient to Maylon. The Battery was reported to me as ready when I arrived, and the Guns were to go out that Night; and as Captain Whippey depended much on the Effect they would produce, I did not object; but as I found there was only a Captain and Thirty Men of this Eſtabliſhment, for the Defence of this advanced Battery, I, at Two in the Morning, ſent out a Company of Grenadier Sepoys under Enſign Dundas, and one of the Twentieth Battalion under Enſign Thompſon, with the Guns, and to ſupport the Battery, and was myſelf going at Day-break to ſee it; but found, before I could get there, that, as I had foreſeen, it was attacked on all Sides. No People could behave with more Reſolution than the Nairs and Malays who attacked; they got in at the Embrazures; on our People's Bayonets they were repulſed; and, I believe, chiefly by a Manœuvre of Enſign Dundas's, who ſallied out with about 16 of his Grenadier Sepoys, and took them in Flank, and diſperſed them; but Five of his Men were killed on the Spot, and Four wounded. Enſign Thompſon was killed in one of the Embrazures, reſiſting the Entrance of the Nairs. The Madras Company in the Battery that Day, had One Officer killed, Ten Sepoys ditto, and Nine wounded; Three more Sepoys of ours belonging to another Company, which I had ſent to ſuſtain the Battery, were ſlightly wounded; and ſeveral of our Malays and Tivies, who were ſent below to ſkirmiſh in the Jungle, were killed and wounded. Upon the Whole we had 44 killed and wounded. Since then the Enemy have made no Puſh.

From the ſhocking State of the Fort and Limit Wall, I have adopted Captain Whippey's Scheme, and am briſkly employed ſo as to give this accidental Line ſome Flanks, if poſſible, to cover the whole Petta and Inhabitants from the Maſſacre and Confuſion which muſt follow, if ſo ſavage an Enemy as the Nairs penetrate: I have therefore appointed Captain Whippey, Commandant of Tellicherry under my Orders, and am myſelf encamped without to ſupport the Lines with my Troops.

There is Reaſon to believe that this Buſineſs will become more ſerious; I am totally ignorant upon what Footing you ſtand with Hyder, but every Act of his here has been uninterruptedly hoſtile, though ſomewhat underhandedly as yet; and Sardar Cawn, the Nabob Hyder's General at Callicut, has moved to Mahé with about 6,000 Men, and Twelve Pieces of Cannon; he has ſeized a Daniſh

Ship in the Roads of Callicut, made all the People in her Prisence, amongst whom are Two English Ladies and Seven Gentlemen, most of them arrived from Surat, have been plundered of every Thing, and all their Papers and Dispatches (some I hear from the Directors) seized, and no Remonstrance has produced any Effect. On Board this Vessel he has embarked Cannon and Stores of all Kinds, as also on Eight large Manchoos, which are landing at Mahé. Part of his Force is on this side Mahé River, and taking Possession of Fort Saint George Hill and the Ruins of Courchy; some of his principal Officers have been with great military Parade and large Escorts, in all the Posts of the Enemy, from whence Cannon have been fired whilst they were there, and they have reconnoitred us all round.

Thus situated, I have thought it necessary to reland the European Infantry and Artillery, and have written my Reasons for it to Bombay, and to Brigadier General Goddard; but I was obliged to protest against Captain Moore, and threaten hard to get them on Shore; he actually sailed away Two Leagues with them after I demanded them, and wished Captain La Motte to raise a Mutiny, and to use Force to prevent him, so that when I wrote the Letter to Bombay, of which I have now the Honour to inclose you a Copy, I was not sure that I should have them. I hope the Reasons held forth in that Letter may prove satisfactory to you. My Situation has all along, on this Coast, been very disagreeable. The System of the Gentlemen of Tellicherry, having been covertly a constant Opposition to that which you ordered me to adopt; and I believe, by my Letter from Bombay, contrary to their Orders from thence; I shall never be able, in my own Mind, to acquit them of being the latent Cause of all the Inconveniences we have suffered at Mahé, and of their own present Troubles. Depending on our Proximity, they have, according to the best Information which I can get, done Things to irritate Hyder's Government, at the same Time without providing in any Shape for the Defence of Tellicherry. They knew that in the End, Necessity must compel me to come to them; and so it has, much against my Will; for here I find myself, in Disobedience to your Orders, protecting the old King of Cartenadu, and in Alliance with the fugitive Coliote, Rebels to Hyder's Government, who had long ago offered me Money, in vain, to take them under my Protection. To protect them might have been necessary for the Company's commercial Views; if so, it should have been done on a settled Plan, and Tellicherry rendered respectable.

I have opposed all this Business for a Month, through a voluminous Correspondence, but in vain. I could not abandon a Settlement of the Honourable Company's calling out for Help: I wished to embroil Madras as little as possible: But Captain Moore cut the Matter short, by saying, he would only carry us to Surat (where the Sepoys refused to go) or to Tellicherry; and if I did not want his Ships and Vessels for that Purpose, he would sail. He knew that we had only Three Days Provision in Mahé; and indeed, his Conduct all along has been very strange: When he came, and I began to embark the Stores, I desired a Receipt every Day for every Thing shipped off. He told me, that would be very inconvenient; that if I should send every Thing off to his Ship, he would distribute them to the proper Ships and Boats to carry them as they came; and that after all he would give my Commissary a Receipt for the Whole: But the Business being over, he told me, it was true he had said so, but there had been a Gale of Wind, some Ships and Boats had been lost, some Things had been relanded at Tellicherry; that he could not in such case take any Responsibility, or give any Receipt; that in Cases like this, there must be great Losses, and they must be expected. Thus, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, after all your Pains and Expence, after our Care and Watchfulness over them, the Mahé Stores are no farther ascertainable by me to you, than by transmitting to you the Returns I have sent to Bombay, which Twenty Witnesses can attest the shipping off.

Immediately on sending the Europeans on Shore, Captain Moore sailed with all the Cruizers but one, leaving the Eagle and Eight Boats here. I cannot help being of Opinion, that the Presence of some of His Majesty's Ships on this Coast is very necessary. Hyder has many armed Vessels, as well as the Marattas, and this is their Season for cruizing; and I imagine the Bombay Ships will be all up about Surat. I have taken the Liberty to endeavour to convey my Sentiments to Sir Edward Vernon on this Head, by a Letter via Cochin, which may be forwarded to him, I believe, at Trincomalee, where I hear he is; and I will venture to take this Liberty to say, that if ever you send any of your Troops round to this Coast, and design any Second Movements of them, it will be necessary to be done by Ships under your own Orders; for in the course of this Expedition, His Majesty's Ships excepted, the rest have paid very little Attention when I have said I had your Orders to do so and so.

As it is possible that Hyder, whose Proceedings are so mysterious and inscrutable, may, from our being in such Strength here, or other political Reasons, I would certainly, could I have any good Information to that Effect, send on the Europeans by the first possible Opportunity; and if you mean that a Battalion of Sepoys should yet go from the Coast to Surat in lieu of those here, who to a Man have declined that Service, it would be well, if you think proper, that they were set in Motion directly for Anjengo. To have the better Prospect of Sea Conveyance and Protection, was my Inducement for writing to Sir Edward Vernon the Letter, of which inclosed I have now the Honour to transmit you a Copy. I also transmit to your Honours my Letter to Sir Eyre Coote, open, which I take the Liberty to request you to forward.

I have

I have endeavoured, in a moſt perplexing State, ſecretly thwarted on all Sides, to diſcharge the Truſt repoſed in me with Zeal and Fidelity; and if I have acquitted myſelf to your Satisfaction, I ſhall not repine or repent of my Labour, having nothing more at Heart than to approve myſelf,

With great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful
and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Camp at Tellicherry,
9th Dec^r. 1779.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 30th December 1779.

Sent the following Letter to Colonel Braithwaite:

To Colonel John Braithwaite, commanding the Madras Detachment at Tellicherry.

We have received your Letters, dated the 2d, 9th, and 10th November, and 9th December.

We are very ſenſible of the Difficulties you have had to encounter, and much approve of the Diligence and Diſcretion you have ſhewn on the Occaſion. We are ſorry at a Time when we have ſo many Calls for our Troops, that you ſhould have been drawn by the apparent Imprudence of the Gentlemen at Tellicherry, into Meaſures we ſo much wiſhed to avoid; however the Defence of the Settlement of Tellicherry, was an Object that could not be neglected under any Circumſtances, and your Activity on this Occaſion is very commendable; but we wiſh, nevertheleſs, that the European Infantry and Artillery had been ſent to Surat, becauſe we are of Opinion, that their Service at this Time with General Goddard, would have been more uſeful than at Tellicherry, particularly as you do not ſeem to think, that the Place was in Danger from the Nairs only, and Hyder's People have not by your Account openly aſſiſted them.

We are ſtill anxious to reinforce General Goddard with your Europeans; and if Circumſtances have not materially changed ſince the Date of your laſt Letter, we would have you embrace the firſt Opportunity of ſending them to Surat or Bombay. With reſpect to yourſelf, as we have ſo much Confidence in your Care and Circumſpection, we deſire you to continue in the Command of Tellicherry with the Madras Sepoys, until you ſhall think the preſent Danger is removed, or until the Place be ſufficiently reinforced from Bombay, when we give you Permiſſion to return to the Coaſt, and to ſend the Sepoys by the Way of Anjengo.

We deſire you will, in our Name, ſtrongly recommend it to the Chief and Council to eſtabliſh Tranquillity by every Means in their Power, and if any juſt Cauſe of Offence have been given either to the Nairs, or to Hyder Ally, we wiſh it were inſtantly removed; for in the preſent Situation of Affairs, it is highly neceſſary that we ſhould induſtriouſly avoid all Occaſions of adding to the Number of our Enemies.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
30th Dec^r. 1779.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 29th May 1779.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite, to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George; dated at Mahé, 10th May 1779.

Herewith I have the Honour to ſend you compleat Returns from this Place, which I have not before been able to do, by which you will ſee our Strength, what we have belonging to Madras, and what was ſurrendered here as belonging to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty.

The Mines in that Part of Fort Mahé near the Sea (as nothing can approach us there at this Seaſon) will be ſprung in Ten Days, by which Time Fort Saint George, Chenibara, and Courchy, will be completely deſtroyed; and I hope by the Time the Seaſon permits us to embark, we ſhall be ready to return, if you think it neceſſary to recall us; but if you have not concluded Matters with Hyder, I will

will venture to assert, from what I see of the State of his Country, that the Stay of this Detachment will be a great Check. With such a Force as the Honourable Company have now on the Malabar Coast, I do not think he will attempt to invade the Carnatic; if he attempts such a Thing, it will be after the Return of this Detachment, when the Gentlemen at Bombay have engaged their own Attention and that of the Maratta State, by the Operations which it is said are to take Place.

I am informed from Tellicherry that Roodo Cawn, Hyder's Manager at Callicut, has invited Mr. Freeman, the English Resident, to return from Tellicherry; but that he does not mean to go till he receives Orders from Bombay.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 14th June 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite to the President and Select Committee at Fort Saint George; dated at Mahé the 20th May 1779.

The Arrival of Hyder's Detachment in this Country, has convinced me that I did not keep One Man more than was absolutely necessary to make sure of what has been so easily yielded to us, and make the Honourable Company respectable on this Coast. His Force in this Neighbourhood is now encreased to Eight Battalions of Sepoys, besides the Horse and Country Troops I before had the Honour to mention to you; but they shew no Disposition to molest us, nor have they on the other Hand shewn any Mark of Attention. My Spies say, they talk with much Anger in their Camp of the Assistance given to the Revolters from Tellicherry.

As the Conduct of Hyder's People, though by no Means offensive, is by no Means complaisant and as none of those who are much attached to him have expressed any Satisfaction at our Acquisitions, I know not what he may attempt, as the Demolition of the Place goes forward, and the Rains abate; however, I am convinced I should always be in a Condition to stand upon the Defensive; and hope the Provisions here collected will be sufficient to keep us from Want; but his Numbers gradually encrease. It is reported here that Lally with his Corps has engaged in Hyder's Service, and that his Views are turned towards the Nizam; and I have certain Information of his having taken Cuddapah: Then he is ready either for the Carnatic, the Circars, or Bazalet Jung's Country; but if the latter is supported, I think he will not cross the Kistnah, but find Work enough on this Side. The general Idea is, that he is not well disposed towards the English.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 13th May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, President,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite, to the President and Select Committee at Fort Saint George. Dated at Mahé the 21st April 1779.

The Chief Articles of Trade were Arms, Guns, Ammunition, &c.; and I believe it was from this Place that Hyder was chiefly supplied, indeed I am told, to a very great Amount; and it is that which will make him feel the Expulsion of the French more sensibly than any Thing else. He begins to be serious now in checking the Revolters. Enclosed, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, I send you a Translation of the last Casin received from my Spies. This Day the King of Cartinatte retreated to within Sight of Fort Condé, and is apparently crossing the River above in great Confusion. I have sent out Word that neither Party must come too near us, as I have nothing to do with their Quarrels. I have had no Message from Hyder's Officer, nor have I sent any immediately to him. I do not believe they mean to disturb us; had they any such Intention, they would have shown it by an Attack on Chunbara, the Fort lately defended by the Prince of Cherical, as I have dismantled it of its Guns, and left only an Havildar, and 12 Sepoys in it, as a Guard to the Flag Staff till it is destroyed.

APPENDIX, N° 36.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 22d April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, President,
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

MINUTES of last Committee read, and approved.

The Committee having at their last Meeting resolved to send Three Battalions of Sepoys and a Company of Artillery, for the Protection of Bazalet Jung's Country, it is now ordered that this Force, together with Six Field Pieces, and a proportionable Quantity of Stores, be got ready to proceed with all possible Expedition; and that the Command be given to Lieutenant Colonel Harpur.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 23d April 1779.

Extract of a Letter to Bengal.

To the Honourable Warren Hastings, Esquire, Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have just received from Colonel Braithwaite, the Articles of a Capitulation for the Surrender of Mahé, and enclose a Copy for your Information. Colonel Braithwaite keeps with him a Company of Grenadier Europeans, a complete Battalion of Sepoys, and a Company of Artillery, to take Care of the Conquest, until the Fortifications be destroyed: The Remainder of our Troops he has returned to this Coast.

Since writing the foregoing, we have Intelligence from the Nabob, that Hyder has made a Conquest of the Cuddapah Country, and taken the Phousdar Prisoner; that he is proceeding to subdue the Phousdar of Cannoul, and that he means also to make a Conquest of the Territories of Bazalet Jung; of which last Measure the Vakeel of Bazalet Jung has, in the Name of his Master, expressed the strongest Apprehensions: That he has also written threatening Letters to the Zemindars of Vencatagherry and Calastry, who are tributary to the Nabob. In consequence of late Negotiations with Bazalet Jung, we have resolved to send immediately, for the Protection of his Country, Three Battalions of Sepoys, a Company of Artillery, and Six Field Pieces.

Hyder's Proceedings in that Quarter have added greatly to his Power, and given him a much more easy Access to the Carnatic than he had before.

Considering all these Circumstances, we are of Opinion, that immediate Measures should be taken to compel Hyder to retreat back within his former Limits, or, if necessary, to reduce him totally; for we have every Reason to conclude, from the Language he holds, and from the Nature of his Proceedings, that he will very shortly draw us into Hostilities; in which Case it will be highly expedient that we should be prepared to act decisively; and we request you will favour us with your Sentiments and Determination upon this Letter as soon as possible.

We have the Honor to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient and
most humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
23d April 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 36.

Extracts from Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 137. *To Hyder Ally.—Dated 26th Auguſt* 1779.

I acquainted you that the Company had entered into a Treaty of Friendſhip with Bazalet Jung, and had in conſequence engaged to lend him the Aſſiſtance of Troops for the Protection of his Government and Country. Agreeably to this Treaty, we ordered ſome Sepoys under the Command of One of our Officers to march to Adoni by the neareſt Route; and that Route lying through a Part of the Diſtrict of the Cuddapah Country, which you lately reduced, I truſted our People might proceed without Moleſtation, it being the invariable Practice of all Powers who live in State of Friendſhip and Peace, to let the Troops of their Friends paſs and repaſs through their Territories, with the ſame Freedom that their own Troops might do; deſirous, however, of behaving towards you on this Occaſion with Attention and Civility, I directed the Commanding Officer of our Sepoys, to write to your Managers in the Cuddapah Country before he marched; and I wrote Letters alſo to them myſelf; with which, no Doubt, they informed you. The Letters which the Managers ſent to our Officer gave him no Reaſon to expect that any Oppoſition would be made; and though they were not ſo friendly as they ſhould have been, I could not ſeriouſly think that they would guard and ſtop the Paſſes through which our People are to march, and to treat them as Enemies inſtead of Friends. This, however, to my very great Surpriſe, has really happened; our Troops found the Paſſes guarded, and every Diſpoſition made to oppoſe their March: In conſequence of this they returned very properly to their former Station within our Territory.

Conſidering the Treaty of Friendſhip that has long ſubſiſted between the Company and you, I am entirely at a Loſs for this Conduct in your Manager, unleſs, as I am willing to perſuade myſelf, they have acted on this Occaſion without your Knowledge or Authority. I write this Letter, therefore, to acquaint you with all the Circumſtances, and to requeſt you will give ſuch Orders that our Troops may paſs through the Diſtricts before mentioned. May your Health and Happineſs ever increaſe!

N° 138. *Tranſlation of a Letter from the Nabob Bazalet Jung to Mahomed Amin Ud Dien, one of his Servants, at preſent with Colonel Harpur.*

I have now undoubted Intelligence that the Ghaut is ſtopped and ſhut up. Hyder Ally Cawn not long ago wrote me, that it was improper in me to make an Alliance with the Engliſh, for that in that he would not continue upon friendly Terms with me; and he deſired I would let him rent the Guntoor Circar from me. I received another Letter from him after he received the Accounts of the Engliſh Troops being arrived at Mootapillee; in which he told me again, that I muſt neither give up the Guntoor Circar to the Engliſh, nor ſend for a Body of their Troops. At the Time that Iſlecher Cawn was with Hyder at Brickunder Gun, the latter deſired him to tell me that the Engliſh, after they had got the French diſmiſſed from my Service, would get the Guntoor Circar into their Hands, and never be of any Service to me; that it therefore would be better to give up the Circar to him, which would be a certain Advantage to me. I anſwered to this, that the Engliſh would not break the Engagements which they had entered into with me, and would faithfully pay me what Rent they ſhould ſtipulate for the Guntoor Circar. Hyder, after this, wrote me again, Not to do this by any Means; that it was an injudicious Step; and he again requeſted I would give up that Circar to him. And I replied, that I had already given up that Circar to the Company, with whom I had entered into a Treaty; that if he had made the Application before it had taken Place, I might perhaps have entered into a Negociation with him about it, but that it was not in my Power to deviate from the Engagements I had made. I have as yet received no Anſwer to this, but by the Steps which Hyder has taken, it ſeems as if he meditated ſome pernicious Deſigns againſt me. He has ordered his Troops to aſſemble from different Quarters, as if he intended to attack this Country, and it was on that Account that I wrote ſo very preſſingly for the Engliſh Troops coming here without Delay, leſt they ſhould meet with any Obſtacle in the Way. It is much to be lamented that they are not come. What is to be done next the Almighty knows: I have reſigned myſelf to the Divine Providence. Loſe no Time in acquainting Colonel Harpur of this, and let him write to the Governor, without Delay, for a Reinforcement. If the Company are to render me a Service, this is the Time for it; when the Opportunity is loſt, their Friendſhip will be of no Service to me. The Company have ſerved many People, and exerted themſelves for them; they ſhould at ſuch a Time as this, exert themſelves for me; if they ſhould delay doing this, their Friendſhip will be of little Advantage to me. Intelligence has juſt been received at the Houſe of Koki Sipana the Soucar, that Hyder has marched from Seringapatam, with an Intention of coming againſt this Place. My Situation is deplorable. Let what is to be done, be done with Speed. The Road by Atcoor is ſhut up, and

and the Communication precarious. My Letters may not, perhaps, reach you. Do not wait for any more, but tell this to Fattah Ulla Cawn, to apply to Colonel Harpur to write to Madras about this. If Assistance is not given me in Ten or Twelve Days at farthest, all they can do will be of no Service to me. I yet trust in the Faith and Engagements of the Company; they will raise their Reputation in saving me. I have wrote you all this for your Information. Lose no Time in procuring the Assistance required.

To the Honourable the President and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Pleasure to inform you, that I have received Intelligence from Captain Lucas, of his having arrived the 2d Instant at Mootapilly, with Two Companies of Infantry, Half a Company of Artillery, and the best Part of the first Battalion of Sepoys, and that One Vessel and Four Boats, with Sepoys on Board, had not then arrived. Every Thing necessary for their March has been dispatched from this Place, except Sheep and Coolies, which Mr. Douglas has engaged to furnish, his Station being much nearer than ours; so that I hope to hear, in a few Days, of their having set off to join me.

I am, respectfully,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your faithful and
most obedient Servant,
Hy Harpur.

Camp Inacunda,
4th September 1779.

N° 149. *To Bazalet Jung.—Dated 11th November 1779.*

I had the Pleasure to receive your Letter of the 8th November, and understand the Contents. The Company will never fail to execute their Engagements with you to the utmost of their Power; and relying upon that, you should set your Mind at Ease. It is true, by unforeseen Accidents, and chiefly on Account of the Scarcity of Provisions, our Troops have not been able to reach you so soon as I wished and intended; but my Desire of getting you the earliest Assistance, is evident, from the Expedition that was used in sending the Troops from hence, and in the large Reinforcement I afterwards added to them, by which they are become much stronger, and better able to protect your Country; I have also sent another Commander to take Charge of them, and it will now rest with you, only to prepare every Thing for their Reception, and to see, that on their March they be furnished with Provisions and every other Necessary they may require. As it may be difficult to send Money from hence regularly to pay them, should they be at any Time in want, you will be pleased to supply them, and advise me thereof, that your Account may receive Credit for it.

I observe that you write concerning the Payment of the Tuncas and Orders you have given on the Zemindars of Guntoor: As that Country is placed under the Management of the Nabob, I have requested his Highness to give Orders, that the Balances due to you be accounted for in the most equitable and speedy Manner possible. Let me hear constantly of your Welfare that I may rejoice. What can I say more?

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 20th November 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, President,
John Whitehill,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Cha. Smith.

To the Honourable the President and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Yesterday I did myself the Honour to address you on the Subject of my March from Inacunda, and my Resolutions of proceeding with Expedition for Adoni. Last Night Falutto Cawn, who remained behind, on

on Account of Indiſpoſition, wrote me a Letter (in conſequence of very important ones ſaid to have arrived from Bazalet Jung) offering me to halt here To-day. He is this Moment arrived, and acquainted me with the Purport of his Letter from Bazalet Jung, which Mr. Forſter has interpreted, and which I beg Leave to incloſe you; the Circumſtances it contains will prevent my going forwards. I ſhall be marching within a few Cos of this Place, juſt to exerciſe the Troops, till I may be honoured with your further Inſtructions.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and
obedient humble Servant,
H. Harpur.

Camp 4 Coſs N. Eaſt
Inacunda.
13th November 1779.

An Interpretation of the Intelligence which Fatah Ullah Khan gave me this Morning.

Yeſterday, being the 3d of the Month Zacadah, Two Horſemen arrived from Adoni, and brought to Fatah Ullah Khan, Four Letters from the Nabob Bazalet Jung; One for the Nabob Walajah, One for the Governor, One for Aſchan Khan, and One for himſelf. In the Letter to Fatah Ullah Khan, his Maſter writes him, that the Nabob ſhall ever regard, in the ſame Sort with his Life, the Treaty he has made with the Engliſh; but he is deeply affected that the peculiar Caſt of the Times have brought him to that Paſs, in which he is forced, for ſome Time, to ſuſpend and conceal the Appearance of Friendſhip with his new Allies. It is now Six Months ſince the Engliſh began their March to yield him Aſſiſtance, and he has been waiting with the greateſt Anxiety for their Arrival; with theſe Hopes, he did not raiſe any Troops of his own.

The Nizam his Brother, and Hyder Ally, by reaſon of his entering into an Alliance with the Engliſh, have become the Enemies of his Life. The Nizam ſome Time ago wrote to Hyder, that he (Bazalet Jung) had made a Treaty with the Engliſh, which Treaty would be highly diſadvantageous to them both, and in the End prove the Loſs of their Kingdoms; that therefore they jointly ſhould prevent the Engliſh from entering the Country of Bazalet Jung; and that he (Hyder) ſhould immediately ſeize on his Poſſeſſions. In conſequence of the Nizam's Letter, Hyder ſent Two thouſand Horſe and Six thouſand Sepoys, and took Poſſeſſion of all the Open Country; they alſo ſurrounded the Diſtricts which are contiguous to Adoni; that Bazalet Jung had given Tunkas in the Guntoor Circar, for the Payment of thoſe Troops which he ſtill retained, but on producing Tunkas to Mr. Douglas, he would not permit them to make any Collections. Theſe People returned to Adoni, and gave Bazalet Jung great Uneaſineſs. Hyder had at that Time, by ſeizing on the Adoni Diſtricts, ſtopped the Collection of Three or Four Lacks of Rupees; and on Bazalet Jung's ordering his Troops to attack the Enemy, they refuſed to act until the Receipt of their Arrears. The daily Stocks of Proviſions with which the Fort uſed to be ſupplied, was now ſtopped, and the great Supply which was already in it, had been wholly deſtroyed by the blowing up of the grand Magazine. The Nizam being apprized of Bazalet Jung's Situation, deſired him to ſend a Vakeel to his Court. On the Arrival of the Vakeel, the Nizam told him his Maſter (Bazalet Jung) might now ſee how fruitleſs his Connections with the Engliſh had proved, and that the Conſequence would be Ruin to this Country, and Deſtruction to his Life; but that if he would renounce all Concerns with the Engliſh, and regain Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, that he (the Nizam) would reſtore him to thoſe Countries which Hyder had ſeized on. The Nizam alſo wrote Bazalet Jung to this Effect, and ſent him a Supply of One Lack of Rupees; That Hyder Ally had written to him (Bazalet Jung) that he ſhould immediately deſtroy the Country, himſelf, and Family, if he did not ſpeedily diſcontinue all Correſpondence with the Engliſh. Under theſe perilous Circumſtances Bazalet Jung and Sadat Ullah Khan had reſolved, without Delay, to join the Engliſh Detachment; when Bazalet Jung received a Letter from the Nizam, requiring him, without Loſs of Time, to break with the Engliſh, and reſume the Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar; and that if they (the Engliſh) did not immediately comply, and march out of the Country, that he (the Nizam) would beſtow the ſaid Circar upon Hyder, and that they would jointly extirpate the Engliſh from the whole Carnatic. On Bazalet Jung's making this Reſolution of joining the Engliſh Detachment known to his own People, they would not ſuffer him to take that Step, but deſired him to join his Brothers. On ſeeing his own Troops impeding his Junction with the Engliſh, and revolving in his Mind his own Diſtreſſes, he thought it moſt expedient to accept the Nizam's Terms, and accordingly wrote to him to that Effect. Bazalet Jung has written to the Governor the Reſult of his Deliberations, and hopes that concealing a ſhort Space of Time his Regard, will be thought adviſeable and agreeable to the preſent Poſture of Affairs; that as ſoon as the Times aſſume a more favourable Appearance, the Friendſhip which he will ever entertain for the Engliſh Company, will be ſtrongly cemented, and laſt for ever. Fatah Ullah Khan, on the Part of his Maſter, requeſts that I would ſtop the Progreſs of the Detachment until further Orders from the Preſident and Select Committee, to whom Bazalet Jung has fully written on the preſent Subject.

A true Interpretation,
Geo. Forſter.

H. Harpur.

The Committee having taken the foregoing Letters into Conſideration, are of Opinion, that, agreeable to Bazalet Jung's Requeſt, the Detachment ſhould be directed to ſtop their March immediately; and a Letter is ordered to be prepared, and ſent to the Commanding Officer, deſiring him to continue where he now is, or to return to Inacunda, as he ſhall judge moſt proper; and directing him to ſtrike off ſuch Expences as ſhall appear ſuperfluous to him on this new Order.

Reſolved alſo, That a Letter be written to Bazalet Jung, acquainting him with the Order for ſtopping the March of the Detachment, in conformity with his Deſire; explaining to him fully all the Steps which have been taken on our Part for executing our Engagements, and the Concern we feel that he ſhould have found himſelf under the Neceſſity of concluding Terms with the Nizam, which was to deprive him of the Aſſiſtance of our Troops at ſo critical a Time, and when they were actually on their March to ſupport him: That notwithſtanding his Circumſtances, we conſider the Treaty between the Company and him to be ſtill in Force; that he may command the Aſſiſtance of our Troops at any future Time that he ſhall require it; and that the Revenues of the Guntoor Circar ſhall be faithfully applied to maintain a Force for that Purpoſe, agreeable to the Treaty: That we are not at all pleaſed with the Interference which the Nizam has thought proper to uſe in this new Alliance, nor with the Reflections which he has thrown out to diſcredit our Intentions, ſo contrary to the Friendſhip he has always profeſſed for the Company; and that in the preſent uncertain Situation of Affairs, we ſhall keep our Troops on the Borders of the Guntoor Circar, to protect our Poſſeſſions, and counteract the Deſigns of any Perſons who may be diſpoſed to diſturb the public Tranquillity.

Ordered, That the Letter to Bazalet Jung be prepared, and diſpatched as ſoon as poſſible.

Tho^s Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Cha^s Smith.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 152. *To Bazalet Jung.—Dated 20th November* 1779.

I underſtand, by a Letter from Colonel Harpur, that you have ſent Orders to Ameer Saib, who is with him, to proceed immediately to Adoni; and that he is in conſequence marched without waiting for Colonel Harpur, who told him our Troops would be ready to go in Two Days. Ameer Saib and Rajah Behauder likewiſe told Colonel Harpur, that the Nizam agreed to give you Aſſiſtance; and that Mr. Lally was preparing to croſs the Kiſtnah, and enter into Adoni Country.

If this Intelligence be true, I am ſurprized you have not mentioned it to me yourſelf; nor can I account for your ſending Orders to your People, with Colonel Harpur to march without waiting for him. Upon this Subject, I can only repeat what I have ſaid in my laſt Letter, that nothing in my Power has been omitted to give you timely Aſſiſtance; and the Force I have ſent is fully adequate to protect your Country. Our Troops, I have no Doubt, will be with you in a few Days; therefore you ſhould ſet your Mind at Eaſe, and rely on their Support for removing all Cauſes of Apprehenſions. I underſtand from the Nabob, you have written to him in Terms of the greateſt Deſpondence, as if your Country and yourſelf were in the greateſt Danger, and deſpairing of the Support we had promiſed you: This is not worthy of that Firmneſs which ſhould accompany you in your preſent Situation, nor doing Juſtice to my Friendſhip, which, as you well know, has been exerted to the utmoſt for your Relief.

If the Nizam be diſpoſed to give you Aſſiſtance, I am glad of it; as the Nizam and the Company are, by the Bleſſing of God, in ſtrict Alliance, his Troops and ours may act together in your Defence; and I have no Doubt you will take all poſſible Care, that a perfect Agreement and Harmony may take Place between them. As to Mr. Lally and his People, you will remember the Nature of your Engagement with us, and proceed accordingly: It is, however, impoſſible that our Troops and thoſe under Mr. Lally can act in Conjunction; if therefore they enter your Territories, ours muſt halt for further Orders, or till you have directed their Removal from the Diſtrict of Adoni.

Before I conclude, I muſt mention a Circumſtance that appears neceſſary to communicate to you. Having reſolved to appoint another Officer to command our Troops in the room of Colonel Harpur, the Letter acquainting Colonel Harpur of this Step was, for the Sake of Expedition, ſent by the

Nabob's Tappal, and came into the Hands of Fatulla Khan; but Fatulla Khan, for Reasons which I am not yet informed of, did not deliver the Letter to Colonel Harpur, wherein he is very culpable. Thus you see that your People have contributed in some Degree to occasion the Delay which has happened. Your Prosperity is however now at hand; let me hear speedily of your Welfare, that I may rejoice. What can I say more?

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 21st November 1779.

Wrote the following Letter to Colonel Baillie, commanding the Detachment on its March to Adoni.

Sir,

We have received Two Letters from Lieutenant Colonel Harpur, of the 12th and 13th Instant. The Letter advising us that Fatulla Cawn had, in the Name of his Master, requested that the Detachment might proceed no further, for Reasons which he (Fatulla Cawn) fully explained to Lieutenant Colonel Harpur, and which have been communicated to us; we direct, in consequence, that the March of the Detachment may be stopped, and that you will encamp it on the Borders of the Guntoor Circar, within our own Territory, and there wait our further Orders. As there will be no Necessity for continuing the same Expences which must have been incurred on the Supposition of the Detachment marching to Adoni, you will reduce them as much as possible, keeping up only a sufficient Number of Bullocks for the Service of the Field Train and Carriage of the Ammunition and Stores. We should suppose Inacunda a proper Place to take Post at; but you will be the best Judge, on viewing the Situation of the Country, and considering how the Detachment can be best supplied with Provisions. We understand that Colonel Harpur has advanced about 4 Cos's from his former Encampment; and should the Spot he is now encamped on be within the Territory of Guntoor, and in other Respects eligible, it may be as well for the present to keep the Troops there, instead of marching them back.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
Tho^s Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Extracts from Fort Saint George Country Correspondence.

N° 154. *Bazalet Jung.—Dated 24th November 1779.*

I wrote you Two Letters of the Instant, explaining to you fully the Steps I had taken to assist you with Troops, according to my Engagements; the Reasons why these Troops had not yet reached you; and the Orders I had given, by which there would be no Doubt but they would arrive in your Districts within Eight or Ten Days from that Time. These Letters I hope you have received. Agreeably to the Assurances I gave you, the Troops, properly equipped with Guns and Warlike Stores of all Kinds, marched from Inacunda the 12th of this Month towards Adoni. On the 13th in the Evening, the Commanding Officer received a Letter from Fatulla Cawn, in consequence of very important ones said to have just arrived from you, desiring him to halt. Fatulla Cawn then explained to the Commanding Officer the Purport of your Letter to him; which was in brief as follows; viz. That the Nizam and Hyder Ally were both extremely offended at you for entering into an Alliance with the English, and giving up the Guntoor Circar to them; that they had threatened your total Destruction, if you did not immediately renounce that Alliance; and that Hyder Ally's Troops had seized and laid waste the Districts of Adoni, and obliged you to remain within your Capital; that the Nizam, being apprized of your Situation, told you again, that if you would renounce all Concern with the English, he would restore you to those Countries which Hyder had seized on. That these, with other Circumstances which you mention in your Letter, had at length compelled you in a Manner to accept of the Nizam's Terms, and that you had accordingly written him to that Effect; that you had written to me the Result of your Deliberation, and hoped, that concealing for a short Time your Regard for the English, would be thought adviseable, and agreeable to the present Posture of Affairs, but that as soon as the Times assume a more favourable Appearance, the Friendship which you shall ever entertain for the Company, would be cemented and last for ever.

I confess it was with much Surprize and Concern that I received the foregoing Account of your Situation, and the Determination you had taken upon it, particularly as nothing had been omitted to relieve you, and as the Troops I had sent for that Purpose, were on their

March, and likely to be with you in Time to reſtore you fully to your Poſſeſſions in ſpite of all your Enemies. The Reaſon why they were not with you before, I have already explained; and if you reflect a little, you will be convinced that I exerted myſelf in a remarkable Manner to fulfil my Engagements. You know, that ſo early as the Month of June I ſent a Body of Troops to march to your Aſſiſtance, but owing to ſome Miſunderſtanding or Neglect on the Part of your People, the Commanding Officer was unable to procure a ſufficient Quantity of Proviſions for them. The Delay which this occaſioned, and the Conſequences of that Delay, you are well acquainted with; and you know alſo, with Expedition I ſent a ſtrong Reinforcement to the Troops in order that they might force their Way to you againſt all Oppoſition, and offered you the moſt effectual Support. You now write, that your Situation has obliged you to come to an Accommodation with the Nizam, upon his own Terms; and deſire me to poſtpone the Aſſiſtance promiſed you by the Treaty, until the Times are more favourable. I have in conſequence ſent Orders to ſtop the March of the Engliſh Troops, and directed them to encamp on the Borders of the Guntoor Circar, where they will remain during the preſent Uncertainty of Affairs to protect our Poſſeſſions, and to puniſh any Perſons who ſhall dare to diſturb their Tranquillity.

I ſincerely hope your Agreement with the Nizam will anſwer the Purpoſe you expect from it, by reſtoring you the Diſtricts which have been ſeized on; at the ſame Time I muſt lament, that the Nizam ſhould require from you, as the Condition of his Friendſhip, that you ſhould forbear availing yourſelf of our Support, repreſenting us to you in Terms ſo injurious to our Honour, and ſo inconſiſtent with that Regard which he has always profeſſed for the Company. I flatter myſelf, however, that the Reports will have no Effect with you, but that the Friendſhip which has commenced between you and the Company, will increaſe and laſt for ever. You may depend upon my punctual Performance of the Treaty; and though you have thought it expedient for the preſent, to deſire our Troops may not be ſent to you, you may reſt aſſured that they ſhall always be kept ready for your Service, and that you may command their Aſſiſtance at any Time you think proper.

With reſpect to the Guntoor Circar, I ſhall undoubtedly fulfil my Engagements, by accounting Annually with you for the Revenues, after paying the Expences of the Troops ſet apart for your Aſſiſtance, agreeably to the Treaty. I have written to the Aumildar, concerning the Balances due to you from the Zemindars, and will give the neceſſary Orders that they be paid to you by Inſtalments, in ſuch Manner as not to interfere with the Revenue; which I have no Doubt you will approve. I cannot aſſign any Reaſon why your Tunkas and Orders upon the Zemindars were not attended to, unleſs it proceeded from your own Servants, who ſeeing their Authority about to expire, might, and I believe did, collect every Thing they could. As to Lieutenant Dougias, our Commanding Officer there, we gave him poſitive Orders to aſſiſt in the Recovery of your Demands, which we are ſure he would not diſregard. I ſhall be moſt happy to hear that you are freed from all your Troubles, and placed in a State of Proſperity, which may daily increaſe during your whole Life. Write me of your Welfare, that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

N° 166. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 5th December 1779; received 6th Ditto.*

I herewith ſend you Two Letters from the Nabob Bazalet Jung, brought here by One of his Servants; One of them is addreſſed to you, and the other to myſelf, and I requeſt the latter may be returned to me after you have read it.

Letter from the Nabob Bazalet Jung, to the Governor.—No Date.

In Conſideration of my Friendſhip towards the Company, and the Requeſt made by them to deliver up the Guntoor Circar for a certain Rent, I demanded a Body of Two thouſand Men for the Protection of my Country; theſe Troops did not arrive in Time, and his Highneſs being highly diſpleaſed, repeatedly iſſued Commands to me, that it was very improper to give up the Circar of Guntoor to the Engliſh; and that if I regarded his Pleaſure I ſhould take back the Circar of Guntoor, and countermand my Application for the Engliſh Troops; that in that Caſe he might continue his Friendſhip, but if I did not agree to thoſe Terms, he would be my Enemy: Hyder Ally Cawn, on the other Side, is diſpleaſed for the ſame Reaſon, and has given Orders to his People to ſeize and poſſeſs themſelves of my Country. You have been informed of all this, and of my Situation, which has been explained at large in former Letters, and now my Life and Government are in Danger. For Three or Four Months I waited in Expectation of the Company Troops, and the Perſon ſent by the Company to his Highneſs did not endeavour to reconcile this Buſineſs to him, which might have ſet aſide all his Doubts; nothing has been ſaid by you or me tending to the Detriment of his Highneſs's Affairs, or of Hyder Ally Cawn. After the Exploſion of the Powder Magazine in the

the Fort, a Magazine of Stores and Grain took Fire and was deſtroyed, and my Affairs were reduced to the loweſt Ebb: This Misfortune, and the Difficulties I and the People left with me were brought to, beſides the Clamours raiſed by the Soudars, and others whoſe Tunkas on the Guntoor Circar were not diſcharged, altogether rendered my Situation very diſtreſſing: The Supplies of Proviſions were cut off, and I had no Authority left whatever; My Situation is not to be deſcribed. There was no other Remedy but to comply with his Highneſs's Commands, for I had nothing left. I had put an entire Confidence in the Company's Friendſhip and Word, but as Things have happened, I am under the Neceſſity, conſidering my Situation, of writing to you in compliance to his Highneſs's Commands; that I expect from the Friendſhip of the Company that they will relinquiſh the Circar of Guntoor, and recal the Troops they intended to ſend me; this will put an End to the Troubles on both Sides, or elſe my Life and Government are in Danger; you will therefore, agreeable to my Requeſt, deliver back to me the Circar of Guntoor, and ſtop the March of the Troops; On this depends my Safety. You will know the Particulars from Caga Saud Ulla Cawn. What ſhall I ſay more?

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 30th December 17[illegible]

Extract of the Preſident's Minute.

I have alſo to recommend to the Committee, that an Account of the Conduct of Bazalet Jung, and what paſſed in conſequence of his ſeveral Letters, with reſpect to our Troops, be tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council.

Colonel Baillie writes, that there is at preſent not the leaſt Appearance of Troubles in the Quarters where the Troops under his Command are now ſtationed; but as the Times are ſo unſettled, and we are not certain what Movements may be made, either by the Nizam or Hyder Ally, it may be neceſſary to caution Colonel Baillie to be on his Guard, and, in caſe of any Attempts being made againſt the Guntoor Circar, or any other of the Circars, the Troops aſſembled at Ellore, after leaving a ſufficient Garriſon there, may have Directions to join him, in order to ſtrengthen his Detachment, and move as Occaſion may require, for the Security of the Northern Diſtricts; the Sepoys alſo, under Lieutenant Douglas, may be held in Readineſs. The Orders to Colonel Baillie ſhould be only to protect our preſent Poſſeſſions, and not to act offenſively againſt any Power, without our poſitive Orders.

The Committee approve of the Preſident's Sentiments, and deſire him to conſider of the proper Mode of having Security ready to tender to the Nizam, in caſe we ſhould be called upon for the ſpeedy Payment of the Peſhcuſh.

Agreed alſo, That Lieutenant Colonel Baillie be empowered, in caſe of any Movement towards the Guntoor Circar, either from the Nizam or Hyder Ally, to call for the Sepoys under Lieutenant Douglas, and for as many Sepoys as can be ſpared from the Maſulipatam Diſtrict; and that the neceſſary Letters be written, conformably to the Preſident's Recommendation.

Agreed, That the Gentlemen at Bengal be informed of our Proceedings in regard to the Guntoor Circar.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 171. *To Bazalet Jung.—Dated 28th December* 1779.

I received the Letter you were pleaſed to write me (without Date) giving an Account of your Affairs, the Diſappointment and Diſtreſs you have ſuffered by our Troops not marching in proper Time to your Aſſiſtance, the Engagements you were in conſequence obliged to enter into with the Nizam, and the Neceſſity you were under in conſequence of thoſe Engagements, of requiring us to deliver up to you the Guntoor Diſtrict; all which I perfectly underſtand. I have often repeated, and do now aſſure you, of the ſincere Concern I feel for the Misfortunes you have ſuſtained; and you will, I think, do me the Juſtice to believe, that, as far as depended upon me, every Thing was done to relieve you, agreeable to my Promiſes. It were unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, becauſe a Delay happened in the March of our Troops, partly owing to the Difficulty they met with in procuring Proviſions, Bullocks, &c. from your People, and partly owing to Cauſes which could neither be foreſeen nor prevented, that there has been Remiſſneſs in performing the Treaty. The Intention, in this Caſe, only ſhould be conſidered, and not any untoward Circumſtances that may have happened to fruſtrate that Intention.

It is with much Surprize and Concern I find, by your Letter, that the Nizam has expreſſed himſelf in Terms ſo hoſtile and diſreſpectful to the Engliſh, his Friends and Allies. This, I apprehend, muſt have ariſen from ſome Miſconception, or from the evil Reports of thoſe who wiſh to create a Difference between us. As to the Guntoor Circar, you are well acquainted with the Reaſons which induced this Government, ſome Years ago, to requeſt the French might have no Footing in it. Frequent Applications were made to the Nizam on this Subject, to little Purpoſe; but, from a Deſire of living on Terms of Friendſhip with him and with you, we did not purſue any other Meaſures but thoſe of Friendſhip. At length, the Propoſal made by you, of renting the Guntoor Circar to the Company, on certain Conditions, ſeemed calculated to remove all Objections; and I cannot poſſibly ſee any good Reaſons why the Nizam ſhould now raiſe Difficulties on the Subject. Our Part of the Agreement, on this Occaſion, has been, and will be, punctually performed. The Surplus Revenue, after deducting the Expence of the Troops and Sibendy kept for the Protection of the Country, will be faithfully remitted. An Account of the Expence already incurred for theſe Services, and of what may ariſe in future, with an Account of the Revenue, ſhall, at proper ſtated Times, be ſent to you, that you may be convinced we have not the leaſt Idea of benefiting by the Agreement, or of adding to the Diſtreſs you labour under.

Immediately on the Receipt of your Letter, deſiring me to ſtop the March of the Troops, they were ordered to halt, and return to Innaconda; and this, I have no Doubt, will be conſidered as a Proof of my Deſire to comply with your Wiſhes, and remove from the Mind of your Brother every Idea of a Deſign, on our Part, to interrupt the Peace of his Government. Our Troops ſtill remain on the Borders of the Guntoor Circar with no Deſign but to prevent Troubles; and if you have no further Occaſion for them, we ſhall ſoon order them into Quarters. May your Proſperity and Happineſs be ever increaſing! What can I ſay more?

Cha^{s} Oakeley, Sec^{ry}.

[For a fuller Account of this Subject, ſee Appendix to the Second Report, N° 79 to 94, inclusive.]

APPENDIX, N° 37.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 23d October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir Tho^{s} Rumbold, Baronet,
John Whitehill,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Charles Smith.

THE Preſident acquaints the Committee, that the critical Situation of our Affairs with Hyder Ally, induced him lately to take a Step in the View of ſounding the real Intentions of that Power, which he deemed it incumbent on him even to conceal from the Knowledge of the Committee; and he hopes the Expediency of ſuch a Conduct will be juſtified by the Nature of the Information he wanted to procure. He then goes on to obſerve, That the Letters and Meſſages received from Hyder Ally ſince we undertook the Expedition againſt Mahé, and formed an Alliance with Bazalet Jung, had been couched in Terms ſo hoſtile and unfriendly, that he could hardly conceive they were the genuine Productions of Hyder; and as it is well known the Nabob's Enmity to Hyder Ally is ſuch, that he would avail himſelf of every Occaſion that might offer of promoting a Rupture; he (the Preſident) thought it not impoſſible but that Hyder's Vakeel here might have been tempted to prevent or exceed the Intentions of his Maſter in his Repreſentations to this Government, and particularly as he (the Preſident) ſaw no juſt Cauſe that Hyder had to quarrel with us, and bring on a War, ſo contrary to his true Intereſt. Under the Influence of theſe Doubts and Opinions, he judged it expedient to ſend a Perſon privately to Hyder Ally with a Letter from himſelf, (which is entered in C. C. N° 139,) deſiring an explicit Declaration of Hyder's real Intentions towards the Company and Carnatic. The Perſon (Mr. Swartz) went accordingly, and was received with great Civility by Hyder; who at his Departure gave him a Letter in anſwer to the Preſident's (which is entered in C. C. N° 142) by which he (the Preſident) has too much Reaſon to apprehend that Hyder's Intentions are really ſuch as they have for ſome Time appeared from his Letters; hoſtile both againſt the Company and

and the Carnatic, and that it is become neceſſary for the Committee to guard as much as poſſible againſt the Conſequences.

The Letter from the Preſident to Hyder Ally, and the Anſwer, together with another Letter from Hyder ſince received, as entered in C. C. N° 142, being now read, the Committee agreed in Opinion with the Preſident, concerning the Deſigns of Hyder; and that the only Meaſure which can yet be taken with Propriety, is to adviſe the Gentlemen at Bengal of our Sentiments on this Subject; which is accordingly agreed to. Agree alſo, that Brigadier General Goddard be informed of our Situation with Hyder, which we hope will prove a ſtrong Inducement to him to come to an Accommodation with the Marattas upon any reaſonable Terms.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 139. *From Hyder Ally Cawn to the Governor; in anſwer to his Letter of the 28th September 1779; received 16th October Ditto.* dated

I have received your Letter, the Contents of which I underſtand. Mr. Swartz came here ſome Time ago, and brought me a Letter from you, to which I have wrote an Anſwer, containing all the Particulars, and ſent it to you by him. He alſo will acquaint you with ſeveral Matters which I have charged him with. I return you the Engliſh Letter for Mr. Swartz, which came encloſed in your's. Continue to write me of your Welfare. What ſhall I ſay more?

N° 142. *Copy of a Letter from the Governor to the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn. Dated 11th June 1779.*

After the uſual Compliments;

Since my Arrival from Europe, I have wrote you ſeveral friendly Letters, to which I have received Anſwers; but thoſe have cauſed me great Aſtoniſhment, for I cannot conceive you would write to me in the Manner they are expreſſed, after the friendly Profeſſions I had made.

As many intereſted and deſigning People do not wiſh that there ſhould be a friendly Alliance between you and the Company, I am led to think ſuch People have been at Pains to diſturb the Friendſhip between us, and prevent the Union which we both have at Heart, from taking Place; in order therefore to aſſure myſelf of your real Intentions, and to remove every Doubt from my Mind, I have thought of one Expedient, which is to ſend a Man in whom I can confide, who will proceed to you without Pomp or numerous Attendants, and whoſe going to you is a Secret to every Body here, even to Vinajee Pundit, your Vakeel. By this Perſon I have ſent the Copies of all the Letters received from you, and of all I have wrote to you ſince my Arrival, that he may explain to you every Part of them; if, notwithſtanding the Sincerity of my Profeſſions, you ſtill do not wiſh to be friendly connected with us, you will acquaint the Perſon whom I have ſent with your Sentiments, and permit him to return to this Country; but if it is your Deſire to enter into the Bonds of Friendſhip with the Company, you may put an intire Reliance on the Perſon whom I have ſent to you, who will communicate to you every Particular you may be deſirous of knowing.

It is my Wiſh in that Caſe, as I before wrote to you, to meet you in any convenient Place you may think proper, as nothing will tend more to the Cement of our Friendſhip, than an Interview in which I can aſſure you perſonally of the Sincerity of my Intentions, and uſe the moſt proper Expedients to render our Friendſhip laſting. If, however, ſuch a Meeting cannot be effected, a Perſon of Rank ſhall be ſent to you from hence to treat with you, and bring Matters to a Concluſion. May our Friendſhip ever increaſe.

Upon a Rickah.

I intended by the Bearer to have ſent you a few Things as Tokens of my Friendſhip, but conſidering it might render his going too public, I have deferred ſending them till another Opportunity.

From Hyder Ally Cawn to the Governor.—No Date; received by Mr. Swartz.

I had the Pleaſure of receiving your Letter by Mr. Swartz, containing friendly Aſſurances towards me, and a Deſire that the Friendſhip between the Company and me may be firmly eſtabliſhed.

Before

Before this, when a Friendſhip confirmed by a ſolid Treaty ſubſiſted between the Company and me, I imagined it would increaſe daily, and would not be broke through. You, ſetting aſide all Faith and Treaties of the Company, have lately ſent Troops againſt Mahé, a French Factory ſituated within my Territories, and plundered it; and beſides this, have committed Depredations in the Countries of Callicut and Cahingury, belonging to me. There are, in my Countries, many Factories belonging to the Engliſh, Germans, Dutch, Portugueze, Danes, and others, amongſt thoſe was one belonging to the French, and there was no Perſon in it who bore the Profeſſion of Arms; it was no more than a Factory, ſuch as the Engliſh, on many Places of the Sea-coaſt. Notwithſtanding the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Company and me, you, without any Regard or Conſideration for it, ſent your Troops, and deſtroyed the Factory of the French, and pillaged the Countries belonging to me: What Propriety was there in this? You wrote me beſides, that you were ſending a Body of your Troops to the Nabob Bazalet Jung, from which I conceive you pay no Regard to the Friendſhip between the Company and me, but do whatever your Inclination leads you to, and are determined at any Rate to break with me. I was convinced, that the King of England, and the Company were one, and that there would not be the ſmalleſt Deviation from the Treaties made by the Company; but I now think otherwiſe from your Proceedings.

Having a Conſideration for the Friendſhip of the King of England and the Company, I have made no Repriſals, or taken any Revenge till this Time: It is no Matter; but if you, henceforth forgetting all Treaties and Engagements of the Company, ſtill are intent on breaking with me, what Advantage can attend writing to you? You are acquainted with every Thing; it is right to act in all Things with Prudence and Foreſight.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 30th October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet,
John Whitehill,
Sir Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

Wrote, and diſpatched, the following Letters:

To Brigadier General Goddard, commanding the Army at Surat.

Sir,

We have ſent Orders to Colonel Braithwaite, who commands our Troops at Mahé, to obey any Requiſition you may find it neceſſary to make for the Aſſiſtance of thoſe Troops; but we ſincerely hope the Neceſſity will be avoided, by the Concluſion of an honourable Treaty with the Maratas.

We think it proper to acquaint you, that from the Conduct of Hyder Ally, we have the greateſt Reaſon to ſuppoſe his Intentions are hoſtile towards the Company, and that he means to take the firſt favourable Occaſion of breaking with them. Thus circumſtanced, a Peace with the Maratta State is the moſt deſireable Thing that can happen, as it will enable us effectually to keep Hyder in Awe, and to employ our Arms at the ſame Time in ſuch Manner as the great national War in which we are engaged may require.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
30th October 1779.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We had the Honour to receive your Letter of the 2d Auguſt, acquainting us with your Reaſons for thinking the French at the Iſlands meditated an Attack on Bombay, and requeſting in Conſequence that we would detach 1 Battalion of Europeans, 3 Battalions of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery Men, from the Forces belonging to this Preſidency, to join the Army commanded by Brigadier General Goddard; whom you ſhould direct to grant the moſt effectual Support in his Power to the Government of Bombay, for defeating any hoſtile Attempt that might be made againſt it.

We ſhall always be led by Inclination as well as Duty to co-operate with you to the utmoſt of our

Power,

Power, in any Plan you may adopt for the Security of the Company's Poſſeſſions; but in the preſent Caſe we hope there will be no Neceſſity for ſuch great Succour to aſſiſt the Gentlemen at Bombay, even ſhould they be attacked, ſince we underſtand their Force is very equal to their Protection againſt any Attempt which can be made by the French in their preſent State; and we are inclined ourſelves to this Opinion, becauſe, having written to Bombay in the Month of July, to inform the Preſident and Council of the Intelligence we had received relative to the Intentions of the French, they do not in their Letter expreſs the leaſt Apprehenſion of the Inſufficiency of their Force; and we ſhould ſuppoſe further that, had they any Doubt upon this Head, they would have detained the Aſia Man of War, which was ſent from England purpoſely to aſſiſt in their Defence, and which they allowed to leave Bombay in the Month of Auguſt to join the Admiral at this Place.

But after all, we conceive the French at the Iſlands will not be in a Condition to fit out an Armament againſt Bombay without conſiderable Support from France; and as far as we can learn from private Intelligence, their Nation is too much preſſed, both in Europe and in the Weſt Indies, to ſpare any Reinforcement for this Country.

Brigadier General Goddard, in a Letter to General Sir Hector Munro, dated the 15th Auguſt, after mentioning that he is authoriſed to make a Requiſition of the Force at Mahé, writes as follows:

"At preſent it is impoſſible for me to ſpeak with any Certainty of the Effect of my Negociation with the Maratta State, or whether I may have Occaſion for this Reinforcement or not; but as I ſhall make it my Care to have every Thing prepared for the Tranſportation of the Troops, I hope you will previouſly furniſh the Officer who is in Charge of them, with ſuch Directions as may prevent any Cauſe of Delay on their Embarkation, ſhould Circumſtances ſo fall out as to render their Junction neceſſary."

We have likewiſe a Letter from our Commandant at Mahé, enclofing a Copy of One from the Governor at Bombay to him; in which he writes, "Brigadier General Goddard acquaints me, that he has been adviſed from Bengal, that the Troops under your Command at Mahé will be inſtructed to obey his Requiſition to join his Army, ſhould he not ſucceed in his Negociations with the Marattas." From theſe Letters we ſhould conceive that the Object of the Reinforcement was principally to ſupport General Goddard's Negociations with the Marattas; and this is a Matter of ſo much Importance, that we are diſpoſed heartily to concur with you in promoting it. We have ſent Directions to Colonel Braithwaite to obey any Requiſition that may be made by Brigadier General Goddard for the Troops at Mahé, which conſiſts of One Company of European Infantry, One Company of Artillery, Six Companies of Grenadiers, and Eight Companies of Battalion Sepoys. We think it proper to mention however, that we are under ſome Doubt whether the Sepoys will voluntarily embark on this new Service, ſince they have been abſent from the Coaſt Nine Months; and though they went to Mahé by Sea with uncommon Alacrity, and have behaved remarkably well there, they have expreſſed an anxious Deſire to return to the Coaſt; and Colonel Braithwaite wrote ſome Time ago, that if they were detained from it much longer, he was apprehenſive that a conſiderable Number might deſert; we are inclined, notwithſtanding, to believe they will be prevailed upon to proceed if the Service require it; but ſhould they not, we have deſired the earlieſt Notice may be given us, that we may replace them by an equal Number, which can be ſent from our Southern Garriſons to Anjengo in a very ſhort Time, and embarked from thence.

As to any further Reinforcement than the above, we are apprehenſive our Situation will not admit of it, at leaſt for the preſent. The Non-arrival of the Fleet leaves us at great Uncertainty concerning the King's Troops; and the Seaſon being now too late for the Ships to come on the Coaſt, we are at a Loſs where or when to expect them: We muſt obſerve likewiſe, that the Conduct of Hyder Ally makes it abſolutely neceſſary for us to be as much as poſſible on our Guard. The Language he holds in his Correſpondence, and the great Preparations he is making for War, manifeſt a ſtrong Inclination of breaking with the Company; and we believe he only waits a favourable Conjuncture, which may ſoon happen, to declare himſelf openly. A War with Hyder, let the Event be ever ſo ſucceſsful on our Part, would diſtreſs the Carnatic beyond Meaſure, and prove a moſt expenſive Burthen on the Company. We ſincerely hope therefore, that General Goddard may conclude a Treaty with the Marattas, and thereby free the Company from the Neceſſity of engaging with the Two moſt powerful States of India at the ſame Time, which will probably be the Caſe if he fails in his Negociation. Should we be at Peace with the Marattas, Hyder will be afraid to diſturb us, for, excluſive of our Strength, which he could then have no Hope of reſiſting, the determined Enmity which the Marattas bear him, would induce him rather to court our Friendſhip, than to provoke us into Hoſtilities; and this is preciſely the State wherein only we can expect to preſerve that Tranquillity in the Carnatic, which is ſo neceſſary to the Affairs of the Company at all Times, but eſpecially at this Juncture.

We earneſtly requeſt you will be pleaſed to ſend, by the firſt proper Conveyance, the Five Lacks of

of Rupees which we were promiſed as in Auguſt laſt, and which are much wanted to anſwer our extraordinary Demands.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
30th Oct. 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 38.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 22d April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, Preſident;
John Whitehill,
General Munro,
Charles Smith.

MINUTES of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letter from Sir Eyre Coote:

To the Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

The Multiplicity of Buſineſs I have been engaged in, has prevented me from embracing an earlier Opportunity of informing you of my Arrival here the 23d of laſt Month, and of my taking my Seat at the Board the next Day, when I ſtated the Neceſſity there was for ſupplying you in ſome Degree adequate to the great Expences I was ſenſible you were at, and the Difficulties which you would certainly be reduced to for want of a Treaſury, ſhould Hyder put his Threats in Execution by entering the Carnatic.

I have now the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that the Governor General and Council have agreed to ſend Fifteen Lacks of Rupees for the ſupporting of the Government, Ten of which are to be embarked on Board the Stafford, Captain Hutchinſon, who will have Orders to proceed directly to Madras; the remaining Five will be ſent by ſome other Ships in order to divide the Riſk.

As much will depend upon the Letters that were expected from Hyder Ally when I left Fort Saint George, I am moſt anxious to know the Contents of them, flattering myſelf, from the Converſation I had with his Vakeel, that they will prove ſatisfactory.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 10th November 1779.

Mr. Smith delivers in the following Minute:

Having attentively conſidered what the Preſident has entered on our Minutes of the 23d ultimo, relative to his having ſent the Rev. Mr. Swartz with a Letter to Hyder Ally, together with the Anſwer which the Prince has returned; and having from thence extended my Reflections to the general Situation of the Company's Affairs here, and connected it with the Probability of an approaching Rupture with Hyder Ally; I have thought it incumbent on me to embrace the earlieſt Opportunity of ſubmitting to the Committee my Opinion on theſe important Subjects. Of all the Country Princes, Hyder Ally is by far the moſt powerful and moſt dangerous: His Connections with the French; his having Sea Ports to introduce Troops and Military Stores; his Army, conſiſting of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery, in Number and Diſcipline greatly ſuperior to any other Country Power, with Abundance of Cannon and ſmall Arms; theſe Advantages, added to a rich Treaſury, his Vicinity to the Carnatic, and laſtly, the Abilities and enterpriſing Spirit by which he has attained his Greatneſs; threaten the moſt fatal Conſequences,

ſequences, unleſs his Power be circumſcribed, while it remains in ours to effect it. In ſupport of what I have ſaid, as to the Power and Reſources of Hyder Ally, I ſhall quote Part of a Letter from Lord Clive, in the Month of October 1766, to the then Preſident here. "The chief Strength of the Marattas is Horſe, the chief Strength of Hyder Ally is Infantry, Cannon, and ſmall Arms; from the One you have nothing to apprehend, but Ravages, and Plundering, and Loſs of Revenue; from the other, *Extirpation.*"

The reducing ſo aſpiring a Man as Hyder Ally within Bounds, muſt be attempted ſooner or later.

I would not be underſtood to recommend precipitating the Company into a War with Hyder Ally in the preſent Juncture, but I doubt if it can be avoided. Hyder's Conduct with regard to Mahé, his ſending Ships to the Mauritius, the Reduction of Cuddapah, his late Conduct reſpecting Colonel Harpur's Detachment, his advancing Part of his Troops towards Adoni, and the Stile and Spirit of his Letter by Mr. Swartz, indicate, in my Opinion, the moſt hoſtile Intentions, and ſcarcely leave us any Option, unleſs we recede from our Engagements with Bazalet Jung, and leave him to fall a Sacrifice to his Reliance on our Faith. Such being my Opinion of our preſent Situation with regard to Hyder Ally, I ſhall proceed to explain myſelf further, and offer my beſt Advice reſpecting our future Conduct. not ſo much from a Preſumption that I ſhall ſuggeſt any Thing to the Committee that has not already occurred to them, as for my own Juſtification hereafter, that in caſe of any adverſe Fortune, my Employers may have no Cauſe to reproach me with having been inattentive to their Concerns. In this (in my Mind) critical Period, I muſt confeſs I have been much too ſanguine in my Ideas of Hyder's Diſpoſition towards us; however, being now convinced of his hoſtile Intentions, if the Committee are of the ſame Opinion, I would propoſe, that the Government General at Bengal ſhould be immediately adviſed of it, as alſo of our Situation at large, and every Circumſtance pointed out that can enable them to form a Judgment on a Subject of ſuch Importance. I would alſo recommend the conſidering of ſome Plan to be ſubmitted to the Government General, for proſecuting the War with Vigour, and bringing it to an happy and ſpeedy Concluſion, which, I am perſuaded, the united Strength of the Three Preſidencies, properly directed, would eaſily effect. In the mean while, I think, we ſhould lay our Account with the Army's taking the Field in January, and employ every Hour between this Time and the End of December, in making the neceſſary Preparations for that Purpoſe; and as the Detachment now under Orders to proceed to Bazalet Jung, will be of the utmoſt Importance, either for ſtopping Hyder's Progreſs in that Quarter, or acting offenſively againſt him, in caſe he ſhould oblige us to do ſo, I propoſe that it be ſtrengthened by drafting from the Northern Circars at leaſt Two other Battalions, which I imagine might well be ſpared, as the Detachment will then afford real Protection to thoſe Provinces, while Sepoys, ſcattered and divided as they are at preſent, cannot.

Laſtly, I ſubmit to the Committee, the Propriety of collecting a ſtrong Body of Troops, immediately to be cantoned at Conjeveram or Vellore, and held in readineſs to act as Occaſion may require.

Charles Smith.

The Committee are of Opinion, that they have already taken the only Meaſures in their Power, in conſequence of the late Intelligence received from Hyder Ally, by writing fully to the Governor General and Council of Bengal on the Subject, and by collecting their Troops as much together as poſſible, to defend the Country in caſe of Invaſion. Their future Conduct muſt depend on what the Gentlemen at Bengal may determine: Upon the preſent critical Situation of Affairs, and until they know what Part thoſe Gentlemen mean to take, they can purſue no active Meaſures whatſoever, being entirely without the Reſources neceſſary for putting any conſiderable Body of Men into the Field. As to reinforcing Lieutenant Colonel Harpur's Detachment, ſuch a Meaſure, ſhould it be found neceſſary, may be taken hereafter.

APPENDIX, N. 39.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Consultations, the 10th November 1779.

DISPATCHED the following to Bengal:

To the Honourable Warren Hastings, Esquire, Governor General, and Council, at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since we had the Honour of writing to you last, we have received Letters fom General Goddard, and from the Gentlemen at Bombay, intimating a great Probability that Hostilities will take Place with the Marattas, and advising, that Requisition has been made to our Commandant at Mahé, to proceed as soon as possible, with his Force to Surat.

In this State of Affairs on the other Coast, we deem it expedient to mention to you again, the critical Situation we are in with respect to Hyder Ally, whose Conduct of late has given us the strongest Reasons to believe that his Intentions are hostile towards the Company and the Carnatic, and that he will seize the First favourable Occasion of breaking with us. The Cause of his Resentment, as appears from his Letters, is the Attack made on the French at Mahé, who, he says, were under his Protection; and our Alliance with Bazalet Jung, which has given some Check to his Views of Conquest in that Quarter.

Hyder Ally has long been making warlike Preparations, and his Force now assembled at Seringapatam consists, as we are informed, of 30,000 Sepoys and 20,000 Horse; should he enter the Carnatic, it will be totally out of our Power to prevent the Ravages of his Horse, and of Course we must suffer materially in our Revenues, and in the Means of supporting our Expences of every Kind; in this Case, the only Dependance we shall have, will be on the Efforts you will be able to make in our Favour, and we could wish to know in Time, what Assistance we may rely on, that our Measures may be taken accordingly.

If we be compelled to act against Hyder, the best, and indeed the only proper Plan in our Opinion, is to send a considerable Force by Sea to Mangalore, to penetrate by that Way to Seringapatam, and at once to lay Siege to his Capital; this would be the most effectual Means of distressing Hyder, and putting an End to the War. The Communication between Mangalore and Seringapatam, might be kept open, and our Troops supplied from the Sea with Provisions and other Necessaries, with much less Risk from Hyder's Cavalry than by any other Mode that could be adopted.

We think it proper to mention to you, that the Force we have sent into Bazalet Jung's Country to protect it, in consequence of our Engagements, consists of One Company and a Half of European Artillery, Two Companies of Infantry, and Four Battalions of Sepoys. These Troops added to the Detachment ordered to join General Goddard from Mahé, make up no inconsiderable Part of our Army, and the Force we have left, unless reinforced by the Battalion of King's Troops expected from England, will be by no Means adequate to the various Services required from them.

Having in this and former Letters, fully acquainted you with our Situation, we shall only express our sincere Hope that the Company may at this critical Juncture be freed from the greatest Inconvenience, if not Danger, of maintaining a War against the Two most powerful States in India at a Time when their Attention is sufficiently taken up in guarding against the Designs of a natural Enemy, who is waiting every Opportunity to distress them; we think Peace with Hyder is so absolutely necessary, that we shall neglect no Measures in our Power to attain it; and we still flatter ourselves, that the Marattas may be brought to Terms of Accommodation; since the Proposals for a Treaty with them, which you transmitted for our Information, were so fair and equitable, supposing no other Requisition have been made, that we cannot be persuaded they will finally reject them.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 39.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 29th November 1779.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, dated the 27th Inſtant, as entered in C. C. N° 158. incloſing a Paper of Intelligence from his Agent to Hydrabad: Which mentions, That a Treaty had been concluded between the Marattas and Hyder Ally, and acceded to by the Nizam, for uniting their Forces, and commencing a general Attack upon the Company's Poſſeſſions in every Part of India.

Agreed to acknowledge the Receipt of the foregoing Letter from the Nabob; to acquaint him, that we have no Account from any other Quarter, of the Proceedings mentioned in his Paper of Intelligence; and that they are ſo improbable, that we cannot give much Credit to them. Nevertheleſs, ſhould any Deſign of the Nature therein mentioned be attempted, we ſhall always be ready to defend his Country, as well as the Company's Poſſeſſions, againſt all Invaders: And we have no Doubt, with the Support he is able to give us, that we ſhall be ſtrong enough to diſappoint every Effort that ſhall be made againſt us.

Extract of Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 161. *To the Nabob.—Dated 2d December 1779.*

I have received your Highneſs's Letter of the 27th November, with a Copy of Intelligence from the Court of Nizam ud Dowlah. I hope and believe that the Facts therein mentioned have not taken Place; and indeed ſuch an Alliance is ſo improbable, and attended with ſo many Difficulties, that I do not ſee how it can be effected. At any Event, however, I am in no Pain for the Conſequences ſaid to be propoſed from it; and I truſt, by the Bleſſing of God, and the Support which your Highneſs is capable of affording, that the Company will maintain you in your Poſſeſſions and Authority, in ſpite of all the Powers of Hindoſtan united againſt you.

N° 168. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 14th December 1779; received 15th D°.*

I ſend you encloſed a Paper of Intelligence which I have juſt received from Poonah. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence ſent by Raw Gee at Poonah; dated 15th Zecayed or 24 November 1779.

I have, in a former Addreſs, acquainted your Highneſs that Colonel Goddard was coming here to have an Interview with the Pundit Purdhaun.

Colonel Goddard was at Bombay on his Way thither. I am ignorant of the Subject of his Conferences with the Gentlemen there; but I have heard Colonel Goddard and Ragonaut Row had diſagreed on account of ſome Money Matters. It had been ſettled that Ragonaut Row ſhould have Ten Anas, and the Engliſh the remaining Six Anas in the Rupee. And the Engliſh, at this Time, demanded Money of him for the Expences of the Troops, and deſired him to raiſe Horſe. Ragonaut Row was diſpleaſed at this, and told them, he would give them what he had agreed for; and if they aſſiſted him in placing him in the Government of Poonah, they were to be at the Expence of maintaining the Troops till that Time: that it was to repay them that he had promiſed the Six Anas in the Rupee. Colonel Goddard, upon this, ordered the People, who had been ſent by Ragonaut Row to different Places about Surat, to leave their Stations. And he wrote to the Pundit Purdhaun, that it was his Intention to reduce his Country; that he was at Liberty to ſend his Aumils, who had left the Country from Fear; and that he himſelf intended coming to him. Anand Bhay, the Wife of Ragonaut Row, made up Matters between him and the Engliſh, and ſatisfied Colonel Goddard, who returned to Surat, and ſent back to Poonah Nehal Chund, one of the Vakeels who had been ſent to him. Nehal Chund arrived at Poonah the ſame Day that Dewagee Pundit, the Vakeel of Moodagee Boonſala, had taken his Leave of Nana Pehu Nevez. The Letters of Colonel Goddard, and the Meſſage he ſent by the Vakeel, contained an Offer of renewing the Treaty made with Colonel Upton; that nothing that had happened ſince ſhould be regarded; but that the Maratta Government ſhould make good One Crore and Twenty Lacks of Rupees, which had been expended by the Engliſh; and that Ragonaut Row ſhould have a Jaghire given him in the Guzerat.

The

The Maratta Miniſters and Dewagee Pundit conſulted together, and agreed, that as the Troubles had laſted now Seven Years, during which they had not been at Liberty to purſue their Conqueſts, it would be better to ſettle Matters at any Rate. Shortly after Sundee and Holkar came to take Leave of the Dewajee Pundit; he related to them the Particulars of Colonel Goddard's Meſſage. Sindee anſwered, that it was unreaſonable, for the Engliſh made Treaties and broke them; and they had ſomething new every Day. That notwithſtanding they had been defeated, they ſtill would not depart from their bad Intentions, and it was therefore neceſſary to chaſtiſe them; that if they choſe to abide by the Terms ſettled at Tulicanoor, it was well; but if not, they muſt ſuffer for it. He ſaid it was improper to treat with the Engliſh, for that they were a bad People, and would not fulfil their Engagements; that he would take it upon himſelf to chaſtiſe them, and bring back Ragonaut Row.

Nana Peper Newez was ſilent upon this; and Dewagee Pundit took his Leave, and went away. Sindi alſo returned to Sam Canoon, and Holkar went to Wobar Canoon. Hurry Pundit and Nana Peker Newez conſulted together, and agreed it would be better to ſettle Matters agreeable to Colonel Goddard's Offer, but on Condition that the Engliſh ſhould abide by the Terms ſettled, and be ſincere: That with regard to the Money they demanded, they ſhould tell them, that if they had expended Money, it was by their own Miſconduct; that they had broke the Treaty, and commenced the War themſelves. To whom was it that they were applying for Money; that the Maratta Government had, by the Conduct of the Engliſh towards them, been obliged to expend near Three Crores of Rupees; that they had loſt Money of their principal Sudars, and a Number of Horſe; and they had loſt every Year a Revenue of One Crore of Rupees: That Hyder kept Poſſeſſion of Countries, which yielded an Annual Revenue of One Crore more, having ſeized the Opportunity to forward his Affairs; that all this was owing to the Engliſh, who had broke the Peace, which they had agreed to keep: That ſtill they made no Repriſals, but they were aſtoniſhed at the Demand of Money made of them: Who was to repay them for the Expences they had ſuſtained? With regard to Ragonaut Row's Jaghire, they agreed to tell Colonel Goddard that they would abide by what had been formerly ſettled on that Account; and that Ragonaut Row might go and enjoy his Jaghire at Sanſri.

Nanar Peker Nevez and Hurry Pundit gave all this in Writing to Nchall Chund, and ſent him back to Colonel Goddard on the 29th of Showal. They told him privately at the ſame Time, that they would give up ſome Diſtricts, by Way of Aſſignment; and if the Engliſh inſiſted hard for a Jaghire in Guzerat, for Ragonaut Row, they would conſent to it. They are now waiting for the Anſwer to thoſe Propoſals. They have heard ſince, that after the Vakeel arrived at Surat, Colonel Goddard went again to Bombay; and after conſulting for Fifteen Days with the Gentlemen there, he is come back to Surat. Although the Sums propoſed are agreeable to thoſe of the Engliſh, yet it is reported that the Bombay Gentlemen do not wiſh for Peace: They are deſirous of having a War; for Colonel Goddard told the Vakeel, that no Peace could take Place, unleſs Ready Money was given. The Vakeel's Letter, however, has not yet been received. The Row Pundit Purdhaun waits for an Anſwer to the Letter he has wrote to the Governor General of Bengal.

Hyder Ally Cawn's Vakeel, Nurſing Row, was here at Poonah ſome Time, and delivered ſeveral Letters from his Maſter. He has ſettled for 25 Lacks of Rupees; and he is alſo to give up certain Countries to them. Nurſing Row has now been diſpatched with Preſents of Elephants, &c. to Hyder. It is reported that the Engliſh Troops who were going to Adoni, were forced to return, but the Reaſon is not known. It is ſaid that Hyder's Troops, to the Number of 15,000, Horſe and Foot, have taken Poſſeſſion of the Country of Adoni; and that Bazalet Jung has wrote to his Brother for Aſſiſtance: That the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah has ſent his Son with 5,000 Horſe, and the French in his Service, to Bazalet Jung. It appears that a Rupture will take Place between the Engliſh and Hyder this Year. The French who were with Bazalet Jung ſent their Vakeels to the Maratta Miniſters, but they conſidering that their Numbers were ſmall, and that they could be of no Service to them, but might give Umbrage to the Engliſh, would give no Countenance to them; for although the Engliſh were to blame, yet they would not do any thing to diſoblige them.

Sukarum Pundit and Boyapa Purſund are ſtill confined in the ſame Place. Mero Pundit has been allowed to come to Ahmudnagur, on Account of ill Health, but is now again ſent to the Fort near that City. Some ſeditious People entertained a Deſign of poſſeſſing themſelves of the Fort, but the Scheme was diſcovered, and ſome principal Men were ſent from Poonah to ſettle Matters there. Some of thoſe concerned in the Plot have been puniſhed, and their Wealth confiſcated for the Uſe of the Government. Hyder Ally Cawn has agreed to pay the Maratta Government 25 Lacks of Rupees. All the Country on the South Side of the Jung Budra is to remain in his Poſſeſſion; he is alſo to keep thoſe on the other Side of the Kiſtnah, on Condition that he invades the Carnatic. If the Engliſh give up aſſiſting Ragonaut Row, and ſend their Troops to oppoſe Hyder, the Maratta Miniſters are to aſſiſt him with their Troops, or elſe they are to engage the Engliſh on the Bombay Side, and Hyder is to attack them in the Carnatic. He is not to make Peace with the Engliſh, until Matters are ſettled here with him; and the Maratta Miniſters on their Part are not to make Peace with the Engliſh, till Nizam ud Dowlah and Hyder's Affairs are ſettled. They deſign alſo to ſend Modagee Boonſala's

Troops into the Chicacole and the other Circars, to prevent the Bengal Troops from coming to the Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh.

Intelligence has been received here, that the Engliſh Troops marching to Adoni, through Part of Hyder's Country, were oppoſed by Hyder's Troops, and that they were obliged to retreat; that a Rupture is now commenced between them; it is his Intention firſt to poſſeſs himſelf of Adoni, and then to claim from the Engliſh the Circar of Guntoor.

The Maratta Miniſters were overjoyed at this Intelligence, and have ſent a Perſon along with Nurſing Row to ſettle Matters with Hyder. They have wrote to Bazalet Jung in Terms of Reproach; they tell him, that ſince he knew the Engliſh were their Enemies, and thoſe of his Brother, what could he mean by entering into Friendſhip with them, and giving them his Country? they adviſe him to drop all Thoughts of it, ſince it is contrary to their Pleaſure and that of his Brother, or elſe that he may repent of it. It appears from the Letters and Meſſages ſent by Hyder, that his Deſign is to go to War with the Engliſh.

Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 30th December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir Tho' Rumbold, Bart. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Charles Smith.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

Having fully conſidered our preſent Situation with reſpect to the Country Powers, and having too much Reaſon to ſuppoſe, from the Declaration of the Governor General and Council, that a War with the Marattas is inevitable, as alſo from the Intelligence we have received, that nothing yet has been ſettled by General Goddard, I ſubmit to the Committee's Conſideration, whether our laſt Letters to Mr. Hollond and the Nizam are ſufficient to quiet the Mind of the latter with reſpect to the Peſhcuſh, or of any Deſigns on our Part to diſturb the Tranquillity of his Government; for as his Attachment to the Maratta Miniſtry has been declared by himſelf, and it is probable in caſe of a War with them, will lead him to take an active Part againſt us, eſpecially if what is ſo confidently aſſerted prove true, that Hyder Ally has entered into the Combination, and concluded a Treaty with the Miniſtry at Poonah.

It is incumbent on us not to afford the leaſt Pretence, either for the Nizam or the Governor General or Council to impute to this Government any Share in the Meaſures that have already involved the Company's Affairs in Difficulties, and are likely to be attended with a ruinous and deſtructive War. I have ſtill, from Circumſtances, ſome faint Hope that Peace may take Place; but ſhould the contrary happen, and the Nizam inſiſt on the immediate Payment of the Peſhcuſh, as a Condition of his remaining neuter, whether it might not be proper, as our Treaſury is unable to ſupply ſuch a Sum, either to take Meaſures for drawing Bills on Bengal, or of giving Soucar Security for the Payment of the Whole or Part of the Peſhcuſh in a limited Time?

It is with much Concern I obſerve, from the Letters of Colonel Braithwaite, that the Detachment under his Command has not been able to proceed to join General Goddard; and notwithſtanding the critical Situation we are in here with reſpect to Hyder Ally, and the Conduct of the Nizam ſo much depends on the Negotiation of General Goddard with the Marattas, and the bringing about a Peace with them, which probably may be the ſooner obtained by his Army being ſtrengthened as much as poſſible, that I conſider it adviſeable, at all Events, to ſend him a Reinforcement; and would recommend that One Battalion of Europeans and One Company of Artillery be ordered to hold themſelves in Readineſs to embark immediately; that Captain Panton, of His Majeſty's Ship Sea Horſe, be applied to receive Part of them on board, and that we endeavour to procure ſuch Country Ships as are in the Road, which, with the Beſborough and Britannia that may be daily expected, will carry the Detachment immediately to Surat. I wiſh if poſſible to ſend a Battalion or Two of Sepoys, or order them to Anjengo, to be embarked from thence Captain Panton informs me, that at this Time of the Year Veſſels may reach Surat in Twenty or Twenty-five Days from hence; and the Situation of Affairs appear to me in ſuch a Light as to require ſome immediate Exertion of our Force. We may daily expect the Arrival of Sir Edward Hughes with Lord M'Leod's Regiment on Board, which will add conſiderably to our Strength on the Coaſt, and enable us to form a ſufficient Army to cover the different principal Garriſons in the Carnatic. As for protecting the open Country againſt the Ravages of Hyder's Horſe, ſhould he declare againſt us,

is impossible with our Troops, that are composed of Infantry only. Should General Goddard be so fortunate to conclude a Peace with the Marattas, we shall have nothing to apprehend from any Quarter; but on the contrary, should he be pressed by the Marattas, and not be sufficient in Force to make Head against them, the Consequences may be fatal to that Part of India as well as destructive to the Company's Interest in general. The Ships from hence, with the Detachment, may touch at Mahé, and convey the Troops from thence, if they have not proceeded before, to join General Goddard.

The Committee approve of the President's Propositions, and Sir Hector Munro is desired to consider how the Detachment can be most expeditiously formed. The President is desired also to consult with Captain Panton upon the Means of transporting it to Surat, and to obtain sufficient Tonnage for that Purpose.

Fort Saint George Select Consultations, 31 December 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the Select Committee to the Governor General and Council in Bengal.

Enclosed we have the Honour to send you a Copy of an Intelligence Paper lately received from Poonah, and transmitted to us by the Nabob. We have undoubted Information that a Treaty of Peace and Alliance has taken Place between the Marattas and Hyder Ally.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
31st December 1779.

To Alexander Panton, Esquire, Commander of His Majesty's Ship Sea Horse.

Sir,

The Situation of Affairs on this Coast rendering it expedient that General Goddard, who commands the Bengal Army at Surat, should be reinforced by a Body of Troops from hence; we mean in consequence, to profit by the Conveyances that may offer for sending them; and we are induced earnestly to request you will on this Occasion assist us with His Majesty's Ship Sea Horse, as the Service is important, and requires every Effort that can be employed to support and countenance it.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
Tho' Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

Fort Saint George,
31st December 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 40.

Letter from Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, to the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Fort Saint George, 21ſt Jan. 1780.

Gentlemen,

I TAKE the Opportunity of a Veſſel ſailing for Buſſorah, to inform you of the Arrival of Sir Edward Hughes with his Squadron, and ſeveral of your Ships under his Convoy. The Reſolution and Hawke, with his Permiſſion, proceeded directly to Bombay. The Talbot has been ſome Time arrived at Bengal. You have before been adviſed of the Arrival here of the Ganges and General Barker. The Ceres and Prince parted Company with the Fleet at Sea, and are hourly expected. At preſent every Thing is quiet in the Carnatic, and nothing very material has occurred ſince my laſt Diſpatch to you, though we have been kept in continual Alarm from various Reports of the hoſtile Intentions of Hyder and the Nizam; the former in conſequence of a Treaty which it is confidently affirmed (and ſcarcely admits of a Doubt) he has entered into with the Maratta State; and the latter from the Friendſhip which has long ſubſiſted between him and the Infant Peſhwah and Miniſters at Poonah. Hyder has hitherto contented himſelf with extending his Conqueſts to the Northward, and has not yet invaded any Part of the Nabob's Poſſeſſions: Every Thing has been done on the Part of this Government to keep him quiet. At ſo critical a Juncture, and from the Advance of the Seaſon, without any Movement having been made by Hyder towards the Carnatic, I am induced to think we ſhall remain in Peace, eſpecially as the very ſeaſonable Arrival of the Fleet with the Troops, will have a very powerful Effect in preventing any Deſign of an Invaſion, if ſuch has been ſeriouſly intended. By the laſt Accounts from General Goddard, he had not been able to bring about a Treaty with the Marattas on the Terms he contended for; and viewing the Situation of your Affairs in that Quarter, and how evidently neceſſary it appeared, that General Goddard ſhould be rendered as formidable as poſſible, either to give him ſufficient Weight to bring about Peace, or to continue the War, if poſſible, to Advantage, your Select Committee here determined, notwithſtanding their Apprehenſions of the Nizam and Hyder, to ſend a very conſiderable Re-inforcement to join General Goddard at Surat. Accordingly we embarked with all Expedition, One Battalion of Europeans, One Company of Artillery, with Six Field Pieces, on Board His Majeſty's Ship Sea Horſe, the Morning Star (an armed Veſſel belonging to the Bombay Preſidency) and the Horſendon, (a Country Ship which we freighted for the Purpoſe.) They left the Coaſt the 11th Inſtant, and we have no Doubt but they will have a ſpeedy Paſſage to Surat. The Troops from Mahé have alſo had Orders to join General Goddard, and the 8th Battalion of Sepoys will embark from Pondicherry in a few Days, for the ſame Purpoſe. This conſiderable Re-inforcment, forming a Junction ſo unexpectedly with the Bengal Army, cannot fail to give great Weight to General Goddard's Negociations, and I hope will be productive of the beſt Conſequences. A Day or two after your Select Committee came to the Reſolution of re-inforcing General Goddard, the Nymph Sloop of War arrived with the Intelligence that Sir Edward Hughes with the Fleet, might be expected in the courſe of a Fortnight, which relieved us in ſome Meaſure from the Apprehenſions entertained in conſequence of our parting with ſo large a Force.

I have the Honour to incloſe you ſome Conſiderations on the preſent Political State of the Company in India. A Taſk ſo liable to different Opinions, on which ſo much has been already ſaid and wrote, I hope will meet from you with every favourable Indulgence; and as it is impoſſible to enter into a Work of ſuch a Nature, without pointing out thoſe ſeeming Errors that require to be remedied in the Company's Political Syſtem, I am to requeſt, that what I have found neceſſary to remark may not be conſtrued as Reflexions on any particular Perſons, but intended only to point out those Defects that may in future be guarded againſt, and cannot come under Conſideration at any Time more eſſential, than when a Renewal of Charter may be expected, and Regulations be formed by the Legiſlature, for the Security and Government of the Company's valuable Poſſeſſions in Aſia. I am further to entreat your Indulgence, when I preſume to obſerve, that as the preſent Adminiſtration here, has been conſidered and declared by yourſelves to be a temporary Government, in conſequence of the late unhappy Diſputes in your Settlement, it will be very neceſſary in any future Arrangement to conſider the Character, Abilities, and local Knowledge of ſuch Gentlemen as may be intended for the Government of this Preſidency. For me to remark from my own Obſervations or Opinion, on thoſe who may appear, from many Circumſtances, unequal to the Taſk, would be a diſagreeable and invidious Undertaking; but there can be no Reaſon why I ſhould not point out to you diſtinguiſhed Merit. A Courſe of Thirteen Years Service; a continual Employment in the Offices of Civil and Military Secretary; a thorough Acquaintance with your Political Intereſts; a Knowledge of your Affairs in different Departments; great Abilities, joined to Moderation and Firmneſs, with a proper Zeal for your Service, demand from me, not only a Recommendation, but as a Duty I owe to your Intereſts, to make you acquainted with thoſe Requi-

ſites in Mr. Charles Oakley, now the Secretary to the Select Committee; and whether you mean to make any Appointments in your future Government from Home, or from the Servants on this Eſtabliſhment, he may be of real Service to your Affairs, whenever you may think proper to bring him forward in your Service; which merits your early Conſideration.

We ſhall diſpatch to you, in the courſe of next Month, the General Barker and Norfolk, fully laden from hence, to be joined by the Ganges and Talbot from Bengal. They will proceed under Convoy of one, if not more, of His Majeſty's Ships.

It is with Concern I acquaint you, that I ſhall be under the Neceſſity of returning to Europe on the General Barker; ſuch has been my State of Health, that it has been Matter of Surprize my Conſtitution has held out againſt the repeated ſevere Attacks I have laboured under. I am the more particular in mentioning my Situation, becauſe, whilſt I have the Honour of receiving your Approbation of my Conduct, I quit the Management of your Concerns with great Regret and Reluctance; but was I to attempt remaining, and eſcape with Life through the approaching hot Seaſon, I could not do Juſtice to your Affairs, from my Inability to give the neceſſary Application to them.

I have the Honour to be, with great Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and faithful
humble Servant,
Thomas Rumbold.

Fort Saint George,
21ſt January 1780.

Extract of Select Letter from Fort Saint George, dated the 3d April 1780, to the Court of Directors.

Par. 13. We have adviſed your Honours from Time to Time, of the Diſpoſition and Movements of Hyder Ally Cawn. This Chief, by Means of our Wars with the Marattas, is now grown to a formidable Height of Power, and his Genius is ſo aſpiring, his Reſources ſo various, and his Authority throughout every Part of his Dominions ſo completely eſtabliſhed, that he is become an Object of the firſt Importance in the political Syſtem of India. Before we were engaged in Diſputes with the Marattas, that Nation turned all its Views to the Reduction of Hyder's Power, and waged inceſſant War for that Purpoſe: During many Years, Hyder, by his ſuperior and active Genius, was able to withſtand their Attacks, which, though very powerful, were of no long Continuance; and whenever the Marattas quitted his Country, he always found Means to recover himſelf ſo far as to be prepared for their next Invaſion. In this perpetual Scene of Warfare between the two firſt Powers of India, your Affairs were every where carried on in perfect Peace and Security, your Force was extremely reſpected and your Friendſhip courted by the Parties at War, and by every other State in India. This then was ſo preciſely the Situation in which we think you ſhould and might eaſily have continued, that nothing could poſſibly have altered it, but the Engagements entered into by the Preſidency of Bombay with Ragonant Row, and the different Attempts formed in conſequence to overturn the reigning Government at Poonah: The Views of the Maratta State became by thoſe Means inſtantly turned from Hyder to the Company: They withdrew all their Forces from his Country, to defend themſelves againſt the Attacks of Ragonaut Row and his Allies. Hyder availed himſelf of this Opportunity, to recover the Conqueſts that had been made from him by the Marattas, and to recompenſe himſelf by Conqueſts upon them; and the Marattas at length ſeeing no Proſpect of Relief from their Wars with the Engliſh, were forced to conclude a Treaty with Hyder, which they made Offenſive, that they might have the Benefit of his Aſſiſtance againſt us.

Par. 14. Such have been the Effects produced by our Diſputes with the Marattas; and if the Country Powers were capable of taking all the Advantages which a Combination might give them againſt us, we ſhould ſeverely feel the Weight of their united Operations; but fortunately for the Company, their Jealouſy of each other is too ſtrong to admit of any ſincere or permanent Agreement; and we think even now, notwithſtanding the Provocations which the Marattas have received by our Meaſures in Support of Ragonaut Row, were we to grant them any reaſonable Terms of Accommodations, they would inſtantly turn their Arms againſt Hyder, and leave us once more to the Enjoyment of that Tranquillity which we experienced from their former Conteſts with this Chief.

Par. 15. We adviſed you in our Letter of the 14th October, that we had made a Treaty with Bazalet Jung for obtaining Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, and effecting the entire Excluſion of the French Troops from that Quarter. We informed you likewiſe, that by One of the Articles of that Treaty, we had engaged, in Conſideration of Bazalet Jung's diſmiſſing the French Troops from his Service, to furniſh him with a Detachment from our Army for the Defence of his Country. This Detachment having been aſſembled in the Guntoor Circar in the Month of June, and afterwards augmented

by a Reinforcement, that it might be more adequate to the Purpoſes intended by it, was directed to proceed to Adoni, the Capital of Bazalet Jung's Territories, by the ſhorteſt Route. In the mean Time, both the Nizam and Hyder Ally appeared extremely jealous of the Connections formed between us and Bazalet Jung, and employed every Artifice in their Power to break it. The Nizam went even ſo far as to recommend in the ſtrongeſt Terms to his Brother, that the Guntoor Circar might be given at Rent to Hyder; and Hyder, with a View of terrifying him into a Submiſſion, invaded his Country with a conſiderable Force, and threatened the entire Conqueſt of it, if he heſitated to renounce his Engagements with us. Bazalet Jung was much perplexed by thoſe Efforts to counteract his Meaſures, and though he ſeemed to be very anxious for the Arrival of our Detachment of Troops to defend him againſt the Operations of Hyder, he was unable to make the neceſſary Proviſion for their March, and they were detained on this Account until the End of November before they could proceed. At length Bazalet Jung, cloſely preſſed on one Hand by the Danger which aſſailed him on the Side of Hyder Ally, and on the other, by the earneſt Importunities of his Brother, wrote us a Letter, repreſenting the Neceſſity he was under of ſubmitting for the preſent to the urgent Situation of his Affairs, and deſiring in conſequence that we would ſtop the March of the Detachment, and cauſe the Guntoor Circar to be delivered back to him. The Firſt Part of his Requeſt, about which he ſeemed the moſt anxious, we inſtantly complied with; but as we had done every Thing in our Power to fulfil the Agreement, we deemed it by no Means incumbent upon us to deliver up the Circar, and more eſpecially as we had ſo much Reaſon to believe this Diſtrict would in that Caſe have been given to Hyder; we therefore acquainted him upon this Article, that as he had already granted the Diſtrict to us on certain Terms, which we had faithfully obſerved, we could not think of reſtoring it, but that we ſhould punctually account with him for the Rent, and after paying the Expences which had been incurred by the Troops appointed for the Defence of his Country, remit the Surplus to him; and we informed him likewiſe, that as this Body of Troops would be ſtill kept apart for the original Purpoſes of the Treaty, he might call for its Aſſiſtance whenever the Situation of his Affairs ſhould require it. We have ſince, with a View of diminiſhing the Expence of the Detachment, ordered it into Quarters at Ellore, where, upon its Arrival, all the extraordinary Charges of Batta, &c. will be ſtruck off.

Par. 16. We conſider it upon the Whole, as a favourable Circumſtance for the Company that our Troops were not required to proceed to Adoni, as from the Part taken by Hyder Ally and the Nizam, to break our Connection with Bazalet Jung, there was much Reaſon to apprehend, if our Troops had marched on that we might have been embroiled with one of theſe Powers. Indeed, we foreſaw the Poſſibility of ſuch an Event, when the firſt Propoſals for a Treaty with Bazalet Jung were made, and certainly ſhould have avoided every Kind of defenſive Engagement, could we have accompliſhed the Objects we had in View upon any other Terms; but as the Queſtion was ſimply reduced to this, whether we ſhould allow the French Troops to continue in the Service of Bazalet Jung and the Guntoor Circar, and Port of Mootapillee to be employed as the Means of ſupporting, recruiting, and eſtabliſhing theſe our Enemies on the Borders of your Northern Poſſeſſions; or by giving that Aſſiſtance ourſelves to Bazalet Jung which he derived from the French Troops, procure their entire Diſmiſſion from that Quarter, and by having the Guntoor Circar in our own Hands, cut off every Proſpect of Reinforcement and Supplies in future; it appeared to us, that a defenſive Alliance, under theſe Circumſtances, was by much the leaſt Evil, and upon this Principle we were governed in our Proceedings. We think, however, that if Bazalet Jung ſhould, from the extreme Jealouſy and Averſion, which his Brother and Hyder Ally ſeem to have entertained againſt this Connection, be deſirous of annulling the defenſive Articles in our Treaty, and permitting the reſt, which concern only the renting of the Guntoor Circar to the Company, to ſtand as at preſent; ſuch a Propoſal ought by all Means to be accepted; and we mean accordingly, if any Opportunity of this Kind ſhould offer, to releaſe you from thoſe Articles, and thereby free you from the only Embarraſſment which can poſſibly attend this Connection.

Par. 65. In our Committee of the 5th January, you will find a Minute from the Preſident, accompanied by a Copy of a Memorial from Mr. Hare and other Engliſh Subjects, who came in a Danish Veſſel from Suez for India; and having put into the Port of Calicut, belonging to Hyder Ally, on the Malabar Coaſt, were made Priſoners by his Manager there (Sardar Cawn) and thrown into Confinement, where they were ſtripped of their Property, and extremely ill uſed. The Memorial was addreſſed to Sardar Cawn, ſetting forth the Circumſtances under which theſe Perſons laboured, and ſoliciting their Liberty, and the Reſtoration of Things which had been taken from them; but without Effect. The Preſident conſidering this ill Uſage as authorized, or at leaſt connived at by Hyder himſelf, propoſed that a Gentleman ſhould be diſpatched to him, to demand the Releaſe of the Engliſh Subjects; and Mr. George Gray was appointed for this Service. He ſet out accordingly the 14th January, but before he reached Seringapatam Hyder had releaſed them, and ſent them to Madras. Mr. Gray however proceeded, and delivered our Letter to Hyder on this Subject; at the ſame Time, giving him Aſſurances of our Diſpoſition to cultivate Friendſhip and good Underſtanding with him. Hyder made but an indifferent Return to theſe Overtures; he ſeemed neither deſirous of accepting our Friendſhip, nor did he treat Mr. Gray with that Civility which might have been expected. Mr. Gray very properly, as we had deſired him, ſeeing that his longer Stay would anſwer no good Purpoſe, and might provoke further Slight, and perhaps Inſult, deſired Leave to depart; and accordingly

ccordingly returned to Madras, with a Letter from Hyder, which is entered in Country Correſpon-ence this Year, N° 29. On Reference to that Letter, and one from Mr. Gray, entered in our Minutes f the firſt Inſtant, your Honours will be able to judge clearly of Hyder's real Diſpoſition towards us. lis unfriendly, not to ſay inſolent Conduct, could only have been encouraged by our preſent roubles with the Marattas, in which he finds ſo much Advantage, as we have already explained.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to forward to you encloſed, a Duplicate of my Letter of the 21ſt ult. (Original ia Luſſorah.) It is with infinite Pleaſure I inform you, that from the late Conduct of Hyder Ally, in eleaſing ſome Gentlemen that were detained by his Officers on the Malabar Coaſt, and from his emaining till this Time at Seringapatam, and withdrawing ſome Troops he had to the Northward, can ſpeak with Confidence, that there is no Likelihood at preſent of any Troubles on this Side of ndia; and I flatter myſelf, that during the Courſe of the Seaſon, ſome effectual Meaſures will be aken to bring about a Peace with the Marattas. It does not appear to me, that any great Advan-ages can ariſe from a Continuance of the War, which muſt be attended with very great Expence, and xhauſt thoſe Reſources that might be much better applied. The Tranquillity that reigns at preſent n every Department of your Service on this Coaſt, leaves me nothing further to add in this Letter, as our Addreſſes from the Select Committee and Board by the Ships now under Diſpatch, will inform ou of every material Tranſaction in your internal Government.

I am,
with great Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and faithful humble Servant,
Thomas Rumbold.

Fort Saint George,
1ſt Feb. 1780.

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Extract of Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 24th April 1780.

PRESENT,

Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Cha^{s} Smith,
Sir Hector Munro,
S. Johnſon.

READ the following Letter from the Governor and Council at Bombay.

To the Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Bart. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your Letters of the 17th December and 3d, 6th, and 7th of January, and have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that the Detachment under Colonel Brown is ſafely arrived at Surat.

We are very ſenſible of your Attention to the general Intereſt of the Company, in furniſhing ſuch a reſpectable Addition to the Strength of the Army under General Goddard; for as Matters now ſtand, the Proſecution of the War with Vigour appears the only Means of obtaining a ſafe and honourable Peace, for which we wiſh with as much Ardour as you do. General Goddard has hitherto proceeded with Succeſs, having concluded a Treaty with Futty Sing, one of the Maratta Jaghiredars, by

by which he has engaged to ſeparate himſelf from the Intereſt of our Enemies, and to make ſome valuable Ceſſions of Territory to the Company; in conſideration of which, our Army has reduced the City of Ahmedabad, the Capital of the Guzerat Province, which is to be put in Poſſeſſion of Furry Sing, if he duly performs his Engagements.

It will be of ſuch great Importance to keep on Terms with Hyder Ally during the Continuance of the Maratta War, and to compoſe the Troubles on the Malabar Coaſt, that we have determined to ſend a Gentleman to his Durbar, to endeavour to cultivate a good Underſtanding with him. The preſent Juncture ſeems favourable; and we have been the more encouraged to this Meaſure, from ſome Inſtances of Attention ſhewn by the Nabob to this Government. Theſe are explained in the incloſed Copy of a Letter from the Nabob to our Preſident; in which, having expreſſed ſome Diſſatisfaction at the Conduct of your Government, the Preſident has taken Occaſion, in his Anſwer (likewiſe incloſed) to offer the Nabob to make Uſe of his good Offices with you, Gentlemen, to remove all Grounds of Jealouſy; and we ſhall accordingly inſtruct Mr. Horſley, the Gentleman appointed to this Commiſſion, to receive Hyder's Repreſentation on this Subject, and to tranſmit them to you with ſuch Information as he may be able to obtain of his Diſpoſition towards the Honourable Company.

The European Force under Major Cotgrave is not ſo conſiderable that a temporary Delay in their joining General Goddard can be very material, eſpecially ſince the Arrival of the reſpectable Reinforcement under Colonel Brown; whereas, their quitting Tellicherry at this Juncture, might greatly endanger the Safety of that Settlement, and give an unfavourable Turn to the Negotiations, which appear likely to be opened with the Enemy. The Moment Circumſtances will admit, we will ſend the Europeans to join the Army, and return the Sepoys belonging to your Eſtabliſhment to Anjengo.

We are of Opinion that Major Cotgrave, in ſome Parts of his Conduct at Tellicherry, has greatly exceeded the Authority veſted in the military Commanding Officer in ſuch Circumſtances by the late Regulations; but as we hope, before your Interference can take Effect, that a Ceſſation of the Troubles will have left him at Liberty to quit Tellicherry, it is not neceſſary to enter into Particulars, though we flatter ourſelves, that on any future Occaſions, the Impropriety of ſending military Forces to this Coaſt, independent of our Authority, will not eſcape your Obſervations.

We requeſt you will forward the incloſed Packet to the Governor General and Council, by a ſafe and expeditious Conveyance; and have the Honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Bombay Caſtle,
7th March 1780.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn Bebader.—No Date; received the 1ſt February 1780.

After Compliments:

I have your Honour's friendly Letter, ſaying, my People do not permit the Engliſh Ships to anchor in my Ports, and deſiring that I will order the Releaſe of Nine or Ten Engliſhmen, their Families, Equipage, Papers, &c. who are detained at Calicut; all which I obſerve; and anſwer, That a Diſpute has ariſen upon account of the preſent Governor of Madras, his not obſerving the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and this Circar. He did ſend his Army to deſtroy the Settlement of Mahé, that is in my Dominions; and he moreover wrote me, that he was aſſiſting Bazalet Jung, and had for that Purpoſe ſent his Army to paſs to Adoni through my Country. My People therefore oppoſing theſe Troops, occaſioned a Skirmiſh between them; at laſt the ſaid Governor's Army retired back into its Limits. Our Limits are very cloſe; and his People do always moleſt mine, and ruin the Country. In this unfriendly Manner he treats me, and quarrels with my People always. I did thereupon order my Officers to take Care of themſelves, and to fight with the Engliſh People, upon entering my Country.

The Country of Nairs came into my Poſſeſſion Five or Six Years ago; ſince which Time the Reſident of Tellichery has protected them and their Families; and, by ſupplying them with Powder, Balls, and Muſkets, diſturbs my Country; by which a Territory of Twenty Lacks of Rupees is entirely ruined; and I cannot get the ſame increaſed. I wrote him, that as a Friendſhip has ſubſiſted between me and the Governor of Bombay for a long Time, that therefore he ſhould put a Stop to theſe Diſturbances; but he did not; all which has obliged me to prepare. The Engliſh Factory, for a long Time, never met with any Hindrance on my Part; and I deliver to them the Sandall, Pepper, &c. as uſual. The Balance that was due to the Factor of Onore, I have paid him, agreeable to his Account. Sometime ago your Reſident at Onore adviſed me, that he was, in conſequence of your Orders, returning to Bombay, leaving his Brother [meaning the other Factor] in the Factory; and which he did accordingly: Your Honour will therefore order the preſent Factor to bring the uſual Things according to my Indent, deliver them to me, and receive the Quan-

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ity of Sandal, Pepper, &c. I have, in conſequence of your Letter, diſpatched the aforeſaid Engliſhmen with their Families, Equipage, and Papers, to Sata Guddah, in the Diſtrict of Madras, ſupplying them with Conveyances, Biggarees, &c. No Diſpute has come between your Honour and me; but upon the People who occaſion unjuſt Quarrels I reſent them. Your Honour will always favour me with your friendly Letters, as it will afford me Pleaſure to hear of your Welfare.

Copy of a Letter to Hyder Ally; dated Bombay, 8th February 1780.

After Compliments:

I have received your Letter, and have great Pleaſure in the Inſtance it conveys to me of your Friendſhip, particularly with your ready Compliance with my Application for the Releaſe of the Engliſh Gentlemen, who had been detained by your Governor at Callicut. I obſerve what you write with regard to the Diſſatisfaction you have received from our Engliſh Troops having taken Mahé; which you ſay is in your Dominions, and from the Protection given by the Reſident at Tellicherry to the Nairs: To both theſe Points it is proper I ſhould give you a clear and friendly Anſwer. Mahé, as you well know, had been for many Years in the Poſſeſſion of the French; and during the former War between us and them, we conquered it as well as all their other Places in India. When Peace was made between us, our King ſhewed Favour to them, and gave back to them Pondicherry and Mahé; of which Places, on the breaking out of the preſent War, we have again diſpoſſeſſed them. They are our Enemies; you are our Friend, and ſhould rejoice at our Succeſs. The French held Mahé as we hold Tellicherry, long before you conquered the Country of the Nairs; there would therefore be no Breach of Friendſhip with you in our attacking Mahé: Theſe Things, I make no Doubt, have been repreſented falſely to you by your Enemies and ours. As to the Conduct of the Reſident at Tellichery, in protecting the Nairs, this is the Truth; the Perſons who came to live at Tellicherry, if they live peaceably and quiet there, are protected. This can occaſion no Difference between you and us; but when our Toops arrived to fight with our Enemies (the French at Mahé) the Chenika Nair went with his Nairs to help them, though we gave him no Offence (Mr. Church, our Reſident, is not ſuch a Man) he ſaid it was by your Order; but this I cannot believe, becauſe it would be contrary to your Friendſhip with us. When he aſſiſted our Enemies, we had no Occaſion to deſire his Friendſhip; we had other Friends; but I aſſure you the Reſident, Mr. Church, of Tellicherry, never could intend to give Aſſiſtance to any one againſt you, for which he had no Orders; and if he had done ſo, I would have puniſhed him for it. You ſay no Diſpute has ariſen between you and me, but the People who raiſe Quarrels without a Cauſe, you reſent their behaviour. My Anſwer with regard to the Cherika Man is juſt the ſame. If the Cherika Nair hears your Orders, ſend him Notice of our Friendſhip, as I ſhall to the Nairs who are now fighting againſt him, and the Quarrel will ceaſe; for I have never intended to give any Hindrance to your buſineſs in the Malabar Country. Our Troops have long ago left Mahé, which we do not deſire to keep, but to root out our Enemies. This may convince you. I intend in a few Days to ſend you an Engliſh Gentleman, a truſty and a wiſe Man, who will ſatisfy you of all Things that you deſire to know, and convince you how much I wiſh that our Friendſhip may ſtill encreaſe. I ſhall direct the Things for which you will write to me, to be provided and bought, and in all other Reſpects ſhall be glad always to give you every Mark of my Sincerity and Friendſhip. I am very ſorry to hear of the Differences that have happened between you and the Governor of Madras, on the Subject of Bazalet Rang, becauſe the Governor of Madras and I act under the ſame Circar. I return you Thanks, however, for informing me of theſe Affairs, and though they are not in my Hand, yet I hope a true Friendſhip may be able to come between, and accommodate all Matters of Diſpute and Doubt, that Friendſhip between you and our whole Nation may encreaſe. If what I propoſe is agreeable to you, I hope you will ſend your Hookums and Randanies to Mangalore and Onore, that on the above mentioned Gentleman's Arrival at either Place, he may proceed without Delay, and meet with Treatment ſuitable to his Character. I am convinced of your Friendſhip and honourable Conduct towards the late Reſident of Onore, who has informed me of all Particulars; for all which I return you Thanks.

But I have a Matter of Complaint to make to you with reſpect to the Delivery of the Sandal Wood of your Country, which I find is delivered in a large Quantity to the Agent of Mr. Bolts at Mangalore and Billiapatam, to the great Detriment of the Honourable Company and myſelf; and this Agent of Mr. Bolts is ſelling it to People who are noways concerned either with me or the Company, to my Prejudice. I wiſh your Health; and may our Friendſhip daily encreaſe!

True Copies.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secry.

Read the following Letter from Major Cotgrave:

To the Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, President and Governor, &c. &c. &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to encloſe you a Copy of a Letter which I received from the Honourable the Select Committee of Bombay. The Orders of which the Reſident and Factors complain, are as follow:

Tellicherry, Saturday, 5th February 1780.

General Orders.

"All Strangers or others, on their Firſt Landing, to be ſent to the Commanding Officer's Tent, and none, of whatever Nation, to be admitted into the Fort, upon their Firſt Arrival, without his ſpecial Permiſſion. This Order, though formerly iſſued by Colonel Braithwaite, the Major is ſurpriſed has not been ſtrictly complied with. The Major further orders, that no Boats be ſuffered to go on board any Ships or Veſſels in the Road or Offing, without his ſpecial Leave; and that all Packets, Letters, or Cajans, arriving by any Boats or Patamars, be ſent up by a Man of the Bankſall Guard to Head Quarters."

My Reaſon for iſſuing the Order regarding the Boats was, becauſe I imagined Mr. Church (on the Appearance of a Ship in the Offing) wrote to the Captain, and by that Means prevented my getting a Paſſage to Surat; but when I found it was of no Uſe I revoked it.

I beg Leave to aſſure your Honours, that I never have had the leaſt Diſpute with Mr. Church or his Council; on the contrary, we were on Terms of Intimacy till I found he took underhand Means to detain me, and then I confeſs I left off viſiting him, but nothing further paſſed.

On the 5th in the Morning, at Day-break, about a Thouſand of the Enemy's Select Men made a deſperate Attack on our Lines; they brought Scaling Ladders with them, and a few penetrated and cut down a Soubahdar, Three Sepoys, and Seven or Eight of the Militia; they were, however, ſoon beat back with the Loſs of Two hundred and Seventeen Men killed and wounded.

There is as little Appearance of an Accommodation with theſe People as there was the Firſt Day of my Arrival here; and I am convinced that Hyder not only encourages but aſſiſts them.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,
Jn° Cotgrave.

Tellicherry,
9th May 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. to Lord Viſcount Weymouth; dated Superb, Madras Road, 5th April 1780.

I beg Leave once more to repeat to your Lordſhip, that the Situation of this Country requires Tranquillity, and a cloſe Attention to the real Intereſts of the induſtrious Natives; which though a leſs dazzling, will be found by the Company and the Nation to be a more efficacious Method of obtaining permanent Proſperity and real Opulence, than any Acceſſion of Territory or Extent of Conqueſt can poſſibly beſtow.

I have Reaſon to think the Marattas are well inclined to treat, and our late Succeſs in the Guzaret Country will I hope be made uſe of to re-eſtabliſh Peace with them on an honourable Footing; but if any Judgment can be formed of Hyder Ally's Intentions, from the Language he holds, they muſt be extremely hoſtile to the Britiſh Intereſts; as a Letter he wrote to the Governor ſo late as the 19th of March, in anſwer to an Attempt to bring on a Negociation by the Means of a Mr. Gray, is replete with the ſevereſt Strictures on the Conduct of the Company's Governors on both Coaſts; and that your Lordſhip may have an Opportunity to judge of it more fully, I have encloſed a tranſlated Copy for your Peruſal.

APPENDIX, No. 42.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 5th June 1780.

READ the following Letter from Lord Macleod:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

In a Letter from Major M'Kenzie to me of the 24th Instant, is the following Paragraph, "I beg "Leave to remind your Lordship, that the Regiment is often distressed for Provisions, as the Sepoys "are often prevented by the Country People from driving in the Sheep for the daily Supply."

This Treatment of the King's Troops is most cruel and unjust, and to me appears the more extraordinary, after the repeated Assurances which the Ameer, who I understand manages the Nabob's Affairs at Poonamalee, so often gave to Sir Thomas Rumbold and to myself, that Provisions should be regularly furnished, and no more Cause given for Complaint.

The repeated Breach of this Promise gives me too much Reason to think that the same may continue; I must therefore, Gentlemen, most earnestly desire and entreat your powerful and effectual Interposition, that the Regiment may be furnished with good and sufficient Provisions, and no more Cause given for Complaint: As, if Redress is not speedily given, I shall be under the very disagreeable Necessity of ordering Detachments of the King's Troops to support the Sepoys in the Execution of their Duty, let the Consequences be what they may; for while the Regiment has Money to pay, and Arms in their Hands, they will not, they cannot starve.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient and most humble Servant,
Macleod.

Fort Saint George,
25th May 1780.

The President acquaints the Committee, that upon receiving the above Letter from Lord Macleod, he waited upon the Nabob, and requested him to give effectual Orders for supplying the Regiment; and that he has no Doubt the Nabob will pay due Attention to this Point in future.

Read the following Letter from Lord Macleod:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, and the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

The Instant I received your Letter of the 27th Instant, enclosing the Copy of a Petition from the Inhabitants of the Village of Noumul, I sent it to the Commanding Officer at Poonamalee, with Orders to make the strictest Enquiry into the Truth of the Matter, and to let me know the Result. I have received Two Letters from Major M'Kenzie on that Subject, the Copy of a Letter from Major Elphinston to the Ameer, and the Declaration of a Subedar, of a Naig of Sepoys, and of the Linguist of the Garrison at Poonamalee; which all concur to prove that the Assertion of the Inhabitants of Noumul, that they had not sold Spirituous Liquors to the Troops, is false.

It cannot escape your Notice, Gentlemen, that the Inhabitants of Noumul were supported by some of the Nabob's Troops in opposing the Sepoys; and that these Troops did attack and beat your Soldiers, when doing their Duty according to Orders: I shall therefore say no more on this singular Event.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient and
most humble Servant,
Macleod.

Fort Saint George,
the 31st May 1780.

Right

Right Honourable Lord Macleod.

My Lord,

I have the Honour to peruſe the Letter from the Select Committee to your Lordſhip, and the Petition from Noumul to the Committee. I do not find any thing againſt the Soldiers of the Regiment in the Petition; it ſeems to be againſt Major Elphinſton, or me, and the Sepoys. The enclosed Copy of a Letter to the Ameer will give your Lordſhip a juſter Knowledge of the Facts than what is repreſented in the Petition. I ſhall make every Enquiry poſſible, as your Lordſhip deſires; and in Obedience to your Commands, I ſend the Letters back by Expreſs.

I have the Honour to be
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient
humble Servant,
James Mackenzie.

Poonamalee,
29th May 1780,
8 o'Clock Morning.

To the Right Honourable Lord Macleod.

My Lord,

Soon after the Arrival of the Regiment here, and repeatedly ſince, the Sellers of pernicious Toddy and Arrack in the adjacent Villages, were ſtrictly forbidden to give any to the Soldiers of the Regiment; but for their own Advantage they have diſregarded theſe Orders, and Drunkenneſs, Riots, and Puniſhments have been the Reſult.

On or about the 10th of this Month many Soldiers were ſeen drinking at Noumul; Major Elphinſton ſent Two different Meſſages to the Toddy Sellers to come up to him, which they diſregarded; the Conſequence was what is ſet forth in the encloſed Declaration, which we believe to be ſtrictly true. We believe further, that the Petition of the Inhabitants at Noumul is a continued Series of Falſhood. We wiſh, however, with them, that the Governor and Select Committee may enquire fully into the Matter, that the Offenders may be brought to Puniſhment. We think it indiſpenſably our Duty to ſupport our Sepoys, upon whom, in a great Meaſure, our Exiſtence depends, againſt the Inſults of the Inhabitants, which they frequently meet with.

I am,
My Lord,
Your Lordſhip's
moſt obedient humble Servant,
James Mackenzie,
Major 73d Reg.

Poonamalee,
May 30th 1780.

The Declaration of the Linguiſt of the Garriſon at Poonamalee, of a Naig of Sepoys, and of a Subedar; 30th May 1780.

The Linguiſt and Naig ſay, that they were ſent by the Commanding Officer, with Four Sepoys, to bring up to him the Toddy Sellers at Noumul; that they took Two of them into Cuſtody.

That ſeeing the People of the Village gathering, they tied their Hands with Cords; that the Inhabitants, aſſiſted by Four Sepoys and Two Havildars of the Nabob's Troops, to the Number of Two hundred, or upwards, with an Amenah, beat the Linguiſt and Sepoys, and reſcued the Toddy Sellers; that One of the Sepoys of the Garriſon was ſent to acquaint the Commanding Officer.

The Subedar ſays, that in conſequence of the above Report, he marched with Half his Company, with Orders from the Commanding Officer to reſcue his own Sepoys firſt, to fetch the Toddy Men and the Nabob's Sepoys who had been guilty of the Riot; that upon his Appearance at Noumul, the Inhabitants hid themſelves; that he however found a Havildar, Two Sepoys of the Nabob's Troops, and Four Inhabitants, whom he brought to the Commanding Officer.

Declares, that no Houſes were forcibly entered; no Plantations deſtroyed; and nothing taken away by his People, except as above.

Says further, That the Inhabitants never quitted their Habitations, as ſet forth in the Petition.

APPENDIX, N° 42.

Read another Letter from Lord Macleod.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor and President, and the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

When I arrived at Madras, it was impossible for me to have any Idea of the Quarters at Poonamalee, and what Number of Troops could be commodiously lodged at that Place, but I was very soon convinced, that 500 Men were the most that could with Propriety be quartered there. I took the earliest Opportunity to mention this Circumstance to the then Governor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, who was so sensible of the Truth of what I told him, that he repeatedly assured me, that sufficient Barracks should immediately be built, for the commodious Accommodation of the whole Regiment, before the hot Season came on. The Land Winds are already begun, and will, as I am informed, be followed by the rainy Season; and hitherto there is no Foundation laid for new Barracks at Poonamalee.

The Duty I owe to the King my Master, to the Regiment, and to myself, and likewise the Attention I owe to the Interest of the Honourable the East India Company, at whose earnest and repeated Request and Solicitations the King's Troops were sent to this Country, for the Protection of their Settlements, obliges me, Gentlemen, to request, that you will, without further Loss of Time, either order sufficient Barracks to be built at Poonamalee for the Accommodation of the Regiment, which yet, notwithstanding the many Deaths, exceeds 1,000 Europeans, including Soldiers Wives; or that you will be pleased to give the Regiment more spacious and convenient Quarters in some other Garrison, where they may continue united in One Body, conformable to the Commander in Chief's Orders to me. The Regiment continuing any longer in the crowded Quarters they now occupy, cannot fail proving fatal to the Lives of many Men, of which they have already had too melancholy a Proof.

Fort Saint George,
the 1st June 1780.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient and most humble Servant,
Macleod.

Major Maule to be called upon to inform the Committee why he has not begun the Barracks.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19th June 1780.

Mr. Johnson delivers in the following Minute, to which Mr. Smith subscribes.

As there are various Reports of the warlike Preparations making by Hyder Ally, and that he has engaged 4 or 500 Lascars, as if resolved to commence Hostilities, I beg Leave to submit to the Consideration of the Board, whether it may not be expedient for us to make some Arrangements which may be requisite for our Safety; and since that we are also preparing for such an Event, therefore, in my Opinion, we ought to have the exactest Accounts which can be procured of Hyder Ally's Forces, and where they are stationed, by which Means we may be enabled to form some Judgment of his Intentions.

We can now take into Consideration the Means of maintaining an Army in the Field, and if we find this impracticable, can deliberate on Measures for reinforcing our Garrisons, and for keeping a Force at least sufficient to protect the Company's and Nabob's Possessions; as it is from them our Resources for Money and Provisions must principally arise in Times of Danger and Distress.

A proper Return of the Stores and Provisions in the different capital Forts, will enable us to form a Judgment of what may be further wanting to put them in a proper State of Defence.

The State of Pallemcotah and Madura requires immediate Attention, as the swelling of the Rivers may next Month put it out of our Power to reinforce them.

Tanjore, I doubt not, is in a proper State, but we should be perfectly satisfied on this Head, as from thence we have Reason to expect great Aid in case of an Invasion.

The General is the best Judge of the present Disposition of our Army, and how far it may be expedient to leave the Europeans divided.

Madras,
the 19th June 1780.

Sam[l] Johnson,
Cha. Smith.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 28th June 1780.

Diſpatched the following Letter.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council of Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the Honour to tranſmit to you, a Copy of a Letter received from Mr. George Smith, dated at the Cape of Good Hope, the 24th April, together with Extracts of News.

You will be able to judge from theſe Papers, what Credit is due to the Report of a French Armament preparing for India, and whether it be adviſeable to take any immediate Steps in conſequence. We ſhall regularly ſend you any further Intelligence that may come to our Hands, and heartily co-operate with you in fruſtrating the Deſigns of our Enemies. Should ſuch an Armament really come abroad, the Object of it, we conceive, muſt be to aid the Marattas or Hyder Ally, and indeed the Motions of this laſt Chief ſtrongly indicate an Expectation of powerful Support from the French. He preſerves a conſtant Intercourſe with the Governor at the Iſlands. Veſſels have come to him from thence with Military Stores, and he has during the Courſe of the laſt and preſent Year, been making great warlike Preparations. His Army is now aſſembled near Bengalore, and equipped in ever Reſpect for immediate Action. Part of it is actually advanced towards the Frontiers of the Carnatic, and our Intelligence mention that he is employing People to clear the Road leading to one of the principal Paſſes.

Such is the Appearance of Things at preſent. If an Invaſion take Place, we ſhall act in the beſt Manner we are able for the Defence of the Country, but we fear our Difficulties will be great for want of Money, as our ordinary Supplies even depend upon the growing Revenues, which in caſe of Invaſion will fall very ſhort.

We are, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
28th June 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 3d July 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant Roberts, commanding at Tiagar.

To Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Forces.

Sir,

As there is a Report of Hyder Ally's collecting a large Body of Forces, with an Intention of entering the Carnatic, I think it my Duty, as commanding at Tiagar, to repreſent to you the Inſufficiency of the Garriſon for its Defence, having only One Company of the Nabob's Sepoys in it, and though there are Nine Guns mounted in the Fort, ſome 24, 14, and 12 Pounders, there is not a ſingle Gunner belonging to the Garriſon, and only Seven Laſcars. It may not be improper to obſerve that there were always ſome Invalid Gunners, one Tindle, and Fifteen Laſcars, till juſt before the Siege of Pondicherry, when they were recalled, and have never been replaced.

As you, Sir, are no Doubt acquainted with the natural Strength and Situation of Tiagar, which from its Affinity to Hyder Ally's Frontiers, which are not above 20 Miles, render it liable to a ſudden Attack, and its Diſtance from any Company's Garriſon not being within 60 Miles of the neareſt, prevents it from receiving any immediate Relief, I ſhall beg Leave to leave you, Sir, and the other Gentlemen of the Honourable Board, whom I ſhould be glad you would make acquainted with my Situation, to judge of the Neceſſity of reinforcing the Garriſon, being the beſt Judges of the Conſequence of it.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
G. Roberts.

July 2d. 1780.

Ordered to lie on the Table.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 42.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 17th July 1780.

Fort Saint George, 3d July 1780.

At a Committee of Stores;

PRESENT,

Major General Sir Hector Munro, K. B.
Colonel Edward James,
Major Geo. Maule,
Mr. Bryan Scottney.

1st. The Honourable the Select Committee having ordered the Indent for Vellore to be supplied except the Gun Carriages; Agreed to apply for their Directions, whether the Guns and Mortars which have been ordered for that Place, are to be sent without Carriages and Beds, or whether they are to wait till Carriages and Beds are ready for them, if the Select Committee shall be pleased to order them to be made up. Agreed also to represent, that it would be useless to send them without Carriages and Beds, which cannot be so well made if the Guns and Mortars are sent away, and the Guns cannot be conveniently removed without Carriages, there being no proper Mode of Conveyance.

The Guns and Mortars to be detained until Carriages are made for them.

2d. Colonel James represents to the Committee, that the Gun Carriages, Tumbrils, &c. at the Mount, except the Six Pound Carriages lately sent from Madras, are, by being long exposed to the Weather, rendered unfit for Field Service; he therefore desires to be supplied with new or serviceable Gun Carriages in lieu of those which are damaged, as there is now a Shed erected which will preserve them in future. Agreed to recommend to the Honourable Select Committee, that the Gun Carriages which require repairing be exchanged.

To be exchanged, as recommended by the Committee of Stores.

3d. As Six of the new 6lb. Carriages which were ordered to be made up and kept in Store for Field Service, have been sent to Surat; Agreed to recommend to the Honourable Select Committee, that Six new Carriages be made up in their Room.

Ordered accordingly.

4th. The military Storekeeper lays before the Committee, Indents for Tents for the Use of the 6th, 9th, and 18th Battalions of Sepoys. The Committee are of Opinion, that they should not be complied with at present, there appearing to be no immediate Necessity for them.

Approved.

Hector Munro,
E^d James,
G. Maule,
B. Scottney.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 42.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19th July 1780.

Mr. Smith enters the following Minute.

The Conduct obſerved for a Length of Time by Hyder Ally, has given us but too much Cauſe to believe his Intentions are hoſtile towards the Engliſh; and from the late Reports, which ſeem well authenticated, it appears not to admit of a Doubt but his Object is to diſturb the Peace of the Carnatic, an Event which would not leſs affect the Intereſts of the Nabob than the Company. It is confidently aſſerted he is already on this Side the Paſs, within a few Days March of Madras, with a very conſiderable Army of Infantry, Cavalry, and a large Train of Artillery. In this alarming Situation, I think it incumbent on us to make ſome vigorous Effort, without Loſs of Time, to oblige him, if poſſible, to retire from the Carnatic. By remaining totally ſupine and inactive, we only encourage him to Attempts againſt us, which he would ſcarcely venture upon, were we any way prepared to repel his Attacks. The exhauſted State of the Treaſury was a ſufficient Argument againſt incurring any additional Expence, whilſt the Extremity of War could poſſibly be avoided; but in the preſent Juncture of Affairs, our Wiſhes in this Reſpect muſt give Place to Conſiderations of a more preſſing and urgent Nature. If the Nabob be unable to furniſh the neceſſary Supplies of Caſh, a Sum of Money ſhould be raiſed on Loan to anſwer the preſent Exigency, and every Preparation towards forming a ſtrong Cantonment, ought, I think, to be forwarded with the utmoſt Diſpatch, in order that the Troops may be ready to take the Field on the ſhorteſt Notice; for unleſs ſome deciſive Meaſure be adopted without Delay, I ſee nothing to prevent Hyder Ally from advancing even to the Gates of Madras. I am of Opinion, therefore, that we ought immediately to take Steps for collecting a Body of Troops wherever they may be moſt wanted, to be in Readineſs to act as Neceſſity may dictate: This, I conceive, may be eaſily and ſpeedily effected by withdrawing the greateſt Part of the Troops at Pondicherry and Poonamalee; which, together with the Artillery at the Mount, added to ſuch Force as can be ſpared from this Garriſon, will place us in a Situation to act defenſively, and fruſtrate any hoſtile Deſigns he may have againſt us, until a larger Army can, if neceſſary, be aſſembled.

19th July 1780.

Charles Smith.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 4th July 1780.

Received the following Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Nixon.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have received Intelligence from an Hircarrah, whom I purpoſely ſent out, of the March of Hyder Ally's Army from Seringapatam to Bangalore, where he arrived on the 10th Inſtant; and that a Detachment was ſent off with Tippo Saib towards Calaſtry. The Man who brings the Intelligence marched with the Army Five Days, and aſſures me his Report is true. A Merchant of this Place, whoſe Relations live near Carow, and who uſed to trade thither, informs me that Orders have been received Three Days ago in all the Frontier Towns, to ſtop every Species of Trade and Communication with this Country.

I remain, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and obedient Servant,
Eccles Nixon.

Trichinopoly,
28th June 1780.

Received the following Letter from Captain Keating:

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have juſt received Intelligence of Twelve Battalions of Sepoys, each Battalion Two Guns, are arrived and encamped Two Miles the other Side Riacotta. They came there the 1ſt of this Month, and the Sepoy ſays, they came there from the Encampment at Oſſoor.

I have the Honour to remain with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
very humble Servant,
Wm Keating.

Amboor,
5th July 1780.

Received

APPENDIX, N° 42.

Received the following Letter from Colonel Lang:

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esq. President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the Intelligence I have received from the Myſore Country, the greateſt Part of Hyder Ally's Army was at Oſſoor on Friday laſt, and he was to leave Bangalore on Saturday to join them: He has ſent Ten thouſand Horſe to the Northward to join Meer Saib.

The public Report in Hyder Ally's Army is, that he is coming into the Carnatic with his Troops only: His Barzar and Baggage are all to be left within the Paſſes.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and
moſt devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
10th July 1780.

Received the following Letter from Captain Keating:

To the Honourable the President and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Juſt now I have Intelligence of Hyder's Two Sons, with all the Troops that were at Bangalore, being arrived and encamped at Oſſoor; they arrived there the 6th Inſtant: Hyder himſelf is at Bangalore, but his Tents are pitched in the Encampment at Oſſoor.

I have the Honour to remain, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
very humble Servant,
Wm Keating.

Amboor,
11th July 1780.

Received the following Letters:

To the Honourable the President and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

This Moment my Sepoys are arrived with Intelligence of the Whole of Hyder's Army having marched from Oſſoor the 10th Inſtant, and encamping at a Place called Sadamanarpilly; and that Hyder himſelf arrived there the ſame Day from Bengalore. The Troops that were at Riacotta are alſo marched to join the Army; but a Number of Matchlock People are ordered to the Paſſes at Riacotta and Patnagurdam: The Arrival of a Number at the latter Place, I have had Information of laſt Night.

I have the Honour to remain, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, and
very humble Servant,
Wm Keating.

Amboor,
14th July 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the Intelligence which I have this Day received from the Myſore Country, Hyder Ally is at Oſſoor, with his Foot and Guns; Tippo Saib is arrived at Kiſtnagurry with the whole of the Cavalry which Hyder had with him: Hyder Ally is ſhortly to follow to Kiſtnagurry.

The public Report is, that Tippo Saib with the Cavalry only, is to be ſent into the Carnatic, to deſtroy the Country, and Meer Saib is to be ſent in at the Damalcherry Paſs, with Cavalry only, for the ſame Purpoſe.

APPENDIX, N° 42.

Hyder Ally is to remain at Kiſtnagurry, till he finds where our Army aſſembles, and then he is to come into the Carnatic with his Foot and Guns.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient
and devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
15th July, 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19th of June, 1780.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Lang.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the Intelligence from the Myſore Country, Hyder Ally has marched from Seringapatam Eight Coſs on the North Road, and all the Guns and Stores he has been ſending to Bangalore for ſome Months paſt, are in Readineſs to join him the Moment he arrives there.

The Force Hyder Ally has with him, is given out to be

Thirty thouſand Horſe,
Twenty thouſand Sepoys.
Forty thouſand Colliries.

I have the Honour to be, with all due Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

11th June 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, July 21ſt 1780.

Received the following Letters.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Two of my People juſt bring me Intelligence of Hyder, his Two Sons, and the beſt Part of his Army, having come through the Paſs, and are now encamped at a Place called Coverypatam; that all their Artillery are drawn up on the Road to Changama.

Since the Arrival of the Camp there, the whole People of the Valley are run away:

I have the Honour to remain, with the utmoſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
William Keating.

Amboor,
18th July, 1780.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir,

I did myſelf the Honour to write you ſome Time ago concerning the Ravages committing daily in the Vankatagerry Rajah's Country, by the Troops of Hyder Ally, ſtationed at Commam. They were pretty quiet for ſome Time, but lately began afreſh. Some Peons of the Vankatagerry Rajah's ſurprized a Party conſiſting of Forty Horſe the other Day near Chircurpar Pettah, and either killed or made Priſoners the greateſt Part of them. This has obliged Meer Saib, Hyder's Commander at Cuddapah, to

to augment the Force at Commam very considerably. The exact Number I have not yet learnt, but soon hope to be able to inform you.

I have the Honour to be, with Respect,
Honourable Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Edward Edmonds,
Captain.

Ongole,
19th of July, 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 12th June 1780.

The President observes to the Committee, that as there are various Reports concerning Hyder Ally's Movements and Intentions, he thinks it a proper Measure, in case of any Disturbance in the Carnatic, that Lieutenant Colonel Baillie's Detachment should be on this Side the Kistnah; he therefore moves, that they be ordered into the Guntoor Circar.

Mr. Johnson. I think the Detachment should not be moved until the Nabob consents to pay the extra Expences.

General Munro. I am of Opinion, that as the Kistnah, when overflown by the Rains, is impassable, and that the Troops, if wanted, cannot then be marched into the Guntoor Circar, they should at all Events be immediately ordered on this Side the Kistnah; and I am further of Opinion, that the Nabob, as Renter of that Country, has nothing to do with the extra Expences, as they were put there at the particular Desire of Bazalet Jung, who alone ought to defray the Charges of that Detachment.

Mr. Smith. I am of Opinion that the Detachment should be ordered on this Side the Kistnah, agreeable to the President's Motion.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, July 19th 1780.

Received the following Letter from Colonel Lang.

To the Honourable John Whitehill, Esquire, President, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
By the Intelligence I have received from the Mysore Country, Hyder Ally is arrived at Roycottah; his Army laying at Kistnahgurry, Coverypatam, and Royacottah.

The public Report continues in his Army, that he positively will enter the Carnatic in Three Divisions, and that he expects a great Body of Marattas from Badam, on the Banks of the Kistnah.

I have the Honour to be,
with due Respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient,
and devoted Servant,
Ross Lang.

Vellore,
17th July 1780.

Extracts of Fort Saint George Country Correspondence.

N° 43. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 11th May 1780; received 12th Ditto.*

I have already taken every Opportunity to inform my Friends of the hostile Intentions of Hyder Ally Cawn towards us, and his Connection with the French; they have also been told of the Disposition of Hyder's Troops, sent by him to the Confines of my Territories in order to pillage them, and those belonging to the English; my Friends are also well convinced by the Tenor of his present Conduct, his Letters to them, and his Behaviour to the Gentleman that was deputed to him, that he is hostilely inclined towards them.

It has been on this Account that I have repeatedly wrote and spoke to you on the Propriety of making Peace with the Marattas; a considerable Part of your Troops being now detached to that Quarter, Hyder imagines the Field is open for him, and with the Assistance and Friendship of the French, he has formed Intentions of breaking with us. I understand from Letters I received Yesterday

terday from Rajah Vencatiput Naig, and my Taſſildar in the Diſtricts of Podla and Durſi, that Ally Reza, Hyder Ally's Phouſdar at Cuddapah, has marched with his Troops, and is raiſing Diſturbances in the Countries of Nellour and Calliſtry; and that he has taken a ſmall Fort called Sittarampoor, which belongs to the Carnatic, and has pillaged and deſtroyed ſeveral Villages. I ſend you with this for your Information, the original Letter from Rajah Vencatiput Naig, and a Tranſlation of a Paper of Intelligence from Padla and Durſi. It is Hyder's Intentions to take Oudgur, one of the principal Fortreſſes of the Carnatic. Now that from his Pride and Ambition he has of himſelf begun making War within the Carnatic, it is not proper in us to look tamely on, and ſee Diſtricts taken out of our Hands: I therefore requeſt you will conſult what proper Meaſures are to be followed, in order to put a Stop to his Depredations in the Carnatic: You might ſend for his Vakeel, and deſire him to write to his Maſter, to give over raiſing thoſe Troubles; and, if you think proper, you might write to Hyder yourſelf on the Subject, ſince he now has openly commenced Hoſtilities in the Carnatic.

Paper of Intelligence from the Nizam Court.—Dated 29th Rubby ul Sani, or 5th May 1780.

It is reported here, that Hyder's Troops are aſſembling at Cuddapah, Cummum, and other Places, with a Deſign of entering the Carnatic; and that Hyder himſelf intends marching ſhortly. It is the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla's Intention to remain Spectator, and not to interfere, but to ſettle his Differences with Hyder by the Means of the Marattas: He waits with Anxiety to ſee Hyder raiſe Troubles in the Carnatic, and the Flame of War raiſed between him and the Engliſh, that he may by theſe Means ſee them effectually reduced by the Poonah Miniſters and Moodogee Boonſela. His Highneſs truſts ſolely to the Poonah Miniſters, and looks upon their Enemies as his own; he has much at Heart the Reduction of the Engliſh, and has taken great Pains to effect it; he conſtantly writes to Poonah on the Subject.

Letter from the Rajah of Calliſtry Vancatyput Naig, to the Nabob.

This Day, the 5th of Jemmdi ul Awel (10th May 1780) Intelligence has been brought from Outerady, that Meer is arrived at Sitterampoor with 4,000 Horſe, and after taking that Place, has laid waſte all the Villages around it. The whole Country will be ruined unleſs your Servant marches there himſelf. If your Highneſs, through the gracious Favour you have ever ſhewn your Servant, will be pleaſed to ſend Two Battalions of Sepoys, and a Hundred Europeans, the Country will ſoon be cleared of the Enemy; at any Rate your Servant will go there, and truſt to the Will of the Almighty.

Letter from the ſame to the Nabob's Dewan, Seyed Aſſum Cawn.

This Day, the 4th of Jemmadi ul Awel (9th May 1780) Intelligence was brought here that Meer, with 4,000 Horſe, has taken the Fort of Sitterampoor, and laid waſte all the Villages around. The whole Country muſt be ruined unleſs I go there myſelf; I ſhall accordingly ſet out To-morrow, the 5th of the Month. You will, I hope, repreſent this to his Highneſs, and get his Orders to ſend a Hundred Europeans, and Two Battalions of Sepoys, with ſome Guns, or this Country cannot be ſettled. I ſend you encloſed a Letter I have received from Outerady, which you will be kind enough to lay before his Highneſs, and procure his Aſſiſtance. I have been in his Highneſs's Service ſince the Death of his Father; if he is now pleaſed to grant me Aſſiſtance, I will go to Outerady, and chaſtiſe the Enemy, and put that Country in Order. If my Requeſt is not granted, the Will of Providence muſt be fulfilled. You might order the Troops from Arcot to march hither, and write to Rajah Burbur for that Purpoſe.

N° 51. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 29th June 1780; received 2d July.*

With regard to the Stores in my different Garriſons, of which you requeſted to have a Liſt, the Caſe is this: The other heavy Charges I am at, have rendered my Situation ſuch that I have not had it in my Power to provide Stores for my Forts. I have only been able to keep in Readineſs what Stores I have in them, ſince the Time of former Governors, of which Liſts were ſent to them. You have herewith, for your Information, a Liſt of what Grain there is at preſent in my Forts. The Guns, Powder, and Shot, which were ſent from thoſe Forts to Pondicherry, and expended there, have not been replaced.

The Situation of Affairs requiring, at this Time, that the ſame Number of Stores be ſent to thoſe Forts, I beg you will be ſo kind as to give Orders for it. What ſhall I ſay more?

Accounts of Grain in the Forts, viz.

Arcot	Cullums 67,539	2	Tons
Vellour	49,100	—	
Wandewaſh	53,537	6	
Gingee	30,587	4	
Tritchinopoly	100,000	—	
	Cullums 300,764	—	

N° 52. *From the Nabob to the Governor.—Dated 30th June 1780; received 2d July Ditto.*

I herewith ſend you what Intelligence I have received from Hyder Ally's Camp and Changama, &c. Places in my Country, with a Letter I have from my Intelligence at Kannoul, reſpecting what was ſaid by Durm Doſs, the Manager of the Kinnoul Phouſdary, who was ſent by him to negociate with Hyder, and has been there for a Twelvemonth paſt; you will from theſe underſtand, that his Intentions are to march this Way. It is the Cuſtom of News Writers to write down whatever Intelligence they hear from different Parts; entire Reliance cannot therefore be placed upon all the News they ſend, but at the ſame Time the Whole is not entirely without Foundation. It is on that Account adviſable, and conſiſtent with Prudence, to put Faith in what comes from good Authority, and make Uſe of it for the Good of our own Affairs, by taking the Steps which appear moſt proper. If the Intelligence received proves falſe, it is well; but if (which God forbid) it ſhould prove true, the being upon our Guard before the Danger approaches too near, will aſſuredly be in our Favour. You are a wiſe and intelligent Man, and will take ſuch Steps as your Prudence will point out. I alſo ſend you with this, a Copy of an Intelligence Paper from Poonah. What ſhall I ſay more?

(Encloſure.)

Letter from Mahammed Shuffy at Kannoul.—Dated 29th Semmadi ut Awel, or 3 June 1780.

Dirm Doſs gives the following Account of the Enemy: His Thoughts are bent Day and Night on entering and deſtroying the Carnatic; he is never at reſt, but conſtantly employed in getting ready Stores, and making Preparations to execute his Intentions. He talks of nothing from Morning to Night, but the Carnatic, and of demanding no leſs than Seven Crores of Rupees, with Intereſt for the Affair of Tritchinopoly. He has with him, beſides the Zemindars Troops, 50,000 Horſe, and near 100,000 Foot; beſides this, he is daily raiſing freſh Troops, particularly Horſe, for which he ſends at a great Diſtance; he has 20,000 of his own. The good Order in which his Foot Soldiers are, is not to be deſcribed. He has wrote to the Maratta Miniſters reſpecting his Deſigns of invading the Arcot Province, and deſires their Aſſiſtance; and they have aſſured him that they will give it to him. If they do not ſend their Forces ſoon, he means to wait until the Rivers have riſen, when no Troops can come to the Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh.

The Enemy [Hyder Ally] one Day lately in public Durbar, ſaid, "We muſt ſee what will be the Event of encountering the Engliſh; they are an obſtinate Set of Caffres (Infidels) and will not let go their Hold till the laſt; it will be neceſſary to diſtreſs them at firſt with our Horſe, and be ſo hard upon them, that they may not be able to face us again; and if they do face us a Second Time, it will not be difficult to deſtroy them entirely; ſhould they have the better of us at firſt, it will not be eaſy to chaſtize them, but we will always have it in our Power to ruin and deſtroy the Country with our Horſe, and not allow the Engliſh to get Proviſions."

From ſuch, and the like Diſcourſes of the Enemy, it appears that he is in ſome Dread of meeting the Engliſh in open Battle; but his Intentions are hoſtile; and may the Almighty preſerve your Highneſs from them!

Intelligence from Hyder Ally's Camp.—Dated 20th Semmadi ut Sani, or 25th June 1780.

Hyder is ſtill at Bangalore, and has ordered five Guns, with Powder, &c. from the Fort, to be ſent to Camp. His Vakeel at Madras writes him, that the Europeans think of making War with him, and are collecting their Troops for that Purpoſe; that they are, however, intoxicated with

Pride, and careleſs of their Affairs. Hyder has wrote an Anſwer to the Vakeel, to give him a particular Account of the Number of Troops at Madras and other Places. He thinks of ſending a Detachment under the Command of his Son into the Tritchinopoly Country, and to march himſelf to Madras by the Way of Vellour and Arcot; he propoſes alſo ſending Meer Ally Reza into the Countries of Trippetty, Vellour, &c. to raiſe Diſturbances there. He has wrote to Hurry Deſſeya, the Aumil of the Barmahals, to clear and repair the Road of the Ghauts of Hurrydurp and Raicotto. He has fixed his March from Bangalore, for the 9th of Rejub (12 July) and on a Suppoſition that the Europeans are not aware of it, and not prepared to oppoſe him, he intends marching at once to Madras.

APPENDIX, Nº 43.

Eſtabliſhment of a Sepoy Battalion.

CAPTAIN	—	1		
Lieutenants	—	3		
Enſigns	—	7		
Adjutant	—	1	—	19 Europeans.
Serjeant Major	—	1		
Quarter Maſter Serjeant		1		
Serjeants	—	5		
Commandant	—	1		
Subadars	—	9	Officers 20	
Jemidars	—	10		
Havildars	—	50		
Naiques	—	50	— 750	Native.
Privates	—	650		
Drummers	—	12	— 22	
Puckallys	—	10		

APPENDIX, Nº 44.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Governor General and Council in their Secret Department, the 2d Auguſt 1779.

THE following Minute from Sir Eyre Coote having been circulated, the Minutes which are entered after it were delivered by the Members of the Board.

29th July 1779.

Sir Eyre Coote. Having lately received ſome Advices, mentioning Preparations at the French Iſlands for a Deſcent upon ſome of our Poſſeſſions in India, particularly Bombay, to which I the more readily give ſome Credit, knowing that that Preſidency and the Circars are the leaſt ſecured, I am induced to propoſe, That the Governments of Fort Saint George and Bombay be recommended to reinforce the Army under General Goddard with the following Proportion of Troops, which, from the laſt Returns, I think they may with Propriety comply with; viz.

APPENDIX, N° 44.

From Madras.

1 Battalion of Europeans,
3 D° — Sepoys,
50 — Artillery.

From Bombay.

300 Europeans,
2 Battalions of Sepoys, and
100 Artillery.

As the Works of Pondicherry are now deſtroyed, the Quota from Madras may the more eaſily be ſpared. The Troops they have at Mahé, 1,100 Sepoys, One Company of Grenadiers, and 50 Artillery, may immediately embark to join General Goddard; the reſt may be compleated from the Southern Stations, and will certainly be with him before any Operations of the Enemy can be commenced.

The Forces of Madras, and of this Eſtabliſhment, are, in my Opinion, fully ſufficient to protect our Poſſeſſions on this Side of India; moreover, we are in daily Expectation of a great Addition to our Strength from Europe; I therefore alſo recommend, that Drafts be ſent from hence to compleat the original Number of General Goddard's Detachment.

The Advantages we may expect to derive from this propoſed Reinforcement, will be, the Security of Bombay againſt any Attack of the French, by having ſo ſtrong an Army in the Field; the expediting of the much-deſired Peace with the Marattas (if it is not already accompliſhed); and the rendering of our Force on the Malabar Coaſt of ſuch Reſpect, as to check any Deſigns which either the Marattas or Hyder Ally (the only Country Powers from whom we have any Thing to dread on that Side of the Continent) may be inclined to form, of taking Part with our national Enemies.

On the whole, I ſubmit this Plan, as the Means which in my Judgment will enſure the Peace and Safety of all our Poſſeſſions; for while we have ſo reſpectable a Force in that Quarter, where we may expect the firſt Efforts of the French, we may be certain that it will confine their Attention to it, and prevent them from diſturbing our more valuable Territories in the other Parts of India.

Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis. I move, That the Commander in Chief may be requeſted to inform the Board of the Particulars of the Intelligence he has received from the French Iſlands, and the Authority on which it is founded. The Board have yet no Materials before them, to judge of the Propriety of the Meaſure recommended.

Philip Francis.

Mr. Barwell. The cautionary Meaſures propoſed by Sir Eyre Coote, appear to me ſo well calculated for the Security of the Company's Poſſeſſions, that I am induced to give them my immediate and hearty Concurrence.

Rich[d] Barwell.

Governor General. I agree moſt heartily to the Propoſal made by the Commander in Chief.

Warren Haſtings.

Mr. Wheler. I will endeavour to prepare my Opinion againſt the next Meeting of the Board.

Edward Wheler.

Sir Eyre Coote delivers in the following Minute:

I muſt own, I feel myſelf not a little injured by Mr. Francis's Requiſition; and will venture to ſay, that a ſimilar Inſtance cannot be found upon the Company's Records, and that it is unknown in any Service, for a Commander in Chief, or any General Officer, to be called upon to ſupport his Opinion and Aſſertion by giving up the Authors of his ſecret Intelligence, upon which theſe may be founded. I therefore peremptorily refuſe it; and if the Opinion I have given on the 27th,

27th, ſhould not guide the Board in the Mode of Defence propoſed for Bombay, I hope I ſhall ſtand exonerated, ſhould any fatal Conſequences happen to that Place.

Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis. Nothing can be perſonally of leſs Moment to me, than whether my Propoſition be carried or not. As a Member of the Government, I think it my Duty to oppoſe the eſtabliſhing a Precedent which I deem inconſiſtent with the Forms and Spirit of our Inſtitution. Every Member of this Board has an equal Right to be informed of the Facts or Grounds on which a Reſolution is taken; no ſeparate excluſive Truſt is veſted in any one of us; nor is any one of us at Liberty to delegate the Truſt veſted in him to any one of the other Members; but if, as in the preſent Inſtance, I am not to know what the Intelligence is on which the Board reſolves to act, nor by what Authority ſuch Intelligence is ſupported, I certainly am no Judge of the Neceſſity or Propriety of the Meaſure ſaid to be founded on ſuch Intelligence, and am ſo far forth deprived of the Exerciſe of the Truſt repoſed in me by Parliament. I did not mean, however, that the Commander in Chief ſhould give up his Authors, if it was neceſſary to conceal them.

For theſe Reaſons, which I hope will not be thought to imply Diſreſpect to any Member of the Board, I adhere to the Motion.

Mr. Wheler. I muſt join with Mr. Francis in expreſſing my Wiſhes that Sir Eyre Coote would be pleaſed to communicate to the Board the Intelligence he has received of Preparations making at the French Iſlands, and upon which he founds his preſent Motion to reinforce General Goddard; becauſe I think, that before the Board paſs their Determination on a Subject which may affect the Safety of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in India, they ought to have every Information before them it is capable of.

I entirely agree with Sir Eyre Coote, that it is poſſible the French may be induced to make ſome Attempt on our Poſſeſſions in India by their Forces from the Iſlands, and if they have a conſiderable Body of Men there, more than ſufficient for the Purpoſe of Defence, I hardly ſee any other Uſe to which it can be applied.

I agree likewiſe with Sir Eyre Coote, that Bombay is likely to be the Object of their Attack; becauſe if they acquire the Place, they will at one and the ſame Time have a Port for their Fleet, Docks, and Allies, in their Neighbourhood; whom we have every Reaſon to ſuppoſe are, by repeated Provocations, made our Enemies: But I confeſs it does not occur to me, how the ſending a Reinforcement to General Goddard at Surat, and weakening Bombay itſelf, by detaching the greateſt Part of the Garriſon, can contribute to the Safety of that Place.

To illuſtrate that further, I need only take a View of the Situation of Bombay, that of General Goddard's Army in reſpect to it, and the Mode of Attack to which Bombay is open. It is certain, that this Attempt can only be made by Sea, and equally ſo, that the French ſhould, for this Purpoſe, have either a ſuperior Fleet to ours, or expect to find the Garriſon of Bombay ſo weak, that it muſt fall before our Fleet could relieve it from any other Part of India. And, if they do reſolve on this Attack, it is hardly within the Bounds of Probability that we can receive any Intelligence of it, or the Governor of Bombay, before the Fleet and Army are within Sight; conſequently the Place will be inveſted by Sea and Land before any Succours can be thrown into it. How the Garriſon of the Iſland of Bombay is to be relieved by Troops under General Goddard after this Event, I do not underſtand, more eſpecially, as I am informed, that it would be attended with great Difficulty, and much Time, to march the Troops from Surat to the neareſt Part of the Continent oppoſite to the Iſland of Bombay.

I conclude, therefore, that the Troops at Surat can be of no Service in caſe of an Attack on Bombay, and that we ought therefore ſo far from ſending Troops to the former Place, to bring down, if poſſible, the Troops that are there, into the Neighbourhood of Bombay; for which, I am told, the Iſland of Salſette is very convenient. Nor do I conceive, that even if it ſhould hereafter be expedient to act againſt the Marattas, the Situation of our Troops will be at all altered for the worſe, but rather mended.

On the Second Queſtion, of ſending Troops from the Coaſt:

When I conſider the great Extent of Country they have to cover and defend, the ſmall Number of Europeans they have for that Purpoſe, the low State of their Finances, the Neighbourhood of powerful Enemies in Hyder Ally, and the Nizam, and the Probability of the French Force being employed either againſt the Circars, or to act in concert with the former, I am equally againſt weakening or detaching the Force of that Preſidency.

On

APPENDIX, N° 44.

On the Third Queſtion, of ſending Drafts from hence to complete the original Number of Gene- Goddard's Detachment, I ſee many, and what appear to me inſurmountable Difficulties.

Such Reinforcement muſt conſiſt of Native Troops, Sepoys, who, if prevailed on to embark, e Seaſon of the Year renders the Voyage next to impracticable; by Land, the Difficulties are ually great. The Army under General Goddard was near a Year in performing its March, though met with no Oppoſition: I do not conceive that Detachment of Drafts will be more likely to rch with Safety acroſs India, than General Goddard's Detachment, but rather that they will be poſed to greater Difficulties; in the mean Time, the Expence is certain and enormous, and the oney muſt be drawn directly from and ſpent out of Bengal.

I am equally at a Loſs to judge how the Army propoſed to be tranſported from the Coaſt of Ma- bar, is afterwards to be maintained there, or by what Means Remittances can be effected to ſup- rt ſuch an Army, and the Expences of a War on the Malabar Coaſt; but I am confident, that eſe Remittances would, if practicable, prove the Ruin of the Company's valuable Poſſeſſions on is Side of India.

I am therefore equally againſt this as the other Propoſitions, and give it as my Opinion, that the e and only Line of Policy to be obſerved in the preſent State of Affairs in India, is, to concenter r Troops on the Malabar Coaſt to the Neighbourhood of Bombay, which I deem the ſureſt Means preſerving that Place againſt the Attacks of the French; and that we ſhould puſh whatever Ad- ntages we actually poſſeſs to their proper Object of obtaining a laſting Peace on that Side of dia.

General Coote. I entirely agree with Mr. Wheler, with regard to the Situation that our Army ould be placed in for the Security of Bombay. When I propoſed reinforcing General Goddard for e Defence of that valuable Settlement againſt the French, I could not have the ſmalleſt Idea that r Army was to remain where it now is; and the very Mode of reinforcing it with Part of the Bom- y Troops, is a ſufficient Proof that it was not my Plan in any Reſpect. The Preſervation of Bom- y is the firſt Object. The beſt Method of defending it, I will venture to ſay (and appeal to the pinion of the firſt Officers in Europe) is by an Army in the Field, ſo ſtationed, as to be able to give e Garriſon immediate Succour, either by throwing freſh Troops into it, from Time to Time, or gaging the beſieging Enemy. The Situation that Bombay is now in, from the beſt Intelligence have received (and I may ſay, I have Intelligence that I can depend upon) is ſuch as renders it, in y Opinion, abſolutely neceſſary that ſomething ſhould be done for the Preſervation of it. Public well as private Reports from Europe, mention a French Armament being deſtined, and actually iled, for the Eaſt Indies. By the laſt Accounts from the Cape, a 74 Gun Ship put in there, with greater Number of Sick on Board than could be ſuppoſed to have ariſen from her Complement of en; and the Report was, that they were all the Sick of a Squadron to which ſhe belonged. 74 Gun Ship ſailed into the Mauritius, when our Cartel Ship was lying off the Harbour. This ip, before the Man of War arrived, was under Orders to go to the Iſland of Bourbon, there to main till they diſmiſſed her; but immediately after the Arrival of the 74 Gun Ship, a Party of rench was ſent on Board, in order to aſſiſt in weighing her Anchor more expeditiouſly; and ſhe re- iving Orders from a 36 Gun Frigate lying cloſe by her, and which had been placed there as Guard upon her, to ſail due North, till ſuch Time as the Frigate fired a Gun; ſhe ſailed Leagues in that Direction; and in the Middle of the Night the Ship fired a Gun, and then ſhe aped her Courſe for Madras; ſo that it is very natural to ſuppoſe, at leaſt the Seafaring Gentlemen hom I have converſed with on the Subject think ſo, that ſhe was ordered to ſhape that Courſe, to revent her falling in with any French Ships that might be bound for the Iſland. When I was at e Cape, they moſt undoubtedly had 5 or 6,000 regular Troops at the Iſlands; and I am well formed that they have been ſince reinforced, but with what Numbers I do not know. I am like- iſe informed, that the Duke de Lazun's Legion is on Board the Fleet, which I ſuppoſe is come to auritius. Part of them, perhaps, may be left behind at Senegal; for it is a Part of the ſame Fleet, not the Whole, that took Senegal. As to the Protection of Bombay, it can receive none but what e give it. It cannot come from Sir Edward Hughes, nor the Forces under his Convoy; they were ot arrived at the Cape when the laſt Accounts came away, though expected there. The Troops he ings out, are raw Troops, and will require ſome Time for Refreſhment at the Cape; the leaſt that n be allowed is Six Weeks. They muſt go the outward Paſſage, and make Ceylon, after which ey cannot get to Bombay, ſuppoſing them determined to make the Trial, till af er Chriſtmas; erefore that Settlement, in caſe of an Attack from the French, muſt either defend itſelf, or ſubmit the Enemy. It is my Buſineſs, as the Commander in Chief in India, to propoſe ſuch Meaſures r the Defence of the Company's Settlements, and to recommend the Diſpoſal of their Strength in ch Manner as will moſt effectually contribute to that End; when I have done this, I have done my ty. It is with the Board wherever I may have the Honour of ſitting, to determine the Propriety my Propoſitions.

Mr. Francis. The Queſtion is much altered by the Explanations with which the Commander in hief has favoured the Board. If it be intended that Brigadier General Goddard ſhall move down with

with his Force from Surat to Bombay, and take the moſt advantageous Poſition which his Judgment ſhall point out to him, for covering Bombay againſt an Invaſion, I approve of the Idea, and join in it; but I beg Leave to ſay, that this Intention does not appear upon the Face of the Motion. No Orders are propoſed to Brigadier General Goddard to move from his preſent Station, nor any general Inſtructions recommended to him upon the Suppoſition that the French may appear upon that Coaſt. From the Terms of the Motion I ſhould conclude, that the Reinforcement was to proceed from Bombay to Surat, and there to join General Goddard; underſtanding the Motion in that Senſe, I muſt confeſs I thought it liable to the ſame Objections which have been ſtated by Mr. Wheler: If it is not ſo, there can be no Difference of Opinion on this Part of the Propoſition. The Commander in Chief is undoubtedly the beſt Judge, whether the Force which he means to draw out of Bombay will be more uſefully employed for the Purpoſe of defending that Place, by joining Brigadier General Goddard's Army in the Field, that is in a Station calculated to cover Bombay, or by being kept in the Body of the Place. On this Point I ſubmit to the Commander in Chief's Authority. I agree that the Madras Troops now at Mahé ſhall proceed to Bombay, or to the Neighbourhood of that Place, and there join General Goddard, but not to Surat. With reſpect to any further Detachment from the Forces at Madras, I muſt declare that my Opinion entirely concurs with that of Mr. Wheler; and that if I recede from it, it is ſolely from the Confidence I place in the ſuperior Judgment of the Commander in Chief, who aſſures us that the Forces of Madras, and of this Eſtabliſhment, are fully ſufficient to protect our Poſſeſſions on this Side of India, after making the Detachment in Queſtion to the other Coaſt. With reſpect to our reinforcing Brigadier General Goddard's Army by Drafts from hence, I am ſorry that ſuch a Meaſure ſhould be found neceſſary, becauſe I deem it a very great Addition to the Weight and Difficulty of maintaining a War on the Malabar Coaſt. I ſhould acquieſce, however, if the Mode of conveying the Drafts from this Side to the other Side of India were ſtated and aſcertained. I foreſee great Difficulty in the Attempt, and no Probability that our Sepoys, ſuppoſing them arrived at their deſtined Station, will continue to ſerve for any Length of Time, at ſo great a Diſtance from Home. The Deſertions, I fear, will at leaſt keep Pace with the Supplies, and the Operation will be endleſs.

Agreed to the Motion of the Commander in Chief, for reinforcing the Army under General Goddard.

Governor General. The firſt Duty of this Board upon the Subject now before us, and the firſt expreſs Object of the Commander in Chief in his Minute, is to provide for the Defence of Bombay in the Event of an Invaſion from the French. So far the Opinions of the Board ſeem to be united, and perhaps we ſhall agree in what I now recommend to that Effect; viz. That in our Advices to Brigadier General Goddard, we inform him of the Subſtance of the preſent Reſolutions: That our Deſign in endeavouring to furniſh him with this Addition of Strength, is to enable him to give ſuch effectual Aſſiſtance and Support to the Government of Bombay, in the Caſe of a French Invaſion, as may defeat it; that therefore he muſt regard this as his firſt Object, until there ſhall be no longer any actual Ground of Apprehenſion from the French; and make ſuch a Diſpoſition of the Detachment under his Command, as to inſure his Co-operation with the Garriſon of Bombay; at the ſame Time, that he is not to withdraw his Attention from the other Points which we have given him in Charge.

Mr. Barwell. I have already given my Opinion upon the Propoſition of the Commander in Chief; I did not limit that Opinion to any partial Object, but had in View the general Intereſts of the Preſidency of Bombay, and a final Settlement with the Maratta Government. I approve entirely of the Inſtructions now propoſed by the Governor General, which ſeems not to have omitted any Point to which it is neceſſary General Goddard ſhould give his Attention. None ſtrike me at preſent; ſhould any afterwards occur to my Recollection, I leave to myſelf a Latitude for extending theſe propoſed Orders.

Mr. Francis. At a Time when the French are expected to attack Bombay, every Reaſon, which heretofore induced the Board to wiſh for a ſpeedy Accommodation with the Marattas, muſt acquire additional Strength.

I am ſorry that any Circumſtance, foreign from the immediate Execution of his Inſtructions, ſhould have engaged Brigadier General Goddard's Attention, or diverted it for a Moment from the Object we have ſo urgently recommended to him.

His reſolving to protract the Concluſion of any thing deciſive in the Negotiation with the Durbar, until he can hear from us, is unauthorized, and may be attended with fatal Conſequences. If a Peace be not concluded before the expected Arrival of the French on the Malabar Coaſt, we may be morally certain that we ſhall then have both the French and the Marattas to contend with. The Entrance into India, which has been happily ſhut, will again be opened to our natural Enemies. The Marattas will be ready to receive and aſſiſt them, and if once they get Footing upon the Continent, their being driven out again will depend upon the Event of a new Conteſt, in which we are far from having a certain Proſpect of Succeſs. For theſe Reaſons, I would direct Brigadier General Goddard to adhere literally to his Inſtructions, and cloſe with the Marattas as ſpeedily as poſſible. As to the Views

Views now held out to us by Ragobah, or any new Advantages ſuppoſed to be attainable by our having him with us, I would poſitively order Brigadier General Goddard not to engage in them on any Account. Ragobah is a deſperate ruined Man, whoſe Situation may make it indifferent to him what Terms he conſents to, or what Promiſes he makes; but he has no Power, and can perform nothing. In the mean Time, the Negotiation with the Durbar, which it is ſo much our Intereſt to conclude, will be protracted; the French may arrive upon the Coaſt, the Marattas of courſe will take Advantage of that Circumſtance, and either refuſe to treat with us at all, or inſiſt on Conditions which they would not pretend to at the preſent Moment.

With reſpect to Ragobah, I would adhere to the Orders given to Brigadier General Goddard in our laſt Letter of the 8th July, viz. "We entirely approve of the Offer which you have made to "Ragonaut Row, and direct that you continue to afford him the Protection of your Camp ſo long as "he ſhall continue to demand it, provided he ſhall not forfeit his Right to it by any Act of Infi-"delity, or attempt to defeat the Effect of your Negotiations, to which you will give your entire At-"tention, without Regard to any other Conſideration.

"For the reſt we leave you to act under our Inſtructions of the 5th April, in which we ſee no "Cauſe to make any Alteration on Account of this Event."

Governor General. If I had not been ſufficiently underſtood, I ſhould have thought it unneceſſary to have added an Article to General Goddard's preſent Inſtructions, had he not himſelf ſuggeſted Doubts, where I think he ought to have entertained none. I have propoſed to refer him to his preſent Inſtructions, for the ſole Rule of his Conduct; and have only ſaid, what I believe agrees with the Senſe of every Member of the Board, that if he can obtain better Terms, in Addition to thoſe we have already preſcribed, he may do it, but we do not enjoin it; nor is he to ſuffer the great Object of his Negotiation to be ſuſpended or impeded by the Proſecution of any other Views. Much might be ſaid in Anſwer to the other Parts of Mr. Francis's Minute. I wiſh to avoid Debate. I ſhall therefore only briefly obſerve, that it is not with the Maratta State that Brigadier General Goddard has to treat, but with the Partizans of a Government diſtracted and totally deprived of its conſtitutional Form and Powers; and that the Event ſuppoſed of the Arrival of a French Armament, while our Negotiations with them were in Suſpence, would be more likely to excite a decided Diviſion among them, and to throw the principal Strength of the Maratta Nation into our own Hands, than to unite it againſt us, when it is remembered that the firſt Invitation of the French proceeded from the firſt Member of the Civil Government at Poonah, and muſt, if ever it takes Place, give him the Aſcendant over the Men who now rule by the Sword.

Mr. Wheler. I agree to the Governor General's Propoſition, as it now ſtands explained.

Sir Eyre Coote. I agree to the Governor General's Propoſition.

Mr. Francis. Undoubtedly General Goddard will not refuſe any extraordinary Advantages that may offered to him. The Danger is, that while he is purſuing them, he may miſs the Opportunity of concluding upon the Terms already preſcribed to him.

Agreed to the Governor General's Propoſition: And

Reſolved, That the following Letters be written to Fort Saint George, to Bombay, and to General Goddard.

To Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

From the Accounts which have been lately received of the Strength of the French at the Iſlands, we have Reaſon to apprehend that an Invaſion is intended againſt the Preſidency of Bombay; we therefore deem it of the utmoſt Importance to provide for the Safety of that Settlement, by reinforcing the Army commanded by General Goddard with a reſpectable Addition of Troops, and to direct him to grant the moſt effectual Support and Protection in his Power to the Government of Bombay, for defeating any hoſtile Attempts which may be made againſt them. The Commander in Chief has informed us, that 1 Battalion of Europeans, 3 Battalions of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery, may be ſpared from your Eſtabliſhment, now the Works of Pondicherry are demoliſhed, without any Riſk or Inconvenience to the Service; and that the Reſidue of the Forces under your Preſidency will be ſufficient for the Protection of your Poſſeſſions; beſides which, as you may daily expect a conſiderable Addition of Strength from Europe, we earneſtly recommend it to you to iſſue immediate Orders to the Officer in Command of the Forces at Mahé, to detach from thence as great a Number of Men as he can ſpare at this Time, to join General Goddard without Delay, and the Remainder of his Force when Mahé ſhall be diſmantled. We alſo requeſt that you will be pleaſed to compleat the Reinforcement, recommended by the Commander in Chief to be ſent to General Goddard, as expeditiouſly as poſſible, from the moſt convenient Stations of your Army, allowing him to fix the Rendezvous.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 2d Auguſt 1779.

To

APPENDIX, N° 44.

To Bombay.

Gentlemen,

From Accounts which have been lately received of the Strength of the French at the Iſlands, we have great Reaſon to apprehend that an Invaſion is intended againſt your Preſidency; we deem it therefore of the utmoſt Importance to provide for its Safety, by reinforcing the Army commanded by General Goddard with a reſpectable Addition of Troops. We ſhall direct him to be prepared for the expected Event, and to make it his firſt Object to afford you the moſt effectual Support and Protection in his Power, for defeating any hoſtile Attempts which may be made againſt you.

The Commander in Chief has informed us, that 1 Battalion of Europeans, 3 Battalions of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery, may be ſpared from the Fort Saint George Eſtabliſhment; and that you can likewiſe contribute 300 Europeans, 2 Battalions of Sepoys, and 100 Artillery, for this Service, without any Inconvenience or Diſtreſs to the Garriſons where your Army is now ſtationed. We have written to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, on the Subject of their Supply; and we earneſtly recommend it to you to iſſue immediate Orders for your Quota of this Reinforcement to be aſſembled, and to join General Goddard at ſuch Place of Rendezvous as he may appoint, without Delay.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
2d Auguſt 1779.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We have to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letters of the 12th and 18th of June, from your Camp near Surat.

We receive great Satisfaction from the circumſtantial Intelligence which they contain reſpecting the State, Diſſentions, and probable Views, of the different Parties exiſting in the Maratta Government.

We do not diſapprove of your endeavouring to obtain the additional Conceſſions propoſed in your Letter of the 12th June; nor did our Inſtructions of the 5th April, though reſtricted to certain Points, preclude you from availing yourſelf of any Occaſion which might be preſented to you, to exact other Conditions by which the Intereſts or Influence of the Company might be certainly promoted, provided they did not impede or retard the Accompliſhment of your original Commiſſion. In this Senſe, and with theſe Proviſions, we repeat, that we ſhall approve of the Addition of the Demands recommended in your Letter of the 12th June, to thoſe which we have already preſcribed in our original Inſtructions, if you ſhall not have concluded a Treaty with the Maratta Government before the Receipt of this Letter.

From Advices which have been lately received of the State of the French Forces at Mauritius, and from other concurring Cauſes, we have Reaſon to apprehend that an Attack has been meditated againſt the Company's Settlement of Bombay: We have therefore thought it expedient to apply to the Preſidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay, to reinforce the Army under your Command, as ſoon as poſſible, by Detachments from their Eſtabliſhments, conſiſting of the following Corps and Numbers;

From Bombay.
300 European Infantry.
2 Battalions of Sepoys.
100 Artillery.

From Fort Saint George.
1 Battalion of European Infantry.
3 Battalions of Sepoys.
50 Artillery.

We have deſired the Select Committee at Fort Saint George, to iſſue immediate Orders for the March of as great a Part of their Quota from Mahé as can be immediately ſpared, and for the others to join you when the Works are demoliſhed; the Remainder of the Number will be detached from the moſt convenient Stations of their Army.

We mean further to recruit your Corps with ſuch a Number of Sepoys drafted from Bengal, as may be requiſite to augment it to its original Complement.

Our Deſign in endeavouring to ſupply you with this additional Reinforcement of Troops, is, to enable you to give ſuch effectual Aſſiſtance and Support to the Government of Bombay, in the Caſe of a French Invaſion, as may defeat it. You muſt therefore regard this as your firſt Object, until there ſhall be no longer any actual Ground of Apprehenſion from the French, and make ſuch a Diſpoſition of the Detachment under your Command, as will enſure your Co-operation with the Garriſon of Bombay. At the ſame Time, you are not to withdraw your Attention from the other Points which we have given you in Charge.

We have acquainted the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George and at Bombay, that you will fix the Places of Rendezvous for the Junction of theſe Troops with your Army; we therefore deſire, that you will make them acquainted as early as poſſible with the Situation which you ſhall judge the moſt convenient for that Purpoſe.

Fort William,
2d Auguſt 1779.

We are, &c.

Approved.
(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Mr. Francis, I cannot approve of the firſt Part of this Letter, for the Reaſons aſſigned by me in the Courſe of the Debate. With reſpect to the Second Part, I ſtill think that, ſuppoſing the Apprehenſion of Bombay's being attacked to be well-founded, Brigadier General Goddard ought to be ordered to move from Surat towards Bombay.

APPENDIX, N° 45.

Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, 8th December 1774.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Council at Fort Saint George, to the Governor General and Council of Bengal; dated 7th December 1774.

WE come now to ſpeak of the Nabob of Arcot, the Company's ancient Ally. The Poſſeſſions he holds, including the Tanjore Country, are eſtimated, by the beſt Accounts, at upwards of Two Crores of Rupees. His Force, by the beſt Information we can procure, conſiſts of Ten Battalions of Sepoys, who may be conſidered as Regulars, being commanded by European Officers, accoutred and diſciplined after the European Manner; and a Battalion of Five hundred Topaſſes. He has alſo Four Regiments of Cavalry, with Guns and Artillery Men attached to each; and he is at preſent raiſing Two more, beſides the Irregulars he maintains, which may be eſtimated at between Ten and Twelve Thouſand. The Regiments of Cavalry are his beſt Troops, having been diſciplined by European Officers, lent to him from this Eſtabliſhment.

Extract of a Separate Letter from Fort Saint George, dated 4th July 1775.

21. His (the Nabob's) ſecond Son, Ummeer ul Umrah, has Seven diſtinct Corps, conſiſting of Cavalry, light armed Sepoys, and Artillery; 12 Battalions of Sepoys, with near 1000 Artillery; all which are far diſciplined than thoſe of any of the Country Powers. Some of his Black Cavalry, we are informed, are as well diſciplined as any of the Engliſh Troops; his Artillery attached to them may vie almoſt with Europeans. He has the Tanjore and Trichinopoly Countries, with Orders upon moſt of Southern Countries for the Payment of the Army. He was not put in the Command of Troops already formed. Before his Time they were a Rabble to be held of no Account. He has formed them himſelf; he has promoted every Man in them. He pays them himſelf; and all look up to him for Honour and Wealth.

29. We beg your Honours will be pleaſed to conſider, that he (the Nabob) has refuſed to entruſt your Servants with Tanjore; that he has fortified it in the ſtrongeſt and moſt expenſive Manner; while with Difficulty he expends ſmall Sums on other Forts. That although he has 10,000 Sepoys kept by you for him, he has 12 Battalions of 1000 Sepoys each, 7 Regiments of Horſe, and near 1000 Artillery, and 500 Topaſſes.

APPENDIX, N° 46.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 132. *Copy of a Letter to the Nabob, dated 7th Auguſt 1778.*

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

I BEG Leave to encloſe you Two Letters from the Commanding Officer at Palamcotah, relative to the Mutiny of the 3d Regiment of your Cavalry for Want of Pay; and the Inſolence and Cruelty with which they have treated the European Officers, who ſtill remain under Confinement in a very alarming Situation. A ſlight Peruſal of theſe Letters, with the Experience you have lately had of ſimilar Behaviour in other Regiments of your Cavalry, will ſet before your Eyes, in a much ſtronger Light than I can do, the alarming Conſequence of ſuch Proceedings at any Time, but particularly at this Period, when all our Efforts are required to maintain the Peace and Security of the Country, and when our Enemies are ſeeking every Occaſion to diſtreſs and perplex our Affairs; nothing ſurely can afford them more juſt Cauſe of Exultation than to ſee the Carnatic thrown into Confuſion by your Highneſs's own Troops, and to obſerve the Company's Forces employed in reducing theſe Troops to Obedience, inſtead of acting in Conjunction with them for the Protection of the Country.

It were Waſte of Argument to prove to your Highneſs, ſince Experience hath already ſhewn it ſo forcibly, that mutinous Troops are Enemies of the very worſt Sort, ſince they have it in their Power to execute, almoſt in an Inſtant, whatever Miſchief they intend, and there is no Guard or Security againſt them. Another Truth, equally conſonant to Reaſon, is, that Troops that have once mutinied are never afterwards to be truſted. The ſtricteſt Diſcipline will not enſure their Obedience; when they have gained their Point by Violence, they feel their own Strength, and will take Advantage of it upon every future Occaſion of Diſguſt, however trivial.

What I mean to infer from this preſent Repreſentation to your Highneſs is, that there is an abſolute Neceſſity for diſcharging the Regiment that has mutinied without Loſs of Time, and that the reſt of your Troops ſhould either be paid regularly, or totally diſbanded, otherwiſe the Carnatic will be in more Danger from them than all your Enemies together. Let me entreat your Highneſs to conſider ſeriouſly the Conſequence of theſe mutinous Proceedings, now that our Troops are chiefly collected in one Place to act againſt Pondicherry, and whilſt Two of your Regiments are actually ſerving with the Army; if ſome Means be not immediately taken to eſtabliſh them on a better Footing, I ſhall earneſtly recommend it to you, to diſband the Whole, and truſt entirely to the Company for the Protection of your Country, which will be much ſafer, and leſs expenſive to you than the preſent Mode. I beg your Highneſs will ſend me an Anſwer to this Letter immediately, as I want to write to Captain Barrington at Pallamcotah, in reply to his Letters concerning the Mutiny.

I remain your Highneſs's, &c.

N° 181. *Copy of a Letter to the Nabob, dated 1ſt December 1778.*

I have the Honour to encloſe your Highneſs a Copy of a Letter from the Officers of the 2d Regiment of your Cavalry to the Select Committee; adviſing, That the Men of that Regiment have mutinied for want of Pay, and put them (the Officers) in ſtrict Confinement, where they now remain in the greateſt Danger. This Mutiny in all its Circumſtances, is ſo like what hath already happened in various Parts of the Carnatic, that it were needleſs for me again to repeat the Sentiments I have ſo often expreſſed to your Highneſs on this Subject. I muſt, however, freely declare to you, that it is a Matter of no leſs Concern than Aſtoniſhment to me, that your Highneſs ſhould ſuffer an Evil of this great Magnitude to encreaſe daily, and take no Meaſures whatever to ſtop its Progreſs. The Danger is now become ſo alarming to the Peace of the Country, and threatens ſuch violent Conſequences to the Lives of many innocent Men, that if ſome Remedy be not inſtantly applied by your Highneſs, the Company will be obliged to interfere ſome Way or other, to prevent the Danger from approaching too near their own Door; for it is impoſſible in the preſent Situation of Affairs, to foreſee to what Extremity it may proceed. If your Highneſs will, notwithſtanding the Experience you have had, ſuffer your Troops to be Twelve and Eighteen Months in Arrear, can any Thing elſe be expected from them, but what you ſee daily happen? Men who are anxious of doing their Duty, and deſerving well from your Highneſs, will never ſuffer themſelves to be famiſhed while they

they have Arms in their Hands, and are in a Condition to procure themſelves Relief. Indeed, when I conſider the Extremities to which ſome of your Regiments have been driven for want of Pay, I am amazed they have acted with ſuch Moderation, as they have appeared to have done in ſeveral Inſtances. There are no Troops perhaps in any Part of the World, that would in the like Circumſtances have carried their Patience to ſuch a Degree of Forbearance; but there are, indeed, no other Troops that have ever been put to ſuch ſevere Trials. In a political View, theſe Proceedings tend ſo much to diſturb the Peace of the Country, and to invite Foreign Powers to inſult us, that the moſt particular Care ſhould have been taken to guard againſt them, eſpecially at a Time when we are employing our Endeavours to ſecure the Tranquillity of the Carnatic, from the Dangers of the only forcible Power that can invade it, and have already ſucceeded ſo far as to eſtabliſh it beyond the Reach of that Power, if we do but make a proper Uſe of our Succeſs. From all theſe Conſiderations, which are very important, I muſt again repeat the Requeſt I have often made to your Highneſs, either that you will put your Cavalry at once under the Company's Orders, aſſigning a ſufficient Revenue for their Support, or that you will provide yourſelf for their Maintenance, ſo as to make them faithful and uſeful to you in Time of Need; or, laſtly, if that be impracticable, that you will diſcharge them all together from the Footing they are at preſent: Their apparent Strength is real Weakneſs, and inſtead of protecting your Country, or becoming formidable to your Enemies, they may prove more dangerous to you than any other will you can have to combat with.

Before I conclude this Letter, I beg Leave to call your Attention to the Situation of the Officers of the 2d Regiment, who are now confined, and to requeſt you will take the expedient Meaſures for obtaining their Releaſe.

ACCOUNT

APPENDIX, N° 47.

ACCOUNT of Ordnance and Military Stores sent to Fort Saint George in the undermentioned Years, viz.

Years.	Ordnance.												Military Stores.								Amount.	
	Brass Guns.			Brass Mortars.			Brass Howitzers.			Iron Guns.			Muſquets, Carbines, and Fuzees, with Bayonets, and Blunderbuſſes.	Piſtols.	Swords, Hangers, and Cutlaſſes.	Iron Shot.			Iron Shells.			Prime Coſt of Sundries for the Uſe of the Military.	Total Prime Coſt.
		cwt.	qrs. lb.		cwt.	qrs. lb.		cwt.	qrs. lb.		cwt.	qrs. lb.					cwt.	qrs. lb.		cwt.	qrs. lb.		
1775.	4	12	— 20	—	—	— —	—	—	— —	—	—	— —	12,160	960	2,300	14,074	472	— 7	40	28	— —	£. 10,253	£. 29,360
1776.	6	42	— 26	8	16	3 18	2	4	1 20	—	—	— —	15,990	2,040	2,550	10,000	262	1 8	—	—	— —	15,186	39,453
1777.	60	224	2 2	2	20	2 20	5	15	— 8	39	1,522	2 7	12,250	2,000	1,500	9,000	313	— 18	3,191	421	1 13	6,580	30,110
1778.	32	91	3 6	—	—	— —	1	2	1 5	54	1,528	— 16	5,520	—	500	1,000	106	— 18	—	—	— —	9,279	19,412
1779	4	20	1 16	—	—	— —	2	8	2 13	18	849	1 9	13,080	—	—	61,790	8,347	3 17	17,671	4,558	1 3	10,532	40,706
	106	391	— 24	10	37	2 10	10	30	1 18	111	3,900	— 4	59,000	5,000	6,850	95,864	9,501	2 12	20,902	5,007	2 16	£. 51,848	£. 159,041

East India House, the 5th May 1781.

Errors excepted,
Sam. Nicoll, Accountant.

APPENDIX, N° 147.

An ACCOUNT or RETURN of Arms, Ordnance, and Military Stores at Fort Saint George the 31st January 1780.

							N°
Iron Ordnance.							
English.	42 Pr	—	—	—	—	—	1
	32	—	—	—	—	—	5
	18	—	—	—	—	—	18
	12	—	—	—	—	—	18
	9 short	—	—	—	—	—	4
	6	—	—	—	—	—	3
	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
	½ short	—	—	—	—	—	2
Foreign.	20 Pr	—	—	—	—	—	23
	14	—	—	—	—	—	9
	9	—	—	—	—	—	6
	8	—	—	—	—	—	8
	7	—	—	—	—	—	18
	5	—	—	—	—	—	7
Brass Ordnance.							
English.	12 Pr, short	—	—	—	—	—	11
	9	—	—	—	—	—	1
	6, short	—	—	—	—	—	20
	6, long	—	—	—	—	—	2
	3, short	—	—	—	—	—	58
Foreign.	32 Pr	—	—	—	—	—	1
	28	—	—	—	—	—	1
	18	—	—	—	—	—	1
	5½	—	—	—	—	—	1
	5 Swivels	—	—	—	—	—	1
	2, short	—	—	—	—	—	1
	8 oz.	—	—	—	—	—	1
	4 Do	—	—	—	—	—	2
Mortars.							
Brass Mortars. English.	13 Inch	—	—	—	—	—	1
	10	—	—	—	—	—	1
	8	—	—	—	—	—	8
	7	—	—	—	—	—	1
	5½	—	—	—	—	—	8
	4½	—	—	—	—	—	16
	4	—	—	—	—	—	5
	3½	—	—	—	—	—	1
	Hand Grenades	—	—	—	—	—	3
Brass Mortars. Foreign.	13 Inch	—	—	—	—	—	6
	10	—	—	—	—	—	1
	8½	—	—	—	—	—	2
	7½	—	—	—	—	—	1
	6¾	—	—	—	—	—	1
	4½	—	—	—	—	—	6
	4⅛	—	—	—	—	—	3
	4	—	—	—	—	—	1
	3¾	—	—	—	—	—	1
	2	—	—	—	—	—	1
Iron Mortars, Foreign.	15 Inch	—	—	—	—	—	1
	13	—	—	—	—	—	1
	6½	—	—	—	—	—	1
Brass Howitzers, English.	5½ Inch	—	—	—	—	—	2
	4½	—	—	—	—	—	4
Iron Howitzers, English.	8 Inch	—	—	—	—	—	1
	7	—	—	—	—	—	1
Petards — —	8 Inch	—	—	—	—	—	1
	6	—	—	—	—	—	1

East India House, the 5th May 1781.

Shot and Shells.

		N°
Round Shot.	46 Pr	85
	42	3,721
	40	1
	32	13,910
	30	5
	28	1,696
	26	4,600
	24	7,873
	22	42
	20	2,864
	18	25,754
	17	347
	16	7
	15	19
	14	1,618
	13	58
	11	520
	10	535
	9	23,694
	8	925
	7	8,947
	6	4,464
	5½	21
	5	476
	4½	1,387
	3	34,019
	2½	3,113
	2	2,992
Round Shot fixed to Bottoms.	3 Por	3,077
	2	12
Empty Shells.	13 Inch	1,989
	10¼ D°	91
	10 D°	469
	9¾ D°	1,491
	9½ D°	306
	8½ D°	1
	8 D°	2,414
	7½ D°	107
	7¼ D°	51
	7 D°	112
	6¾ D°	3
	6½ D°	216
	6⅛ D°	33
	5¾ D°	30
	5½ D°	845
	5¼ D°	1
	4½ D°	2,413
	4¼ D°	1,803
	4 D°	1,287
	3¾ D°	3,010
	3½ D°	1,207
	3¼ D°	945
	2¾ D°	325
	2½ D°	10
Shells fixed to Bottoms.	5½ Inch	123
	4½ D°	204
Grape Shot Quilted.	32 Pounders	6
	20 D°	180
	8 D°	38
	6 D°	30
	4 D°	201
	3 D°	1,184
	2 D°	141
	1 D°	6
	8 Inch	63
	5½ D°	83

Th

APPENDIX, N° 47.

		N°
Tin Case Grape.		
6 Pounders	—	8
2 D°	—	5
Iron Balls for Grape	Cwt. 285 : 2 : 9	
Double-headed Shot	— 2050	
Lead Shot	Can^{s} 19 : 2 : 20	
Carcaſſes, empty.		
13 Inch oblong	—	37
9 D° round	—	20
Gunners Stores.		
Rattan Buckets	—	11
Lead Aprons	—	38
Linſtocks	—	268
Powder Horns	—	28
Buff Slings for D°	—	243
Elevating Screws	—	110
Canvas Pouches	—	36
Tanned Hides	—	2
Copper Salting Boxes	—	46
Powder Cloth	—	31
Copper Clouts	—	28
Mortar Baſkets, 13 Inch	—	105
Match Grenadiers	Sk^{s} —	98
Worſted for Quick Match	lb. —	194
Country	Sk^{s} —	3261
Gunners Utenſils.		
Mortar Spunges, 13 Inch	—	1
10 D°	—	10
8 D°	—	18
5½ D°	—	19
4½ D°	—	14
Howitzer Spunges 5½	—	19
4½	—	2
Spunges with Rammerheads.		
42 Pounders	—	2
32 D°	—	9
24 D°	—	121
20 D°	—	60
18 D°	—	54
12 D°	—	52
4 D°	—	2
3 D°	—	31
1 D°	—	6
Long Hand Spikes	—	22
Spunge Staves, Europe	—	162
Country	—	9
Reliefs	—	2
D° with Staves	—	6
Gun Searchers, Braſs-mounted		12
D° Iron-mounted	—	5
Scrapers with Staves	—	15
Wadhooks	—	59
D° with Staves	—	4
D° with Staves and Ramheads	—	2
Copper Ladles.		
32 Pounders	—	7
24 D°	—	24
18 D°	—	20
12 D°	—	47
9 D°	—	40

Gunners Utenſils.

		N°
Copper Ladles		
6	Pounders,	26
3	D°	61
1	D°	5
Copper Ladles with Wadhooks		
32	Pounders	6
28	D°	2
26	D°	1
20	D°	19
16	D°	2
14	D°	4
8	D°	1
5½	D°	2
3½	D°	3
3	D°	12
2½	D°	2
2	D°	1
1	D°	7
Copper Ladles with Staves.		
18	Pounders	1
12	D°	6
6	D°	2
Copper Powder Meaſures		29
D° large		Sets 11
D° Small		Sets 4
Braſs Shot Gauges		Sets 6 and 28
Braſs Shell Gauges		Sets 3 and 8
Iron Shot Gauges		12
Iron Shell Gauges		7
Copper Funnels		16
Steel Bitts		594
Priming Irons		338
Fiſh with Staves		4
Fiſhes		18
Spring Spikes		51
Steel Spikes		220
Reliefs		36
Spunge Heads.		
42	Pounders	8
32	D°	19
24	D°	19
18	D°	49
12	D°	81
9	D°	122
6	D°	54
4	D°	21
3	D°	38
2½	D°	11
2	D°	57
Rammer Heads.		
42	Pounders	4
32	D°	36
24	D°	15
18	D°	42
12	D°	101
9	D°	165
6	D°	65
5½	D°	1
4½	D°	15
4	D°	14
3	D°	17
2	D°	34
1	D°	24

			N°
Gunners Utenſils.			
Rammer Heads.			
8 Inch	—	—	1
5½ D°	—	—	25
Tompions.			
32 Pounders	—	—	37
24 D°	—	—	178
18 D°	—	—	141
12 D°	—	—	145
9 D°	—	—	40
7 D°	—	—	1
6 D°	—	—	49
3 D°	—	—	22
2½ D°	—	—	2
2 D°	—	—	16
1½ D°	—	—	7
8 Inch	—	—	18
5½ D°	—	—	13
Neceſſaries for the Powder Houſe.			
Braſs Mortar for beating Powder	—	—	3
Copper Boiler with Cock	—	—	1
Steel Punches	—	—	42
Copper Salt-Petre Pans	—	—	9
Canvas Bags for Powder Barrels	—	—	539
Brimſtone	—	Cwt.	74 : 1 : 12½
Braſs Wire-work for Sieves	—	Feet	192½
Braſs Wire Sieves, double Bottoms	—	—	76
Ditto ſingle Ditto	—	—	55
Hair Duſters	—	—	53
Lawn Sieves	—	Sets	4
Hair Sieves	—	D°	8
Leather Sieves	—	—	3
D°	—	Sets	4
Lawn Sieves	—	—	13
Materials for the Powder Mills.			
Iron Stove Pan, 1 Pr.	—	Cwt.	27 : 1 : 24
Cooling Pans, 8	—	D°	7 : 1 : 16
Iron Pots	—	—	1
Braſs Pots	—	—	12
Braſs Boxes for Powder Mill	—	—	31
Braſs Crows	—	—	4
Buſhel Meaſure	—	—	1
Iron Crow large, 1 Pr.	—	Cwt.	2 : 1 : 0
Iron Crampion, Trivet, Bars and Staples	—		3 : 0 : 21
Firelocks.			
Pocket Piſtols	—	Prs.	6
Braſs Barrel Piſtols	—	—	5
Iron Piſtols	—	—	2903
Fuzees	—	—	18
Fowling Pieces	—	—	18
Iron Blunderbuſſes	—	—	82
Braſs Blunderbuſſes	—	—	26
Muſkets with ſcrew Barrels	—	—	8
Cups for Grenade Pieces	—	—	30
Carbines with Ribs	—	—	6948
Carbines with Ribs, new, Pungle Conſtruction		—	106
Carbines with Ribs different Bore, repaired		—	160
Carbine rifled Barrels	—	—	1
Muſkets of Sorts	—	—	11
Muſkets 2d Sort,	—	—	52
Short Muſkets	—	—	1430
Long Muſkets	—	—	1247
French Muſkets, with Bayonets	—	—	116
Trading Gun	—	—	1
D° with Bayonets, Pungle's Conſtruction	—	—	199

	N°
Firelocks continued.	
Buccaneer Pieces	169
D° fine long	21
Long Guns	2
Short Muſkets with Bayonets	4695
Muſkets with Spring Bayonets, new, 2d Sort	5225
Muſkets with Spring Bayonets, ſhort, Pungle's Conſtruction	199
Carbines with Bayonets, for Artillery	2533
Muſkets with Spring Bayonets, new Conſtruction, 2d Sort	1802
Small Arms.	
Bayonets	3615
Hand Bayonets	63
Country Swords	80
Braſs Hilted Swords, French	3066
Halberts	161
Eſpontoons	166
Braſs Hilts for Swords	78
Braſs Hilted Swords for Serjeants	90
Braſs Hilted Swords for Huſſars	17
Braſs Baſket Swords	76
Sword Blades	2086
Ditto ſmall	120
Hanger Blades	22
Braſs Hilted Hangers	20
Iron Baſket Swords	4472
Armoury Stores.	
Europe ſingle Cartridge Pouches	2210
Country double D° D°	4643
Bulgar double Muſket Cartridge Pouches	31
Europe double Grenadier Pouches with Braſs Dawning Boxes	300
Europe double Muſket Cartridge Boxes	868
Europe ſingle Carbine D°	431
Europe double Carbine D°	3146
Country double Carbine D°	366
Buff Shoulder Belts for Artillery	114
Buff Shoulder Belts	3228
Europe Leather Sword Belts	24
Buff Waiſt Belts	111
Buff Sword Belts	40
Buff Bandeliers with Swivels	2241
Bulgar Bandeliers with D°	1
Europe Leather Waiſt Belts	747
Country Leather D°	917
Shoulder Belts, Country	3595
Europe Muſket Slings	2704
Country D°	2934
Swivels for Bandeliers	96
Braſs Dawning Boxes	100
Huſſar Pouches	41
Sword Scabbards	1679
Bayonet Belts	425
Lock Caſes	6278
Bayonet Scabbards, Country	4528
Country Slings for Pouches	87
Piſtol Stocks	288
Buckets for Carbines	24
Cotton Shoulder Belts	15
Cotton Pouch Belts	142
Country Cartridge Paper	Qrs. 28489
Muſkets Stocks	620
Cotton Laſh for Belts	Cubits 349
Carbine Pouches, Country	8
Armoury Petty Stores.	
Flints	300062
Hammers	20965

Armoury Petty Stores continued.		N°
Pickers		12664
Screw Worms		25263
Steel Ramrods		4831
Braſs Guards		2147
Braſs Heel Plates		1318
Braſs Loops		522
Braſs Caps for Piſtols		120
Old Braſs Work for Muſkets	lb.	203
Wooden Ramrods		10

Neceſſaries for the Armoury.		
Standing Vices		24
Bench Vices		3
Beak Irons		2
Rubbers		158
Files		52
Screw-Plates		41
Bellows for proving Shells		1
Cocoanut Oil	Meaſures	87
Taps for Screw-plates		138
Scowrers		209
Anvils		5
Hand Vices		5
Iron Steddy		1

Neceſſaries for the Gun Room.		
Portfire Sticks		192
Marking Irons		19
Tin-plates		447
Canvas Shoes	Pr	624
Pincers for Fuzees	Pr	128
Ditto for Tubes	Pr	13
Machine for pointing Cannon at Night	Set	1
Braſs common Quadrants		4
Braſs Spirit Quadrants		6
Braſs Compaſſes	Pr	1
Braſs Pocket Callipers		2
Braſs Callipers, large		6
Spirit Perpendiculars		4
Iron Shell Scrapers		21
Wax Candles	Md	8 : 6¾
Lamb Black	lb.	6
Braſs Scale		1
Sheet Copper	Md	16 : 15
Muſcovia Lights		4
Claw Hammers		6

Pioneers Stores.		
Mamoties		1146
Breaſt-plates		30
Head-pieces		18
Pole-axes		257
Helves for Axes		114
Iron Crow-feet	Cwt.	29:1:18
Handles for Marmoties		74
Felling Ax		1

Coopers Tools.		
Braſs Drivers		15
Adzes		17
Vices		20
Grinding Stone		1

Drums and Appertenances.		
Braces, Europe		146
Country		1040
Hoops, Batten, Europe		11

		N°
Drums and Appurteuances continued.		
Hoops, Batten, Country		131
Lining Europe		107
Country		126
Fleſh, Country		336
Fifes, Country		398
Sticks	Pr	39
Braſs Drums, Europe		28
Country		36
Braſs, Fife Caſes, D°		7
Drum Slings		6
Snares, Europe		49
Country		269
Heads Europe		86
Country		72
Buntin for Colours.		
Red Buntin	Yds	773
Blue D°	Yds	594¾
White D°	Yds	76½
Blue Bettilas	Ps	7½
Gun Flags		2
General Stores.		
Scythes		279
Hand Jacks		8
Braſs Pentagrapher		1
Wax Cloth	Pieces	20
Ticken	Yards	3457½
Gunny Bags		150
Double Yokes		968
Gunny Carriage Bags for Powder Barrels		697
D° for Shot		2673
Park Pickets		46
Single Yokes		21
Mortar Carts		10
Tumbrils		36
Cattamaran Timbers		40
Mantelets		5
Scaling Ladders		2
Tents and Tarpaulins		
Large Tarpaulins		107
Timbril D°		14
Gun D°		30
Small D°		30
Field Officers Tents		7
Officers Tents		21
Private Tents		24
D° for 21 Men		1
Bell Tents		58
Field Officers Inner Tents		9
Walls for D°		7
Officers Inner Tents		46
Walls for D°	Sets	23½
Fly for Officers Tent		1
Neceſſary Tent		1
Laboratory Tent		1
Quarter Maſters Stores		
Melting Ladle		1
Dipping D°		6
Canteens		52
Copper Diſhes		6
Copper Shot Sieves		3
Reels		1
Iron Mould for Round Shot	Pr	10
Braſs Ditto for Muſquet Balls		14

Quarter

			N°
Quarter Maſter's Stores continued.			
Braſs Mould for Grape			1
Iron D° — D°			5
Braſs D° — Carbine			16
D° — Piſtol			7
Iron D° — Muſquet			23
D° — Carbine			4
D° — French			66
Knapſacks	—		10
Handcuffs	—	Pr	32
Garriſon Stores.			
Trail Carriages,	32 Pdr		1
	20		3
	18		14
	1		6
Field Carriages.	24 Pdr		12
	18		11
	12		8
	6		6
	3		15
	8 Inch		5
	$4\frac{1}{2}$		4
Truck Carriages,	18 Pdr		20
Gin Blocks -	Pr		2
Wooden Horſes			329
Sentry Boxes			88
Wheelbarrows			13
Iron Trucks			382
Iron Work for Carriages, new		Cwt.	31:2: 0
D° — D° old			9:1:15$\frac{1}{4}$
Braſs Spaniſh Arms			1
Wooden Cheeks			1
Mortar Beds, $4\frac{1}{2}$ Inch			2
Horſe Furniture.			
Country Boots		Pr	42$\frac{1}{2}$
Leather Holſters			14
Heel Leather			10
Holſter Pipes		Pr	10$\frac{1}{2}$
Rains			9
Stirrup Leathers		Pr	9
Curry Combs			2
Scales and Weights.			
Iron Weights	5	Pr Cwt	2:2: 0
Braſs D° —	3		1:1:22
Stilliards		Prs	3
Large Steel Beams			3
Braſs Scales without Beams		Pr	1
Poil Weights		Sets	3
Trlangles		Prs	2
Braſs Scales, ſmall		Pr	3
Copper D° with Weights		Sets	9
Copper Scales			1
Laboratory Stores.			
Tin Tube Boxes			168
Havreſacks			15
Iron Bottoms for Grape			2286
Engine for Fuzees			7
Empty Tin Tubes			512
D° Copper D°			11516
Braſs Rocket Moulds			6
Braſs Portfire D°			7
Roſin		Cwt	3 : 1 : 9
Turpentine			1 : 3 : 23$\frac{1}{4}$

						N°
Laboratory Stores continued.						
Boudge Barrels	—	—	—	—	—	15
Laboratory Tables	—	—	—	—	—	6
D° Cheſts	—	—	—	—	—	2
Blue Lights	—	—	—	—	—	104
Forming Tables	—	—	—	—	—	6
Benches	—	—	—	—	—	12
Portfire Paper	—	—	—	—	Q^rs	2683
Portfires	—	—	—	—	—	526
Lock Work for Muſkets.						
Hammers	—	—	—	—	—	283
Cock Pins	—	—	—	—	—	649
Cocks of Sorts	—	—	—	—	—	5173
Pans	—	—	—	—	—	754
Tumblers	—	—	—	—	—	201
Hammers and Shear Springs	—	—	—	—	—	4867
Muſket Locks	—	—	—	—	—	1995
D° French	—	—	—	—	—	565
French Fuzee Locks	—	—	—	—	—	20
French Piſtol D°	—	—	—	—	—	119
Old Lock Works	—	—	—	—	Cwt	40 : 0 : 25
Fixed Ammunition.						
Tubes filled Copper	—	—	—	—	—	3267
Live Fuzees, 13 Inch	—	—	—	—	—	1241
10 D°	—	—	—	—	—	1148
8 D°	—	—	—	—	—	768
7 D°	—	—	—	—	—	1126
4½ D°	—	—	—	—	—	3503
Hand Grenades	—	—	—	—	—	2730
Round Shot fixed, 3 P^dr	—	—	—	—	—	1220
2 D°	—	—	—	—	—	78
Grape Shot fixed, 12 D°	—	—	—	—	—	11
3 D°	—	—	—	—	—	148
Tin Caſe Grape fixed, 2 D°	—	—	—	—	—	4
Cartridges, filled.						
Cloth Cartridges, 42 P^dr	—	—	—	—	—	4
32 D°	—	—	—	—	—	80
24 D°	—	—	—	—	—	147
18 D°	—	—	—	—	—	140
12 D°	—	—	—	—	—	247
9 D°	—	—	—	—	—	391
6 D°	—	—	—	—	—	699
6 D°, with Wads	—	—	—	—	—	270
Flannel Cartridges, 12 D°	—	—	—	—	—	39
6 D°	—	—	—	—	—	125
5½ D°	—	—	—	—	—	42
Cartridges, empty.						
Flannel Cartridges, 12 P^dr	—	—	—	—	—	163
9 D°	—	—	—	—	—	200
3 D°	—	—	—	—	—	2772
Cloth Cartridges, 32 D°	—	—	—	—	—	20
28 D°	—	—	—	—	—	150
26 D°	—	—	—	—	—	1000
24 D°	—	—	—	—	—	8948
20 D°	—	—	—	—	—	1
18 D°	—	—	—	—	—	6806
14 D°	—	—	—	—	—	12
12 D°	—	—	—	—	—	602
6 D°	—	—	—	—	—	2853
5½ D°	—	—	—	—	—	1000
5¼ D°	—	—	—	—	—	500
5 D°	—	—	—	—	—	317

		N°
Cartridges, empty.		
Cloth Cartridges,	4½ Pdr	54
— —	4 D°	1243
	3½ D°	250
	3 D°	3900
— —	2½ D°	88
— —	1½ D°	198
— —	1 D°	790
— —	8 Inch	42
— —	5½ D°	7
	4½ D°	209
Musket Ammunition.		
Carbine Ball Cartridges		7540
Blunt Cartridges		12375
— —		
Director of the Laboratory.		
Meal Powder		lb. 385
Rockets, 2 Pound		10
Fuzees, empty, 4½ Inch		7515
Fire Ball Cases 8 Inch		302
5½ D°		1699
— 4½ D°		52
Tin-Man's Shears		Pr. 1
Canvas Aprons		396
Mealing Blocks		4
Ammunition Boxes		28
Shot Boxes		15
Empty Leagers		22
Cutting Tables		2
Rocket Frame		1
Salt Petre Spadles		8
Copper Skimmer		1
Mealing Tables		2
— —		
Bottoms for round Shot.		
— — 12	Pdr	92
— — 9	D°	864
— — 6	D°	1167
— — 4	D°	421
— 3	D°	562
— — 2½	D°	881
— — 2	D°	733
— —		
Bottoms for Grape Shot.		
— — 42	Pdr	29
— — 32	D°	107
— — 24	D°	251
— — 18	D°	162
— — 12	D°	59
9	D°	459
6	D°	658
— — 4	D°	886
— — 3	D°	684
— — 2	D°	962
8	Inch	2
— — 5½	D°	239
4½	D°	180
Bottoms for Shells.		
— 5½	Inch	200
— — 4½	D°	359
— —		
Bottoms for Hen and Chickens.		
13 Inch		29
10 D°		139
—		
Fire Ball Formers.		
8 Inch		8
7 D°		1
5½ D°		18
4½ D°		2

Director

APPENDIX, N° 47.

Director of the Laboratory continued		N°
Bottoms for Tin Case Grape		
2½ Pounders		657
Spindles for Grape		
24 Pounders		4
9 D°		31
3 D°		210
5½ Inch		17
4½ D°		152
Wooden Setters		
13 Inch		8
10 D°		72
8 D°		94
7 D°		1
5½ D°		289
4½ D°		25
For Hand Grenades		4
Wooden Drivers		
13 Inch		33
10 D°		32
9 D°		14
8 D°		53
7 D°		17
5½ D°		102
4½ D°		17
For Hand Grenades		25
Salt Petre refined	lb.	450
Sulphur refined	lb.	189
Compoſition Boxes		18
Compoſition Ladles		71
Port fire Drifts		12
Fuzees D°		197
Driving Blocks		2
Fuze Blocks		8
Wooden Numbers		40
Cutting Knives		12
Iron Squares		2
Braſs Setters		4
Rocket Rammers		5
Drawing Knives		3
Copper Chiſſels		5
Iron D°		4
Iron Gauges for Drifts		1
Iron Punches for Shells		3
Triangle for Pendulum		1
Rolling Boards		18
Paper Cylinders		
5½ Inch		495
4½ D°		525
3 Pounders		3068
Formers for Canon and Howitzer Carriages		52
Cylinder Formers		
12 Pounders		2
9 D°		3
6 D°		2
4½ D°		1
3 D°		3
2 D°		2
1½ D°		1
1 D°		1
5½ D°		2
4½ D°		2

Director of the Laboratory continued.

		N°
Tin Cafes empty		
9	Pounders	125
4	D°	200
3	D°	33
5½	Inch	84
Canvas Bags for Grape.		
42	Pounders	10
32	D°	15
24	D°	26
6	D°	248
Vitry Bags for Grape.		
3	Pounders	131
Sundry Stores.		
Sledge Hammers		3
Iron Calliper Compaſſes	Pr.	1
Hand Saws		7
Wooden Wad Gauges		13
Tin Water Pots		11
Bullock Collars		25
Gun Scrapers		100
Drawing Knives for ſcraping Guns		6
Iron Hammers for cleaning Guns		4
Range Pickets		26
Spun Yarn	Rolls	178
Sinnett	Balls	172½
Wads, of Sorts		6,712
Coir Nets for Wads		63
Wooden Shot Gauges		26
Wood Frames for Spunges		8
D° for Hand Spikes		4
Double Yokes with Traces		26
Drag Ropes	Sets	81
Wooden Buckets		10
Leather Buckets		77
Auguſs		7
Chaulking Irons		12
Wooden Fids		12
Rope Collars for Cannon and Tumbrils		23
Marline Spikes		31
Chairs		5
Deſks		4
Gunters Scales		2
Braſs Gauges for Muſkets, &c.		1
Mills for glazing Powder		2
Provet		1
Iron Pitch Kettles		2
Traces, Europe		36
Wooden Shell Gauges		15
Unſerviceable Stores.		
Iron Guns.		
Engliſh, 32	Pounder	3
24	D°	4
12	D°	5
9	D°	3
6	D°	8
Foreign 28	D°	2
24	D°	2
20	D°	1
18	D°	2
9	D°	2
6	D°	1

APPENDIX, N° 47.

Unserviceable Stores continued.

				N°
Brass Guns.				
English	12	Pounder		1
	6	D°		4
	4½	D°		1
Foreign	22	D°		1
	20	D°		1
	6	D°		1
	3	D°		1
Brass Mortars.				
English	13	Inch		1
	4	D°		1
Foreign	2	D°		1
Iron Mortar, Foreign,	13	Inch		4
Mill Stone				12
Ship Carriages.				
	24	Pounders		27
	12	D°		16
	6	D°		3
Trail Carriages.				
	12	Pounders		2
	9	D°		4
Field Carriages.				
	24	Pounders		2
	18	D°		2
	9	D°		2
	6	D°		3
Mortar Beds.				
	13	Inch		3
	10	D°		2
	8	D°		6
	5½	D°		2
Gin				1
Park Pickets				7
Single Yokes				29
Double Yokes				349

Errors excepted.

(Signed) B. Scottney,
M. Storekeeper.

East India House,
22d June 1781.

John Annis,
Auditor of India Accounts.

APPENDIX, N° 47.

ACCOUNT Remains of Provisions and Stores belonging to the Honourable Company, under the Charge of the Garrison Storekeeper, to the 31st December 1779.

	Garce.	Merculls.
Paddy	383	180 1/16
Rice	247	90
Wheat, Surat	343	
	Maunds.	
Biscuit	9	
	Candy.	
Lamp Oil	8 : 13 :	3
		lb.
Ghee		15 1/2
Garrison Stores.		
Ropes		8,000
Matts		7,450
Rattan Baskets		1,430
Common D°		6,470
Straw	Bundles	16,957 1/4
Firewood		2,460,148
Pots and Pans		27,687
Materials for weighing.		
Iron Beam		1
Scales and Weights	Sets	2
Provisions.		Tierces.
Salt Beef, Europe		57
D° Pork		22
Vinegar	Half-Hogsheads	10
Batavia Arrack	Leaguers 132 1/6 and	12 1/2 Gallons.
	Candy.	Md. lb.
Sugar	35 :	18 : 9
Live Stock, not particularized, amounting to Pagodas		9,736
Dead Stock.		
Copper Pot		1
Jars		81
Teak Horses		83
Palmyras		2,466
Teak Joists		1
Tarpaulins		4
		Cand
Red Wood		4

Fort Saint George,
31st December 1779.

(Signed)
C. B. Dent,
Garrison Storekeeper.

Memo^m.

There are not any Accounts received of Arms, Ordnance, and Military Stores, in the different Garrisons in the Carnatic.

The above Accounts are formed as near as possible to the Order of the Honourable Committee.

East India House,
25th June 1781.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accts.

APPENDIX, N° 48.

Copy of the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 22d, and 23d Articles, of the Capitulation for the Surrender of Pondicherry; dated 17th October 1778.

Article 12th.

The Fortifications and public Buildings in Pondicherry, ſhall in noways be deſtroyed, until Inſtructions are received from Europe.

Article 12eme.

Les Fortifications, le Gouvernement, les Magazins, et autres Edifices appartenans au Roi, ſeront conſervés dans leur Etat actuel dont il ſera dreſſé, par L'Ingenieur en Chef de cette Place, Procés verbal conjointement avec les Commiſſionaires de S. M. B. et il n'y ſera fait aucune Degradation.

Article 13th.

Granted, as long as they behave with Propriety, and do not endeavour to make Converts from amongſt the People profeſſing the Proteſtant Religion.

Article 13eme.

Le libre Exerciſe de la Religion Catholique Apoſtolique et Romaine, ſera conſervé en entiere, les Egliſes ſeront reſpectées, les Eccleſiaſtiques et Religieux ſeront maintenus dans la pleine Joüiſſance de leurs Maiſons, et toutes leurs autres Proprietés, et Priviléges des Sauvegardes ſeront données à cet Effet principalement au Privet Apoſtolique; à fin qu'il puiſſe exercer ſans Crainte et avec Decence les Fonctions de ſon Etats; les Miſſionaires auront la Liberté d'aller d'un Lieu à un autre, pour continuer leurs reſpectables Fonctions, et ils recevront ſous le Pavillon Anglais la même Protection dont ils jouiſſaient ſous le Pavillon Français; et l'on aura ſurtout pour Mr. l'Evêque de Rabraca actuellement à Pondicherry, tous les Egards qu'il mérite par ſa Piété, plus encore que par ſa Dignité.

Article 14th.

Such of the Inhabitants who chuſe to remain in Pondicherry, and who have not been mentioned in the foregoing Articles, will, on taking the Oaths of Allegiance to his Britannic Majeſty, be allowed to trade under the Protection of the Britiſh Flag; the private Property of all Perſons now in Pondicherry will be ſecured to them; ſuch as chuſe to diſpoſe of their Property will be permitted to do it, Arms and warlike Stores excepted. Granted, with reſpect to the Veſſel called the Briſſon, if ſhe is proved to be private Property of the Merchants now in Pondicherry, but liable to Inſpection with reſpect to her Cargo, before ſhe ſails from the Road of Pondicherry.

Article 14eme.

Les Officiers Militaires et Civils, les Habitans, les Negociants, et toutes autres Perſonnes quelconques, tant Europiennes qu' Indiennes, et de toute autre Nation, actuellement dans Pondicherry et Dependances, comme auſſi les Abſens dont les Affaires ſont gerées par des Procureurs, conſerveront, avec la Liberté de leurs Perſonnes, l'entiére et paiſible Propriété et Poſſeſſion de leur Bien, meubles et immeubles, Merchandiſes, et autres Effets; même leurs Vaiſſeaux; comme auſſi l'Exerciſe de leurs Créances et Contracts, tant à Pondicherry, que dans tels Comptoir ou Manufacture que ce ſoit, ils pourront les garder ou en diſpoſer, envers les Français comme envers les Anglais, et les converter en Effets d'Exportation, qu'ils auront la Liberté d'envoyer ſoit à l'Iſle de France, ſoit dans des Ports neutres dans le Cours de Quinze Mois qui ſuivront le preſent, ſans être ſoumis à aucun Droit. Les Negociants auxquels le Vaiſſeau le Briſſon appartient pourront l'éxpedier pour l'Iſle de France, en Parlementaire avec les Paſſagers et Merchandiſes, qu'ils voudront y embarquer; les Paſſeports néceſſaires ſeront accordés à cet Effet.

Article

Article 15th.

Granted, except to the Military Officers, who must go with their Corps; but they may leave Power of Attorney to Perſons to act for them.

Article 16th.

Anſwered in the foregoing Article.

Article 22d.

Granted.

Article 23d.

Granted.

Article 15eme.

Les Sujets François, que leurs Affaires ou la Situation de leur Fortune retiendront à Pondicherry, auront la Liberté d'y reſter? Ils n'y ſeront moleſtés en aucune Façon: Ils y jouiront de la même Protection qui eſt accordée aux Sujets de S. M. B. et il leur ſera permis dans tous les tems de ſe tranſporter où bon leur ſemblera.

Article 16eme.

Les Militaires dont les Affaires exigent la Preſence à Pondicherry pourront y reſter, après toute fois qu'ils auront obtenu la Permiſſion de Monſieur de Bellecombe, et dans ce Cas ils participeront à toute la Faveur de l'Article précédente.

Article 22eme.

Les Sujets François, Européens ou Indiens, qui reſteront dans les Places ou Poſſeſſions Françoiſes ou Anglaiſes, n'auront rien à demeler avec les Indiens, et le Gouvernement Anglais les garantira de toutes Vexations et Prétenſions de leur Part en leur accordant la même Protection qu' aux Sujets de S. M. B.

Article 23eme.

Les Sepayes et autres Indiens, de quelque Caſte ou Religion qu'ils ſoient, qui auront été ſous le Pavillon Français, ne pourront être récherchés ni inquiétés en leurs Biens, ou en leurs Perſonnes, pour Cauſe de leurs Services, et de leur Attachement envers la Nation Françaiſe: Le Gouvernement Anglais les prendra même ſous ſa Protection dans le Cas ou ils ſeraient perſecutés par quelque Puiſſance Aſiatique.

APPENDIX, N° 49, and Laſt.

Copy of a Tranſlation of Two Paroles, incloſed in a Letter from Colonel Brathwaite.

I WHO have hereunto ſigned my Name, declare, that ſince the Surrender of Pondicherry to the Engliſh, I have held no Correſpondence whatever, either directly or indirectly, with Hyder Ally Cawn himſelf, or with any other Perſon either European or others, in his Service, or employed by him; nor have I, by any other Means whatever, been acceſſary to the preſent Diſturbances in the Carnatic, by the Invaſion of the ſaid Hyder, as is reported, allied with the Officers and Troops of the French Nation: And I hereby promiſe to perſevere in the ſame Conduct, that is to ſay, that I will hold no Correſpondence, either directly or indirectly, with the Enemies of the Britiſh Nation now in India, to the Diſadvantage of the ſaid Britiſh Nation, but that I will conduct myſelf in every Reſpect during my Abode in India, ſo as to give no Offence either by my Converſation, Correſpondence, or Behaviour to the Engliſh Governtment: This I promiſe of my own free Will and with Pleaſure, conſidering it as a Duty incumbent on me in my preſent Situation. In Witneſs whereof I have ſigned my Name hereunto.

Pondicherry, this 7th Day of Auguſt 1780.

(Signed) Piveron de Mortat.

APPENDIX, N° 49.

I, who have hereunto ſigned my Name, declare, on my Honour, that I have never, in any Inſtance, intentionally ſhewn any Contempt of the Honourable Governor and Committee of Madras, or for their Orders, or entertained any Doubt of the Authority of the Engliſh Government over Pondicherry, as was ſpecified in the laſt Capitulation. I alſo declare, on my Honour, that ſince the Surrender of Pondicherry to the Engliſh, I have never held any Correſpondence, either directly or indirectly, with Hyder Ally Cawn himſelf, or any Perſons, Europeans or others, in his Service, or employed by him; nor have I been, in any Reſpect, acceſſary to the preſent Diſturbances in the Carnatic by the Invaſion of the ſaid Hyder, as is reported, allied with the Officers and Troops of the French Nation: And I hereby promiſe to perſevere in the ſame Conduct, that is to ſay, that I will hold no Correſpondence, either directly or indirectly, with the Enemies of the Britiſh Nation now in India, to the Diſadvantage of the ſaid Britiſh Nation, but that I will conduct myſelf in every Reſpect during my Abode in India, in ſuch Manner as to give no Offence to the Engliſh Government either by my Converſation, Correſpondence, or Behaviour; And this I promiſe of my own free Will and Pleaſure, as a Duty incumbent on me in my preſent Situation. In Witneſs whereof I have hereunto ſigned my Name.

Pondicherry,
this 7th Day of Auguſt 1780.

(Signed) L. Caſanove.

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